Feature Articles

Latino Electoral Participation

The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Latinos and the 1996 Elections
Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Ph.D. and Louis DeSipio, Ph.D.

Latino Electoral and Non-electoral Political Participation: Findings from the 1996 Chicago Latino Registered Voter Survey
Peter M. Sanchez, Ph.D. and Maria Vidal de Haymes, Ph.D.

Antonio Sisneros, Ph.D.

Dynamics of Latino Partisanship in California: Immigration, Issue Salience, and Their Implications
Gary M. Segura, Ph.D., Dennis Falcón, and Harry Pachón, Ph.D.
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The Journal's mission is to educate and provide leadership that improves the quality of public policies affecting the Latino community. In doing so, the Journal hopes to further the economic, social and political empowerment of the Latino community.
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Editors’ Remarks

In 1985, Volume I of the *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* was published, becoming the first journal of original policy research dedicated to the discussion of issues which affect the Latino community in the United States. In 1997, the *Journal* still actively embraces its mission to further the economic, social, and political empowerment of Latinos by sponsoring speakers, convening forums, and soliciting articles.

Characteristic of recent presidential election years, the local and national campaign fanfare of 1996 advertised to constituencies of different colors and creeds, but many cynics, advocacy groups, and scholars alike were skeptical that this campaign bedecked to woo voters of colors was more than a perfunctory display. The nascent demographic majority of Latinos is not easily dismissed by politicians, but the war on the poor and the immigrant bashing which imbued politics in 1996 may reflect an incredulity by many of the nation’s politicians that Latinos will be able to translate numerical growth into political clout. It is with appreciation for this concern that the staff chose Latino Electoral Representation as the theme for Volume X.

More specifically, changes in the national welfare system, immigration policies, and the fear that California’s Propositions 187 and 209 could be enacted on a national level, has piqued dialogue among activists, advocates, and academics as to the next steps needed to ensure that the interests of Latinos are adequately represented and protected in all of the political institutions in the country.

 Barely audible, but still important in this dialogue is the irresolute ability of Latinos to seek relief in Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act for underrepresentation due to ambiguous and wavering Supreme Court decisions regarding majority-minority districts.

It is the hope of the Editors that the comments, lessons, and prescriptions of the articles in Volume X will contribute to the current discourse by examining the subject in the context of policymaking.

This issue is dedicated to the late Congressmember Frank Tejeda. Congressmember Tejeda was born in San Antonio on October 2, 1945. As a marine, he earned the Bronze Star for valor and received the Purple Heart for wounds sustained in combat. While in the Marine Corps Officers Candidate School, he earned numerous awards for his superior academic standing and leadership achievements. Congressmember Tejeda graduated from St. Mary’s University with a Bachelor of Arts in Government; at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law, he earned a Juris Doctorate; at the Kennedy School of Government, he earned a Masters in Public Administration; and at Yale University School of Law, he earned a Masters in Law. Congressmember Tejeda served in the Texas Legislature as both a State Representative and State Senator before he was elected to Congress in 1992. Congressmember Tejeda will be remembered for his commitment to veterans, expanded educational opportunities, and the eco-
onomic development of the greater San Antonio-Bexar County area, especially southside San Antonio.

Louis DeSipio and Rodolfo de la Garza present a commentary which debunks the chimerical optimism that the election of three new Latino Congressmembers, in one case at the expense of Republican Party stalwart Robert Dornan, signified that Latinos played a decisive role in the 1996 elections. Rather, they argue that the election results of 1996 were mixed for Latinos.

Antonio Sisneros explores the enigmatic human resource management problem Illinois is experiencing, resultant in the underrepresentation of Latinos in the Illinois state government.

Peter Sanchez and Maria Vidal de Haymes, by examining different measures of political participation, create an index of political participation that provides a more multi-dimensional picture of Latino participation than that available in prior research in the mainstream analysis.

Gary Segura, Dennis Falcón, and Harry Pachón posit that the increased size and partisan skew in the Latino vote is significantly attributable to the increased naturalization rate among Latino non-citizens.

There are two allies at Harvard in particular to whom the Editors would like to express sincere gratitude. Dean Joseph McCarthy has consistently provided the Journal with strong financial and institutional support. Professor Xavier de Souza Briggs, our faculty advisor, has unflinchingly served as our advocate to the Kennedy School and as our fount for advice.

The Editors would like to thank all of the Journal’s student staff members who, despite coursework, job searches, and other activities, dedicated their time and energy to the Journal. The camaraderie created among Journal staffers grew to be just as important as the finished product. It would not be possible to extend the deserved amount of thanks to Juan Espino, our term time Business Manager. The sanity of the Journal Editors is largely a testament to his assiduity, organizational prowess, and mediation skills. The Editors also owe much to Rebecca Gelfond, who provided final editing and production support for this volume.

We would also like to thank the Kellog Foundation for their generous grant which has enabled the Journal to execute strategic planning. The advice and support provided by the staff of the Asian American Policy Review is also greatly appreciated.

Finally, we would like to thank the members of both our Executive and Editorial Advisory Boards. The Boards play an irreplaceable role in the Journal’s endeavors, and the Editors are thankful for their participation.

Irma Muñoz
1996-7

Myrna Pérez
1996-7
The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Latinos and the 1996 Elections

Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Louis DeSipio

Rodolfo O. de la Garza is Mike Hogg Professor in Community Affairs in the Department of Government at the University of Texas in Austin and Vice President of the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute. Professor de la Garza combines interests in American and Comparative Politics. He has edited, co-edited and co-authored numerous books including *Ethnic Ironies: Latinos and the 1992 Elections*, and *Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics*. Louis DeSipio is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign where he is also a faculty affiliate of the program in Latina/Latino Studies. His research focuses on Latino politics and on the political incorporation of immigrant populations. His most recent book is *Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos as a New Electorate* (1996, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia).

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity ....

—Charles Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities* (1859)

Charles Dickens' observation about the era just before the French Revolution captures the sense of opportunity and disappointment that Latinos experienced in the 1996 election well. Unlike in any recent election, the party to which a majority of Latinos express allegiance—the Democrats—controlled the White House and the incumbent faced no competition for the party’s presidential nomination. Similarly, most leading Latino elected officials faced no competition. Finally, issues of concern to Latino communities had become part of the national debate allowing for the possibility of a Latino voice and influence in the outcome of congressional and national policy debates. Yet, when the election was over, it became evident that the expectations for a newly important role for Latino electorates were not met: the Latino voice in the presidential election was muted. While issues important to the Latino community entered the debate, Latinos were often on the losing side. Equally disturbing, we provide preliminary evidence that indicates that Latinos did not vote at higher levels than previous elections despite a steady growth in the voting-eligible population, including many newly naturalized U.S. citizens. Thus, despite unique opportunities and a newly found role for Latino issues in the national policy debate, Latinos were not decisive actors in the elections. Instead, as we will suggest, the factors that have kept Latinos from the polls for the past two decades continued to do so in 1996.

In this article, we assess this seeming contradiction between new opportu-
nities and the continuing pattern of low electoral participation. Our discussion has two parts. First, we discuss the major events of the 1996 elections with a particular focus on campaign efforts to reach Latino voters and on Latino efforts to shape national political outcomes. Second, we look at the results of the election.

...when the election was over, it became evident that the expectations for a newly important role for Latino electorates were not met: the Latino voice in the presidential election was muted.

Results have several meanings including Latino turnout on election day, election of Latinos to office, and the ability of Latino elites to make demands on government based on the Latino vote. Each measure reinforces the others to show that Latinos were not able to use the 1996 election cycle to exercise greater influence on political outcomes than they had in previous elections. We indicate several indicators of this absence of greater influence.

This article builds on our previous studies of Latinos and national politics (de la Garza and DeSipio 1992, 1994, 1996a; DeSipio and de la Garza 1993). We seek to build on the available scholarly knowledge of how Latinos contribute to national politics and how national political institutions understand and reach out to Latino communities in order to document the process of Latino empowerment as it is taking place. Our endeavor, then, is not theoretical, but instead empirical. This undertaking requires that we be eclectic in our research method, using such diverse sources as newspaper reporting, interviews with campaign workers and observers, analysis of electoral data, and reporting on events that we observed.

The 1996 Elections and Latino Communities

The 1996 elections presented Latinos with unique opportunities for four reasons. First, the Democrats—the party to which a majority of Latinos report allegiance—controlled the White House and President Clinton faced no primary opposition. While primaries had intermittently presented Latinos a chance to demonstrate their cohesion, Democratic primaries have often so divided the party that it could not run a winning campaign in the fall. Second, more than ever before, Latino leaders had central roles in the administration. Housing Secretary Henry Cisneros was part of the Clinton inner circle. Although less visible than Cisneros, Latinos received unprecedented numbers of sub-cabinet and White House positions. Third, California Latinos mobilized against Proposition 187 in 1994 and it looked as if similar proposals would be a part of the national debate in 1996. Although Proposition 187 passed in 1994, Latinos had voted at unprecedented levels and were largely unified in their opposition to it. Latino leaders sought to build on this unity to spur greater involvement in the 1996 election. Finally, the Latino electorate was growing. Because it is a younger population and a population with a higher share of naturalizing immigrants, the potential Latino electorate increases much more rapidly than does the non-Latino electorate. Furthermore, between 1992 and 1996, this increase accelerated because the
number of Latinos naturalizing increased as never before. While these opportunities excluded some Latinos—for example Republican Latinos or the approximately one-third of the California Latino electorate that supported Proposition 187 at the polls in 1994, it looked at the beginning of the 1996 campaign as if Latinos could build on the important role they played in key states in the 1992 elections and put themselves in a position to make greater demands on national political actors (de la Garza and DeSipio 1996a).

The Primaries

The 1996 election season began soon after Bill Clinton’s 1992 victory. Early activities involved mostly the Republican party and did not include a significant role for Latino electorates or elites. Potential Republican candidates jockeyed for position and, more importantly, money. Many prominent Republicans, including Dan Quayle, Jack Kemp, William Bennett, and Colin Powell, decided not to run, largely out of fear that they could not raise enough money. The competitors that emerged can be classified in two categories. The first consisted of just the front runner—Bob Dole. The second category included candidates seeking to emerge as the chief competitor to Senator Dole, including Pat Buchanan, Phil Gramm, Lamar Alexander, Steve Forbes, Bob Dornan, Pete Wilson, Morry Taylor, and Alan Keyes.

Neither Dole nor his competitors actively sought Latino votes in the Republican primaries. Most of the competitive Republican primaries took place in states with small Latino populations. Only in Florida did their votes play a significant role. That is not to say, however, that Latinos were unimportant to the Republican primary. To the contrary, they played a significant role in the calculations of two of the candidates—Pete Wilson and Pat Buchanan.

Wilson sought to parlay his success at capturing California’s anti-immigrant sentiment to the national stage. The failure of his campaign to make any appreciable headway in the early primary and caucus states indicated that the nation was not as concerned with immigration as was California, and Wilson dropped out of the race well before the primaries.

Buchanan, on the other hand, was better able to tap concerns about immigration, in general, and Mexican immigration and Mexico, in particular, to mobilize his followers. Buchanan called for a three-year halt to immigration, tighter controls of the southern border, passage of English-Only legislation, and protectionist trade policies that would repeal the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Buchanan explicitly used anti-Mexican imagery as part of his campaign. For example, he identified all Mexicans (on either side of the border) as “José.” His inflammatory rhetoric also appeared in his discussion of immigration, which he characterized as an “invasion” (Bennet 1996).

Initially, Buchanan was quite successful. He surprised Gramm in non-binding Louisiana caucuses that took place before the traditional starting points of the campaign—the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary. This surprise victory meant little in concrete terms, although symbolically it was of great im-
portance, and it allowed Buchanan to replace Gramm as the leading opponent to Dole. Gramm dropped out of the race before the New Hampshire primaries. Buchanan was then able to win in New Hampshire and Arizona.

Despite these early defeats, Dole was in control of the Republican primary process. The Buchanan victory in New Hampshire forced Dole to run in a series of Republican primaries and caucuses in order to beat his major opponents (Buchanan, Forbes, and Alexander) one by one. These proved to be Pyrrhic victories, however, and Dole emerged as the Republican victor after the Super Tuesday primaries. Florida was central to his Super Tuesday triumph and there he relied on Cuban Americans who gave him 81 percent of their votes. This rate far exceeded the non-Cuban Republican voters, who only gave Dole 54 percent of their votes (USA Today, [March 13, 1996]).

Dole’s Super Tuesday victory assured him a wide lead in the contest for

Because it [the Latino electorate] is a younger population and a population with a higher share of naturalizing immigrants, the potential Latino electorate increases much more rapidly than does the non-Latino electorate.

delegates and the uncontested title of front-runner, but his victory carried two liabilities. First, these early contests proved very expensive. Consequently, the campaign was low on funds from March until it received federal monies in August. During this same five-month period, on the other hand, Clinton and the Democrats were flush with money and ran extensive anti-Dole advertisements in key states. Second, the primary opposition to Dole showed divisions within the Republican party that Dole would face throughout the campaign. Dole won the nomination because he controlled the party establishment and had a deep pool of endorsements from party influentials. It was never clear, however, that Dole spoke for the entire party and he never articulated a message that united its warring factions. Dole’s inability to unite the party became apparent in the period after he had assured his nomination. He did not use this time to create a message for the fall campaign. Instead, he moved aimlessly from idea to idea, from an attack on Hollywood to the decision to resign from the Senate.

One dimension of this controversy within the Republican party was the issue of immigration and the rights of immigrants. At one extreme, Buchanan advocated a three-year cessation of immigration and the denial of most state benefits to immigrants, regardless of legal status. At the other extreme, Forbes defended the existing system. Dole seemed to take positions based on the polls and was unable to present a cohesive and unifying Republican position. These various messages, however, were lost on many Latino activists who took Buchanan’s rhetoric and Dole’s support of Proposition 187 and, later, the anti-affirmative action California Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209) as evidence of the intolerance of the Republican Party. Consequently, among Latinos, Dole was never able to overcome the image of the Republican primaries. Not, as we will suggest,
that he tried.

The Dole campaign did seek to organize Latino Republicans in the primaries. In four states, Texas, New York, California, and Florida, the campaign's Latino campaign coordinator, Norma Patiño-Lippe, established networks of Latino elites at the state and county levels to support the Dole campaign. It is unclear how extensive these networks were or what they accomplished in terms of the primary elections. Patiño-Lippe was a volunteer with the campaign who had initially worked in the accounting division. There is no evidence that the other Republican candidates developed Latino campaigns. Few, other than Dole, competed in states with Latino voters.

Unlike the Dole campaign, the Clinton campaign effectively used the primary season to prepare for the fall. Although Clinton did not face primary opposition, he raised and spent the maximum amount that matching funds recipients could legally spend on the primary campaign (approximately $38 million, an amount matched by Dole). Some of this money went to Clinton's travel to primary states, which included states with large Latino populations. The vast majority of the primary monies were spent in two areas not directly related to the primaries—laying the foundation for the general election campaign and attacking Dole and the Republicans in the media. These official monies supplemented soft money that purchased even more media and landed Clinton in trouble after the campaign.

The Clinton Latino campaign began early. Hispanic appointees within the administration, including the two cabinet secretaries, began informal meetings in November 1995 to plan a comprehensive coordinated strategy to reach out to Latinos. Their efforts led to the appointment of a paid campaign staff person during the primaries to direct the Latino campaign. Under Ken Mireles' direction, the Clinton campaign established twenty state-level Adelante con Clinton-Gore! campaigns. Each had a state director and a coordinating board of elected officials and prominent Latino Democrats. Although these state-level Latino campaigns were not necessary for primaries, they were in place in advance of the fall campaign.

Adelante con Clinton-Gore! also facilitated Latino access to President Clinton and Vice President Gore during this period. These encounters included coffees at the White House, a screening of the PBS series Chicano! at the White House, Clinton's attendance at a Latino Vote USA fund-raiser that raised $1.2 million for voter registration and the get-out-the-vote campaign. Perhaps most impressively, Adelante con Clinton-Gore! was formally launched in a teleconference with Clinton, the state chairs, and other prominent Latino Democrats. Unlike previous campaigns, the Clinton campaign's Latino outreach team was in place and funded before comparable campaigns to reach out to other race and ethnic groups. More-
over, in addition to the *Adelante* structure, Latinos had prominent positions in other parts of the campaign.

In sum, the primaries presented two different models for campaign outreach. The Clinton campaign was well organized and well funded. It followed a model of targeted ethnic outreach, but did not limit Latinos to these roles. It expanded the role of ethnic-specific campaigning over 1992, but demonstrated that these ethnic campaigns could be integrated at all levels of the campaign and not simply be window dressing. The Dole campaign, on the other hand, was disorganized and not designed to reach out to Latinos. It had to use its resources to win primaries and not to plan a campaign to reach non-traditional Republican electorates like Latinos. Even more problematic was the legacy of anti-immigrant rhetoric of the Republican primaries. As we will indicate, these models presented different opportunities to Latinos in the general elections. The Clinton campaign incorporated Latino campaign staff and Latino issues into the campaign to an unprecedented degree in the recent campaigns that we have studied. The Dole campaign, on the other hand, was insufficiently coordinated to incorporate Latino views. The Latino campaign staff was unable to translate their labors into a public campaign for Latino votes. Equally important, many Latino Republicans, like non-Latino Republicans, gave up on Dole’s chances for victory long before November.

**The Conventions**

The differences between the Democrats and the Republicans in their ability to mount national campaigns was evident during their conventions. The Democratic convention was a choreographed infomercial in which dissent was muted and delegates were willing participants in the spectacle. The Republican convention gave the appearance of unity, but dissent seemed to be lurking beneath the surface. At both conventions, the power of money, particularly lobbyists’ money, was evident in the many opportunities for entertainment. From the perspective of Latino communities, the conventions highlighted significant differences between the parties. At the Republican event, Latino delegates were rare. When speakers addressed issues of importance to the Latino community, such as education for undocumented children or birth-right citizenship, Latinos usually were not in agreement with the positions taken.

The Republican convention took place in San Diego from August 12 to August 15. It began with a note of excitement and even energy. Dole had selected Jack Kemp as his running mate. Dole and Kemp had sparred in the past, but Dole’s last-minute adoption of tax cuts as a key issue made the supply-sider Kemp a palatable choice. Among Kemp’s strengths was an uncharacteristic ability for a Republican to reach minority communities, the roots of which can be traced to
his advocacy of enterprise zones during his days in Congress and as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in the Bush administration. In both of these capacities, Kemp spoke extensively to African American and Latino leaders and organizations. Kemp’s connection to Latinos went no deeper than these elites, however. Nevertheless, at the time of the convention, the selection of Kemp gave the Dole campaign the appearance of challenging Democratic dominance of minority votes.

Early in the convention, Kemp disappointed many Latino delegates by reversing his long-held support for affirmative action. On the first day of the convention, he announced that he had come to support California’s Proposition 209.

While the [Democratic] party and its candidate advocated some issues that alienated Latinos, the Democrats also included Latino concerns among their core issues.

The Republican platform muted the party’s ability to reach out to Latinos. The platform was particularly forceful in addressing immigration and immigrant issues. Among other provisions, it called for an end to automatic citizenship for U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants; advocated a prohibition on public education for the children of undocumented immigrants regardless of the citizenship status of the child; called for a prohibition on all public benefits (except emergency aid) for all undocumented immigrants; supported English-only legislation; condemned President Clinton for opposing Proposition 187; and supported a reduction in legal immigration levels. With the possible exception of the last of these provisions, these proposals alienated many Latino voters, who generally support programs to assist in immigrant adaptation (de la Garza and DeSipio 1996b). The platform also distressed Republican Latino leaders. Edward Juárez, vice-chair of the Michigan Republican Party, called these platform planks “...isolationism ... and purely racist. Our numbers are increasing and that scares non-Latinos” (Guadalupe 1996a).

Although exact numbers are in doubt, Latino delegates were few. According to the Associated Press, they made up 46 of the 1,990 delegates (2.3 percent) (“Delegate Facts” 1996). Republican officials reported higher numbers, but these were dismissed by Republican Latinos who, on checking the official lists, noted that some of the delegates being claimed as Latino were of Italian ancestry. The small number of Latino delegates matched equally small numbers of African Americans and Asian Americans (2.7 percent and 1.1 percent, respectively).

A paucity of Latino delegates was reinforced by a scarcity of Latino speakers from the podium. In general, the speakers were drawn from Republican elected officials, few of whom were Latino. The three Latino Republican members of Congress did speak at the convention, although Texas Representative Henry Bonilla’s (a Mexican American) plum speaking spot engendered resentment among his two Cuban Americans colleagues.
Republican Hispanic leaders sought to put the best face possible on the platform language and on the small number of Latino delegates. Instead of looking to specifics, they emphasized the economic benefits of Dole’s proposed tax cuts and per-child tax credits. As National Hispanic Republic Assembly Chair Antonio Monroig said, “[W]e shouldn’t be concentrating so much on this document [the platform] and emphasize what the party can bring to the community” (Guadalupe 1996b).

Overall, then, the Republican convention did little to draw Latinos to the Republican fold. The convention represented the difficulties that the party would face in the fall. It was internally divided in such a way that it could not so easily reach out to new voters. Moreover, the message it sent to Latinos was one of exclusion. Republican leaders’ emphasis on immigration and immigrants served to drive Latinos away from the Republican ticket.

The Democratic convention held two weeks later in Chicago proved much more inclusive to Latinos. While the party and its candidate advocated some issues that alienated Latinos, the Democrats also included Latino concerns among their core issues. Latinos were also much more visible at the Democratic convention, both as delegates and as speakers.

Like its Republican counterpart, the Democratic convention was highly choreographed. With few exceptions, the convention stuck to a schedule drawn in advance. Each evening had a theme and the key speakers appeared when the television networks were likely to carry the speeches live. The Democrats demonstrated greater confidence and presented some dissenting views. Both Jesse Jackson and Mario Cuomo called the president to task for signing the welfare reform bill, though not during prime time.

The exact number of Latino delegates again seems to be in doubt. The Democratic National Committee reported that 389 of the 4,320 delegates and alternates were Latino (9 percent). A survey just of delegates found that only 6 percent were Latino (Chicago Tribune, [August 26, 1996]). This figure could represent a poor sample or a disproportionate number of Latino alternate delegates (Washington Post National Edition, [August 26-September 1, 1996]). Whichever number is accurate, Latinos were much more evident at the Democratic convention than they were at the Republican convention.

Latinos were also more likely to be speakers. These included Latino elected officials with brief slots at poor times, but they also included a very prominent role for Texas Senate candidate Victor Morales, who was placed with two other challengers for national office in between Hillary Clinton and keynote speaker Evan Bayh. The Morales speech gave his candidacy a national audience in a way that the national conventions rarely do. Latinos also served as convention vice-chairs.

These formal events and roles overlook what is probably the more important role of the modern political convention—the opportunity to network and socialize. While the Latino delegates to the Republican convention undoubtedly
had these opportunities, their small number limited the opportunity to organize around Latino issues. At the Democratic convention, these opportunities were considerable. Latino delegates had a daily caucus meeting with figures such as Al Gore and Hillary Rodham Clinton. There were daily receptions honoring national and local Latino leaders and a daily newsletter.

The Democratic platform was much less contentious than its Republican equivalent. It was adopted with virtually no debate by the platform committee. It, and the message shared with the delegates by key Democrats including President Clinton, was one that was much more in synch with the policy preferences of the majority of Latinos. The platform spoke to some issues of unique Latino concern, such as advocating self-determination for Puerto Rico, but tended to speak to broader concerns. Among these, the most important were expanded access to education, job training, and targeted tax cuts. The President linked the various reforms (some called it a laundry list) as part of the metaphor of building a bridge to the twenty-first century.

Despite the Dick Morris scandal that erupted during the convention, the Democrats presented their most unified convention of the recent past. Latino delegates and Latino speakers were very much a part of this activity. Moreover, issues of importance to Latinos—domestic policy issues designed to improve the lives of working Americans—were at the center of the convention’s policy discussions. While many of the Latino delegates opposed the president on welfare reform, this issue did not divide the convention as abortion and culture wars did with the Republicans. Thus, the Democratic convention laid a foundation for Latino outreach that the Republican convention had not. Holding all other factors constant, then, the Adelante con Clinton-Gore! campaign began the general election campaign with a greater advantage than the Hispanic Americans for Dole campaign. The Democratic convention offered a positive message and a series of issues around which Latinos seeking to support the Clinton-Gore ticket could mobilize; party activists had also been rewarded for their participation. The Dole campaign, on the other hand, had to make up for the failings of its convention. As we will indicate, they never had either the resources or the inclination to make this added effort.

In previous campaigns, the period between the primaries and the general

...[I]ssues of importance to Latinos—domestic policy issues designed to improve the lives of working Americans—were at the center of the [Democratic] convention’s policy discussions.

election saw candidates reaching out to Latino electorates (de la Garza and DeSipio 1992; 1996a). This pattern did not appear in 1996. At the organizational level, the Clinton campaign used this time to prepare its general election Latino campaign. The president and vice president, on the other hand, were not actively campaigning before Latino audiences. The Dole campaign continued to pay the price for
its primary campaign spending; it had mortgaged its future to win the early primaries. At the organizational level, Latino Dole strategists planned a Latino campaign, but had no promise of receiving any funds from the campaign and had no connections to senior campaign staff. Dole himself made no effort in this transition period at Latino outreach.

The General Election

Depending on the focus of the analysis, the fall campaign represented either a great success for Latinos (the best of times) or a great failure (the worst of times). At one level, Latinos saw one of the most comprehensive and expensive campaigns to win their votes. In addition to designing this targeted Latino campaign, the Clinton campaign also relied on Latino campaign professionals. At another level, however, the issue focus of the campaign differed from those concerning the majority of Latinos. Although issues of concern to Latinos entered the debate, the result was often contrary to the preferences of the majority of Latinos. Furthermore, the money spent and the organizational resources invested went to media, not to new voter mobilization and get-out-the-vote campaigns. Thus, the Democrat’s Latino outreach does not seem to have resulted in an increase in Latino turnout. In sum, the Latino influence was muted in the 1996 national elections.

The infusion of federal funds to the Dole campaign did not reverse its fortunes. On the contrary, it began the general election at a disadvantage and never recovered. It faced the problems that Democratic candidates had during the 1980s. It needed to spend what money it had to gain the votes of core Republican voters and could not afford to win over traditional Democratic votes. As a result, Cuban Americans were a target for the campaign, but other Latinos fell by the wayside. Further, Dole undermined any hopes that he had among Latinos through his positions on immigrant rights and affirmative action.

Although the formal structure of the ethnic outreach effort remained, interviews with key campaign staff indicate that “Hispanic Americans for Dole” was marginalized within the campaign. It had little money and no influence. Patiño-Lippe remained a volunteer through much of the fall campaign. Hispanic Americans for Dole was able to distribute some election materials in Spanish, but these were simply translations prepared by Patiño-Lippe of English materials. Evidently, the Dole campaign saw no contradiction between its advocacy of English-only legislation and the use of Spanish materials to influence U.S. elections. The Dole campaign, unlike previous Republican campaigns, did not run Spanish-language advertisements. The campaign prepared advertisements, but never budgeted money for their broadcast. The state-level Hispanic Americans for Dole remained in place, but they lacked autonomy and had to work through the state governor’s offices (in states with Republican governors). The Hispanic campaign had no contact with Dole or Kemp. Only at the end of the campaign did the campaign’s schedulers respond to suggestions that Dole and Kemp speak to Latino audiences. Although there were some Hispanics in other parts of the campaign, including the campaign’s advertising director beginning in September, they had no
ties to the Hispanic Americans for Dole organization within the campaign. In sum, according to Dole campaign insiders, there was little effort to reach out to the grass roots, except in the Cuban American community.

The issues articulated by Dole did not help his efforts. In addition to support for Proposition 209, neither Dole nor Kemp was able to overcome the anti-immigrant message of the Republican primaries. The impact of these positions became evident to Republican leaders well before the election. Polling among Cuban Americans, who are among the most loyal Republicans, showed a defection by as many as 40 percent. Although Dole did actively campaign in Miami and spoke of undermining Fidel Castro, he did not establish much of a connection to Cuban Americans.

At a formal level, the Clinton campaign did more to earn Latino votes than had any previous campaign, with the possible exception of John Kennedy’s in 1960 (Garfía and de la Garza 1977). Some of the positions taken by Clinton conflicted with positions held by the majority of Latinos. By election’s end, Clinton was the favorite of the majority of Latinos. Yet, as we will show, the campaign was apparently unable to excite many new voters.

Adelante con Clinton-Gore! directed a national campaign to reach Latino voters. Its budget of approximately $2.5 million just for advertising far exceeds any presidential campaign’s spending on Latinos. It is also telling of the failure to mobilize new voters. As a senior staffperson characterized it, they were running an “air war, not a ground war.” The ground war was coordinated as part of the state-level coordinated campaigns, but here there was no distinct Latino effort. Arguably, the patterns of non-voting in Latino communities are such that they would have benefited more from targeted mobilization and get-out-the-vote than from targeted advertising. Campaign staff reported that the coordinated campaigns were successful at working with the Adelante state committees in the Southwest, but less so outside of the Southwest.

The Adelante staff had greater access to other campaign resources than did their Dole equivalents. Although they were never able to conduct a huge Latino rally, several campaign events reached predominantly Latino audiences—San Antonio and El Paso rallies with Bill Clinton and a Brownsville rally with Hillary Rodham Clinton. The Adelante campaign did not work in either California or Florida where it was perceived that state parties were adequately reaching out to Latinos.

Clearly, the Adelante campaign was much better integrated into the overall Clinton campaign structure than was Hispanic Americans for Bob Dole on the Republican side. In part, the large number of Latino staff may explain this reinforcing relationship. One estimate was that between 30 and 40 of the 400 campaign staff were Latino, including 7 state directors and the political director in one state.

The Clinton administration undercut some of the support that Clinton might have received from Latinos. While many of the issues on which Clinton built his
campaign received wide support from Latinos, two caused much controversy: the welfare reform bill and the immigration reform bill. Together, these reduced the government’s commitment to safety net programs, particularly to permanent resident immigrants. Clinton was widely condemned by Latino leaders for his support of these bills. Clinton’s advocacy of added education funding, greater tax fairness, training assistance for adults, and international security broadly match positions held by Latinos.

Clinton’s support for the immigration and welfare bills was a key issue raised by marchers at an October March on Washington that drew 25,000 Latinos from throughout the country (Constable 1996). While it would be hard to imagine a situation in which a candidate and any electorate would be in complete agreement, Clinton’s ability to advocate positions so opposed by the majority of Latinos and still receive so many of their votes indicates how marginal Latinos were to the plan of the Clinton campaign.

Between Labor Day and Election Day, Clinton never lost his lead in the national polls. During the campaign’s last weeks, pundits observed that Dole had given up on his own campaign and was seeking instead to assure that Republicans seeking other offices were not dragged down with his defeat. On election day, Clinton took 49 percent of the vote; Dole took 41 percent, and Ross Perot took 8 percent. In the Electoral College, Clinton earned an even more sizable victory—379 to 159.

Clinton’s victory among Latino voters was even more decisive, as table one shows. Exceeding the vote for a Democrat since Jimmy Carter in 1976, Clinton took 72 percent of Latino votes. In three states, his share of the Latino vote exceeded 80 percent. Most surprisingly, he fought to a near draw with Dole in Florida.

Table One. Latino Presidential Vote in Key States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Clinton</th>
<th>Dole</th>
<th>Perot</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Dole</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Dole</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Voter Research and Survey exit poll data did not collect a sufficient sample to report on Latino voting in Illinois. Less than one percent of its Illinois sample was Latino. Assuming the previous Latino voting patterns continue, Latinos make up approximately 3 percent of Illinois’s vote.*
The Impact of Latino Votes

At this writing, we do not have the final estimates of total number of Latino votes. The only national source of data on Latino registration and voting (and that of other racial and ethnic groups) that also offers state-level analysis and the ability to compare turnouts across elections years is the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey for November of each election year. Until 1992, the Census Bureau had released these data in March following the presidential election. For the 1996 elections, however, the Census Bureau has delayed the release of these data until at least September. In the absence of these data, we have developed a surrogate quantitative measure that indicates that public claims about a substantial growth in the number of Latino voters do not appear to be substantiated. Our best estimates indicate that the Latino vote stagnated, or perhaps, even declined in 1996 from the 4.2 million Latino votes in 1992.

If our surrogate measure proves to be accurate after the release of the Census Bureau’s more comprehensive numbers, it would be surprising and, ultimately, disappointing for three reasons. First, the Latino population has been growing more rapidly than the population as a whole. While much of this growth is made up of people who cannot vote, such as children and immigrants, the voting-eligible and voter populations have also been growing at faster than average rates since at least 1980 (DeSipio 1996a). A second reason that pundits expected Latino voting to increase in 1996 was a surge in naturalization among Latinos and other immigrants. Between 1994 and 1996, more than two million immigrants naturalized. Estimates suggest that at least 750,000 of these new citizens were Latino (DeSipio 1996b). Latino community leaders promised to dedicate extensive resources to making voters of these new citizens. Finally, the 1994 elections offered a promise. Mobilized by the anti-immigrant and anti-Latino message of Proposition 187, California Latinos turned out at unprecedented levels in 1994 (voting at levels above the 1992 presidential race). Although their votes were lost in an equally high turnout among Anglo voters who supported the Proposition, the lesson was not lost on Latino leaders—Latino voters can be mobilized around concern for the rights of immigrants (Tomás Rivera Center 1996). With immigration being discussed as part of the national campaign, many hoped that Latinos nationwide in 1996 would follow the model of California Latinos in 1994.

The 1996 Latino Vote

Candidate outreach and Latino mobilization efforts face several structural obstacles, some of which are intrinsic to the Latino community and others of which are more generally felt (DeSipio 1996a). The first of these barriers are sociodemographic: Latinos are more likely to have characteristics that predict...
non-voting. Chief among these is non-citizenship. Nationally, approximately 4 in 10 Latino adults is not a citizen. In Florida and California, more than one in two Latino adults are not citizens. In addition, and regardless of ethnicity or race, three characteristics reduce the likelihood of voting: youth, low levels of formal education, and low income. On average, the Latino community is disadvantaged in each of these sociodemographic characteristics. As a result, any mobilization or get-out-the-vote effort in a Latino community is more likely to encounter people who cannot or will not vote (Tomás Rivera Center 1996). In addition to these sociodemographic obstacles, Latinos face another impediment to higher levels of participation. Since the extension of the Voting Rights Act to Latinos in 1975, Latinos have increasingly been concentrated in districts with safe Latino incumbents (de la Garza and DeSipio 1993; DeSipio 1996c). As a result, there is little competition for local offices in areas with high concentrations of Latino voters. Thus, there is little community-level mobilization that could help overcome the demographic limitations on Latino voting (de la Garza, Menchaca, and DeSipio 1994). Instead, however, it is important to recognize that discussion of Latino voting and turnout must account for lower than average rates of participation. Thus, in the discussion that follows, we look at change in the Latino vote relative to previous elections as well as the Latino vote relative to changes in the electorate as a whole.

The Census Bureau report on Latino voting and registration in the 1996 elections is eagerly awaited by Latino leaders and outside observers. Because of the demographic limitations we have outlined, the electoral power of the Latino community has always lagged behind its raw size. In each of the recent elections,

**The Clinton administration undercut some of the support that Clinton might have received from Latinos.**

Latino leaders hope or expect that Latinos will be overcome and that the Latino vote will have a greater than expected impact. The turnout figures prove important because, in addition to electing people who will ideally be more responsive to Latino community needs, they allow leaders to make claims on those who are elected. Simply, the claim is that the elected official owes his or her election (and, by extension, the next reelection) to the support of that electorate, so it is wise for the official to be responsive to the needs of that electorate. These claims began to be made within days of the 1996 election, but, as we will indicate, these claims are often inflated.

Expectations grew in 1996. Beginning with the passage of Proposition 187, Latino leaders committed themselves to new levels of voter registration and voter mobilization. In October 1995, a coalition of Latino organizations committed to registering one million new voters prior to the 1996 elections (Torres 1995). Leaders of Latino Vote USA reported that they had registered one million previously unregistered Latinos by October 1996. Registration, though, is simply the first step. The registered must go to the polls. Traditionally, this has been a greater problem in the Latino community than among other populations. Just two-thirds
of registered Latinos go the polls compared to approximately 80 percent among Anglos and African Americans (DeSipio 1996a).

As we indicate in table two, the available evidence demonstrates that the Latino vote did not grow substantially and may have declined. This review of Latino-majority congressional districts shows that in areas of Latino concentration, the vote at the congressional level seems to have declined in 15 of 17 districts in which there was competition in both 1992 and 1996 presidential elections.

This review of Latino-majority congressional districts shows that in areas of Latino concentration, the vote at the congressional level seems to have declined in 15 of 17 districts in which there was competition in both 1992 and 1996 presidential elections. The average decline in voter turnout was 9.1 percent. By comparison, voting in the electorate as a whole declined by 7.8 percent between these two elections. Non-Latinos make up sizable shares of each of these districts and the declines in voter turnout could reflect changes in these populations. Nonetheless, the consistent patterns—decline in all but two of the districts relative to 1992—indicate that any claim of a substantial growth in the Latino electorate in these states is unfounded.

State-level analyses in several states with large Latino populations reinforce these findings. Precinct-level analysis in Arizona, for example, finds that turnout in high-concentration Latino precincts statewide declined by 9 percent between 1992 and 1996. In Maricopa County (Phoenix), the decline in high-concentration Latino precincts was 15 percent (Avalos 1997). In Texas, turnout in high-concentration Latino counties declined by 14 percent between 1992 and 1996 (Montoya 1997). An analyst in New York developed preliminary estimates indicating an increase in Latino turnout, but this increase is small—2 percent (Falcón 1997). While these are the most sophisticated efforts available to develop state-level estimates in anticipation of the release of the Census Bureau data, they suffer from the same weakness as our estimate: the changes could reflect changes in non-Latino voting in areas of high Latino concentration. Even with this caveat in mind, however, they reinforce the findings of our estimate based on Congressional districts and indicate that there is no foundation for claims of a significant increase in Latino turnout in the 1996 elections.

What does this mean in real terms? In 1992, 4.2 million Latinos voted, making up 3.7 percent of the national electorate. Had the Latino vote increased simply at the rate that they had increased between 1980 and 1992, the 1996 Latino vote would grow to approximately 5 million and make up 5.2 percent of the national electorate. If, on the other hand, Latino voting stagnated in 1996 and again equaled 4.2 million, it would still make up a larger share of the national electorate (4.4 percent) than it did in 1992. This increased share of the national electorate would result from the decline in non-Latino voters who went to the
polls in 1996. Finally, if the Latino vote declined at the rate of the electorate as a whole (7.1 percent), it would number about 3.9 million. While the difference in these shares of the electorate may seem small, they can make a great difference in close state elections.

Until the Census Bureau releases its final voting calculations, it is not possible to say conclusively how many Latinos voted. It is evident from our surrogate measure that if there was an increase, it was not at previous rates. If this is

Table Two. Change in Turnout in Congressional Races in Districts with Fifty Percent or Greater Latino Population, 1992 and 1996 Presidential Elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AZ 2</td>
<td>(50.5%)</td>
<td>137,373</td>
<td>120,629</td>
<td>-16,744</td>
<td>Pastor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 20</td>
<td>(55.4%)</td>
<td>112,067</td>
<td>84,136</td>
<td>-27,931</td>
<td>Dooley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 26</td>
<td>(52.7%)</td>
<td>120,908</td>
<td>93,934</td>
<td>-26,974</td>
<td>Berman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 30</td>
<td>(61.5%)</td>
<td>83,543</td>
<td>72,422</td>
<td>-11,121</td>
<td>Becerra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 31</td>
<td>(58.5%)</td>
<td>109,197</td>
<td>93,846</td>
<td>-15,351</td>
<td>Martínez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 33</td>
<td>(83.7%)</td>
<td>50,779</td>
<td>53,126</td>
<td>+2,347</td>
<td>Roybal-Allard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 34</td>
<td>(62.3%)</td>
<td>149,717</td>
<td>127,854</td>
<td>-21,863</td>
<td>Torres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA 46</td>
<td>(50.0%)</td>
<td>110,806</td>
<td>101,186</td>
<td>-9,620</td>
<td>Dorman/Sánchez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL 18</td>
<td>(66.7%)</td>
<td>156,897</td>
<td>unopposed</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Ros-Lehtinen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL 21</td>
<td>(69.6%)</td>
<td>149,717</td>
<td>unopposed</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Díaz-Balart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL 4</td>
<td>(65.0%)</td>
<td>116,606</td>
<td>86,900</td>
<td>-29,706</td>
<td>Gutiérrez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY 12</td>
<td>(57.9%)</td>
<td>73,067</td>
<td>65,318</td>
<td>-7,749</td>
<td>Velázquez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY 16</td>
<td>(60.2%)</td>
<td>93,197</td>
<td>92,596</td>
<td>-601</td>
<td>Serrano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX 15</td>
<td>(74.5%)</td>
<td>142,900</td>
<td>137,450</td>
<td>-5,450</td>
<td>de la Garza/Hinojosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX 16</td>
<td>(70.4%)</td>
<td>128,601</td>
<td>127,784</td>
<td>-817</td>
<td>Coleman/Reyes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX 20</td>
<td>(60.7%)</td>
<td>138,409</td>
<td>unopposed</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>González</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX 23</td>
<td>(62.5%)</td>
<td>166,347</td>
<td>163,800</td>
<td>-2,547</td>
<td>Bonilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX 27</td>
<td>(66.2%)</td>
<td>156,844</td>
<td>150,202</td>
<td>-6,642</td>
<td>Ortiz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX 28</td>
<td>(60.4%)</td>
<td>140,585</td>
<td>146,121</td>
<td>+5,536</td>
<td>Tejeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX 29</td>
<td>(60.9%)</td>
<td>98,673</td>
<td>91,751</td>
<td>-6,922</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage change in turnout 1992-96: -9.1%

Notes: Texas’s 29th district was redistricted prior to the 1996 election and has different constituents than it did in the 1992 and 1994 elections. It remains a Latino concentration district.

Defeated incumbent Bob Dorman is contesting the results in California’s 46th district.

After the election, Texas Representative Frank Tejeda died. His replacement is Latino. Also, after the election, New Mexico Representative Bill Richardson (a Latino) resigned to become U.S. Ambassador to the United National Nations. His replacement is a non-Latino.

the case, and the number of Latino voters is closer to 1992's 4.2 million than the predicted 5.0 million for 1996, then the path to Latino electoral empowerment will be further slowed.

**Latinos and Other National Offices**

The 1996 elections offered Latinos opportunities to influence national politics beyond simply the presidential election. Latinos competed for 33 Senate or Congressional seats, held on to the 17 Congressional seats that they held prior to the election, and added two new Congressional seats. These new victories came in Latino-majority Congressional districts. Latinos also sought national office from non-Latino-majority districts. The two most notable of these races resulted in Latino defeats for two Senate seats. At the congressional level, 39 Latinos competed for 31 seats (including minor party competitors). In six seats, Latinos competed against incumbent Latinos, and two Latinos competed for an open seat in a majority Latino district.

Latinos received the Democratic nominations for U.S. Senate in Texas and New Mexico. New Mexico's nomination of Art Trujillo was not unusual. New Mexico has long nominated and elected Latinos to statewide and national office. The election of Latinos has become less common with the growth of New Mexico's Anglo population and the ascendency of the state's Republican party. Trujillo could not overcome the disadvantages of competing as a Democrat against popular Republican incumbent Pete Domenici; Trujillo took just 30 percent of the vote.

Texas's nomination of school teacher Victor Morales proved more unusual on several dimensions. Major parties in Texas have never nominated Latinos for Senate or Governor, although over the past ten years, Latinos have been nominated and won lesser statewide offices. Morales was unusual for reasons other than his ethnicity. He was a political neophyte who beat two establishment Democrats in the primary. He also ran a non-traditional campaign based largely on small contributions, minimal media, volunteers, and a driving around the state in his pickup truck.

The novelty of the Morales campaign, in the end, was not enough to overcome Texas's Republican majority and the strength and financial resources of Morales' opponent, Phil Gramm. Morales never raised enough money to run a true statewide campaign. Further, he never convinced national Democratic contributors or the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee that he was viable. In a state with so many media markets, the personal visits favored by Morales proved to be a losing strategy. Finally, Morales never articulated a clear agenda and seemed to many to lack sufficient skills to serve as Senator. Inexplicably, he sacrificed an opportunity to debate Gramm. As the underdog, a debate would have likely benefited Morales. In the end, he took a respectable 44 percent of the vote but was never a contender. This 44 percent represented a better showing for the Democrats than in either of the previous Gramm Senate races in which Anglo Democrats took 37 percent and 41 percent of the vote.
Many expected that Morales’s position on the ballot would help the Democrats. A Tomás Rivera Policy Institute survey revealed that 42 percent of Texas Latinos reported that they were more interested in politics because of Morales’ candidacy. This impact was particularly strong among those who felt that they had some or a lot of influence in politics (Tomás Rivera Policy Institute 1996). Whatever the immediate impact of Morales, he showed the Texas Democratic party the value of nominating a moderate Mexican American for statewide office. Considering his many liabilities, Morales did well and, had he been a stronger candidate, could have been more competitive.

The number of Latino members of Congress increased by two. In addition to this increase, one Latino retired and his seat was won by another Latino. Each of these changes took place in districts with Latino populations of fifty percent or more. With these victories, just two majority Latino congressional seats continue to be held by non-Latinos. Thus, future victories will have to take place in non-Latino districts.

The two new Latino districts, California’s 46th and Texas’s 16th, had Latino majorities and were drawn under the provisions of the Voting Rights Act that mandate the drawing of majority-minority districts. Both had long-term Anglo incumbents who slowed the process of Latino victory. In the Texas district, the incumbent, Ron Coleman, retired after facing repeated strong Republican competition in this overwhelmingly Democratic district. Coleman was replaced by Silvestre Reyes, the former district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Reyes has risen to prominence by implementing Operation Hold the Line, a reallocation of INS staff to prevent undocumented immigrants from crossing the border (a reversal of the previous strategy which was to capture undocumented immigrants once they were in the United States). Reyes won with 71 percent over a Latino Republican.

Unlike the Texas race, California’s 46th district generated national attention and was, perhaps, the Democrats’ greatest upset nationally. Newcomer Loretta Sánchez beat long-term incumbent and bellicose conservative gaudly, Bob Dornan. Although this district is evenly divided between Latinos and non-Latinos, it was an unlikely place for a Latino victory for several reasons. Many of the Latinos were non-citizens or otherwise ineligible to vote. In previous elections, the Latino share of the electorate numbered no more than 20 percent. A second was ideology. Dornan’s conservative ideology seemed to match Orange County’s conservatism. With these barriers, Sánchez was a well-suited candidate. She was a former Republican, a native of the district, and a woman in a year when the gender gap disadvantaged Republicans, particularly Republicans with Dornan’s combative history. Further, Dornan had weakened himself with his unsuccessful run for the presidency which did not go far and cost a great deal, which he paid for in part.

...[F]uture [Congressional] victories will have to take place in non-Latino districts.
from his congressional reelection fund.

On election night, Dornan seemed to have won the race by approximately 250 votes. Absentee ballots, however, gave the victory to Sánchez by approximately 900 votes. Dornan cried fraud claiming that Sánchez’s narrow victory was the result of non-citizen voting. Subsequent investigation found that some non-citizens did vote, but there is no evidence to suggest as Dornan has claimed that this fraudulent voting was orchestrated by the Sánchez campaign.

This victory was unexpected at this point in time. It came in a Latino-majority district, but not one that had been targeted by Latino leaders. Sánchez will prove an interesting addition to the Latino caucus in Congress. She represents a suburban district with a large share of middle and upper-income constituents. Equally important, she owes her rise not so much to Latino activism, but to women, particularly Anglo women, including Anglo Republican women who voted for Sánchez at much higher rates than did Republican men. Her days as a Republican may continue to influence some of her policy positions. In sum, she will add to the already evident difficulty in presenting a unified Latino position in Congress and she will need to maintain the support not just of Latinos and naturalized voters, but also of moderate Republican women who saw Sánchez as a preferable alternative to Dornan.

The final new Latino member of Congress is Rubén Hinojosa who replaced retiring incumbent Kika de la Garza. None of the sitting Latino members of Congress faced serious opposition and two were unopposed. Six of the 16 incumbents seeking reelection faced Latinos in the general election. Eleven Latinos challenged sitting members in minority-Latino districts. None of these challengers was competitive. Exit polling found that in 1996 Latinos nationwide voted overwhelmingly Democratic in congressional races—73 percent to 27 percent. This represents a significant increase over 1994 when Latinos favored the Democrats by a 61 percent to 39 percent margin (New York Times, [November 7, 1996]: B3).

Latinos and the New Administration

A final measure of Latino impact relates to the claims that Latinos can make on the presidential administration based on their contributions in the election. The evidence from the transition period indicates that Latinos were not in a strong position. At best, Latinos were an afterthought in the appointment of the cabinet. At a formal level, Latinos ended up with the same number of seats at the table as they had had before the election. Yet, the style of these appointments, and the positions held, suggest a decline in status.

During Clinton’s first term, Latinos served as Secretaries of Housing and Urban Development (Henry Cisneros) and Transportation (Federico Peña), and Cisneros was part of Clinton’s inner circle. Cisneros and Peña were named as part of a ceremony that united the cabinet designees publicly for the first time. Their appointment, along with that of four African Americans, created a cabinet that was more racially and ethnically diverse than any previous cabinet.
In Clinton’s second term, Peña was nominated to return as Secretary of Energy, and New Mexico Representative Bill Richardson received the nod as ambassador to the United Nations (which is being treated as cabinet level). Cisneros resigned to return to the private sector. The appointments of Peña and Richardson came late in the process and, particularly in the case of Peña, had the appearance of responding to pressure from Latino leaders to appoint a Latino—any Latino—to a second position (Holmes 1996). A few days prior to Peña’s nomination, several Latino names were raised including California Representative Esteban Torres and Department of Labor official Maria Echaveste. In the end, Peña was asked to return to the cabinet in a position that he had no obvious training for as part of an effort to maintain ethnic diversity in the cabinet. Reportedly, Peña had already placed his Washington home for sale.

The final measure of the impact of Latino votes can only be evaluated in full after the appointment of the hundreds of sub-cabinet and administration positions. The Clinton administration certainly has a talented pool of Latino former campaign workers to tap. Yet, if the experience of cabinet appointments proves any lesson, Latinos will not do as well or achieve positions as easily as they did in 1992.

Conclusions

The 1996 elections presented Latinos with both new opportunities and new disappointments. As we indicated at the beginning of our essay, it was the best of times and the worst of times.

On the positive side, Latino voters voted overwhelmingly for the winning candidate. Some of the races in these states were close so, once the final voting estimates are released, we will undoubtedly be able to show that Latinos were instrumental to the award of some Electoral College votes, particularly in New Mexico, but also possibly in Florida and Arizona. Only in Florida, however, were these Latino votes shaped by either new Latino voters or Latino voters who changed their usual levels of partisanship. For the first time in the recent past, the “Latino” vote included a significant share of Cuban Americans joining Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in support of the Democratic presidential candidate.

Equally important, at an organizational level, the “Latino campaign” reached a new level of sophistication, integration, and cost. The Adelante con Clinton-Gore! campaign was sophisticated in that it was planned well in advance of the general election, had operations in twenty states, and functioned throughout the campaign. It began and continued to be a central part of the overall Clinton-Gore reelection strategy. It was planned by Hispanic insiders in the administration and could make claims both on administration and campaign resources. Finally, its integration was evident in the fact that state Clinton campaigns sought to include
Hispanic outreach among their activities. Its budget is undoubtedly a record. The Adelante campaign followed the model from 1992, however, in that the message that it disseminated was not a targeted ethnic message. While an overwhelming success from an organizational perspective, it is hard to construct a scenario where a future Democratic campaign will have the resources and incentive to develop a comparable effort.

Finally, in terms of visibility, issues of importance to Latinos entered the national debate. Although these more often resulted in defeats than victories, it is important that issues such as the rights of immigrants and the resources that are available to immigrants to become part of American society are discussed. The March on Washington highlighted that these immigrant-focused issues are now more central to many in the Latino community than are the tradition civil rights issues that have shaped much of Latino politics over the past two decades.

Latino community disappointments in this election include both results and process. In terms of results, the election brought not just President Clinton into office, but also a Republican Congress. The majority of Latinos voted against the

While an overwhelming success from an organizational perspective, it is hard to construct a scenario where a future Democratic campaign will have the resources and incentive to develop a comparable effort.

Republicans in congressional races. In addition, the election saw the passage of California’s Proposition 209 which the majority of California Latinos also opposed. The California-led effort to eliminate affirmative action is now spreading to other states and Congress. If 209 is the harbinger, then Latinos lost greatly in this election, just as they did when California passed Proposition 187 two years before. Proposition 187 started a similar process that led to the enactment of the Welfare Reform Bill and the Immigration Reform Bill. Thus, contrary to our own expectations, visibility is not necessarily a good thing for Latinos. The neglect of Latino issues in previous elections may have protected the interests of the Latino community.

Latino victories continued to be concentrated in majority Latino districts. Although two more majority Latino districts with Anglo incumbents remain at the congressional level, for Latinos to continue to expand their control of elective offices, they have to begin to win in non-majority Latino districts. Here, they face a partisan limitation. In most of the states with large Latino populations, the Republicans dominate. Thus, we are likely to see Democrats, such as Morales or Trujillo, winning Democratic nominations, but losing in the general election to better funded Republicans. They also face a constitutional limitation. The Supreme Court has indicated that it is reconsidering the constitutionality of majority-minority districting procedures.

The final concern for Latinos is more one of process. The Adelante! cam-
campaign, despite its many impressive characteristics, reflects the direction that campaignng is going in the modern age. It was an “air war.” This strategy can be effective when targeted to regular voters. It is not, however, a way to bring non-participants into the process. With a higher than average share of regular non-voters Latinos pay a price for modern high-technology campaigns. Latino leaders promised to complement national campaign strategies with community-level get-out-the-vote efforts. The low levels of Latino voting that we document indicate that these efforts failed or were incompletely implemented. It is in this area that the Latino community faces its biggest challenge over the coming years. If the Latino vote is to count, campaigns, candidates, elites and organizations must find strategies to mobilize new voters. The surge in naturalization offers a pool of potential voters that, if brought into the active electorate, can add significantly to the number of Latino votes. As it stands now, however, among citizen adults, more do not vote than vote. While this pattern was also true among non-Latinos in 1996, Latino citizens are less likely to vote than Anglos or African Americans.

The legacy of the 1996 national elections will be shaped by the policies of the second Clinton administration. The promised bridge to the twenty-first century can either include or exclude Latinos. The initial evidence, particularly the cabinet appointments, presage that Latinos will not play a central role. The impact of Latino votes was not sufficiently great to make demands on the administration based solely on the number of their votes.

Endnotes

1 In this article, we use the terms Latino and Hispanic interchangeably to refer to residents of the United States who can trace their ancestry to origins to the Spanish-speaking regions of Latin America and the Caribbean.

2 The number of marchers is in dispute. March organizers sought to bring hundreds of thousands to Washington. Their failure may indicate that these issues were less salient at the mass level than at the elite level.

3 We make no observations on Perot’s Latino campaign as there does not seem to have been one.

4 After the election, New Mexico Congressman Bill Richardson resigned to serve as U.S. ambassador the United Nations. In the special election called to fill the vacancy, an Anglo Republican defeated a Latino Democrat.

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Latino Electoral and Non-electoral Political Participation: Findings from the 1996 Chicago Latino Registered Voter Survey

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Introduction

The Latino population in the United States has been expanding at a tremendous rate over the last two decades, so much so that it is predicted that Latinos will become the largest ethnic minority group shortly after the turn of the century. In 1990, one out of every ten persons counted in the US census was Latino, and the Bureau of the Census projects that by the year 2050 one of every five US residents may be Latino (US Bureau of the Census 1993:2). As the number of Latinos in the United States grows, so does their potential for influencing American politics. Yet, we have a very limited understanding of Latino civic engagement and political behavior.

Few Americans, whether Latino or not, are politically active at high levels or in sustained fashion. Voting turnout has thus become a very common manner in which to measure political participation, since many individuals participate in this perennial political activity. When citizens vote they exhibit at least a minimum level of political activity, even if only once every four years.

While voting is an important measure of political participation, it does not capture other forms of civic engagement, such as participation in political organizations or other private voluntary associations (e.g., charities, community groups, religious organizations). A multi-dimensional conceptualization of political participation incorporates a broad spectrum of citizen mobilization like voting, campaigning, participation in community activities, involvement in collective action to solve a problem, public discourse, and many other forms of non-electoral political activity. Furthermore, some analysts have argued elsewhere that taking part in private voluntary associations is strongly associated with voting and other political activity (Verba & Nie 1972, Putnam 1994, Diaz 1996). Thus, a view that incorporates both electoral and non-electoral political behaviors provides a more
accurate picture of civic engagement and political participation.

In this study, we attempt to gain a multidimensional understanding of Latino political participation by looking at different measures of participation, including an index of political participation. Our hope is to contribute more understanding to the little studied phenomenon of Latino political participation.

**Literature Review: Latino Political Participation**

**Electoral Participation:**

Political surveys have historically ignored, undercounted, or oversimplified Latino political behavior. Arvizu and Garcia have pointed out that "...the omission of ethnicity by most major voting studies and data sets has created an incomplete and inaccurate depiction of the American voting public" (1996: 110).

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**As the number of Latinos in the United States grows, so does their potential for influencing American politics.**

It has only been in the last two decades that researchers have begun to give serious attention to Latino political participation. Most of the research thus far, however, is limited to comparisons of Latino and Anglo voting rates. While this is an important vein of research, scholars must be prepared to accept that such comparison may be akin to comparing apples and oranges, since the Latino population may exhibit important differences from the Anglo population that affect levels of political behavior.

Perhaps the first attempt to understand Latino voting behavior can be found in Wolfinger and Rosenstone's, *Who Votes* (1980). Their findings indicate that while Chicanos were three percent more likely to vote than the general population, when controlling for socioeconomic status, their potential political power was compromised by high levels of noncitizenship and low naturalization rates. Similarly, Calvo and Rosenstone (1989) note the diluted voter potential among Latinos due to lack of citizenship. Interestingly, Garcia and Arce (1988) found higher voter turn out rates among naturalized and first generation, American-born Chicanos in contrast to second generation and beyond Chicoano citizens.

Nearly a decade later, Calvo and Rosenstone (1989) reported Latino voter turn-out to be 51.8 percent, 15 percentage points lower than that of the US population in general, contradicting Wolfinger and Rosenstone's earlier findings. However, Calvo and Rosenstone found considerable ethnic group differences among Latinos. For example, Cuban turnout rates exceed that of non-Latino voters and Puerto Ricans are least likely to vote among Latinos. Similarly, de La Garza and others (1992) found Latino participation to lag substantially behind that of non-Latinos.

More recently, Diaz (1996) indicates that Latino voter registration rates were
approximately 20 percent lower than those of non-Latinos, in the 1990, 1992, and 1994 election years. Diaz also found ethnic variation in voter registration rates when analyzing data from the Latino National Political Survey. For example, he found that approximately 66 percent of Mexican Americans, 65 percent of Puerto Ricans, and 83 percent of Cuban Americans were registered to vote. Furthermore, he found that approximately 78 percent of Mexican Americans, 74 percent of Puerto Ricans, and 88 percent of Cuban Americans had ever registered to vote. The lower registration rates, when paired with lower voter turnout rates produced a substantial difference between the proportion of Latino and non-Latino voters in the 1994 election, in which approximately one third of Latino citizens voted, in contrast with one-half of non-Latinos. We can see, then, that part of the Latino population is distinct from the Anglo population in that some Latinos — non-citizens — must surmount barriers to participation that Anglos do not confront. Latinos of voting age, who are not citizens, must become engaged in the process of becoming citizens before they can register to vote. This additional hurdle is likely to significantly attenuate overall Latino voting rates.

Previous studies of the general electorate have indicated that participation in electoral politics is positively associated with increases in socioeconomic status (Verba and Nie 1972). There is some evidence of a similar pattern among

Their findings indicate that while Chicanos were three percent more likely to vote than the general population, when controlling for socioeconomic status, their potential political power was compromised by high levels of noncitizenship and low naturalization rates.

Latinos. Higher levels of educational attainment and occupational status were found to increase Mexican and Puerto Rican voter turnout, while having virtually no effect on Cuban voting (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989). Calvo and Rosenstone (1989) argue that, while education was found to be the best socioeconomic predictor of increased voting for the general US population, its impact on Latinos, while significant, was less pronounced. They found the same pattern regarding income: increases in income were associated with rising turnout rates for both the general and Latino populations, but were more marked for the former. Wrinkle and others (1996) observe that increases in income promoted non-electoral political activity among Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, and Cubans, but found that increases in education had a positive effect on Puerto Rican and Mexican Americans only. Arvizu (1994, 1996) found the interaction between education and age to be important in predicting Latino voter turnout. Older, rather than younger, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans were found to be more likely to vote.

Gender has been identified in previous research to be a significant factor in political participation and opinion formation. Numerous studies have documented lower participation levels in electoral and nonelectoral political activities among
women prior to the 1970s (Andersen 1975; Welch 1977; Conway 1985; Romer 1990). However, the reversal of this trend in the last two decades has been noted by several researchers. Stanley and Niemi (1992) found stronger voter turnout rates among women since the 1970s in federal elections, and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) reported a closing of the gender gap in traditional politics, during the 1970s and 1980s. Gender differences have also been identified in measures of Latino political participation. Welch and Sigelman (1992) uncovered a gender gap among Latinos on measures of political ideology, party identification, and presidential voting.

Nonelectoral Participation:

Hero and Campbell (1996) found that, while Latinos may be less likely to vote than non-Latinos, Latino participation in a number of other nonelectoral forms was not distinct when socioeconomic differences were considered. More specifically, when socioeconomic variation is accounted for, there is not a significant difference between Latino and non-Latino nonvoting political participation, such as attending public meetings, writing to public officials, attending rallies, and contributing money. Significant differences between the two groups were found only in the rates of volunteering for a candidate or party and signing petitions.

Wrinkle and others (1996) found that participation in nonelectoral political activities increases for all Latino groups with higher incomes, similar to patterns observed in voting behavior in the general population. They also found that nonelectoral political participation was boosted by increased levels of education among Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans, while not affecting Cubans. They did not find any significant differences between Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in their patterns of nonelectoral political activity. Yet, they did find that Cubans, while having higher voting rates, were less likely to engage in nonelectoral political activities than were Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans. They also found age to be significant in predicting Mexican American and Puerto Rican nonelectoral political participation.

Winkle and others (1996) also identified gender as a significant predictor of nonelectoral political activity among Mexican Americans. They found Chicanas were more likely to write letters, attend public meetings, and engage in other nonelectoral political activities than their male counterparts.

In summary, we can see that numerous factors have been found to affect Latino political participation. Both education and income seem to be positively
related to political participation, with education clearly the stronger predictor. Numerous studies have also found age to influence political activity, with older individuals participating at higher levels than younger individuals. Finally, there have been varied findings concerning the effects of gender on voter participation. Some studies have indicated that while women voted with less frequency than men prior to the 1970s, the gap has been closed in recent decades. Other research has shown that women participate at higher rates than men in nonelectoral political activities.

Methodology and Operationalization

The Survey:

In order to collect data on Latino political participation as well as other predictor variables, we developed a 54 question telephone survey, which was administered during a two-week period in late October 1996, just prior to the national elections. We collected data on demographic characteristics, nonelectoral and electoral political participation, public policy opinions, and candidate choices. The instrument contained both multiple choice and open ended questions. The questionnaire was piloted on a small number of individuals and modified according to the feedback received. The survey instrument was administered by about 40 volunteers in both Spanish and English and required approximately 20 minutes to complete.

The Sample:

The Cook County Board of Elections provided two electronic files for the purpose of drawing a sample. One file contained a complete list of all registered voters in Chicago, with phone numbers when available. The second file contained a list of Latino surnames developed by the US Census Bureau. The total list of registered voters (N=1,374,644) was matched with the Latino surname file, yielding 141,659 estimated Latino registered voters for the city of Chicago. A five percent random sample of voters with phone numbers was drawn from this file to generate a list for conducting the survey. A total of 408 surveys were completed during the two-week period.

The sample represented the following general characteristics. Women comprised 61 percent of all respondents. With regard to national origin, 46.7 percent were of Mexican heritage, 37.7 percent were Puerto Rican, and 15.6 percent were of other Latino heritage. Sample frequencies and means indicated that the typical Latino registered voter was 40 years old, had some college education (30.9 percent), was foreign born (54.2 percent), had immigrated to the US at 18 years of age, was married (54.3 percent), and was overwhelmingly of the Catholic faith (77.1 percent). Furthermore, the average Latino registered voter lived in a four-member household (3.74), in which Spanish is more likely to be spoken than English (43 percent), and was a full-time employee (52.5 percent) with a total annual family income ranging from $20,000 to $29,000.
Measuring Political Participation:

Our goal was to measure political participation broadly. We therefore constructed three questions on political participation. First, we asked the respondents whether or not they had voted in the last election in which they were eligible to vote. Second, we asked if they had ever participated in a political organization. Third, we asked the respondents if they had ever been active in a community or religious organization. These questions allow us to look at political activity involving both electoral and non-electoral forms. For example, some Latinos may be reticent to vote, yet may be very active in a grassroots political organization or in a religious organization that is highly involved in community activities.

It would be logical to assume that some respondents will be active in all three types of activities. For example, we may surmise that an individual who votes is much more likely to belong to a community or political organization than an individual who does not vote. Interestingly enough, however, in our sample there is little covariance among our three measures of participation. Table 1 shows that voting (VOTED), being active in a political organization (POLORG), and being active in a community or religious organization (COMORG) are weakly correlated. These findings suggest that voting captures only a slice of political participation and that other forms of political activity must be taken into account by scholars in order to construct a valid measure of political involvement.

TABLE 1. Correlation between Voted, Active in Political Organization and Active in Community Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VOTED</th>
<th>POLORG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLORG</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMORG</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Keeping the above correlations in mind, we constructed a simple index of political participation. Combining the three variables above, we created an index with four values, from zero to three. If an individual did not vote and did not participate in a political or community organization, s/he would represent the lowest level of participation, receiving a zero. At the other extreme, a respondent who voted, participated in both a political organization and a community organization was coded as a three, representing the highest level of participation. With this index, we measure participation beyond just casting a vote every two or four years, in hopes of capturing political involvement more fully. Additionally, the index yields a variable that depicts political participation in increments rather than simply dichotomously.

Consequently, we use four dependent variables. Three variables measure different forms of participation dichotomously: voting, involvement in a political organization, and involvement in a community or religious organization. Our
fourth variable is an index that attempts to measure political participation more generally and fully by combining the three forms of participation.

Measuring Predictors of Political Participation:

Guided by previous research, we constructed a survey which would generate the variables most commonly cited as probable predictors of political participation. At the same time, we did not want to be constrained completely by previous findings and thus constructed numerous questions simply based on a possible, logical relationship with political participation. We employed the following independent variables:

AGE: Age of the respondent. Several studies have found that young people tend to be less active politically. As an individual gets older, s/he is more likely to become incorporated in the political system, perhaps because s/he has more at stake in the community.

BORNUS: Dichotomous variable depicting whether or not the respondent was born in the United States. This variable tests whether those who are immigrants (not born in the United States) are less likely to be involved in the political system.

EDU: Level of education. Numerous studies have found that increased levels of education correspond with increased levels of political participation, especially voting.

EMPLOYED: Dichotomous variable depicting whether respondent is in the workforce full-time. A full-time worker (whether an employee or self-employed) may have more of an interest in being politically active than someone who is not fully engaged in the workforce.

FEMALE: Dichotomous variable for gender (female or not). Our sample is composed of 60 percent women, which suggests that Latinas may be more likely to register to vote and perhaps participate politically.

HOMEOWN: Dichotomous variable measuring whether respondent is a homeowner. We may expect to find that homeowners are more actively involved in their communities and in the political process, since they have more at stake, at least economically.

INCOME: Total family income. Some studies have found that higher income leads to higher levels of political involvement.

MEX and PR: Dummy variables for Mexican and Puerto Rican ancestry. Some studies have found differences in political activity based on the national origin of Latinos. In Chicago, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans dominate the Latino community numerically. Since most studies have found that Cubans differ in participation from other Latino groups, we did not expect to find a significant difference between Mexi-
canics and Puerto Ricans. Regardless, we created dummy variables to see if differences were present.

**REGISTR**: Length of time respondent has been registered to vote. Since Latinos are a special case in the American political system, because many have to become citizens before they can vote, we hypothesized that the length of time an individual has been registered to vote would help to explain whether that individual is active politically or not. Those who have just recently registered to vote may not be as active as those who have been registered for a longer time.

**SPANISH**: Dichotomous variable for language used in the home. Those who still speak Spanish predominantly in their homes may not be as connected to the US political system as those who speak mostly English, or both languages, and thus be less likely to participate in that system.

**YEARSUS**: Number of years respondent has been in the United States. As with age, those who have been in the US for a longer period of time may have become more incorporated into the political system.

Rather than constructing parsimonious models based on the findings of previous studies, we entered the independent variables above in a pool and used forward stepwise selection, with the likelihood-ratio test criterion for removing variables from the pool, to determine which covariates were significantly related to our three dichotomous measures of participation (See Norusis 1992: 15-19; Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989: 82-91; and Menard 1995: 54-57). We used the same procedure for each dichotomous dependent variable — VOTED, POLORG, and COMORG — in a logistic regression analysis. We introduced some interactive terms for variables that exhibited a high degree of covariance, particularly age and time the respondent has been in the United States, and income and education. However, these interaction terms did not yield any significant results. After the forward, stepwise process was completed, we were left with only those variables that were significant at least at the .05 level of confidence. We then ran a logistic regression model with only the significant variables included, in order to see the effects of these variables with a maximum number of cases. The results with larger Ns were always slightly better in terms of prediction than the initial results, which had all possible predictors included in the regression analysis. For our fourth dependent variable, political participation, we ran a linear, multiple regression analysis, using a step-wise procedure for determining which variables to keep in the model.

**Data Analysis**

Our results are interesting because different types of participation appear to be correlated with different combinations of predictor variables. Table 2 shows that voting is best explained by two variables: how long the respondent had been registered to vote and the age of the respondent. These results seem logical and consistent with some previous findings. However, they do not square with find-
ings which show that education is an important predictor of voting turnout. Some studies, however, point out that education is not as important a factor in Latino voting turnout than in the voting turnout of Anglos (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989). Additionally, other studies have not used a variable that measures how long the respondent has been registered to vote. In our study this factor appears to be paramount in predicting voting turnout. Age has also been found to be important in predicting voting turnout in other studies. Our results show that while age is a significant factor, the length of time a respondent has been registered to vote is clearly the most important element in predicting that respondent’s likelihood of voting.  

Table 2. Logistic Regression Predictors of Voting

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Significance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How long registered to vote</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.91</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correct prediction = 77.6 percent
N = 402

We can surmise that when first registering to vote an individual may still be hesitant to vote or not be completely sure about the voting process, thus minimizing his or her chances of actually voting.  

...[F]our factors best predict political participation in our sample: age, education, gender and how long the respondent has been registered to vote.

ever, the registrant is much more likely to have become enfranchised into and familiar with the political system. And, the older the registrant, the more likely it is that s/he will vote.

Table 3 indicates that gender, level of education, and the number of years the respondent has been in the United States all determine whether an individual will participate in a political organization. It is not surprising that education level and number of years in the United States emerge as significant factors, since other studies have pointed to their influence on political participation. The importance of gender, especially since it appears to be the most salient factor, is surprising, however. It appears that women are less likely than men to participate in political organizations, despite previous findings suggesting that women and men participate at similar levels.
Table 3. Logistic Regression Predictors of Participating in a Political Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in the US</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.76</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Correct prediction = 84.5 percent
N = 401

Table 4 displays that education is the only factor that significantly predicts whether a respondent will become involved in a community or religious organization. Again, education appears as an important influence on political participation, which is consistent with previous studies. We can see from Table 4, however, that education’s influence on this type of community activity is slight. It is interesting to note that no other factor had a significant effect on this type of community involvement. Perhaps an individual’s level of community participation is more the result of personal networks than any other factor except education.

Table 4. Logistic Regression Predictor of Participating in a Community or Religious Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.92</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correct prediction = 61.98 percent
N = 405

Finally, we look at an index variable, political participation, that incorporates our previous measures of participation. Table 5 shows that four factors best predict political participation in our sample: age, education, gender and how long the respondent has been registered to vote. That age and education are positively related to political participation is no surprise, since previous studies have consistently shown similar results. However, again we see that in our sample women tend to exhibit a tendency to be less active politically than men. And, we also see
that the length of time an individual has been registered to vote has the strongest, positive influence on political participation.

Table 5. Linear Regression Predictors of Political Participation

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How long registered to vote</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R = .41
Adjusted R square = .16
N = 406

Conclusions and Implications

Our data tend to corroborate the findings of previous studies in a limited manner. As in other studies, our data support the notion that education is positively related to political participation. Those Latinos with higher levels of education tend to be more active politically than those with lower education levels. Additionally, we find that maturity, or simply time, has a positive effect on participation. Those who are older or have been in the United States longer tend to participate more than those who are younger or have been in the United States only for a short time.

Our study, on the other hand, yields some new and interesting findings. For example, our data suggest that women tend to participate at lower levels than men. We can surmise that women may be less focused on politics because they may be more involved than men in time-consuming family activities and responsibilities. It is also possible that women are active in school and community activities that detract from electoral political participation, but nevertheless reflect community involvement. We cannot reach any conclusions about why women seem to be less active politically than men without collecting and analyzing more data. Our findings are surprising because our sample was composed of 60 percent women. Since there are more men than women in the Chicago Latino population, we were convinced that Latinas were much more likely to register to vote than Latino men, and consequently we expected to find that women would be more active politically.

Our study uncovers a predictor of political participation — how long a respondent has been registered to vote — that has not been explored in the past. For example, the Latino National Political Survey did not ask respondents how long they had been registered to vote (See de la Garza and others 1992: Appendix 1). Since much of the work on Latino political participation has used the data from
this extensive, national survey, no one has found a relationship between participation and the length of time a respondent has been registered to vote. Those Latinos who have been registered to vote for more than four years tend to participate at higher rates than those who have recently registered. This finding suggests that in a period of a large-scale Latino voter registration campaign (like the Latino Vote 96 campaign), the Latino vote may not be as large as hoped by activists. However, in the long run, registration efforts will yield large dividends.

What we did not find in our analysis is also of interest. For example, it appears that Latinos who were born in the United States are no more likely to participate politically than Latinos who are immigrants. Likewise, Latinos who speak Spanish predominantly in their homes are just as likely to participate politically than those who speak English principally. Being more “American,” as defined by speaking English or being born in the United States, does not seem to increase political participation, at least among those who are citizens and registered to vote.

Another important finding is that we did not uncover a very strong relationship between education and age and political participation. This could be due to the fact that Latinos may be motivated to participate politically by factors different from those that motivate the population at large or more specifically the Anglo population. One of the questions in our survey asked the respondents whether they thought their political participation would increase if there were more Latinos running for public office. The results were quite startling: 61 percent said that their participation would increase or dramatically increase. Latino political participation, like the participation of other minorities, may be greatly affected by the fact that candidates do not usually come from their ethnic group. If Latinos knew that they were going to be represented by a Latino it is much more likely that their political participation would follow the general patterns of Anglo voters. Thus, when Latinos can vote for Latinos to represent them we may see increased levels of participation, and participation patterns that resemble more closely the patterns of Anglo voters.

Endnotes

* The authors would like to thank Angela Anderson, Lewellyn Cornelius, and Keith Kilty for their insightful comments in the preparation of this manuscript. Our graduate assistants, David Jesuit and Angela Nircchi, were instrumental and invaluable in the preparation and administration of the survey. The survey could not have been accomplished without the financial support of the Center for Urban Learning and Research, at Loyola University Chicago, headed by Phil Nyden. We especially would like to thank Juan Andrade, Director of the Midwest
Northeast Voter Education Registration Project (MNVREP), who allowed us to use his facility and staff for the administration of the survey. And finally, we wish to thank the many volunteers, most of whom were provided by MNVREP, who selflessly gave up their time to accomplish this survey.

1 We used SPSS Windows for all statistical analysis.

2 When we ran the regression with all twelve independent variables we were left with an N of only 360, owing to missing data. When we ran the regressions again, using only the variables that were significant, our N increased to over 400 for each of the four models.

3 Since age is a continuous variable and the length of time the respondent had been registered to vote was not (categorical with four categories) we would expect the B coefficient to be smaller for age. When we recoded age as a categorical variable, in increments of ten years, the B coefficient increased by a factor of about 10 but still remained smaller than the coefficient for length of time the respondent had been registered to vote.

4 One of the reasons given for registering to vote was “to get an ID card.” While this seems like a reason that few scholars would look for, it may actually be a more important reason for registering than we may think.

5 We must keep in mind, however, that we are comparing registered Latinas with registered Latinos. If we were to look at the entire Latino population, we would perhaps find that Latinas are more likely to vote and participate politically than Latinos.

References


DISFRANCHISEMENT IN LATINO COUNTRY:
The Management of Latino Human Resources in
Illinois State Government

Antonio Sisneros

Antonio Sisneros is Associate Professor and Chairperson of the Public Administration Program at the University of Illinois at Springfield. His research has been published in the Public Administration Review, Review of Public Personnel Administration, American Review of Public Administration and Labor Law Journal. He also serves on the editorial board of the Review of Public Personnel Administration and has served as a peer reviewer for Public Administration Review.

“With the exception of Hispanics, overall percentages of minorities and protected classes in state government’s work force currently are at or above their representation in the state’s total population.”

— Governor’s Human Resources Advisory Council Final Report
State of Illinois, September, 1993

Introduction

Illinois is Latino country. There are more Latinos in Illinois than in Arizona, Colorado or New Mexico. It is therefore significant to note Illinois’ 900,000 Latino population, Chicago’s annual exports to Mexico of $1.5 billion,1 and Illinois’ standing among the five states most heavily populated with Latinos that hold the vast majority of the total U.S. Latino purchasing power which is worth $129 billion.2 It has also been predicted that Latinos will make up the largest slice of the Illinois labor force pie, 40 percent, by 1999.3 But while there are two Latinos at the cabinet level, Latino proportional representation in Illinois state government has not been realized. Furthermore, Illinois ranks at the bottom when it comes to Latino representation in state government in those states where most

In the first year of Governor Jim Edgar’s first term, the Illinois Commission on the Future of Public Service concluded that “Hispanics are not well-represented at any level of government.”

Latinos reside. See table 1. This background then serves as a basis for a significant Illinois state government public policy problem.

Latinos constituted, on average, approximately 2.4 percent of all new hires per year in state government between 1976 and 1990. This compares to 19.8
### Table 1. Latinos in State Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hispanic States</th>
<th>Percent in Government Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


percent for blacks and 74.7 percent for whites. Latinos comprised only 2.1 percent of all promotions in state government between 1976 and 1990, compared to 25.5 percent for blacks and 70.2 percent for whites. see tables 2 and 3. in the first year of governor jim edgar’s first term, the illinois commission on the future of public service concluded that “hispanics are not well-represented at any level of government.”

### Table 2. Summary of Latino New Hires and Promotions, 1976-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
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<td>338</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8955</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>10454</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8984</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>12670</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>10143</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>12373</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7947</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>13114</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8950</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>6536</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5061</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>6129</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3736</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
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<td>162</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4265</td>
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<td>245</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6213</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>10417</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6601</td>
<td>121</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>7581</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5005</td>
<td>127</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>7025</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5403</td>
<td>136</td>
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<tr>
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<td>215</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6046</td>
<td>146</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>9382</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6227</td>
<td>146</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6912</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4747</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>65.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>71.1</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
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<td>16.5</td>
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<td>72.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>78.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>70.4</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In October 1991, there were 106 Latinos employed within the constitutional offices, other than the Office of Governor, in Illinois. By December 1995, there were 154 Latinos employed in the offices of Lieutenant Governor (6), Secretary of State (75), Attorney General (47), Comptroller (6) and Treasurer (20). As of December 31, 1996, Latinos, who comprise 7.9 percent of the Illinois population, held only 1,829 jobs in the code agencies under the jurisdiction of the governor (2.8 percent). See table 4. This is in marked contrast to blacks, who make up 14.8 percent of the population but who hold 13,730 (21.1 percent) state jobs. Whites, at 78.3 percent of the population, hold 48,074 (73.9 percent) state jobs.

Table 4. Latino Representation in Illinois State Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workforce</th>
<th>Percent Representation</th>
<th>Percent Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>48074</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>13730</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>1829</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is also instructive to note how Latino state employees feel about the public workplace. Motivation to public service is an important reason why Latinos and non-Latinos alike enter state government. Latinos are interested in promotion to either supervisory or managerial positions. Failure to adhere to hiring standards and pre-selections of non-Latinos and cultural insensitivity and stereotyping are serious barriers to their promotion. It is unknown why Latinos do not experience mobility, either organizationally or occupationally. Latinos are confronted with the assumption that “minority” still means “black” and that race means either “black” or “white.” Latinos do not fit this continuing and troublesome ideological-biracial perception in today’s multicultural society. Supervisors and managers rarely discuss new job opportunities with Latinos. Lack of opportunity is one of the most important sources of job dissatisfaction for Latinos. State agencies generally do not prepare Latinos for their current jobs or for higher level jobs. See Table 5.

Table 5. Illinois State Code Agency Ratings by Latino Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency Rating</th>
<th>Preparation for Current Job (N=575)</th>
<th>Agency Rating</th>
<th>Preparation for Higher Level Job (N=571)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>8.0 %</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>3.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>25.6 %</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>14.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>30.1 %</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>20.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>20.0 %</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>25.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency played</td>
<td>16.3 %</td>
<td>Agency played</td>
<td>36.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no role</td>
<td></td>
<td>no role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This article presents, in part, relevant results from an exploration of Latinos within agencies under the jurisdiction of the Governor in the Illinois state public service (see footnote 13). My results should inform elected officials and Latino community leaders. It is necessary to improve policy-maker knowledge if effective public policy is to be undertaken to attract, retain and mobilize Latino talent for the public sector in the delivery of state services to the Latino community and the society at large.

This article also presents an overview of the policy-development role played by a Latino advocacy organization, the Illinois Association of Hispanic State
Employees (IAHSE). It examines a number of initiatives throughout the 1990s designed to respond to the situation Latinos find themselves in when it comes to inadequate representation and associated policy challenges facing Illinois state government.

The *Hispanic Employment Plan and the Latino Sacred Cow*\(^{10}\)

The *Hispanic Employment Plan* of 1988 represents the first serious effort by Illinois state government to address the need to increase the number of Latinos employed at all levels. Assigning bilingual options to examinations for civil service job titles has been the state’s most significant action in carrying out the *Hispanic Employment Plan.*\(^{11}\) As of August 1994, there were 718 Latinos, 143 Whites, 29 African-Americans, 18 Asians and 2 Native Americans receiving supplemental compensation ($100 or 5 percent beyond base salary, depending on which is greater) for the required use of languages other than English.\(^{12}\) The following anecdotal comments from the Latino Code Agency Survey Database illustrate the use and non-use of the Spanish language—“viewed with suspicion and harassed while attempting to provide services; disapproval of speaking Spanish in the workplace; forbidding interpretation in the Spanish language; failure to permit complete and accurate interpretation for Spanish-speaking clientele; inadequate supply of official bilingual literature; and delivery of services to Spanish-speaking clientele by non-Spanish-speaking employees resulting in inadequate state resources.”\(^{13}\)

Latinos also complained about the inability to complete their job responsibilities as a result of spending too much time interpreting for other employees. One Latino even revealed that Spanish-speaking clients had been refused state services unless clients themselves provided their own translators. These findings are disturbing in as much as they impact services provided by the state as well as the productivity of employees. Interestingly, in 1986, in the now well-known *Vinson* sexual harassment case, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the principle “...that a Hispanic complainant could establish a Title VII violation by demonstrating that her employer created an offensive work environment for employees by giving discriminatory services to its Hispanic clientele.”\(^{14}\)

House Resolution 1014, recommended by IAHSE and sponsored by former Illinois State Representative Benjamin Martinez, adopted on June 6, 1993, created the Illinois State Bilingual Advisory Committee. After a delay of one year by public officials, the first of only four committee meetings took place between August and December 1994. Recommendation No. 6 of the committee’s final report calls for an advisory group to include employee participation in the monitoring of agency screening processes and assisting agencies in filling bilingual positions.\(^{15}\) Frustration was also expressed with the lack of significant progress made by the Illinois Department of State Police regarding previous commitments to the provision of law enforcement workforce language skills. Former Attorney General Roland W. Burris’ failure to keep his promise to institute a bilingual pay program was also criticized. Attorney General James E. Ryan has declined to institute bilingual pay. Illinois Secretary of State George H. Ryan has also not
delivered on his promise to Latino state employees that he would establish a bilingual pay program.

It is critical to recognize the nature of the twofold policy roles that bilingualism plays in the state workplace. In early 1994, IAHSE interacted with the Illinois Department of Central Management Services and AFSCME Council 31 reporting that certain state agencies were making progress in the delivery of bilingual services. Such advances were occurring in part because the necessity of bilingual skills brought into state government by employees hired into positions requiring the regular use of a language other than English had been acknowledged by the Office of the Governor, the Illinois Department of Central Management Services, state agency users and collective bargaining. It was also IAHSE’s

Interestingly, in 1986, in the now well-known Vinson sexual harassment case, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the principle “…that a Hispanic complainant could establish a Title VII violation by demonstrating that her employer created an offensive work environment for employees by giving discriminatory services to its Hispanic clientele.”

assessment that employees that could competently provide state bilingual services to the public simply brought more human resource assets to their positions and organizations. According to IAHSE, ultimately bilingualism in the state workplace turns into questions of service and diversity.

As early as 1986 in testimony before the House State Government Administration and Regulatory Review Committee, Spanish-Speaking Option job titles were predicted to prove instrumental in increasing the hiring of Latino bilingual employees. This approach to increasing the number of Latinos in state government continues to be appreciated and may yet prove to be a catalyst as the state prepares to implement the delivery of human services by consolidating social service agencies where most Latinos are employed. At the time of this writing, IAHSE is positioning itself to develop a partnership with the state in a monumental effort to define cultural competence as it is viewed as a significant principle, recommended by IAHSE, which has been embraced by the state as a necessary tool for the delivery of human services in Illinois.

Inquiries should continue to be made about current resources available for the protection of language rights in the state work place. For example, it can be questioned whether officials know the scope of the Spanish-speaking population, whether they have determined the level of Spanish-language ability required to service this public, and whether they know who in the public workplace possesses the skills to effectively perform job responsibilities in Spanish. It was not until 1992, after the Personnel Code was amended to provide a bilingual pay supplement, that the Illinois Department of Central Management Services began releasing details about bilingual pay recipients and positions.
The *Hispanic Employment Plan*, White Male Group Rights and Legitimate Proportionate Quotas

The majority of Latino state employees report they believe their public organizations are not committed to affirmative action. The question of why white males are the only group increasing its numbers in state jobs received media attention in 1993. This continuing trend was viewed as a surprising outcome resulting in Governor Edgar officials admitting grounds for asking some serious questions. The Governor called for a thorough analysis, but nothing has since been forthcoming.\(^{18}\) In early 1995, Governor Edgar was asked to be held accountable for remarks made by his executive assistant for human rights which implied that minorities were "...quite adequately represented when viewed as a percentage of the overall labor force..."\(^{19}\) IAHSE chastised the Governor that such "...assertions not only clearly misrepresent the facts but also misinform the Hispanic community, media and society at large." Governor Edgar was reminded about the gap between the Latino labor force rate of 7.8 percent and the Latino coded agency representation rate of only 2.6 percent. The Governor was also referred to the conclusions reached by his own appointed Human Resources Advisory Council which stated, "With the exception of Hispanics, overall percentages of minorities and protected classes in state government’s work force currently are at or above their representation in the state’s total population."\(^{20}\) IAHSE also expressed its distress at the implication of *de facto* segregation within Illinois state government.

IAHSE opposed Senate Bill 1184 sponsored by Illinois State Senator Walter Dudycz. Senate Bill 1184 was designed to eliminate affirmative action in employment, education and contracts. In open testimony before the Illinois Senate Executive Subcommittee on Equal Opportunity in August 1995, IAHSE maintained that the issue for Latinos revolved around the gross underrepresentation of Latinos and the inadequate and inequitable delivery of state services to the growing Latino population. IAHSE submitted that anti-affirmative action efforts result in a denial of an even break for Latinos when the deck is stacked, resist the impetus to movement away from equal opportunity, and encourage the use of false measures of merit, such as relying strictly upon veterans preference and seniority.

The issue of implementing legitimate proportionate quotas in the workplace has been addressed by professor Ronald J. Fiscus. As a point of departure, Fiscus quotes U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra O’Connor: "...protection of the rights of non-minority workers demands that a racial goal not substantially exceed the
percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or work force absent compelling justification. The gross underrepresentation of Latinos precludes any possibility of exceeding the Latino labor force percentage in Illinois.

Fiscus’ principle of proportional representation in the workplace means that all individuals are to be hired into positions they would have competed for under fair conditions. Every individual realizes their respective equal protection. It therefore becomes unnecessary for white males to continue to play the role of the guilty party every time they seek to receive a benefit for which they would not qualify. The principle of proportionality is intended to tear down the usual claims of white males not to have to sacrifice anything. It is also designed to protect them against excessive sacrifices unfairly imposed simply because of race. Fiscus characterizes proportionality as a principle of “individual fairness.”

The lack of a “proportionality” mindset on the part of the Illinois public service leadership on behalf of Latinos is especially harmful particularly in light of the 1992 Illinois public service disproportionate layoff rate for Latinos. See table 6. Only whites and blacks are experiencing proportionality in their layoffs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Lack of Latino Layoff Proportionality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White 78.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black 14.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic 7.9 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the same year, Fiscus’ theory of proportionality emerged onto the marketplace of ideas, and in the midst of the state’s celebration of Hispanic Heritage Month, IAHSE issued a Comunicado de Prensa (press release) and held a press conference to protest layoffs in the Illinois Departments of Children and Family Services and Public Aid. IAHSE’s objective was twofold: 1) to emphasize the gross disproportionate Latino layoff rate, and 2) to focus on the inequitable reduction of services to the community by virtue of the layoffs. Latino leaders challenged the governor to keep his 1990 campaign promises. The governor’s response was to blame the legislature for the layoffs. The governor claimed he was sensitive to the concerns of Hispanics.

Policy Options and Executive Leadership

The Illinois Department of Central Management Services acknowledged in 1987 that a “...specific targeted aggressive campaign to address the obstacles
blocking Hispanic employment must be undertaken...” and “...failure to meet this objective will mean the disfranchisement of a vital sector of the state population.”24 Looking back in hindsight, these words can be considered extraordinarily optimistic. But that was ten years ago and now well past the half way mark of Governor Edgar’s second term.

The state has invested time and energy in carrying out the Hispanic Employment Plan. The State of Illinois has not, however, met the objective of preventing the disfranchisement of Latinos. Governor Jim Edgar can tout about being the only Illinois governor, republican or democrat, to appoint two Latinos to his cabinet. But Illinois has not delivered on the promise of increasing the number of Latinos and bilingual persons at supervisory, technical, professional and managerial levels when counting the numbers of Latinos in the Edgar administration. Governor Jim Edgar has himself, on more than one occasion, acknowledged that “the numbers are not good.”25 The current administration can also claim national leadership regarding bilingual pay policy in Illinois. But the Edgar administration cannot claim the initiative. The initiative of supplemental bilingual compensation rightfully belongs to the leadership within the Latino community.

The majority of Latinos report that underrepresentation in administrative ranks is the critical missing link which they believe accounts for the Latino community’s weak influence in the policy process. Similarly, they contend that increasing Latino representation in policy making positions is the long-range solution to institutionalizing Latino concerns in the policy process. Policy option efforts should continue in the directions outlined below, including repeating measures previously resulting in unsuccessful outcomes. See table 7.

IAHSE has advocated instituting Hispanic Advisory Committees in all state agencies since early 1992. On December 2, 1992, during a meeting with the Labor Relations and Employment Committee of the IAHSE Board of Directors, Governor Edgar declined to establish an Hispanic Advisory Committee for the Office of Governor. By the end of 1993, IAHSE informed the Governor that the state would need to realize 525 new Latino hires by the end of his first term just to achieve parity with equivalent percentage increases in the Latino population in the previous decade between 1980 and 1990. By late 1994, the state reported a Latino increase of 14 percent during a time in which the overall non-Hispanic workforce experienced a 3 percent decline.26
Table 7. Policy Options for Improved Management of Latino Human Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediocre Leadership</td>
<td>Class Action Litigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receptivity Models</td>
<td>Executive Advisory Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc Committees</td>
<td>Legislative Hearings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bipartisan Committee</td>
<td>EEO Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast-Track Programs</td>
<td>Veterans-Like Preference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncitizen Voting Rights</td>
<td>Cultural Competence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How can policy options be presented to an administration that possibly cannot, even under the most optimistic environment, achieve parity in its last years of power? Unfortunately, disproportionate representation is not unique to Illinois state government. Los Angeles County, home plate to the largest single concentration of Latinos within the United States, has been experiencing an increase in Latino underrepresentation.²⁷

Employing the strategy of class action litigation in Illinois on behalf of Latino state employees seems unfeasible as a result of a lack of resources and priorities.²⁸ Furthermore, Latino voting behavior did not conclusively make a difference in Governor Jim Edgar's margin of victory in 1990.²⁹ It would not be surprising, then, to expect the state to do nothing more than continue its current efforts.

In early 1995, IAHSE asked Governor Edgar to seriously review and consider hiring statutes and executive orders from eight states throughout the nation which have significant Latino populations. IAHSE considered this request as an option for improving public policy which would result in rapidly introducing new Latinos and promoting Latinos currently working in state government. Governor Edgar’s Policy Director remained avoidingly silent on the policy question of new directions for Latinos. Courtesy to the growing Latino community in Illinois would dictate that Governor Edgar respond to the consideration of the above Latino receptivity models used in other states.

Such a response could be articulated by Governor Edgar in the form of creating a commission to assess the status of current public policy, the Hispanic Employment Plan. It would consist of a non-partisan privately funded organization. This Commission would operate out of either the executive office of the Governor or a major Illinois-based Latino non-profit advocacy organization. Initial operating costs are estimated to be $150,000.

Another option is for legislative action to include hearings on the gross
underrepresentation of Latinos. The work of the National Council of La Raza’s *THE EMPTY PROMISE: The EEOC and Hispanics* would serve as a foundation for such hearings.30 These hearings would review the Illinois state EEO system to document scope and degree of employment discrimination against Latinos, analyze current enforcement efforts on behalf of Latinos, such as, proportion of department caseload of charges involving Latinos, disposition of charges and litigation efforts. A favorable response by the legislature would entail an annual increase of $265,000 to the budget of the Illinois Department of Human Rights for additional human resources in outreach, compliance, training and investigation.

Such hearings would also consider significant amendments to the Illinois Human Rights Act, including the introduction of legitimate proportionate quotas in Illinois state government (this is not the position maintained by IAHSE). Precedent can be found in the institution of veterans preference which is widely used in the United States. In fact, Senate Bill 1184 provided for maintaining quotas for veterans. The Illinois Supreme Court has recently required *absolute preference* for veterans; the state has agreed to subscribe to this policy. The use of preferential treatment has also become institutionalized when it comes to the application of seniority rights in the public sector. One of the five most widely used texts in human resources management in the United States today contends that “...[t]he most effective way of realizing social equity claims is through the establishment of quotas—for veterans, women, or racial and ethnic minorities.”31

The end result of these executive and legislative activities would be the creation of a permanent Illinois State Interagency Committee on Latino Affairs, officially empowering IAHSE participation.32 House Bill 4162 did not survive passage in 1993 out of committee during the 87th General Assembly. House Bill 4162 proposed amending the Personnel Code by creating the Interagency Committee on Latino Employees. This concept was designed to provide a forum where problems of general concern to Latino state employees could be raised and resolutions reached. The Illinois Department of Central Management Services opposed this bill. A compromise was reached, however, in the form of House Resolution 1014 discussed above.

These other following recommendations are proposed for the purpose of strategically designing future efforts on behalf of Latino applicants and currently employed Latino public service employees. The following actions would be undertaken, through the normal course of conducting business, by the Illinois Departments of Central Management Services, Human Rights, agency directors and collective bargaining representatives: (1) monitor and evaluate justifications for permitting extended presence of Latino names on promotional supervisory, managerial and executive eligibility lists; (2) investigate the causes of massive workloads
being placed on Latinos particularly if related to the provision of bilingual services; (3) develop a fast-track programs for training and placement of potential Latino managers and executives; and (4) make public a list of code agencies which have not complied with equal employment and career opportunity and affirmative action obligations.\textsuperscript{33}

The last option is directed at both local and state government and the Latino community and is designed to seek constitutional authority to permit noncitizen

\textbf{It is essential for Illinois to develop an effective public policy that will attract, retain and mobilize Latino talent for the public sector in the delivery of state services to the society at large.}

voting. Recognizing that the validity of requiring citizenship for voting eligibility has been questioned, Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Louis DeSipio have suggested a five-year period of noncitizen voting eligibility for new permanent resident immigrants where “...[i]ntegration into the civil and political culture is the objective.”\textsuperscript{34} Importantly, de la Garza and DeSipio stress that because these new immigrants “...constitute nearly 40 percent of the Latino adult population, noncitizens need to be a central focus of any discussion of Latino community empowerment.”\textsuperscript{35} This would create conditions for significant Latino voice in Illinois public affairs.

\section*{Conclusion}

The dawn of the “illusion of inclusion” in Illinois state government begins to rise when taking into account Governor Edgar’s prominent record of having appointed two Latinos to his cabinet. However, this illusion becomes very real when considering the absence of Latino proportional representation. This same illusion also mirrors a much less bright reflection when contrasting the hiring, promotion and layoff of Latinos to that of non-Latinos.

Illinois is undergoing a severe human resource management public policy problem when it comes to the underrepresentation of Latinos. This is a serious management problem particularly since the state has predicted Latinos will make up the largest slice of the Illinois labor force pie, 40 percent, by 1999. It is also a problem of “administrative ethics” if political leadership does not act to reverse current disproportionate results in state hiring, promotion and layoffs for Latinos.\textsuperscript{36}

It is essential for Illinois to develop an effective public policy that will attract, retain and mobilize Latino talent for the public sector in the delivery of state services to the society at large. Current policy, in the form of the \textit{Hispanic Employment Plan} has served well as a point of departure. However, provision of access for Latino entry into the public service by way of increasing bilingual options to civil service job titles (404 out of 1250 titles) requires additional policy
inputs.

The State of Illinois failed to respond to House Resolution 1014 by not quickly convening the Illinois State Bilingual Advisory Committee, thereby losing a significant amount of time for the consideration of issues. A significant number of elected constitutional officers failed to keep their promises, are otherwise predisposed, or lack the vision to understand that delivering state services through the use of languages other than English is an important public policy need. The need also persists to address a policy balancing the delivery of efficient and adequate services to a growing multicultural society with the language rights of state employees.

The political climate for improving upon the Hispanic Employment Plan is not conducive in Illinois. Hostility was best reflected in the sponsorship of Senate Bill 1184 intended to eliminate affirmative action programs. An uncomfortable challenge facing Latinos is the continuing pattern of white males making up the only group increasing its numbers in state jobs. The irony, however, is that the bitterly criticized groups rights issue is now being visited by this non-protected class.

It remains essential that the Hispanic Employment Plan not be perceived as a policy strictly in place for the facilitation of Latino diversity into state government. It is necessary for public policy makers to understand that the adequate provision of state services, in today’s society, hinges significantly upon an appropriate implementation of both bilingualism and cultural competence in the public workplace. This is best learned by recognizing that employees competently providing state bilingual services to the public simply bring more human resource assets to the job, the organization and the state government.

The “illusion of inclusion” characterization of Latinos has now been publicly acknowledged by the Illinois Commission on the Future of the Public Service and by Governor Jim Edgar’s own Human Resources Advisory Council. Collective bargaining institutions must continue to demonstrate more leadership, particularly in respect to the disproportionate layoff of Latinos. This becomes important since Illinois has emerged into a Dual Personnel System which is defined as “shared systems that attempt to integrate competing elements” of civil service merit and collective bargaining environments. Latino leaders must also expend significant political capital in this effort, including the leadership within the Illinois Department of Human Rights.57

Holding legislative hearings into the public policy problem of the gross
underrepresentation of Latinos is an essential first step in the formulation of a new public policy for the management of Latino human resources. A statutorily protected Illinois State Interagency Committee on Latino Affairs is another recommended step in this policy direction. Simultaneously, key state agencies, where Latinos are concentrated, need to significantly increase their efforts into the problems of ensuring fair competition for state jobs, prohibiting unwarranted workloads for Latinos, developing fast-track programs for Latino in the supervisory and middle-management ranks and rigorously following through on their affirmative action obligations.

Public policy formulation and implementation short of an obsessive commitment to the rapid increase of Latino representation in state government proportional to the Latino labor force and population should be considered ineffective public policy. The Governor’s Human Resources Advisory Council Final Report explicitly cited population as the context by which to measure representation and a culturally diverse work force. Any deviation from this criterion raises significant questions about the competence and credibility of the Governor’s Human Resources Advisory Council.

Latino labor force participation and associated Latino expectations will most certainly present applicant pools in the very near future heretofore never experienced by state governments. Public policy failure by virtue of the inefficient and inequitable management of Latino human resources will ensure the continuing perception of inaccessibility to civil service and collective bargaining participation in Illinois state government.

Endnotes


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In 1992, the Illinois Association of Hispanic State Employees (IAHSE) developed the concept represented in the Illinois State Employment Records Act (SER) and presented the proposal to Illinois State Senator Miguel del Valle and former Illinois State Senator Judy Baar Topinka (R) who sponsored the legislation in the senate. Illinois State Representatives Miguel Santiago (D) and Jack Kubick (R) sponsored the bill in the house. This statute requires information to be compiled and maintained as public information. In addition to criminal penalties for intentionally falsifying information or intentionally failing to comply with this law, the guilty employee shall be terminated and guilty elected officials shall be removed from office. The Illinois State Employment Records Act requires comprehensive collection, classification and maintenance of information that will provide opportunity for meaningful review. By 1993, IAHSE had succeeded in informing public opinion as a result of an investigation by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reviewing SER agency work force reports. The result was Governor Jim Edgar publicly acknowledging, “And the bottom line, in at least those agencies under me...is that our numbers reflect the population pretty well, except in the Hispanic area.” See endnote 25. IAHSE continued to persist in improving the legislation by recommending House Bill 4204, in 1994, which was designed to achieve strict enforcement. The bill was sponsored by State Representative Miguel Santiago and received support from the House Judiciary Committee. This IAHSE effort reached closure during the 89th Illinois State General Assembly. Amending SER began with an initial contact with Representative Miguel Santiago. Major sponsorship was provided by Representative Tom Ryder (R) and Senator Kirk Dillard (R). Policy director Stephen Schnorf also provided significant support. Representatives Carol Ronen (D) and Edgar Lopez (D) and Senators Jesus Garcia (D) and Miguel del Valle also supported amending SER. P.A. 89-0670 became effective August 14, 1996. SER is now subject to the Illinois State Auditing Act which was also amended to require the Auditor General, in the course of auditing a state agency, to determine whether an agency has complied with SER. Agencies in noncompliance are required to file corrected reports and the Auditor General is now directed to report evidence of apparent criminal noncompliance to the head of the agency who must forward the information to the appropriate policing board.


9The term “Hispanic” emphasizes, or overemphasizes, the Spanish or European aspects of the Latino political experience, while it de-emphasizes experiences in the Americas, particularly the experience of conquest by the United States. See Rodney E. Hero, Latinos and the U.S. Political System: Two-Tiered Pluralism, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), pp. 2-3. Interestingly, the Latino Code Agency Survey Database discussed in this article showed only five percent of the respondents identifying themselves as Latinos. However, 44 percent reported birthplace to be outside the United States.

10Charles L. Kyle and Edward R. Kantowicz coined the concept in the following passage: “...bilingualism is a sacred cow for Latinos in Chicago and throughout the nation.” See Kids First-Primero los Ninos, (Illinois Issues, Springfield,

11. Public Act 85-301 amended the Civil Administrative Code and directed the Illinois Department of Central Management Services to “develop and implement plans to increase the number of Hispanics employed by State government and the number of bilingual persons employed in State government at supervisory, technical, professional and managerial levels.” The immediate result of Public Act 85-301 was the development of the Hispanic Employment Plan. The Hispanic Employment Plan recommended the following initiatives: a) expand the Spanish-Speaking Option for up to 175 job titles; b) sponsor job forums and conduct on-site civil service exams in predominately Hispanic communities throughout the state; c) develop and coordinate informational workshops; d) initiate a review of written employment exams to assure fairness and that they pose no cultural bias; e) make the recruitment service staff of CMS available to state agencies to assist in hiring Hispanic employees for any level of position with emphasis on professional, technical and managerial positions; f) plan the development of a management intern program for minority employees and include Hispanic employees with management potential; g) develop a formalized posting system of job announcements; h) plan to sponsor communications skills seminars; i) CMS commitment to the upward mobility program previously developed; j) enhance Hispanic training and employee development to allow for promotion of less senior employees by working with AFSCME to consider innovative approaches to the issue of seniority; and k) encourage state agencies to hire Hispanics to fill jobs within their affirmative action programs. Former Illinois State Representative Benjamin Martinez (D) and Illinois State Senator John A. D’Arco (D) were the chief sponsors of this bill. Illinois State Senator Miguel del Valle also played an instrumental role in this legislation.


The Latino Code Agency Survey Database is a result of a 1991 mail survey of the 1438 Latinos in the agencies under the jurisdiction of the governor. This survey yielded information from 581 Latinos (40 percent response rate). An extensive presentation of all survey results and analysis appears in The Illinois Public Service: Problems and Perspectives, (ed.), Samuel K. Gove, Papers prepared for the Illinois Commission on the Future of the Public Service, 1992. Information appearing in this article about Latino reported perceptions is reflective of those Latinos responding to the Latino Code Agency Survey Database.


Director of the Illinois State Department of Human Rights. In April, 1994, Director Bombella was quoted accordingly, “I don’t think the governor has anything to feel ashamed of.” This sentiment appeared in an analysis which concluded, in part, that “State government continues to be run primarily by white men as blacks, Hispanics and other minorities are clustered mainly in a few agencies.” It was also noted that “57 percent of the 1,917 Hispanic employees earned less than $30,000 a year.” See *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 5, 1994, pp. 1-2.


21*United State v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 199 (1987). *Paradise* is the best example of a “quota” required by the U.S. Supreme Court. In this case, the Court determined the Alabama State Police had been guilty of “egregious discrimination.” This case illustrates a balance among individual rights, administrative efficiency and social equity.


28Interview, MALDEF, August 15, 1995.


IAHSE is a not-for-profit corporation advocating parity in the state work force, quality work environments, upward mobility, information exchange network development and full delivery of state services to the Latino community. The IAHSE public policy model includes the components of initiating research, maintaining an information dissemination network and promoting the development of public policy. See A. Steve W. DelCastillo, "The Colorado Hispanic League: A Latino Public Policy System," *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy*, Volume 7, 1993-94, pp. 49-65. IAHSE has been instrumental in issues such as bilingual compensation for state employees (California, Ohio and Missouri appear to be the only other states providing additional compensation for bilingualism in the public workplace), refinement of the Personnel Code and initiated a design for a state-wide human resources management information system (SER) currently in use by the State of Illinois. IAHSE encourages appropriate services delivery for immigrants, bilingual preschool education, development of an informed Latino electorate, workplace skills development, public affairs education and Latino scholarship development. IAHSE must maintain, however, its vigilance as a policy network community member. For example, in a 3 day hearing in Chicago on June 24-26,1992, IAHSE past president Robert Ruiz provided an IAHSE position paper to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights as testimony addressing Latino underrepresentation and complaints about the treatment of both Latino employees and limited-English-proficient clientele. In September 1995, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights published *Racial and Ethnic Tensions in American Communities: Poverty, Inequality, and Discrimination Volume III: The Chicago Report*. Interestingly, it appears commission Acting General Counsel Rosalind D. Gray accepted correspondence from Stephen Schnorf (then Director of Central Management Services and now the governor’s policy director) dated May 25, 1994 as a response to IAHSE testimony; see footnote number 4, p. 94. IAHSE was unaware of the state’s testimony thus precluding itself from submitting a rebuttal. Instructive on the matter of responding to policy window events, see Charles H. Levine, "Where Policy Comes From: Ideas, Innovations, and Agenda Choices," *Public Administration Review*, (January/February) 1985, p. 258 and John W. Kingdom, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984).

33See endnote number 7.


35Ibid.


References


Dynamics of Latino Partisanship in California: Immigration, Issue Salience, and Their Implications

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Introduction

We suggest that increased naturalization rates among Latino non-citizens in California had much to do with the increased size and partisan skew in the Latino vote. Further, we suggest that the salience of issues important to the Latino community, like affirmative action, immigration, and welfare reform, have overwhelmed changing levels of income and the relative religiosity of the Latino community (both perceived to benefit Republicans) and produced a pro-Democratic effect on all segments of the Latino community.

We tested our expectations by examining survey data on 508 randomly selected Latino citizens living in California, compiled in a pre-election poll by the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute. Employing multivariate logit and ordered logit models, we find considerable support for this hypothesis. In addition, controlling for partisanship, income, education, gender, and ethnicity, the pro-Democratic shift in sentiment is strongest among recently naturalized citizens, those interested in these specific issues, and those more generally interested in politics.

Overview

In an interview with National Public Radio some weeks after the 1996 election, California Congressman John Doolittle (R-Roseville) was asked to comment on why the GOP had done poorly in the California Assembly and U.S. House elections. He was specifically asked about the defeat of Congressman Robert Dornan (R-CA) by political neophyte Loretta Sanchez, a Latina woman
in her early 30s. In response, Doolittle expressed disbelief at the size of the Latino vote, particularly in Orange County; he said, “It’s clear that there were people voting who shouldn’t be.”

He and, no doubt, Congressman Dornan were surprised by the size and decisiveness of the Latino vote. So sizable was the change—and so decidedly Democratic was the participation—that charges of electoral fraud were forthcoming from several prominent GOP office holders including Governor Pete Wilson. Those charges notwithstanding, it is very clear that this portion of the electorate has shown substantial growth in recent years and that the principal beneficiary of this growth in 1996 was the Democratic Party.

The 1996 general election produced some significant results for the Latino population in California and nation-wide as well. Latinos voted in record numbers and, by some accounts, at the highest turnout level ever....

As a result, the number of Hispanic members of the House of Representatives increased. In California, Latinos sent 14 members to the California Assembly—all but one are Democrats. That Assembly subsequently selected Cruz Bustamante as Speaker and Antonio Villaraigosa as the Majority Leader.

Despite the simultaneous passage of Proposition 209, these 1996 results far and away mark the high water mark of Latino political power in California politics. But such political power could be said to be long overdue since Latinos represent 30 percent of the state population (though clearly not 30 percent of the eligible voter pool by virtue of the community’s relative youth, the large percentage of non-citizens, and the historically low rates of turnout). What changed? Why after a considerable wait do we suddenly observe substantial political mobilization and an unexpected partisan shift?

In this effort, using data collected in a 1996 pre-election poll conducted by the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute among Latino citizens of California, we intend to address these questions. Specifically, we suggest that increased naturalization rates among Latino non-citizens in California had much to do with the increased size and partisan skew in the Latino vote. Further, we argue that the salience of issues important to the Latino community, like affirmative action, immigration,
and welfare reform, have overwhelmed changing levels of income and the relative religiosity of the Latino community (both perceived to benefit Republicans) and produced a pro-Democratic effect on all segments of the Latino community. That effect, if anything, is exacerbated among recently naturalized citizens. We test our expectations using multivariate logit and ordered logit models.

**Partisanship and Mobilization among California Latinos**

What specific factors in the political environment produced the substantial turnout and favorable outcomes for Latinos in the 1996 election? The evidence is strong that the two principal components in the emergence of Latino political power were a substantial growth in the Latino electorate and an increasingly Democratic partisanship in defiance of popular expectations.

**New Voters and a Growing Latino Electorate**

In the election of 1996, an enormous percentage of the Latino electorate was entirely new to the process. Polling numbers, as represented in table 1, suggest that as much as 27.2 percent of the eligible Latino electorate in California was not in the potential voting pool just four years before, either because these voters were not yet 18 or, more likely, because they were not yet citizens. These distinctions are why the Latino percentage of the overall population is greater than its share of the eligible electorate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Latino Eligible Voters in 1996: New and Previous Voters by Nativity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native-Born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalized 1992 and Before</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalized Since 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native (18-21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Latinos are a remarkably young population in California, averaging approximately 27 years of age compared to a median of 43 in the Anglo community. Because of its relative youth, the voting population will grow at a higher rate than in older communities since the percentage of the population newly eligible in each election will be larger. In the 1996 presidential election, 5.7 percent of the eligible Latino voter pool was between the ages of 18 and 21—meaning this was their first presidential vote. The comparable figure among Anglo voters was 3.9 percent.

The larger share of the growth in the Latino electorate has been through the naturalization process. As recently as five years ago, almost half of California’s Latino population was composed of non-citizens. Naturally, this provides a substantial pool of potential new voters should some of these immigrants choose to complete the citizenship process, and there is evidence indicating an enormous
shift in this direction.

Among Latino citizens in the pre-election poll, just over 43 percent reported being naturalized U.S. citizens (as opposed to native born). Of these, an astounding 49 percent had become citizens in just the last four years and over 60 percent in the 1990s. Our data suggest that just over 21 percent of the entire Latino electorate in the 1996 election were not citizens for the previous presidential election, and that as many Latinos were naturalized as U.S. citizens in the last four years as in the previous forty. The move to naturalization is likely the result of a combination of four factors: the 1986 amnesty, which legalized many undocumented individuals whose citizenship waiting period is complete; changes in Mexican immigration/citizenship laws; the passage of Proposition 187; and Welfare Reform, which specifically excluded legal non-citizen immigrants from receiving benefits.

Those new citizens, along with native born Latinos turning 18 years of age, together comprise 27.2 percent of the Latino electorate. Given the comparative youth of the native born Latino population, the very large pool of immigrants not yet naturalized, and the astonishing rates of naturalization in recent years, it is readily apparent that the growth rate in the Latino electorate will be high in both absolute terms and, perhaps more importantly, relative to the Anglo population.

### Table 2: 1996 Pre-Election Presidential Preference for New and Previous Voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clinton</th>
<th>Dole</th>
<th>Perot</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newly Enfranchised Voters (Since 1992) (n=138)</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Likely Voters (Voted in 1992) (n=370)</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This growth in the Latino electorate—sizable though it is—is not particularly important unless there are political consequences that result. It would appear that the new Latino electorate is more partisan than its predecessors. As we reported, about 76 percent of Latino voters voted for President Clinton. The pre-election poll found that "likely" Latino voters (those who voted four years ago and remain registered for the 1996 vote) preferred President Clinton at a rate around 71 percent to Senator Dole’s 14.5 percent. The increase came from the newly enfranchised 27 percent of the Latino electorate which preferred Clinton at a rate of almost 84 percent, while only 5.4 percent expressed a preference for Dole. Republicans constitute 16.2 percent of long-term Latino voters but only
9.4 percent of the new voters. As the presidential preference numbers clearly indicate some of these 9.4 percent did not appear to be planning to vote Republi-

can.

**Partisan Shifts Among California Latinos**

Though believed by many political scientists to be on the decline in recent decades, partisanship—an individual’s subjective affiliation with a particular political party—continues to be one of the single best predictors of individual political participation, interest, and voting behavior in the United States. Unfortunately, systematic scholarly analysis of subjects like Latino partisanship, ideology, and policy preferences is only now beginning to provide researchers with the kind of information needed to develop models of Latino political attitudes and behavior (Hero, 1992; DeSipio, 1996).

The paucity of information regarding Latino political attitudes and behavior has contributed to considerable disagreement among political scientists and others, particularly among those studying Latino partisanship. Commentators agree on one thing: the Democratic party has traditionally enjoyed the support of a majority of the nation’s Latinos (Garcia and de la Garza 1977; Hero 1992). However, the level of Latino support for the Democratic party, as indicated by a number of polls, varies significantly. For example, in a nationwide survey conducted by the Gallup organization in 1988, 51 percent of the Latinos surveyed said they were Democrats (Gallup Report 1988). Just two years later, in another national sample, researchers from the City University of New York (CUNY) found that only 41 percent of Latinos surveyed identified themselves as Democrats (Kosnin and Keysar 1995). It should be noted that these figures include a significant number of Cuban American respondents who have historically shown high levels of support for the Republican party (Hero 1992; DeSipio 1996). However, even when the analysis is limited to a particular state, such as California, reports of Latino support for the Democratic party continue to show considerable variation. In the previously mentioned 1990 CUNY study (Kosnin and Keysar 1995), 44 percent of Latinos surveyed in California said they were Democrats. Just two years later, the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) reported that 81 percent of Latino respondents in California identified themselves as Democrats (a 37 percent difference) (de la Garza, et al. 1992). Finally, a *Los Angeles Times* exit poll of California voters conducted in November of 1996 reported that 71 percent of Latinos polled identified themselves as Democrats. Similar variation has appeared in studies that focus exclusively on Latino immigrants, with Democratic identifiers estimated as being as high as 60 percent among long-term residents (more than 16 years, Cain et al. 1991), and as low as 25.6 percent among all immigrants (Pachon and DeSipio 1994) and 30 percent for recent immigrants (Cain, et al. 1991).

Given these disparate rates of Democratic identification from the various data sources, it is no wonder that the issue of Latino partisanship should engender such disagreement, even among the experts. Many of these disagreements are, no doubt, the result of differences in sample frame and timing. And there is, how-

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ever, a growing consensus among political scientists about the factors that contribute to the variation in reported Latino partisanship at the individual level (the aggregation of which might be responsible, in part, for the aforementioned differences). The list of factors includes national origin (or Latino subgroup), region of the country (including state), income level, educational attainment, age, gender, and nativity.

**Changing Dynamics**

The journalistic literature has been, of late, replete with conventional wisdom suggesting that Democratic dominance within the Latino electorate is waning and, in fact, is ripe for a fall. Similar thoughts have been voiced in the scholarly literature as well (Kosnin and Keysar 1995; Chavez 1996; de la Torre 1996; Rodriguez 1996), and the argument, at least on its face, makes a good deal of sense. Latinos are generally a socially conservative group of people, not with-

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The paucity of information regarding Latino political attitudes and behavior has contributed to considerable disagreement among political scientists and others, particularly among those studying Latino partisanship.

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standing factors of socio-economic status. Latinos’ high levels of church attendance, Roman Catholicism, and strong family structure suggest that this population would be more responsive to campaigns and partisan invective based on recent hot-button social issues such as abortion and homosexual rights—certainly more so than other traditionally Democratic constituencies. The principal tie between the Democratic Party and the non-Cuban Latino community had been an economic one. Prevailing low levels of socio-economic status among Latinos meant a natural affinity for Democratic politics. If those levels of economic prosperity go up—that is, if the Latino middle class grows as some speculate—we would expect that the uniformity of economic interests and preferences would shortly break down if it has not already begun to do so. Once the economic ties decline in relevance or importance, the social conservativism can have a greater effect. GOP strategists, as they should have, saw these characteristics as opportunities for outreach and partisan conversion.

The results for the GOP have proved less than satisfying, and the aforementioned 1996 general election results (and the partisan data contained therein) suggest that the Latino community has, if anything, moved closer to the Democratic Party. In addition to the high levels of voter support, our polling data suggest a larger, deeper shift to Democratic identification. With circumstances widely deemed favorable for significant GOP inroads into the Latino population, the partisan trends within recent results require an explanation.

The suggestion that social conservatism on the more traditional social issues like abortion would produce more Latino GOP votes is premised on the assumption that some significant portion of the Latino population ever consid-
ered these voting issues. We suspect, and hope to demonstrate here, that other issues are of greater salience to the Latino electorate. If it is the case that the population is thinking of elections in different terms and making their decisions along different dimensions—say economic or cultural—Latino disagreement with the Democratic party on some of these less salient dimensions will be insufficient motive for defection to the GOP.

How likely is it that traditional social issues have been supplanted in the Latino decision process? We believe that it is very likely and, ironically, the product of GOP strategizing. In this effort, we will show that the probability that the Latino electorate is supplanting issues like abortion and “family values” with other, more salient matters, is increased by GOP support for immigrant exclusionary welfare reform and Propositions 187 and 209, as well as any number of other ancillary issues like English-only efforts, opposition to school district funding reform, and making the naturalization process more difficult.

Proposition 187 was passed by the voters in California during the 1994 general election. It provided for the withholding of services from undocumented aliens including schooling, basic health and pre-natal care, and other state services, as well as more aggressive and intrusive measures to identify said undocumented individuals. It has, in the main, been held unconstitutional, and most, if not all, of its provisions have been enjoined by the federal judiciary, though it has not yet been adjudicated by the Supreme Court.

Proposition 209, dubbed by supporters as the “California Civil Rights Initiative,” was passed in the 1996 general election and mandated the end of affirmative action practices deemed “preferential” by all organs of government in California. Its legal status is, at this time, uncertain, though implementation and enforcement has been delayed by federal court order.

The Latino electorate likely perceived both of these ballot initiatives as targeting their interests. Proponents of both argued that they enjoyed substantial Latino support and, more importantly, that the issue was not intended to “target” anyone. Nevertheless, perception matters more than any truth or intention when individuals make political decisions, and these ballot initiatives were widely perceived as a threat by California Latinos. Seventy percent of all Latino voters voted against Prop 209 while over 80 percent voted against Prop 187.

We believe that the presence of these group specific agenda items as part of the Republican platform, or their embracing by the GOP presidential ticket, have served to help frame the partisan debate in terms less friendly to the long-term Republican interests of recruiting converts and new voters from the Latino population. Since the salience of these issues, their importance to the voters, is less susceptible to variance across levels of socio-economic status, their prominent
position on the agenda serves to weaken the effect of improving economic fortunes on partisanship. That is, middle-class Latinos are less likely to drift into the GOP camp than they might otherwise have been.

Design and Data

We set out here to test our hypothesis that the primacy of these ethno-specific issues on the political agenda is serving to drive Latinos, particularly newly enfranchised Latinos, closer to the Democratic Party. Because of the rhetoric surrounding such issues as affirmative action, welfare reform, and immigration, Latinos in the aggregate and individually perceive themselves as being closer to the Democratic Party. We will test this relationship, controlling for several key alternative explanations including religiosity and income, nativity, gender, education and political interest. Data are taken from the 1996 pre-election poll conducted by the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute, with a total sample of 508 U.S. citizens of Latino origin living in California. The poll was conducted by phone in the language of the respondents’ choosing between October 12 and 14, 1996.7

Dependent Variable: Shift in Partisan Sentiment

The Tomás Rivera poll asked respondents a battery of questions regarding their partisan preferences, including whether they considered themselves Democrats, Republicans, or Independents and the strength of this identity. In addition, after a battery of questions concerning the issues in the campaign and issues of specific concern to them, respondents were asked:

There has been a lot of talk about affirmative action, immigration, and welfare reform in the last few years. As a result of the positions taken by the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, do you feel you have moved closer to the Republican Party, closer to the Democratic Party, away from both parties, or have these issues had no effect on your feelings toward the political parties?

From the respondents’ answers to this question, two alternative formulations of this change in partisan sentiment were coded. The first, Democratic Shift, is a simple dichotomy coded one (1) if the respondent reported feeling closer to the Democratic Party and zero (0) otherwise. The second, Party Shift, is a trichotomy coded one (1) if the respondent reported feeling closer to the Democrats, negative one (-1) if the respondent reported feeling closer to Republicans, and zero if they reported moving away from both parties or feeling no change. In both instances, those not responding are coded missing.

The two alternatives are necessitated by the skew in the data. The trichotomous variable is a more valid indicator of the meaning of the respondent’s answer, since it captures movement in either direction. The skew is substantial, however, in that only 6 percent of all respondents reported moving toward the GOP while 43 percent of the respondents reported the reverse. The dichotomy serves to redress the pro-Democratic skew in the data but does so at the cost of
conflating a pro-GOP shift with those who report either being unaffected or turned off of both parties. In both cases, we do conflate moving away from both parties with no partisan change. This is an analytic convenience which, in light of our specific question, seems both justified and of little effect on the shape of the relationships with which we are most concerned.

It is important to remember here that what we are explaining is not simply partisan shift. Instead, it is the principal relationship of interest—the respondents receive a stimulus with regard to the issue-specific partisanship change we are asking them to report. What we are trying to predict, then, is the likelihood of this effect given other factors. In that respect, each of the parameter estimates for the independent variables are, in fact, estimating interactions between the exogenous factor in question and the issue stimulus in producing the reported shift in emotion toward partisanship.

**Predictors of Shifts in Partisan Sentiment**

To predict these varying reactions to the ethnic-specific issues, we use an array of six important predictors and four additional control variables. We expect that four of these six predictors will have a positive effect on the likelihood that these issues produce a pro-Democratic shift: whether the citizen is naturalized as opposed to native born, the respondent’s reported interest in past ethnicity-specific issues, their overall level of political interest, and whether the respondent is newly eligible to vote by virtue of turning 18. The two remaining factors, the respondent’s religiosity and income, will either be negatively associated with this shift, should they remain important, or will be insignificantly associated with the shift, that is, have no effect should they have been overwhelmed by the salience of the ethnic-specific issues.

*Naturalized* is coded one (1) if the respondent was born as a non-citizen and later naturalized and zero (0) if the respondent was a native born U.S. citizen. As we indicated in our discussion of the new voters, many of these naturalized citizens went through the process precisely because they felt threatened by the political rhetoric surrounding the issue. For example, the welfare reform legislation adopted in 1996 specifically excluded legal immigrants, thereby dramatically altering the incentive structure for naturalization. In addition, we would expect *ceteris paribus* that this group of citizens would be more sensitive to any discussion of immigration, language, or ethnicity issues. Since the process of naturalization appears to have contributed greatly to the increased numbers of Latino voters, a finding that suggests that they are more sensitive to the rhetoric and, by extension, more partisan would be of considerable import.

*Issue Interest* is intended to capture the level of attention the respondent pays to these issues. In our survey, we asked respondents whether the passage of Proposition 187 during the 1994 election made them more or less interested in politics, or if it had no effect. We recoded the results into a trichotomy where one (1) signals an increase in interest, negative one (-1) a decrease, and zero (0) no change.
Political Interest is our measure of the respondent's general level of interest in all political matters, measured as the self-reported frequency of political discussion. We include this for three reasons. First, discussion of political matters is an indicator of the saliency of politics in the life of the respondent. Second, more politically aware respondents will be more familiar with the issues and rhetoric circulating in the political arena. Third, we feel it is potentially important to distinguish between general political awareness, on the one hand, and the issue mobilization implied in the Issue Interest variable, if only to be certain that this

...[P]erception matters more than any truth or intention when individuals make political decisions, and these ballot initiatives [Proposition 187 and Proposition 209] were widely perceived as a threat by California Latinos.

previous measure is not really just tapping into broad political interest and thereby overstating the importance of these issues to political attentiveness. Collinearity is not a problem as these two variables correlate at only r=.1644, an indication that the two variables are, indeed, measuring distinct phenomena and not tapping the same dimension twice.

Youth is coded one (1) if the respondent is voting in his or her first presidential election by virtue of age and zero (0) otherwise. Given the relative youth of the Latino population previously discussed, we expect that any skew in the preferences of these young voters would exacerbate the existing differences as these newly enfranchised citizens move into the voter pool at disproportionate rates (vis a vis non-Latinos). We expect that this variable will be positively related to a pro-Democratic shift in sentiment, but our confidence in such an expectation is limited, given the comparative paucity of information and weakness of interest in politics manifested by most younger voters. 9

Religiosity measures the frequency of church attendance, with the highest values indicating more than once per week while the lowest value indicates non-participation. Religiosity is, of course, associated with social issues like abortion, family values, and homosexual rights over which GOP strategists believed they had the opportunity to make appeals to the Latino community. We would expect for both versions of the dependent variable that, should religiosity be an important predictor, its coefficient would be negative, indicating that Latinos who attend church regularly are less likely to feel that they are getting closer to the Democrats. If, as we have argued, ethnicity specific issues are overwhelming this effect by virtue of their relative salience, we would observe no significant relationship.

Income measures the respondent's annual family income, grouped into ranges of equal breadth. The higher the reported family income, the less likely we believe the respondent would feel that s/he has shifted toward the Democrats. Improving economic status, like social conservatism, is among the factors cited by those expecting the GOP to make inroads into the Latino vote. Again, should our
belief that this effect is being undermined by the salience of ethnic issues prove correct, we would expect this relationship to diminish in magnitude or become insignificant altogether.

Control variables are employed, including Education level, Gender, Partisanship, and whether the respondent identifies as a Mexican-American as opposed to other Latin American ethnicity. While we have no specific priors on Gender or Education, correlations between either of these and our predictors might, in the absence of control, bias our estimates. Partisanship is included since the probability of partisan shift in either direction is, no doubt, constrained by where one begins. This variable is coded one (1) if the respondent is a Democrat, zero (0) for independents, and negative one (-1) for Republicans. Failure to control for simple partisan identification is highly likely to bias estimates since the remaining predictors would, in effect, also be explaining simple partisan preference. Without this control, each coefficient would thus overestimate the variable's importance in predicting issue-motivated shifts. The variable for inter-ethnic distinctions is merely to control for the distinctiveness of the Mexican-American community vis a vis others, though given the absence of substantial numbers of ethnic Cubans in California, we again do not have strong theoretical priors for the importance of this control in California.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Valid Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partisan shift</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>.3700787</td>
<td>.5965469</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Shift</td>
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<td>.4311024</td>
<td>.4957185</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>.4336634</td>
<td>.4960713</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Issue Interest</td>
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<td>.5651451</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
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<td>2.871542</td>
<td>.9213101</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>.0669291</td>
<td>.2501456</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td>3.102767</td>
<td>1.055543</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>1.465964</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
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<td>.7307347</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexican-American</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>.757874</td>
<td>.4287924</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>.4783465</td>
<td>.5000233</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>3.238</td>
<td>1.333008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary statistics for all independent and dependent variables are reported in table 3.

Results

We tested the effect of these predictors on both the dichotomous variable Democratic Shift and the trichotomous version Party Shift. In all instances, our
expectations regarding sign and significance of the parameter estimates do not vary from one approach to another.

Table 4: Logit Estimates for Predicting Pro-Democratic Shift in Partisan Sentiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Democratic Shift</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naturalized</td>
<td>.5179*</td>
<td>.2520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Interest</td>
<td>.8753***</td>
<td>.2203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.4072**</td>
<td>.1421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>-.0991</td>
<td>.4568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.1138</td>
<td>.1131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.0263</td>
<td>.0932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>1.536***</td>
<td>.2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican-American</td>
<td>.4127</td>
<td>.2961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.2718</td>
<td>.2479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.1962*</td>
<td>.1048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>-5.470***</td>
<td>.9037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 405
Chi Square = 133.97
P-value = .0000
Percent Predicted Correctly = 74.1%
Proportional Reduction in Error = .4385

*Significant at p<=.05
**Significant at p<=.01
***Significant at p<=.001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>405</td>
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</table>

Using the dichotomous measure Democratic Shift as the dependent variable, we tested the effect of these predictors using logit analysis—an appropriate method for dichotomous dependent variables. The results, presented in table 4, are, in the main, strongly supportive of our expectations. Naturalized citizens, and those in whom Political Interest or specific Issue Interest is high, are more likely to feel that they are moving closer to the Democrats because of recent discussions of affirmative action, immigration, and welfare reform. The Youth vote, surprisingly, is no more likely than any other segment to move in this direction—in fact the parameter estimate is negative though highly insignificant and
therefore effectively zero. Neither Religiosity nor Income were significant, supporting our hypothesis that ethnic-specific issues are negating the partisanship effects of Latino social conservatism and increasing affluence.

Among the control variables, Mexican-Americans seem marginally more likely to shift toward the Democrats than other Latinos, though this relationship

**In all instances, the insignificant (and in the case of income, unstable) parameter estimates suggest that reactions to the stimulus of political rhetoric about affirmative action, immigration, and welfare reform does not vary appreciably across different groups on these dimensions.**

is weak (p<.10). Those reporting higher levels of Education seem less likely to shift toward the Democrats, and Gender appears to have no significant impact. As we would expect, self-reported Partisanship is strongly associated with whether or not the respondent feels closer to the Democratic Party as a result of discussion of these issues.10

The model correctly predicts 74 percent of the cases, and the overall significance of the model is high. More importantly, the Proportional Reduction of Error is a robust .4385, indicating substantial predictive purchase from the model.11

As we suggested earlier, this dichotomous variable conflates pro-GOP sentiment with no pro-partisan movement. In order to separate these effects and get more accurate estimates of the effect of our predictors on the sentiments of the respondents, we need to analyze the data with respect to the trichotomous version of the dependent variable.12 We employed an Ordered Logit, which allowed us to estimate logistic relationships between the predictors and a multiple category ordinal level variable. We can do so without dropping cases, constraining the variance in the dependent variable, or violating the assumptions of the method in use. We performed this analysis on the variable Partisan Shift. The results are presented in table 5.

The results of this model are highly consistent with those of our earlier one with Democratic Shift as the dependent variable. All of the important predictors retain their sign and significance, and the model remains highly significant. The percent predicted correctly is 71 percent, which is not surprisingly somewhat smaller than the previous model given the increased variance in the dependent variable. The Proportional Reduction of Error remains high, at .4138. Perhaps more important however is that the model incorrectly predicts the direction of shift for those actually reporting some effect only 1 percent of the time.

One minor difference with the earlier model does occur. The control variable for Mexican-American ethnicity is significant (p<=.05), indicating a modestly higher propensity of Mexican-Americans, compared with other Latinos, to feel closer to the Democrats. The poor performance of the young voter indicator
(Youth) persists. The sign on income switches to the predicted direction, but the variable remains, as anticipated, highly insignificant.13

Table 5: Ordered Logit Estimates for Predicting All Shifts in Partisan Sentiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Partisan Shift</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naturalized</td>
<td>.6691**</td>
<td>.2304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Interest</td>
<td>.6970***</td>
<td>.1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.2967**</td>
<td>.1261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>.0606</td>
<td>.4326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.0625</td>
<td>.1043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.0560</td>
<td>.0825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>1.641***</td>
<td>.1779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican-American</td>
<td>.4821*</td>
<td>.2635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.3546</td>
<td>.2266</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.1586*</td>
<td>.0962</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Cut Point 2</td>
<td>5.520</td>
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(Ancillary Parameters)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>-1</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 405
Chi-Square = 160.74
P-value = .0000
Percent Predicted Correctly = 70.6%
Proportional Reduction in Error = .4138
*Significant at p<=.05
**Significant at p<=.01
***Significant at p<=.001

Discussion

Our hypotheses have, in the main, been supported. The movement in partisan sentiment, occasioned by discussions of affirmative action, immigration, and welfare reform, appears to be constrained by initial partisanship, but still driven by the general level of political interest of the individual, the specific attention...
they pay to these issues since the passage of Proposition 187, and whether they are naturalized citizens of the United States rather than native born. We had expected that the youngest voters, those entering the voting pool by virtue of turning 18, might also have been more moved toward the Democrats by the salience of these issues, but this was decidedly not the case. The reason for this is unclear, but one might suspect that the rather low levels of political attention paid by the young traditionally might serve to damp their awareness of this issue dimension

The Latino community, already 10 percent of the population, is America’s fastest growing minority, and will displace African-Americans as the largest minority in less than 20 years. Like other immigrant and minority populations, this one lags economically behind the rest of the nation....

and, by extension, their reaction to it. In other words, the youngest voters are the most likely to have ill-formed partisan attachments in the first place. Finding that these weak or uninformed attachments are less sensitive to the issue environment is not, then, all that surprising.

Perhaps our most important findings concern the religious or higher income respondents, that is, those Latinos perceived as being ripe for the picking by GOP electoral strategists. In all instances, the insignificant (and in the case of income, unstable) parameter estimates suggest that reactions to the stimulus of political rhetoric about affirmative action, immigration, and welfare reform does not vary appreciably across different groups on these dimensions. Those professing more religious observance, like those of higher income, are as likely as their less fortunate or less faithful brethren to find the discussion of these issues a cause for warmer feelings about the Democratic Party and presumably, by extension, less enthusiasm for voting for the GOP candidates.

Among the control variables, there does appear to be some evidence that Latino’s of Mexican origin—about 76 percent of our respondents—are more prone to pro-Democratic shifts in sentiment than the remainder. The reason for this is not entirely clear but is, perhaps, a question worthy of investigation in future endeavors. This finding does, however, call into question the national generalizability of these California-based findings for two reasons. First, the issue of immigration and ethnicity is currently far more politicized in the California context with Propositions 187 and 209. Our findings would imply, then, that the identified shift in partisan sentiment likely is smaller elsewhere but, as in California, would respond to partisan invective on these issues should it emerge in those other states. The second reason why the findings might not be fully generalizable is that the percent of the Latino population in California that is Mexican-American, while similar to that in Texas, is clearly higher than in Florida, New York, and Illinois, where Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Cubans make up substantial segments of the Latino population. Unfortunately, the very small number of respondents of non-Mexican origin in our sample makes testing this propo-
situation problematic.\textsuperscript{14}

Gender never appears as a significant predictor for the full sample. While we had no strong theoretical priors that it should, our polling data suggested that the gender gap in the presidential vote was as significant in the Latino community as in the non-Latino white community, which might lead us to expect that female respondents would be more prone to feel closer to the Democrats. No such pattern emerged. The effect of education level was, perhaps, the most intriguing relationship among the controls since high education was a negative predictor of pro-Democratic shift. This surprised us mildly given the results on the effect of income. One possibility was that significant overlap in what education and income measure is falsely damping the importance of income, though tests for this effect suggest that this was not the case.\textsuperscript{15}

**Conclusion**

In our survey, we asked respondents how issues widely perceived to be targeted towards their ethnicity affected their feelings about the political parties. We set out in this analysis to understand which factors would play an important role in their answer. Our results were informative and their implications important.

Issues matter—but not all issues are created equal. It is an axiom of American politics since Schattschneider (1960) that how the agenda is set and where the cleavages are drawn largely determine outcomes. Given the data we have presented here, we cannot say that these presumably ethnicity related issues of affirmative action, immigration, and welfare reform are the most important to all or even most Latino voters. What we can say is that discussion of these issues, and the positions on them adopted by the Republican Party and its candidates, are a cause of concern among Latino voters in general and the newly naturalized voters specifically, and that this concern has effects on attitudes towards the nation’s political parties. This concern would appear to permeate much of Latino-American society, and if the results of the 1996 election are indicative of things to come—and we think they are—emphasis on these issues is counter-productive to any GOP strategist hoping to make partisan inroads into this rapidly growing voter bloc.

The Latino community, already 10 percent of the population, is America’s fastest growing minority, and will displace African-Americans as the largest minority in less than 20 years. Like other immigrant and minority populations, this one lags economically behind the rest of the nation—median family income for Latinos is $10,000 below the national average and only 1 in 11 (9 percent) of Latinos hold a bachelors degree.\textsuperscript{16} For the Latino community to succeed in addressing these economic and educational disparities, they must be effective at extracting outcomes from their political institutions. How exactly this group is integrated, politically and economically, into the larger American polity and economy is an issue of growing importance and one on which we have very little information. Both political parties will be grappling with these questions for some
time to come.

Endnotes

"Morning Edition" on National Public Radio, November 22, 1996

'Dubbed by supporters the "California Civil Rights Initiative," Proposition 209 would have made illegal any program of Affirmative Action that relies on "preferences" over race, ethnicity, or gender. Though it passed, the state is currently enjoined from enforcing it by the federal courts, pending a ruling on its constitutionality.

Polling numbers are drawn from the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute Pre-Election poll. The poll consists of 508 U.S. citizens of Latino origin in California, as well as a companion poll of 203 non-Latino whites, taken October 11-14, 1996. The total number of observations is 405, reduced from 508 survey respondents through missing data on one or more variables. Conclusions drawn here are our own, and neither the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute nor the original collector of the data bear any responsibility.


'On the other hand, numerous studies show that a majority of Latinos continue to identify themselves as "Democrats" (Garcia and de la Garza, 1977; DeSipio and Rocha, 1989; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner, 1991; DeSipio, 1996; Guerra and Fraga, 1996).

Welfare reform was used in the question prompt; so, we include it in our discussion here. Since the actual passage of welfare reform predates the 1996 election by only a few months, however, it is not clear that its full effect has been accounted for in the data presented here. If our argument is correct, this short time frame implies that, if anything, we have underestimated welfare reform's effect on partisan sentiment.

'It should be noted then that this poll was taken during the campaign on Proposition 209. The respondents' partisanship, therefore, might be affected by the initiative's presence but not by the outcome.

An alternative, of course, would have been to ask about interest in Proposition 209. Given the stage of the campaign at the time of the survey, as well as uncertainty regarding both the content of that initiative and the outcome, we felt that interest generated by Prop 209 was, at that point, a less reliable indicator of sensitivity to the ethnicity-laden political rhetoric. Were the survey repeated in a post-election context, this indicator would be a better measure.

See Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) for an extensive discussion of the weakness of political interest and participation among the youngest segment of the electorate.

'This is not a tautology. The data include strong partisans of both parties
who, as a result of these issues, felt they had moved either closer to, or further away from, their own party.

"Proportional Reduction of Error (sometimes called Lambda-p) estimates the model's improvement over predicting the mode of the dependent variable for all cases. It is considered a more accurate estimate of a model's predictive power than the percent predicted correctly, particularly under circumstances when there is a substantial skew in the dependent variable. PRE varies, in theory, between negative one (-1) and one (1). A zero (0) indicates no additional predictive power; a negative value implies that the model introduces more error than it explains; and a positive value estimates the percent of error explained above the mode.

"For methodological reasons, we avoided using two approaches. First, we could use OLS regression, but given the non-continuous nature of the dependent variable in question, we would violate the assumptions of regression and produce inaccurate estimates of the relationships. A second alternative would be to perform a logit or probit analysis on those respondents who shifted either one way or the other, but to do so we would have to drop over half the cases (who report moving closer to neither party), as well as introduce a huge skew into the dependent variable.

"Ancillary parameters are essentially thresholds, estimated by the routine, that are used to demarcate the predictions of the model across values of the dependent variable.

"Nevertheless, we did run the model separately on two sub-samples. Among only Mexican-Americans, the results are highly consistent with those reported in tables 4 and 5, though the effects of Naturalization and Gender appear much stronger while Education slipped to statistical insignificance. The non-Mexican subsample was small—only 96 valid responses—and, as a result, two parameter estimates, Issue Interest and Naturalization, fell to insignificance. One variable, Gender, produced a conflicting finding. The remaining five estimates remained similar in magnitude, direction, and significance to those from the full sample.

"These two variables only correlate at .4217, which is not usually considered high enough to reduce the efficiency of the estimators. As a further test, removing either had no effect on the coefficient of the other and, in fact, in the absence of education, the estimate on income becomes more insignificant.


References


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