
Summer 2002

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Dear Reader,

Traditional conventional wisdom held that national and international security issues were too hard, too harsh, or too bloody for women. Thus key positions in national security policy making have long been an exclusive male preserve. No longer.

As Vaclav Havel has remarked in a different context, the world has changed “so fast, we have not yet had time to be amazed.” While there have always been women who played significant roles in security issues—recall Golda Maier and Margaret Thatcher—most have made their contributions from positions in families and communities, not from formal leadership positions in governments. The past decade in America has seen a dramatic shift, as women became secretary of state and national security advisor—with barely a whimper from the larger security community. And more women now pursue degrees or concentrations in international security. Women’s increased participation is especially critical to the field of international security, where a diversity of perspectives is important for lasting and effective resolutions to complex issues.

Please take time to read this edition of the Women’s Policy Journal of Harvard, John F. Kennedy School of Government that highlights the role of women in international security and human rights. The articles presented include contributions from practitioners and academics alike, providing different and invaluable perspectives on related issues. We hope the articles are informative but also that they inspire increased engagement on these important issues.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

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FROM THE EDITORS

When we decided on the theme for the second edition of the Women's Policy Journal of Harvard, John F. Kennedy School of Government, it was only a few short weeks after September 11. Many of our staff members have friends and family in New York and Washington, D.C., and during our discussion, we reflected on those dark and harrowing hours when we waited to hear from them. Like many others, we wanted to respond in a meaningful way to the horrific events that befell our nation. That's why this year's edition focuses on a broad definition of international security, examining women's roles in the protection of human rights and the rebuilding of war-torn nations.

The prevailing view of women's contributions to this issue has often been limited to situations involving abuse and victimization. Despite this perception, women have been key players in addressing international security. This year's edition is dedicated to highlighting the contributions of women to international security and exploring new ways for them to positively impact global conflict resolution, international development, and human rights policy.

In an effort to provoke thoughtful discussion on these topics, we have included articles with a diversity of opinions, some of them potentially controversial. Not surprisingly, many of the articles in this edition focus on Afghanistan and the Middle East. This is an area in which women, particularly because of the different roles they play across cultures, often have unique perspectives. We hope that the articles are received as a vehicle to help stimulate original thinking about difficult issues.

We have many people to thank for helping us produce this journal, including a proactive staff and Becca Goldstein, who did a wonderful job managing the editing process and keeping everyone on schedule. Additionally, we are grateful for the support from the Kennedy School administration, including Dean Joseph Nye and Dean Joseph McCarthy, as well as our faculty advisor, Professor Carol Chetkovich.

We hope that this time next year, the prospects for peace and stability in many of the world's troubled regions look healthier than they do today.

Sincerely,

Danielle Levine
Laura Manjarrez
Editors-in-Chief
THE WOMEN’S POLICY JOURNAL OF HARVARD,
JFK SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
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# Table of Contents

## Articles

- Women and a New Vision for U.S. Foreign Policy
  *Ambassador Sandy Vogelgesang* .................................................. 1

- Women and the Building of Peace: Muslim-Hindu Women’s Resistance to Militarization in Kashmir, and Israeli Women Seeking an End to Military Occupation of Palestinians
  *Mary E. King* ........................................................................... 11

- Mainstreaming Women’s Perspectives in the Military: The Next Advance
  *Lory Manning* ........................................................................ 35

- The Veil and the Gun: Universal Women’s Rights and the War on Terrorism
  *Sigal R. Benporath* ................................................................. 43

- Citizenship, Security and Women’s Rights: An Update of
  *T.H. Marshall*
  *Ann Marie Flores, Helen Rizzo, and Stephen Scanlan* ....... 65

- From Sufferers to Activists: Israeli and Palestinian Women Talk on War, Bereavement, and Peace
  *Ziva Flamhaft* ..................................................................... 83

## Interview

- Reflections from a Former Prime Minister
  *Kim Campbell*
  *Interviewed by WPJH staff Hilary Roxe and Nicole Kohleriter* ....... 29

## Case Study

- Promoting International Women’s Human Rights One Lawyer at a Time
  *Mary Hartnett* ...................................................................... 55

## Fun Facts

- Achievements by and for Women .................................................. 99

## Book Reviews

- *Loose Connections*, by Robert Wuthnow
  *Reviewed by WPJH staff Michele Russo* .................................. 101

- *Sustaining the New Economy*, by Martin Carnoy
  *Reviewed by WPJH staff Gretchen Elias* ............................. 105
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Women and a New Vision for U.S. Foreign Policy
by Ambassador Sandy Vogelgesang

War leaves few winners. To achieve lasting victory in America’s war on terrorism, the United States must not only vanquish the perpetrators of violence, but also deal with the underlying despair that helped provide the cause and catalyst for the fiery implosion of the World Trade Center towers.

Most emphasis in the evolving Bush doctrine is on military intervention. Although a tough armed response to terrorism is essential, U.S. decision makers should formulate a broader, longer-term perspective on international security, both to combat terrorism and to address other American foreign policy priorities. In particular, U.S. diplomacy must demonstrate a much greater and more sharply focused commitment to politico-economic development abroad. This article suggests that one key part of this new strategy should include more emphasis on involving women and that doing so is likely to redound to the ultimate advantage of American and global security.

The key questions addressed by this article are:
- Why should U.S. policy makers increase attention to the role and rights of women?
- How should this new strategy be implemented?

The Case for Change

There are several reasons for the United States to change the way it conducts foreign policy, including the participation of women before, during, and after international conflict. First, we have moved into a post-Cold War world. Gone is the stark clarity of conflict between two superpowers. Instead, we confront the less clear clash of economic, social, cultural, ideological, and other forces, inside and among nations and regions. U.S. foreign policy since 1991 has thus shifted from an emphasis on the former Soviet Union to preoccupation with issues or places that had rarely registered on the global screen. Who among us had ever heard of Kandahar, and who among us will forget its importance?

Ambassador Sandy Vogelgesang is a veteran diplomat with the U.S. Department of State and served as ambassador to the Kingdom of Nepal from 1994-1997. She is now president of Everest Associates, a trade and consulting business, and is active in several international organizations. She holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a BA in history from Cornell University.
Second, the challenge of terrorism has given new salience to the term “interdependence.” Tension in Central Europe can spread and engulf the entire North Atlantic community. Hostilities in the Middle East can ignite oil crises and risk nuclear escalation. Festering grievances and the rise of religious or ideological fanaticism abroad exact, we now know, a chilling toll.

Third, instability is emerging as a global phenomenon both within and among states. It is often due to poverty. As reflected in the annual United Nations Human Development Report, there is a wide gap between the rich elite and the poor masses. One half of the planet’s six billion people live on less than two dollars a day. Instability and inequity provide an unparalleled opportunity for terrorists who are ready to capitalize on the rage of rising frustration. Muslim fundamentalists are just one example. There will be others if, as seems likely, the gap between haves and have-nots grows.

Feminization of Global Poverty

Women bear a disproportionate share of this hardship in what amounts to the “feminization” of global poverty. They constitute two-thirds of the world’s illiterate. One woman dies every minute every day due to needless complications from childbirth or pregnancy. Most women in most developing nations are without a choice or voice in their lives. At the same time, they represent enormous untapped potential. They could do much more to help build and support stability at the community, national, and international levels, in times of war or peace.

The United States has a potentially historic choice with respect to women in developing countries. We can ignore a female lawyer in the moderate Muslim nation of Morocco in her fight against ultraconservative clerics, thereby ceding the field to our enemy. Or we can help and thus give that woman a stake in society and regional peace. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated at the World Economic Forum in early 2002, “Terrorism really flourishes in areas of poverty, despair, and hopelessness, where people see no future.” For that reason, he said, “we have to show people who might move in the direction of terrorism that there is a better way.” That opportunity applies with particular salience to women.

Agenda for Action

Given the challenge of terrorism and the opportunity to address its root causes, what can be done to show this “better way?” Although the
first priority in the current war is to deal with the immediate terrorist threat, the United States must do much more over time to tackle terrorism at its source through nonmilitary means. Doing so will require, *inter alia*, a huge additional commitment to development assistance—money tough to come by in the face of the growing federal deficit. Accomplishing our goals, however, will require not just more money, but also new approaches to foreign aid.

To that end, this article addresses just one element in a broader American strategy: how the U.S. can help women in developing nations become more constructive partners in the three phases of conflict noted below—with special emphasis on conflict prevention.

1. Conflict resolution
2. Post-conflict rebuilding
3. Conflict prevention

**Women at the Peace Table**

To formulate and implement an action plan for conflict resolution that involves women, U.S. decision makers need to help ensure that women actually have a seat at the table. That rarely happens, despite the fact that the Platform for Action for Women and Armed Conflict issued at the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing 1995) called on all governments “to take action to promote equal participation of women and equal opportunities for women to participate in all forums and peace activities at all levels, particularly at the decision-making level, including the United Nations Secretariat.” U.S. representatives in peace talks should:

- Encourage the participation of women as senior members in peace negotiations. They should include women from the concerned warring parties, so that they can speak most credibly for their constituents and facilitate the transition to peace.

- Support the involvement of women’s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the peace process. Example: The Carter Center organized a conference attended by more than one hundred women from Sudanese political parties and national and international nongovernmental organizations that culminated in the signing of the Maastricht Declaration. Result: Sudanese women agreed to work for peace on two levels—conflict resolution in a war situation and the building of a postwar civil society.

- Assure that the terms of peace include specific provision for protecting women and children as much as possible during conflict and in the immediate aftermath. That requires compliance with the
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and Additional Protocols and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights. Violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict—including murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced slavery—require particular attention. While entire communities suffer from war, women and girls often suffer more than their male counterparts because of their sex and low status in society.

Women Helping Rebuild after War

Ending conflict on the battlefield is just one part of the peace process. There must be comparable commitment to what happens after the last shot is fired—including much more attention to the role and rights of women. To implement such an action plan for the post-conflict period, the United States should:

• Require the participation of host-nation women at a senior level in the formation of any new government. One prerequisite is a prior investment in women via training in political leadership and governance (addressed below).

• Insist on senior-level female participation in the decision-making body for direction of host-nation refugee matters, including a court of redress for violations of human rights. Women and children constitute 80 percent of the world’s millions of refugees and displaced persons, and suffer disproportionately from abuses. They need protection. Female refugees also need to be involved in decisions that affect them, so that they can make a positive contribution to countries where they resettle or to their country of origin upon return.

• Seek the participation of multilateral agencies, such as the UN Development Program, the World Health Organization, the World Food Program, the International Labor Organization, UNICEF, and UNIFEM, to help meet the basic human needs of women and their children.

• Assure that the international donor community works with women and their representatives in the host-countries. There has been some recent tendency for aid agencies to shift too fast from humanitarian relief in the immediate post-conflict period to projects for sustainable development before the community is ready to handle those projects and before members of the community, particularly women, have the chance to express their priorities.
Women Helping Prevent War

Most important, U.S. decision makers must give their greatest attention to conflict prevention. America will succeed best and at the least ultimate cost with a clear commitment to avoiding war in the first place. One way to do so requires a substantial increase in foreign aid and a clearer focus on top priorities and new realities for that assistance program. Specifically, for this new development strategy to work, it must reflect the fact that the face of poverty is usually female and that women constitute an untapped resource for building stable peace.

Shifting development gears means making U.S. programs “gender-sensitive” so that they reflect the different needs and roles that men and women play in their families, communities, and countries. Although the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has made major progress in this regard since the early 1970s, it still has a long way to go. For example, its “Gender Plan of Action” is honored more in the breach than reality, despite the fact that many USAID employees understand the essential link between giving women a role and achieving sustainable development.

Most to the point for American foreign aid, the United States must increase its bilateral and multilateral assistance substantially in order to make a real dent in the development challenge post-September 11. The Bush Administration has spent more than $30 million a day for the war in Afghanistan and has requested an additional $50 billion for overall defense spending. However, its initial fiscal year 2003 budget requested just $8.47 billion for foreign assistance and humanitarian programs, including almost $500 million for foreign military financing. Of that figure, only $2.7 billion was designated for development assistance, with a tiny fraction of that targeted for women.

These budget requests come against a dismal backdrop. USAID has been decimated over the last ten years by cuts in funds and personnel. The United States has also reduced its contributions to many multilateral programs or just not paid its bills. The United States ranks last among industrialized nations in the amount that it allocates for assistance to developing nations, relative to the size of the economy. Despite the most recent pledge from President Bush (at the International Conference on Financing for Development in late March 2002) for a $5 billion annual increase over current levels, there is still relatively little funding for any long-range development programs, including those targeted at women. That must change.

To engage women effectively in conflict prevention, the United States must also formulate a different kind of development strategy. It
should address the four highest program priorities for women and such cross-cutting factors as population trends.

In hundreds of interviews for a recent assessment of USAID’s programs for women in development, I found an instructive consensus about what women abroad consider most important.

1. Top Marks for Education

First, education ranks highest on most women’s lists of priorities for foreign aid. They usually take the lead in seeing that their children learn to read and write. According to World Bank data, the more education girls in particular get, the faster rates of population growth fall and the more the economy grows.

The United States should bolster assistance for education by reviving programs run by the former U.S. Information Service, now folded into the State Department. For example, the United States could reopen American libraries and cultural centers abroad and expand educational exchanges, such as the Fulbright program. Increasing the U.S. budget for public diplomacy would help reach a new generation of leaders, especially young women, who often find a U.S. scholarship their only ticket to advancement.

2. Matter of Life and Death

Women care deeply about access to decent health care. If one out of five of their children does not live to see age five—often the case in developing nations—no wonder that their mothers want choices for family planning, or that they seek access to reasonably priced AIDS vaccines or to vitamin A tablets that cut infant and maternal mortality rates in half. It is time the United States became a forceful advocate on issues that are, literally, a matter of life and death in much of the world.

3. Power of the Purse

The women that I have met, from Nigeria to Bangladesh, are practical. They know that with more money in their pocket, they can care for their families and get more respect from their husbands and communities. Thus, they want training that equips them to earn additional pay. Further, as much as many appreciate the recent focus of USAID and other donors on microenterprise and microfinance, they also want training that prepares them to compete better at the macroeconomic level. Many, there-
fore, want the kind of instruction usually given to men, such as training in information technology and more practically oriented vocational training to complement current emphasis on traditional primary education.

4. Political Clout

Women from Ghana, Indonesia, and elsewhere have told me that they must learn how to run for office locally and nationally, and what to do once they win election. They say that their voices will never be heard unless and until they get political power. Without it, they see little prospect for enjoying the most basic legal protection against one of their main grievances: rampant domestic violence and abuse. Most to the point for situations of conflict, women think that they cannot be serious players in peace talks or postwar rebuilding without experience in and access to government.

To achieve the most sustained impact, U.S. programs for women in these four priority areas should be interrelated and mutually reinforcing. For example, during my tenure as U.S. ambassador to the Kingdom of Nepal, we found that USAID literacy classes for women in rural Nepal work best when the teaching materials include practical information on health care, income generation, and community leadership. Such “integrated” training avoids the pitfall of many USAID and UN projects with their “stovepipe” approach to one issue at a time.

New Demography

In addition to increasing attention to the above four areas, the new U.S. development strategy should reflect current and projected population trends. Why not, for example, pay more attention to where the greatest concentrations of women live—namely, the huge cities of the Third World, from Cairo to Calcutta? Most U.S. assistance programs emphasize the rural sector. Urban slums, where women and their families endure lives of increasing desperation, become feeding grounds for unrest and revolt. The United States should thus shift to a more results-oriented balance of rural and urban programs.

U.S. foreign aid should also focus more strategically on youth. The world now faces the largest-ever cohort of adolescents reaching child-bearing and working years. America is in a battle for their minds in the new millennium. Too many teenagers in developing nations, girls and boys alike, have no access to school or jobs and thus no stake in making their societies work. Unless we act quickly, we may lose this new gener-
ation of leaders, whether in sub-Saharan Africa or in India, the latter of which will soon surpass China as the world’s most populous nation.

Some reports from post-Taliban Afghanistan suggest what can be done—and the attendant dividend for American diplomacy and global security. One recently established program to train twenty thousand teachers and to open schools already means that more than one million Afghan children are enrolled in elementary school, more than double those in class last year.7

Multilateral Appeal

Creating an effective development strategy, including greater emphasis on women, will require more than a bilateral approach. New global realities argue for increased U.S. reliance on multilateral programs and advocacy of women’s concerns in multilateral forums. Because of rising anti-American sentiment, the United Nations and other international organizations, including nongovernmental organizations, often enjoy greater access and credibility. Thus, just as UN peacekeeping forces may operate where the U.S. Marines cannot, so, too, can a representative from UNICEF or a local NGO have more access to women in a remote Somali village.

Further, the United States can facilitate attention to women in the multilateral development arena by encouraging U.S. ambassadors or USAID mission directors to put women’s priorities on the agenda for donor nation coordination of development assistance. Many annual meetings of donors convened by the World Bank have little or no specific reference to women’s priorities.

Gender Matters

Finally, to help ensure the constructive engagement of women, America must increase its commitment to affirmative action in the U.S. foreign affairs agencies and the international system. Individuals and gender make a difference. As a woman and career U.S. diplomat, I have been struck by the unique role that women can play and the particular impact they achieve. Two cases in point: the work done by Prudence Bushnell, U.S. ambassador to Guatemala, underscoring the participation of women in Central American peace initiatives; and the zeal of former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, fighting against girl-trafficking. They set an example for other women and sent a powerful signal of America’s support for women’s rights.
The same point applies to multilateral organizations. The fact that women head such UN programs as the World Health Organization or UNICEF has a different impact. When Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner for human rights, speaks out on the rule of law, she speaks with particular force and sensitivity for women. Thus, although men can and do champion the concerns of women, the U.S. government should appoint more women to senior positions in the American foreign policy establishment and support more women for top jobs in multilateral organizations.

Conclusion

The events on 11 September 2001 underscore the imperative for American policy makers both to stay the military/intelligence course and to adopt a broader strategy that involves women before, during, and after war. The United States should capitalize on the current conflict to win the support of women for the world we want—whether by giving them a seat at the peace table or building their longer-run stake in peace.

Americans have learned, through the civil rights and feminist movements, that democracy is a perpetual work in process. We are finding that terrorism constitutes a tale of two timeframes—one demanding B-52s now and another requiring the sustained resolve and outreach of the Marshall Plan. The choice is ours: to encourage Palestinian mothers to rear children to live in peace or to die as suicide bombers.

As the women of Afghanistan begin their new lives, the United States should therefore launch a bold new international strategy, one that reflects the positive role women can play in making and keeping peace. America should heed the call, post-September 11, for unveiling both women and a new vision for U.S. foreign policy.

Endnotes:
1. Background from International Center for Research on Women, based in Washington D.C., or the Human Development Report, UN Development Program.
4. This is the author’s own statement. It is based both on what she has seen in more than fifty developing nations, and through data in the annual UNDP


Additional References:

This article reflects views developed over a thirty-year career in international affairs. It does not pretend to be an academic treatise, although some references are noted below. Instead, it draws primarily from the author’s work with the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, USAID, the United Nations, and international NGOs, as well as several books and articles, including a recent assessment of USAID’s programs for gender equality.


Women and the Building of Peace: Muslim-Hindu Women’s Resistance to Militarization in Kashmir, and Israeli Women Seeking an End to Military Occupation of Palestinians

by Mary E. King

Women have participated in armed struggles as fighters in guerrilla warfare and soldiers in conventional war for centuries. Two thousand years ago, Boadicea, queen of the pre-Roman Iceni people in what is now Norfolk and Suffolk, England, led a revolt against the Romans in which seventy thousand were slaughtered, according to Tacitus. More recently, in 1982, Britain’s former prime minister Margaret Thatcher led the British into war when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. “Women as warriors” is not a novelty. What is new is that women are being recognized in international relations and multilateral diplomacy as significant players in the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts.

In recent years, a literature has developed in arguing that while women may not be the combatants in civil war or violent strife, the only way to achieve an enduring peace is through the involvement and empowerment of women. The role of women is increasingly recognized for its significance in securing and maintaining peace.1 This conceptual shift from a depiction of women as victims of war to builders of peace rests upon a long record of women who have worked to pursue peace throughout the twentieth century.2

Peace, without the full participation of women, is unsustainable, according to the UN Security Council. On 31 October 2000, the Security Council voted for SC Resolution 1325, enjoining member states to take adequate steps to ensure all forms of protection for women in conflict, including increasing roles for women in the building of peace and in peacekeeping operations and mechanisms. Inherent in the resolution is a major alteration, in which women are recognized to be not only survivors—but crucial mediators of social change and agents of history.

Mary E. King is professor of peace and conflict studies and special adviser to the rector at the University for Peace of the United Nations in Costa Rica, and visiting scholar at the American University Center for Global Peace in Washington, D.C. Dr. King won a Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Book Award for Freedom Song: A Personal Story of the 1960s Civil Rights Movement (New York: William Morrow, 1987). Her most recent book, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action (Paris: UNESCO, 1999), was published to worldwide acclaim and is being republished in India in 2003. She has a PhD in international politics from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom.
The notion of a natural, or given, predisposition to avoiding bellicosity probably disempowers the efforts of women in the building of peace and delegitimizes the voices of women in international politics. According to a panel of journalists from various regions of the world assembled by the Woman’s Foreign Policy Group in Washington, D.C., women look at conflict in ways different from men. Women may search for consensus and tend to believe that familiarity breeds not contempt but the breaking of stereotypes that prolong hostilities. This instrumental view incorporates the findings of a now undisputed body of research, which proves that an entire society is stabilized and uplifted—men, children, and women—when the status of women improves. Swanee Hunt’s work exemplifies this perspective. Hunt notes that grassroots women’s organizations are highly active in most places worldwide where struggles for democracy are under way. Data also suggest that nations that had higher rates in secondary school enrollment (including girls) twenty years ago currently experience greater political stability, with more democratic rights, than countries with lower rates of such enrollment in the early 1970s. In any number of strife-ridden situations worldwide, the experiences of women have led them to seek to resolve the conflict, prevent the outbreak of hostilities, and fight against the militarization of their societies.

Two examples are considered here, from conflicts whose tentacles reach far beyond their own geographic domains, both of them potential flashpoints that could spark larger conflagrations. Discord between Muslims and Hindus on the subcontinent and strife in the Eastern Mediterranean had, by mid-twentieth century, led the British to propose the instrument of partition. At the dusk of European colonialization, partition did not resolve either conflict, and both persist to this day. Yet in these chosen examples, women are taking bold steps to resist a definition of peace based on military subjugation. As noted here, in examining the work of a woman’s group in Kashmir and an Israeli women’s group, the experiences of women have sometimes led them to take bold steps in arguing that security involves more than military weaponry.

The Experience of Kashmiri Women Leads to Action

In the Vale of Kashmir at the foot of the Himalayas, on India’s northern border, women are working to combat entrenched armed struggle and to achieve a peaceful solution.

Insurgencies have raged since the partition of predominantly Hindu India and the Islamic state of Pakistan in 1947, when the rulers of 565 princely states were forced to choose between one of the two newly inde-
pendent nations. The maharajah of Kashmir, Hari Singh, was Hindu and ruled a largely Muslim populace. Hari Singh fled and was forced to sign an Act of Accession to India, which was enshrined when Indian troops landed the following day on 27 October 1947.

In the years since, the resulting “Kashmir problem” has remained onerous. Although a clear Muslim majority existed in the state before the 1947 partition and was contiguous with the Muslim-majority area of the Punjab region, the failure to face the inevitable consequences has resulted in a territorial division that lacks rationality or common sense. Pakistan has been left with areas that, while essentially Muslim in culture, are underpopulated, remote, and economically weak. The largest Muslim grouping is situated in the Vale of Kashmir—the so-called top of the world—and more than half the population of the entire state lies in Indian-administered lands. 7

India and Pakistan have episodically waged war in pursuing their claims to Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir is today divided by a painstakingly demarcated “line of control,” while cross-border military operations take place daily. To Pakistanis, Kashmir should have merged with them at the time of partition, with India refusing to make good on its promise of a plebiscite that would determine the resolution. India, on the other hand, maintains that a claim to Kashmir on the basis of religious preference is a threat to India’s position as a secular, multireligious, and multiethnic nation. To address the grievances of oppositional movements, confront the Pakistani armed forces along the cease-fire line, and support the administrative apparatus for the state, a strong military presence has been maintained by a union government in the Indian sector, especially since the end of the 1980s. 8

Since the inception of a militant insurgency in 1990, an estimated twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand lives have been lost in the Valley of Kashmir. 9 Kashmir epitomizes an example of political conflict that escalated from popular upheaval to a bitter confrontation between states, and hence to a brutalization of an entire society. The militarization of Kashmir has been exacerbated by the training in weaponry and ideology of armed struggle emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan. 10 Both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda declared the outing of India from the disputed territory of Kashmir as a major goal. 11 While India and Pakistan—both nuclear powers, although asymmetrical, with India the larger and more powerful of the two nations 12—face the prospect of a fourth war, the saga of the subcontinent’s 54-year alienation between Hindus and Muslims is acted out in the mountainous villages of Kashmir, in day-to-day deaths,
separations, disappearances, displacements, and savagery. With twelve years of transnational terrorism and a fanatically religious and extremist culture infiltrating into the state of Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan, the larger conflict over territory disputed by both Pakistan and India spills over into the civilian population.

Houseboats still ply the waters of Lake Dal at Kashmir’s capital city, Srinagar, although the fabled countryside of the Kashmir Valley—the home of Rishis, or seers, and Sufi saints, with mosques capped with pagoda-like architecture rather than minarets—has become the most militarized part of South Asia. As the mujahidin, or warriors of holy struggle, spread fear and terror, the Indian armed forces often retaliate similarly and with impunity.

Current options under debate include whether the line of control between India and Pakistan in Kashmir should be turned into an international boundary, a long-sought referendum held on governance, or whether a negotiated settlement based on an indigenous Kashmiri ethos should be undertaken. Finding a solution to the territorial dispute through multilateral means is yet another choice. Pakistan prefers to have a third party, preferably the United States, involved in negotiating a resolution and has hinted at permitting the Kashmiris to select the option of an independent Kashmir as a possible solution. India says that no third-party action is necessary.

Kashmiri Sunni Muslims dominated Jammu and Kashmir’s political institutions from October 1947 until January 1990, and they are most actively involved in the struggle for self-determination. Within this major group, subgroups want degrees of accession with India or merger with Pakistan. Women belong to all of these subgroups, yet they do not have a cross-cutting identity that transcends their differences, and they often speak of their differences in the name of Islam.13

In 1990, twenty-five thousand women wearing hijab marched to the UN office in Srinagar and declared solidarity with armed struggle. Yet alongside this image—according to Ashima Kaul Bhatia, a Kashmiri Hindu journalist and peace and conflict analyst who lives and works in Srinagar—should be showcased another, more realistic exhibit. According to Bhatia, camaraderie with armed struggle has been eclipsed a decade later by women risking their lives to work for peace. It is the result of their experiences in living with the permeation and degradation from a gun culture, Bhatia claims, that women resist the “Talibanization” of Kashmiri Muslim society.14

The saturation of Kashmiri society with weaponry means that the settling of scores, personal vendettas, abductions, murder, targeted killings,
extortion, abuses of human rights, and violence against women have become the new "cultural codes." Massacres in minority communities, attacks on pilgrims, shoot-outs, and bombings of parliamentary buildings characterize the atmosphere conducive to those who justify violence against civilians in the name of jihad, meaning sacred struggle. Such a situation benefits those most fearful of democracy, accountability, and pluralism—among them the militant opposition groups dedicated to armed resistance.

For a Kashmiri, particularly of a second generation that knows nothing but the language of guerrilla warfare, it often seems that violent resistance is the only means of expressing oneself—the sole legitimate means of fighting oppression and injustice, or of bridging economic disparities, asserting human rights, or struggling against victimization. Women are now fighting for an alternative political discourse, using nonviolent tools from the simplest category of protest and persuasion. Based in Srinagar, women's groups seek to end the violence, on the grounds that weaponry and cruelty seep into all facets of life, greatly increasing domestic violent abuse of women and children inside their own homes.

Although violent conflict traumatizes both men and women, Bhatia claims that women bear the brunt of aggression and carnage. As widows, they find themselves with unrelieved responsibility for households. As wives abandoned by husbands for military cadres, they are displaced and forced to return to their parents' abodes. As victims of rape, whether by soldiers or militants, they are ostracized, reviled, and exploited; the soldiers rape women who are believed to be supporters of the militants, while the militants rape women who are believed to be related to informers or deserters. Repressed by religious sanctions, they are subjected to draconian changes in lifestyle and a drastic loss of human rights, entitlements, and autonomy. Each leads a life of "uncertainty, disquiet, pain, and sorrow," according to Bhatia, struggling for survival for herself and her dependents in the prevalent hostile situation. As Kashmiris and as women, their experiences of violence, its consequences and repercussions, have enabled them to rise above the victimhood discourse and to question the prevalent notions and definitions of jihad and azadi [freedom]. Jihad for most of these women means education, clothing, and decent lives for their children; azadi means economic independence. Struggle is for their rights, and freedom means an end to male hegemony and domestic abuse. It is their experience of violence that makes them want peace in their lives. 
Although an obstacle to discussions of women and the building of peace has been the reflexive argument that men and women are controlled by their intrinsic natures, the experiences of Kashmiri women give them a view of peace and security that produces a different toolkit. The Kashmiri women use the tools of brainstorming, roundtables, seminars, and conferences. An initiative known as Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace (WISCOMP), active in South Asia, provides a non-sectarian interface between women with different ideologies, religious and social backgrounds, and in different professions. Women educators and professionals, through WISCOMP’s Kashmiri affiliate, Athwaas (meaning hand-shake in Kashmiri), attend Hindu-Muslim women’s roundtables, which focus on both principled and pragmatic methods of nonviolent conflict resolution, thereby demonstrating that leading Kashmiri women want the problem resolved through dialogue and negotiation. Roundtables take place at intervals, the point being dialogue, not debate. Topics include the necessity for women’s voices to be heard in any decisions about the future; azadi; human rights violations; reconciliatory measures between Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus, and between Kashmiris and the Indian nation; protection of minorities; and the rebuilding of Kashmir. Follow-up traveling roundtables, called athwaas, also take place throughout the hills, migrant camps, and conflict-prone areas of Jammu and Kashmir. Exploratory in purpose, the roundtables and athwaas do not seek to define the contours of a political solution, but to reverse the shrinkage of democratic space that resulted from the ongoing violence. This enables women in Kashmir to participate in a search for nonmilitary answers, and to work for an ungendered and democratic peace process. WISCOMP also provides peace and conflict studies researchers, experts, analysts, and activists with a body of knowledge on how a constituency for peace can develop and, conversely, about its constraints.

Israeli Women Fight the Military Occupation of the Palestinians

Experience has also been the predominant factor leading some Israeli women to protest openly their own government’s policies and to raise the need to break the impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In the modern era, Jewish colonization of Palestine began in the 1880s, as pogroms in Eastern Europe and Russia drove Jews to return to the eastern Mediterranean area. The concept of a nation-state in an era of European colonialism seemed an appropriate response for the protection of Jews from the discrimination and persecution of anti-Semitism on the
European continent. Although the leadership of the world Zionist movement was aware of the numerical significance of the Arab population, it was only following World War I that the average persons among European Jewry realized the ethical and practical complications of the Zionist dream: Palestine was inhabited by half a million Muslim and Christian Arabs. 25

After the Ottoman Empire was divided into British and French spheres of influence, a letter from Britain’s secretary of state for foreign affairs, Arthur James Balfour, in 1917 supported a national home for the Jews in Palestine. Lord Balfour wrote to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, that:

His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish 26 communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. 27

Between 1914 and 1918, Britain made a succession of promises to the Arabs concerning independence, self-government, and the principle of the consent of the governed. 28 From the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration as policy to the onrushing events of World War II, the Palestinians exerted little influence on the British policy and Zionist goals.

With the advantage of historical retrospect, it can be seen that the ideal of the Zionist settlement of Palestine would lead to affrays of epic proportions with the Muslim and Christian Arab inhabitants. In August 1947, a UN commission recommended the end of the British Mandate and tripartite partition with a Jewish state, an Arab state, and Jerusalem internationalized under UN auspices. 29 With UN General Assembly Resolution 181 passed on 29 November, the United Nations accepted partition for Palestine. The simplistic notion that the Jews readily accepted the plan while the Arabs rejected it has been debunked by Israeli “new historiography,” based on newly released archival materials. 30 The Jews were well-prepared for statehood, but the Arabs, most of whose leaders had departed from Palestine, were in no position to administer themselves. 31

War raged between Jews and Palestinians from the time of the vote on the resolution, 29 November 1947, until April of the following year, with the Palestinians greatly outnumbered, even with volunteers from other Arab states. 32 On 15 May 1948, the mandate formally ended, and British forces withdrew as Jews filed a declaration of independence and pronounced Israel a state. 33 The UN design lacked implementation
machinery, and as the world body turned its attention elsewhere, it was left to the parties involved to implement the plan. The Jews continued to fight for the land, claiming that they were defending Resolution 181, protecting their half, and operating under a UN decision. Palestinian resentment of what had been viewed since 1917 as foreign and colonial intrusion now manifested itself in armed fighting against the UN resolution.

Zionism had early in the twentieth century become a sophisticated global political movement fortified by a great power, while most of the Arabic-speaking world was still under the European colonialism that replaced Ottoman rule after World War I. The idea of independent statehood for the Palestinians was never considered, apart from the concept of a binational state compatible with the Balfour Declaration and Britain’s strategic interests. Today, it would be inconceivable to argue that the Palestinian Arabs had no right to insist on consultations over the major changes to their society that would result from Zionist immigration. Despite decades of Jewish immigration, by 1948 the Arabs still comprised the majority of the population. The turmoil of the Palestinian Arabs in response to the UN decision on partition has never subsided, and several wars ensued. In 1967, Egypt’s closing of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran provided an opening for Israel to take the offensive, and active warfare resumed. Six days of fighting ended with the Arab states bitterly defeated by Israel, which captured not only the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also the Golan Heights of Syria and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. Arab East Jerusalem also came under Israeli authority. Under Israeli control, these lands became known as “the occupied territories.”

The Israeli military occupation in 1967 of lands set aside by the United Nations in 1947 for the Palestinians has outlasted several cycles of attempted negotiated settlements. Punctuated by both nonviolent and violent resistance by the occupied Palestinians, the military occupation persists, despite the efforts of a diverse extra-parliamentary “peace camp” that developed in Israel, among whose ranks are former military generals. One such group is Women in Black, that opposes both the occupation of lands allocated for the Palestinians by the UN and the use of violence to accomplish political aims.34

As deaths mounted in 2001, Women in Black of the United Kingdom—an offshoot of the Israeli women’s peace organization, which originated the name when it began its protests against the occupation in January 1988—traveled to Israel and the Palestinian areas to hold vigils in East Jerusalem.35 Wearing black (and joined by male adherents), the women practice a technique from the repertoire of nonviolent struggle
known as “accompaniment,” in which one’s presence acts as a shield to protect someone else, both unarmed.\textsuperscript{36} The group openly condemns the occupation and opposes the use of excessive force by Israeli troops against the young Palestinians who protest it. Each week, a vigil is held in Paris Square, a hundred yards from the prime minister’s residence, at a busy five-way intersection near downtown West Jerusalem. Evoking images of widowhood and mortality—wearing black to signify mourning and loss of morality and of reason—the women raise black signs in the shape of a hand saying “Dai L’Kibbush,” or “Down with the Occupation!”\textsuperscript{37} The idea has spread to other parts of the world, where twenty-four organizations in Europe, North America, and South America hold vigils in solidarity.\textsuperscript{38} In Israel, Women in Black has joined forces with other Israeli women’s peace coalitions and networks.\textsuperscript{39}

Women have long served in the Israel Defense Force. Our consideration of Women in Black and other Israeli women’s peace groups, however, begins soon after the start of the first Palestinian uprising, or \textit{intifada}, meaning shaking off, in December 1987. By 1990, there were between two thousand and three thousand Women in Black throughout Israel.\textsuperscript{40} Some civilian women’s groups believed that they had a unique contribution to make to the extra-parliamentary peace groups that comprised a movement of more than four hundred organizations, each with its own distinct identity and purpose.\textsuperscript{41} Women’s groups were not alone in the broad phalanx of the Israeli peace movement,\textsuperscript{42} yet approximately 180 specifically Israeli or mixed Israeli-Palestinian women-only groups were in action by 1990, although some have since disbanded.\textsuperscript{43} Some traveled to the West Bank to meet with their Palestinian counterparts.

The Israeli women’s peace groups specifically argue that the failure to negotiate peace, and the continued militarization of Israel, disadvantage women in the society and militarism permeates their culture.\textsuperscript{44} The Israeli women peace leaders maintain that the bankruptcy of efforts to reach a deal means that they are chronically required to subordinate their own pursuits because concerns for security overwhelm their lives and families. Furthermore, the routine promotion of men from military ranks into senior domestic political positions blocks the promotion of women into influential policy posts. Some Israeli women leaders said that they identify psychologically with the tragedy that befalls the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{45} According to Israeli political scientist Simona Shari, military structures must be grasped as inherently gendered. In her studies, she shows that Israeli women made conceptual connections between systems of domination and inequalities that were structured into disparities of privilege and
power. Linking the violence and torture against Palestinians to the increased violence against women in Israel, they perceive an association between the struggles for self-determination of the Palestinians and a quest for self-determination by Israeli women. In states sundered by conflict, Sharoni claims, the more that government is preoccupied by national security, the less its citizens, particularly women, experience physical security.

Palestinian women have also been irregular fighters and combatants in armed struggle. Some, however, have pressed for a resolution of the overarching conflict through political means. Palestinian women’s organizations existed since the Ottoman period, and by the start of the 1920s, Palestinian women were obtaining political experience through nonsectarian and exclusively female-run and female-led organizations, the first of which was the Palestinian Women’s Union, which by 1921 had headquarters in Jerusalem and Haifa. At a time when women’s groups in Tunisia and Egypt were fighting against polygamy and summary divorce, the Women’s Union called for retraction of the Balfour Declaration, limits on Jewish immigration, and improved treatment for Palestinian political prisoners. As early as October 1929, more than two hundred women from across historic Palestine gathered as delegates to the First Arab Women’s Congress of Palestine. In the 1950s, Palestinian resistance movements arose in the refugee centers of the Palestinian diaspora, taking up the call to armed struggle because of the perceived failure of Arab unity to “liberate” Palestine. A decade later, inside the territories captured by Israel in the June 1967 war, the Palestinians began to organize themselves. Consistent with this long history, by the 1970s, Palestinian women’s organizations in the occupied territories numbered in the hundreds if not thousands, most of them working through small self-help committees designed to compensate for Israel’s military occupation.

The activities of Palestinian women’s groups seeking a peaceful political settlement is beyond the scope of this article, and it would be facile to suggest an exact comparability, yet it is worth noting that with the outbreak of the first intifada, collaborative endeavors developed between Palestinian and Israeli women’s groups. Both sought the lifting of a belligerent occupation; however, the Israeli women’s groups tended to see the occupation as corrosive to their own society, morally corrupting, and furthering a militarization of their state that was itself deeply gendered. The Palestinian women’s groups tended to be activated by a national quest for statehood and the conviction that only nonmilitary means could achieve their principal goal—a Palestinian state.
In the summer of 2001, with assassinations of Palestinians openly carried out by Israeli soldiers working from lists, the British branch of Women in Black stepped into the breach created by Israel’s refusal to allow international monitors or to widen the role for the United Nations as witnesses in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. When mounted Israeli police rode their horses into a Women in Black demonstration in East Jerusalem, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon could no longer be sure that the targets of his police and soldiers were solely Palestinians, since British women and men were “accompanying” them. Wariness must greet the unproved assumption that women have a reflexive interest in peacemaking; however, it is clear that Sharon has one view of the meaning of the term security, while Women in Black and other Israeli women’s peace groups have another.

Conclusion

A view of women as the victims of war is giving way to an understanding of the potency of women as agents of change and makers of history. Women are often the first to begin working on a new order in the midst of the old. They may be non-combatants or combatants, yet increasingly, they are essential to the formulation of an enduring and lasting peace. In some conflicts, such as the two cited here, women are leading the efforts to address the circumstances that have led to the permeation of their societies by violence and a weaponized culture.

Endnotes:


Policy Group, 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 720, Washington, D.C. 20009, e-mail wfpg@wfpg.org, or go to http://www.wfpg.org.

4 See Hunt, Swance, and Cristina Posa. 2001. Women Waging Peace. Foreign Policy (May-June):38-47. The work of Hunt and others can be found on the Web site of Women Waging Peace (http://www.womenwagingpeace.net), a collaborative effort of the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the nonprofit Hunt Alternatives. One must have a password to view strategic discussions with women in various parts of the world, which is available via phone at (617) 868-3910. Articles related the topic of the Hunt and Posa piece in Foreign Policy can be found at http://www.foreignpolicy.org.

5 See, for example, Hunt, Swanee. 2001. Learn from the Women behind the Fall of Milosevic. International Herald Tribune, 10 July, 8.

6 The Academy for Educational Development posts studies on its Web site, http://www.aed.org, from which its publications can be ordered. Publications can also be ordered by e-mail at publsinfo@aed.org.

7 Prior to its division, the territory was comprised of the provinces of Jammu, Kashmir, and the border states of Ladakh (mostly Buddhist), Baltistan, and the Gilgit Agency. The districts of Muzaffarabad, Kotli, and Mirpur, including part of Poonch, now compose the state of Azad, or Free, Kashmir, while Baltistan, Astor, and the Gilgit Agency together form the Northern Areas—all of these lands in the Pakistani-controlled sector. The districts of Ladakh (Leh), Anantnag, Badgam Baramula, Pulwama, Srinagar, Kupwara, and Kargil in Srinagar province, and the districts of Jammu, Doda, Kathua, Rajauri, Udhampur, and part of Poonch of Jammu province constitute the Indian-held sector and have representation in the parliament of India as the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Encyclopaedia Britannica, CD2000, s.v. “Kashmir.”

8 The state of Jammu and Kashmir possess special standing within the union government. The other states follow the Indian constitution; however, the state of Jammu and Kashmir has its own constitution, adopted in 1956, which acknowledges the integrity of the state within the Republic of India. The union government exerts direct legislative authority in defense and foreign policy within the state, and possesses indirect weight in issues of citizenship or emergency powers. Encyclopaedia Britannica, CD2000, s.v. “Kashmir.”

9 During an eleven-year period, according to an unnamed Indian official, 9,515 civilians were killed, along with 2,911 members of the security force and 13,711 “terrorists,” of whom 2,186 were reportedly foreigners. Kiifer, John. 2001. Proxy War Threatens to Unravel U.S. Alliance. New York Times, 29 October, B5.

10 Bhatia, Ashima Kaul. 2001a. Transcending Faultlines: The Quest for a


12 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2002. For India, Deterrence May Not Prevent War. New York Times, 17 January, A1. Western military analysts estimate that India possesses fifty to one hundred nuclear warheads, while Pakistan has thirty to forty-five. Both nations have short-range missiles that are able to carry nuclear weapons.

13 Studies by the Lebanese writer Evelyne Accad include the intersection between identity as women and pressures as members of political organizations, for women in the Arab world. She has long called for open discussion of forced marriage, virginity, honor codes, claustrophobia, polygamy, repudiation, beating, lack of freedom, and denial of the opportunity to achieve one’s goals in life. Accad argues that marital domination is politically significant because sexuality and sex-role socialization are intimately connected to national conflicts, because war and sex are used to conquer, control, and possess, and because both are driven by the need to enlarge domain and authority. As examples, see Accad, Evelyne. 1991. Sexuality and Sexual Politics: Conflicts and Contradictions for Contemporary Women in the Middle East. In Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, edited by Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press; Women Unmask War Unveils Men: Sexuality, War and Literature in the Middle East. 1989. New York, New York University Press.


15 Bhatia 2001a, 2-3.

16 Ibid., p. 2.

17 Compared to a typology of methods developed by the Harvard theoretician Gene Sharp, the measures used by Kashmiri women’s groups all fall within the first, most elementary of six categories: protest and persuasion. Indeed, they are among the simplest methods: meetings, pamphlets, journals, and publications. The other five categories are social noncooperation (such as ostracism of persons); economic noncooperation (such as boycotts); economic noncooperation (such as strikes and walkouts); political noncooperation (such as civil disobedience); and nonviolent interventions (such as hunger strikes, sit-ins, and the development of alternative institutions). Sharp, Gene. 1973. Methods of Nonviolent Action. Vol. 2 of Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston, Porter Sargent Publishers, 117–29.


19 Bhatia 2001a, 11.


21 Bhatia 2001b.

22 Kashmiri women, according to Bhatia, spontaneously joined the armed conflict, and finding that they could not identify with the pan-Islamic ideologies, concluded that they wanted peace more than anything else and were willing to work for it. Bhatia, Ashima Kaul. 2001d. Other Side of Truth: The Kashmiri Women’s Cry for Peace. *Times of India*, 1 February, 14.

23 Bhatia 2001a, 19, 24.

24 Ibid., 28.


29 Failure to grasp the consequences of the British-proposed partition was not limited to Kashmir. Partition of historic Palestine was first formally recommended in the report of the Peel Commission, officially: U.K. Parliament. Royal Commission of Enquiry. 1937. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Cmd. 5479, July. Twenty years after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, in 1937 the commission headed by Lord William Robert Wellesley Peel would grant that little had been known about the indigenous population and admit the opposition of its leaders. U.K. 1937, 32.


32 In May 1948, there were 4,000 Palestinian forces, joined by 8,000 mostly irregular Arab soldiers, “no match” for the active Jewish military force of 22,425. Pappé 1994, 65.


38 Kaminer 1996, 92.

39 To follow the work of the Coalition of Women for a Just Peace, go to http://www.coalitionofwomen4peace.org.


41 Extensive interviews with leaders of Israeli peace groups and Israeli women’s peace groups with the author. Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem, June 1988 and June 1989.

and Samaria Remains in Force; Curfew in Gaza District. *Jerusalem Post*, 18 December.


44 Interviews, 1988 and 1989. (See endnote 41.)
46 Sharoni 1995, 119-120.
Society for the Study of International Affairs, 23.


54 Among the activists were women who had been involved in the Trident Ploughshares Campaign and had staged protests in Scotland, where marines guarded nuclear submarines. Some of the women had eluded tight military security to swim into the docks in which the submarines were moored, where they sprayed the words “useless” and “illegal” on the subs with paint. Two years earlier, three of the women had been involved in protests of the Trident program’s floating research laboratory at Loch Goil. In Grendnock court, the sheriff had ruled that rather than committing a crime, they were preventing one. One woman was among those who had been found not guilty in 1996 for smashing a Hawk aircraft bound for East Timor. The resulting publicity caused the U.K. government to stop selling Hawks to Indonesia. Ibid.
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Reflections from a Former Prime Minister: An Interview with Kim Campbell
by WPJH staff Hilary Roxe and Nicole Kohlerite

Kim Campbell served as Canada’s first female prime minister, as minister of justice and attorney general, and as minister of national defense. As one of only two women to have participated in a G7 summit, she was the first woman to be defense minister of a NATO country. Campbell chairs the Council of Women World Leaders based at the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government. An author, lecturer, diplomat, consultant, and corporate director, Campbell speaks widely on women and leadership, international conflict resolution, and democratization.

The Women’s Policy Journal of Harvard asked Kim Campbell to reflect on her experiences, as well as on the role she envisions women playing to help rebuild the post-September 11 world.

We want to begin by asking if you faced any special challenges as the first female defense minister of a NATO country?

I may have been the second female defense minister in the world, but I wasn’t the first. The first was actually Elizabeth Rhen from Finland. But I was certainly the first in a NATO country.

I was only in the portfolio for six months when I ran for the leadership and became prime minister. There are some jobs that, whatever people think about having a woman there, they have to take you seriously because you have the job. That’s why the leadership of men in appointing women to important positions is so significant.

Think of someone like Madeleine Albright. I’m sure there were a lot of places she went in the world where people had a disdain for the fact she was a woman. But she carried on her shoulders the mantle of the United States of America. And if people didn’t like it, they just had to lump it because she was the United States. It doesn’t matter who you are.

Kim Campbell served as Canada’s first female prime minister. She was also minister of justice and attorney general, minister of national defense and veterans’ affairs, and minister of state for Indian affairs and northern development. Today, Campbell chairs the Council of Women World Leaders at the Kennedy School of Government and serves on a number of international think tanks, including the Gorbachev Foundation of North America and the International Council of the Asia Society. She holds degrees in political science and law from the University of British Columbia and has done graduate work in Soviet government (ABD) at the London School of Economics.
If you are the American ambassador or the American representative, you carry the power of your country. So similarly, when I was the defense minister, people had to deal with me.

The military is very hierarchical. There's a great deal of heel-clicking and saluting, and I think men are more susceptible to hierarchical organizations. Particularly for men who haven't had military service, there's often a certain wistfulness of the military that is seen as supermasculine—not for all men, but for some men, there's something really quite compelling about the mystique of the military. I think I was not susceptible to those things. It wasn't that I didn't appreciate the fact there was a role for hierarchy—of course I wasn't disdainful of it at all—but I think I had a different response to a lot of things. I was not easily seduced by the effort that the Defense Department makes, that the military makes, to kind of co-opt their minister, even though they do not have a nefarious purpose.

I think there were eleven people on the Gulf Cabinet when I was justice minister, and when I talk about that whiff of testosterone, I think back to those days sitting in the Cabinet room. The brass would come in and give us all these briefings, and a number of years later, the man who at that time had been the minister of foreign affairs said to me, "You know you were the one who used to ask all those tough questions." To me this was a very important issue, as I didn't have the same need to be seen as one of the boys. It wasn't that I was obnoxious—it was just that my duty was to ask questions and to make sure that we were doing things based on the flow of information.

What about special challenges that you faced because you were a female prime minister?

While I was prime minister, it was hard for me to reflect on this, as I was so busy. But I was surrounded by people who had served my predecessor, and my predecessor had a wife who worked very hard to make life work for him. And, of course, he had been in office for some time by the time he left. So it's not really fair to compare a new leader with someone who's been leader of the party for ten years and prime minister for nine years because he made a lot of mistakes when he started out, and it takes a while to get used to the job.

The problem was just the failure to understand that a woman is different from a man. It takes a woman longer to get ready in the morning. That's because society has different expectations for you. One of the things I admire enormously about Hillary Clinton is the extent to which she has mainstreamed the pantsuit as appropriate professional dress. I can
tell you, I used to have to put on my pantyhose and suits every day. It just takes more time. And there was a total lack of understanding, but also a failure to understand the extent to which my predecessor had had a support system working for him—I didn’t have a wife. In that sense, I had to make other arrangements to make things happen.

Did you find a difference in the way you were treated domestically and internationally as prime minister?

When I went to the G7 summit, I was the prime minister of Canada. At the political dinner, which is very intimate, we sat around a table not much larger than this and talked. What brings you together is the fact that you all play the same role in your own country, so there’s a sense of camaraderie. You all deal with the same pressures; you all have to deal with your party. It’s an unspoken understanding because you’re all the leaders of your country, so I didn’t see a difference. There was enormous interest in me, and I still meet Japanese people who remember that I was there because I was the only woman.

You have some interesting ideas about the role that gender has played in the exclusion of women in civil society in the Middle East and how that might play with the rise of terrorist networks. Can you comment on this?

I’m certainly not the first person who’s noticed this. If you look at the societies that generate so much of the terrorism, in particularly fundamentalist Islamic societies, women live in considerable segregation, and women are quite explicitly socially disadvantaged or regarded as inferior.

The fact that men don’t have regular interactions with women, I think, creates a more macho culture, a male-bonding culture, which very much lends itself to the kinds of military plotting and scheming and violence that’s part of what terrorists need. Part of that is, again, the notion that you need women to breed, but it’s men who are fully developed human beings. I think the role of women is a very important indicator of a whole lot of other things in a society.

One of the interesting things I see in the advancing role of women in our own cultures is the extent to which it has broadened the acceptable rules for men. It goes to this notion that it’s not a situation where men are agent-focused and women are communal. Men are agent-focused and communal; women are agent-focused and communal. Both sexes have both qualities. And I think that it’s easier for men to express the communal sides of their natures in a broader range of activities in societies where women are equal.
You mentioned political movements. What role do you see women playing in postconflict resolutions?

Women exist in societies. They often have their own organizations. They have ways of seeing things. They have functions they perform. If you don’t design your postconflict behavior to take that into account, first of all, you miss huge opportunities. You will be less likely to be successful. You know there are opportunities to involve women and mobilize women that can really help to give the new regime or the new situation a much more grounded basis. That’s not something that can be accomplished purely institutionally or purely at the level of ceasefires. There is this whole other half of humanity that needs to be recognized.

Many policies have a differential impact on women and children than they have on adult men. But also, women are a resource. Women educate the children. That’s why women developmental theorists now argue that one of the most important things to do in terms of economic development is to teach women to read, increase the literacy levels of women, and empower [them] economically.

What pro-active steps can we be taking to help that situation? Or is this something that is culturally engrained and people outside those countries therefore don’t have the right to step in and change?

I’m not prepared to accept the cultural relativist mode because we have things like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As a world, we have come together, and even though we don’t necessarily fulfill all the goals, the international community has, from time to time, articulated values and places it wants to go. I think it’s important for us to sustain that.

If you look at a place like Afghanistan, there was a time when women did have more rights. They can’t accomplish what they need to accomplish without empowering their women. They would doom themselves to poverty, starvation and stagnation without developing their women. I teach a course on democratic transition and consolidation, and democratization is a very difficult process to make happen from the outside. The most anyone can do from the outside is really have an effect on the margins. But that doesn’t mean that you shouldn’t do things, that you shouldn’t try to make a difference.

One of the things the Council of Women World Leaders has done is offer our assistance in the transition in Afghanistan. We are now articulating what it is that we can do. We cannot go in and tell women there what they should do, but simply by making women leaders more visible, by creating some mentorship relationships, some supportive friendships, we can help strengthen the women who are there. The Afghan women
themselves [can remind] their colleagues that this notion of women as leaders and important players is very strongly accepted around the world. And fortunately, you’re not starting from square one there, because you do have some quite extraordinary women. Some women who had left under the Taliban rule want to go back and make a difference, so there are Afghani professionals and scientists and organizers.

I think it is important not to write women off as somehow marginal. Women are more than half the human race. It’s a sign or a symptom or a reflection of women’s disempowerment that somebody could think that rights for women were a negotiable factor, that there was some kind of cultural relativism that would justify turning your back on, or turning aside from, the oppression of women. I would like to think that we are beyond that.

Women themselves may desire to live in a certain way—if women themselves want to dress modestly, if women themselves want to confine the circumstances under which they interact with men, that’s one thing—but to be denied the fundamental right of literacy based solely on your gender is to me unthinkable. What is interesting is that the religious justifications of that are not in the mainstream and are not justified by those religions themselves. Traditional practices get intertwined with religious practices, and people forget that what they think of as a religious practice is in fact traditional and relates only to their own particular communities.

Look at the Saudis who won’t let women drive cars—the prophet’s wife rode a camel, and she was in business. All of these things, where do they come from? It doesn’t come from the basic principles of Islam, but Islam is used as a justification. If men have rights, women have rights. It’s as simple as that; it’s human rights. That’s why I say one of the things that we can do as countries is to make very clear that the empowerment of women and enfranchisement of women are some of the fundamental requirements to be a democracy. Universal manhood suffrage is no longer enough. As countries we can take those positions. And as women, either as individuals or on the Council of Women World Leaders, we can work to try to make the reality of women as leaders, women as fully fledged participants, something that is seen to be real and appropriate.

You mentioned the Council of Women World Leaders. When you get together with these other women, do you find that there are aspects that you all have in common? Are there any shared characteristics?

Just as with the G7, there were things we had in common. There’s that plus. When women get together, many of whom were the first woman out, they are an example of what women can do when they get a chance.
They’re often extremely good at what they do. You can’t judge what someone can or can’t do simply by what they are currently doing. In other words, very often what people view is limited by cultural realities or structural realities or financial realities. The only way you can judge somebody is if (she is) in a position to do whatever it is they are able to do. Only then can you assess (her) ability.

On the Council of Women World Leaders, all of these women had different roads to power. Some of the women became prime ministers because they were appointed by their president. Some, like me, had to run and win the leadership of their party, although I didn’t win a general election like Margaret Thatcher. And some are women who didn’t see themselves necessarily as leaders. I think that most of the women would not have said as little children that they wanted to grow up to be president or prime minister, which I think boys are more likely to do. However, I do hope more girls now think they want to grow up to be president or prime minister.
Mainstreaming Women's Perspectives in the Military: The Next Advance
by Lory Manning

Introduction

An unmarked revolution is under way worldwide, a revolution whose implications for international security and global conflict resolution have yet to be explored, a revolution in women's military roles. There have always been a few women warriors: some disguised themselves as men to fight; some followed husbands onto the battlefield; some lived in countries like Dahomey (now Benin), with a tradition of women's units; and some, like the Iceni Queen Boadecia, commanded military forces because their roles as tribal leaders demanded it. Women have also long served in guerilla and irregular forces. What was new in the twentieth century was women's entry with rank and pay into the regular armed forces of sovereign nations. This allowed women to garner the experience to gain a voice in an aspect of national security affairs in which they had formerly been silent.

Background

Until 1985, national need drove women's entry into the military—at first the need for skilled nurses, then, during World War I, the need for personnel with administrative skills like typing and switchboard operating. After 1918, women who had not served as nurses returned to civilian life, until an even stronger need for their services arose during World War II when large numbers of women were recruited or conscripted in a few countries. The jobs these women undertook depended on their country's need. In the United States, Australia, and Canada, women served in a wide array of noncombatant jobs, including those in the medical, administration, communications, intelligence, aviation, and vehicular maintenance fields, as well as serving as aircraft ferry pilots and gunnery instructors. In Great Britain, where the need was larger, women also served in air defense crews. In the Soviet Union, where the need was

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greatest, they served in combat—flying fighter and bomber aircraft as crewmembers of navy ships and fighting in the infantry. During the war, women performed well in all types of military occupations, but their wartime performance did not matter after the war—they were not needed, and thus, most returned to civilian life.

Several countries allowed a few women to remain in service after the war in a decreased range of occupations, mostly in the medical and administrative fields. Need—not their skills and talents—continued to determine women’s places in the military in the postwar period, and the need was minimal in most countries. Israel was the exception. Israeli women could be drafted, though the 1949 Defense Service Law barred them from combat occupations. Countries that allowed women to serve limited not only the women’s occupations but also their numbers, their rank, and their military authority. For forty years after the end of World War II, women in military service remained on the sidelines. Combat, always among the most gendered of human activities, remained a male-only domain. Since the bar to women’s participation in combat occupations was universal, women were, ipso facto, universally barred from attaining positions in which they could influence national military planning, policy, and direction. Then, in the mid-1980s, the bar slowly began to lift.

The Transition

National equal rights laws, court decisions, the need for women’s services in the face of insurgent movements and other national crises, and especially the success of women in every military field opened to them were catalysts of this extraordinary development. In the mid-1990s, the movement of women into combat occupations accelerated. Currently, a few women are beginning to find themselves in positions from which they can direct national military planning, policy making, and direction. Increasing numbers of countries have opened some combat arms occupations to women, allowing them to enter and remain in the military for longer periods, serve in greater numbers in both senior enlisted and officer ranks, obtain leadership skills at increasingly senior levels within combat units, and undertake a career-long immersion in combat doctrine. This remarkable change has been little noticed, but its genesis is the same sea change that metamorphosed women’s roles in other arenas, like politics and business, from ancillary to principal roles.

The opportunity for military women to become players in the formulation and direction of national military policy is radical. In 1984, no country permitted women to serve in combat occupations. Women made
up considerably less than 5 percent of active forces in most countries (the United States, with 9.5 percent,\textsuperscript{4} was an exception) and those women who served were concentrated in the lower enlisted and officer ranks; military leadership was 100 percent male. The first cracks in the general worldwide prohibition against women in combat came in 1985. Three countries—France, the Netherlands, and Norway—lifted the ban altogether, while Denmark began trials that resulted in the lifting of its ban three years later. Women are now serving in combat positions in navies and air forces around the world; many countries also permit them to serve in infantry, armor, and artillery positions.\textsuperscript{5} Women make up a growing percentage of active-duty forces. They serve in many countries which barred them from service altogether in 1985, and they are beginning to serve in greater numbers in the more senior enlisted and officer ranks.

Among the countries that have recently opened their armed services to women are Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Germany, Italy, Indonesia, Malawi, Mexico, Peru, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey (women can now enlist, previously only women officers could serve), and the United Arab Emirates. Women also serve in many countries for which detailed data on numbers and occupations are not readily available. These countries include Colombia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Zambia.

**Where Matters Stand Today**

Service in a combat specialty is the *sine qua non* for military personnel aspiring to reach positions in which they can shape operational planning and direct military policy on a national level. Although a few countries—Canada, for instance—have had women serving in civilian positions with such responsibilities, and several countries, including Great Britain and Israel, have had women as wartime prime ministers, no country in modern times has had a woman serving in a senior national military position. This will change as the first cadre of women allowed to serve in combat occupations begins competing for promotion to the admiral and general ranks. From there, it is only a matter of time before a woman is serving as a service chief or as an operational commander.

A change with perhaps greater consequences for international security, however, is already underway. This is the emergence of an increasing number of military women, in a growing number of countries, serving at ever more senior ranks in combat and combat support units. Their numbers are small but rising, and they are reaching mid-level enlisted and officer ranks. Their presence is visible in news reports and photographs—
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Women in Active Forces</th>
<th>Combat Occupations</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>Sea; Air</td>
<td>Australian women serve on submarines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>Sea; Air; Ground</td>
<td>Submarines recently opened to women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>Sea; Air; Ground</td>
<td>Women cannot serve in most Foreign Legion positions. Before 2000, women could serve only in medical and musician positions. In January 2001, Germany began to allow women to serve in all military positions. Court cases in the 1990s opened air and sea combat positions to women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>Sea; Air; Ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Sea; Air; Ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Sea; Air; Some Ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Italy opened its military to women in 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Sea; Air</td>
<td>The senior woman in the Jordanian Army is a colonel, the sister of King Abdullah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>Sea; Air; Ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>Sea; Air; Ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Sea; Air; Ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>Sea; Air; Ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Sea; Air; Ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>Sea; Air</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>Sea; Air</td>
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a tank commander on peacekeeping duty in the Balkans, a naval officer assuming command of a ship, a flyer returning from a combat mission, and a combat engineer in charge of a unit building roads and bridges in a combat zone. There are more than ten thousand women serving aboard combat ships in the United States, and thousands of military women around the world are serving as peacekeepers in trouble spots. In some countries, a startling number of new recruits are women. For example, in 1999, 27 percent of first-term enlistees in the U.S. Air Force were women, as were 22 percent of Australia’s 1998 navy recruits. Twenty-four percent of forces in South Africa are women.

**Consequences for Global Security**

It has taken a mere fifteen years to overturn the traditional, universal pattern of excluding women from most combat and combat support occupations. The consequences this reversal will have on international security and global conflict resolution is still largely unknown. The most visible early effects are taking place in peacekeeping operations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that women peacekeepers are particularly successful in safeguarding the rights and dignity of the women and children living in conflict areas. Scholars and international organizations, including the United Nations, are now studying the impact of women peacekeepers more systematically. One sign of their value is that government officials in nations receiving peacekeepers are requesting that women be included among them. For example, in her 19 December 2001 *Washington Post* column “Diplomatic Dispatches,” Nora Boustany reports that Sima Samar, who is serving as minister for women’s affairs in the interim Afghan government, “delivered a list of requests to the State Department that included a plea for women to serve among the peacekeeping troops to be deployed in Afghanistan.”

The long-term effects of having increasing numbers of women serving in combat and combat support roles are not yet known. Various theories and studies contend that when women reach critical mass within an organization, organizational cultures change; certainly, there are social critics who contend that women’s presence has enervated military culture. These critiques grow more out of ideology than scholarship or experience, and often blame women for organizational changes that have nothing to do with women’s presence or that other observers view as positive changes. Two matters concerning the impact of women’s military service are often jumbled together in discussion, but they are discrete questions requiring separate answers.
The first question is: Are women militarily effective? Many people believe that women do not have either the physical strength or the mental and emotional endurance to serve in most military capacities, but the experiential evidence to date indicates that they, in fact, do. No country that has begun using women in the military has stopped; no country that has increased women’s numbers has decided to reduce them—in fact, most are continuing to increase the numbers; and no country that has allowed women to serve in combat roles has rescinded the decision. Women from a number of countries have participated in both naval and air combat operations and have performed as well as their male peers. The experience with which to judge women’s success in ground combat roles remains slim to date because women are largely absent from ground combat occupations, including infantry, armor, and field artillery, in most countries. Even in those countries that permit women to serve in these occupations, the number of women who do remains small. Women are also almost universally excluded from special forces (e.g., SEALS, Rangers). The next decades will show whether these occupations will eventually open to women or will remain off-limits. It is likely they will gradually open but will have a higher male-to-female ratio than other military occupations because of requirements for above average physical strength.

The second question is: What changes, if any, will women’s presence as both combatants and military leaders make in how nations approach matters of international security and global conflict resolution? One can only speculate about this at present, but the speculation can be informed by considering what changes have come from women’s participation in greater numbers and at higher echelons within other fields, such as law, medicine, business, diplomacy, and politics. None of these have undergone a notable transformation in professional fundamentals because of women’s presence. What can be observed, however, is an expansion in the scope of essential considerations that increasingly captures and mainstreams women’s experiences and concerns. In other words, when women participate in a particular field, the model around which institutional and professional values form comes increasingly from the experiences and worldviews of both sexes, rather than just one.

The past decade has seen long-needed changes arising from women’s increasing participation in international security affairs on the diplomatic, governmental, journalistic, and NGO fronts. Using rape as a weapon of war is now a war crime, for instance, and the initial discussions on the formation of an interim Afghan government included delegates who rep-
resented woman *qua* women. A previously insurmountable barrier to women's fuller participation in international security affairs has been their absence from military leadership. That barrier is crumbling.

The military ethos will not change as a result of this—the military will remain the military. Its worldview, however, will expand, and its values will be shaped and grounded in the circumstances of women as well as of men. Though these results are still speculative, they are based in observations on how women's presence has changed other institutions opened to their participation in greater numbers at senior levels, and how women have heretofore been able to affect the military. As women enter higher ranks in the military, one more institution with international security responsibilities will find it harder to tell the women of the world that their human rights and concerns have to wait while larger matters are pursued. One more institution will come closer to understanding that women's rights are central to the pursuit of global justice and global peace.

**Endnotes:**


5 In the United States, the ban against women serving in combat aviation was lifted in 1993, and that against women serving as permanent crew aboard combat ships in 1994. U.S. women remain barred from ground combat occupations.


**Additional References:**


The Veil and the Gun: Universal Women’s Rights and the War on Terrorism
by Sigal R. Benporath

The violation of women’s rights by the Taliban regime was presented by the U.S. administration as yet another justification for the war on Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. The war was aimed at the terrorists and the Taliban authorities in an effort to “hunt down” the terrorists and “bring them to justice,” as President Bush proclaimed in post-September 11 public speeches. However, claims were also made that the war was waged to help the people of Afghanistan regain control from the Taliban authorities over the country and over their daily lives. To this end, the harsh life conditions of the Afghan women were taken to be an additional justification for international intervention in the region. It is true that this justification was not in itself a satisfying condition for intervention before September 11. However, my claim here is that the rhetoric of justification for the war in Afghanistan sets a standard that should be taken seriously. Including women’s rights in the criteria for a justified intervention of the international community, as was done in Afghanistan, should be used as a future guideline for similar cases. I will argue that the international community should develop and implement a universal lexicon of responses to human rights violations, and specifically include within it a response to extreme violations of women’s rights by oppressive cultures. I offer two justifications for the implementation of such a code in the international arena. The first is based on an adaptation of mainstream political theories of state-subculture relations. The second justification, derived from the overlapping nature of patriarchalism and militarism, suggests that support for women’s rights in oppressive cultures can consequently decrease militaristic tendencies within those cultures and can contribute overall to the American and international war against terrorism.

Part One

Political-philosophical accounts offer justifications for violating the borders of a nation-state in some circumstances. There is a wide agreement among just war theorists that a war can be justly waged if some con-

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ditions are met, including a just cause (self-defense or the defense of others, based on a set of criteria) and proportionality. Severe human rights violations by sovereign states against (some of) their members should be regarded as a just cause for intervention for the defense of others.

However, such intervention need not always take the form of war. Proportionality between the means employed and the ends to be achieved suggests a range of alternatives to be used in the struggle against women’s human rights violations. Walzer and other just war theorists stipulate that for a war to be just, it must be a last resort, utilized only after all other alternatives for conflict resolution have been exhausted. In the struggle to maintain plausible life conditions by avoiding basic human rights violations against women, as for other marginalized groups in oppressive countries, war should serve as the extreme end of a range of intervention tactics available to the international community.

The wide denunciation of Apartheid in South Africa exemplifies international agreement on the unacceptability of severe race discrimination. This moment in history demonstrates the international community’s universal or cosmopolitan obligation to protect all humans from cruel violations of their rights. Other examples range from the economic sanctions imposed on China for its human rights violations, to the intervention in Kosovo when the extent of “ethnic cleansing” was becoming clear. However, the violation of women’s rights alone, severe as it may be in some countries, has never served as a reason for significant international pressure. If we take seriously the humanity of women, as well as the rhetoric of the U.S. administration in the war against Afghanistan, then we should amend the moral and practical justifications for international coercion to include the most appalling instances of human rights violations against women.

An agreement as to what constitutes an appalling instance of rights violation is the first step toward developing a code of international intervention. Some impressive theoretical suggestions have been made in this direction in the past few years; examples include resolutions from the Beijing conference, the creation of the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Treatise of Human Rights. Presently, we face a pressing need to agree that violations against women’s human rights serve as a satisfactory justification for international coercion.

For the purpose of advocating international intervention to protect women from severe violations of their rights, it would be enough to outline some of the most obvious women’s rights violations, with possible
international responses. Women’s human rights violations range from prohibition of education and professional training to prevention of workforce participation to forced marriage (especially of young girls) to murder for the failure to provide dowry or for violating “the family’s honor.” In extreme cases, the violation of women’s human rights can take the form of female infanticide or widespread organized rape for military and political purposes. Possible responses by the international community and superpower(s) can be minor or extreme. In minor cases, the international community should consider 1) economic sanctions, including banning participation in trade agreements to import and export embargoes; and 2) expulsion from international trade, cultural, and sports organizations, where organizations would be encouraged to set criteria for participation in their activities. The ban on the South African participation in sports events is considered to have been very effective in creating internal pressure against Apartheid. In extreme cases, the international community should consider military intervention.

Some might ask why it is justified to violate the nation-state’s borders or use other means of coercion when it violates state sovereignty, even if it is to protect oppressed groups within its borders. Justifications offered by political and feminist theorists for affecting a group’s cultural practices and limiting their rights to self-determination in an effort to protect minorities within that group should be adapted for the international arena. Most notably, Okin argues for the defense of women’s rights in any cultural setting, claiming that oftentimes cross-cultural tolerance results in acceptance of oppressive and misogynic traditions. Martha Nussbaum defends what she labels the capabilities approach, which utilizes a comparative view of the quality of life for women (and men) in different nations. These theories can be used to evaluate women’s human rights violations and to allow—as Nussbaum suggests—the safeguarding of national sovereignty, along with the promotion of global policy and global institutions for the protection of basic rights.

In discussing the protection of individual members from oppression by their cultural or national group, the international community should be regarded as justified in exercising power over oppressive countries, much as the state is justified in exercising power over groups within it when group members severely violate basic human rights. When taking action against countries that violate the human rights of their members, the international community and the superpower(s) should take into account Spinner-Halev’s warnings: “Newly formed good intentions are not enough to cast aside deep-seated oppression.” His practical rejection of
protecting individuals from oppression by overriding the group’s autonomy is the potential for a possible backfire. State intervention, he fears, can cause stronger opposition on the side of the oppressed (and oppressive) group, violence, and a stronger tendency to maintain the oppressive culture. “When people’s identity is attacked or demeaned, they often react by clinging to it ever more fiercely.” To defend group autonomy, simply because it is difficult to fight effectively, however, is both morally and practically dubious. As Amy Gutmann claims, “Viewing group identity as intrinsically good is morally mistaken, and the source of ongoing injustice in democratic societies and world politics more generally.”

The institutions of the international community, such as the UN, do not have the same authority over all countries as a state has over its citizens and the groups they form. The right to autonomy and self-determination may be controversial in the discussion of oppressed minorities within sovereign nations, but a state is generally assumed to have an indisputable legal and cultural sovereignty over its own members. The state member’s right to emigrate reinforces the state’s right to practice any laws within its jurisdiction.

In this age, however, isolation from the international community is hardly an option for any country. International relations and global decisions regarding trade, rights, and other factors influence individuals’ lives around the world; individuals and entire nations alike are subject to decisions made beyond their national boundaries, including work for or trade with international corporations, and the reception of support from the IMF. As Diana Zoelle recently claimed, “Any effective remedy to the oppression of women is at this point in history, ultimately, an international one: a remedy that reaches into the private realm . . . in which women are found globally and within which their particular harms are contained.” The UN’s increasing conflict intervention and regional allied forces suggest that the practical possibility and the moral obligation exist for a more vigorous transnational intervention. This activity suggests that the potential exists for increasing interventions in the case of women’s rights violations as well. The international community’s obligation and ability to prevent tribal oppression or murderous feuds in Sierra Leone or Rwanda are not morally or practically different from the required response to gender oppression in Afghanistan or Yemen, although they do differ in their severity. The international community has to ensure proportionality between the extent of the rights violations and the response they entail; nevertheless, the commitment to actively oppose severe rights violations should be followed and can be done using a broad scale of violations and subsequent responses.
This has actually been the case in response to some extreme rights violations in the past. The international community responded with military force or with imposing significant sanctions in cases such as the genocide and severe atrocities in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, and the extreme mistreatment of political dissidents in China. However, the severe violation of women’s rights was never, in itself, a justification for political, economic, or military intervention.

The acknowledgment of women’s rights as human rights by the international community would be a vital declaration of support for local groups struggling to allow more freedom and civic equality for women and other minorities in their cultures. To make such an acknowledgment, the international community and its institutions should commit to using their legal power, and in extreme cases, their military might, to protect women and other oppressed groups from severe rights violations.

The suggestion to use military force to protect women’s and other minorities’ rights could generate some objections. Mainly, international military intervention could be regarded as politically or culturally imperialistic, and it could be viewed as increasing levels of militarism. Intervention can indeed be imperialistic; I believe it is the duty of international legal and political organizations to decide sensitively on the proportional measures of interventions. The evil of organized mass rape as part of “ethnic cleansing” was widely acknowledged as deserving military intervention, even at the cost of a possible blame of cultural imperialism, or of enforcing a specific morality (the liberal morality of individual rights) on other cultures. Similarly, the evil of denying a right to education to all women merits various forms of economic sanctions even if that, too, can be regarded as cultural imperialism. The evil of state-orchestrated (or -facilitated) murder of women for the sake of “family honor” warrants active protection of such women, by giving them political asylum, for example, rather than turning a blind eye for the sake of peaceful international relations (as was the British response to the Indian tradition of widow-burning). The more extreme the evil is, and the more it endangers the life and well-being of large groups, then the more seriously the option of intervention should be considered.

Generally, the possibility of international intervention, including the use of force, should be part of the lexicon of responses, with its pros and cons weighed carefully in each case. The value of international intervention to protect the rights of women and other minorities from severe rights violations overrides any possible objections. The fundamental advantage of considering this extreme step is that it sends a clear moral message that
the international community opposes the oppression of women and other minorities and is willing to back up this moral viewpoint by the use of force in various forms. By declaring that no step is too extreme to be considered as a response to women’s rights violation, the international community declares its opposition to the oppression of women and maintains that no tradition can be exempt from this rule. The most efficient way to convey this statement is by associating with it significant sanctions that could be used against its violators. Military force could actually be used when all other means are exhausted, as is the requirement of the theory of just war. In such cases, military intervention is indeed justified, and its advantages outweigh the disadvantages.

The pictures of joyous girls going back to school after five years under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan provides an example of the type of international protection that can be provided to a subgroup from oppression by the majority or political leaders. This, of course, was not the main justification for the intervention in Afghanistan, nor could the denial of education have been sufficient as a sole reason for use of military force. However, it serves to illustrate that beyond possible objections, the positive consequences of a well-informed and relevant response to the cultural oppression of women can outweigh the ethical questions inherent in intervention.

Part Two

States and international organizations should aim to encourage specific economic decisions to be made by sovereign states by setting the acknowledgement of women’s human rights as criteria for economic relations. Trade agreements between states rely on factors that express stability and prospects of a state’s economy. Likewise, international organizations such as the IMF promote desired economic approaches by setting criteria for receiving their financial support. The United States often requires the improvement of human rights as a prerequisite for its financial and political support. Similarly, a set of basic human rights could serve as criteria for participation in international institutions and programs.

This approach stands the risk of creating a backfire: countries can choose to defend their discriminatory or rights-defying culture and take the risk of international condemnation. Iraq’s policy since the Gulf War can serve as an alarming example for such a response—alarming because the civilian population absorbs most of the harms that result from the sanctions. Hence, what is needed is an approach that acknowledges a state’s sovereignty yet sets standards for human rights and associates
those standards with specific policies, prerequisites, sanctions, and various types of coercion.

Several authors have claimed that a state’s denial of basic rights to its members calls for a humanitarian intervention by other states (or the international community). An agreement defining criteria for what is shocking enough “to the moral conscience of mankind” is needed in order to decide when an intervention is to take place. Moreover, we need a language of human rights that is both authoritative and culturally sensitive to decide what types of sanctions or interventions are required for various cases of rights violations. It is not enough to mention the most abhorrent cases of genocide or “ethnic cleansing” and agree that these justify a military intervention from superpowers or international troops. Similar to the economic standards that are used to decide which states are developed and which are developing, or to decide which states are in the G10 and which are not, a lexicon of rights violations with corresponding responses needs to be developed and agreed upon for purposes of international relations. In such a lexicon, women’s basic human rights should be acknowledged as a type of rights for which, when violated, an international response would ensue.

The economic standards set by the international and multinational organizations have not, as of yet, enabled all countries around the globe to enjoy a prosperous economy. Similarly, setting standards for human rights and their protection is unlikely to result in an eradication of all violations of basic human rights. Such rights are violated even in countries that formally endorse a liberal rights-based constitution.

The strict implementation of these standards is required to create an international understanding of the most basic qualities of a decent life. The standards could include various basic welfare rights such as freedom from physical abuse and a right to equal basic education. The lexicon of rights can well be based on the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and Children’s Rights, and the Beijing declaration and platform for action from 1995. The important step is to utilize such declarations as guidelines for an international obligation to support the promotion of these rights within sovereign states.

Governments like the United States that have the financial, political, and military means to interfere with other states’ internal affairs have used those means many times in the past. Whether the goal is to protect a government’s own interests (as in the case of supporting the Islamic Afghan government that opposed the Soviet intervention in their country) or to fight drug trafficking (as in Panama), the sovereignty of national borders has not proven to be an impenetrable barrier to governments that
have the impetus and means to cross them. From the perspective of political morality, some justifications for crossing the borders of national sovereignty are better than others, and there are few better justifications than the crude violations of basic human rights.

Speaking from the viewpoint of humanist political morality, it would be justified to use the U.S. superpower status and the growing military ability of the United Nations to promote the humane interest of endowing basic rights to women as well as other oppressed groups. Basic rights can be defined minimally, yet their implementation can make a world of difference in societies around the globe that fail to acknowledge the humanity of some of their members.

As morally compelling as such a proposal may be—and it will surely not be compelling to all—it may not serve as a satisfactory justification for political action. Governments and international institutions may justify their actions using moral terminology, but they nevertheless use a calculus of interests in their process of decision making. Therefore, after suggesting here to take moral justifications seriously, I would like to provide another justification for the demand to create a universal lexicon of responses to human rights violations.

This further justification relies on the correlation between women’s oppression and a culture’s or a nation’s militaristic tendencies. As Katha Pollitt recently put it, “Women’s rights are crucial for everything the West supposedly cares about: infant mortality . . . political democracy, personal freedom, equality under the law, not to mention its own security.” The multilayered connection between militarism and patriarchalism can further justify the demand to advance an international protection of women’s rights from severe violations. In countries where women are marginalized, where they are traditionally kept outside the public sphere, women fail to provide a significant alternative voice in the public discourse. The oppressive conceptual framework common to both patriarchal and militaristic thought and practice creates a public sphere in which the practice of keeping women’s voices on the margin is mutually supported and enhanced. Conversely, the incorporation of women’s inclinations, interests, and practices into the public sphere promises to alter the strength of militaristic tendencies. Potentially, the alternative life experiences of women shaped by generations of exclusion can offer—if properly encouraged and supported—pathways to establishing a new agenda and alternative ways of pursuing it.

Challenging oppression serves the aims of feminism and peace alike. To challenge oppression in a militaristic and patriarchal society, the sup-
port of the international community is invaluable for dissident organizations. Local organizations that offer an alternative set of priorities and innovative means of advancing them can and should be supported by the international community’s institutions as a first means of intervention in a country that severely violates women’s human rights.24

The implementation by the institutions of the international community of a minimalist universal code of women’s rights as human rights that all nations would be required to follow when executing their foreign policies can contribute to both individual well-being and the gradual decline of militarism. The atrocities of September 11 force the United States and the international community to take notice of women’s suffering around the world and to respond to neglected, oppressed, and oppressive regimes by agreeing that the protection of the universal rights of women is critical to winning the war on terrorism.

Conclusion

Women’s rights violations should serve as a justification for international pressure and intervention in oppressive regimes. The intervention should take various forms in accordance with the severity of the rights violations. The superpower(s) and the international community should proclaim a willingness to cast sanctions and even to go to war when all other means have been exhausted, in an effort to defend women’s rights. Such a statement should send a clear message of support to women around the world that their basic rights are of importance and that violation of these rights could bear grave consequences. The message need not be culturally imperialistic, and the intervention itself need not take the form of imperialism. Rather, I am advocating for the defense of basic human rights for women as minimally defined by various multinational organizations, which has earned vast support by nations and cultures around the globe. The next step is for this support to be translated into policies that will protect and empower women and oppressed minorities, wherever they may live.

Endnotes:
1 The author wishes to thank Jeff Spinner-Halev, Eran Benporath, and Suzanne Dovi for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this paper.
2 For an extensive list of press coverage concerning the women of Afghanistan and their status as a justification for the war, see RAWA’s Web site at http://rawa.fancymarketing.net/.

4 In his secular just war theory (differing significantly from the traditional Christian just war theory), Walzer maintains that the defense of human rights is the only legitimate reason for war (just as bellum). See Walzer, Michael. 1977. *Just and Unjust Wars*. New York: Basic Books, 72.


6 Lifting the sanctions from China due to the American economic and diplomatic interests was highly controversial, and mistaken according to the view presented here. However, the sanctions failed to consider the crude violations of women’s rights in China, from infanticide of baby girls to restrictions on education. See the critical account of the Beijing conference, and particularly the decision to locate the women’s rights convention in Beijing in 1995, in the book *Empowering women: Critical Views on the Beijing Conference*. 1995. Crows Nest, NSW: Little Hills Press.


12 Oppressed citizens rarely have the knowledge, access, and resources to exercise their right to emigrate.


For France, See Okin’s discussion on polygamy in France in Okin 1999. Although France has outlawed polygamy since then, this example is used to draw attention to the fact that women rights violations can occur also in a democratic polity, even if not to an extent as extreme as in other settings.

15 For one recent example, see “U.S. Tells Colombia to Improve Rights Record Before It Gets Aid.” 2001. New York Times, 20 December, A19. The sanctions on South Africa during the Apartheid, and against Serbia during Milosevic’s government are other well-known examples of the connection between human rights violations and political and economic sanctions. Similarly, American cooperation with China changed drastically after the Tiananmen bloodshed. See discussion of the history of these relations, including references to human rights disagreements, in Lampton, David M. 2001. Small Mercies. The National Interest (66):106-113. The author claims that “the comparatively long period of Sino-American security cooperation was brought to an end by a series of developments, the principal ones being that China’s national power grew much more rapidly than had been anticipated in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the sharp reaction of Americans to the 1989 Tiananmen bloodshed.”


21 “Sexism and war are cultural problems that cannot be illuminated, much less solved . . . in isolation from each other. The notion of reciprocal causation seems to me to offer . . . the knowledge and the strategies . . . for overcoming the twin problems of sexism and war.” Reardon, Betty A. 1996. Sexism and the War System. New York: Syracuse University Press, 36.


24 For example, RAWA in Afghanistan, Betzelem or New Profile in Israel, Al-Manar for Palestinian Israeli women, EWLA in Ethiopia, and many others.
Promoting International Women’s Human Rights One Lawyer at a Time
by Mary Hartnett

Introduction

Conflict, instability, and terrorism do not develop instantaneously or in a vacuum. Poverty, oppression, and inequality create a ripe medium in which despots not only flourish, but also cultivate followers.\(^2\) It is no surprise that some of the world’s most severe and portentous security crises have arisen in countries and regions where women—who comprise more than half of all citizens—are denied equal rights.\(^3\) The terrorist events of September 11 are no exception. The al Qaeda network flourished in Afghanistan, where women under the Taliban regime lived in poverty and fear and were denied their fundamental human rights.\(^4\)

As much as the oppression of women and their absence from decision-making roles contributed to this and other crises, so must the autonomy of women and their presence in rebuilding their own countries contribute to meaningful solutions. However, it is not enough to simply ensure that women are part of transitional and long-term governments in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the world. To foster true democracy and development, women’s human rights lawyers must also play a significant role in the reconstruction process and beyond, and these lawyers must be trained to use the international women’s human rights framework\(^5\) to ensure that women’s human rights are provided, protected, and promoted in the context of their own culture and society. Trained women’s human rights lawyers are needed not only to help draft laws providing for gender equality, but to help governments prioritize implementation of these rights and to ensure that “resources follow rhetoric.”\(^6\)

This article examines the Leadership and Advocacy for Women in Africa (LAWA) Program, based at Georgetown University Law Center, as a “policy in action” case study and recommends such in-depth training programs as key building blocks to ensure women’s human rights and promote security, democracy, and development. The article first describes

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the history and components of the LAWA Program in Section I. In Section II, the results of the LAWA Program are discussed, with an illustrative focus on the domestic violence work by LAWA alumnae in Uganda. In Section III, the article provides lessons learned and prescribes recommendations for future human rights training programs. The article concludes with thoughts for the future.

I. The Leadership and Advocacy for Women in Africa Program

The LAWA Program was founded in 1993 in order to find and train promising lawyers from Africa committed to advancing the cause of women’s human rights upon return to their countries. Under the program, participants study for and receive a masters of law (LLM) degree at Georgetown University Law Center, with an emphasis on human rights and gender studies, and complete a major graduate paper on an African women’s rights issue. They then complete a six-month work assignment with a public interest or government organization in Washington, D.C., compatible with their interests and long-term plans, such as the World Bank or the Women’s Rights Division of Human Rights Watch. The thirty-one lawyers who have completed the LAWA Program have come from and returned to Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana.

Throughout their time in Washington, D.C., the LAWA fellows and their American counterparts in the program attend biweekly seminars in which they discuss key women’s human rights issues and their own work with each other and with local activists and leaders. The advocates also attend Supreme Court and Congressional hearings on current women’s rights issues, and meet and exchange ideas with leading women’s rights lawyers from the United States and other countries. These activities expose all participants to new ideas and approaches for use in their future women’s human rights work.

II. Program Results: The Ugandan Case Study of Human Rights in Action

The LAWA graduates have returned home to their countries where they are using their human rights training to promote women’s human rights through their work in NGOs, governments, law schools, courts, legislatures, and private firms. They draw on international, regional, and comparative human rights law to draft legislation on issues that include domestic violence, marital rape, HIV/AIDS, female genital mutilation,
inheritance rights, and employment equality. They have produced human rights reports on a variety of issues that not only highlight shortcomings in domestic law and practice, but also encourage governments to comply with international norms. They also have used their training to design legal and practical strategies so that women understand and can claim these rights, including establishing domestic violence shelters and volunteering their time to provide legal information and advice to women in rural areas.

To illustrate how LAWA Program participants are using their international women’s human rights training to promote democracy and women’s rights and to effect change, we profile the human rights work of Leadership and Advocacy for Women-Uganda (LAW-Uganda), an NGO formed by the LAWA alumnae in Uganda, and specifically highlight LAW-Uganda’s work on the issue of domestic violence.

LAWA alumnae in Uganda founded LAW-Uganda in 1997. One of LAW-Uganda’s foremost goals was to use the international women’s human rights framework to improve the situation for women in Uganda facing domestic violence. Although domestic violence was once seen as a private family matter outside the domain of international human rights law, international law now clearly recognizes that women have a right to live their lives free from domestic violence, that violence prevents women from exercising their other fundamental rights, and that states have an obligation to protect those rights. Many of the LAWA alumnae had worked during their careers to provide advice and assistance to individual victims of domestic violence but found that without a comprehensive legal and systematic approach with government backing there was little they could do to provide more than a “band-aid” approach to individual victims.

The LAW-Uganda plan to implement positive change for domestic violence victims in Uganda was threefold: (1) research and document the problem of domestic violence in Uganda and highlight Uganda’s obligation under international law to take action to address the problem; (2) draft comprehensive domestic violence legislation; and, (3) devise a strategy to enact and effectively implement the new law. We discuss how LAW-Uganda developed this domestic violence initiative below and contend that this three-pronged model for change—document, draft, and implement—can be replicated for other women’s human rights issues in other countries.

LAW-Uganda first put their plan of action to work by documenting the problem of domestic violence in Uganda. This documentation was an
important step in order to illustrate the depth of the problem and to demonstrate the requirement for action on the part of the Ugandan government to comply not only with its own constitution, but also with the provisions of numerous international human rights instruments to which it was bound.\textsuperscript{12}

LAW-Uganda, working together with faculty and law students at Georgetown’s International Women’s Human Rights Clinic, then drafted comprehensive domestic violence legislation based on comparative models and international norms, and taking into account the unique situation of Uganda’s own culture and society.\textsuperscript{13} This draft legislation broadly defines and criminalizes domestic violence.\textsuperscript{14} It also provides a mechanism by which victims can obtain civil protection orders to protect against physical, emotional, verbal, psychological, and economic abuse; establishes a procedure to determine temporary child custody; and provides for shelters for victims. The draft legislation also provides for broad-based medical treatment and counseling services for victims of domestic violence, and establishes training and awareness programs for health officials, police, and judges.\textsuperscript{15}

LAW-Uganda and its partners also devised a strategy to enact the legislation and are now taking steps to lobby members of the Ugandan Parliament to adopt the law. This strategy included finding an effective ally for the law within the Ugandan Parliament, an easier task once Dora Byamukama, LAWA alumna and co-founder and Chair of LAW-Uganda, won a seat in the Ugandan Parliament. In sum, in less than four years, this major domestic violence initiative has moved from the drawing board, through the human rights documentation phase, into draft legislation that is now poised for adoption and implementation.

The LAW-Uganda example demonstrates the need for trained women’s human rights lawyers at all levels of developing democracies. These human rights lawyers are not only crucial to promoting change from within non-governmental human rights advocacy organizations, but also to exerting authority within administrations, parliaments, and courts where they can play a meaningful role helping to prioritize, enact, interpret, and enforce laws and policy for all women.

III. Lessons Learned: Practical Recommendations for Human Rights Training Programs

Below, we highlight several “lessons learned”—reflections on how certain components of the LAWA Program have contributed to initiatives, such as the domestic violence initiative in Uganda discussed in Section II
above, that improve women’s lives in an effort to provide useful recommendations for practitioners developing human rights training programs.

Keep Training Pertinent

One challenge is to make sure that the training is relevant for fellows who will return home to countries with unique political, legal, cultural, and practical conditions that are in many ways different from those in the United States. The program has carefully designed the fellows’ academic and other activities with this goal in the forefront, providing broad-based human rights, constitutional, and comparative law training to develop the fellows’ analytical abilities so that they can use their legal toolbox effectively within their own cultures when they return home. The LAW-Uganda group drew upon this broad-based training in developing its domestic violence initiative, which, as discussed in Section II above, integrated a human rights, constitutional, and comparative law approach.

Keep Training Practical

Another important component of the program, developed over the years in large part due to feedback from participants upon their return home, is to ground the training in practical legal approaches and include exposure to different methods of legal activism, so that fellows are able to use their training to successfully challenge women’s human rights violations. For example, the fellows take an international women’s human rights seminar that uses the case-study method to go beyond the theoretical international legal framework and to develop practical, on-the-ground strategies to use international law to effect real change for women. This seminar culminates in a major research paper wherein each fellow examines a significant problem in her home country using the international women’s human rights framework and recommends practical steps to effect meaningful change. The final paper often becomes a blueprint for action when the fellow returns home.

The program also exposes the fellows, through their coursework, seminars, and six-month internship, to methods of legal activism that have been successful for civil rights lawyers in the United States, which they can then adapt for use to effect change at home. Although the fellows learn early and often about shortcomings in the U.S. legal system, they are also exposed to the rich history of creative legal activism, which can be especially useful for lawyers returning home to help implement new constitutional provisions. For example, Uganda has a new and egalitari-
an constitution, but discrimination against women in law and practice is alive and well. Although Brown v. Board of Education-style litigation has not been widely utilized in most developing countries, including Uganda, fellows exposed to the use of test-case litigation can utilize it as a powerful tool for change. The LAW-Uganda group relied heavily on their constitutional training in the domestic violence initiative discussed in Section II of this article, not only by drawing upon the gender equality requirements contained in the Ugandan Constitution while drafting model legislation, but also to fortify lobbying efforts with the potential for test-case constitutional litigation in the event the new law is not enacted or effectively implemented.

**Keep Training Personal**

The program limits each fellowship class to a maximum of twelve fellows (U.S. and international) in order to focus a high degree of individual attention on each fellow and in deference to the importance of the group dynamic, both for exchange of ideas and for development of long-term collaborative relationships. The relationships the LAWA attorneys build with each other and with their American counterparts and contacts during the sixteen-month program, together with their training in computer research and technology skills, provide a valuable advocacy network and the ability to draw upon expanded legal resources upon their return to Africa. It is critical to devote the time and resources to this portion of the training so that professional interactions are built substantively and over time, resulting in ties based on mutual respect and exchange of ideas and trust that establish a powerful basis for future cooperation. The Ugandan case study discussed in Section II is an example of this cooperation, with the Ugandan alumnae collaborating closely with colleagues and U.S. counterparts to design and implement the domestic violence initiative. In addition, by relying on U.S. colleagues and law students to provide substantial research and drafting assistance, LAW-Uganda was able to leverage their own resources and to focus on leadership and on-the-ground strategy crucial to success of the initiative.

**Conclusion**

Educating and empowering women, who constitute more than half of all citizens, is a proven and crucial link in the fight against poverty and the struggle for democracy, security, and peace in our world. The presence of effective "home-grown" advocates and leaders with knowledge
and skills in women’s human rights is especially needed to improve women’s lives in developing countries, not only through direct services to those most in need, but also in order to change and implement laws and to build and lead democracies. Long-term women’s human rights training programs are an indispensable component of any comprehensive strategy to reduce political instability, and they comprise a sound investment in a more peaceful and prosperous future for all.

Endnotes:
1 The author thanks Johanna Bond, Charlene Gomes, Marci Hoffman, Kate Norland, Dick Norland, and Wendy Williams for their review of, and valuable comments on, earlier drafts of this article.
2 See generally Talbott, Strobe. 2001. The Other Evil: Why the War on Terrorism Won’t Succeed Without a War on Poverty. Foreign Policy (November/December):75-76.
4 See generally “Afghanistan Humanity Denied: Systematic Violations of Women’s Rights in Afghanistan.” 2001. Human Rights Watch 13(5). Under the Taliban regime, women could not go out in public without a male relative and could not be employed, with few exceptions. Women and girls could not be formally educated beyond primary school. Ibid., 2.
7 The LAWA program is administered by the Women’s Law and Public Policy Fellowship Program, an independent non-profit 501(c)(3) corporation at
Georgetown University Law Center. The LAWA program originated as a USAID-funded pilot program. Major architects included then-USAID official Yvonne Andualem, former LAWA director Judy Lyons Wolf, Georgetown law professors Susan Deller Ross and Wendy Webster Williams, and other board members Eleanor Holmes Norton, Judith Lichtman, and Marcia Greenberger. The program is funded by the Ethel Louise Armstrong Foundation, the Harriet B. Burg Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation, the Rita Charmatz Davidson Fund, the Fannie Mae Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, the Moriah Fund, the Charles H. Revson Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Sandler Family Supporting Foundation, Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa, and USAID.

8 Participants from South Africa and Sierra Leone are currently completing the program, and in the future the program may include participants from other countries and regions.


13 The debate of universality of rights versus cultural relativism rages on in legal literature. See Afkhami, Mahnaz. Cultural Relativism and Women's Human
Rights. Women and International Human Rights Law 2:479. The oversimplified version of this debate is that some view human rights as universal. That is, they transcend cultural or religious limitations and interpretation, and should apply to all humans everywhere, while others view these rights as subject to interpretation or abrogation based on cultural beliefs and practices. Part of this debate is based on the assumption that “outside” (often Western) human rights lawyers are imposing their view of individual human rights on cultures and societies other than their own. One of the advantages of providing training and resources to “home-grown” lawyers and leaders, regardless of a country’s location on the globe, is the avoidance of the need to rely on outside experts for approaching and solving local problems. Instead, the voices promoting human rights are indigenous, as are the proposed solutions.

14 Draft Domestic Violence Legislation, on file at LAW-Uganda office in Kampala, Uganda.

15 Ibid.


18 See Uganda Constitution at ch. 14, arts. 21, 22, 23, 24.
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by Ann Marie Flores, Helen Rizzo, and Stephen Scanlan

Introduction

In this paper, we build upon classic formulations on citizenship from T.H. Marshall to explore the relationship between women and human rights in the context of international security and development in contemporary world societies. With the onset of a new millennium and the presence of new and lingering concerns about gender on these fronts, a need emerges for a re-evaluation of Marshall to better accommodate the position of women in security and development dynamics. We posit that links between Marshall’s notions of civil, social, and political rights should be broadened to reflect the growing emphasis on human security and its importance to citizenship and women’s rights. The women and development lobby of the United Nations has highlighted the importance of women’s roles and rights by putting pressure on national governments to integrate women into development projects; to recognize women’s roles in the struggle against poverty, illiteracy, and high birth rates; and to end all forms of discrimination based on sex. Women’s demands for full citizenship are gaining attention and thus pose a challenge to the simple framework suggested by Marshall. The three forms of citizenship in this framework neither explicitly include women, nor do they address women’s unique needs for expansion of citizenship rights in order to fully equate their citizenship status with men. While Marshall’s classic work

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remains important for its contributions to understanding citizenship in contemporary world societies, it must be updated to incorporate the dynamics of security, democratization, and women’s roles.\textsuperscript{5}

Marshall’s writing on citizenship laid an important foundation for the formation of modern human rights principles. Initially developed in the immediate post-World War II period, his ideas coincided with the release of key statements from the United Nations such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Marshall sought to explain citizenship as it relates to the dynamics of class and social equality. In doing so, he traced the origins of citizenship in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries using comparative and historical observations to illustrate its evolution into the granting of social rights that are the foundation to programs and services seeking “equalization.”\textsuperscript{6} Marshall’s conceptualization of equality is not a socialist one, in which class and economic inequality are eliminated, but instead one in which basic equalities in status are guaranteed by the modern welfare state.

Marshall divides citizenship into three elements: civil, political, and social. Civil rights include various guarantees to individual freedom, including “liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right of justice.” Political rights guarantee the opportunity to participate in the political process, both by holding elected office and by engaging in the electoral process. Last, social rights encompass the ability to enjoy a certain minimum standard of well-being, and range from “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.” Together these rights shape and define citizenship and serve as the most basic foundations of democracy.\textsuperscript{7}

Marshall’s formulation is central to understanding contemporary human rights ideals. Nevertheless, it must be updated to reflect the changing nature of citizenship that incorporates the newer concepts of security and development and recognizes women’s rights as human rights. In his discussion of citizenship rights Marshall recognized only one definite right, that of children to be educated, and, in order to avoid having his writing misconstrued as socialist rhetoric, approved of state powers to achieve this goal alone. But several decades of the Cold War, decolonization, development, waves of democratization,\textsuperscript{8} and the onslaught of globalization have made citizenship rights more imperative than ever, yet also more challenging and complex. An examination of the present state of women in the world and of their centrality to our understanding of citi-
zension of citizenship, development, and security serves as an excellent start for broadening Marshall’s framework.

Marshall acknowledged that women had been excluded from the “story of civil rights” in that new statuses and rights granted in the evolution of citizenship primarily concerned adult male members of society. This had been the case from the beginning of modern democracy. Even as the concept of human rights became more popular and relevant, Marshall failed to incorporate gender into his formulations of citizenship. For this reason we have chosen to build upon his work. The importance of Marshall lies in his conceptualization of citizenship and the centrality of civil, political, and social rights as the foundation to our modern understanding of human security and social development. Because these concepts continue to evolve, it is imperative that they be updated to incorporate new factors that shape and redefine the meaning of citizenship and its rewards, hence our focus on gender. We incorporate gender to redefine citizenship and rights, and we emphasize how these are important to processes of democratization, development, and security.

We are guided by the definition of “human security” proposed by the United Nations that represents a shift away from the more traditional, Cold War-era military notions that emphasized nuclear deterrence, weapons proliferation, and balance of power. As the United Nations Human Development Programme notes, “For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life . . . . In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced.” Security now comes in several forms—including economic, health, environmental, personal, community, and political securities—that are interwoven with and inextricably linked to citizenship. Furthermore, human security is fundamental to and inseparable from human development and should provide the foundation for human rights policies and practice. Development is thus no longer measured solely in terms of economic “progress” but is judged instead on how well a nation’s people are able to live their lives. Citizenship and the rights associated with it are central to human well-being and therefore to development and human security. Development cannot occur without recognizing the role and importance of women as equal citizens and their contributions to human security, therefore making the inclusion of gender essential for the modern evolution of Marshall’s original formulation of citizenship.

That women continue to be treated as secondary “citizens” around the world brings about a renewed effort to incorporate women in the process-
es determining citizenship outcomes. Some progress has been made toward greater female political participation and inclusion, yet women hold only 13.6 percent of the seats in parliaments around the world and constitute 70 percent of the world’s 1.3 billion poor. The result has been persistent civil, political, and social marginalization of women. Women across all income levels remain on the sidelines with little voice and power despite their centrality to development processes, the reproduction of the labor force, and the future security of the planet. Calling attention to the importance of a new gender-inclusive citizenship will both improve the status of women and benefit the entire global community.

We therefore extend Marshall’s classic notion of citizenship to include security and human rights and emphasize the importance of these concepts to meeting the development needs of the global citizenry, particularly women. Moreover, by expanding his framework and linking it to the various forms of security noted above, we reveal that the delineations between specific components of citizenship may not be as distinct as originally formulated. We argue that an understanding of the interaction and reinforcement of civil, political, and social rights—what we call “blended rights”—is essential to protecting human rights and securing the well-being of all people.

Civil Rights and Citizenship for Women

A wide range of issues comprise the civil component of Marshall’s notion of citizenship and its importance to development, security, human rights, and the role of the world’s women in pursuing these goals. In this section we elaborate upon the meaning of civil rights using the lens of gender. Specifically, we focus on the implications of women’s citizenship within the contexts of violence against women and rights in the workplace.

To reiterate from above, civil rights provide the foundation for civil society and include the right to equal treatment and justice under the law and the freedoms of speech, religion, and property ownership. These rights are meant to guarantee all members of a society fair access to the benefits and privileges of living in that society. Specifically, gender-inclusive civil rights would guarantee women’s economic security in the form of equal access to employment, education, and training programs; safe workplaces; and freedom from violence and discrimination. Because of their universality and importance, women’s civil rights have been pursued in a number of international documents and actions including the 1995 Beijing Platform and Plan of Action, the 1981 Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the
1949 Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Civil Rights to Women, among numerous others.

The idea that civil rights should be guaranteed creates complex challenges with regard to their implementation and attainment in contemporary societies. This challenge is particularly evident when considering how civil rights are tied to development and security and the overlapping and complementary political and social forms of citizenship. If development is considered to be “progress” in the form of improved quality of human life, well-being, and security, then civil rights are part of the engine that moves societies toward development and modernity.

Violence, Citizenship and Women

With regard to personal security, civil rights guarantee the freedom from fear of violence in all its forms, but especially sexual harassment, domestic violence, and rape. With regard to community security, civil rights would also guarantee against targeting women for oppression, systematic denials of basic freedom, or victimization and violation of human rights. Complementary to and overlapping with political and social rights and the other important forms of human security, civil rights should be a requirement to the condition of development and progress, and, to that end, policy programs should work to guarantee women equal footing and opportunity in global societies as the way and means to achieve equality of citizenship.

Be it domestic violence, dowry murder, female genital mutilation, honor killings, infanticide, rape, or sexual harassment, violence against women in all forms detracts from human development.\(^6\) Trafficking, forced prostitution, and systematic tolerance of rape of women and girls are some of the more egregious civil rights violations that threaten human security and the global well-being of women. To understand the pervasiveness of civil rights transgressions, one could look to the long list of cases from around the world where women’s lives have been placed in peril. Migrating women in Nigeria, for example, have been pursued and forced into domestic servitude and prostitution; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the bonding of Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Romanian women to brothels is common. These are only two examples of the numerous atrocities that occur in many countries throughout the world.\(^7\) Such trafficking is tantamount to slavery and is one of the greatest challenges confronting human rights in the new millennium. Trafficking is indicative of an integrated network of terror and corruption that transcends boundaries and states, thus reinforcing the belief that women are
commodities to be traded as property. This network undermines international security as well as democratization and human rights that are essential to equality, citizenship, and development. Violence against women is a global phenomenon that touches women across nations and from "cradle to grave." To ensure the quality of life that is essential to citizenship in developing societies, women must be able to live without violence that threatens not only their most basic freedoms but also their very existence. Human development therefore demands freedom from fear and human insecurity.

The Workplace, Citizenship, and Women

The status of working women and their access to adequate employment is an additional challenge to civil rights, and the attempts to acquire the full benefits of citizenship can be complex. When progress is simply gauged by the increased numbers of women entering the workforce, then the subtler dimensions of sexual discrimination are conveniently and conspicuously overlooked. While women in developing societies are entering the workforce at rates higher than in previous years, the quality of the workplace has not kept pace with the promises that development makes. Many women are exploited for low wages and possibly may work under hazardous or otherwise unhealthy conditions, often being recruited for their perceived willingness to be subservient and obedient, in addition to their physical ability to perform menial and repetitive tasks under cramped conditions. Such treatment is possible under the circumstances of poverty, powerlessness, and desperation that too often threaten the well-being of the world’s women. The unequal position of women in the labor force and the realities of maquiladora and sweatshop labor in this era of globalization have gained increasing attention. True citizenship and security can only be realized when women have full access to the economic opportunities and rewards in the global labor force from which men have benefited for decades. Furthermore, female contributions in the form of unpaid labor remain undervalued, and for men and women, earnings and work largely operate in separate worlds. Intense and persistent occupational segregation results in higher unemployment rates for women than men, as well as poor access to credit and technology among women. Furthermore, women are overrepresented in the informal economy and agriculture contributing to the deepening of the feminization of poverty. Thus, the intersections between security and civil rights are paramount both to human development and to definitions of citizenship.
Political Rights and Citizenship for Women

Historically the literature on development, democratization, security, and citizenship has ignored the gendered effects of these processes. Beginning with Ester Boserup’s pioneering work, the women and development field has begun to correct this enormous oversight. However, this literature tends to focus on economic development and women’s economic status and contributions to development. Recent research addresses the contradictory impacts of social and economic development on women’s status. By broadening status to include multiple dimensions beyond pure economic status, Rizzo found that development enhances women’s education and health, but still excludes women from other important arenas. The result is an inconsistency in women’s status that is especially acute in the developing world. Women are increasing their educational attainment and entering the paid labor force in many areas of the world, but are either denied basic political rights, such as voting and running for parliament, or have low representation and power in politics. To fully understand the gendered nature of the processes of globalization, development, and democratization of citizenship and security, we must develop a multidimensional framework for extending Marshall’s notion of citizenship rights to include women’s political rights.

Built into many governmental institutions and political processes is the assumption that men are citizens while women are dependent, second-class members of society. Women’s citizenship rights and benefits are typically tied to being the wife or daughter of a male citizen. Women’s relationship to the state is negotiated through family membership, and their status as citizens, like children’s, is dependent on their relationship to men. Social welfare benefits are distributed to citizens based on labor force participation, thus making unemployed women dependent on employed men. In the Middle East, political benefits are routinely linked to family membership instead of designated to individuals as in liberal democracies. Examining the gendered nature of political rights of citizenship has gained increasing importance with the “global resurgence of democracy” since the beginning of the 1990s. As more and more countries incorporate popular participation into their political systems, it becomes imperative that governments recognize who does and does not have access to political participation. With the collapse of communism, democracy has become the only legitimate form of national governance. Since the Gulf War, even Middle Eastern countries have demonstrated increased democratization. Examples include countries which have held competitive elections for national legislatures, such as Tunisia, Algeria,
Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, Lebanon, and the Palestine Authority. Yet for women in most of these countries, other political rights (e.g., suffrage and running for political office) remain limited. Although countries’ constitutions use universal, gender-neutral language to guarantee all citizens certain rights, in practice this has not been the case. None of the Middle Eastern countries mentioned earlier gave women the right to vote at the same time as men, and in some countries, such as Kuwait, women still do not have voting and other political rights of citizenship.32

Nevertheless, women’s liberation and equality are intertwined with the democratization process. “Both have in common a concern with emancipation, freedom (personal and civic), human rights, integrity, dignity, equality, autonomy, power-sharing, liberation, [and] pluralism.33 As we have seen in the more extreme cases, such as Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, the lack of women’s liberation and equality goes hand in hand with the lack of democratization in the developing world. In Kuwait, women’s lack of such formal political rights has been cited as a barrier to democratization.34

According to Marshall, political rights include the rights to participate in elections, run for public office, politically organize, and protest. Political rights are essential to citizenship because of the role they play in developing a sense of nation—the sense that citizens belong to a similar and relatively politically equal community. Thus, a citizen’s loyalty lies with a territorialized community, not with a particular ruler. The development of the nation is seen as a common achievement of the citizens and not something given to citizens through a benevolent leader. According to Longva,

“... the community is conceived of as a community of watchful citizens, jealously guarding their rights in relation to the power holders, including the right to have a say in public life and the right to hold the leaders accountable.”35

Thus, when political rights are gendered, women are denied key elements of citizenship: the rights to participate in public affairs and to hold political leaders accountable. This denial leads to the lack of political power and opportunities to have their needs addressed in the political arena. Moreover, this lack of access erects other barriers, such as the reality of constant sexual discrimination in the workplace, unequal rights of divorce, and discrimination in opportunities to gain education without any protected legal recourse.36 According to women activists in Kuwait, the denial of formal political rights means that women have no voice in the shaping of laws and policies that directly affect their lives. These
same activists believe that the inclusion of women in the political process can make real, positive, and palpable differences in other aspects of women's lives such as employment, marriage, divorce, reproductive rights, child custody, domestic violence, and the ability to pass on their nationality status to their children.37

The exclusion of women from the political realm creates undemocratic and insecure environments for women's lives. As Gamson argues, exclusion of groups from citizenship rights often leads to discrimination, fear, violence, and death.38 Expanding citizenship rights to excluded groups is an integral part of the development and democratization processes.39 Thus, the extension of political rights to women is inextricably tied to civil and social rights and to democratization and security.

Social Rights, Blended Rights, and Citizenship for Women

Social rights involve the idea that all citizens must share a common level of security, well-being, and opportunity to realize a common heritage within a civil society.40 For advanced democracies, the line between security and citizenship is relatively imperceptible, but in nondemocracies or newly formed democracies the gap between citizenship and security is widest for women. In addition to the burdens of pregnancy and childcare, women have fewer chances for employment and social mobility, even through marital ties.41 Women are also the most common victims of sexual harassment, abuse, and violence, thus further eroding their already tenuous level of security.42 When women lack even the most basic form of protection via rights of citizenship, they are left with little means of providing for their well-being. While concern with social rights is typically confined to security in developed democracies, the issue of women's security cuts across the lines of civil, political and social rights and is particularly challenging in non- or newly forming democracies. Marshall's static and inflexible framework better fits the situation obtained by men in relatively consolidated democracies and fails to consider the option of blended rights, which are most characteristic of the citizenship needs of women, especially in non- or newly forming democracies.

The concepts of social and blended rights of citizenship for women are best illustrated with reproductive rights. Reproductive rights are defined by access to basic health care, autonomy, liberty, freedom of choice, and self-efficacy to affect and determine sexual and fertility behaviors. While reproductive rights are often seen as less crucial for citizenship in advanced democracies, these rights are absolutely critical for women in nondemocracies or newly democratizing countries. Sweden,
Norway, and former communist states are examples in which basic maternal health care is a civil right. Where women are not considered citizens, basic health care either does not exist or is inaccessible due to social and/or political barriers to services. In other words, women lack basic civil rights. Obvious examples of civil rights violations regarding reproduction are China’s one-child policy and coerced contraceptive use, Romania’s coercive family planning policies under Ceausescu, and the multiple policies of the Taliban in Afghanistan, including brutal punishment or death for sexually proscribed behavior and the ban on female physicians from practice and women from seeking health care from a male physician.

Liberty of person, defined as control over one’s body, is another relevant aspect of women’s civil rights. Rahman, Katzive, and Henshaw report that 25 percent of the world’s population lives in countries that either totally ban abortion or permit it only to save the woman’s life. Yet more than half (61 percent) live in countries that allow abortion for a variety of reasons or without restriction of reason. While Rahman, Katzive, and Henshaw point out that over time abortion laws have tended to be liberalized, barriers to abortion still exist. Such barriers include, but are not limited to, affordability of services or the lack of access to services, enforcement and interpretation of the law, and socially proscribed sexual behaviors. These barriers are especially high for women living in poverty and lesser-developed countries. Because maternal mortality is so closely linked with illegal abortion, this places women (and especially poor women who make up most of the world’s poor adult population) at an extremely high risk of unnecessary complications and death thus further eroding security and civil rights.

Women’s lack of basic political rights, such as the right to vote and run for public office, also affects their reproductive rights. The absence of such rights, as well as the absence of women’s civil rights, has resulted in laws that ban contraception, dissemination of information about birth control, and family planning. Likewise, the lack of laws protecting women from unwanted sexual advances and the lack of women’s political and civil rights deepen the chasm between the social rights of women and those for men. The compounding effects of social, civil, and political rights create a new class of rights—blended rights. Women’s rights in newly forming democracies do not adhere to the narrow categories of traditional citizenship rights. These rights overlap, feed back, and mutually influence one another. This suggests that all three categories must be simultaneously addressed and “blended” to protect women’s citizenship rights.
Conclusion

Marshall’s conception of citizenship rights is the classic non-Marxist class conflict argument. He contends that the development of citizenship rights in democratic industrialized countries (namely Great Britain) has mediated two contradictory processes of the modern era: capitalism, a system based on class inequality, and democracy, a system based on individual political equality. The progressive expansion from civil to political to social rights, especially the extension of social benefits in the areas of health, education, work, and retirement, softens class conflict by reducing the risks and insecurities of living in market societies. Social citizenship stabilizes industrial, capitalist democracies by granting more status equality. Marshall’s conception of citizenship rights, however, serves not only to stabilize and reduce class conflict in democratic, capitalist societies, but also to provide a starting point toward understanding human rights as an integral component of development, democratization, and security.

Furthermore, if we think of “democracy” as the overarching form of structured government and ideals, citizenship can be considered the lifeblood of democracy—it is democracy in action. But as described earlier, concepts of citizenship have traditionally ignored women’s need to benefit from rights of citizenship as well. Because of the male bias inherent to Marshall’s framework, the consideration of women as citizens poses a challenge to its modernization. Expanding these rights to women can help us better understand the gendered nature of this phenomenon in the current, global era. As more and more countries attempt to become democratic and capitalist societies, they do not have the luxury of hundreds of years to progress from civil to political to social citizenship rights as in the West. Instead, the development of citizenship rights must happen over a span of only decades, making the progression from civil all the way to social rights in the order that Marshall outlined is not necessarily inevitable. In fact, this lock-step formulation makes it difficult to study the overlapping and richly interconnected characteristics of each form of citizenship rights.

In this paper, we argued that civil, political, and social rights interact and reinforce one another, especially in the case of women. When women have partial or no access to the political arena, their access to civil and social rights are also jeopardized. The result is second-class citizenship for women. Likewise, basic civil rights for women in the workplace and freedom from violence in women’s daily lives empower the state and women as a group to improve their status in society. This suggests that citizenship rights are essential tools for women’s social progress. The
area of reproductive rights, cast as a fundamental aspect of civil, political, and social rights, demonstrates the need for updating the classic Marshall framework of citizenship. Reproductive rights also underscore the blurring or spillover effects of the three forms of citizenship, resulting in blended rights. Thus, all aspects of human rights must be protected, and the unique needs of women must be recognized, in order for countries to be fully developed, democratic, and able to secure the safety and well-being of all their citizens.

Endnotes:
1 Authors are listed in alphabetical order. No ranking of authorship implied.
7 Ibid., 78.
10 One could argue that there are other important factors excluded from Marshall’s original formulation, including age, ethnicity, and race, but in this paper we focus only on gender. Given the social context and era in which Marshall produced his work, his omission should not be surprising. Thus, while his work should be renewed and updated, as we do in this paper, he should not necessarily be faulted for what now, in a different context, may be a glaring omission.
11 UN Development Program 1994.
12 UN Development Program 1994, 22
14 Ibid., 168.
19 UN Development Program 1994, 31.
24 UN Development Program 1995.


32 Joseph 1996.


42 Hartmann 1994; UN Development Program 1994.


Additional References:


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From Sufferers to Activists: Israeli and Palestinian Women Talk on War, Bereavement, and Peace
by Ziva Flamhaft

Introduction

The large number of women widowed as a result of the September 11 attacks on the United States and their organized attempt to influence the way the World Trade Center site will be memorialized demonstrates bereaved women’s abilities to transform agony into political activism. Examples such as this should empower women who directly suffer the consequences of war and its aftermath to organize political movements dedicated to conflict resolution and peace building. This proposition rests on three assumptions: first, because of their unique status in their societies, these women are able to influence public opinion on peace and security matters; second, the majority of women victimized by war opt for reconciliation rather than vengeance; third, the inclusion of women in peace-making will remedy their chronic absence in peace processes, thereby conforming to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of October 2000, a resolution urging member states to increase women’s representation at all decision-making levels in national, regional, and international institutions aimed at conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

Link between Personal Experience and Activism

The link between women’s personal experiences and their political activism is not uncommon. Several examples demonstrate this link. In the United States, after her husband suffered a severe brain injury during the 1981 presidential assassination attempt on then-president Ronald Reagan, Sarah Brady became chair of Handgun Control, a Washington-based organization advocating government regulation of the manufacturing, importation, sale, transfer, and civilian possession of handguns. A strong

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advocate of gun control legislation, Sarah Brady was influential in the passage of the 1994 Brady Law, that requires a five-day waiting period before purchasing a licensed handgun.

Similarly, New York Congresswomen Carolyn McCarthy ran for U.S. Congress in 1996 after her husband was murdered and her son severely injured during the 1993 Long Island Rail Road massacre. A major part of her platform was a call urging for the end of gun violence. Other women who lost children in drunk driving accidents established Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) in an effort to eliminate drunk driving; and mothers who lost their children to AIDS are currently attempting to influence U.S. healthcare legislation.

Unlike these activists, however, women in war-plagued societies are often reluctant to transform their experiences into political activism. This reluctance stems from factors such as societal pressures, mental siege, or admiration for the military, all resulting from prolonged conflicts and security concerns. Frequently, in such societies, women are caught between their obligation to the state and their duty to themselves, accepting as primary the role of men in the political security spheres, while tolerating the restrictive and traditional female functions reserved to them.¹

**Women and War**

The subject of women and war has captivated a growing number of feminist theorists and other social scientists since the early 1980s. Scholars have surveyed the role of women warriors, the exploitation of women workers in wartime, the changing roles of women in the military, and the role of women in resistant and revolutionary movements.² Others have studied the role of women as peacemakers, often dissociating them from war and bloodshed, connecting instead womanhood with pacifism and motherhood with antiwar activism.³ Researchers have mostly ignored, however, examination of how women’s bereavement and anguish caused by conflict can motivate these women to adopt new roles in peacemaking.

The link between feminism and peace has long been established: It began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the first feminist peace movements sprang up in the United States and Europe. Initially, the connection between the two concepts centered on the conventional belief that a relationship existed between women’s “nurturing nature” and world peace—a correlation that continued well into the 1980s and beyond.⁴ This linkage overlooks the fact that those women have led nations to war, have often willingly supported their countries’ war efforts, or have proudly sent their sons to the battlefield.⁵
Therefore, a woman’s tenderness may not explain her yearning for peace. Instead, we must find other explanations for the emergence of feminist peace protest movements the world over. To do so, one can look at movements such as the following: (1) women-based movements opposing nuclear armament in Europe in the early 1980s; (2) ongoing protests of the mothers and grandmothers of those who disappeared in Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s; (3) the emergence of Mothers against Silence, Women in Black, and Four Mothers in Israel in the 1980s and 1990s; (4) the 1999 demonstrations by Serbian mothers and wives demanding that their sons and husbands be released from military duty in Kosovo; and (5) Russian mothers and wives demanding the end of war in Chechnya.

More precisely, it was not women’s compassion that linked them to peace movements, but their efforts to associate peace with their own human and political rights. These efforts began as early as the 1880s when existing concepts of civil rights were directly connected to one’s ability to bear arms in war. Women, who were traditionally deprived of that provision, were stripped of basic civil rights, including citizenship and suffrage. In addition to losing these rights and privileges, women were also restricted from positions of power in the political hierarchy of the state.

In time, women began to associate peace with the cessation of violence against them, with their inclusion in a growing middle class, and with the right of the masses to live fearless lives. Peace also became connected to women’s entrance into the public sphere, a less-prejudiced division of labor between men and women during wartime, and the eradication of poverty among women and children resulting from the loss of their husbands and fathers in war. Subsequently, women in the 1970s were motivated by these feminist movements and began to reject their socially, politically, and economically subordinate roles in society. Instead, they requested their inclusion in “high politics” (a Cold War term describing politics relating to military-security issues and other matters of vital national interest, usually reserved for men). Women began to associate peace with their own right to live fearless lives and their right to raise families and to see their children grow, survive, and flourish. At the same time, women began to associate justice with accountability, demanding that policy makers and military strategists accept responsibility for their decisions and be liable for deeds that affect women and their families.

Researchers may object to the assertion that bereaved women seek peace in lieu of vengeance. However, as the results of my Israeli/Arab interviews reveal, a considerable number of these women do prefer reconciliation, not only because conflict is a source of suffering but also
because conflict prolongs their exclusion from the national decision-making process. Furthermore, the pursuit of peaceful means, rather than violent ones, to achieve change is not exclusive to women; instead, it is political disenfranchisement that often motivates these pursuits. Men like Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Desmond Tutu are powerful examples that support this assertion.

The Arab-Israeli Case

A recent example of the desire of bereaved women to build peace comes from Israeli war widows. Making a conscious decision to use their bereavement as a platform from which their voices could be heard, a group of fifty-five war widows organized in April 2002 for the first time since the formation of peace movements in Israel, calling for the end of bloodshed. This example, as well as other patterns shown in the Israeli-Arab case below, supports many of the assertions stated above.

Israeli Women

Israeli women began to resist war, albeit subtly, after the costly Egyptian and Syrian surprise attacks in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Their outcry resulted in the establishment of a government-appointed commission of inquiry, the Agranat Commission, whose task was to examine the events leading to the war, including an unprecedented investigation of the conduct of the Israeli military on the eve of that war. A decade later, women organized the first feminist-oriented peace protest movement, Mothers Against Silence, which soon developed into Parents Against Silence. Initially, the movement sprung up in the aftermath of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the first Arab-Israeli war to be regarded to be unjust by a considerable number of Israelis. Such perception, coupled with a large number of casualties, triggered the protest of mothers who objected to their sons’ participation in that war, demanding Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon. The movement was dissolved with the partial Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) retreat in 1985. However, in 1997, with mounting casualties in Israel’s remaining security zone in southern Lebanon, a similar yet smaller group named Four Mothers sprang up, advocating a unilateral withdrawal from the area. The best-known activist in that group was Orna Shimoni, a bereaved mother who lost her son in Lebanon. Short of forming a new movement, in 1998, together with Lella Parnass, another bereaved mother who lost her son in the same country, Shimoni staged a well-publicized protest in front of the Israeli president’s residence in Jerusalem, demand-
ing to move the Lebanon issue to the top of Israel’s national priorities list. By the end of that year, after a month-long sit-down strike, the two mothers met with then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a number of his cabinet members to voice their demands. Their activism became the first peace protest staged exclusively by bereaved women.

Along with her co-activists, Shimoni was widely recognized in Israel as one of the forces influencing Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s decision to unilaterally withdraw the Israeli forces from Lebanon, a move that was completed without casualties in May 2000 and verified by the United Nations in June of that year. Such recognition stood as a stark contrast to the ridicule and criticism Shimoni and her friends endured from the media, army officers, government, and other officials during months of activism.

Building on Shimoni’s example, a group of bereaved Israeli parents set up Peace Tent for Bereaved Families in July 2000 in Tel Aviv to express support for peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority that were taking place in Camp David under the leadership of U.S. President Bill Clinton. Five months later, using Barak’s forced decision to call for new elections two months into the al-Aqsa intifada, the group (including bereaved Palestinian parents) assumed the official name The Parents Circle/Bereaved Families Forum. Its activities expanded after the rise of Ariel Sharon to power in 2001 following the escalation of violence. Noticeably, at the time when mounting violence silenced the peace camp, the Parents Circle became increasingly vocal and well known within Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Earlier female-only peace groups sprang up after the breakout of the 1987 intifada. Alongside other female peace movements, Women in Black, the best known Israeli feminist protest group, was organized, calling for the end of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land and the opening of a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Because of these stances, Israel branded Women in Black a terrorist organization, and prohibited contacts with the group. Faced with scorn and convinced that its unorthodox ideas would be rejected, the female peace movement stopped much of their activities following the 1993 Oslo peace agreement. After the eruption of the al-Aqsa intifada in the fall of 2000, Women in Black regrouped, staging vigils in cities where they had long disappeared. At the same time, women from all the feminist peace movements joined hands to work together, primarily under the umbrella of the Coalition of Women for a Just Peace. Apparently, none of these groups was as influential as was Shimoni’s on a government’s decision on any military-security issue.
Palestinian Women

Because the conditions under which they exist are entirely different from those of their Israeli counterparts, the Palestinian women’s primary activities have concentrated on opposing the Israeli occupation, rather than building peace. Under the watchful eyes of Israelis and Palestinians alike, women assembled at meetings, established committees, and organized hunger strikes in order to protest the Israeli occupation. While becoming major producers of means to sustain their communities, they were also active in clandestine movements, which resulted in their torture and humiliation.11

The outbreak of the first intifada, however, provided Palestinian women the opportunity to interact with Israeli female peace activists, form dialogue groups, stage joint demonstrations, and work collaboratively on different projects. The Persian Gulf crisis in 1990-1991 interrupted these joint efforts, and attempts to restore ties between the two groups were not successful.12 Perhaps ironically, following the signing of the Oslo accords in 1993, Palestinian female peace activists were reluctant to collaborate with their Israeli counterparts because they were disillusioned with these agreements. Instead, they turned to build and protect their own democracy. This latter trend became even more prevalent after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1995.

The violent upheavals caused by the al-Aqsa intifada, the excessive use of force by the Israeli military, and an apparent radicalization on both sides seems to have destroyed any chance for collaborative peace efforts. Moreover, the pride that some Palestinian mothers expressed toward their suicide-bomber sons and their willingness to raise children to become martyrs stunned many Israeli peace activists. Nonetheless, by the end of 2001, as the number of Israeli and Palestinian casualties rise daily, female peace activists from both sides are cautiously resuming old contacts. Even though optimism about the prospect of peace has decreased in both societies, polls indicate that a peaceful solution is still desirable to a majority of Israelis and many Palestinians.

The questions remain: Do bereaved or aggrieved women feel victimized by war? If they do, what has prevented them from becoming activists? If they view themselves as potential peacemakers, why have they not organized to mobilize domestic support for peace at a crucial junction of Middle East history, when Israelis and Palestinians were grappling with a delicate process of peacemaking or when the peace process was breaking apart, turning war imminent?13
Study and Participant Specifications

Using the Arab-Israeli conflict as a case study, in 1995-1996, I conducted interviews with thirty Israeli Jewish women and eight Palestinian Arab women, the latter group with the help of a Palestinian assistant, to examine whether women directly affected by conflict and war believe they have a special role to play as peacemakers.

Israeli Participants

Because Israel is a small country with a bloody history, it was not difficult to locate women directly affected by conflict and war. As the interviewer, I made no special recruiting arrangements prior to travel to Israel other than to contact a small number of women. I recruited women for the interviews through networking with friends, screening old newspapers and talking with citizens such as taxi cab drivers or transit passengers. Recruiting women was not an easy process. Although women with recent loss were not contacted, many approached women declined to be interviewed. Very few women who had agreed to meet changed their mind and refused to participate.

A gap in the study participants is the involvement of Bedouin women, many of whom are war widows and bereaved mothers. Like the Druze and Circassian Muslims, and unlike Israeli Arabs of Palestinian descent, the Bedouins are recruited into the Israeli army, suffering a relatively large number of casualties. One assumption as to the lack of interest from these bereaved women is that they are fearful of participating because it will lead to their being viewed as traitors.

I prepared twenty questions for the interviews. I interviewed all subjects face-to-face, most at the home of the subject. Other than focusing the interviews on the prepared questions, my role was passive and objective. All of the Israeli women agreed to be recorded; only two preferred to use fictitious names.

Palestinian Participants

My intention to show the Palestinian side through interviews was much more difficult. A major obstacle was the mutual fear and suspicion that existed in Israel and the territories, resulting from a wave of terrorist attacks in Israel and the military countermeasures. Thus, in the summer of 1995, through a professor of sociology at Bir Zeit University in Ramallah, I met my assistant, a thirty-one-year-old Palestinian woman.
She agreed to interview ten Palestinian women from the West Bank and possibly Gaza. Though I originally intended to accompany my assistant on the interviews, my presence had the potential to bias the results and/or prevent cooperation from these women. However, according to my assistant, she conducted the interviews in Arabic herself, traveling to the women’s homes and using the same questionnaire.

Due to travel restrictions, family concerns, and fears for personal safety, it took three years for my assistant to provide me with the transcripts of the eight completed interviews. She did not interview the last two women from Gaza because she was unable to travel there from Ramallah due to repeated closures. The interviews were translated into English at Bir Zeit University. None of the women agreed to be recorded. The transcripts do not reveal any unusual bias, given living conditions under Israeli control.

**Interview Results**

Based on their personal experiences, most of the respondents believed that women suffer the consequence of war differently than men do. Widows, for example, contended that the Israeli society sets much more stringent standards on their behavior than on widowers’. Others explained the different behavior of men and women in terms of the two sexes’ contrasting roles in national war efforts. Men are usually engaged in war planning and in actual fighting, having no time, chance, or, according to the interviewed women, natural inclination to worry about life back home. Females, on the other hand, are left to carry all civilian responsibilities in addition to worrying about their loved ones in the front. Almost all of the respondents maintained that women are emotionally stronger than men.

Most interviewees thought not only that the number of Israeli women involved in decision making on military and security issues was disturbingly low, but that their participation could change the essence of such decisions. Most were also convinced that their role in Israel’s national and existential struggles was no different from that of the male members of their society, even if such a role assumed a different pattern than that of men. More women maintained that their sacrifices had no special meaning, compared to a smaller number of women who thought that such sacrifices were particularly meaningful because of their sense of patriotism or the national honor accorded to them. While many challenged the very notion of the need to sacrifice human life for any idea, including statehood, those who were victimized in the 1948 War of Independence and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Sufferer</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>Specific Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Widows (15)</td>
<td></td>
<td>From the 1967 Six Day War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>From the 1973 Yom Kippur War</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>During the aftermath of the Lebanon War</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>During the intifada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bereaved Mothers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lost son in the 1982 Lebanon War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lost sons during the Hezbollah attacks in southern Lebanon in the early 1990s</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lost son to Hamas terrorism in the post-Oslo period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bereaved Sisters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lost brother in the 1948 War of Independence (also widow of an underground Jewish fighter who died in a British jail prior to Israel’s independence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lost brother in the 1970 War of Attrition (also father subsequently committed suicide on the grave)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lost brother in the 1973 attack on PLO bases in Lebanon in retaliation for 1972 terrorist attack in Munich, where 11 Israeli Olympians were murdered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphans (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lost father in the 1948 War of Independence (also lost brother in the 1973 Yom Kippur War). <em>Note: At time of interview, she was seeking an official exemption from military service for her eighteen-year-old son, who was solicited by a number of elite combat units.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled Husband (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Husband blinded in the 1948 War of Independence (she was subsequently widowed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Seriously injured in a Syrian attack in 1970 during the War of Attrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother of MIA Soldier (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Missing since the 1982 Lebanon War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother of Disabled Son (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Son seriously injured in a Hezbollah attack in Lebanon in the aftermath of that war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Active in peace movement before each of their sons died</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the 1967 Six Day War did not question their loss. This result is not surprising since most Israelis perceive both these wars as wars of survival.

Because of their unique, agonizing experiences, these women tended to view ordinary daily occurrences as trivial, often resulting in the isolation, real or perceived, of these women. Usually, the degree of seclusion corresponded to the level of bereavement. Thus, while most women believed they were an integral part of the Israeli society, even when constituting a distinct group, bereaved mothers felt especially secluded. Noticeably, women who had never met one another used identical metaphors to describe their isolation.

Though only three of the thirty women interviewed were politically active, all described themselves as politically aware. Generally, ideological identification remained rather consistent, with most women adhering to the same political views they had held prior to the incident of loss or injury, supporting the same policies. The few who changed their views were equally divided among those who shifted from left to right and vice versa. On the whole, ideological affiliation remained constant, even after the national trauma resulting from the murder of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995. More than merely adhering to their previous ideas, most women held them more strongly. One could expect, however, that recent violence caused many to alter their moderate ideas towards more radical stances. Such shifts will likely reverse again once the level of violence drops to an acceptable level, both sides take confidence-building measures, and the peace process resumes.

Almost all of those interviewed thought that women with similar experiences were capable of influencing public opinion on war and peace issues. Yet, some of those who believed they had potential influence to shape public opinion on these issues were unable to correlate such influence with their ability to affect the complexities of the Arab-Israeli peace process, or the essence of an eventual peace treaty.

Nevertheless, nearly two-thirds concluded that women affected by war have a special role to play as peacemakers in their societies’ conflicts and that they were able to influence the peace process. The source of their potential influence was their unique experience and their belief that women, generally, desire peace more than men do and that they are more results-oriented than men are. However, when asked whether they were able to influence the political process itself or the type of peace that will ultimately result from that process, only about one-fourth of those interviewed were confident they could do so. The rest were nearly evenly divided among those who were uncertain about the ability of women to
do so and those who were convinced they were unable to influence the type of peace.

The same two-thirds who embraced their role as peacemakers also thought shared memories of past violence could inspire reconciliation among Arabs and Jews, and they thought bereaved women on both sides of the conflict could transform their grief into political power. Only a third believed that such memories could impede reconciliation; an equal number maintained that personal memories or experiences were, or should be, politically relevant.

Those who rejected their potential role as peacemakers also repudiated the idea that women on either side were able to transform their personal experiences into political influence. Even these women, however, recognized their capacity to communicate, organize, mobilize, and recruit others, not to mention their ability to influence election results. Only a few women complained about the absence of Israeli women at the negotiating-table.

The answers from the Palestinian women confirm the fact that their primary concern is the end of the Israeli occupation, the most burdensome aspect of which is the existence of Jewish settlements in Palestinian territory. (One should expect that the presence of the Israeli military in towns that have been under Palestinian control, closures, and harsh conditions caused by the present situation are equally burdensome.) Since the

<table>
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<th>Table 2: Information on Palestinian Women Interviewed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Information:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Interviewed: 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldest: early 40s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest: 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Widows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Details:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location Information</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Description of Where From</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Ramallah area in the West Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Hebron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jabalia refugee camp in the Gaza strip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Widow Information</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Description of How Widowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Lost husbands between 1987-1993 in the first intifada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Lost husbands in the 1994 Hebron Massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Note: None of the widows offered details about the circumstances surrounding their husband's deaths, except to say that they died in the intifada at the hands of the Israelis.</em></td>
</tr>
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</table>
occupation is the single most important obstacle to peace, peace activities involving mutual trust can begin, according to them, only after the occupation comes to an end.

Like their Israeli counterparts, they believed women suffer from war in a different way than men because of prevailing social norms and familial responsibilities and because of the different roles men and women have in wartime. The Palestinian women, too, thought women were stronger than men. Additionally, they thought their role in the national struggle of their people was equal, if different, to that of any men in their family, and they felt an integral part of their society. All but one claimed to be politically aware; one woman was a longtime member of the Hebron Women’s Association for Peace.

Seven of the eight women felt that not enough Palestinian women were involved in politics. Six of them emphasized factors such as lack of experience, absence of a high level of education, and social traditions and customs as instrumental in holding women back. Three women believed these restraints have prevented them from transforming their own grief into political action, while three others maintained they could eventually transform their grief into political activity, but not under the prevailing conditions in the territories. Only two women felt that solidarity among women could reinforce their participation in the political life of their society.

Five women agreed that bereaved women have a role to play in conflict resolution, while three rejected that notion. Of these, one did so because she did not trust women’s judgment, one thought women were too emotional, and the third claimed she did not understand politics enough to explain her opinion. Three women felt mutual experience of past violence could create a bridge between women from both camps, while three others thought past memories of violence could only breed hatred. Four women felt sympathetic toward bereaved Israeli women suffering similar losses, but they could not identify or express solidarity with them; two, in fact, blamed Israel for the conflict.

Unlike many Israeli women who questioned the need for the sacrifice of human lives even for the sake of the state, the Palestinian women approved of such sacrifices, viewing it as martyrdom. Thus, all but one referred to her husband as a martyr, his eternal glory translating into honor and respect in her society. As a rule, they did not criticize the Palestinian Authority for their suffering, but placed all blame on the Israeli military.

In sum, Israeli women affected by war feel they have equally shared the national and existential burdens of the state, yet society has treated
them unequally, undermining their capacity as policy makers. Hypothetically, their special status in a society afflicted by conflict and war enables them to translate their personal experience into political power, influencing public opinion and playing a meaningful role in the political process. However, due to prevailing social norms, they would be unable to utilize their power in a manner that could significantly influence the peace process or the type of the emerging peace. This paradoxical sense of helplessness can partly explain why, as a group, these women have not mobilized to support—or to oppose—the peace process, even though most women believed that their own experiences and that of their Arab counterparts could be utilized politically. Perhaps more than any other reason, bereaved and aggrieved women have not mobilized politically because of their emotional exhaustion and their daily struggles to protect what is left of their shattered families.

Palestinian women also feel they have equally shared the national and existential burdens of their society. Rather than blaming society for treating them unequally, however, they relate their inability to assume power to lack of experience, insufficient education, and existing norms and traditions. Alternatively, they blame the Israeli occupation. Presumably, their special status could enable them to translate their personal experience into political power too, but they might not be able to do so in today’s conditions.

Conclusion

The subject of this paper is the potential empowerment of women who suffered the consequences of conflict and war through becoming peace builders. As revealed earlier, this work rests on a few assumptions: first, because of their status, these women are able to influence public opinion on peace and security matters; second, the majority of women victimized by war opt for reconciliation rather than vengeance; third, peacemaking is tied more to political disenfranchisement, rather than to an inherent peace-loving quality in women.

That these women are able to influence policy became evident in Israel, when the government of Ehud Barak unilaterally withdrew Israel’s military forces from south Lebanon in the spring of 2000. That many such women opt for nonviolent means to solve conflict has not only become apparent from my interviews, but also from the recent example of the newly organized group of Israeli war widows who are publicly calling for the end of bloodshed.
I was disappointed by the small number of bereaved women in my Israeli study who were peace activists (and by the absence of a protest group exclusively organized by bereaved women or men), but there is now a movement, Parents Circle/Bereaved Families Forum, created by bereaved Israeli and Palestinian families. They spoke loudly in March 2002 when, in front of the UN headquarters in New York, they staged a demonstration with more than two thousand mock coffins covered with Israeli and Palestinian flags, representing the number of casualties both sides suffered as a result of the current situation in Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Many of the women interviewed who supported their government’s peace efforts stated they were not involved in peace movements because they had never considered the subject. Since the study, however, I discovered some of the interviewed women have become active in the peace movement. Apparently, raising the level of consciousness of bereaved women can motivate at least some of these women to engage in peace building. Additionally, discovering their own leadership and recruitment skills rewards women. As previously described, in the United States and the West, there are good examples of seemingly ordinary women who became activists after suffering loss. Unquestionably, the inclusion of women in peacemaking will remedy their chronic absence in peace processes, especially in deep-rooted conflicts.

Finally, the assertion that peacemaking is tied more to political disenfranchisement rather than to an inherent peace-loving quality in women is historically evident. Powerful women such as Queen Boudica, Indira Gandhi, Golda Meir, and Margaret Thatcher unhesitatingly led their nations in war, while disenfranchised men like Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Desmond Tutu set powerful examples supporting nonviolence as methods used to achieve change.

There are several steps that others can take in order to motivate bereaved women to engage as peacemakers or to become activists. People must try to spread the information they obtain from peacebuilding works, possibly by organizing small or large community lectures. Fellow researchers should expand studies into other conflict or former conflict areas, such as Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Kosovo, as well as other areas in Eastern and Central Europe, Africa, or Central America. Many women in such conflict areas became brave enough to talk about their ordeals, rape, and other war victims. With encouragement from the political and academic communities, coupled with information disseminated via the news media, the courage demonstrated by these women can be expanded into political activism.
Endnotes


4 See note 2.


7 In this context, that peace is a basic human right and that governments are fundamentally obligated to preserve, promote, and implement that right was stated in UN Resolution 39/11 of 12 November 1984.


9 The al-Aqsa intifada refers to the second Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza, following the controversial visit of Ariel Sharon to Temple
10 The 1987 intifada was a violent popular uprising that began in the Gaza Strip on 9 December 1987. It was ignited by the deaths of four Palestinians the day before in a crash involving a car driven by an Israeli.
12 Sharoni 1995, see ch. 8.
13 It should be noticed that this undertaking is not presumed to be scientific. First, respondents do not represent a cross-section of the Israeli or Palestinian population. Instead, they embody a rather distinct, relatively small group with a very specific experience. Second, within this very group there are a small number of individuals, few of whom agreed to be interviewed. Furthermore, respondents were not divided into particular age groups, war periods, ethnic groups, religious-secular backgrounds, levels of education, or political affiliation. Nonetheless, these women represent a segment of society that needs to be heard in the Middle East and elsewhere.
14 These interviews were conducted through the support of a Fulbright-Hays scholarship.
15 For the unfamiliar reader, the Bedouin people are Sunni Muslims who, unlike other Arab groups that moved northward during the spread of the Islamic empire in the seventh century A.D., remained nomads, living mostly in the Arabian desert and adhering to the simple way of life of their Semitic ancestors. In Israel the Bedouins constitute a small minority among a larger group of Muslim and some Christian Arabs who remained in the country after the establishment of the state in 1948.
16 Because of prevailing conditions in Ramallah at the time of this writing, I opted not to reveal the name of this professor.
ACHIEVEMENTS BY AND FOR WOMEN

- The U.S. Department of Defense rescinded a long-standing policy requiring female personnel deployed in Saudi Arabia to wear an abaya when off-base. Saudi Arabia adheres to a strict interpretation of Islamic religious law, including a requirement that Muslim women wear an abaya—a long black cloak covering the head and body. In other areas of the world, an abaya is a simple headscarf. The policy change was initiated by Lt. Col. Martha McSally, the highest-ranking female fighter pilot in the Air Force, who sued Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last year on the grounds that the rule discriminated against women and violated religious freedom. Although the Department of Defense continues to strongly urge female personnel to wear it off base out of cultural respect and safety from religious police, it is no longer required. (Source: U.S. News and World Report, 24 January 2002.)

- In February 2002, Jill Bakken and Vonetta Flowers made history by taking the gold medal at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games in the inaugural women's Olympic bobsled race. The victory was the first in forty-six years for the United States in Olympic bobsledding and signified another landmark: Flowers became the first African-American to win a medal at the Winter Games. (Source: Associated Press, 20 February 2002.)

- On 15 March 2002, the Lower House of Parliament amended the Nepalese Civil Code to legalize abortion for Nepalese women in their first trimester. Nepal has the fourth highest maternal death rate in the world, of those women that die from pregnancy-related complications, an estimated 50 percent die from illegal abortions. (Source: www.feministmajority.org.)

- On 23 March 2002, a new school year began for Afghani children, and for the first time since Taliban rule, women and girls attended school without fear of reprisal. (Source: www.feministmajority.org.)

- On 6 February 2002, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) was sworn in as the U.S. House of Representatives' Minority Whip and its second-ranking Democrat, making her the first woman to hold either of
these positions. When Rep. Pelosi was first elected to the House in 1987, she joined eleven other women. Today, she is one of forty-two. *(Source: www.emilyslist.org.)*

- Toronto Minister of Parliament Marilyn Churley launched a unique public campaign this March in honor of International Women’s Day: she called for an end to the seven cents sales tax on feminine products. It is estimated that Canadian women spend $5,000 during their lifetime on feminine products, and pay nearly $350 in taxes. *(Source: Canada News Wire, 8 March 2002.)*

- The Smithsonian premieres “Game Face—What Does a Female Athlete Look Like?” to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of Title IX, the federal law that mandated gender equity in sports for women and girls in schools. The 182 photographs of female athletes were displayed in Salt Lake City during the 2002 Olympic Games. *(Source: Associated Press, 30 January 2002.)*

- In December 2001, President Moi of Kenya banned the circumcision of girls under 18 and provided a minimum one-year jail time and/or a fine of Sh50,000 for anyone who circumcises girls or forces them into early marriage. *(Source: Africa News, 13 December 2001.)*

- In the 2001 Census of Women Board Directors of the Fortune 1000, Catalyst found that women now hold 12.4 percent of all board seats in the F500, up from 11.2 percent in 1999, and 10.9 percent of all board seats in the F1000, up from 10 percent in 1999. If the rate of change remains constant in F500, women will occupy 25 percent of the board seats by 2027. *(Source: www.catalystwomen.org.)*

- A panel of NASA women scientists will try to attract more young women to the field of science by broadcasting a live Webcast of women scientists discussing why they chose science-related careers and the challenges that they overcame. While only 22 percent of scientists are women, women make up just 9 percent of engineers. Studies have shown that girls and boys show equal interest in math and science during elementary school, but girls’ interest declines sharply by the time they reach middle-school. *(Source: Ascribe News Service, 10 January 2002.)*

100
Book Review: Robert Wuthnow’s *Loose Connections: Joining Together in America’s Fragmented Communities*
Reviewed by *WPJH* staff Michele Russo

Robert Wuthnow’s book, *Loose Connections: Joining Together in America’s Fragmented Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), presents an interesting, if anecdotal, analysis of modern Americans’ feelings that “community-mindedness is eroding” (1); concerns over the “breakdown of families” (1); and “the degree to which selfishness prevails” (2). He discusses both the validity of and premise behind these pervasive feelings that are held by many of today’s urban, suburban, or small-town Americans.

Unlike other researchers in the field, Wuthnow is more optimistic about citizen engagement in U.S. society. He agrees that there are fewer people engaged in structured civic organizations like the Lions Clubs and Garden Clubs popular in the 1950s and 1960s, but he points to the emergence of new areas for public involvement, namely nonprofit organizations, self-help groups and public-private ventures. He also points to a more complex American society that requires more public involvement from its citizens. This observation may explain why most people feel there is less public involvement, even though his research demonstrates a steady level of activity from Americans over time.

Wuthnow’s focus on community involvement in urban, suburban, and small-town settings draws out the similarities within the three areas and supports his premise that societal change has predicated much of the altering face of community ties.

One of Wuthnow’s more interesting points pertains to the important role that national security played in the formation of large civic organizations and its influence on the organizations’ capacity to involve so many Americans from the 1940s until the end of the 1970s. Wuthnow states:

The lack of a significant external threat to the nation from a rival military power is one of these conditions [contributing to the increasing porousness of American social institutions in recent years]. During World War II and the Cold War, concerns about national security led to tighter policing of borders and of the information that could flow across them . . . . With these specific threats giving way to a more generalized atmosphere of uncertainty, minor skirmishes and economic competition, resources have been permitted to flow more easily across national boundaries (70).
In his concluding chapter, he discusses a limitation of returning to these structured organizations, stating:

Interpreting current social problems as caused by loosely connected civic involvement implies that the way to solve them is to bring back commitment to membership organizations. These organizations, however, were embedded in a particular set of social arrangements. Loyalties were reinforced in the post-1945 era by (among other things) the memory of a massive war effort and the continuing fear of communist aggression, by segregated neighborhoods and discriminatory club policies that kept memberships homogenous, and by a virtual taboo on civic organizations open to both men and women. It is unlikely that those who advocate a return to strong membership associations would be willing to promote fears about national security, racial segregation, and gender boundaries in order to bring about such a return (222).

After September 11, it is interesting that Wuthnow’s analysis has proven true—with changes in our social arrangements coinciding with more Americans clamoring to structured civic institutions, such as the Citizen Corps created after President George W. Bush’s 2001 State of the Union Address. The newly developed Citizen Corps, which includes an expanded Neighborhood Watch Program, was set up to build on existing networks in an effort to combat terrorist threats, crime, natural disasters, and public health threats. This is just one way that American’s recent national security threat has caused people to return to a formal, structured civic organization in their volunteer efforts. Wuthnow’s examination suggests that Americans will return to looser contributions once this national security threat dissipates.

Wuthnow’s use of anecdotal evidence makes the examination quite readable to a general audience, although the reliance on such data may undermine his message with those who prefer more quantitative data. It would have been interesting to see this analysis coupled with a comprehensive study detailing hourly contributions of people’s civic contributions.

One part of the book that seemed somewhat disjointed was his examination of Americans’ search for “soul mates.” He argued that modern Americans’ quests for soul mates have led to some of the changes in their civic involvement and community ties: No longer do people want casual acquaintances. They would rather get to know a smaller group more intimately. This argument, however, is not supported by his research. His anecdotal examinations show that people today are no less drawn to friendships made through civic involvement than they were thirty or forty
years ago. Many members of the Garden and Lions Clubs claimed they joined precisely to make close friends outside of their families in an effort to enrich their personal lives. If true, this trend of looking for soul mates is not new to American civic involvement or public service.

Despite these critiques, Wuthnow’s book provides a fresh look at America’s communities, offering several concrete suggestions for organizations and individuals to improve their public service efforts. One can only hope that readers are inspired by his stories and recommendations—and that they use his work as a tool to improve public participation.
The Women's Policy Journal of Harvard,
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Proudly Announces its Second Edition

Dimensions of International Security
The Role of Women in Global Conflict Resolution,
International Development, and Human Rights

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Book Review: Martin Carnoy’s *Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family, and Community in the Information Age*
Reviewed by *WPJH* staff Gretchen Elias

Globalization is perhaps one of the most-discussed, least-understood issues of our day. It is less a distinct phenomenon than a catch-all expression used to describe a cluster of recent economic, social, political, and technological developments. The concept is hailed as the source of bountiful economic growth just as often as it is deplored as the cause of growing inequality and social injustice. In developing the thesis of his new book, *Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family, and Community in the Information Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Russell Sage and Harvard University Press, 2000), Martin Carnoy addresses one aspect of this cluster: the impact of technological change on the dynamics of work and family in industrialized countries. While Carnoy does not explicitly include an assessment of the effects of globalization as part of his stated purpose, he offers a workable definition of globalization as “a new, global way of thinking about economic and social space and time” (60), and his explanations of recent trends in work and family structure provide valuable insight into some of the complex ways in which the globalized economy influences our world.

Carnoy documents a fundamental shift in the nature of work toward a greater emphasis on flexibility and on access to information, and he argues that the key to success in this increasingly knowledge-based environment will involve adaptations of social institutions and policy agendas. In particular, he cites the growing importance of access to information and education in determining an individual’s success in the labor market. According to Carnoy, this fact calls for public policy that broadly supports individuals’ and families’ abilities to invest in their human capital, such as education ranging from pre-kindergarten day care to higher learning; facilitates families’ capacity to remain involved in their children’s education, despite the increased demands of the workplace; and transforms schools into “community knowledge centers” that serve as a common entry point for educational and training opportunities across generations and income levels. Not only do these recommendations resonate in the context of the economic trends he describes, they also include policy changes that would likely have positive impacts on gender equality in the workplace and in the division of reproductive labor.

As his starting-off point, Carnoy addresses the debate about the impact of recent advancements in technology on the nature of work. He provides statistical data discrediting the arguments linking technology
with systemic job losses or a "deskilling" of jobs among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. If anything, he argues, the increased informational requirements associated with technological change have placed a greater premium on workers' ability to improve their knowledge and skill bases. But the most significant change related to technology and information in the age of globalization, according to Carnoy, is the shift to a workplace where "flexibility" dominates. This trend can be observed in the shift away from the traditional career job towards frequent job-hopping and alternative forms of employment (such as self-employment and contractual arrangements). The growing demand for workers capable of adapting to changing informational demands and the increased flexibility of labor prices contributes to this trend, as evidenced by a decline in real wages for low-skill workers and by widening gaps in earnings between the highly educated and those with only a high school diploma.

Carnoy argues that this demand for greater flexibility in the workplace must be understood in the context of ongoing and significant changes in the larger social structure. Specifically, he points to changes in family structure and, with somewhat less success, to the declining role of the community. Carnoy makes the case that the institutions that have traditionally supported individuals' integration into the economy are in flux and that new ones are needed that will complement the emerging knowledge-based economy. Central to his argument is the dramatic rise in female labor force participation in recent decades. Carnoy relates this trend to corresponding shifts in family structure, such as delayed marriages, higher divorce rates, and lower fertility rates. On the whole, his discussion of the context of women's increased participation in the labor market is informative, and his conclusion that this trend is best paired with greater public sector support for the family's ability to care for and educate children is heartening for proponents of universal day care and other policies.

At times, however, his analysis lacks depth. For example, Carnoy ends his account of the growth of female labor force participation with the observation that women appear to have a certain comparative advantage in the flexible labor market. He speculates briefly that this may be a result of women's historical tendency toward more flexible labor market involvement due to conflicts with their reproductive capacity. But he fails to acknowledge its potential implications in terms of substantial qualitative differences between women's and men's employment opportunities. In fact, he dismisses concerns about the nature of women's employment
(for example, whether women tend to be overrepresented in low-skill, low-wage sectors) as unimportant, relative to the fact that, in the aggregate, more women are working. Granted, the book is not intended to be a gendered analysis of the consequences of patterns of women's integration into the labor market, but rather an argument about the societal impact of a more flexible workplace in conjunction with changes in the family and other social institutions. Nevertheless, central to Carnoy's argument is the premise that increased workplace flexibility does not necessarily reflect a negative trend; this argument is compromised by his glossing over of some of the specific concerns surrounding the circumstances of women's labor market participation.

Carnoy's book suffers from several other limitations. First, he relies on labor market data from the 1970s and 1980s, whereas some of the more dramatic changes in information and technology have occurred since the early 1990s. Carnoy also confines his analysis to the changing nature of work in industrialized nations of the OECD community. Certainly, an attempt to integrate analyses of the changing nature of the workplace and its implications both in developed and in developing countries would have been a daunting task. However, many of the labor market and economic trends that Carnoy documents are directly linked to employment trends in developing countries, and these trends often have significant consequences for workers, particularly women, in these countries. Carnoy's failure to acknowledge this interrelatedness and its possible implications for the new economy is disappointing. But overall, Carnoy's book is a valuable and balanced contribution to the literature on analyzing the effects of the globalized, Information Age economy on work and family.
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