In a patriarchal country like Russia with “traditional” values endorsed by the official Kremlin propaganda, the first organized group[i] to confront the government after Putin’s declaration of the invasion of Ukraine was paradoxically comprised of feminists. Within 24 hours, they mobilized to form the Feminist Anti-War Resistance (FAR). For an embarrassingly long time, they were the only structured initiative to unite anti-war activists, provide legal help to dissidents, collect donations for Ukraine, and debunk the Kremlin’s misinformation campaign. FAR has no hierarchy, no headquarters, no official leadership, and no big sponsors. Feminists in Russia have been The Russian authorities have persecuted, arrested, imprisoned, assaulted, and pushed feminists out of the country in response to their women’s and LGBTQI+ rights protection initiatives, shelters, legislative efforts against domestic violence, and educational programs. When the war escalated, they had the resources for grassroots horizontal mobilization, which was very efficient and difficult to track and catch. I talked to several activists. Some of them stay in Moscow, some remain in Russian ethnic regions, now fighting not only for women’s rights but also for ethnic minorities, and others escaped to other countries, from where they coordinate information, advocacy, legal and humanitarian aid. In this paper, based on my respondents’ unique experiences, I look into the dynamics of the Russian feminist-based anti-war movement, its methods, struggles, and insights. Together with a historical analysis of the country’s feminism evolution, I seek to delve into the roots and perspective of so-far the most structured anti-war movement in Russia.
“War means violence, poverty, forced migration, broken lives, insecurity, and the vanishing of the future. It opposes the whole essence of the feminist movement… War exacerbates gender inequality and can set back years of advancements in terms of human rights”.[ii] This was a fragment from the manifesto published by the newly organized Russia’s Feminist Anti-War Resistance (FAR) a day after President Putin declared the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. They were the first to respond in a structured manner, and to begin coordinated resistance action against the war. Unexpectedly, women positioned themselves at the forefront of anti-war activism in an environment controlled by a patriarchal vertical governmental system built on security services, repression, and Vladimir Putin’s hyper-masculine image[iii] as the father of the nation.
Within the framework of feminist sociology, looking into the entwinement of gender scholarship and power studies (see Chafetz[iv] or Hesse-Biber[v]), patriarchal cultures are seen as the ones that force women into rigid social roles and limit their access to certain occupations, and particularly those related to politics or big money, which prevents them from assuming political leadership positions. Despite active participation in economic and social life, Russian women have been largely excluded from formal political decision-making. In 2021 the Russian Federation ranked 133 in the Political Empowerment sub-index in the Global Gender Gap report. This sub-index assesses the share of women in parliament, in ministerial positions, and in positions of head of the state, and Russia has dropped almost 20 points in this ranking since 2008[vi]. Despite widespread misconceptions in patriarchal countries about women’s lack of participation in political activism and broader disinterest in politics, Russian women have steadily increased their involvement in political action. In 2012 during some of the largest pro-democratic protests in modern Russia, women constituted 27% of participants. Ten years later, 31% of the people detained at a demonstration against the imprisonment of renowned opposition figure Alexei Navalny were women. Less than a year after, during the protests following an increase in Russian troop mobilization on September 21 and 24, 2022, women made up 51% and 71% respectively of the detainees at anti-war protests.[vii]
In this paper, I examine the dynamics of the expanding feminist movement in Russia, their motivation, protest methods, and techniques in reaction to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the increased involvement of women from different socioeconomic groups who have avoided political participation in the past.
Russian feminism was born over two hundred years ago[viii] and by the 1917 Russian Revolution, the emancipation of Russian women reached remarkable results. Official Soviet rhetoric proclaimed progressive principles of equality between men and women in all spheres of life, from education to political participation. The Soviet Union was the first modern nation in the world to legalize abortion in 1920. The government introduced expansive labor rights and protection for women and children and provided support for working mothers. However, during the Stalinist era the feminist agenda was completely silenced, as Stalin himself claimed that “woman’s question” had been resolved and shut down women’s organizations.[ix]
Although the Communist government suppressed human rights, Russian women retained their economic and social rights as much as possible under totalitarian rule. The limited political participation that existed was largely dominated by men. Nevertheless, women persisted in trying to shape the political agenda. Throughout the entire 20th century, women, and especially mothers, were the driving force of anti-war movements, starting from the First World War. In February 1917 (old Orthodox calendar style), which later became March 8, International Women’s Day, thousands of women in Petrograd (now St. Petersburg) went on strike to protest food shortages and the continuation of the war. This strike quickly spread to other cities and factories, and soon became a major political movement. The demonstrations and strikes by women and workers, known as the February Revolution, eventually led to the collapse of the Tsarist government and the end of the war.[x] Russian women also actively demanded an end to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which led to some of them being persecuted, arrested, and forced out of the country.[xi] This tradition continued in modern Russia with the rise of soldiers’ mothers’ committees during the Chechen wars. The committees were formed in 1989 following the illegal military recruitment of thousands of university students, who were soon returned home due to persistent pressure from organized women’s groups on local and federal authorities. In the following years, various committees’ suggestions were integrated into the country’s legislative system. During the wars in Chechnya, mothers organized anti-war marches, picketing, al-Russian petitions to stop the intervention, met top military officials, as well as many other activities.
However, in public discussion and the media, the post-Soviet feminist agenda remained limited. For a long time, feminists were practically invisible to the government and to the larger part of society. Anna,[xii] who remembers attending feminist events in the early 1990s and has continued her activism for decades, explains that “at that time the government and other political actors were too busy, building the new order. When Putin came to power, we started to see gradually the rise of conservatism and traditionalism, but feminists were not targeted that much. I guess, it is due to the inner sexism of our political forces and the police – they just don’t perceive us as a threat or a competition. Maybe they saw other “pro-Western” groups as more dangerous – like, the LGBT community or human rights organizations.” This approach from the government allowed feminist groups some space and a certain level of freedom in their operations for several years, as they worked under the radar. Apart from this, Putin’s masculinity cult might have played its role. As the Russian President has been promoting his image of a tough leader in the framework of “remasculinizing”[xiii] Russia at home and abroad,[xiv] I tend to share the opinion of the interviewees that Putin’s government underestimated women as political force.
However, in recent years various civic initiatives linked to female activism were targeted by the authorities. The regime closed shelters for victims of domestic violence, searched homes of women’s rights activists for extremist charges, and declared feminist organizations “foreign agents”. In 2022, feminists launching the anti-war campaign inevitably became targets for the police.
For many female activists, it is important to stay anonymous and to protest without disclosing their identity. As women are traditionally responsible for taking care of children, elder parents, or relatives with health issues, taking action that can possibly lead to legal repercussions have consequences that extend to their families. One-third of families in Russia are led by single mothers,[xv] and women who are the main breadwinners[xvi] for their extended family cannot afford to lose their only source of income or risk losing child custody. Once under the attention of security services, women experience enormous pressure as they are often threatened with deprivation of parental rights and sending children to an orphanage.
Although legally in Russia a mother of a young child cannot be detained for over three hours, from the very beginning of the war the police made it clear that arresting a mother or even a child is no longer a taboo. On a single day on March 6 at least 113 minors were arrested.[xvii] I connected with a family who had a similar experience – both parents were arrested at separate protests, and the mother was arrested together with her children, ages 11 and under, after they laid flowers at the Embassy of Ukraine. This family is now safe, but they had to flee from the country and move abroad, experiencing the hardship of migrating with children under emergency conditions. Understandably, many women are not ready to risk their children’s well-being but at the same time, they cannot stay silent about the war atrocities in the neighboring country. Hence, they are searching for options to protest and find support in feminist initiatives and groups.
Personal is Political
Living under dictatorship for decades during Soviet rule and later under the growing pressure of Putin’s authoritarian “siloviki” (security forces) governance, Russians are allergic to collective action. Massive demonstrations often remind anti-government forces of soviet-era forced mobilization, which is still a huge historic trauma for entire generations. What is more, Putin’s authorities have successfully instrumentalized political indifference, social isolation, the atmosphere of general distrust, and the credibility gap (perceived discrepancy between statements or actions) for decades. Under these conditions, it is extremely challenging to build a structured social movement, particularly given that a month before the invasion the generally recognized leader of the opposition, Alexei Navalny, was arrested as he returned from Germany, where he had been recovering from an attempted assassination.
However, it turned out that Russia’s feminist movement did not need a formal opposition leader for operations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, feminist and women’s initiatives have been building support not on the basis of political participation, but rather around the common ground of fighting for women’s rights in the economic and social domain. Hundreds of NGOs, initiatives, and groups have emerged in recent years to tackle specific issues such as domestic violence, reproductive rights, abortion, support for mothers and children, sexual, financial, and psychological abuse. Joining online and offline disputes on body image, sexualization in the media, unrealistic beauty standards, dysmorphia, and the pay gap led women to political discussions over unequal representation, police brutality, a misfunctioning justice system, and corrupt legislative bodies.[xviii] They transformed their vision according to the well-known slogan of Carol Hanisch, “the personal is political,”[xix] and they utilized their interest in areas that were mostly regarded in the Russian context as non-political.
Activists that for years were fighting for human rights under Putin’s authoritarian regime gained experience in protest campaigns, solidarity practices, dealing with legal issues, and facing police persecution. They trained themselves in civil action and mastered the courage to confront the government machine. They built reliable networks that could be swiftly mobilized after President Putin declared the invasion.
Marina has been an activist against domestic violence for over ten years in one of the regional centers. In her practice, she had to stand up to police oppression, corruption, and injustice all the time and was unafraid of arrests or fines. After reading the news in the opposition media about the atrocities toward women in Ukraine, she was appalled. Since the invasion in February 2022, there were multiple reports about Ukrainian women experiencing displacement, loss of loved ones, sexual violence and other forms of gender-based violence, lack of access to healthcare and other essential services.[xx] “It was all too familiar, too close to me, something that I have seen for years. I work every day with women who were abused, raped, kidnapped, or humiliated by men, and I just could not remain silent. I knew already that Russia’s feminists organized a resistance, so I looked into their initiatives and joined as an independent activist.” Marina printed out anti-war leaflets designed by the FAR and spread them in the city center and her neighborhood. Together with other activists she also installed stands with information on the death toll caused by the Russian army in the neighboring country. When it became clear that the war would not be over by the beginning of the winter of 2022, she launched a donation campaign for power generators to help Ukrainians get through the cold season. Marina successfully used her previous experience in social activism and practice in confronting the government and represents one of thousands of similar cases across Russia and abroad.
Marina’s experience is an example of how the movement has been dispersed, decentralized, and horizontal, which makes it so hard for the authorities to neutralize it. It is made up of thousands of individuals or small groups acting independently and without the guidance or a recognized leader, whose death or incarceration could demoralize or paralyze the movement. The FAR is organized in local “cells”, on the basis of the individual capacity of every faction, without a rigid plan or schedule. On the one hand, it prohibits organizing massive demonstrations and lacks personalized political representation, but on the other hand this makes it extremely challenging for the hierarchical and centralized Kremlin security apparatus to hunt down and silence them.
How to Protest in a Dictatorship
Ksenia currently resides in South Korea. Before leaving Russia, she took an active part in the pro-democracy movement, participated in anti-government protests, and supported the opposition. She was following well-known Russian feminists on social media, and as a result, she learned about the FAR project fairly quickly. “At some point, the FAR published a post with detailed instructions on how to create a cell in your city or your country. I saw it as a sign.” Ksenia established a South Korean branch of the FAR . In September 2022, Ksenia’s parents, still in Russia, were visited by armed military soldiers and security forces officials, who intimidated her mother because of Ksenia’s activism. Nevertheless, Ksenia claims that she is not afraid. Police in Russia targeted hundreds of activists to intimidate and demoralize those who have taken part in anti-corruption or pro-democratic protests or donated to Navalny’s team. These actions did not stop the emergence of anti-war protests, symbolic actions, solo picketing, and information campaigns. As discussed earlier, the horizontal and decentralized structure of the FAR protects it from destruction. “We are completely autonomous in our actions, we can join an initiative if it works for us, or we can launch our own and invite others to participate,” Ksenia says.
The FAR coordinated protests in hundreds of cities in Russia and abroad to boost visibility and let the opponents of Putin’s regime know that they are not alone. Performance became a prominent form of non-violent protest. Women In Black, the international initiative, launched pickets and marches across the globe, from Moscow to New York. Participants were encouraged to wear all black as a sign of remorse and a white flower, a commemoration to the “White Rose”, a non-violent, intellectual opposition group during the Nazi rule in Germany. Sometimes there were “mutes”, women dressed like widows who cried and mourned the death of people in Ukraine in public places, like metro stations.
Among the most eye-catching activities have been the display of crosses and fake “graves” in public areas as a tribute for civilians who perished in the conflict. Another art infiltration tactic utilized has been public installations in the shape of blood-stained toys or baby crawlers in honor of the children, who died during the Ukrainian war.[xxi] These tactics are relatively safe for those who perform them due to ease of anonymity, but are efficient in eroding the Kremlin’s discourse of overwhelming and active support to what it calls a “special military operation”. For years Putin’s regime was relying on several major ideas – stability, peace, security, and social order, which was in high demand in Russian society due to the deep trauma of the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.[xxii] Therefore, admitting to the public that Putin started the war would be a political suicide. It disrupts the indifference of those who passively support the government and raises the spirit of those who are against it.
The information war is probably the most important field of action for all anti-war citizens. The Kremlin propaganda machine can operate in full force when there is an almost total information blockade, with social media platforms banned, independent media dismantled, and non-government websites taken down. Maria, who joined the FAR in the summer of 2022, shared the struggles of staying in contact with family members who fell under the influence of propaganda. “I am the only one in the family who was born in Russia, all my relatives, including my mother, are from Ukraine, and they support the invasion. My mom watches TV and she is very much pro-Putin, although she is an intelligent and well-educated woman.” Maria used to be someone who preferred to stay out of politics for a long time, isolate herself from the news, and focus on her personal life and career. This changed when her daughter volunteered at 18 years old to become an election observer with Navalny’s team. Gradually, Maria became interested with the help of her daughter, and eventually, after the February 24 invasion declaration, Maria realized that she simply could not stay silent and inactive. She stated that she wished she had gotten involved sooner, but she had not anticipated that the lack of participation would turn catastrophic. Those in Maria’s daughter’s generation are more technologically intelligent and can find a way to bypass social media bans or search for independent sources of information. However, older people have fewer digital competencies and no resources to delve into them and ease access to independent information. Under these conditions it is crucial to spread information about the war, the real number of casualties, the scale of repression, and anti-war initiatives. These information tactics gained popularity in many Russian cities.
The FAR has designed leaflets, postcards, and municipal announcements that mimic pro-governmental or administrative information while providing up-to-date information about the invasion. For instance, they disseminated papers that look like missing person posters with information about soldiers killed in the warfare in Ukraine.[xxiii] That is how they specifically target indifferent social groups or the elder generation who are the major supporters of the invasion of Ukraine. As Marina explains, “Many older women do not want to get involved in politics, because they understand how dangerous it can be. They are exhausted by the worsening living conditions and daily struggles, so if we push our narrative on them, they’ll just go into their shell. We try to get through with the help of instruments that are familiar and comfortable for them.” One of the main initiatives turned out to be the newspaper, which imitates the freesheets distributed through mailboxes and press stands. The newspaper “Zhenskaya Pravda” [Women’s Truth] refers in its name to one of the main Soviet periodicals and together with articles on anti-war activists or politically-motivated arrests, it contains crossword, astrological reviews, and recipes. “You can easily bring this magazine to your mother or grandmother to break the propaganda information bubble”. The objective is to connect with elderly audiences who prefer printed news sources, are isolated from independent media, and probably were never interested in politics. It is fascinating and alarming at the same time to see how the anti-war movement in modern Russia, over 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is forced to bring back to life the long-forgotten tradition of so-called Samizdat (a method used by dissidents throughout the Eastern Bloc to duplicate restricted and censored publications).
Many feminist activists seek to stay anonymous, on the one hand, because Russian authorities now imprison people for speaking against the war and punish them for posts on social media, and on the other – because the regime encourages the far-right groups to hunt them down. “There is an entire network of “volunteers”, who belong to radical traditionalists and support the war and Putin’s regime in general”, explains Svetlana, who has been a feminist activist in Saint Petersburg for several years. “They deanonymize girls, leak their private data on social media, and start a witch hunt. Sometimes it stops at online bullying, sometimes they get your personal phone number and call you in the middle of the night with death and rape threats. The problem here is the same as with domestic violence – the system does not see anything wrong about abusing a woman who refuses to fit into a strict patriarchal pattern”. Understandably, for the sake of the security and safety of their families, many women preferred to stay out of open feminist activism. However, after the feminist movement became a loud anti-war voice, more women started to join it not to counter the injustice and violence towards them, but to protect their children, brothers, husbands, and fathers.
“I am not a Feminist, but…”
Russia’s feminist anti-war resistance has managed to mobilize women who do not identify as feminists. Feminism in Russia and in the region, in general, has been stigmatized and marginalized[xxiv]. A 2012 survey in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus revealed that both men and women typically disapprove of feminist action and that a significant section of society associated feminism with decay and “wrong” values. In this survey, just a few percent of Russians identified as feminists, while 17% strongly disagreed with feminist ideas. Ironically, 45% of the respondents who identified as female supported equality with men “in certain ways”. Only 3% of males said they sympathized with the feminist goal, and over 45% said they found it “disgusting.”[xxv] The dynamics have shifted recently, particularly as a result of the strong pro-democracy movement led by women in neighboring Belarus and the expanding social media presence of the feminist agenda, independent from the mainstream media. Nevertheless, it has been incredibly difficult to maintain the feminist identity in the face of such social pressure and strong public disapproval of the feminist “label.” Ideas of women’s empowerment are especially challenging to introduce in remote regions or areas with a large traditionalist population. For this reason, FAR has been actively collaborating with all female communities or groups who were willing to do so, without clinging to the notion of feminism.
Lisa, a feminist activist in Buryatia, a native republic in Russian Siberia, remembers that she encountered many traditionalist women, who used to be completely indifferent to politics but changed their minds after the war. “A lot of women leave comments on my page saying things like “I am not a feminist, like you, but I am a mother” or “I am a worried wife, I care about my husband”. They are lost and feel betrayed by the authorities, whom they used to see as a source of stability and protection for years. So, eventually, they come to us for guidance and vision, they want to know the truth, they need answers, and they don’t care anymore if they can obtain it from a “suspicious” pro-western feminist with green hair.” This shows the perspective of political engagement of broad female social groups, who used to be loyal to the government and could potentially have a stronger influence on it.
In a patriarchal and authoritarian country like modern Russia, where the government has been suppressing any form of civil solidarity and non-governmental collective action, the feminist agenda turned out to be too powerful to be silenced. Women, who have been fighting for their rights, security, and equality, ended up being the first social force that managed to mobilize large groups for the anti-war campaign. Through this civil combat they are gaining more political agency in Russia and continue to articulate their position on various socio-economic topics.
Russian women who escaped abroad also actively learn to speak for themselves and share their experiences with female activists from other authoritarian states such as Iran and China. Despite the different cultural and political contexts of these countries, women in each of these places have organized and protested against oppressive regimes, discriminatory laws, and violent conflicts. They have worked to promote democratic values and principles, such as free and fair elections, freedom of speech, and respect for human rights. And they have often faced similar challenges and obstacles, such as censorship, harassment, and violence, in their efforts to effect change. “We are forbidden to practice it in our countries, so here we realize how many instruments we have – from conferences to open letters, to performances, etc. Now we learn.” Russian women keep learning within the country’s borders and abroad. They have been creating networks and ties, key for political activism while fighting together against sexual harassment, domestic abuse, and discrimination. They have discovered a sense of community and solidarity in the defense against male aggression, an unfair labor market situation, or reproductive abuse, and have turned it into political empowerment. It is becoming increasingly clear that the ingrained patriarchal mentality in Russian politics has proven to be archaic, as the country’s anti-war opposition definitely has a female face. As they state in the Feminist Anti-War Manifesto: “Over the past 10 years, the feminist movement has been gaining huge media and cultural power, it’s time to turn it into political power. We are the opposition to war, patriarchy, authoritarianism, and militarism. We are the future and we will prevail.”
 Feminist Anti-War Resistance. (2022). Manifesto of the Feminist Anti-War Resistance. Retrieved from https://t.me/femagainstwar/4
[i] The Village. (2022, March 29). «Feministskoe antivoennoe soprotivlenie» — glavnoe protestnoe dvizhenie v Rossii sejchas. [“Feminist anti-war resistance” – the main protest movement in Russia now]. Retrieved from https://www.the-village.ru/city/opyt/fem-soprotivlenie
[ii] Feminist Anti-War Resistance. (2022). Manifesto of the Feminist Anti-War Resistance. Retrieved from https://t.me/femagainstwar/4
[iii] Sperling, V. (2016). Putin’s macho personality cult. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 49(1), 13–23. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48610430
[iv] Chafetz, J. S. (1988). Feminist Sociology: An Overview of Contemporary Theories. Itasca, IL, USA: P. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc.
[v] Hesse-Biber, S. N. And Yaiser, M. L., eds. (2004). Feminist Perspectives on Social Research. New York,
USA: Oxford University Press.
[vi] World Economic Forum. Global Gender Gap Report 2021. Retrieved from: https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2021.pdf?_gl=1*gjbcxw*_up*MQ..&gclid=Cj0KCQiAq5meBhCyARIsAJrtdr6LKfYnoJIZJQvuRNwVFYSgMDTTr5zgOgBNl22sYwDFzRCzWDPOMW8aApbUEALw_wcB
[vii] OVD-Info. (2022). Repressions in Russia in 2022. OVD-Info overview. Retrieved from https://english.ovdinfo.org/repressions-russia-2022#1
[viii] Yukina I.I. (2007). Russkij feminizm kak vyzov sovremennosti [Russian Feminism as the challenge to modernity].Spb: Aleteya.
[ix] Zdravomyslova E.A., Tyomkina A.A. (2003)ю Gosudarstvennoe konstruirovanie gendera v sovetskom obshchestveю [State construction of gender in Soviet society]. The Journal of Social Policy Science. № 3-4.
[x] Clements, B. E. (1981). Revolutionary Women in Russia, 1870-1917. Cambridge University Press.
[xi] Elkner, J. (2004). Dedovshchina and the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers under Gorbachev. The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies. Retrieved from https://journals.openedition.org/pipss/243
[xii] For confidentiality, the interviewee and all the following are using pseudonyms.
[xiii] Ryabova, T. B., & Ryabov, O. V. (2010). Nastoyashchiy muzhchina rossiyskoy politiki? (K voprosu o gendernom diskurse kak resurse vlasti) [The Real Men of Russian Politics? (On the Issue of Gender Discourse as a Resource of Power)]. The Polis Journal, 5, 48-63.
[xiv] Sperling, V. (2016). Putin’s macho personality cult. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 49(1), 13–23. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48610430
[xv] RIA Novosti. (2017, February 7). Pochti v tretyi rossiyskikh semey detey vospityvayut materi-odinoshki [13,5% of all families in Russia are single-parent families – Rosstat]. RIA Novosti. https://ria.ru/20170207/1487325545.html
[xvi] Federal State Statistics Service. (2020). Women and Men in Russia in 2020. Retrieved from https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/yhNtbedG/Wom-Man%202020.pdf
[xvii] HRW. (2022, March 9). Russia: Brutal Arrests and Torture, Ill-Treatment of Anti-War Protesters. Retrieved from Human Rights Watch : https://reliefweb.int/report/russian-federation/russia-brutal-arrests-and-torture-ill-treatment-anti-war-protesters
[xviii] Meduza. (2022, March 22). “Putinskaya Rossiya – zhivoy zakoldovannyy trup” Odnoy iz samykh zametnykh antivoenykh organizatsiy v Rossii stalo “Feministskoye soprotivleniye”. Vot ego istoriya. [“Putin’s Russia is a living enchanted corpse” One of the most prominent anti-war organizations in Russia is “Feminist Resistance.” Here is its story.]. Meduza. Retrieved from https://meduza.io/feature/2022/03/22/putinskaya-rossiya-zhivoy-zakoldovannyy-trup
[xix] Firestone, S., & Koedt, A. (Eds.). (1970). Notes from the second year: Women’s liberation. New York: Radical Feminism.
[xx] UN Women. (2022, March). In focus: War in Ukraine is a crisis for women and girls. UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/in-focus/2022/03/in-focus-war-in-ukraine-is-a-crisis-for-women-and-girls
[xxi] Proskurnina, O. (2022, June 17). «U nas dvizhenie napolovinu partizanskoe, podpol’noe». Kak rossijskie feministki sozdali samuyu deyatel’nuyu antivoennuyu organizaciyu v strane [“Our movement is half partisan, underground.” How Russian feminists created the most active anti-war organization in the country]. Republic. Retrieved from https://republic.ru/posts/104066
[xxii] Godzimirski, J.M. (2008). Putin and Post-Soviet Identity: Building Blocks and Buzz Words. Problems of Post-Communism, 55(5), 14-27.
[xxiii] Silina, M. (2021, August 5). Russia’s feminists are protesting the war and its propaganda with stickers, posters, performance and graffiti. The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/russias-feminists-are-protesting-the-war-and-its-propaganda-with-stickers-posters-performance-and-graffiti-179989
[xxiv] Ashwin, S. (2000). Gender, State and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia. London: Taylor & Francis.
[xxv]Center of Humanitarian Technologies. (2012). Issledovanie Fonda «Integraciya» i agentstva NewsEffector: otnoshenie k feminizmu zhitelej Rossii, Ukrainy i Belarusi. [Attitude to feminism of the residents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus]. Retrieved from https://gtmarket.ru/news/2012/08/17/4898
Image credit: Andrea Domeniconi / Alamy Stock Photo