ASIAN AMERICAN POLICY REVIEW

Volume V • 1995

COMMENTARY

WILL THE WELFARE DEBATE END CHILD POVERTY?
Congressman Robert T. Matsui

FEATURE ARTICLES

IMMIGRANT RIGHTS: A CHALLENGE TO ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN
Political Influence
Ignatius Bau

ASIAN AMERICAN ADMISSIONS TO AN ELITE UNIVERSITY:
A Multivariate Case Study of Harvard
Stephen S. Fugita and Marilyn Fernandez

WELFARE REFORM: EFFECTS ON THE LEGAL PERMANENT IMMIGRANT
Andrew Leong

ASIAN AMERICANS IN ENCLAVES - THEY ARE NOT ONE COMMUNITY:
Three Decades of Demographic Changes
Tom L. Ching

BOOK REVIEW

Reed Ueda’s, POSTWAR IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY
Ivan Light and Chong-Suk Han
The Asian American Policy Review is published annually by an editorial board of graduate students at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley.

Articles, interviews or reviews appearing in the Asian American Policy Review do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors, the sponsoring universities, or the members of the editorial board.

All rights reserved:
© 1995 Asian American Policy Review. Except as otherwise specified, no article or portion herein is to be reproduced or adapted to other works without the express consent of the authors or the editors of the Asian American Policy Review.

Subscriptions:
$28 per issue for libraries and other institutions; $12 for individuals. Back issues of Volumes II, III, and IV are also available at the same prices.

Donations:
Donations in support of the Asian American Policy Review are tax-deductible as a non-profit gift under the John F. Kennedy School of Government’s IRS 501(c)(3) status. Grants and other contributory assistance should specify intent for use by the Asian American Policy Review in order to facilitate accounting.

Mailings and Communications:
For all inquiries regarding call for papers, advertising, and subscriptions, please write to:

Asian American Policy Review
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Phone: (617) 495-1311
Fax: (617) 496-9027

ISSN# 1062-1830
Volume V
The Immigrant Experience
Spring, 1995

John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

Graduate School of Public Policy
University of California at Berkeley
EXECUTIVE ADVISORY BOARD

Patricia Akiyama
Press Secretary
U.S. Senator Patty Murray

The Honorable March Fong Eu*
Ambassador to Micronesia
U.S. Department of State

Dennis Hayashi
Director, Office of Civil Rights
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Henry Y. Hwang
President
Far East National Bank

Dr. HeSung Chun Koh
East Rock Institute

Sharon Maeda
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

The Honorable Robert Matsui*
Congressman
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Norman Mineta*
Congressman
U.S. House of Representatives

Irene Natividad
Principal
Natividad & Associates

William Tamayo
Attorney
Asian Law Caucus

Chang-Lin Tien*
Chancellor
University of California, Berkeley

Chantale Wong**
Office of the Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Grant Ujifusa*
Founding Editor
Almanac of American Politics

S.B. Woo*
Professor
University of Delaware

Benjamin Wu
Legislative Assistant
Office of U.S. Congresswoman Constance Morella

Teddy Zee
Executive Vice-President
Columbia Pictures

ACADEMIC ADVISORY BOARD

Diana Eck
Professor
Harvard University

Peter Kiang
Professor
University of Massachusetts, Boston

Elaine Kim
Professor
University of California at Berkeley

Lee C. Lee*
Professor
Cornell University

Robert Lee*
Professor
Brown University

Don Nakanishi*
Professor
University of California, Los Angeles

William Ouchi
Professor
University of California, Los Angeles

Ronald Takaki*
Professor
University of California, Berkeley

Elizabeth Ahn Toupin**
Dean Emeritus
Tufts University

Ling-Chi Wang
Professor
University of California, Berkeley

Paul Watanabe
Professor
University of Massachusetts, Boston

* Founding Board Member
** Board Chair
EDITORIAL BOARD

Co-Editor
Bonaparte Liu

Publications Editor
Jeanne Shen

Board Relations Director
Sapna Gupta

Production Director
Karthik Chandramouli

KSSG Liason
Malee Tobias

Co-Editor
Linda Yueh

Finance Director
Grace Kim

Fundraising Director
Edward Lee

Marketing Director
Jordan Matsudaira

Berkeley Editor
James Toma

Staff

John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

Pei-Chi Chang
Wing Sze Cheng
Linda Cheu
Deborah Chien
Tammi Chun
Andy Huang
Heidie Joo
Ashok Parameswaran
Sam Kim
Warren Mar
Dean Matsubayashi
Genevieve Siri
Julie Song
Angie Wei
Lai-Wan Wong
Sung Un Yoo

Graduate School of Public Policy
University of California at Berkeley

Michael Kobori
Mona Nakashima
Larry D. Natividad
Ferdinand Ramos
Devara Rodriguez
Alisa Tanaka
Patty Tung
Pat Vinh
CONTRIBUTORS

Institutional

Anheuser-Busch Companies

Asian American Studies Department
University of California at Berkeley

Center for the Study of Social Change
University of California at Berkeley

Graduate School of Public Policy
University of California at Berkeley

Kennedy School Student Government
Harvard University

Individual

Dr. Paula Y. Bagasao
The Chien Family
Joy Dahlgren
Henry Y. Hwang
Kate Howard
Katsuji Imata
Tongkun Kim
Kevin Kosher
Carol Lazzarotto
Edwin Lau
Cecilia Leong
Imelda Mehlert
Gloria Megino Ochoa
Sharon Maeda
Mona Nakashima
Neal Taniguchi
Helen Tirsell
Garrett Toy
Chantale Wong
Walter Wong
S.B. Woo
Contents

Asian American Policy Review
Volume V

Introduction
Editors' Note ................................................................. 1

Commentary
Will The Welfare Debate End Child Poverty? .......................... 3
Congressman Robert T. Matsui

Feature Articles
Immigrant Rights: A Challenge to Asian Pacific American Political Influence ............................................. 7
Ignatius Bau

Asian American Admissions to an Elite University:
A Multivariate Case Study of Harvard .................................. 45
Stephen S. Fugita and Marilyn Fernandez

Welfare Reform: Effects on the Legal Permanent Immigrant ................................................................. 63
Andrew Leong

Asian Americans in Enclaves - They Are Not One Community
Three Decades of Demographic Changes .................................. 78
Tom L. Chung

Book Review
Reed Ueda's Postwar Immigrant America: A Social History ................................................................. 95
Ivan Light and Chong-Suk Han
Immigrants and immigration, both legal and illegal, have recently been the focus of national debates, from the appropriate response towards illegal immigration to access to basic services for legal immigrants. Accordingly, the Asian American Policy Review is pleased to release this latest volume addressing the impact of public policy on the immigrant experience.

In continuing with the tradition of the Asian American Policy Review, this volume spans a range of issues, in hopes of injecting thoughtful analysis and debate on this pertinent and timely subject. The articles touch upon legislative responses, rights to social services, demographic changes, and educational access with an emphasis on their impact on Asian American immigrant communities. This collection of articles focuses on the effects of public policy on this nation's immigrants, instead of solely on immigration policy. We hope this volume will generate more thoughtful public discourse and ensure that the needs of Asian Americans are taken into consideration in policy formulation.

This issue would not have been possible without the support of numerous individuals and organizations. First, we have benefited greatly from the active involvement of the Executive and the Academic Advisory Boards and from the leadership of the Chairs, Liz Toupin and Chantale Wong. Second, this volume has been generously supported by the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the Kennedy School Student Government at Harvard University, and the Graduate School of Public Policy, the Asian American Studies Department, and the Center for the Study of Social Change at the University of California at Berkeley. We would also like to thank members of the Kennedy School administration for their continuous support: Pete Zimmerman, Marge Lucker and Carmen Foster. Finally, we want to thank our tremendous staffs, both here at the Kennedy School of Government and at the Graduate School of Public Policy.

On behalf of the members of the Asian American Policy Review, we hope that this volume will serve as a useful reference for policy makers, advocates, academics, and students, in thinking about the impact of public policies on communities of Asian American immigrants.
Will the Welfare Debate End Child Poverty?
Congressman Robert T. Matsui

There's been a lot of talk about reforming the welfare system. Let's try to cut through the rhetoric and discuss what's really at stake in this debate.

A recent report shows that decades of falling wages, broken families, and dwindling government aid have left our nation with more children in poverty than at any time since 1964. More than 20 percent of the children in the United States are destitute.

Despite these appalling figures, no one is arguing against welfare reform. The current system must be changed to move recipients from assistance to independence and to ensure that taxpayers get a fair return on their investment.

Yet, the Republican Contract with America welfare proposal being debated in the Congress is not designed to make the system work. Rather, its purpose is to punish those who have been betrayed by the failures of the current welfare system.

The independent Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimates that more than five million children would be denied welfare benefits if the Republican bill were in effect today. All of us would like to see the number of children receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) cut in half, but the approach of abandonment espoused by the Republicans in the House of Representatives is not the answer.

The proper response is to create a system that helps people help themselves. By providing education and training, and by imposing strict requirements so that those who receive AFDC give something back, we can break the cycle of dependency.

In 1993, federal spending for AFDC was about $14 billion, approximately the same amount the federal government spent on farm price supports. The United States of America is the richest country in the world,
Will the Welfare Debate End Child Poverty?

yet we have more child poverty than virtually all other developed nations. Can we, with a clear conscience, cut back further on federally-supported welfare, food stamps, and school lunch programs?

The Republican Contract with America must be examined with these questions in mind: Will it reduce child poverty? Will it put an end to childhood hunger? Will it protect children from homelessness? I believe the answer to all these questions is a resounding “no.”

The impact of the proposal embodied in the Contract with America will be felt by all Americans, not just single mothers on AFDC. In an effort to squeeze savings from social service programs, the Republicans propose denying federal benefits to legal immigrants.

Under the Contract with America, the list of programs that would be denied those who enter this country legally is long, and would include AFDC, food stamps, supplemental security income, Medicaid, and a host of other health programs. This prohibition belies the fact that, on balance, immigrants do not come to the United States to receive welfare benefits.

A federal government survey of newly legalized immigrants found that 94 percent came to the United States for increased economic opportunities, 62 percent said they wanted to join relatives in the United States, and a smaller proportion immigrated to this country for personal safety or political reasons.

According to a recent study by the Urban Institute, immigrants pay more than $70 billion in taxes in this country. These taxes more than offset the estimated $5.7 billion legal immigrants use in welfare benefits when they fall on difficult times.

The most recent ethnicity-based information on welfare recipients is provided by the March 1994 population survey by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The census documents the percentage of people that live in poverty and the percentage that receive AFDC by ethnic group.

Of native born Asian Americans, 11 percent live in poverty and 4 percent receive AFDC. The corresponding numbers for Caucasians show that, of native born Caucasians, 10 percent live in poverty and 3 percent receive AFDC.

The percentage of African Americans and Hispanics living in poverty is much higher than that of Asian Americans or Caucasians, as is the corresponding percentages for those on AFDC. For native born African Americans, the census shows that 34 percent live in poverty and 18 percent receive AFDC. The percentages for Hispanics show that 30 percent live in poverty and 14 percent receive AFDC.

These numbers demonstrate that a great many families in need, for whatever reasons,
do not request AFDC. What the figures don’t show is that a majority of the children on AFDC are in a family with an adult who works. In fact, two-thirds of poor children live in families with an adult who works. But working does not guarantee an escape from poverty because many of these jobs are low-wage positions and, to compound the difficulties faced by these families, wages have not kept pace with inflation for the last 20 years.

We all want to get to the root of the problems that most often lead to welfare — teenage pregnancies, broken homes, and a lack of job skills. To solve these problems, we must look for realistic and reasonable solutions.

Instead of helping families in need stay together and investing in their future, Republicans have proposed cutting aid for unmarried mothers under the age of 18 and their children. Republican leaders have said some of the money denied these families could be used to build orphanages or group homes in which to house children when their families can no longer support them. While this may seem a cost effective way to force families off of welfare, the idea is penny wise and pound foolish.

The average combined AFDC and food stamp benefit for a family of three is $661 per month. The average residential treatment facility for a child removed from her home costs about $100 per day, or $3,000 per month. And these are only the material costs. This does not even begin to estimate the human cost of warehousing children in an environment devoid of parental contact.

Preventing teen pregnancy means more than threatening young mothers with losing their children. As a society we must stop sending mixed messages to teens. We cannot continue to tell young women that they are doomed to a life in poverty if they give birth as teenagers and at the same time send young men the message that they have no responsibility for the children they father.

We must be serious about our commitment to enforce the nation’s child support laws. We must ensure that young men know that they are financially responsible for their children for the next 18 years.

It is unfortunate, but true, that divorce is a fact of life in our society. Rather than condemning children to poverty, we should make sure both parents understand that walking away from a marriage does not allow them to walk away from the responsi-
Will the Welfare Debate End Child Poverty?

Bibility of meeting their children’s basic needs. Parents must understand children are their charge and not an obligation that can be relegated to the government. However, when parents fail, we cannot levy the punishment on the children.

Government can make a real difference in reforming welfare by requiring job training and providing the skills to move recipients permanently off welfare. For a population that is largely uneducated, education and training can mean the difference between assistance and independence.

The welfare reform debate is really about one thing—responsibility. The responsibility of parents to take care of their children. This means parents must get an education, find a job, pay child support, and do whatever is necessary to improve the lives of their children. Should we expect more from parents who receive AFDC? Sure. But when we talk about individual responsibility, we must also address the federal government’s obligation to help families who fall on hard times. Eliminating funding for basic services across the board is not the way to move people out of poverty.

All the proposed reductions in spending on nutrition and other programs belie the fact that the Republican bill does have a price tag. Savings achieved by denying assistance to legal immigrants or teen parents would instead be spent to warehouse children in orphanages or group homes. American families must ask themselves this question: If they become unemployed and needed help to provide for their families, would they rather the federal government provide some assistance and help them find a new job or would they rather have their children in a government-run home until they are able to meet all of their children’s financial needs?

The debate over reforming the nation’s welfare system is far from over. Before we conclude it, we must come to terms with how the government’s mission is defined: Should we protect the neediest or leave them exposed to the elements.
Immigrant Rights: A Challenge to Asian Pacific American Political Influence

Ignatius Bau

Ignatius Bau examines Proposition 187, comparing voting patterns of Asian Americans versus other groups and campaign strategies against Proposition 187. Bau uses Proposition 187 to explore the capacity of Asian Pacific Americans communities to organize and respond at a national political level and the strategies for approaching immigrant rights issues and electoral politics in the future. This article was awarded the Anheuser-Busch Companies Asian American Policy Award, administered by the Asian American Policy Review, in best capturing the theme of this volume.

The recent passage of Proposition 187 by California voters is cause for alarm within Asian Pacific American communities and reflects the danger of their continuing political disenfranchisement in the United States. Immigrants’ rights issues are certain to remain one of the "hot-button" topics for the United States electorate up until the 1996 presidential election. How Asian Pacific Americans are able to organize and respond to these anti-immigrant measures will present one of the most difficult challenges yet to Asian Pacific American political influence.

Historical parallels between anti-immigrant sentiment that exists today and the anti-Asian sentiment in California during the late 1800’s are disturbing. Nineteenth century discrimination led to the formation of the Workingman’s Party and resulted in the passage of both the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1879 California Constitution. The Chinese Exclusion Act was the first racially-based immigration exclusion law, which impacted Asian immigration to the United States for several generations. The

Ignatius Bau is the Staff Attorney for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area. He also serves as the Chairperson of the Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights and Services and as Co-Chairperson of San Francisco Californians United Against Proposition 187.
Immigrant Rights

1879 constitution prohibited Asians from becoming United States citizens, from bearing witness in court, and from being employment by any California corporation. Subsequent legislation also denied Asians rights to marriage, public education, and land ownership. Today's calls for restrictions on immigrants' rights to employment, public education, and other public services obviously have historical echoes. The current challenge to Asian Pacific American communities is to prevent a recurrence of history.

This article uses the experiences of the campaign against Proposition 187 as a case study for measuring and analyzing the influence of the Asian Pacific American communities in electoral politics. The article seeks to apply some of the lessons from the California campaign to explore strategies for approaching immigrants' rights issues and electoral politics in the future.

Part I examines Proposition 187, including its content, impact, and general popularity. This section focuses on the responses of the Asian Pacific American communities in California and their participation in the campaigns against the ballot initiative. Finally, Part I explores the two principal campaign strategies employed against Proposition 187 and their connection to the broader debate about the effectiveness of specific electoral strategies.

Part II analyzes the voting results on Proposition 187, with a focus on votes by Asian Pacific Americans. The analysis includes an examination of the implications of the principal campaign strategies for community organizing and political participation.

Part III places the votes by Asian Pacific Americans in the context of other studies and analyses of Asian Pacific American voting patterns. This section also examines the capacity of Asian Pacific American communities to organize and respond at a national political level in the future.

Part IV of the article examines the future, describing how immigrants' rights issues are likely to continue to be a national political concern and how Asian Pacific American communities might influence the debates on those issues at various levels of policy-making. This section applies the assumptions and analyses of the parallel campaign strategies used in Proposition 187 to strategies for pursuing immigrants' rights issues and electoral politics in the future.

PART I: CALIFORNIA
PROPOSITION 187: A CASE STUDY
Background on Proposition 187

Proposition 187, or the so-called "Save Our State" initiative, was the culmination of three years of anti-immigrant sentiments in California. The anti-immigrant movement was largely fueled by Governor Pete Wilson.
For three years, Wilson blamed the state budget deficit on the costs imposed by immigrants on the state. In addition, over thirty-five bills restricting immigrants' rights were introduced in the California legislature between 1992 and 1994. In fact, the defeat of almost all these legislative measures led anti-immigrant forces in California to embrace the ballot initiative process.

Proposition 187 requires all California public school teachers, doctors, social workers and police to verify the immigration status of all persons, citizen and non-citizen alike, seeking public education, publicly-funded health and social services, and all persons arrested. If any individual is "reasonably suspected" of being in violation of federal immigration law, the public official is required to deny services and report the person to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for deportation. In addition, the initiative criminalizes the manufacturing, distributing, selling, or using false immigration documents.

If implemented, Proposition 187 will have a negative impact on California's children. All students at all California public schools and colleges and universities will be subject to the new verification requirements. Those children "suspected" of being undocumented will be reported to the INS for deportation and expelled from school after ninety days. Moreover, all K-12 students must turn in their parents or guardians; if any parent or guardian is suspected of being undocumented, that student will also be expelled. Finally, undocumented children will be denied foster care and child welfare services. Abused, neglected and abandoned children will be especially vulnerable to the denial of services.

Proposition 187 also will have a negative impact on California's public health. Persons who are "suspected" of being undocumented will be denied immunizations, health education, nursing care, and rehabilitation services. Undocumented pregnant women will be denied prenatal care. Rather than yielding savings, denial of such services will result in even greater long-term, acute and emergency care costs.

Under Proposition 187, all Californians, including U.S. citizens, will be required to carry documentation of their immigration status at all times, ostensibly because everyone has daily contact with schools, public
Immigrant Rights

health facilities, social services departments, and the police. The initiative will result in delays at public health facilities and social service departments while immigration documents are being checked. The millions of verifications required by Proposition 187 will bloat administrative costs to California taxpayers by up to $100 million a year. Finally, Californians who physically appear to be "foreign" or have "foreign-sounding" accents will be subject to greater suspicion and discrimination.

The nonpartisan California Legislative Analyst concluded that Proposition 187 actually may cost California up to $15 billion in federal education, health and social services funds because it violates federal privacy and eligibility laws. Any "savings" realized from denying the few services that undocumented immigrants now receive will be offset by the more than $15 billion that stands to be lost in total implementation costs.

A broad coalition of civil rights, health, education, women's, children's, seniors', law enforcement, environmental, business, labor, religious, and other groups opposed Proposition 187.

Every major California newspaper, from the Los Angeles Times to the Orange County Register to the San Francisco Chronicle to the San Diego Union-Tribune, editorialized against the initiative. Political figures from both major parties, from Democrats Kathleen Brown, Dianne Feinstein and President Clinton to Republicans Jack Kemp and William Bennett publicly opposed Proposition 187.

Support for Proposition 187 came from former INS officials Alan Nelson and Harold Ezell, Governor Pete Wilson, the California Republican Party, Republican Senatorial candidate Michael Huffington, Patrick Buchanan, Ross Perot's United We Stand, the Traditional Values Coalition, the Federation for American Immigration Reform and a network of local anti-immigrant groups.

On November 8, 1994, 4,624,825 Californians (59%) voted in favor of Proposition 187 and 3,197,409 (41%) of the electorate voted against the initiative (See Table 1 for voting patterns by race). As of this writing, state and federal courts have temporarily enjoined
the implementation of Proposition 187 pending future hearings on numerous legal challenges to the initiative.\textsuperscript{38}

Asian Pacific American Role in the Campaign Against Proposition 187

The degree of Asian Pacific American involvement in the campaign against Proposition 187 is characterized by mixed reports. Many Asian Pacific Americans simply did not view the initiative as an issue for our communities.\textsuperscript{39} Longtime California Asian Pacific American political activist Maeley Tom responded to such apathy in an Asian Week column:

Some Asians have expressed to me that the illegal immigrant issue pertains to Latinos because of the border issue. I have news for individuals with this na\textsuperscript{i}ve perspective. If this initiative is passed and implemented, Asians will be treated with as much suspicion as any Latinos - this is reality. In short, the Asians, as well as the Latinos, will be most victimized by visual discriminatory practices if this initiative is implemented.

It will be our children in schools, our parents in hospitals, who will be most subjected to being a "suspect," in addition to the Latinos. To those Asians who feel this initiative does not concern them, unless they can change their Asian features, they will be in for some harsh realities the first time they are delayed in line for a job, medical treatment or admission into a school.\textsuperscript{40}

The organized campaigns against Proposition 187 made a concerted effort to reach out to Asian Pacific American organizations and individuals. The principal grassroots campaign, Californians United Against Proposition 187,\textsuperscript{41} immediately made available educational materials about the initiative translated into Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, Tagalog, Japanese, Cambodian and Laotian. Longtime Asian Pacific American activist Miya Iwataki was one of the three statewide co-chairs of the Californians United campaign. Iwataki noted that "[e]ven though this is the most insidious, mean-spirited initiative, it really provides us with an organizing opportunity."\textsuperscript{42} Iwataki and others noted that Proposition 187 provoked an unprecedented amount of interest and participation among Asian Pacific Americans in voter registration, voter education, and get-out-the-vote efforts.\textsuperscript{43}

In Los Angeles, Asian Pacific Americans formed an active Asian Pacific Islander Caucus Against 187. The API Caucus worked with several local Los Angeles campaigns against the initiative and focused on voter registration, phone banking over 30,000 targeted Asian Pacific American voters, and conducting community education at street
Immigrant Rights

fairs and other community events. In areas such as San Francisco, Sacramento, Santa Clara and Alameda, Asian Pacific Americans were integrated into the local campaigns, including representation on local steering committees. For example, in San Francisco, two of the earliest community forums on Proposition 187 were sponsored by the Asian Pacific Democratic Club and by the Asian American Bar Association of the Greater Bay Area. Active voter registration, education and outreach also was conducted by the Chinese Progressive Association in San Francisco.

Ultimately, almost every major Asian Pacific American organization in California publicly opposed Proposition 187. The opposition was led by national organizations such as the Organization of Chinese Americans, the Japanese American Citizens League and the Chinese American Citizens Alliance. However, newer organizations representing the diversity of the Asian Pacific American communities such as the United Cambodian Community and the Thai Community Development also publicly opposed Proposition 187.

Only one new group, called Asian Americans for Border Control, publicly supported the initiative. The group was formed in March 1994, but as of early October, only had ten members. Republican Congressperson Jay Kim also signed the argument in support of Proposition 187 in the California ballot pamphlet.

Nonetheless, the perception persisted that the grassroots campaign against Proposition 187 was largely a Latino effort and that Asian Pacific Americans were not a key force in the campaign. For example, although the massive march and rally against Proposition 187 in Los Angeles on October 16, 1994 was a multiracial and multiethnic event, the public perception was that 70,000 to 100,000 “Latinos” had marched and rallied against the initiative. Similarly, many walkouts, demonstrations and other efforts by students of all racial backgrounds against the initiative were perceived primarily as efforts by Latino and Chicano students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Adult Population</th>
<th>Eligible to Vote</th>
<th>Registered to Vote 06/94</th>
<th>Voted 11/94</th>
<th>Voted Yes on Prop. 187</th>
<th>Voted No on Prop. 187</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: California Field Institute, Los Angeles Times Poll
Another measure of political participation is monetary contributions. The campaigns opposing Proposition 187 were unable to raise their original goal of $3.5 million and ended up raising less than $1.5 million. The largest contributors to the campaigns were labor unions, with contributions of $443,000 from the California Teachers Association and $140,000 from the California State Council of Service Employees. The Spanish language television network Univision donated $100,000. It is unclear what level of money was raised from the Asian Pacific American communities. No major contributions from Asian Pacific American organizations, businesses or individuals were made. Ultimately, the campaigns against the initiative only were able to buy one month of radio ads and one week of television ads. In contrast, the campaign supporting Proposition 187 raised less than $500,000, with more than half that amount coming from the California Republican Party. The Federation of American Immigration Reform also purchased radio ads supporting Proposition 187 that began airing on October 31st.

PART II: ANALYSIS OF THE VOTES FOR AND AGAINST PROPOSITION 187

The ultimate indicator of whether or not Asian Pacific Americans were actively engaged in the campaign against Proposition 187 is how Asian Pacific Americans voted on the initiative. Some polls conducted prior to election day reported that Asian Pacific Americans supported the initiative. For example, one California Field Poll reported that 53% of Asian Pacific Americans and African Americans supported Proposition 187 and only 37% opposed it. However, these polls had extremely small sample sizes of less than eighty persons and combined voters from the Asian Pacific American and African American communities, raising questions about their reliability. Furthermore, the polls generally showed that support for the initiative declined, to barely a winning majority immediately before the election when the actual margin of support for the initiative turned out to be 59% to 41%, a wide difference of 18 percentage points.

Although the election results are still being analyzed, the Los Angeles Times exit poll
Immigrant Rights

reported that 53% of Asian Pacific American voters voted against Proposition 187.61 The poll also estimated that 43% of the Asian Pacific Americans who voted were motivated primarily by Proposition 187.62 The exit poll was based on an estimate that the November 1994 California voters were 81% white, 5% black, 8% Latino and 4% Asian American.63 (See Table 1) The only counties that voted against the initiative were San Francisco (71% opposed),64 Alameda (60%), Marin (58%), Santa Cruz (52%), Santa Clara (52%), Yolo (50%) and Sonoma (50%) counties.65 Yet even in these seven counties where the initiative was defeated, the total vote was only 57% opposed and 43% in favor of Proposition 187. Moreover, these seven counties only accounted for 17% of the total votes cast statewide.66 In other counties with large numbers of Asian Pacific American voters, the initiative passed easily. For example, in Los Angeles, 56% of the voters supported Proposition 187 and in Sacramento, 60% supported it.

The most significant conclusion that can be drawn from exit polls is that Asian Pacific Americans did not have a significant impact on the outcome of the Proposition 187 vote, because they comprised only 4% actual voters. In light of that low percentage, support by Asian Pacific Americans for or against Proposition 187 ultimately did not make a meaningful difference in the overall result.

A 1994 Field Institute study reported that although Asian Pacific Americans comprise 11% of the California population and 10% of the adult population (age 18 and older), they only are 8% of all the citizens eligible to vote, 6% of all registered voters, and only 4% of those who actually vote in California.67 (See Table 1).

The data for Latinos resembles the data for Asian Pacific Americans: Latinos are 29% of the total California population and 26% of the total adult population, but only 14% of the citizens eligible to vote, 11% of all registered voters, and only 8% of those who voted in June 1994.68 Voter registration rates and turnout are higher for African Americans than other communities of color in California: African Americans are 7% of the population, 7% of the adult population, 8% of the citizens eligible to vote, 7% of those registered to vote and 5% of those who actually vote.69 These figures sharply contrast with the voting patterns for whites in California: whites are only 53% of the California population and 57% of the adult population, but comprise 70% of all citizens eligible to vote, 76% of all registered voters, and 83% of those who voted in the June 1994 elections in California.

Parallel Political Strategies in the Proposition 187 Campaigns

The experience of the campaigns against Proposition 187 offer important insights on
### Table 2A: Votes for Proposition 187 Based on Los Angeles Times Exit Poll, By Race (In Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Prop. 187</th>
<th>% Voters</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% Yes</th>
<th>Total Yes Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>6,257,787</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>3,942,406</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>391,112</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>183,822</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>625,779</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>143,929</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>312,889</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>147,058</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>7,587,567</td>
<td>56%1</td>
<td>4,417,215</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Los Angeles Times Poll, California Field Institute.
Total Votes Cast on Proposition 187: 7,822,234
Winning Majority: 3,911,118

1 Because the totals in the Los Angeles Times Poll estimates do not add up to 100%, the total votes for Proposition 187 only add up to 56% rather than 59% of the total yes votes cast.

### Table 2B - Votes for Proposition 187 Based on Voter News Service Exit Poll, By Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Prop. 187</th>
<th>% Voters</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% Yes</th>
<th>Total Yes Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>5,710,231</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>3,254,832</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>625,779</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>312,889</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>1,016,890</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>233,865</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>312,889</td>
<td>47%1</td>
<td>147,056</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>78,222</td>
<td>59%1</td>
<td>46,151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>7,744,011</td>
<td>51%2</td>
<td>3,994,816</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Voter News Service, Los Angeles Times Poll
Total Votes Cast on Proposition 187: 7,822,234
Winning Majority: 3,911,118

1 Percentage of "yes votes" for Asian Americans and Other are taken from the Los Angeles Times Poll.
2 Obviously, this exit poll greatly underestimated the votes in favor of Proposition 187. Yet this poll mirrors some of the last polls conducted before the election and was used early on election night to conclude that the Proposition 187 vote was too close to call.
Table 3: Projections of Votes for Proposition 187 by All Registered Voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Prop. 187 % Voters</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% Yes Votes</th>
<th>Total Yes Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>5,944,898</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>3,745,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>547,556</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>257,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>860,446</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>197,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>469,334</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>220,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7,822,234</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>4,421,127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Los Angeles Times Poll, California Field Institute.
Total Votes Cast on Proposition 187: 7,622,234
Winning Majority: 3,911,118
1 Assumes same percentage of each racial group voted for Proposition 187 based on the Los Angeles Times exit Poll.

In fact, the campaigns against Proposition 187 were divided over which messages would be emphasized. Californians United Against Proposition 187 and other local grassroots campaigns were formed partly because the political consultants running the Taxpayers Against Proposition 187 campaign chose to focus on major fundraising and media strategies rather than a pro-immigrant, grassroots campaign. For example, the political consultants that drafted the argument against the initiative that appeared in the official ballot pamphlet began with the admission that California needed a solution to the problem of illegal immigration. Proponents of Proposition 187 quickly seized upon the statement as a major shift in the immigration debate.

The Taxpayers’ strategy targeted “likely”
voters with messages that Proposition 187 would hurt them: that Proposition 187 would result in increased taxes because it would be expensive, especially in lost federal funding; that it would result in increased juvenile crime because more children would be expelled from school; and, that it would result in the spread of contagious diseases because of denied medical care.\textsuperscript{71} This strategy ignored the human and social costs to undocumented immigrants from the denial of educational, health, and social services. That Proposition 187 would harm immigrants was of secondary importance; more relevant was the fact that Proposition 187 was not in the self-interest of the likely voters.\textsuperscript{72} This strategy also attempted to limit the access of minority spokespersons to the press and the public.\textsuperscript{73}

By avoiding issues of scapegoating and racism, this strategy avoided offending likely voters, even though internal polling and focus groups demonstrated such reasoning to be present. Those focus groups showed that "likely" voters, regardless of background, were feared and scorned immigrants, feelings that often were articulated as resentment against persons who did not speak English or, otherwise, did not appear "American." Even when the Taxpayers' radio and television ads raised racism as an issue, it was done quite obliquely, linking one of the initiative's authors to a funding source for his former employer, the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). The ads publicized the fact that FAIR had been funded by the Pioneer Fund, which also funded eugenics researchers and others promoting white supremacist views.\textsuperscript{74} The strategy was to taint the initiative's author with racism rather than directly challenge the initiative on its racist assumptions and impact.

In contrast, Californians United Against Proposition 187 and other grassroots campaigns focused on the Latino, Asian Pacific American, religious, labor and other progressive communities.\textsuperscript{75} For example, the Californians United statewide campaign brochure emphasized the "human costs" of the initiative to "our children, our public health and safety and our civil rights."\textsuperscript{76} More specific messages that emphasized the defense of immigrants' rights, both undocumented and legal, were targeted at each community. These messages emphasized the importance of community
participation and empowerment.  

Ultimately, evaluating of the more effective strategy proves to be difficult. Although the Taxpayers' campaign influenced some undecided voters, it did not have a major impact on likely voters. On the other hand, while Californians United and other grassroots campaigns did register, turn out, and mobilize thousands throughout the state, the voter turnout in Latino\(^7\) and Asian Pacific American communities was weak, and much more so relative to white voters. The combination of 77% of Latino voters voting against Proposition 187 and Latinos increasing their percentage of the electorate through citizenship, voter registration,\(^7\) and voter
turnout campaigns, proved insufficient to defeat Proposition 187, even in heavily concentrated Latino areas such as Los Angeles and the Central Valley.\textsuperscript{60} Even additional resources and time might not have helped to defeat this initiative, given the political context and contemporary demographics of the California electorate.\textsuperscript{61}

The first \textit{Los Angeles Times} poll in May showed 64\% of white voters supporting Proposition 187 while the exit poll showed 63\% in support.\textsuperscript{82} Overall, support for the initiative might have dropped from the 60\% range between May and the beginning of November, but it ultimately returned to that range for the election, with 59\% ultimately voting for the initiative. The Taxpayers' campaign may have been responsible for swaying many undecided white voters and some women\textsuperscript{83} to oppose Proposition 187, just as Californians United and other grassroots campaigns may have been responsible for greatly increasing Latino opposition and convincing divided Asian Pacific American and African American voters to vote against the initiative. Overall, however, the campaigns did not have an impact on the composition of actual voters, which remained over 80\% white, and did not have an impact on how likely white voters actually voted (about 60\% in favor of the initiative).\textsuperscript{84}

If one examines the voting patterns in California by race, the potential for communities of color to have significant influence on statewide electoral politics is discouraging.\textsuperscript{65} Assuming that the polls on voting patterns are accurate, even if all voters from communities of color who were registered to vote in the November 1994 elections actually voted in proportion to their voter registration rates (equivalent voter turnout for all racial groups), Proposition 187 would have passed, 57\% to 43\% (See Table 3). Moreover, even if all eligible voters from communities of color actually had registered to vote and then actually voted in proportion to their eligibility to vote (equivalent voter registration \textit{and} voter turnout for all racial communities), Proposition 187 would still have passed 55\% to 45\% (See Table 4). Finally, even if all eligible voters from communities of color registered, actually voted \textit{and} opposed the initiative in the same percentage as Latino voters (77\%) and there was equivalent voter registration and voter turnout for all racial communities, Proposition 187 would still have
Immigrant Rights

passed, 51% to 49%, by over 156,000 votes (See Table 5).

Thus, while the importance of political empowerment and participation among communities of color can be emphasized, influence over electoral politics remains squarely in the hands of white voters, even in California. Influence is also concentrated in southern California, especially in Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego counties, where 41% of the voters live. Yet, on votes such as Proposition 187, it is clearly unnecessary to “win” among white voters or voters in southern California. It is sufficient to decrease the losing margin among white voters so that a “winning” vote among communities of color results in an overall victory.

Three variables can significantly affect electoral results: continuing demographic growth in communities of color; the potential for increased electoral participation; and, increasing naturalization rates. The potential to mobilize and organize youths in communities of color, especially Latinos and Asian Pacific Americans, is especially great, as reflected in student activism against Proposition 187. In addition, voter registration and voter turnout rates in communities of color can be raised to at least the equivalent of those for white votes. Ultimately, rates for communities of color would have to exceed those for white voters. Finally, the number of Latino and Asian Pacific American immigrants eligible to vote can be increased through naturalization. Latinos and Asian Pacific Americans are 36% of the adult population in California but only 22% of those eligible to vote. If naturalization rates are significantly increased within those communities, their proportional influence on electoral politics would increase dramatically.

Therefore, the mainstream strategy of targeting likely voters, principally whites, and the grassroots strategy of registering and turning out votes in communities of color and among progressive voters are both critical to electoral victory. Alone, neither strategy appears to be sufficient because of each one’s inherently limited effectiveness.

Given the anti-immigrant hysteria prevalent in California up until the election, it would have been unrealistic to expect the Taxpayers’ strategy, by itself, to change the votes of sufficient numbers of white voters who supported the initiative to reverse the result. The Taxpayers’ strategy alone would have ignored most voters from communities of color. Even if large numbers of likely voters had changed their votes, it still would have been difficult to win because low voter registration and turnout in communities of color would have necessitated that an even greater number of likely white voters change their votes to defeat the initiative.

On the other hand, it was unrealistic to expect that, by themselves, voter registration
and turnout could be significantly increased in communities of color, enough to have changed the final result. Even if all communities of color had matched white voter registration and turnout rates, the initiative would have passed. (See Table 5)

Thus, these parallel strategies remain in tension, manifested in differences in messages and resource allocation.

**PART III: ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN POLITICAL INFLUENCE**

**Asian American Voting Patterns**

Placing the experience of Proposition 187 in the context of what is known about Asian Pacific American voting patterns is essential in distilling lessons and strategies for the future. Several recent studies have documented much lower voter registration rates among Asian Pacific Americans compared to the general population. Analysts have pointed to several factors for the low levels of political participation among Asian Pacific Americans: the diversity and lack of cohesion among Asian Pacific American communities, prioritization of survival issues over politics, lack of national Asian Pacific American political organizations, unfamiliarity with and distrust of democratic elections and government, and greater interest and priority in "homeland" politics. In addition, legal scholars point to the historical prohibitions against naturalization of Asian Pacific Americans and continuing apportionment policies that dilute Asian Pacific American votes as reasons for the disenfranchisement of the Asian Pacific American communities. Professors Don Nakanishi and Bill Ong Hing also argue that Asian Pacific Americans are more prone to engage in non-electoral political activities such as labor organizing and legal challenges.

It remains to be determined whether the campaign against Proposition 187 significantly increased Asian Pacific American voter registration or had any impact on Asian Pacific American voter turnout. An optimist might argue that as the population and the percentage of Asian Pacific American voters also increase, the numbers will make a difference. When increases in voter registration and turnout in the Asian Pacific American, other communities of color, and other progressive communities might translate into actual electoral impact is far from certain.

**Asian Pacific American Political Capacity Nationally**

Similar challenges to Asian Pacific American political influence can be found the national level. Nakanishi, a political analyst for the Asian Pacific American community has observed:

*Indeed, as a result of both structural and group-specific constraints,* [Asian Pa-
Immigrant Rights

cific Americans] have not been able to sufficiently cultivate either a statewide or national political presence, or an explicit set of statewide or national priorities, which is at least recognized when major public policy issues dealing with education, the poor, the elderly or even United States relations with Asia are legislated and implemented. At best, their present impact on American politics has been regional and sporadic rather than national and continuous, and their reputed success as a model minority continues to disguise their overall lack of influence and representation in many of the most significant political arenas and social institutions of American society.93

At an organizational level, there are few Asian Pacific American spokespersons in Washington, D.C. on the issues of immigrants' rights or on any other issues affecting Asian Pacific American communities. The two principal organizations, the Organization of Chinese Americans and the Japanese American Citizens League, each only have minimal Washington, D.C. staffs. In recent years, other Asian Pacific American organizations such as the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance (APALA),94 the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium95 and the Asian Pacific Islander American Health Forum96 have established Washington, D.C. offices and have begun to have a presence on Asian Pacific American issues.97 However, other leading Asian Pacific American civil rights organizations such as the Asian Law Caucus, the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern California and the Chinese American Citizens Alliance, remain based outside Washington, D.C. and therefore have limited capacity to provide leadership on national legislation. Even research or "think tank" capacity on Asian Pacific American issues is focused at the University of California at Los Angeles and the Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics (LEAP) Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute in southern California.98

Similarly, the dearth of Asian Pacific American members of Congress means that there is limited capacity to articulate and implement an Asian Pacific American agenda in Congress. Only in 1994 was the Asian Pacific American Congressional Caucus formed.99 The group was formed because, according to chairperson Norman
Mineta, "we didn’t have the leverage or the clout to get the attention to us on certain issues.” The fate of the Caucus in the 104th Congress, which has eliminated funding for all such organizations, is unknown.¹⁰⁰

The other major obstacle to Asian Pacific American empowerment is the lack of focused resources. Politics today revolves around money. Over $41 million was spent on the California senatorial campaign¹⁰¹ and over $47 million on the California’s governor’s race in 1994.¹⁰² Even Asian Pacific American candidates who have been able to raise money nationally like S.B. Woo and Michael Woo have not been able to parlay their fundraising into success in being elected to higher statewide offices. On the other hand, Asian Pacific American communities commonly have been thought of as reliable sources for political contributions.¹⁰³ Unfortunately, those contributions are seldom focused on any political agenda specific or issues. As the campaign against Proposition 187 illustrated, Asian Pacific Americans are likely to be challenged to forge such an agenda on immigrants’ rights issues, at the very least.

In the aftermath of Proposition 187’s passage, plans are being made to place similar initiatives on other state ballots or to pass similar legislation at the federal level.¹⁰⁴ The fact that the seven states with the largest immigrant populations - California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey and Arizona - account for 189 electoral votes, 70% of the total needed to win the presidency, ensures that immigrants’ rights will continue to be an issue of national importance through the upcoming presidential election.¹⁰⁵

The 104th Congress will probably hear other highly controversial proposals targeting immigrants, including Asian Pacific Americans. There will be proposals to limit the numbers of legal immigrants, especially in the category for brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens, used heavily by Asian Pacific Americans.¹⁰⁶ Another area of great concern is national welfare reform; both Republican and Democratic proposals on this issue seek to eliminate or restrict welfare benefits currently available to legal immigrants. Some proposals would eliminate eligibility for all federally-funded programs for all non-citizens. Others would target SSI benefits for elderly and disabled immigrants.¹⁰⁷ There has been strong opposition to these welfare reform proposals from the Asian Pacific American communities.¹⁰⁸

PART IV: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS ISSUES AND FUTURE ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Continuing National Focus on Immigrant Rights Issues

Building Coalitions to Maximize Political Influence
Immigrant Rights

One lesson that can be learned from the campaigns against Proposition 187 is that coalitions with other communities of color and other progressive communities are essential to electoral success. Asian Pacific Americans worked side by side with Latinos and other progressive communities in opposing Proposition 187. However, even these collaborative efforts were insufficient to defeat the initiative. Any such coalition needs to be both deeper and broader in order to be successful. Not many participants from other communities—African Americans, youth, women, seniors, religious, labor, gays and lesbians—were engaged to form the base broad and deep enough to defeat Proposition 187. Although many organizations and leaders in these constituencies publicly opposed the initiative, the message of the political “elites” within these communities did not necessarily translate into votes.

In order to forge such coalitions, the Asian Pacific American communities must be able to redefine their political interests. During the Proposition 187 campaign, it was natural and easy for Asian Pacific Americans to align ourselves with Latinos. Developing working relations with other progressive communities was far more difficult because few common interests existed upon which to build a foundation.

Part of the problem is that no clear Asian Pacific American political agenda exists. Asian Pacific American candidates will find it difficult to unify the Asian Pacific American community without articulating an agenda that appeals to the diverse interests within the various Asian Pacific American communities. In a survey of Asian Pacific Americans about issue priorities, Professor Don Nakanishi has noted that generational differences persist on the issues facing more recent Asian Pacific immigrants and refugees and more established Asian Pacific Americans. It is interesting that immigration, refugee and family reunification issues were not identified as top priorities in Nakanishi’s survey. Similarly, many of the issues identified could be characterized as those of economic and educational opportunity that Asian Pacific Americans share in common with many other communities.

Others have noted that the Asian Pacific American communities are far from being a monolithic voting block. Indeed, one could argue that politically active Asian Pacific Americans are polarized between ideological conservatives and liberals, between Republicans and Democrats. Others have noted the difficulty of characterizing the Asian Pacific American “vote” as either Democratic or Republican and have documented the unusually high percentage of independent and unaffiliated Asian Pacific American voters. Asian Pacific Americans, who are targeted specifically on immigration
issues by Republicans such as Jack Kemp and William Bennett, may be polarized by party affiliation but unified on the issues of immigrant rights. All these factors are obstacles to Asian Pacific American political cohesiveness and coalition building with other communities.

**Developing and Implementing Parallel Political Strategies**

The experience of Proposition 187 suggests that Asian Pacific Americans need to pursue parallel strategies for political empowerment. Asian Pacific Americans need to continue to define issues in the framework of their own interests, focusing on the themes of discrimination, racism, exclusion, immigration, hate violence and glass ceilings. Such themes emphasize the “Asian Pacific” part of our identities and communities and are useful in mobilizing Asian Pacific Americans to become naturalized, to register to vote and to turn out to vote.116

However, Asian Pacific Americans also need to participate in the national debates about the economy, tax policies, health care and welfare reform, and crime. These issues may not seem to be “Asian Pacific American” issues but Asian Pacific American voices and faces need to be a visible part of those debates. This strategy reinforces the notion that Asian Pacifics also are “Americans”—part of the complex and changing redefinition of what it means to be an “American.” We abdicate any meaningful role in those debates if we only focus on the “Asian Pacific” perspective on these national issues.

For example, the Asian Pacific American role and contribution to the debate about the national economy should not be limited to U.S. trade relations with East, Southeast, or South Asia. Asian Pacific Americans also need to articulate positions on the North American Free Trade Agreement, on whether the Federal Reserve should continue to raise interest rates, or on whether there should be changes in the capital gains tax. Similarly, Asian Pacific Americans need to have a voice and positions about national health care reform that are not limited to securing access for those who do not speak English or maintaining community-based health clinics. Our role should include debate about employer mandates and the feasibility of managed care. This strategy already has been articulated by Asian Pacific Americans active in the Republican Party. Republican National Commit-
Immigrant Rights

tee Deputy Chief of Staff Dennis See has said: “We’ve tried to stay away from tailoring a message to Asian Americans. When we speak before Asian audiences, we talk about topics that concern all Americans, like crime and health care. We focus less on Tiananmen and more on Texas.”

Future Strategies on Immigrants Rights Issues

The debate about future strategies on immigrants’ rights issues is likewise polarized. One view argues that a more radical concession is needed, that immigration is a problem and that more extreme measures to control immigration and restrict immigrants’ rights are necessary. A variation of this view states that we must propose credible measures to control illegal immigration in order to preserve the rights of legal immigrants and refugees. If one must concede certain rights of the undocumented in order to preserve the rights of legal immigrants, the sacrifice is worthwhile. This view argues that what is needed is a viable centrist proposal that can serve as an alternative - a floor - that can diffuse the more reactionary anti-immigrant proposals. Thus, one might support greater border enforcement and visa control measures and the restriction of certain public benefits in exchange for maintaining current levels of legal immigration, maintaining other public benefits and opposition to proposals such as national identification cards.

This strategy is encouraged by the public opposition of Republicans like Jack Kemp and William Bennett to Proposition 187, indicating that there may be some Republicans who want to meet Democrats in the political center on immigration issues. Since the election, both new Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Republican Senator Alan Simpson, the new chairperson of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, have expressed their opposition to national legislation similar to Proposition 187. Similarly, the Republican governors of key states such as Texas, New York, New Jersey and Massachusetts publicly have opposed Proposition 187-type legislation in their states.

Another view is that too much has been conceded in the immigration debate and that an unapologetic defense of immigrants’ rights is required. Only by reasserting the rights of all persons, regardless of immigration status, to certain fundamental rights will immigrant advocates be able to defeat anti-immigrant proposals. This view explicitly includes the rights of the undocumented in the immigrant rights debate. However, this view rejects nationalism as a response to nativism and instead seeks to reframe the debate in terms of broader civil and human rights in order to attract the support of and build coalitions with others - women, African Americans, gays and lesbians, the poor - who are also targeted and under attack by
resurging conservatism. \textsuperscript{122} Latino writer Ruben Martinez notes:

This Latino unity [from the opposition campaign to Proposition 187] must now spread out to mobilize - by way of moral example - the other constituencies that must be part of a new civil rights coalition....Now, Latinos must not only “de-Latinonize” 187, they must go on to embrace issues of class disparity that transcend ethnic and racial lines... Message to activists: Chuck the flags, and be there for your (racial-, ethnic-, sexual-, etc.) “Other” if you want the “Other” to be there for you. You can’t go it alone, not just because you don’t have the numbers, but also because it perpetuates the divisions exploited by the nativists.\textsuperscript{123}

African American columnist Brenda Payton similarly writes:

But even more basic than the economic realities that contradict anti-immigrant sentiments are the basic principles of human rights. Given the history of slavery and legal discrimination, African Americans, of all people, cannot indulge our frustrations by denying other people human rights. How can we shape our mouths to support the denial of education and health services to children? We’ve been there, suffering ignorance because we were denied education; enduring pain and disability, even suffering death, because basic health care was unavailable. Besides, it’s foolhardy to support a racist measure that could be turned against many of us. Illegal immigrants today, poor people tomorrow.

In spite of the vote for 187, in spite of the numerous arguments I’ve had with African Americans, I think deep down African Americans realize that to bash immigrants is uncharacteristic; it’s un-African American. It won’t advance our position to trample on the rights of another vulnerable group. If anything, our position can only be strengthened by forging coalitions.\textsuperscript{124}

After noting how gay and lesbian leaders in California opposed Proposition 187 and how California gay and lesbian elected officials took action to help block the implementation of the initiative, lesbian leader Torie Osborn writes:

Creative coalition building will be crucial in the days ahead. Our [gay and lesbian] community has ample common ground with others working against the Right on education, family, health, environmental, welfare and civil rights issues. Only by linking arms will we keep the engines of progress moving forward. And we have solid experience: Proposition 1 in Idaho was defeated only
Immigrant Rights

because of an alliance built with Mormons who hate the radical right as much as we do. Gay Anglo Texas state representative Glen Maxey was reelected with 69% of the vote in a district that is 45% Hispanic.¹²⁵

Such a civil and human rights framework seeks to be inclusive, affirmative and proactive. It articulates common rights rather than solely defending immigrant rights. More critically, this view warns that no counterproposal on immigration policy can be centrist enough to attract sufficient support that will genuinely diffuse the anti-immigrant hysteria sweeping the nation. According to this view, making compromises at this time ensures that the immigration debate shifts further to the right, with no limit in sight. In this view, no position can garner the support of a wider coalition that includes whites. Instead, increased political power must be achieved by changing the political equation and increasing the political influence of disenfranchised communities. This view also acknowledges the probability of short-term defeats. It is almost fatalistic in its view that many Proposition 187-type measures are “unwinnable” under current political conditions. It is dependent on riding out the current wave of anti-immigrant hysteria and building a long-term strategy for political empowerment and influence.

Ultimately, these two political strategies are not mutually exclusive. Immigrants’ rights advocates will not abandon attempts to defeat measures like Proposition 187 and other proposals restricting immigrant rights. On the other hand, those who seek compromises to prevent even more drastic restrictions must remain accountable to the immigrant communities themselves, including the undocumented. There must be a recognition that these political strategies are parallel, although often in tension. It is entirely appropriate for different Asian Pacific American organizations to take different roles as both these strategies are developed and pursued.

Implementing Parallel Political Strategies

Regardless of which strategies are pursued, political empowerment and coalition building does not happen overnight. Yet, hopeful signs exist that Asian Pacific Americans are forging such coalitions and pursuing such strategies on a variety of national issues. These efforts are genuine “crossovers,” providing an Asian Pacific American voice to national issues while increasing the consciousness of Asian Pacific Americans on those issues. Examples of such efforts include the Asian Pacific Environmental Network,¹²⁶ the National Asian Women’s Health Organization,¹²⁷ and the Asian/Pacific AIDS Coalition.¹²⁸
One promising example of how both political strategies can work is the recent ratification by the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) of its support of same-sex marriages. Part of the testimony that turned the debate at the JACL national convention were the gay and lesbian Japanese Americans who came out and came forward to demonstrate that civil rights for gays and lesbians are an issue for Japanese Americans. Others spoke eloquently and publicly for the first time about family members, friends, co-workers and neighbors who are gay and lesbian.\(^\text{129}\) Also critical was the speech by Congressperson Norman Mineta, who evoked the leadership of gay Congressperson Barney Frank in securing the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provided redress for the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Mineta pointed out that Frank was not Japanese American and did not have a significant Asian Pacific American constituency but provided leadership nevertheless because he felt deeply about the violation of the civil rights of Japanese Americans. Mineta observed that now Japanese Americans were being offered the opportunity to take up the struggle of gay and lesbian Americans.\(^\text{130}\) Both perspectives and both strategies were necessary to secure ratification by the JACL national convention.\(^\text{131}\)

**CONCLUSION**

Professor Ronald Takaki has noted:

> American is being redefined now. And I think the idea that we will become a multicultural society is scary to people, because there is this popular notion that America is white. I think many politicians are catering to these fears, and I think it is tragic to all the people of California. It blinds people to the real problems.... It's not that we're now one people, but that we are constantly becoming one people out of many peoples. The American story is an unfinished story.\(^\text{132}\)

The current debate about immigration policy ultimately is a debate about national self-definition and self-identification. It is about who belongs to the community that we call "America" and who is entitled to the rights and privileges of being "American." Asian Pacific Americans will be drawn into that debate whether or not we choose to participate.\(^\text{133}\)

In looking at strategies to increase Asian Pacific American political influence many lessons and insights can be gleaned from the
Immigrant Rights

experiences of the campaigns against Proposition 187. For example, immigrants’ rights issues will, most likely, continue to be prominent in national and state politics, especially during the 1996 elections. However, Asian Pacific Americans currently are numerically, organizationally, and politically unprepared to lead on, or even influence the immigrants’ rights debate. While much work can and needs to be done in Asian Pacific American communities to build political infrastructures, encourage naturalization, and ensure voter registration and turnout, alone, these efforts will not achieve electoral success. Only by creating and sustaining broader coalitions with other communities of color and other progressives will Asian Pacific Americans have any significant influence on national debates and on the 1996 elections. A political strategy that shifts the debate from one focused on “immigration” to one of “immigrants’ rights” as part of a broader civil and human rights political agenda will help build such coalitions. If Asian Pacific Americans are unable to develop such strategies to influence the political debate and electoral battles, we risk being excluded from that ongoing redefinition of the American community.

Endnotes


I acknowledge the limitations of using the terminology “Asian Pacific American” and my own biases (e.g., limited to English language sources, influence of my own experiences in the San Francisco and statewide campaigns of Californians United Against Proposition 187). Much of the data relied upon and the conclusions made in this article are generalized, without any analysis of how that data or those conclusions might be different for the diverse Asian Pacific American communities in California. For example, it would be important to examine the more specific experience of Proposition 187 within the Vietnamese American community in Santa Clara county, or the Filipino American community in San Mateo county or the Laotian American community in Fresno county or the Cambodian American community in Long Beach or the Korean American community in Los Angeles. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this article to examine whether “Asian Pacific American” is a viable political category.


6. See, Hallye Jordan, “Emphasis Is Shifting From Bills to Ballot,” San Francisco Daily Journal, October 10, 1994, p. 7. Among the defeated bills were proposals to deny emergency disaster relief to undocumented immigrants (AB 2607), to make it a crime for undocumented immigrants to attempt to enroll in a public college or university (ABX 70), and to deny state income tax refunds to undocumented immigrants (SB 955).

7. Some observers have commented on the danger and power of the initiative process. Initiatives have the aura of being a more direct expression of the political will of the people. However, initiatives today are not grassroots efforts but part of a political industry of petition circulators, campaign consultants, direct mail specialists and lawyers. Jerry Roberts, “Hiram Johnson, Please Call Home,” San Francisco Chronicle, September 10, 1994, p. A20 and Martha Angle, “The escalating use of ballot initiatives,” San Francisco Examiner, October 29, 1994, p. A19. Unlike legislation which can be amended during legislative debate and ultimately vetoed by the executive, the initiative is an all-or-nothing, take-it-or-leave-it process. Ultimately, such efforts are not purer expressions of the democratic process but controlled by a small minority of political professionals and the minority of the population that actually votes.


11. Proposition 187 Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, California Ballot Pamphlet for General


20. These groups included the California Latino Legislative Caucus, the California Legislative Black Caucus, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, California Association of Hospitals and Health Systems, the California Medical Association, the California Nurses Association, the California Conference of Local Health Officers, the American College of Emergency Physicians, the California Academy of Family Physicians, the LIFE AIDS Lobby, the Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California, the California Teachers Association, the California Federation of Teachers, the National Education Association, the California School Boards Association, the Association of California School Administrators, the California PTA, the California National Organization of Women, the California National Women's Political Caucus, the League of Women Voters of California, Children NOW, the Congress of California Seniors, the American Association of Retired Persons, the Sierra Club, the California League of Conservation Voters, the California Council for Environmental and Economic Balance, the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the California Organization of Police and Sheriffs, the Peace Officers Research Association of California, the California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO, the Service Employees International Union, the United Farm Workers of America, the California Catholic Conference of Bishops, the American Jewish Congress, the California Council of Churches, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the American Friends Service Committee.

21. Paul Feldman, "Measure's Foes Try to Shift


**23.** “No on ‘Save Our State,’” *Orange County Register*, September 18, 1994.


**30.** See, William J. Bennett and Jack Kemp, “A Statement on Immigration,” October 18, 1994 (on file) and Ronald Brownstein and Patrick J. McDonnell, “Kemp, Bennett and INS Chief Decry Prop. 187,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 19, 1994, pp. A1 and A26 and “GOP leaders hit Prop. 187,” *San Francisco Examiner*, October 19, 1994, p. A7. Kemp and Bennett argued that immigrants “hold principles which the Republican party warmly embraces: an entrepreneurial spirit and self-reliance, hostility to government intervention, strong family values, and deeply rooted religious faith” and that “[t]he most ardent opponents of Immigration are among the core constituencies of the Democratic party.” Instead of Proposition 187, Kemp and Bennett proposed more border enforcement, expediting the deportation process for immigrants convicted of crimes, cracking down on fraudulent immigration documents, reforming the INS, changing the sponsorship requirements for legal immigrants seeking welfare, reducing the number of work permit documents and “exporting democratic capitalism” to Central America.
Immigrant Rights


Proposition 187 also was opposed by unsuccessful California Republican gubernatorial candidate Ron Unz. Ron K. Unz, "A Losing Proposition," San Francisco Daily Journal, October 3, 1994, p. 4 and Edward Epstein, "Unz Declares He Opposes Prop. 187," San Francisco Chronicle, October 3, 1994. Unz had first articulated the Kemp-Bennett rationale that because core Democratic constituencies such as labor, African Americans and environmentalists were anti-immigrant, the Republicans should seek support from immigrant Latino and Asian communities.


41. Asian Pacific American activist Deena Jang suggested the name "Californians United Against Proposition 187," borrowed from the 1986 campaign against California's "English-only" initiative, "Californians United Against Proposition 63."


43. Id. and Julie Ha, "Thousands March to Defeat Prop. 187, Rafu Shimpo, October 17, 1994 (noting that thousands of new voters were registered by Asian Pacific American volunteers at citizenship ceremonies in Los Angeles).

44. Kang, Id.

45. Samuel R. Cacas, "Minority Lawyers Orga-


48. Kang, *Id.*.


58. Susan Yoachum, "Voters Line Up on 187 - Support Still Strong," *San Francisco Chronicle*, September 27, 1994. The polls also seemed unable to predict the Latino vote on Proposition 187. The May *Los Angeles Times* poll showed that 35% of registered Latino voters would vote for the initiative and 57% would oppose it. However, the first poll conducted after the initiative qualified for the ballot showed that registered Latino voters supported the initiative 52% to 42%. Paul Feldman, "62% Would Bar Services to Illegal Immigrants," *Los Angeles Times*, September 14, 1994, p. A1. By late
Immigrant Rights

October, the polls reported that Latino voters had changed their minds, with only 22% in favor and 65% opposed, a dramatic 30 percentage point drop in support. Paul Feldman, "Support for Prop. 187 Erodes, but It Still Leads," Los Angeles Times, October 27, 1994, p. A1. Two separate exit polls reported that ultimately 77% of Latinos voted against and only 23% for Proposition 187. Los Angeles Times, November 11, 1994, p. B2 and Voter News Service poll, San Francisco Examiner, November 9, 1994, p. B3.

59. The first statewide Field Poll in July showed 64% in favor of the initiative and 27% opposed among those likely to vote. Edward Epstein, "Poll Finds Few Voters Know About Fall Initiatives," San Francisco Chronicle, July 28, 1994, pp. A17 and A18. By September, that margin was reduced to 57% to 31%. Susan Yoachum, "Voters Line Up on 187 - Support Still Strong," San Francisco Chronicle, September 27, 1994. By late October, the Field Poll showed that the initiative was supported by only 53% and opposed by 39%. Pamela Burdman, "Prop. 187's Lead Keeps Shrinking, Field Poll Finds," San Francisco Chronicle, October 27, 1994.

The Los Angeles Times Poll reported a similar trend: The first poll, taken in May, before the initiative qualified for the ballot, reported 59% in favor and 32% opposed among registered voters. A mid-September poll showed 62% in favor and 29% opposed among likely voters. Paul Feldman, "62% Would Bar Services to Illegal Immigrants," Los Angeles Times, September 14, 1994, pp. A1 and A10. A mid-October poll showed that the initiative was leading 59% to 33%. Paul Feldman, "Prop. 187 Is Still Favored Almost 2 to 1," Los Angeles Times, October 15, 1994, p. A1. However, by late October, the margin of support had fallen dramatically, to 51% in favor and 41% opposed. Paul Feldman, "Support for Prop. 187 Erodes, but It Still Leads," Los Angeles Times, October 27, 1994, p. A1.

Other polls conducted days before the election also showed support for the initiative falling to below 50%. Susan Ferriss, "Latinos Deserting Prop. 187," San Francisco Free Press, November 7, 1994, p. 1 (independent poll shows support at 49%) and Maria Puente, "Foos plan all-out blitz this weekend," USA Today, November 4, 1994, p. A7 (KACL-TV poll showed likely voters supporting the initiative at 49% to 41% and KCBS-TV poll showed support at 48% to 38%). The internal tracking poll conducted by the Taxpayers Against 187 campaign even showed the measure being defeated in polling conducted during the days preceding the election. Paul Feldman, "Measure's Foos Try to Shift Focus From Walkouts to Issues," Los Angeles Times, November 4, 1994, p. A30.

60. It is possible that respondents misrepresented their opinions to the pollsters, especially when so many organizations and prominent individuals had publicly opposed Proposition 187. The opinions of voters also were difficult to measure accurately once the campaign against the initiative began to link proponents of Proposition 187 to "white supremacist" groups. Paul Feldman, "Group's Funding of Immigration Measure Assailed," Los Angeles Times, September 10, 1994, p. B3; Ed Mendel, "Prop. 187 opponents question FAIR funding," San Diego Union-Tribune, September 8, 1994, p. A4 and Pamela Burdman, "White Supremacist Link Trips Prop. 187," San Francisco Chronicle, October 13, 1994, p. A4. It is less likely that respondents would acknowledge continuing support for an initiative that has been characterized as racist. Susan Ferriss, "Latinos Deserting Prop. 187," San Francisco Free Press, November 7, 1994, pp. 1 and 3 (quoting one political analyst as noting, "When race is interjected into a campaign, people are less likely to tell the truth."). Others argue that the polls were in fact accurate, showing a significant decline in support until the October 16th march in Los Angeles and the student walkouts shifted voters back to supporting the initiative. Patrick J. McDonnell, "State's Diversity Doesn't Reach Voting Booth," Los Angeles Times, November 10, 1994; Ben Sherwood, "California Leads the Way, Alas," New York Times, November 27, 1994, p. E11 and Kathleen Buckley, Prop. 187 backers outraged by opponents," West
County Times, November 12, 1994, p. 6A (quoting spokespersons from the Taxpayers Against 187 campaign saying that the student demonstrations swung the vote back in favor of the initiative).

61. Los Angeles Times, November 11, 1994, p. B2. The exit poll reported that white voters supported the initiative 63% to 37%, Latinos opposed it 77% to 23% and African American voters also opposed it 53% to 47%. It is unclear whether, like the earlier Field Poll, Asian Pacific Americans and African Americans were lumped together in the sample.


63. Another exit poll, the Voter News Service poll, projected greater participation by communities of color on Proposition 187, (73% white and 8% African American, 13% Latino and 4% Asian Pacific American), but failed to provide any data on Asian Pacific American voting patterns on Proposition 187. The Voter News Service poll showed that white voters supported the initiative 57% to 43%, Latino voters opposed 77% to 23% and African American voters split evenly 50% to 50%. San Francisco Examiner, November 9, 1994, p. B3. See Table 2B.

64. Local observers agreed that the dramatic 71% vote against Proposition 187 in San Francisco resulted from a high turnout of progressive voters that helped ensure the election of Mabel Teng, the first Chinese American woman elected to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors (and the first person of color to win a citywide election without first being appointed to the board) and of Lawrence Wong, a gay Chinese American man to the San Francisco Community College Board. See, Bruce Petit and Jim Wachob, "Bracing against storm," The Independent, November 11, 1994, pp. 1 and 10 and Michael Colbruno, "Election results of Lavender Sweep II," San Francisco Sentinel, November 9, 1994, p. 3.


66. In the nine counties with the largest number of voters (more than 250,000 per county) - Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, Santa Clara, Alameda, San Bernardino, Sacramento, Riverside and Contra Costa - the initiative passed 59% to 41%, mirroring the total state vote. In fact, these nine counties comprised 67% of the statewide vote. In the three largest counties - Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego - compromising 41% of the total state vote, Proposition 187 was passed 61% to 39%. San Francisco Chronicle, November 10, 1994, p. B4.


68. Id..

69. Unfortunately, these studies and polls do not report data on Native American voter registration and turnout.

70. See, Alan C. Nelson," Something Must Be Done," San Francisco Chronicle, August 17, 1994, p. A19 ("Illegal immigration, as even [Proposition 187] opponents acknowledge, is a major problem for California. The first sentence of its opponents' ballot argument for November reads: 'Something must be done to stop the flow of illegal immigrants coming across the border.'").

71. See, "Anti-Prop. 187 ad hits airwaves," San Francisco Examiner, October 12, 1994 (the ad stated: "Illegal immigration is a real problem, but Proposition 187 is not going to fix it. It does absolutely nothing to beef up enforcement at our borders and just makes a bad situation worse.") and Pamela Burdman, "Wilson Hasn't Decided on Controversial Prop. 187," San Francisco Chronicle, September 10, 1994, pp. A1 and A15. Many of these arguments were reflected in how likely voters, those who in fact did vote, decided their votes on Proposition 187. Of those who voted against the initiative, 60% said they against it because "it was poorly written/didn't solve the problem," 40% because "it would throw children out of
Immigrant Rights

school," 39% because "it is racist/anti-Latino," 25% because "it could create a health crisis" and 15% because "it would cost the state billions in federal funds." Of those who voted for the initiative, 78% voted for it because "it sends a message that needs to be sent," 51% because "it will force the federal government to face the issue," 34% because "it will stop immigrants from using state services" and 32% because "it will save the state millions of dollars." Los Angeles Times, November 9, 1994, p. A22.


76. Emphasis added.


78. Initial analysis about the impact of Proposition 187 on Latino voting patterns is mixed. While the Los Angeles Times exit poll reported that 47% of Latinos were motivated to vote primarily by Proposition 187, Latinos were only 8% of the statewide electorate, about the same percentage as the 1990 and 1992 elections. In Los Angeles county, where Latinos are 37% of the population, the poll estimated that only 9% of those that voted were Latino. On the other hand, the Southwest Voter Research Institute preliminarily reported that Latino turnout had increased from 39% in 1990 to between 45% and 52% in 1994, accounting for between 10.2% to 11.4% of the total statewide electorate. Efrian Hernandez Jr. and Richard Simon, "Latino Voter Turnout Points Up Gains, Also Shortcomings," Los Angeles Times, December 4, 1994, p. A1, A38 and A40.

79. The Los Angeles Times polls minimized the impact of Proposition 187 on voter registration because it found that only 3% of those opposing the initiative had registered to vote in the last three months. Paul Feldman, "Support for Prop. 187 Erodes, but It Still Leads," Los Angeles Times, October 27, 1994.


81. Although the strategies and messages can theoretically exist in tension with one another, choices must be made in the context of a specific campaign about fundraising and the allocation of resources. For example, it is difficult to evaluate whether fundraising for more television ads would have made more of a difference in the Proposition 187 campaigns than more resources for a get-out-the-vote campaign in communities of color.


83. There is some evidence of a "gender gap" on the Proposition 187 vote. Although the Los Angeles Times exit poll estimated that 56% of women voters supported and 44% opposed the initiative, the Voter News Service exit poll estimated that only 48% of women voters voted for Proposition 187 and 52% opposed it. Compare, *Los Angeles Times*, November 11, 1994 p. B2, with *San Francisco Examiner*, November 9, 1994, p. B3. In contrast, both the Los Angeles Times and the Voter News Service exit polls reported that men supported Proposition 187, by either 60% to 40%, or by 55% to 45%.


85. Much of this analysis is reductionist by using race as the point of analysis. Obviously, there are progressive voters in white communities and conservative voters in communities of color. Yet the exit polls for Proposition 187 did demonstrate racially polarized voting patterns. However, more detailed analysis, adding other important variables such as gender and class, are needed.

86. See, Albert Y. Muratsuhi, "Voter Registration in Asian and Pacific Islander Communities: An Agenda for the 1990's," *Asian American Policy Review*, vol. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 17-31 (voter registration rate of 41.8 for Japanese Americans and 22.6% for Chinese Americans in Oakland, compared to 67.4% for all Oakland residents); Don T. Nakanishi, "Asian American Politics: An Agenda for Research," *Amerasia Journal*, vol. 12, no. 2, 1986, pp. 1-27 (voter registration rates of 43% for Japanese Americans, 35.5% for Chinese Americans, 28.5% for Samoan Americans, 27% for Filipino Americans, 16.7% for Indian Americans, 13.0% for Korean Americans and only 4.1% for Vietnamese Americans in Los Angeles) and Grant Din, "An Analysis of Asian/Pacific Registration and Voting Patterns in San Francisco," M.A. Thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1984 (voter registration rates of 36.8% for Japanese Americans and 30.9% for Chinese Americans in San Francisco). However, one scholar has criticized these studies as misleading because they failed to adjust for those members of the respective Asian Pacific American communities legally ineligible to vote because they are not yet U.S. citizens. Bill Ong Hing, *Making and Remaking Asian America Through Immigration Policy, 1850-1990*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, pp. 156-158.

87. As noted in footnote 1, I acknowledge the serious limitations of generalizing the experiences and data about "Asian Pacific Ameri-
Immigrant Rights

cans” without exploring the difficult challenge of cohesiveness among Asian Pacific American communities. Many of the tensions and strategies examined in this article regarding political coalition building across communities and constituencies are equally applicable to building political cohesiveness among Asian Pacific Americans.


91. The U.S. Census Bureau projects that by the year 2050, the U.S. population will be 53% white, 23% Latino, 10% Asian Pacific American, 14% African American and 1% Native American. “Census paints new U.S. face,” San Francisco Examiner, September 29, 1993, p. A7. Those projections mirror the current racial demographics of California (53% white, 29% Latino, 11% Asian Pacific American and 7% African American).

92. In a bizarre footnote to the California November 1994 elections, losing Republican Senate candidate Michael Huffington and the victorious Proposition 187 campaign teamed up to make unsubstantiated charges of massive


97. See, Carlos Mendez, “Will Asian Pacific Americans Roll with the Post-Election Punches?” Asian Week, December 9, 1994, p. 4. After the November 1994 elections, two new national Asian Pacific American organizations were established: the Filipino Civil Rights Advocates and the National Association of Korean Americans. Samuel R. Cacas, “Filipino Civil Rights Advocates,” Asian Week, November 25, 1994, pp. 1 and 8 and Lisa Y. Park, “Koreans Bidding for a Louder Political Voice,” Asian Week, December 9, 1994, pp. 1 and 15. If these organizations are successful in establishing a presence in Washington, D.C., they can have an immediate impact simply because there have not been Filipino American or Korean American voices on the national level.


100. “Mineta Blasts GOP Ban on House Caucuses,” Asian Week, December 9, 1994, p. 6.


112. See, Carole T. Uhlman, "Perceived Discrimination and Prejudice and the Coalition Pros-
pects of Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans," in *Race and Ethnic Politics in California*, Byran O. Jackson and Michael Preston, eds., Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1991, pp.339-371 (suggesting perception and experiences of discrimination as common ground for political coalition-building). Uhlman concludes: Overall, the conditions seem to point to the feasibility, but hardly the inevitability, of coalition building among these groups. As coalitions develop, they are likely to arise first among subgroups - such as recent immigrants - rather than across grand categories. A coalition could build upon the willingness to see shared conditions of disadvantage. However, translation into broad support for specific issues will require skillful leadership.

*Id.* at p.370.

113. The more recent communities focus on acculturation and assimilation; job training and unemployment; youth gangs and delinquency; education and English language acquisition; counseling services; services for the elderly; mental health services and family resources as their top priorities. In contrast, the issues identified most for the more established Asian Pacific American communities are discrimination, violence and anti-Asian sentiment; economic advancement against the "model minority" myth and glass ceilings; education access, especially admissions and equal access to universities; political, social and economic empowerment; services for the elderly; cultural conflict and identity and outmarriage; and leadership development, upward mobility and career development. Don T. Nakanishi, “Broad Outlines for Asian America in the 1990’s,” *Asian American Policy Review*, vol. 3, Winter 1993, pp. 73-77.

114. Even within families the polarization is evident, as reflected in the November 1994 election of Republican Matt Fong as California state treasurer, replacing his Democratic mother, March Fong Eu, as the only Asian Pacific American elected to a statewide of- fice in California. Curiously, Fong was able to avoid taking a public position on Proposition 187. Paul Feldman, “Riordan, Other Officials Still Neutral,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 3, 1994, p. A3.


116. Yet, according to Professor Nakanishi’s survey, these themes are more likely to resonate with more established Asian Pacific American generations and communities. In fact, more recent immigrant and refugee communities might find it easier to discover common interests with other communities of color and other progressives because their priority issues of employment, education and social services are more in common with members of those other communities rather more established Asian Pacific Americans.


Immigrant Rights


122. See, Rene P. Ciria-Cruz, “How Far Have We Come?” Filipinas, October 1994, pp. 40-44 (arguing for coalitions with other ethnic minorities on immigration issues, that include defending the rights of the undocumented).


128. See, Robert T. Bernardo, “AIDS Cases Rising Among Asian-Pacific Islanders,” San Fran-


131. The coalition work on this issue continues with the establishment of a gay and lesbian chapter in the JACL. “JACL Establishes Gay and Lesbian Chapter,” Hokkubeki Mainichi, November 9, 1994, p. 1.


133. Nearly three years ago, a Gallup Poll found that 58% of those polled thought there were too many Asian Pacific immigrants being admitted to the U.S. The poll also found that 69% thought there were too many Latino immigrants being admitted and in a very revealing indication of how race affects immigration policy, 47% thought there were too many African immigrants although Africans are less than 1% of all immigrants admitted. In contrast, only 36% thought there were too many Europeans being admitted. Lizette Alvarez, “Americans tired of welcoming immigrants,” Miami Herald, March 3, 1992, pp. 1A and 15A. One presumes that the animosity towards immigrants would be much higher today, given the wave of anti-immigrant hysteria that is sweeping the nation.
Asian American Admissions to an Elite University: A Multivariate Case Study of Harvard

Stephen S. Fugita and Marilyn Fernandez

For over a decade there has been controversy about possible discrimination against Asian Americans in admissions to elite universities. In response to this, several universities have conducted internal reviews while at other institutions governmental agencies have become involved. Harvard University recently underwent an Office for Civil Rights (OCR) compliance review. A unique feature of OCR’s effort was that it was able to utilize extensive quantitative data that the institution had collected over the relevant time period. Multivariate statistical procedures applied to this data suggested that the lower admit rate of Asian American applicants was not the product of lower qualifications but the lack of legacy and recruited athlete status. Arguments about the economic, legal, and public policy implications of the legacy preference are discussed.

For over a decade, there has been a great deal of controversy surrounding the issue of admission of Asian American applicants to prestigious institutions of higher education. As both the absolute numbers and percentages of Asian Americans on university campuses have rapidly increased, so have the charges of covert quotas and other ceilings to admission. In response to these charges, some universities have conducted their own internal investigations (e.g., Brown, Princeton and Stanford). Others have been the subject of federal, principally the Office for Civil Rights, or state

Stephen S. Fugita is Director of Ethnic Studies and Professor of Psychology at Santa Clara University. His current research interests are the persistence of Japanese American ethnicity and Asians in the Russian Far East.

Marilyn Fernandez is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Santa Clara University. Her primary research interests are in the areas of economic adaptation of Asian Americans, adolescent pregnancy and parenting, and domestic violence.

45
Asian American Admissions to an Elite University

reviews (e.g., Harvard, UCLA, and the University of California, Berkeley).  

A major impediment in determining the factual bases underlying the admissions controversy has been the lack of quantitative data on all applicants, both those rejected and those admitted. Not only do many universities fail to collect and retain such information in an easily accessible manner but, when available, most institutions have been very reluctant to release it. Fortunately, in the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) compliance review of Harvard University, the agency was able to obtain and utilize the extensive quantitative data collected on all applicants that the University maintains for its own internal use. As these data were already in computer accessible form, they provided a rare opportunity to quantitatively test, with multivariate statistical procedures, various allegations surrounding Asian American admissions.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The issue of discrimination in admissions to elite universities is an old one. In the early part of the century, Jews and Italians applying to Columbia were severely restricted. In fact, Jews were victims of quotas at Harvard and Yale until the late 1950's.  

Given this backdrop and the rapid rise in the Asian American population on campuses beginning from the mid-1970's, it is not surprising that fears would arise about possible attempts to restrict this population's access to elite universities.

The allegation of discriminatory treatment against Asian American applicants was first raised by the Asian American Students Association at Brown University in 1983. They argued that at Brown, Asian Americans had a lower admit rate compared with other groups. Specifically, they pointed out that the number of Asian American applicants to the University increased eight and one-half times between 1975 and 1983, yet the number of Asian Americans admitted increased less than twofold. Similar findings were reported in a survey of 25 schools by the East Coast Asian Student Union (ECASU) which was also released in 1983. The ECASU report claimed that the lower Asian American admit rates were the product of admission officers who perceived Asian American applicants to be overrepresented, careerist and characterized by passive personalities.

In 1985, the issue of Asian American ad-
missions received national attention when the New York Times and the Washington Post published widely read articles on the topic. The New York Times reported lower admit rates for Asian Americans at Princeton, Harvard, and Yale. This article also related how difficult it had been for Princeton students and alumni to get relevant statistics from the University. In fact, both independent researchers as well as the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights have reported that admissions related data for selective colleges and universities have been extremely difficult to obtain from university administrations. This, not surprisingly, fueled suspicions.

As the controversy over admit rates and discrimination raged, the absolute number of Asian Americans in higher education continued to rapidly increase. According to statistics published by the National Center for Education, their numbers more than doubled from 1976 when they made up 1.8 percent of students to 3.8 percent in 1988. At UCLA and UC Berkeley, two universities favored by Asian Americans because of their quality, low cost, and location near large Asian American populations, freshman Asian American enrollments exceeded those of European Americans by 1990.

II. ENTANGLEMENT WITH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

In 1988, the Asian American admissions issue became embroiled in the volatile and shifting controversy over affirmative action. Probably the most visible actions in this area were taken by then Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds and Congressman Dana Rohrabacher. These conservatives suggested that the alleged discrimination against Asian Americans in admissions argued for the dismantling of affirmative action programs more generally. They claimed that restricted admissions of Asian Americans was the inevitable result of a larger problem—affirmative action policies. Specifically, they felt that admissions policies that are designed to correct past injustices or produce a diverse student body (which are permitted by the 1978 Bakke U.S. Supreme Court decision), are unfair and no longer necessary. This conservative appropriation of the Asian American admissions controversy, not surprisingly, provoked considerable consternation among Asian American critics.

We agree with the assessment of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights that the two issues of discrimination against Asian Americans and affirmative action should be kept distinct.

Given the politically charged environment engulfing the controversy, it is...
important that the public not lose sight of the central issue of the controversy: Do institutions of higher education, particularly the elite ones, treat Asian American applicants unfairly compared to whites?  

The Commission also pointed out that the Office for Civil Rights compliance review of Harvard was the first study to unveil much previously unavailable information.

The OCR report on Harvard presents the results of the first thorough, outside investigation of the admissions discrimination issue at one of the country's top private universities. The report unveils, for the first time, some of the well-guarded institutional proprietary information about Harvard's admissions procedures. More importantly, it provides a factual basis for evaluating the admissions discrimination controversy on its merits. Because of its historical importance, the OCR report merits careful consideration.  

The purpose of this paper is to utilize the quantitative data and analyses produced in the Harvard compliance review to examine whether Asian Americans have been discriminated against, and if so, through what possible mechanisms. First, the quality of the Asian American applicant pool was compared with the white applicant pool. Second, the differential impact of ten major admission criteria on the likelihood of being admitted for Asian American as compared to white applicants was examined. Finally, the policy implications of the results were discussed.

III. METHOD

Data Set

The data were obtained by OCR from Harvard University as part of the OCR compliance review of the institution. The University collects and computerizes these records to provide a “shorthand” numerical summary of each of the thousands of applicants who apply in a given year. These summary data include much of the quantitative information on the admissions application, evaluations of applicants by various raters, and whether applicants were ultimately admitted to the University.

Sample

The total number of applicants for the period 1983 through 1992 consisted of approximately 93,137 whites and 18,261 Asian Americans. These racial classifications were, for most applicants, self-reported. In a minority of cases, Harvard officials were able to verify applicants’ self-categorization. Also, in a minority of cases, the white label was assumed from the designation “other.”

The actual sample available for analyses
contained 22,658 whites and 4516 Asian Americans. Only those applicants for whom there was complete information on all of the variables in the analyses were included. The major source of incomplete data was a missing alumni rating. Frequently, alumni ratings were sent in late in the evaluation process because of delays in arranging a meeting between a local area alumnus and the applicant. Even though this information was utilized in making admissions decisions, it was frequently not entered on the University’s data tape.

**Statistical Procedures**

Both univariate and multivariate procedures were utilized. The primary univariate technique used was odds ratio analyses. In the instances where mean differences were examined, the Tukey post-hoc multiple comparison test was employed. The primary multivariate approaches used were discriminant analysis and logistic regression.

**IV. RESULTS**

**Variables**

Ten admissions criteria which appeared to be central to the admit/reject decision were selected for the analyses. They were SAT Verbal, SAT Mathematics, class rank, and counselor, teacher, alumni, academic, athletic, personality, and extracurricular activity ratings. The last four of these ratings are summary measures created by the Harvard admissions staff. The staff also assigned an overall summary rating, which was not excluded from the analyses since it would reveal the same variance as the more specific measures. Some items were reversed so that higher numbers consistently indicated a higher score. Most significantly, it should be kept in mind that the majority of these admission criteria are evaluative ratings by Harvard staff and other professionals and therefore may themselves be biased in subtle, statistically undetectable ways.

**Acronyms**

The following acronyms for variables were uniformly used in the tables which follow:

- SATVERB - SAT Verbal
- SATMATH - SAT Mathematics
- CPERCENT - Class Rank
- COUNSELN - Counselor Rating
- TEACHERIN - Teacher Rating
- RALUMN1N - Alumni Rating
- RACADEMN - Academic Rating
- RATHLETN - Athletic Rating
- RPERSONN - Personality Rating
- REXTRAN - Extracurricular Rating

**Admit Rates**

The first question examined was whether white applicants were more likely than Asian American applicants to be admitted to Harvard over the ten year period be-
Asian American Admissions to an Elite University

ing examined. Based on the applicants for whom complete data were available, the observed odds of admission was .36 for white applicants compared to .27 for Asian Americans. On a percentage basis, whites had a 17.4% admit rate, Asian Americans 13.2%.

Comparability of Asian and White Applicants

One possible explanation for the higher admit rate for white applicants is that they scored higher on the qualifications that Harvard used to select applicants. In order to determine if there were significant differences in Asian American applicants’ qualifications as compared to white applicants’ qualifications, a two group discriminant analysis was performed on the ten admission criteria previously listed. This analysis determined which of the ten criteria distinguished between Asian American and white applicants while statistically controlling for the effects of the other variables. The stepwise procedure employed selected, in sequence, the admission criteria that best discriminated between the two groups of applicants.\textsuperscript{14}

As shown in Table 1, on eight of the ten criteria, Asian American and white applicants were significantly different. Asians had higher mean scores on four of the variables: SAT math, class rank, counselor rating, and academic rating. White applicants had higher mean scores on: SAT verbal, athletic rating, personality rating, and extracurricular rating.

Overall, these results suggest that Asian

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Variable} & \textbf{Partial r$^2$} & \textbf{F} & \textbf{p} & \textbf{Ethnic Group} \\
\hline
1. RATHLETHN & 0.0180 & 466.61 & 0.0001 & White \\
2. SATMATH & 0.0125 & 332.39 & 0.0001 & Asian \\
3. SATVERB & 0.0180 & 466.20 & 0.0001 & White \\
4. CPERCENT & 0.0035 & 89.59 & 0.0001 & Asian \\
5. RPERSONN & 0.0010 & 26.59 & 0.0001 & White \\
6. COUNSELN & 0.0008 & 19.29 & 0.0001 & Asian \\
7. REXTRAN & 0.0005 & 13.62 & 0.0002 & White \\
8. RACMEMN & 0.0002 & 5.02 & 0.0215 & Asian \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Discriminant Analysis\textsuperscript{1,14} 1983-1992 All White and Asian American Applicants}
\end{table}

1. Stepwise selection of variables was used with an inclusion criterion of p < .05.
2. Variables TEACHER1N, RALUMN1N were not selected.
4. Item scores were reversed such that 1 was the lowest and 5 was highest score.
Americans tend to score slightly higher on academic criteria, and whites on non-academic. However, as indicated by the partial $r^2$'s, the magnitude of the differences was very small. Most importantly, it is unclear how the Harvard admissions committees differentially weigh the various criteria. When asked about this by OCR, Harvard officials could not articulate a “weighting” system. Given the similar number of higher scores for Asian Americans as compared with whites and the small size of the differences, this analysis suggested that Asian American applicants were as qualified as white applicants.

**Univariate Analyses Predicting Admissions**

Next, we examined the relationship between receiving a particular score on the various admission criteria and the likelihood of being admitted. SAT scores were omitted from this analysis because of their interval nature. Table 2 reports the percentage of Asian Americans as compared with whites who were admitted with a particular rating score (1 to 5). Generally, applicants needed to receive a score of 4 or higher to have a moderate chance of being admitted. At the highest rating level (5), Asians and whites were similar in the percentages admitted with that score. However, with more modest scores (2, 3, and 4), whites had a higher percentage of their members admitted. In order to test the statistical reliability of the greater likelihood of whites being admitted with a particular score on an admission variable, odds ratios were calculated. If the odds ratio is larger than one, whites had a greater probability of being admitted than Asian Americans with the same score. These re-

---

**Table 2: Percentage of Asian Americans and Whites Admitted, at the Five Levels of Rating Scores, 1983-1992**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Score</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Asians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. RACADEMN</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>4.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RPERSONN</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>8.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. RATHLETN</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>12.52</td>
<td>15.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. REXTRAIN</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>8.28</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. RALUMN1N</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>11.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. COUNSELN</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. TEACHER1N</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>5.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Item scores were reversed such that 1 was the lowest and 5 was highest score.
Asian American Admissions to an Elite University

Results are reported in Table 3. They support the conclusion that with moderate scores, whites had a higher probability of being admitted than did Asian Americans.

Multivariate Analyses Predicting Admissions

In order to examine the unique effects of each of the admission variables on being admitted to Harvard net of the effects of the other variables, we utilized logistic regression. The admit/reject criterion variable was regressed on the same ten predictor variables as were used in the discriminant function analysis along with race and an interaction term for race and the ten predictors. As seen in Table 4, race significantly interacted with seven of the admission criteria. These were SAT mathematics, counselor rating, alumni rating, academic rating, athletic rating, personality rating, and extracurricular rating. There was also a significant additive effect for race. Thus, the race effect operated both through the seven admission criteria and independently of them.

With the exception of class rank, all predictor variables were significantly related to admission. Class rank was a weak predictor because of its restricted range, particularly for Asian Americans. Hence, we eliminated it from subsequent analyses.

Since there were numerous interaction effects between the admission criteria and race, we divided the sample by race in subsequent analyses. Separate equations for whites and Asian Americans were then estimated (see Tables 5 and 6). We generated expected odds for each group by entering the

Table 3: Odds Ratios for Admissions, 1983-1992
All White versus Asian American Applicants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. RACADEM</td>
<td>4.78***</td>
<td>2.53***</td>
<td>1.59***</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RPERSONN</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.34***</td>
<td>1.21***</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. RATHLETN</td>
<td>1.31***</td>
<td>1.23***</td>
<td>1.09***</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. REXTRAN</td>
<td>4.69***</td>
<td>1.53***</td>
<td>1.17***</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. RALUM1N</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>2.17***</td>
<td>1.50***</td>
<td>1.24***</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. COUNSELN</td>
<td>1.89***</td>
<td>1.80***</td>
<td>1.47***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. TEACHER1N</td>
<td>1.60***</td>
<td>1.50***</td>
<td>1.34***</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Higher numbers indicate whites have greater probability of admission than Asian Americans.
2. Item scores were reversed such that 1 was the lowest and 5 was highest score.
3. ** p < .01
4. *** p < .001
5. † Zero admit cells for Asian Americans
6. †† Zero admit cells for Asian Americans and Whites

52
group's mean scores on the admission criteria into their regression equation. When this was done, the expected odds of admission for whites (.17) were significantly higher than the expected odds for Asian Americans (.05). Thus, similar to the observed odds, when the admissions process was modeled using the nine predictor variables, whites were more likely to be admitted.

The expected odds for both whites and Asian Americans were lower than their observed odds because the nine admission criteria did not capture all of the relevant information that influenced the admission deci-

---

**Table 4: Logistic Regression (Race Interaction Model) 1,2,3 1983-1992**

*All White and Asian American Applicants*

*Criterion: Reject versus Admit*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>-31.58</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. RACADEMN</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RPERSONN</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. RATHLETN</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. REXTRAN</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. RALUMN1N</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. COUNSELN</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. TEACHER1N</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SATVERB</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SATMATH</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. CPERCN</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.0205</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. RACE</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. RATHLETNR4</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. RACADEMR</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. COUNSELNR</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.0112</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. REXTRANR</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. RPERSONNR</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. SATMATHR</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. RALUMNR1NR</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.0349</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Stepwise selection of variables was used with p < .05 as the inclusion criteria.
2. Following variables were not selected by the logistic regression: CPERCENT, SATVERBBR, TEACHER1NR.
3. Item scores were reversed such that 1 was the lowest and 5 was the highest score.
4. Variable names that end with R were the race interaction terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>25,465</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>18,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted</td>
<td>6,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>85,933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Asian American Admissions to an Elite University

## Table 5: Logistic Regression, White Applicants\(^1,2\)
### 1983-1992
### Criterion: Reject versus Admit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>-22.78</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. RACADEMN</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RPERSONN</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. REXTRAN</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RALUMN1N</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>3.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. COUNSELN</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. RATHLETN</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. TEACHER1N</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SATMATH</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>64.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SATVERB</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>67.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Stepwise selection of variables was used with p < .05 as the inclusion criteria.
2. Item scores were reversed such that 1 was the lowest and 5 was the highest score.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N rejected</th>
<th>22,658</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admitted</td>
<td>6,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>73,217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 6: Logistic Regression, Asian American Applicants\(^1,2\)
### 1983-1992
### Criterion: Reject versus Admit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>-31.96</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. RACADEMN</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>3.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RPERSONN</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. REXTRAN</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RALUMN1N</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. COUNSELN</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. RATHLETN</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. TEACHER1N</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SATMATH</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>70.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SATVERB</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>63.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Stepwise selection of variables was used with p < .05 as the inclusion criteria.
2. Item scores were reversed such that 1 was the lowest and 5 was the highest score.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N rejected</th>
<th>4,516</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admitted</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>11,007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sion. If all such information was included in the model, the expected odds would be the same as the observed odds. A significant finding was that the white model predicted the admission decision for white applicants better than the Asian model for Asian applicants. Specifically, the expected odds for the white model of .17 was closer to the white observed odds of .36 than was the .05 expected odds for Asian Americans as compared to their observed odds of .27. Thus, the same nine predictor variables were more strongly related to admission for whites than for Asian Americans. Another way of stating this is to say that there were more unknown or unmeasured variables which affected the admission decision for Asian Americans than for whites.

Another way to document any differences in how the admission criteria were related to the admission probabilities of the two groups is to estimate the expected odds of a group being admitted by entering the mean scores of the other group in that group's regression equation. In fact, when Asian mean scores were substituted into the white model, the expected odds for Asians jumped from .05 to .15, quite close to the expected odds for whites. Similarly, when the white means were placed into the Asian model, the expected odds for whites fell from .17 to .05, exactly the same as the expected odds for Asian applicants. Thus, the difference in the expected probabilities of admission for white and Asian applicants appears to be due to the differential evaluation of admission criteria and not in differences in the two groups' scores. If Asians, with their pattern of scores on the nine admission criteria, were evaluated in the same way as whites, they would be admitted to Harvard at a rate quite similar to whites. Conversely, if whites were evaluated on the nine criteria in the same way as Asians, their admission rates would drop to a rate almost identical with Asians.

The logistic regression equations, and their beta weights”, provided some additional information about the relationship of admissions criteria scores and getting admitted to Harvard (see Tables 5 and 6). Although all nine variables were significant for both Asian Americans and whites, the size of the beta coefficients were larger for Asian Americans with the exception of athletic rating. In other words, a change in unit score for Asian Americans on these variables had a greater impact on their probability of admission than for whites. For example, if an applicant’s academic rating score changed from a 5 to a 4, it would have a stronger negative impact on the admission probability of an Asian American than a white applicant. These multivariate results were thus consistent with the univariate findings previously reported.
Asian American Admissions to an Elite University

Table 7: Observed versus Expected Odds for Asian American and White Applicants,† 1983-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Odds of Being Admitted versus Being Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observed Natural Log</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Model/White Means</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Model/Asian Means</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† The pool excludes children of alumni and recruited athletes.
The sample size in each group is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Asian Sample</th>
<th>White Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4,337</td>
<td>17,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>3,461</td>
<td>14,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>3,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>10,597</td>
<td>61,212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legacy and Recruited Athlete Status

Harvard's explanation for the higher admit rates for whites as compared with Asian Americans was that white applicants were more likely to have parents who attended Harvard (legacies) and were more likely to be recruited athletes. These two classes of applicants are given “tips” or preferences. Once these two factors are accounted for, the institution claimed that the admit rates for the two groups would be similar.

To examine this claim, the observed odds for Asian Americans and whites were recalculated excluding all children of alumni and recruited athletes. It should be noted that 96.4% of the applicants in our total sample who were either legacies or recruited athletes were white (4.0% of Asian applicants, 20.9% of white applicants). With this restricted pool of applicants, the two groups appeared to be admitted at essentially the same rate. Table 7 shows that the observed odds for Asian Americans and whites were almost identical. Further, as can be seen in the same Table, the expected odds for both groups were also quite similar.

Consistent with this, as shown in Table 8, when the logistic regression model was estimated without athletes and legacies, the additive effect of race and all of the race admission criteria interactions except those with academic and athletic rating became nonsignificant. Thus, as Harvard admission officials have stated, the two major factors which appeared to account for the differential ad-
Table 8: Logistic Regression (Race Interaction Model)¹,²,³,⁴
Asian American and White Applicants, 1983-1992
Criterion: Reject versus Admit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>-33.61</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. RACADEMN</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RPERSONN</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. REXTRAN</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RALUMN1N</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. COUNSELN</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. RATHLETN</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. TEACHER1N</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SATVERB</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SATMATH</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. CPERCENT</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. RATHLETNR5</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. RACADEMN</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Stepwise selection of variables was used with p < .05 as the inclusion criteria.
2. Following variables were not selected by the logistic regression: RACE, SATMATHR, SATVERBR, CPERC, REXTRANR, RPERSONNR, TEACHER1NR, COUNSELNR, RALUMN1NR.
3. Item scores were reversed such that 1 was the lowest and 5 was the highest score.
4. The pool excludes children of alumni and recruited athletes.
5. Variable names that end with R were the race interaction terms.

- **N**: 20,883
- **Rejected**: 16,474
- **Admitted**: 4,409
- **Missing**: 73,192

It appears that part of the legacy and athletic "tip" was given when the overall summary scores (ROVER3N) were assigned. The overall scores of alumni children and recruited athletes were significantly higher than non-athlete/non-alumni applicants. This seems unwarranted based solely on their ratings on the ten admission criteria as compared with the ratings received by non-athlete/non-alumni applicants.

It is also instructive to examine the mean...
### Table 9: Mean Scores on Variables for Recruited Athletes and Children of Alumni vs. Non-Athlete/Non-alumni Applicants
#### 1983-1992
##### For Applicants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Recruited Athletes</th>
<th>Children of Alumni</th>
<th>Non-Athlete &amp; Non-Alumni</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ROVER3N</td>
<td>3.16&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.09&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.84&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SATMATH</td>
<td>64.95&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>66.40&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>66.57&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. SATVERB</td>
<td>57.85&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>63.67&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>62.11&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RATHLETN</td>
<td>4.60&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.89&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.82&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. RACADEMN</td>
<td>2.71&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.11&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.05&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. REXTRAN</td>
<td>3.01&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.29&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.25&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. RPERSONN</td>
<td>3.34&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.25&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.18&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. TEACHER1N</td>
<td>3.41&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.38&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.39&lt;sup&gt;a,b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. COUNSELN</td>
<td>3.38&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.33&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.34&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. RALUMN1N</td>
<td>3.45&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.46&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.35&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. CPERCENT</td>
<td>88.35&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>86.36&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>91.82&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a, b, c* Means with the same letter are not significantly different for the same variable.

- N = 20,883
- Rejected = 16,474
- Admitted = 4,409
- Missing = 73,192

### Table 10: Mean Scores on Variables for Recruited Athletes and Children of Alumni vs. Non-Athlete/Non-alumni Applicants
#### 1983-1992
##### For Admitted Applicants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Recruited Athletes</th>
<th>Children of Alumni</th>
<th>Non-Athlete &amp; Non-Alumni</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ROVER3N</td>
<td>3.50&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.70&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.78&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SATMATH</td>
<td>67.02&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>69.50&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>71.77&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. SATVERB</td>
<td>60.30&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>67.41&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>68.67&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RATHLETN</td>
<td>4.69&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.92&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.89&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. RACADEMN</td>
<td>3.00&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.60&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.81&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. REXTRAN</td>
<td>3.10&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.48&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.57&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. RPERSONN</td>
<td>3.48&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.47&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.56&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. TEACHER1N</td>
<td>3.57&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.68&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.92&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. COUNSELN</td>
<td>3.57&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.66&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.86&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. RALUMN1N</td>
<td>3.65&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.75&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.94&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. CPERCENT</td>
<td>92.30&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>92.47&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>96.73&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a, b, c* Means with the same letter are not significantly different.

- N = 20,883
- Rejected = 16,474
- Admitted = 4,409
- Missing = 73,192
admission scores of only the admitted applicants in these three groups. These scores are presented in Table 10. It is evident that the “tip” for recruited athletes and legacies was quite significant as their scores, both overall and on all of the specific admission criteria except athletic rating, were significantly lower than those of non-alumni/non-athlete students. Thus, it appears that another part of the “tip” was given after the overall summary scores were assigned, most likely when committees met to make final admission decisions.

V. DISCUSSION

Harvard admission officials have frequently stated that ethnicity is a “plus” for admission to the institution. Nowhere in our quantitative analyses of Asian Americans vis-à-vis whites did we find evidence for this assertion. However, the analyses did support their claim that the lower admit rate for Asian American applicants, as compared with white applicants, was primarily due to the small number of Asian Americans who were legacies or recruited athletes.

The Office for Civil Rights, in their statement of findings on the Harvard compliance review, determined that giving preference to alumni children and recruited athletes was not a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. When asked by OCR to justify the policy of legacy preferences, Harvard argued that parents’ financial, recruiting, and community relations support were important for legitimate institutional goals. Specifically, OCR accepted Harvard’s explanation that:

[Harvard’s alumni] are naturally, very interested in the college choices of their own children. If their children are rejected by Harvard, their affection for and interest in the college may decline; if their children are admitted, their involvement with the College is renewed. Having children share the parent’s college affiliation stimulates those three aspects of contribution: of service, of money, and of community relations.

Harvard submitted documentation which indicated that, for example, in 1989 alumni contributed 36 million dollars to the Harvard College Fund, much of which provided financial aid to needy students. Moreover, over 4,000 alumni served on school and scholarship committees.
Asian American Admissions to an Elite University

OCR found no case law which addressed the issue of a private university giving admissions preference to alumni children. In one Federal District Court case noted by OCR (Rosenstock v. Board of Governors of University of North Carolina)23, however, the court did recognize the “legitimacy of a link between a University’s economic interests and admissions preference to alumni children based on the fact that alumni donate large sums of money to the University.”24 As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has pointed out, the relevance of Rosenstock to a private university is open to question. Most pertinent to Harvard, no “suspect class” such as Asian Americans was involved in Rosenstock and thus the less stringent “rational relation test” and not the stronger “strict scrutiny” legal test was involved. The Civil Rights Commission also emphasized that the issue of legacy tips will continue to affect not only Asian Americans but all minorities who are underrepresented among alumni of elite universities. As some critics have argued, in a sense, the legacy tip serves as “affirmative action for the white privileged class.”25 Further, it should be noted that these institutions receive considerable federal funds, significantly more than received from alumni. The financial justification for the legacy tip, and the related public policy issues, should be evaluated in this context. Given the significance that access to these universities has for the well-being of minority individuals and their communities, these issues should be much more fully debated by the larger community of legal scholars and civil rights advocates.26

Soon after OCR’s decision on Harvard’s Asian American review was released, Senator Robert J. Dole wrote to then Secretary of Education nominee Lamar Alexander that he should “re-examine the Department’s . . .endorsement of the so-called ‘legacy preference.’” He also pointed out that the practice “calls into question . . . the very assumptions undergirding our society (that ‘the rules of the game are fair to all’ and that ‘merit will prevail’).”27

Finally, as the number of Asian American alumni dramatically increases and their children apply to Harvard and other elite institutions, the political dynamics surrounding the legacy issue will undoubtedly change. What will happen when many Asian Americans are able to take advantage of the legacy “tip?” Can the current justification that alumni contribute to the well being of the university hold in the face of pressures from whites and other groups associated with a student body that has more Asian American than white students? This issue bears continued careful monitoring from both conceptual as well as community interest perspectives.
Endnotes


13. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1992, p. 120.

14. The rationale for stepwise analysis within the general linear model applies here. As Kim and Kohout (1975) have argued, the stepwise procedure is best suited to research problems in which the goal is "to isolate a subset of available predictor variables that will yield an optimal prediction equation with as few terms as possible" (p. 345). In this instance, it was used to identify a parsimonious set of variables that account for differences between Asian American and white applicants on the admission criteria. It should also be noted that the large sample size insures that variables that have even small effects will be retained in the model. See Jae-On Kim and F. J. Kohout, "Multiple regression analysis: Subprogram regression," In Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. eds. Norman H. Nie, C. Hadlai Hull, Jean G. Jenkins, Karin Steinbrenner, and Dale H. Bent (Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press, 1975).

15. The statistically appropriate way to assess the
Asian American Admissions to an Elite University

contribution of the rating variables (which are measured on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 5) is to use a series of contrasts in which the effects of each score (e.g., 1) on the probability of being admitted are sequentially compared to the effects of all other scores. But, in the logistic regression analyses presented here, the rating scores were treated as interval measures because we were interested in obtaining a summative measure of the effect of the rating rather than in the relative contribution of each score.

16. Elimination of the class rank variable in the subsequent logistic regression analyses conducted separately by race increased their sample sizes slightly. This is because removal of the class rank variable added those respondents with missing data on that variable to the sample.

17. Beta weights indicate the amount of change in the odds of moving from rejection to admission that is attributable to an increase of one unit on an admission criterion.

18. For the years 1985-1992, legacies had an admit rate of 35.7% and recruited athletes 48.7%. While Asian Americans made up 15.7% of all applicants over the period, they were only 3.5% of the alumni children and 4.1% of the recruited athlete pools. The data for the years 1983 and 1984 were incomplete. See U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, “Statement of Findings, Compliance Review No.01-88-6009” (on Harvard University), Oct. 4, 1990, p. 35 (hereafter cited as OCR Findings).

19. The Tukey post-hoc multiple comparison test provides a systematic comparison of all possible pairs of group mean scores. When such comparisons are made, the Tukey test reduces the probability that comparisons will be significant by chance alone.

20. Title VI prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or national origin. OCR’s investigation, which was based upon Title VI and its implementing regulations,

first attempted to determine if there was intentional discrimination, then whether one or more admission criteria had a disparate effect on Asian Americans. For each instance of a procedure, criterion, or factor which accounted for a lower admit rate for Asian Americans compared to white applicants, OCR investigated whether it could be justified in terms of institutional goals or legitimate educational purposes, or whether it was a pretext for discrimination.


24. OCR Findings 1990, pp. 41-42.


Welfare Reform: Effects on the Legal Permanent Immigrant

Andrew Leong

This article examines the potential impact of the Republican welfare reform proposal, the Personal Responsibility Act, on Asian Pacific American legal immigrants. The Act would deny legal immigrants virtually all forms of public assistance. One potential outcome is the division of American society into "first class citizens" and "second class immigrants." If this measure passes, it is another example of the historical persistence of anti-immigrant sentiments.

With the victory of Proposition 187 by the conservative forces in California, immigrant rights advocates have filed for injunctions in federal district courts to halt its implementation. In addition to Proposition 187 this past year, there have been numerous recent incidents involving Cuban and Haitian refugees, the smuggling of Chinese nationals in the Golden Venture case, and the suits by various states against the federal government for reimbursement of state costs relating to services for undocumented aliens.\(^1\) Yet we have not heard as much regarding the proposals affecting legal immigrants by Congress, which, if enacted, will have a far greater impact on legal immigrants in the United States.

In this piece I will provide a review of the "Personal Responsibility Act."\(^2\) As opposed to the undocumented immigrant who was an easy target in California, this proposed legislation will have its greatest impact on legal permanent residents.\(^3\) Therefore, this comment will focus on Section IV of the Act, which primarily affects legal permanent residents including Asian Pacific Islander legal immigrants.

Andrew Leong, esq. is Assistant Professor at the Law Center in the College of Public & Community Service at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. He currently serves as pro bono General Counsel to a grass roots organization in the fight against institutional expansion in Boston’s Chinatown.
Welfare Reform

THE 103RD CONGRESS

A review of the various immigration related legislation introduced during the last session of Congress revealed several on-going themes: the reduction of the annual number of immigrant visas, reduction in the annual intake of refugees, a reduction of government benefits for legal permanent residents, additional funding for the INS for the hiring of more border patrol guards, and a tamper-proof national "ID" card.\(^4\) Certain legislation even proposed that any individual born in the United States to an undocumented person would not be considered a United States citizen.\(^5\) If anything, these bills demonstrate the depth of animosity surrounding the debate on immigration reform.

The "Personal Responsibility Act"

During November of 1994 in the 103rd session of Congress, Republicans proposed House Resolution 3500, entitled the "Personal Responsibility Act" (also known as the Santorum/Shaw bill). In the current 104th session of Congress, the Act has been reintroduced by Representative Clay Shaw (R-Fla) as H.R. 4. This Act is one of the ten pieces of legislation in the Republican Party's "Contract with America."\(^6\) H.R. 4 is not an immigration bill. It is, rather, a welfare reform measure. The title of the Act states that the intent of the bill is "to restore the American family, reduce illegitimacy, control welfare spending and reduce welfare dependence."

However, our focus is on its impact on Asian Pacific Islander legal immigrants. In order to finance welfare reform, Title IV of H.R. 4 would eliminate over 60 different entitlement programs for non-citizens.\(^7\) Legal permanent residents would become ineligible for four major federal programs to aid the poor: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), food stamps, and Medicaid.\(^8\) Secondly, beyond the "Big Four" above, other programs to be eliminated for legal permanent residents include: school lunch and breakfast for children; public housing and rental assistance; higher education loans; foster care and adoptive services assistance; maternal and child health services, food programs for women, infants, children, and the elderly; funds for the prevention of lead poisoning in infants and children; job training programs for disadvan-
tagged youths and adults; low income energy and weatherization assistance; community services block grants; and legal assistance to the poor.9

Legal permanent residents who are over 75 years old and who have resided in the U.S. for at least 5 years are exempted from H.R. 4.10 The other exemption is for refugees. Refugees would only be eligible for public assistance for the first six years, dated from their date of entry.11

One purpose behind the “Contract with America” is to bring our deficit down and balance the budget. One provision in H.R. 4 specifically states that savings from welfare spending will be used for deficit reduction.12 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) believes that legal immigrants will receive $21.3 billion in federal assistance via the “Big Four” over the next five years.13 Therefore, sponsors of H.R. 4 claim that the elimination of the above programs for legal permanent residents could save the government over $20 billion during the same five years.14

Even assuming the validity of the above savings, we are venturing into a sensitive area by focusing the budget reduction on services to legal immigrants. As history reveals, the non-citizen immigrant was utilized for the generation of funds through various fees or tax measures especially during the 19th century.15 This Act has the potential of dividing American society into clear categories of citizens and non-citizens.

Unfortunately, the welfare reform debate is marred with the myth that most immigrants are here because of the “welfare magnet.” We must realize that recent immigrants are ineligible for most public welfare because of current regulations. For instance, people who were granted the “temporary protected status” under the Immigration Act of 199016 are ineligible for many federal programs.17 For newly arrived legal permanent residents, they are ineligible for many cash assistance programs due to the three year “deeming” rule, whereby the income of their sponsor is attributed as resource available to the immigrant, whether or not the resource is available to the sponsored immigrant.18 Regulations also exist to deport a legal immigrant if he/she has become a public charge by using welfare within their first 5 years of residence.19 Resident aliens re-entering the U.S. may be excluded from entry based upon previous use of welfare, therefore signaling their likelihood of becoming a public charge.20 Lastly, most recent immigrants want to petition their relatives to immigrate to the U.S. Therefore, they may be deterred from applying for public assistance despite need, since public dependency reduces their chances of becoming a sponsor.

From the 1990 Census, another set of information that is seldom publicized is that native-born Americans receive 87.2% of all
Welfare Reform

welfare benefits ($26.4 billion) while immigrants and refugees receive the remaining 12.8% ($3.9 billion). Moreover, welfare spending is a mere 1% of the overall federal budget. There are certainly more effective ways of reducing the deficit. The defense industry could be reduced in this post-Cold War era. As Labor Secretary Robert Reich has pointed out, “corporate welfare” is also a drain on the U.S. budget, yet conservatives have ignored this form of entitlement. Subsidies to the farm or tobacco industries are also a form of welfare. According to the Office of Management and Budget and the Joint Committee on Taxation, in 1994, U.S. taxpayers spent $51 billion in direct subsidies to business and lost another $53.3 billion in tax breaks for corporations. An estimated $29.2 billion alone was spent subsidizing just the agribusiness sector. If the focus is truly on deficit reduction, the effort spent on cutting welfare funding for the poor seems extremely ineffectual, especially given that conservatives intend to increase corporate welfare by lowering the capital gains tax.

EFFECTS OF THE ACT

Direct effects on immigrants’ Supplemental Security Income

The immediate effect of cuts in SSI would mean the elimination of supplemental cash payments to more than 600,000 legal permanent residents, of whom 225,000 are disabled and 372,000 are elderly.

Examining the CBO’s estimation of savings, the largest category of use for immigrants is SSI. One study indicates that more than 25% of post-1980 elderly immigrants receive welfare as compared to 7% of elderly native-born Americans. When a comparison is made between elderly immigrants who have resided in the U.S. for over 20 years versus elderly native-born Americans, the figures show that the use of SSI is 8.7% versus 6.9%, respectively. This is a dramatic difference from the earlier figure. The explanation behind this is that most U.S. citizens or elderly immigrants with a U.S. working history of 20 years or more have social security to support themselves, whereas recently arrived elderly immigrants are unable to fulfill the eligibility requirements since they do not have the work history. In essence, the use of SSI becomes a substitute safety net for the recently arrived elderly immigrant. One 1992 study found that 11% of all SSI recipients are legal permanent residents.

The clear message to any legal immigrant family who supports their non-citizen parents is that their tax dollars will go toward supporting other people’s parents, but not their own. This would certainly affect the rate of reunification of family members via immigration, since most immigrants are working class and might not be able to support their elderly parents. It would mean a
choice between not reuniting with your family and reunification under poverty circumstances.

**Medicaid**

Cuts in Medicaid for legal immigrants would add almost one million men, women, and children to the number of uninsured people in this country.²⁹ This consequence is ironic in light of the current discussions regarding health care reform. Since preventive care is not an option unless the patient can afford the high price of health care, these cuts in Medicaid will mean that legal immigrants will not seek out medical services unless there is an emergency.³⁰ The long-term effects will be higher emergency room admissions, increased hospitalizations, and overall increased cost to the health care system. The medical effects of H.R. 4 would not be restricted to immigrants. For example, the Act eliminates grants for immunizations against vaccine-preventable diseases and will affect all people in the U.S.³¹

**Aid to Families with Dependent Children**

The elimination of AFDC for immigrants and especially for refugees, even after the refugees have been here for over 6 years, would mean additional burdens on single mothers trying to adjust to life in a new land. Cutting AFDC for these immigrants would also mean the denial of other related benefits, possibly including child care, job training, and transportation³². As such, single immigrant mothers able to get a job would leave more “latch-key” kids in our society, since they would not be supported by child care programs. Others unable to find employment due to unavailability of job training programs or adequate transportation would face more dire consequences, such as homelessness. It seems that the very things that the government is trying to prevent (homelessness, unemployment, government dependency) will, in fact, occur as a result of these proposed policies.

With the CBO’s estimation of cost savings at $1 billion over the next five years, AFDC is the smallest program out of the “Big Four.” However, the cut in AFDC will mean one less alternative for immigrant women to become independent or escape from abusive households. AFDC is usually the key transitional program for immigrant women
Welfare Reform

trapped in both an abusive environment and a financial situation where they are economically dependent on their spouse. Therefore, even though the monetary figure might be small, the cut will still be sharply felt by abused women.\textsuperscript{33}

**Food Stamps**

By eliminating food stamp eligibility for low-income immigrants, these families will have even fewer available resources to sustain themselves with basic necessities. These cuts would most heavily impact infants, since recipients often use food stamps to buy baby food, diapers, and other daily necessities. The elderly would also be affected since food stamps are perhaps the major source of purchasing power for this group outside of the cash benefits from SSI.

Little is known about the amount and pattern of food stamps used by immigrants. For example, since food stamps obviously identify the user as a welfare recipient, there is a stigma factor associated with their use which many recent immigrants may find culturally unacceptable. Therefore, the accuracy of figures about how much would be saved by eliminating this program would be doubtful. This gap in knowledge, and the grave impact that the elimination of food stamps could possibly have for those immigrant families who utilize the program, shows the lack of analysis that has accompanied the proposals in H.R. 4.

**Other Items to be eliminated in the Act**

Besides the “Big Four”, nine health-related\textsuperscript{34} and at least seven food-related programs\textsuperscript{35} will be cut with passage of the Personal Responsibility Act. In addition, fourteen different types of housing programs will be cut for immigrants,\textsuperscript{36} ranging from major programs such as “section 8” rent subsidies\textsuperscript{37} to low income public housing\textsuperscript{38}. Moreover, the Act makes low to middle income immigrants ineligible for certain loan programs to assist in the purchase of homes\textsuperscript{39}, or to preserve or rehabilitate homes\textsuperscript{40}.

H.R. 4 will eliminate nine higher education loan and scholarship programs for immigrants.\textsuperscript{41} Eight job training programs will be cut for immigrants.\textsuperscript{42} These cuts will affect not only poor immigrants, but middle class immigrants as well, since many of them utilize educational loans and scholarships, and housing assistance programs. For many immigrants, the cuts may push them out of the middle class, resulting in greater divisions between the poor and the rich.

The total impact of these measures will be much more wide-spread since various programs will overlap and create a multiple effect because eligibility for one program often determines eligibility for other programs.
If poor immigrants are not already the most vulnerable and least protected class in the U.S., the Personal Responsibility Act will ensure them that status. Furthermore, the drafters of the Act have pre-empted any attempt to protect immigrant’s rights. For example, the Act eliminates the eligibility of immigrants for legal assistance provided by the Legal Services Corporation. This effectively prevents many immigrants from challenging unlawful government actions, as well as from challenging unscrupulous employers, slumlords, and abusive spouses. The high price of budget reduction by the Personal Responsibility Act is an America with non-citizens that are, for the most part, sick, hungry, malnourished, homeless, uneducated and unemployed.

INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER EFFECTS

Even though the above cuts would save the federal government some money, these same costs would be shifted to the states. Once immigrants are deemed ineligible for federal programs, they will start applying for aid with local and state offices under state guidelines. This would prompt states to sue the federal government in attempts to obtain reimbursement. The inner-city communities would be affected greatly, since 93% of immigrant families reside there. In turn, the states might pass similar measures to eliminate legal immigrants from programs not covered under federal legislation. These measures, if they involve state benefits not covered by federal mandate, will certainly be subject to constitutional changes based upon equal protection grounds. In 1971, the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardson prohibited states from denying public assistance to legal immigrants based on their status. In 1976, however, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of Graham in Mathew v. Diaz and Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong. In the two latter cases, the Supreme Court held that federal statutes and regulations are not subject to 14th Amendment equal protection challenges by legal permanent residents. Therefore, so long as the states remain consistent with federal policies, legal permanent residents may not be able to raise these constitutional challenges.

By directly increasing poverty and homelessness among immigrants and refu-
Welfare Reform

ges, the Personal and Responsibility Act will indirectly affect immigration policies and practices. With the current anti-immigrant sentiment, INS will probably increase the number of legal immigrants that it deports as public charges. Another effect would be that prospective immigrants, i.e. those who are applying for visas, will be more aggressively screened and interviewed by American Consulate officials to determine the likelihood of their becoming a public charge upon entry. Upon passage of this Act, the rejection rate of immigration applications may increase due to the perception that more beneficiaries will become public charges.

One positive, albeit unintended, effect of this Act is the enticement for an immigrant to become naturalized, since a citizen would be eligible for all of the above programs being eliminated. The impetus is to mobilize immigrant communities to naturalize and become a political force to be reckoned with, rather than being victimized. Unfortunately, the process of naturalization is difficult in many ways due to lack of understanding of the naturalization application and process, as well as passing the English and U.S. civics examinations. The extensive waiting list at non-profit organizations that offer English and naturalization classes reveals that naturalization is a long and arduous task for many working class immigrants.

Ultimately, the Personal Responsibility Act will create a two-tier society of “first-class U.S. citizens” and “second-class immigrants.” The citizen would be eligible for all rights and services, while the immigrant will survive on a sub-class basis. Apparently, this society desires immigrants as a cheap source of labor, but is not willing to provide for their basic needs and services.

POLICY EFFECTS

The effects on the policy front have already been felt. By March of 1994, conservative and moderate Democrats, in the form of the “Mainstream Forum” came up with similar legislation that would eliminate immigrant eligibility from the “Big Four.” They did leave intact other programs which the Personal Responsibility Act would eliminate. The drastic nature of this Act makes other welfare reform measure, such as the “Mainstream Forum’s,” seemingly moderate and acceptable.

By June of 1994, the Clinton Administration unveiled its own version of welfare reform. Its effects include an extension of the “deeming” period from the three to five years. From the sixth year until naturalization, the sponsored immigrant would be barred from benefits unless she could prove her sponsor’s income is less than the U.S. median family income, regardless of the household size.

With the current Republican majority
control of the U.S. Senate and the House, the situation is even more serious. All of the above welfare reform measures were introduced prior to the mid-term elections of 1994. Now the Republicans have a "mandate" from the American people to pass these measures into law.

CONCLUSION

Even though the percentage of aid to the poor is not a large portion of the federal budget, for many this reform initiative is a highly symbolic gesture. The inherent notion within the welfare reform message is that the groups for which benefits are being eliminated do not "deserve" the entitlement and should not have full rights and benefits of society. The prospect of eliminating wholesale entitlement programs for legal permanent residents is consistent with the idea that this will turn off the "welfare magnet." Since the focus is on "less deserving" groups, poor immigrants are the most likely target since they are arguably viewed by many as the "least deserving." Furthermore, the current debate pits working class citizens against working class immigrants.

Lost in the discussion is that the Personal Responsibility Act harms people who entered this country legally. The current debate lumps all immigrants together, whether they are legal or undocumented. Many American citizens are understandably confused into thinking that there is no discernible difference between legal and undocumented immigrants. Further lost in the argument is that legal immigrants make use of public benefits much less than the native-born.\(^2\) Moreover, immigrants have a positive effect on the economy. They generate $285 billion in income and pay over $70 billion in taxes each year. After deducting the costs of services they receive, immigrants generate a net annual surplus of $25 to $30 billion in taxes, yet use only $5.7 billion in welfare.\(^3\) From these figures it appears that admitting immigrants makes economic sense because their contributions outweigh their costs.

The main tasks are to balance the federal budget and choose which programs to downsize. The conservative Republican or Democrat chose to take the easy task of mounting an attack against the weak, taking on cases of "welfare fraud" and convincing the American working people that the enemy is our neighbor. All the effort by conservatives will only save a few dollars, but no-
Welfare Reform

where near the amount we could save if the focus were on other programs.

The real issue is one of scape-goating a group of people who are vulnerable and without political clout.\textsuperscript{54} It would appear that the U.S. wants immigrants only if they are capable of supporting themselves. Immigrants might come to the U.S. for a new opportunity, but if they should fall upon hard times, they should expect nothing from the society. Meanwhile, immigrants continue to pay their taxes, contribute to the community, and serve in the military should the need arise. It is not enough for businesses to exploit the cheap source of labor from our immigrant communities. Now, Congress wants to finance our welfare reform upon the backs of the immigrants. The level of this de-humanizing debate takes us back to over 100 years ago, where immigrants were offered piece meal wages without any benefits, workers were dismissed at the whim of the employer, and were invisible for all purposes but for the cyclical need for a cheap source of labor.\textsuperscript{55} What the Personal Responsibility Act and other similar legislation do is to open the flood gates to the exploitation of the immigrant class again. We might soon see a fee being re-introduced for immigrant entry to the U.S. Not far along will come another exclusion act,\textsuperscript{56} this time, not just for Asians, but for all immigrants. History seems to be repeating itself.

Appendix

H.R. 4, TITLE IV - RESTRICTING WELFARE FOR Aliens
SECTION 401. INELIGIBILITY OF ALIENS FOR PUBLIC WELFARE ASSISTANCE.

(d) Programs For Which Aliens Are Ineligible. - The programs referred to in this subsection are the following:

(1) The program of medical assistance under title XIX of the Social Security Act, except emergency services as provided subsection (c).
(2) The Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant Program under title V of the Social Security Act.
(3) The program established in section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (relating to community health centers).
(4) The program established in section 1001 of the Public Health Service Act (relating to family planning methods and services).
(5) The program established in section 329 of the Public Health Service Act (relating to migrant health centers).
(6) The program of aid and services to needy families with children under part A of title IV of the Social Security Act.
(7) The child welfare services program under part B of title IV of the Social Security Act.
(9) The program of foster care and adoption assistance under part E of title IV of the Social Security Act.
(10) The food assistance block grant program established under title V of this Act.
(11) The program of rental assistance on behalf of low-income families provided under section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437).
(12) The program of assistance to public housing under title I of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq.).
(14) The program of interest reduction payments pursuant to contracts entered into by the Secre-
tary of Housing and Urban Development under section 236 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1715z-1).


(16) The program of rental assistance payments pursuant to contracts entered into under section 521(a)(2)(A) of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1490a(a)(2)(A)).

(17) The program of assistance payments on behalf of homeowners under section 225 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1715z).

(18) The program of rent supplement payments on behalf of qualified tenants pursuant to contracts entered into under section 101 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 (12 U.S.C. 1701a).

(19) The loan and grant programs under section 504 of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1474) for repairs and improvements to rural dwellings.

(20) The loan and assistance programs under sections 514 and 516 of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1484, 1486) for housing for farm labor.

(21) The programs of grants for preservation and rehabilitation of housing under section 533 of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1490m).

(22) The program of grants and loans for mutual and self-help housing and technical assistance under section 523 of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1490c).


(32) The program established in sections 338A and 338B of the Public Health Service Act and the programs established in part A of title VII of such Act (relating to loans and scholarships for education in the health professions).

(33) The program established in section 317(j)(1) of the Public Health Service Act (relating to grants for immunizations against vaccine-preventable diseases).

(34) The program established in section 317A of the Public Health Service Act (relating to grants for screening, referrals, and education regarding lead poisoning in infants and children).

(35) The program established in part A of title XIX of the Public Health Service Act (relating to block grants for preventive health and health services).

(36) The programs established in subparts I and II of part B of title XIX of the Public Health Service Act.

(37)(A) The program of training for disadvantaged adults under part A of Title II of the Job Training Partnership Act (29 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).

(B) The program of training for disadvantaged youth under part C of title II of the Job Training Partnership Act (29 U.S.C. 1641 et seq.).

(38) The Job Corps program under part B of title IV of the Job Training Partnership Act (29 U.S.C. 1692 et seq.).

(39) The summer youth employment and training programs under part B of title II of the Job Training Partnership Act (29 U.S.C. 1630 et seq.).

(40) The programs carried out under the Older American Community Service Employment Act (42 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.).

(41) The program under title III of the Older Americans Act of 1965.


(44) The program under the Low-Income Energy Assistance Act of 1981 (42 U.S.C. 8621 et seq.).


(46) The program of block grants to States for social services under title XX of the Social Security Act.

(47) The programs carried out under the Commu-
Welfare Reform

...nity Services Block Grant Act (42 U.S.C. 9901 et seq.).
(48) The program of legal assistance to eligible clients and other programs under the Legal Services Corporation Act (42 U.S.C. 2996 et seq.).
(49) The program for emergency food and shelter grants under title III of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11331 et seq.).
(50) The programs carried out under the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 9858 et seq.).
(51) A State program for providing child care under section 402(i) of the Social Security Act.

TITLE V - CONSOLIDATING FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
SECTION 501. FOOD ASSISTANCE BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM.

c) An assurance that not less than 12 percent of each grant received from funds allotted for fiscal years 1996 through 2000 will be expended to provide food assistance and nutrition education to pregnant women, postpartum women, breastfeeding women, infants, and young children,
(d) an assurance that not less than 20 percent of each grant received from funds allotted for fiscal years 1996 through 2000 will be expended to provide:
A) nonprofit school breakfast programs for students from economically disadvantaged families,
B) milk in nonprofit schools and in nonprofit nursery schools, child care centers, settlement houses, summer camps, and similar institutions devoted to the care and training of children, to children from economically disadvantaged families,
C) nonprofit school lunch programs for students from economically disadvantaged families,
D) expanded food service programs in institutions providing child care for children from economically disadvantaged families,
(E) summer food service programs carried out by nonprofit food authorities, local governments, nonprofit higher education institutions participating in the National Youth Sports Program, and residential nonprofit summer camps, to provide meals to children from economically disadvantaged families.[]

Endnotes

1. The states include Florida, California, Arizona, Texas, New Jersey, and New York.
3. Refugees are also not the major focus here since, by law, they can receive welfare upon entry to assist them in their resettlement process while immigrants cannot. As a result welfare use amongst refugees is usually higher.
5. See S. 1351, H.J.Res. 396, H.J.Res. 340, H.J.Res. 129, H.R. 1191, H.J.Res. 117, 103rd Cong. (1994). The above measures go against the established principle of jus soli (citizenship by the place of one’s birth), which not only is settled law [See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)] but was codified by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1868.
6. The other proposed legislation include H.R. 2, the “Fiscal Responsibility Act”; H.R. 3, the “Taking Back Our Streets Act”; H.R.5, the “Unfunded Mandate Reform Act”; H.R. 6, the “American Dream Restoration Act”; H.R. 7, the “National Security Restoration Act”; H.R. 8, the “Senior Citizens Equity Act”; H.R. 9, the “Job Creation & Wage Enhancement Act”; H.R. 10, the “Common Sense Legal Reform Act”; and H.R. 11, the “Family Reinforcement Act.”
7. The 103rd Congressional session’s H.R. 3500 version of this bill included at least 60 programs to be eliminated for legal immigrants. The 104th session’s H.R. 4 seems to have only
53 programs to be eliminated under Section IV. However, the other programs in the earlier version were shifted to a different section of H.R. 4. Section V of H.R. 4 enumerates the various food programs to be cut for immigrants. See Appendix for listing of programs.

8. Hereinafter, I will refer to these programs as the “Big Four.”

9. A complete listing of the programs to be eliminated appear in the appendix.

10. See H.R.4, Title IV, §401 (b) (2).
11. See H.R.4, Title IV, §401 (b) (1).
12. See H.R.4, Title III, §303.


14. Specifically, the Congressional Budget Office’s 1993 Report estimates the Republican welfare reform measure would save the U.S. $21.3 billion via just cutting the “Big Four” over the next 5 years: SSI ($9.4 billion), Medicaid ($8.1 billion), Food Stamps ($2.8 billion), and AFDC ($1.0 billion). See Michael Fix and Jeffrey Passel (1994). “Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight.” The Urban Institute, p. 65. [Hereinafter as Fix and Passel]


18. The alien sponsor “deeming” requirements for Supplemental Security Income can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 1382. Please note that recent amendment to the SSI “deeming” rules increased the time period from 3 to 5 years, see Pub. L. No. 103-152 (1993). See also 42 U.S.C. § 615 for “deeming” rules for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program and 7 U.S.C. § 2014(j) for Food Stamps. Currently, there are no “deeming” requirements for Medicaid.

20. For a detailed account of the exclusion of elderly Asian SSI recipients, see Hing, pp. 113-115.


26. See Fix and Passel, p. 63

27. Ibid. at p. 64.

Welfare Reform

30. H.R. 4 exempts emergency medical services from elimination, therefore, legal and undocumented immigrants are still eligible for this service. See, H.R. 4, Title IV, Section 401(c).

31. Title VI, § 401(d)(33). See Appendix.

32. The specific contents of each AFDC program will vary from state to state. In Massachusetts, current regulations require AFDC recipients to be registered with the “Mass JOBS Program,” which require recipients to be either attending school for 12 or more credits/week or be involved in job related activities. Child care and transportation expenses are covered under the Mass JOBS Program. See 106 C. M. R. §307.


34. Title IV, §§ 401(d)(1)-(5),(33)-(36). See Appendix.

35. Title V, §§ 501(c)(3), (4)(A)-(e) and Title IV, § 401(d)(49). See Appendix.

36. Title IV, §§ 401(d)(11)-(23), (49). See Appendix.

37. See Title IV, § 401(d) (11). See Appendix.

38. See Title IV, § 401(d) (12). See Appendix.

39. For an example, see Title IV, §§ 401(d) (13)-(15), (17). See Appendix.

40. See Title IV, § 401(d) (21). See Appendix.

41. Title IV, §§ 401(d)(24)-(32). See Appendix.

42. Title IV, §§ 401(d)(37A), (37B)-(43). See Appendix.

43. Title IV, § 401(d)(48). See Appendix.

44. Fix and Passel, p. 29.

45. These measures will also certainly be challenged on constitutional grounds. For example, one provision in California’s Proposition 187 violates the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyer, the Supreme Court ruled that the states cannot deny undocumented children the right to a public education. California realized that Proposition 187 could be unconstitutional under Plyer, yet chose to proceed with the measure. Other states will probably cut benefits for the legal permanent residents and face similar constitutional issues.

46. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).

47. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).


49. The public charge exclusion ground can be found at 8 U. S. C. §1182 (a) (4).


51. Currently this figure is $39,500. Bureau of the Census, United States Census 1990.

52. Fix and Passel, p. 63. Based upon their analysis of the 1990 Census, the authors of the Urban Institute’s report found that, throughout the 1980s, immigrant use of welfare actually declined. For non-refugee immigrants (ages 15 and over) who entered the U.S. during the 1980s, 2% reported receiving welfare income versus 3.7% of the same age group of natives.

54. Certainly if immigrants were allowed to vote, this type of victimization may not occur. In fact, this was another right that was taken away from immigrants. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, legal permanent residents had the right to vote in many state elections. Arkansas was the last state to end this right for aliens in 1928.


56. Chinese were the first of many Asian groups to be excluded from immigrating to the U.S. For further discussion, see Hing, note 15.
Asian Americans in Enclaves — They Are Not One Community: New Modes of Asian American Settlement

Tom L. Chung

Based on three decades of demographic and social changes in eastern Massachusetts, a new framework, has been identified: an ethnic enclave. This framework is derived from empirical data and isolates three types of enclaves. Chinatown, the original enclave, has transformed into an ethnic crossing. It that facilitates interactions among ethnic enclaves. Only after acknowledging the internal differences among the Asian American population, and recognizing the differences among enclaves, can policy makers and activists enact plans for social and political empowerment.

The focus of most studies about Asian Americans has been primarily on either “community needs” or cultural differences (e.g., attitude toward Western style health care), which mainly reflect the passive aspects of Asian Americans’ lives. The active aspects of Asian Americans’ lives such as the interdependence of the various groups are overlooked. Consequently, Asian Americans are often referred to as “the Asian American community.” Too often, Asian Americans are lumped together as a single group in quantitative studies; while in qualitative studies, individual groups are conveniently taken or implied to be the representative of all Asian Americans. There are at least two obvious reasons why Asian Americans should not be considered as one community. First, in a geographic sense, Asian Americans do not always live close enough to develop a “community” relationship. Second, they come from very diverse backgrounds. When Asian Americans are assumed to be homogeneous, their differences are de-emphasized and their inter-relationships are ignored. This pre-conception can be soundly dispelled through a study of three decades of demographic and

Tom L. Chung is the Director of Research at the Massachusetts Executive Office of Elder Affairs. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect those of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Elder Affairs.

78
Asian Americans in Enclaves

social changes in eastern Massachusetts.

At the national level, the Asian American population in the U.S. has been increasing rapidly since the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, which placed an emphasis on family reuni-

fication. New Asian immigration increased so dramatically that the total U.S. Asian population doubled between each census since 1970. The census estimates of the total

U.S. Asian population grew from 1.5 million in 1970 to 3.7 million in 1980 to 7.5 million in 1990. This rapid increase in immigration helps explain the demographic shifts for-

ward in eastern Massachusetts. For instance, on average in every year during the 1980s, the number of Asian Americans settling down in Greater Boston exceeded the total number of Chinatown residents, on average.¹

In addition to the population growth, the Massachusetts' Asian American population became more diverse. Along with a wave of professional and entrepreneurial immigrants between the mid-1960s and 1970s, there has also been a large influx of refugees and poorer, working class immigrants.² A century old geographic pattern of distribution in eastern Massachusetts was inevitably altered.

Prior to the mid-1950s, Massachusetts' Asian Americans settled primarily in Boston. Within Boston, the proportion living in Chinatown was consistently around 80% from 1890 to 1950.³ Chinatown was the 

“Asian community” until 1953, when it began to lose land to urban renewal, highway construction (e.g., Massachusetts Turnpike, Northeast Expressway) and institutional expansion (e.g., New England Medical Center). In 1960, the proportion of Boston’s Asian Americans residing in Chinatown had dropped to 31%.⁴ By 1970, the proportion of Boston Asian Americans living in Chinatown shrank to 25%,⁵ and below 20% thereafter.⁶ Land loss, however, was not the only cause of geographic dispersion. Indeed, the size of Chinatown’s residential population had actually grown despite continuous land loss. It was the continuous influx of immigrants who settled in other areas, and the continuous emigration from Chinatown that has reduced Chinatown’s role as a residential center.

A 1988 survey found that the median length of stay for Chinatown residents was seven years. If only those who moved out were counted, the average length of stay was four years.⁷ Chinatown’s share of the state’s Asian population had decreased from 5.5% in 1980⁸ to 2.3% by 1990.⁹ Where have these people gone? Peter Kiang and Carlton Sagara observed the growth of the Asian American population in every Boston neighborhood.¹⁰ Indeed, Boston’s Asian population had doubled between 1980 and 1990, increasing by 195.6%, but Boston’s proportion of Asian Americans in Massachusetts
dropped because it had been outpaced by a 289.7% increase in the state’s total Asian population.¹¹ One explanation for the settlement of the Asian American population is the emergence of ethnic enclaves beyond Chinatown and Boston.

**Definition of Enclaves**

For the purpose of this study, the concept of ethnic enclaves must be defined. The term ethnic is used because it cuts across race and culture. In addition, it takes into account of an “externally imposed ethnic identity” and does not assume cultural and emotional homogeneity. The “externally imposed ethnic identity,” according to Yen Le Espiritu, results from a categorization process of lumping minorities together by a dominant group, regardless of their subgroup differences.¹² These subgroups, however, may eventually develop a common ethnic identity when they recognize that the larger society does not acknowledge their differences.

The term enclave is used instead of community because it does not presume any internal cohesiveness. It also avoids notion of being functionally or institutionally complete, an image too often associated with the term community. The term enclave also underscores the fact that an ethnically distinct settlement may be enclosed within or across political or administrative boundaries.

For many years, advocates and fund raisers have emphasized ethnicity in order to reach beyond geographic or administrative boundaries. Many Asian Americans still live close to Chinatown, creating clusters that are closely linked and highly visible. The geographical expansion of the Asian American population beyond Chinatown carries political and economic implications. Greater interaction with non-Asian neighbors inevitably increases the heterogeneity of Asian Americans. Meanwhile, Chinatown has more economic competition as Asian restaurants, churches and other services thrive outside of Chinatown. The impact of geography clearly affects the decision to purchase goods and services locally or in Chinatown. Ignoring geographic factors will only relegate studies of Asian Americans to incomplete inquiry. The term enclave heeds the geographic implication.

Based on their varied backgrounds, but under the same, externally-imposed ethnic identity, three categories of ethnic enclaves have emerged. For a better understanding of the proposed ethnic enclaves, a concrete example for each type (one-step-up,¹³ new immigrant, and suburban) will be presented. As will be seen later, these enclaves have distinct and separate characteristics. More importantly, they and the Boston Chinatown to create a dynamic set of inter-relationships, replacing the old relationship between the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>6,016,425</td>
<td>144,492</td>
<td>2.40%</td>
<td>$36,952</td>
<td>$17,224</td>
<td>$162,800</td>
<td>$506</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Boston</td>
<td>574,283</td>
<td>30,386</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
<td>$29,180</td>
<td>$15,581</td>
<td>$161,400</td>
<td>$546</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Ethnic Crossing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinatown</td>
<td>3,301</td>
<td></td>
<td>88.90%</td>
<td>$12,143</td>
<td>$7,573</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$456</td>
<td>22.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Immigrant Enclaves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorchester</td>
<td>3,725</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.40%</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>$12,500</td>
<td>$153,000</td>
<td>$530</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>11,493</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.10%</td>
<td>$29,351</td>
<td>$12,701</td>
<td>$131,100</td>
<td>$494</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelsea</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>$25,144</td>
<td>$11,559</td>
<td>$142,000</td>
<td>$501</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynn</td>
<td>3,003</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.70%</td>
<td>$28,533</td>
<td>$13,026</td>
<td>$139,200</td>
<td>$507</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-step-up Enclaves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quincy</td>
<td>5,577</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td>$35,858</td>
<td>$17,439</td>
<td>$161,100</td>
<td>$599</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maiden</td>
<td>2,815</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.20%</td>
<td>$34,344</td>
<td>$15,820</td>
<td>$162,900</td>
<td>$575</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerville</td>
<td>2,824</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.70%</td>
<td>$32,455</td>
<td>$15,179</td>
<td>$165,800</td>
<td>$591</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban Enclaves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexington</td>
<td>1,876</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.50%</td>
<td>$67,389</td>
<td>$30,718</td>
<td>$282,800</td>
<td>$902</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newton</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>$59,719</td>
<td>$28,840</td>
<td>$293,400</td>
<td>$809</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brookline</td>
<td>4,585</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.40%</td>
<td>$45,598</td>
<td>$29,044</td>
<td>$377,800</td>
<td>$829</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 1990 Census data.
3 There have been several delineations of Chinatown. Figures adopted here come from the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA).
4 Dorchester figures are estimated from several BRA Dorchester sub-district 1990 Census summary reports.
society and the “Asian American community.”

Three Types of Ethnic Enclaves

Earlier studies of Asian Americans, particularly historical studies on immigration law and Asian laborers, have reinforced the image of Asian Americans as a homogeneous group. Recent socio-economic data counter that image and support the view that Asian Americans are quite heterogeneous. While much media focus has portrayed Asian Americans as either poor or affluent, there is little information about those in the middle. The data describing the U-shaped distribution of socio-economic status only serve to reinforce the stereotype that Asian Americans, unlike other ethnic groups, are bimodal. This bimodal impression only reflects the socio-economic conditions at both ends of an expanding spectrum. An inconspicuous but emerging middle ground of Asian Americans has appeared. Their presence is strongest in the one-step-up enclaves, which are significantly different from the new immigrant and suburban enclaves.

The settlement of Asian Americans in eastern Massachusetts is, by no means, random. Although no longer confined to Boston, the overwhelming majority still concentrates around Greater Boston, where they settle in areas that match their socio-economic status. Table 1 shows that ethnic enclaves are located in three economically distinguishable tiers of municipalities. Because standard data pertaining to Asian Americans within individual ethnic enclaves is not available, the overall municipality data provide the closest estimates for a systematic comparison. The ten municipalities presented here, albeit only a small portion of the 351 Massachusetts cities and towns, host about half of the state’s Asian American population.

A discussion of enclaves, however, is not complete without Chinatown and its emerging role in eastern Massachusetts. The 1990 Census shows that the median Asian household income in Chinatown was only 41% of the city median, which was in turn less than 80% of the state median (see Table 1). Because it has separate and distinct characteristics, it is neither a prototype of ethnic enclaves nor a center for Asian American social and political activities. Chinatown, the original immigrant enclave, serves as the “hub” for the various ethnic enclaves. Amid rapid changes, Chinatown has managed to take on a new role as an ethnic crossing, a role that facilitates inter-enclave dynamics.

The One-Step-Up Enclaves

In Massachusetts, one-step-up enclaves are located in areas with easy access to Chinatown. In these enclaves, there is an increase of Asian Americans whose income
Asian Americans in Enclaves

and education attainment are much closer to that of the American mainstream (i.e., middle class.) Most of them are not new immigrants but arrivals from other areas. While maintaining close ties with Chinatown, their attitudes and behaviors are no longer dominated by their homeland culture; they have frequent exchanges with other ethnic groups. In a decade or two, these one-step-up enclaves may replace Chinatown and other enclaves as the major mode of settlement.

An example of the one-step-up enclave is Quincy, Massachusetts, the first and largest of its kind. In the 1980s, Asian Americans began to settle down in Quincy at a rapid rate, so rapid that the city has been unable to accommodate most of their social service needs until recently. According to the 1980 Census, there were only 750 Asian Americans in Quincy. In the late 1980s, two independent studies estimated that the Asian population had grown to approximately 10,000.\(^{15}\) Public agencies' inability to agree on how many Asian Americans lived in Quincy may help explain why the city was slow in responding to Asian American residents' needs. The 1990 Census acknowledged only 5,577 Asian residents. In 1992, Quincy City Hall conducted its own census with a special effort to identify its Asian residents. It found 67% more Asian Americans than the 1990 U.S. Census did. Yet, this figure was still below earlier estimates. In 1993, the Quincy City Hall estimated the population figure to be 12,000. This latest figure is several times larger than the figure for Chinatown. Despite its size and the Chinese majority in Quincy's Asian American population, Quincy has not become another Chinatown. Instead, it has emerged as a new type of enclave.

Unlike Chinatown in its earlier days and the new immigrant enclaves today, Quincy mainly attracts immigrants who already have resided in the U.S. for several years. A 1989 survey estimated that only 16% of the city's Asian population came directly from foreign countries. Approximately 56% of them came from Boston, 15% from other parts of Massachusetts, and 13% from other states.\(^{16}\)

More importantly, most Asian American households in Quincy are complete family units, rather than single persons or non-traditional families. In 1988, 66% of the Asian Americans in Quincy had school age children, and the percentage was expected to increase.\(^{17}\) The fact that there are more home owners than renters,\(^{18}\) which was not true for
the city as a whole, suggests the permanence of their settlements.

While the median price of a house in Quincy is slightly higher than in most Boston neighborhoods, it is substantially lower than that of an upper-middle class suburb. Given the median income of residents of one-step-up enclaves, most cannot afford a home in an upper middle class suburb. Nevertheless, Quincy Asian Americans generally have paid a higher price for a similar house than non-Asian Americans. Possible explanations range from the reluctance of former residents to sell their property to Asian Americans to unfair practices by the real estate brokers.

There is no comprehensive assessment available on the financial status of the Quincy’s Asian population. The closest indicator is the median household income reported in the 1990 Census. The median Asian household income was slightly higher than the local median ($36,455 versus $35,858) but the median per capita income was below the local median($11,140 versus $17,436). The data suggests that many Asian American families have been able to purchase a home in the one-step-up enclave only when family members pool their resources together. A 1989 survey found that the average Asian household is larger. Approximately 52% of the respondents had 3-4 persons in their household (versus 31% among non-Asian Americans), and 33% had 5 or more persons in the household (versus 12% among non-Asian Americans).21

One reason Quincy may be desirable to Asian Americans is its accessibility to Chinatown via public transportation. In the late 1980s, 76% of the city’s Asian Americans visited Chinatown at least once a week, but only 54% of them owned a car. At least during the initial stages, it appears the goods and services sector in Quincy was not equipped to meet their basic needs. One study reported that one-third of the respondents did not even do their primary shopping in Quincy.24 Were it not for the goods and services available in Chinatown, Asian Americans might not have considered Quincy a desirable area to settle.

As the number and size of Asian American family units increase in Quincy, the need for services such as pediatric, dental and child care has also increased. Yet by 1989, Quincy Hospital still had no full-time bilingual clinician. Asian Americans accounted for five out of every eighty residents rushed to the emergency room in 1989, but none of the ambulance paramedics spoke any Asian language, and there were no interpreters at the hospital. Not surprisingly, 70% of Quincy’s Asian residents went outside of Quincy for health care services. Furthermore, 84% of the respondents to a 1988 needs assessment survey doubted they knew about
Asian Americans in Enclaves

the range of services and support available in Quincy.26

As can be inferred from the available data, Asian Americans moving into a one-step-up enclave intend to settle down despite the aforementioned inadequacies. Even if their financial situation improves, many one-step-up enclave residents may decide to stay rather than leave for a suburban enclave. Suburban living is expensive and the suburban lifestyle requires a greater cultural adjustment. With a continuous influx, will Quincy become the new ethnic crossing? It is still too early to tell. Perhaps a “local ethnic crossing” will form in Quincy, but the available evidence suggests it will more likely become an additional layer of ethnic crossing, complementing rather than replacing Chinatown, the current ethnic crossing.

Chinatown in Transition

In its early days, Chinatown was a community comprised of predominantly single, young males that expected very little outside help. Traditional community organizations existed as informal networks among friends or colleagues. Over the last three decades, the services offered by traditional community organizations have not been sufficient to accommodate the influx of immigrants. Evidence of the inadequacy of the traditional network can be found in a 1987 employment study which asked clients where they would try to obtain their next job. Two-thirds, including many who used to rely upon an informal network for employment, would contact secondary organizations.27

Today people do not come to Chinatown just for their basic needs. They also look for specialized professional services. The broader range of services and goods is reflected by the occupational changes in the last three decades. Until the late-1960s, Chinatown predominantly offered personal service positions (82%).28 The 1990 Census revealed that employment in the service sector (excluding personal service) in Chinatown increased to 17%. In addition, there was also an expansion of the finance, insurance, and real estate sector from almost negligible in the 1980 Census to 12%.29 Inevitably, the increased presence of professionals who operate under professional codes and administrative procedures established outside of Chinatown diminished the old, informal system.

As more Asian Americans from other enclaves rely on Chinatown, Chinatown residents themselves are no longer the only target of the local agencies. In a 1987 employment study, a survey of employment program and English class enrollees found 12% came from one-step-up enclaves, 25% from new immigrant enclaves, 8% from suburban enclaves, and only 55% from Chinatown and adjacent areas.30 A 1989 comprehensive
needs assessment survey found only 52% of the clients using services in Chinatown lived in the area.\textsuperscript{31} If these trends continue, the proportion of local resident clients using Chinatown's services will decline.

There is both direct and indirect evidence confirming the fact that Chinatown's businesses target Asian American patrons. In 1988, a Boston Redevelopment Authority study found that two-thirds of the "Chinatown users" were Asian Americans (55% Chinese, 4% Chinese-Vietnamese, 3% Vietnamese, 1% Cambodian, 24% White, 8% Black, 2% Hispanic, and 3% others).\textsuperscript{32} More importantly, 96% of these Chinatown users came at least once every month (54% daily, 2% more frequently than weekly, 18% weekly, 15% bi-weekly, and 7% monthly).\textsuperscript{33} Tourists obviously do not visit with such frequency. The kind of businesses in Chinatown inform us of their primary targets. In 1988, half of the businesses in Chinatown were related to regular consumption (29.1% related to personal/professional services, 11.3% wholesale/factory, 8.7% grocery/drug store.) The remaining businesses were restaurants/bakeries (25.4%) and entertainment (12.0%). In contrast, only one-tenth of the Chinatown business targeted tourists: 10.3% were gift shops or specialty stores.\textsuperscript{34} Chinatown still keeps a keen interest in tourism, but perhaps not as much as Ivan Light observed in his 1972 book, \textit{Ethnic Enterprise in America}.\textsuperscript{35}

By accommodating the needs of Chinese Americans and other Asian American groups, Chinatown has become more inclusive and effective in meeting the needs of all groups. There are a growing number of Vietnamese signs on grocery stores, drug stores, restaurants, video rental, jewelry and variety shops in Chinatown. The presence of Thai, Japanese, Cambodian and Laotian activities are also detectable. To some observers, Chinatown could be aptly renamed Asiatown.\textsuperscript{36}

In sum, Chinatown is in transition. Its activities and resources have extended far beyond its geographic boundary. The expansion of its customer base and service sector reflect its role among the ethnic enclaves. Although Chinatown does not always assume a leadership role, it does provide resources, connections and a convenient location for facilitating exchanges among Asian Americans. In this sense, Chinatown serves as a crossing, and sometimes a center, for Asian Americans in eastern Massachusetts. When an ethnic crossing expands and extends itself to appeal to non-residents, local residential issues are no longer its only priority. Its attention is often extended beyond Chinatown. One example of this extension is regular coverage of suburban current events by one Chinese daily newspaper.

An ethnic crossing is the most conve-
Asian Americans in Enclaves

The New Immigrant Enclaves

The new immigrant enclaves are situated in municipalities with the lowest median household income. Dorchester, a poor inner city neighborhood with a large Vietnamese population, is an example of a new immigrant enclave. Until recently the Vietnamese settlement in Dorchester was rather transient, and a commitment to the community simply did not exist. The Executive Director of the Vietnamese American Civic Association, the largest Vietnamese service agency, believed thousands of Vietnamese may already have left for other towns such as Quincy or Malden. 37 One observation vividly illustrates the transience:

There are few obligations to meet and few contacts to notify. The telephone number and utility bills still bear the name of the tenants who lived there two years ago, no one bothered to change it. 38

Despite its size and growth, the Vietnamese population is not yet well organized politically. Many Vietnamese move several times within a few years after immigrating to the United States. 39 The high mobility rate makes it difficult to organize. Moreover, a 1989 Massachusetts state agency study, cited a general distrust of organizations among the Vietnamese. This study reported that, only 5 out of the 453 persons sampled belonged to any organization other than religious ones. 40 And when they did organize, their attention was more likely directed to issues
in Vietnam than in their present environment.41

There are, however, indications of change in Dorchester; the Vietnamese population appears to be more stable.42 The Dorchester Avenue area has about three dozen stores (e.g., video tapes, personal care, food and book) and agencies (e.g., insurance, travel, and human services.) Fliers in Vietnamese are posted along the streets. A local ethnic enclave capable of fulfilling basic needs appears to be taking shape. Recently Sampan, an Asian newspaper published in the Boston Chinatown, reported a number of Vietnamese Americans had moved back from outlying areas.43 Many others return regularly to visit a Vietnamese doctor or to shop at Vietnamese stores, not unlike the Chinese Americans who return regularly to Chinatown.

While the Vietnamese population is not well organized, they were able to muster some organizational capacity after a highly publicized event. In June 1992, a racial slur made by a city council member and his subsequent refusal to apologize, aroused public outcry. The Vietnamese held meetings and organized protests, and for the first time, they rallied around local politics rather than their homeland politics.44

In general, new immigrant enclave members are poor, and contain more single persons or incomplete families. As seen in Table 1, they live in areas where the median household income is far below the state median. Cost is a determinant factor in their choice of residence. Cheap rent and utilities, as well as easy access to inexpensive transportation for work are major considerations. Housing that meets such constraints is more likely to be located in a rundown section of the inner city. Thus, new immigrants face problems other inner city poor are facing: poor housing facilities, high crime rate, noise pollution, and poor school systems. In addition, new immigrants are hindered by informational, cultural and language barriers, and may face service providers that are not sensitive to their needs. It is not surprising that this group underutilizes local human services.45 When they finally decide to seek help, new immigrants often have no choice but to travel outside of their immediate neighborhood.

The need to seek help outside their immediate neighborhood may be a reason why Dorchester and other new immigrant enclaves have maintained a close link with Chinatown. As previously noted, approxi-
Asian Americans in Enclaves

mately 25% of the 1987 Chinatown User survey respondents came from the new immigrant enclaves. These visits suggest that human service needs are not being met in the new immigrant enclaves. Among the new immigrants are refugees who suffered great emotional and physical distress in Southeast Asia. A 1989 Massachusetts state report suggested that Southeast Asian refugees tend to have more problems in their daily living adjustment than other groups. Their resettlement is stressful due to language difficulty, downward mobility, a shift in the sex ratio, a change of family roles, and employment barriers. A 1990 U.S. House Committee Report on Hunger revealed that thirty-five percent of these refugee families were under the federal poverty guideline, two and a half times greater than the national level.

In the health and human services field there has been an increase in exchange among enclaves. During the last decade, funding agencies such as the government and private foundations, have urged individual ethnic groups to form "coalitions" when they apply for grants. Service providers in the new immigrant enclaves often have to work closely with Chinatown agencies, and their cooperation reinforces the connection between these enclaves. Meanwhile, Chinatown has been making substantial adjustments to the needs of other Asian Americans. For example, Chinatown agencies are hiring more non-Chinese workers. The largest social service agency, previously named Chinese American Civic Association (CACA), has adopted a new name by replacing the word "Chinese" with "Asian" (AACA). New programs in Chinatown have expanded to cover all Asian Americans, not just Chinese Americans, such as the SafeNet Hate Violence Prevention Program, which monitors incidents of hate crimes against the Asian Americans. Recently established agencies also prefer to call themselves "Asian" instead of "Chinese." Examples include the Asian Economic Development Council and the Asian Shelter Advocacy Project.

Suburban Enclaves

As Asian Americans moved into the suburbs in greater numbers, they began to form suburban enclaves. Despite their vast differences in socio-economic status, they nevertheless still share similar experiences and concerns with other Asian Americans in other enclaves, and they still maintain an exchange with Chinatown.

Lexington, a town that has been particularly appealing to Asian Americans, is an example of a suburban enclave. Asian Americans comprise 6.5% of the town population in 1990 (see Table 1), which is among the highest in the state. Lexington is known
for its quality of life, an excellent school system, and a progressive atmosphere. According to the 1990 Census, Lexington ranked tenth in household income among the 351 cities and towns in Massachusetts. The median income among Asian residents was 17% higher than the town median.51

Even in a town like Lexington, Asian American residents still share concerns with other enclaves. In a police survey, Asian American respondents were more likely to think that the local police did not treat them with respect.52 Lexington’s Asian residents, like other residents, are mostly professionals and entrepreneurs. A recent study on the membership of a suburban Asian association showed that almost all of the household heads and spouses finished college, 80% of the household heads hold a Master’s degree, and 40% hold an M.D. or a Ph.D. degree.53 The local newspaper could only attribute their response to the race factor.54

In early 1994, an Asian parent group issued a statement presenting the fact that Asian American students comprised 11.5% of the school population, with further increases expected. The group questioned the inadequate representation of the Asian perspective in the educational curriculum after finding the public school system did not have a single Asian American full-time teacher or administrator.55

Lexington is one of the few politically mobilized ethnic enclaves,56 but less so on the local issues. Even though the town elected an Asian American selectman in the mid-1980s, political participation on the local level is sporadic and inconsistent as Asian Americans in Lexington have shown greater interest in political affairs beyond Lexington. Mobilizing Lexington’s three largest Asian groups, the Chinese, Indians and Koreans, can be difficult when they rarely interact beyond an individual level.

As previously detailed, a small percentage of the Chinatown service agency clients come from the suburbs. If the suburban enclaves like Lexington have local Asian restaurants, groceries, churches, and other services, why then do suburban Asian Americans still maintain a relationship with Chinatown?

Several hypotheses may be put forth. First, the increasing professionalism in services in Chinatown have created hundreds of positions that cannot be adequately filled by Chinatown residents alone. Businesses and non-profit organizations that try to recruit a qualified Asian American find that many live in the suburbs. Second, many Chinatown business owners live in the suburbs. Third, food supplies, at retail and wholesale, are abundant and competitively priced. Fourth, suburban Asian Americans looking for volunteer work can find plenty of opportunities in Chinatown. The pace of
Asian Americans in Enclaves

clientele growth has been so rapid that many programs are understaffed or even underfunded. Finally, Asian Americans everywhere share many common concerns: their children’s academic performance, college admission quotas, the glass-ceiling, preservation of cultural heritage, hate crimes, stereotypes, changes in immigration laws, and current events in their native countries.\(^{57}\)

**A Conceptual Framework — the Ethnic Enclave Complex**

The majority of Asian Americans in eastern Massachusetts live in ethnic enclaves. An ethnic enclave is an aggregate of ethnic members who live nearby and communicate in a linguistically or culturally different way from their non-ethnic neighbors. Enclave members mingle with non-ethnic neighbors and share local concerns that are not necessarily ethnic. Yet, their interests could extend along ethnic links beyond local boundaries. Their interactions at times seem to be loosely organized when compared to the outdated notion of the “community.”

An ethnic enclave is different from a community. The term ethnic enclave is inclusive, fluid and dynamic in its conceptualization of the diverse and rapidly changing experiences of the Asian American population. The ethnic enclave is a more open system than a community. The term “community” is static and structured, and assumes homogeneity and coherence. An enclave can be formed in a few years while a community takes much longer to develop. Even with the passage of time, there is no guarantee that an enclave can become a community. First, its geographic boundary is not always clearly delineated. Second, unlike members of a homogeneous community who predominantly interact with members of the same group, ethnic enclave members engage in contacts with both non-ethnic neighbors and ethnic non-neighbors.

The ethnic enclave complex acknowledges that Asian Americans come from different places of origin, via different paths and at different periods of time. From different places of origin, via different paths and at different periods of time; they are not easily mobilized behind any single ethnic issue. Even with these differences, members of the ethnic enclave complex share certain physical and cultural characteristics, which are conspicuously different from those of the majority. Based on their similarities, a common identity is easily imposed exter-
nally. The externally imposed identity, as Espiritu argued, can be transformed and internalized to become a common identity. In other words, when the “ethnic-group-in-itself” begins to work toward common interests, it has the potential to become an “ethnic-group-for-itself.”

In sum, the framework of the ethnic enclave complex direct our attention to the interactions among individual enclaves, and between the enclaves and society. The “community” concept does not facilitate such interactions. Whereas community problems are more likely to become important issues to society because of assumed homogeneity, the individual ethnic enclaves’ problems, due to their uniqueness and small population size, are less urgent to society unless they are common across different locales. Hence, individual enclaves may find it difficult to attract social or political attention. Given its precarious societal support, an enclave has to rely upon other enclaves. That is, the incompleteness of individual enclaves presents a predisposition for the formation of an ethnic enclave complex. They become robust when they join forces with other enclaves, regardless of geographic boundary and socio-economic background. Within a larger entity, the ethnic enclave complex, they can become a stronger vehicle for social and political empowerment.

Endnotes


There are many ways to define Chinatown and Greater Boston which leads to different population estimates. On average, the Chinatown population in the 1980s was around 4,000, including non-Asians. Estimates of the Chinatown population ranges from below 3,000 to over 5,000, according to various census and survey reports released by the Boston Redevelopment Authority. The estimate of Chinatown adopted for this article identified 3,301 Asians out of a total of 3,714 residents.

The average annual influx of Asian immigrants to Massachusetts was about 7,000 (See Massachusetts Office of Refugees and Immigrants reports: Refugees and Immigrants Demographic Update, 1990, Volume I, No. 1 and Refugees and Immigrants in Massachusetts: A Demographic Report, 1989). About 4,200 settled in Greater Boston.


4. Ibid., p. 20

5. Ibid., p. 20


Asian Americans in Enclaves

This report listed 2,712 Asians in Chinatown and 49,501 in Massachusetts for 1980. The boundary of Chinatown in this report outlines a smaller area than that in the Goetze and Johnson report for 1990. Hence, if the data for the area designated in the Goetze and Johnson report were available in 1980, the percentage may be slightly larger.

This report listed 3,301 Asians in Boston Chinatown and 143,392 in the state in 1990.


11. Ibid., p. 26


14. Goetze, Johnson, op cit., p. 26


17. Ibid., p. 77.

18. Ibid., p. 16.

The Patriot Ledger reported that between 1984 and 1989, Asian Americans paid more than non-Asians for homes, even though the homes were assessed at about the same value. An unpublished 1992 study, Quincy Real Estate Study, by Thomas Flynn, replicated the findings.


22. Ibid., p. 12.


24. Ibid., p. 20.


33. Ibid., p. 19.


   This study found that over 80% of its sample had lived in the U.S. less than five years. Approximately 17.9% of its respondents had moved twice, 28.3% three to five times, and 2.9% more than five times.

40. Ibid., p. 27.

41. Pham, 1992, p. 19.


43. Ibid., p. 8.

44. 1992, Metro Section, Rezendes, 31. See also Irene Sege, "Vietnamese Find Their Voice After Boston Councilor’s Remark," The Boston Globe (June 26, 1992): Metro Section, 1.

45. Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, Domestic Violence, Southeast Asian Refugees, and the Public Health: A Qualitative Study, 1991, Tufts University, p. 35-36.


47. Lyon, 1991, p. 89.


51. 1990 Census of Population and Housing Summary Tape Fine 3A, PO82.

   The median Lexington Asian household income is estimated to be $79,850. The town median is estimated to be $67,389.


53. Tom Lun-nap Chung, Cynthia Ker, Carrie Tang, Loraine Choi, GBCCA Membership Survey (Greater Boston Chinese Cultural Association, 1992), pp. 4-5


57. Many of these concerns were expressed during and after the Massachusetts Asian American Commission Town Meeting in Bedford/Lexington, Chinatown and Quincy held in October and November 1994.
Reed Ueda’s short book promises a social history of postwar immigration and actually delivers more than it promises. Because the author drops back consistently for comparisons of today’s immigration with the turn-of-the-century European immigration, he provides a comparative history of immigration in the twentieth century, not just a history of postwar immigration. This back and forth was neither inevitable nor easy. After all, the juxtaposition requires Ueda to introduce historical evidence from the early part of this century without actually writing a history of that period. Skirting the potential for disaster this requirement imposed, Ueda turns in a splendidly useful book that pulls together the information readers need and the issues they must address in a brief but cogent volume.

Ueda’s comparison of European immigrants with contemporary Asian and Hispanic migrants is intellectually risky as well as methodologically demanding. Ever since the 1960s, when the theory of internal colonialism was still in vogue, radicals and race militants have usually claimed that earlier European migration is irrelevant to contemporary non-white immigrants. This objection arises because, as Ueda (p. 138) writes, “the melting pot may have worked for Europeans” but it is irrelevant to non-white immigrants and to African Americans. Of course, the variable of race makes a big difference and must be taken into account in any complete treatment, but Ueda shows it is nonsense to suppose that European immigrations of the past have nothing to teach us about the present. That could only be true if history has nothing to teach us in general.

Several persuasive reasons emerge from Ueda’s low-key, reasoned, and dispassionate discussion of this important issue. One is the numerous points of similarity between migrations of the past those of today. For

Ivan Light is a professor of sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the co-author of Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles 1965-1982 published by the University of California Press.

Chong-Suk Han is a graduate student in sociology at the University of California, Irvine.
example, Ueda criticizes the U.S. government's extensive resort to the pan-ethnic categories of Hispanic and Asian. Administratively useful, these unnatural and contrived categories obscure differences that need recognition. "These new forms of ethnic classification helped to solidify racial boundaries in oversimplified ways" (p. 143). However, Ueda also points out (p. 110) that ethno-cultural "diversity" is not greater today than it was in 1910 because diversity is relative to "nationalistic, regional and religious differentiation." The differences between Jews and Catholics, Serbs and Croats, Northern and Southern Italian, green and orange Irish were in their time every bit as serious as the differences between Hispanics, Asians, and Europeans today. Indeed, the concept of Euro-American has only come into existence in response to the creation of large Hispanic and Asian categories. The concept of European Americans did not exist in a society that was predominantly European. At that time, Ueda points out, U.S. immigration authorities "classified European immigrants by highly abstracted categories of race to justify discriminatory quotas for immigrants from southern and eastern Europe" (p. 143).

A second similarity is the underlying policy issues that immigration raised then and now. By increasing the ethno-racial and ethno-linguistic diversity of the national population, unrestricted immigration was perceived to threaten the cohesiveness of the nation. To deal with this threat, turn-of-the-century authorities unleashed "Americanization" campaigns upon the European immigrants. As Theodore Roosevelt explained, "hyphenated Americanism" was not good enough. Only 100 percent Americanism would do. Ueda believes that these drastic policies were exaggerated because the "private forces of social mobility and cultural fusion" reliably produced the needed "supra-ethnic" identity at that time (p. 152).

In today's contest of immigrant assimilation, the government no longer demands Americanization. In fact, official multiculturalism now protects ethnic identities and integrity with affirmative action quotas in hiring and education. Ueda fears that his policy of managed diversity will engender backlashes that undermine the "world melting pot" which is forging a new American identity from social mobility and cultural fusion now as in the past. This new world melting pot is not Anglo conformity because "even Anglo-Saxons" are "in the mix" and they too are exchanging cultural features with others (p.83).

We do not wish, however, to give the impression that Ueda has written a confrontational or tendentious book that focuses only on the controversies. He has successfully produced a dispassionate and evidence-centered book on the sensitive but urgent topic of immigration. Yet, ideologues will read
confrontation into any book on the subject, regardless of the author’s intent. The book’s principal chapters challenge the ideologue by rolling out a well documented and readable history of immigration that combines text and data in an interesting way. For example, Ueda’s twenty-three page chapter on the “Changing Face of Post-1965 Immigration” contains three maps, one pie chart, four bar charts, and a letter from Graciela Valencia, a farm worker, to her family. Although the book appears to be oriented to undergraduate students, the chapters contain a mine of information that will make the book valuable to professionals as well. The main chapters treat the demography of past and present immigration, its legislative history, social mobility of immigrants, assimilation and acculturation, and government policy towards immigrants.

Ueda’s positions are generally centrist and optimistic. That is, he thinks that adequately regulated immigration will have beneficial long-run effects for everyone. For example, Ueda declares that immigration is good for native-born persons as well as immigrants because it builds a “dynamic economy” that improves “overall material welfare” (p. 94). One would have to agree with this evaluation of the long-run economic effects of European immigration which are now visible. It seems somewhat premature to assume that the same beneficial long-run effects must come out of the postwar immigrations when these effects are not yet visible. Here the evidence does not support Ueda’s optimism. However, Ueda does not shrink from discussing the difficult issues. He concedes that, in the short run, postwar immigration “created transitional economic changes that reduced the rate of earnings and increased inequality” (p. 94).

He also acknowledges that Hispanic, Asian, and West Indian immigrants compete with African Americans, causing inter-group friction in affected cities. The Los Angeles riots of 1992 was one of these regrettable events when this friction exploded into violent confrontation. The perspective seems optimistic, but Ueda believes that competition, disruptions, and riots are transitory, and that much headier benefits for all lie ahead.

Possibly because of his sympathy for immigrants, Ueda avoids full and frank discussion of the most painful native/immigrant conflicts and immigration-related dilemmas. Drugs and crime are current pre-
occupations of American society, and many people blame immigrant criminals for the plague of imported cocaine and heroin. We sought in vain for treatment of immigrant crime. Ueda’s index contains no entry for crime, and Ueda does not discuss this issue at all. The omission is regrettable because the public, fed up with drugs and crime, is likely to act on rumor and innuendo if there is no discussion of the causes of immigrant crime. Indeed, the voters have already brought in a Republican congressional majority that promises to build more prisons.

Similarly, the public is currently very concerned about illegal immigration. Ueda discusses undocumented immigration on page 71 where we learn that according to “impressionistic accounts and journalistic reports” it increased in the 1980s. This treatment implies that possibly illegal immigration did not increase in the 1980s, an implication we think implausible in view of the apprehension records. Ueda acknowledges (p. 48) that between three and six million illegals were thought to be in the United States in 1986, when Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act. We found nothing about the contradictory expert reports on the subject nor any summary of the technical issues involved in the estimation process. From newspaper accounts, many of Ueda’s readers will have learned that 20 million illegals are currently in the United States, and Ueda should have provided more information about these numbers.

Finally, on the subject of immigrants and welfare, Ueda posits (p. 150) that native/immigrant tensions over welfare rise in periods of economic hardship. Both whites and blacks “resented Asian and Hispanic newcomers who received government assistance.” In hindsight, we confidently declare that Ueda’s treatment was on the right track, but insufficiently so. Confronting now the aftermath of Proposition 187 in California, where voters lashed out at undocumented immigrants, we understand that voters will not tolerate the perceived costs of education and health care for illegal immigrants. Unfortunately, Ueda’s book contains no estimates of what those costs really are nor how large they are, in contrast to other government expenses, the deficit, or the national debt.

Of course, Ueda’s slim volume contains no fat. We must admit that to increase his treatment of these immigration-related problems, Ueda might have been compelled to reduce his treatment of other serious issues. As is, Ueda’s short book can be supplemented with other readings on the topics we mentioned. It is an excellent book.
THE STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA series:

Immigration (working title)
This report will address key issues of the nation’s immigration policies and the implications of the current immigration debate on Asian Pacific Americans. The study will examine the socio-economic impact of both documented and undocumented Asian immigrants, and will formulate new ways of viewing immigration in a constantly-evolving global environment. Specific emphasis will be placed on the participation of Asian Pacific immigrants in the nation’s welfare programs, the political process, the entrepreneurial sector, and in education.
To be released Fall 1995

Economic Diversity, Issues & Policies
A report that documents the historic labor, immigration and education patterns that have shaped the current status of Asian Pacific Americans. This project examines key sectors of the economy which are heavily impacted by Asian Pacific Americans, such as ethnic enclaves, welfare, science and technology, and health care. Asian Pacific American experts show how meeting the needs of Asian Pacific Americans can transform major current public policy debates over economic restructuring.
Published 1994/305 pages $15

Policy Issues to the Year 2020
This report forecasts a near tripling of the Asian Pacific American population by the year 2020 and examines the profound and far-reaching implications of these demographic changes for national public policy. Asian Pacific American experts across the nation offer analysis and public policy recommendations in a range of areas including race relations and civil rights, education, health, political representation, work force issues, and the treatment of Asian Pacific issues by the media.
Published 1993/318 pages $10

OTHER TITLES:

Beyond Asian American Poverty: Community Economic Development Policies & Strategies
This report is the result of a year-long study by researchers at the UCLA Urban Planning Program. The study examines the needs and conditions of low-income and Asian Pacific communities in Los Angeles. It provides community economic development strategies and policy recommendations in the areas of housing, job training, workers’ rights and small business development. This publication is a valuable resource on Asian Pacific Americans and their roles in the revitalization of inner cities.
Published 1993/171 pages

Reapportionment & Redistricting in Los Angeles: Implications for Asian Pacific Americans
A series of short pamphlets introducing the issues of reapportionment and redistricting. These pamphlets use data from the 1990 Census and from a survey of Asian Pacific Americans to illuminate past Asian Pacific American involvement in redistricting and its effects on political empowerment in the community. Also included in this series are demographic profiles of the Asian Pacific American population in Los Angeles, historical information on the voting rights of Asian Pacific Americans, basic explanations of reapportionment and redistricting, and a practical guide to the technical aspects of redistricting.
Published 1991 $10/set of 6

Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The State of Asian Pacific America: Economic Diversity, Issues &amp; Policies</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1994)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond Asian American Poverty: Community Economic Development Policies</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Strategies (1993)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respportnment and Redistricting in Los Angeles: Implications for Asian</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Americans (1931)</td>
<td>per set</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please make checks payable to: LEAP
327 East Second Street, Suite 226
Los Angeles, CA 90012-4210

8.25% sales tax—CA residents only
1st Class Postage & Handling ($3.75 per book)

Discounts for 25 or more books available.
For details, please call LEAP:
Phone (213) 485-1422  ■  FAX (213) 485-0050
E mail: leap90012@aol.com
Back Issues of
Amerasia Journal

The Inter-text of Asian American Modernity

Postcolonial Asian American Identity
Vol. 17:2 (1991)—Student Literary Issue, "Burning Cane"
Vol. 8:1 (1982)—Chinese of America

Beyond Orientalism: Counterhegemonic Perspectives
Vol. 17:1 (1991)—Asian Americans and War
Vol. 9:2 (1983)—Asian American Literature

Expatriates & Exiles: New Asian American Discourse
Vol. 18:2 (1992)—Rockefeller Humanities Research Issue
Vol. 6:2 (1980)—Interethnic Conflict & Race and Class Relations

Subscriptions:
Individual—1 year $18.00
Institutions—1 year $24.00
Published three times a year.

Back issues $7.00 each, plus $2.00 postage and handling. California residents add 7.25% sales tax, Los Angeles residents 8.25%.

Make checks payable to "UC Regents."

Mailing Address
UCLA Asian American Studies Center Publications
3230 Campbell Hall, 405 Hilgard Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90024-1546
(310) 625-2968

Name
Address
State Zip
Asian American Policy Review

A Call For Papers

Volume VI:

Affirmative Action and Asian Pacific Americans

The Asian American Policy Review is currently accepting submissions for its sixth volume, which will be published in March 1996. Volume VI will focus on affirmative action as it relates to Asian Pacific Americans. Articles on other social, political, and economic policy issues affecting APAs are also welcome.

The Asian American Policy Review is a non-partisan academic journal, published annually by graduate students at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley. The Review fills a crucial gap within policy discussions across the United States by providing a forum for issues that concern Asian Pacific Americans and their respective communities. As the only publication of its kind, the Review is an important resource for practitioners, policy makers, and academicians alike.

The Review is committed to the following principles in conceptualizing themes, soliciting ideas, and selecting papers for publication:
- Timeliness of topic to current policy discussions
- Incorporation of practitioner and academic perspectives
- Promotion of emerging researchers and research areas
- Pursuit of diverse ethnic, class, gender, and regional experiences

Guidelines for Submissions:
- Must be unpublished and include both a hard copy and a disk copy (MS Word or WordPerfect)
- Suggested length:
  - Commentaries should be between 8-10 pages in length (double-spaced)
  - Research articles should be between 15-25 pages in length
- Please send a one page thesis proposal ASAP
- Articles should be consistent with the mission stated above
- Any questions? Call the journal office: (617) 495-1311 or fax: (617) 496-9027

> SUBMISSIONS DEADLINE: NOVEMBER 1, 1995 <

John F. Kennedy School of Government - 79 John F. Kennedy Street - Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
# ASIAN AMERICAN POLICY REVIEW

**Volume 5 • 1995**

**Feature Articles:**
- Immigrant Rights: A Challenge to Asian Pacific American Political Influence
  - Ignatius Bau
- Asian American Admissions to an Elite University: A Multivariate Case Study of Harvard
  - Stephen S. Fugita and Marilyn Fernandez
- Welfare Reform: Effects on the Legal Permanent Immigrant
  - Andrew Leong
- Asian Americans in Enclaves - They Are Not One Community: Three Decades of Demographic Changes
  - Tom L. Chung

**Commentary:**
- Will The Welfare Debate End Child Poverty
  - Congressman Robert T. Matsui

**Book Review:**
- Reed Ueda's Postwar Immigrant America: A Social History
  - Ivan Light and Chong-Suk Han

---

**Volume 4 • 1994**

**Feature Articles:**
- San Francisco School Desegregation and Chinese Americans
  - Henry Der
- Asian Americans in Government
  - Pan S. Kim
- Anti-Asian Violence and Community Mobilization
  - Kathy Yop

**Interviews:**
- Linda Wong, Co-chair of Rebuild Los Angeles (RLA)
- Michael Woo, former Los Angeles mayoral candidate

**Commentary:**
- Reflections on Running for Congress
  - Gloria Ochoa

**Book Review:**
- Ronald Takaki's, A Different Mirror
  - James Toma

---

**Volume 3 • 1993**

**Feature Articles:**
- Dispelling the Myth of a Health Minority
  - Asian American Health Forum
- Equal Justice Denied: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
  - Dennis Hayashi & Daphne Kwok
- Social Service Needs of Immigrant Students in New York City
  - Shao Chae Sim

**Interviews:**
- Angela Oh, President, Korean American Bar Association
- Grant Ujifusa, founding editor, Almanac of American Politics

**Commentary:**
- Broad Outlines for Asian Americans in the 1990s
  - Don T. Nakanishi

---

**Volume 2 • 1991**

**Feature Articles:**
- Asian Immigrant Battered Women and US Immigration Policy
  - Deanna L. Jang
- 1990 Census Outreach to Asian and Pacific Americans
  - Vitus Leung and Don Mar

**Interviews:**
- Chang-Lin Tien, Chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley

**Commentary:**
- The Challenges of Asian American Suburbanization
  - Gen Fujitaka and Jo Ann C. Gong
- Policy Implications of Population Changes within the Community
  - Juanita T. Lott

**Public Address:**
- Irene Natividad, President, National Women's Political Caucus

---

**Billing Information**

- Institutional Subscription: $26
- Individual Subscription: $12
- Student Subscription: $8

Please make all checks payable to:

Asian American Policy Review

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Telephone: (617) 495-1311 • Facsimile: (617) 496-9027
Call for Papers

- We welcome submissions of original, unpublished works that explore policy issues affecting the Asian Pacific American community.
- A brief abstract and the author's name, address, and telephone number should be included.
- Articles should be 15-25 pages in length.
- If accepted a copy of the article on computer disk will be requested (preferably on Microsoft Word® for the Macintosh®).

For more information regarding submission policy, please contact the Policy Review at (617) 495-1311.

Asian American Policy Review
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: (617) 495-1311
Fax: (617) 496-9027

The Asian American Policy Review is a joint graduate student publication of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley.