HARVARD JOURNAL OF HISPANIC POLICY
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Hispanic Policy in the 21st Century

Feature Interviews


Feature Articles
All Politics Is Local: Latinos and the 2000 Elections Michael Jones-Correa, Ph.D.

Substantive Representation for Hispanics: Explaining Congressional Support for Hispanic Issues Adolfo Santos, Ph.D.

Ignored Migrant Voices—Mexican Political Refugees in the United States Luis F. B. Plascencia, M.A.

The Race Is Not Even: Minority Education in a Post-Affirmative Action Era Gilberto Q. Conchas, Ph.D., Kimberly Goyette, Ph.D.

Book Reviews
Linda Chavez’s Out of the Barrio Reviewed by Alejandra Montenegro

Mike Davis’s Magical Urbanism Reviewed by Claudia Milian
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Editors’ Remarks

The growing Hispanic population in the United States carries broad public policy implications for the 21st century. The transition of Latinos becoming the largest minority in the country has sent ripple effects that can be felt in every sector of American society and culture. Latino voter turnout has continually increased in U.S. presidential elections since 1974, and politicians are courting Hispanic votes in ways thought unimaginable just decades ago. George W. Bush had a Spanish television broadcast with Sabado Gigante’s Don Francisco, an extremely popular Spanish television persona. Al Gore held a campaign rally with legendary musician Carlos Santana. As presidential candidates in the 2000 elections wooed Latinos with Spanish advertising, Hispanics were making direct impacts on state and local levels. If current projections remain true, by 2025 only two countries will have more people of Latin American descent living within their borders, and the United States will become the third largest Latin American nation in the world. As Hispanics continue to shape the demographics of the American political landscape, policymakers would be wise to take into account the diverse perspectives that Latinos have to contribute in this new millennium.

Since 1985, the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy has persistently served as a forum for the articulation of a plurality of voices on public policy issues relevant to the Latino community. The Journal’s mission to further the economic, social, and political empowerment of Latinos remains our cardinal objective. We humbly offer Volume 13: Hispanic Policy in the 21st Century to policymakers and those who implement policy initiatives as a tool for the fostering of practical recommendations based on rigorous analysis of public policy issues.

Our featured interviews are with two leaders who dedicated their lives to the betterment of the Latino community. The Honorable Bill Richardson, former secretary of energy, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and member of Congress, discusses the current challenges and future potentials of Hispanics in the U.S. political arena. The Honorable Pedro Rosselló, former governor of Puerto Rico, discusses economic development, political status transformation, statehood, and U.S. military bases in Vieques. Their experiences and leadership provide much insight, and we thank them for their participation and their determination to further issues of importance to the Hispanic community.
Michael Jones-Correa’s article provides us with a thorough analysis of the 2000 elections. He includes key demographical data and notes in his conclusion that, at least for now, Latinos’ impacts will be greatest at the state and local level. Adolfo Santos identifies conditions for substantive congressional representation of Hispanic issues. His evidence concludes that such support may be explained in terms of party affiliation, ethnicity, and party-ethnicity interaction. Gilberto Q. Conchas and Kimberly A. Goyette’s article provides a comparative study of Vietnamese and Mexican American educational inequalities and stereotypes. They conclude that the school context and perceptions of students based on race are more significant than family conditions. Luis F. B. Plascencia’s article addresses the rise in Mexican nationals seeking political asylum and upon careful analysis finds that United States decisions represent intermestic policy decisions. He concludes that U.S. interests in fostering the “war on drugs” and relations with Mexico most directs asylum policy-making.

We close this Journal with two book reviews. Following President George W. Bush’s controversial nomination of Linda Chavez to a Cabinet level position, we include an analysis of her book Out of the Barrio: Toward a New Politics of Hispanic Assimilation. Claudia Milian’s review of Magical Urbanism: Latinos Reinvent the U.S. Big City by Mike Davis underscores the economic and intellectual potential of Latinos and stresses the importance of recognizing the plurality within the Latino community.

As editors in chief, we take great pleasure in extending our heartfelt gratitude to the many individuals without whose help Volume 13 would not have been possible. First and foremost, the dedication, altruistic compassion, and selfless devotion to the ideals of the Journal from our student board members have been underscored by countless hours of valued contributions. Their commitment, leadership, and vision represents hope for the many good things yet to come, as they shall continue to change the world in ways that shall affect us all. They have earned our respect, gratitude, and receive infinite abrazos!

We are greatly indebted to our executive advisory board and Chairperson Grace Flores-Hughes for their generous support, guidance, and assistance. Their passion for Hispanic policy and leadership motivates us to strive to be our best. The Journal would not exist without the continued financial and institutional support of Dean Joseph McCarthy. In addition, Mayra De La Garza merits unconditional appreciation, as well as Maurilio León who assisted us.

We are appreciative to Abigail Miekó Vargus for her copyediting, the John F. Kennedy School of Government staff for logistical coordination, and the Kennedy School Student Government for their yearly support. Special assistance was provided throughout the year by the Honorable Pedro Rosselló, whose generosity and integrity are examples for all of us. Furthermore, the staffs of the Harvard Journal of African American Public Policy, the Asian American Policy Review, the Women’s Policy Journal of Harvard, John F. Kennedy School of Government, and Q: Journal of Sexual Orientation and Public Policy at Harvard.
We dedicate this journal to Professor Richard Parker. The advice, vision, and production experiences he shares with us as co-founder of Mother Jones Magazine enlighten our decisions and motivate us towards perfection. We are greatly indebted for his friendship, humor, and wisdom. An economist by training, he makes sure that production is not calculated on the basis of shelf-space! Likewise, we are honored to welcome back to the Journal Professor Xavier de Souza Briggs as an adviser. For sharing with us his wealth of policy knowledge and willingness to provide assistance throughout the editorial process we are thankful. Ultimately, we would especially like to recognize Christine Connare, our unsung heroine, who works daily to ensure the success of the Journal. We appreciate on behalf of the entire staff their commitment to the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy.

Finally, we would like to thank the many individuals and institutions that subscribe to and read the Journal. With support from our readers, we are able to further create a space for dialogue and promote solutions to furthering the Latino community’s economic, social, and political empowerment.

Adelante con la lucha para el futuro de nuestra comunidad!

Sandra Margarita Gallardo and Luis Sergio Hernandez, Jr.
Editors in Chief
Developing a National Latino Agenda for the 21st Century

Interview with the Honorable Bill Richardson
Former Secretary of Energy, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and Member of Congress

Bill Richardson was the highest-ranking Hispanic in the Clinton Administration and the first Latino to serve in a foreign policy cabinet-level position. He served as secretary of energy of the United States from 1998 to 2000, having served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 1997 to 1998, and, before that, as a U.S. Congressman from New Mexico for seven terms.

At the Department of Energy, Richardson made improving security and counterintelligence at the nuclear weapons labs and throughout the DOE complex his top priority. He led the administration effort to combat rising oil prices; enhanced nuclear safety and security in Russia by signing a series of nonproliferation agreements; developed electricity restructuring legislation; streamlined DOE’s organization and management structure; and initiated the Scientific Simulation Initiative, to provide a computational system to advance the nation’s missions in energy, environment, and basic science.

While serving as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. he addressed numerous difficult international negotiating challenges and crises including Iraq, unpaid U.S. United Nations dues, peaceful transfer of power in the former Zaire, and Afghanistan. In Congress he was elected eight times to represent New Mexico’s third congressional district, one of the most ethnically diverse in the country. Bill Richardson held one of the highest-ranking posts in the House Democratic Leadership serving as chief deputy whip. He was a member of the Resources Committee, the Commerce Committee, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Helsinki Commission on Human Rights, and also chaired the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. He also served as vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Richardson has served as President Clinton’s special envoy on many missions and has been nominated three times for the Nobel Peace Prize. As a diplomatic “trouble shooter,” he has negotiated the release of hostages, American servicemen, and prisoners in North Korea, Iraq, Cuba, and Sudan. Richardson received a bachelor of
arts degree from Tufts University in 1970 and a master of arts degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1971.

Luis Sergio Hernandez, Jr., of HJHP interviewed Bill Richardson on 1 May 2001.

HJHP
First, thank you for granting the Journal this exclusive interview. As Latinos transition into the largest minority in the country, what do you see as the most important political issues affecting our community?

Richardson
First is how we can consider ourselves Hispanics and Latinos—and not just Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and South Americans. We need to integrate ourselves into a Latino family. That’s number one. Beyond that, the most important issue for us is education. We have got to attack the ingrained school drop-out rate of our community. We have got to attack pregnancies, aspects of Latino women. We have got to accelerate the Latino community’s entry into the Internet and global economy as rapidly as possible.

HJHP
You mention education. Which issues concerning education do you believe are most important? And at what grade levels—higher education, middle schools?

Richardson
I believe the concentration should be first in early childhood education to prevent approximately one out of two Latinos from later dropping out of high school. Secondly, I think we should accelerate Latino education experience in technology, the Internet, and science. Third, it is important to get Latinos to look at community colleges and universities.

HJHP
What factors do you consider critical for raising awareness among non-Latinos about the policy and political issues most relevant to our community?

Richardson
I believe that we should convey to non-Latinos that Latinos are just like anybody else. They care about mainstream issues. They care about jobs, and children’s safety, and the economy. That Latinos do not want a handout; they just want equal opportunity. But also mainly conveying to non-Latinos that the Latino community is a growing political force that is uniting and must be taken seriously.
**HJHP**

The *New York Times* called the 2000 election a “virtual love-fest” as politicianscourted the Hispanic vote. From your vantage point, what are the key Democratic and Republican successes and challenges in building a Latino constituent base?

**Richardson**

Both Republicans and the Democrats take the Latino vote for granted. Democrats assume that Latinos will vote more than 70 percent Democratic. They are mistaken unless more outreach and serious efforts to give Latinos leadership positions within the Democratic party and boost membership in elected positions take place. So far, Republicans have not overcome the huge baggage of being associated with anti-immigration and anti-discriminatory provisions like Proposition 187 in California and anti-immigration measures in Florida. Republicans have a tougher road to go. Nonetheless, they are making an effort, and Democrats cannot take the Latino vote for granted and must be more aggressive themselves. I think under Bush there will be a major outreach to Latinos for 2002 and 2004. And while Democrats will not lose the Latino majority, there could be some serious Republican inroads unless Democrats respond with concrete policies and efforts to connect with the Latino voter. Democrats can no longer take their vote for granted, given the diversity and the independence of the Latino community.

**HJHP**

Although the sheer number of Latinos has been continuously rising to a current level of 31.7 million, according to the 1990 Census nearly half of the adult, Latino population are not U.S. citizens. If you factor in age, nearly 70 percent of Latinos cannot vote. Given these statistics, what do you perceive to be the most important leadership challenges in effecting voter participation for Latinos?

**Richardson**

The point you are making is that they do not register. The Latinos have got to develop unity among themselves as a community as well as develop a common agenda. Latinos cannot view themselves as just having Northeast interests, or Southwest or Chicano agendas, but a national Latino agenda. That has not happened. Hopefully with the election of a Latino mayor in Los Angeles there will be a national Latino leader that will bring Latinos together. The Latino community needs to develop a leadership that promotes Latino candidacies at the national level, at the Congressional level, and does not automatically become part of a coalition in either party. We need to develop more political leaders who run for office. We need to learn about developing political action committees and get-out-the-vote efforts and our own ability to attract the new Latino generation that is apolitical.
HJHP
Bill Clinton promised a cabinet that “looks like America” and went about appointing an ethnically diverse cabinet that included people of color in “non-traditional” areas. Are there common challenges faced by African American and Latino political managers in public service? Are there differences?

Richardson
Yes. Too many times the power structure appoints Latinos to positions that are in a box—to Latin America, to deal with Mexico, to deal with equal opportunity, immigration. It is important that the Latino community be seen as a community with a broad range of interests that can deal with science and the Internet and finance issues. We should not be pigeonholed.

HJHP
You keep bringing up the Internet. With the technical divide between the haves and the have-nots widening, what would you propose to narrow the gap?

Richardson
The statistics I have seen on Latino community use of, and involvement with, the Internet have been encouraging. They are moving up, but I think they are still substantially behind the Anglo communities. I think it is important too that we work with the African American community but recognize that we have diverse interests—that we be part of coalitions with the African American community in some communities but not in others. It is a case-by-case basis. What is more important for the Latino community—something the Black community has already achieved—is to develop a new generation of leaders and a common agenda. We do not have that yet. The Black leaders have done so with a common agenda and Black leadership.

HJHP
How would you describe your own leadership or management style?

Richardson
I think that, first of all, I view myself as primarily an American political figure with Latino roots, not just a Latino politician. Secondly, my management style is one of inquisitiveness but of firm direction. Thirdly, it is very important for a minority political leader to appoint other minorities, especially women.

HJHP
The latest census figures shows that, for the first time, nearly half of the nation’s 100 largest cities are home to more Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and other minorities than Whites. This urban population shift will certainly impact fiscal strength, economic vitality, and political influence in our cities, but in light of stark racial tensions, how can Hispanics foster greater solidarity with
other minority groups? Given the plurality among Latinos, what do you believe is needed to bring us together?

Richardson

Agenda number one is to bring us together as a Latino community, ethnically and regionally. Second, develop a common agenda with issues that we all agree on: on bilingual education, immigration, but also job opportunities and education. The agenda has to expand beyond traditional issues. Until we have done that, I do not believe that a national minority coalition effort is in order. I think we first have to get our act together, but on a case-by-case basis, city by city, use coalitions as long as we pick up a piece of the pie—that our own people are in power positions rather than just as appendages. I think it is important; this is why I think that this election in Los Angeles will be a major breakthrough with a Latino being elected mayor of one of the most important and largest cities in the country.

HJHP

There was speculation during the 2000 presidential campaign that you might have been a finalist as Al Gore’s vice-presidential running-mate. Some have blamed Congressional Republicans for the Senate hearing fiasco which ensued. The president of the National Council of La Raza, Raul Yzaguirre, said that “the Republican leadership treated [you] differently than they would have treated a former Anglo member of Congress.” Do you agree with that statement?

Richardson

Yes I do. I think there were opportunist persons in politics, and it showed perhaps Republican concern that I might be on the ticket. Nonetheless, I was caught in a situation where there was no way that I could have been on the ticket with Los Alamos and the hard drives incident. It made no sense, but the Republicans, certain Republicans, did pile on, and I believe it was partisanship and a little ethnic edge to their attacks.

HJHP

In terms of energy policy, some claim that it has not been a major area for minority leadership. What possibilities do you see in this arena, given that the fastest-growing, most energy-intensive parts of the country—namely the border states in the Sunbelt—are, for example, the ones with the fastest-growing Latino populations?

Richardson

There has been a scarcity of Latinos getting into the energy field, and that is regrettable. We are also seriously underrepresented not just in energy companies but in our national science laboratories as well. Like Los Alamos and the Lawrence Berkley, many of which do energy and science research as well. What is need is very strong recruitment programs so that Latinos are not left
out of the energy and science mix. In particular, we need to sensitize corporate America to the need to develop energy-training programs for Latino executives. We need to sensitize Wall Street, which is involved in many energy investments today for power generation, so that Latino businesses and Latinos, especially in the border states, are not left behind.

**HJHP**
How do you view the current Bush administration’s handling of energy policy so far?

**Richardson**
So far their emphasis is too much on production and not enough on conservation. There has to be a balanced approach—additional oil and gas production and drilling, but also energy efficiency, more fuel-efficient vehicles, and more technology research into solar, wind, and biomass alternatives.

**HJHP**
Census projections are based in part on steadily increasing immigration rates. Should there be a recession, how could immigration policy be altered—and what would that mean for the future of Hispanics in the United States?

**Richardson**
Well, I strongly believe that eventually we are going to move toward open-border policy. That is years away. My view is that while we should continue enforcing our immigration laws, we should at the same time realize that many of our skilled workers in the technology field are coming from other countries, principally South Asia. For Latinos, we should expand our science and technology education base so that we are not left behind in this new emerging Internet/technology generation.

**HJHP**
Who do you think will be the top Democratic contenders in 2004? Moreover, who are the top Latino leaders who you think currently have potential for success in national politics?

**Richardson**
For the Democratic presidential nomination, I think that there are several senators who are obvious early contenders: Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, Senator Edwards of South Carolina, and Senator Lieberman, for example. But I believe the nominee will be a dark horse from the states—a governor perhaps. I do not believe the nomination is sewed up right now. It is much too early. But I do believe it will draw at least eight to ten contenders, and I do think that for the sake of the Democratic Party we need a wide-open primary with wide-open choices.

As for Latino leaders right now, should Antonio Villaraigosa be elected mayor of Los Angeles, he clearly becomes the titular hit of the party.
Members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus are also at the top of the list, but I think it is important that we acknowledge leadership in the various communities and not just make the leadership Mexican American. We need to acknowledge and develop Latino leaders from the other communities, such as the Puerto Rican, Cuban American, Colombian, and South American wings of the Hispanic community. But right now the titular hits, I believe, become Villaraigosa—should he be elected mayor—and the 20 members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus.

**HJHP**

As a former member of Congress, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and secretary of energy, you have had a broad range of experiences in public service. How would you describe the challenges and rewards of each position?

**Richardson**

With the Congress, it is a job with freedom to do virtually anything you want and be accountable only to your constituents. It is a job many times where you see the rewards directly when actions you have taken better the lives of individuals and communities. It is a fascinating job with a lot of demands nonetheless. At the United Nations, it was an opportunity to represent America before the entire world, and where you see how America is cautiously viewed as the world's only superpower. Yet we retain our strong moral force coupled with our military power to be major players in the United Nations. At the Department of Energy, you are able to see incredible problems pile up, yet when you act decisively, you see concrete results. Being a Latino has helped me become a successful negotiator and manager because of my cross-cultural roots, because of my knowledge of other cultures, and ability to bridge gaps between different ethnic communities.

**HJHP**

Following up on that, how did you become a diplomatic troubleshooter and are there any lessons to be learned from you experience negotiating with the regime in Cuba, for example?

**Richardson**

First of all, you have to be at the right place at the right time. You have to have a little daring in your approach. You have to recognize that you cannot be a freelancer. You have to work with the existing power structure. Otherwise you have no credibility. In Cuba, I was able to negotiate the release of political prisoners because Castro and I struck up a respectful relationship based on a common language, culture, and a love for baseball. Yet I do not believe I compromised my beliefs, and I still believe that Castro’s human rights record is dismal. Nonetheless, one can achieve positive results like the release of prisoners and immigration agreements that we signed based on mutual respect and our mutual objectives.
HJHP
Have you had any role models or modeled yourself after anyone?

Richardson
I believe that a combination of the negotiating style of Henry Kissinger and the moral strength of Jimmy Carter in their approaches to negotiation, I felt that a combination of both would serve me well. But I mainly developed my own negotiating style based on establishing a personal rapport, connecting culturally, showing respect, and being extremely persistent.

HJHP
When and how did you first realize a personal desire to enter the political arena?

Richardson
As a student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, meeting individuals from other countries and other communities, and as part of that experience visiting Washington, D.C., and hearing former senator Hubert Humphrey speak about the role of human rights in American foreign policy. That inspired me to get into the political arena.

HJHP
Given the level of distrust and political cynicism surrounding American politics, why would you encourage young Latinos to run for public office? And is there any advice you would provide to them?

Richardson
Young Latinos should realize that the political arena is where policy happens, and where we can no longer be spectators, given the size of our population and the potential and the problems as. I would urge young Latinos to become skilled in the arts of running for office, getting the vote out, and fund raising—because it is through the political process that our voices can be heard. My advice is again for Latinos to run not exclusively as Latinos but as mainstream candidates who care about the entire community, including their Latino roots.

HJHP
Earlier in the interview you said that you view yourself primarily as an American political figure with Latino roots. How closely do you identify yourself with Latino roots in terms of Hispanic culture, family values, etc., and do you consider your last name to be an asset or a liability?

Richardson
My connection with the Latino culture is strong. I speak Spanish daily, I read Spanish magazines, watch Spanish television, but at the same time view myself in the total American mainstream. My name, I have found it to be with
the Latino community a liability, but with the broader population an asset. But Latinos, after they see me and hear me speak, can identify equally with me as if I had a Spanish surname.

**HJHP**
Do you ever use Lopez, your mother’s maiden name?

**Richardson**
No, I do not. I think that would be a little cynical.

**HJHP**
You have consistently been identified among the most influential Latinos by media polls such as that taken by *HISPANIC Magazine*. Do you feel pressure to represent all Latinos or to serve as a role model?

**Richardson**
Yes—I do try to represent all Latinos. I do feel I have to be a strong role model. I think that it is my obligation. I cannot shirk that responsibility, and I enjoy it. So I accept a number of speaking engagements and board appointments to help the Latino community. But I think that those of us who have achieved responsibility and some degree of success have an obligation to give something back.

**HJHP**
There is speculation you might seek public office in New Mexico. If so, what sorts of issues would you address?

**Richardson**
Well, should I make the run for office in New Mexico, one has to address three issues: education, economic development, and health care. New Mexico is among the country’s poorest states, and it needs a breath of fresh air—and it needs political leaders that are inclusive. So I am seriously considering making that race in 2002 but have not made a final decision. Nonetheless, I do not see myself having run my last race. I feel I have one or two races left in me.

**HJHP**
Last question, will Bill Richardson be the first Hispanic president of the United States?

**Richardson**
My hope is that there will be a Latino president someday.

**HJHP**
In your lifetime?
Richardson
Yes, as my view is that there will be a Latino president in my lifetime, but I see my role as perhaps paving the way. The presidency is a role for a young Latino probably getting out of the Kennedy School today.

HJHP
Secretary Richardson, on behalf of the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy, I would like to thank you once again.

Richardson
Thank you.
Puerto Rico: Unfinished Business for the United States?  
The Prospects for Change in the Enchanted Island

Interview with Pedro Rosselló, M.D., M.P.H.  
Governor of Puerto Rico (1992-2000)

Pedro Rosselló was born in San Juan, Puerto Rico. He graduated from Notre Dame University in 1966. In 1970, he received his medical degree, cum laude, from Yale University's School of Medicine, where he was president of his class. He also obtained a master's degree in public health from the University of Puerto Rico in 1981. Governor Rosselló began his career as a pediatric surgeon and professor of medicine at Harvard University. In 1985, he was appointed director of health for the city of San Juan. He entered elective politics in 1988 as an advocate of statehood for Puerto Rico and in 1992 was elected governor, winning the island's biggest gubernatorial landslide in 20 years. In his eight years as governor, Rosselló focused on combating crime, implementing major health care reform, privatizing state-owned companies, and promoting resolution of the island's political status.

Governor Rosselló has served as president of the Council of State Governments, chair of the Democratic Governors Association, and chairman of the Southern Governors Association. He received the President's Award from the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in 1996 and the League of United Latin American Citizens Award in 1998. He was a fellow at the Institute of Politics at Harvard University during the spring of 2001.


HJHP
From your perspective, what is the main challenge Puerto Ricans face?

Rosselló
Well, I think, the main challenge facing Puerto Rican society is to understand and internalize the idea that we can solve problems, no matter how difficult
they are. This idea was originally captured in a small phrase—“se puede”—which became a political phrase, but it really captures even more a vision for Puerto Rico.

Given the historical trajectory of Puerto Rico, I think that particularly in recent years the pervasive fatalistic attitude accepting problems and feeling that we have no ability to influence or solve them, for me, remains the major challenge facing Puerto Rican society. However, with the new generation of Puerto Ricans coming up, there is an increased awareness of this sense of being able to solve problems. It may well the generation of “se puede”—the generation that internalizes the idea that, yes, problems may be big, but that we have the wherewithal to solve them.

**HJHP**

What was your administration’s major policy achievement?

**Rosselló**

Well, I think it is the policy of empowering people—a policy that cuts through government, but also living. For example, our health reform program was based on the principle of empowering people. Before this reform, people were dependent on state or local government, and, in essence, had to participate passively in the health care they were given or not given.

Our reform really went to the central proposition that it is the patient who should be in control of his or her own health care.

The same policy was applied to housing, where we thought that instead of following the traditional policy of building public housing in which the person or family was permanently dependent on government that we could empower people by subsidizing housing that the families could own and therefore not be so dependent on government.

In education we felt it was important to empower the parents, the children, and the teachers under the concept of community schools, where autonomy was given to the school community so that it could, in essence, take initiative and not be totally dependent on a very centralized Department of Education.

So if you look at many of the basic areas in our daily living, including, for example, the empowerment that is supposed when taxes are lowered and people can then decide what to do with more of their hard-earned income, those are all examples of what I think is the major policy that we try to institute throughout the government and throughout the Puerto Rican society.

**HJHP**

Talking about public policy in Puerto Rico, the new administration is seeking more incentives for economic development, which include amending Section 956 of the Internal Revenue Code, and also constructing a trans-shipment port in the southern part of Puerto Rico, a plan that your administration started. Do you think that these policies are going to have the expected results?
Rosselló

Well, I think the major theme we should follow in economic development is to try to make Puerto Rico more competitive within a rapidly developing global market. I am a little bit concerned that policies that have been implemented in the past—and once might have been successful—are looked to as the only policies to stimulate the economy in Puerto Rico. I think that is an error.

I think that Puerto Rico is going through a second transformation. A first transformation—from an agricultural to an industrial society—occurred in the 1940s, ’50s, and ’60s; now at the beginning of the 21st century, we’re going through a second transformation from an industrial society to basically an information- and service-based society. If we continue to depend only on strategies geared to industrial society, then we’re going to fall short in the new, evolving global market.

So as governor, our new economic model for Puerto Rico was to help transform it from a predominately monosectoral economy, based on manufacturing alone, to a multisectoral economy where services, and especially the information and technology sectors, become more and more important every day.

To do that, however, we have to empower our people—and not rely as much on tax incentives. Actually, if you ask the CEOs of large corporations what factors finally determine whether they will start or keep operations in a given jurisdiction, tax incentives are mentioned but are not the most important factors. So I am concerned about trying to go back to the past, to traditional incentives that may have served in an industrial era but won’t be very effective in the new society that Puerto Rico is becoming.

When people talk about the technology divide, sometimes they are referring to the divide within the United States—but also there is a technology divide in the world, and our policy should be to make sure that Puerto Rico is not left behind in that global technology divide. So I am also concerned about those policies that focus on a specific sector of manufacturing and require federal incentives, and which don’t try to develop our overall competitive advantages. Creating a well-educated, well-trained labor force, making sure we develop entrepreneurs, making sure that we have technologically savvy people—those are the factors that I think will give us advantages in the future and allow us to avoid reverting to the mechanisms of the past.

That’s why we identified the trans-shipment port you referred to as an important factor in making Puerto Rico more competitive. Puerto Rico’s success in becoming one of the world’s major trans-shipment points depends on our ability to be competitive. Making Puerto Rico one of the world’s and the region’s top trans-shipment ports is very important—but I don’t think that that will happen unless we can present a very competitive front. And, again, I think our major competitive advantages are based on the capacity of our people, the stable structure that is intrinsic in Puerto Rico, and the fact that we are a part of the United States and use not only their monetary system, but also their judicial system.
HJHP
I would like to talk about transformation in the political sense. Do you think that the political status of Puerto Rico will undergo a significant change in the next decade, and if so, why?

Rosselló
The short answer is yes, I think there will be a significant change to a permanent and final political status for Puerto Rico. I say this because I think there is momentum building to resolve a situation that is really perceived as an anomaly in the context of the United States and the world, and from which derive many of the problems that we see continually. Problems that come to the fore occasionally here in the states—such as the President's grant of clemency to Puerto Rican nationalists, or the current situation in Vieques, or the court cases on the voting rights of U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico—are all symptoms of an unresolved situation.

So I think that pressure is building, and that there is a greater awareness of needing to solve this now century-old situation. I have been wrong before, but I feel very strongly that within the next decade, Puerto Rico and the United States will finally agree on a permanent and stable political status for Puerto Rico.

HJHP
You have been a supporter of statehood for Puerto Rico. What are the obstacles for Puerto Rico to become a state? And, why should the United States grant Puerto Ricans statehood if they decide that that is what they want?

Rosselló
Well, I think the same obstacles have emerged every time a U.S. territory has moved to become a state. If you look at U.S. history, you will find that there were economic obstacles to all the territories that eventually became states. There were also concerns about the cultural implications of becoming a state. There were concerns about the political influence in the balance between the parties at the national level. And each of these factors has been discussed every one of the 37 times a territory has become a state of the union.

In that sense, I think that the arguments and counter-arguments today for us are no different. Yet one thing that is somewhat different about Puerto Rico at the current time is that it is the only remaining U.S. territory that fulfills all the requirements to be a state. The other few territories, because of their small size, cannot aspire to be a state.

Why should the United States admit Puerto Rico as a state? First of all, I think Puerto Rico has been a territory longer, with one exception, than any other territory that became a state. Oklahoma was a territory for 104 years—and we are fast catching up.

Secondly, Puerto Rico is better prepared than any previous territory that did become a state, politically, economically, and in its capacity to be a productive member of the union.
Thirdly, it would be in the interest of the United States to have Puerto Rico as a productive member of the union and not a dependent jurisdiction that does not participate fully in the nation. It is no coincidence that territorial economies are not as productive as state economies. There has not been a case where a territory that became a state then did worse economically. Hawaii, for example, almost doubled its GDP growth in the decade after it became a state.

So, essentially, I think it is in the interest of the entire nation to have Puerto Rico as a productive, full participant, rather than as a dependent non-participant.

**HJHP**

Do you think that there is going to be a policy change with the Bush Administration in regards to Puerto Rico?

**Rosselló**

I do not think so, based on their initial statements. In one very current issue, Vieques, the Bush Administration has said that it will follow the agreement and the presidential directives announced by President Clinton in January 2000.

With respect to our status, President Bush has said he’ll support the will of the people of Puerto Rico, including statehood.

So I think that this administration will not change policy dramatically—and that gives me the confidence to say that, over the next decade, we will see a definite movement toward solving the basic political problems that Puerto Rico has today.

**HJHP**

On the Vieques issue, St. Kitts and Nevis recently sent a letter to the U.S. Navy indicating they would be willing to provide land to conduct the military practices the Navy conducts in Vieques if they decide to leave that island.

In light of this, do you think the Navy should leave Puerto Rico, or do you think it is beneficial for Puerto Rico to maintain U.S. military bases, and specifically that one in Vieques?

**Rosselló**

Well, Vieques for me is a resolved issue. The elements are in place through federal and state legislation for people who really have to decide this—the people in Vieques—to do so democratically through a referendum in November of this year.

I think I know what the results of that referendum will be, by the way. The people of Vieques will decide that the Navy should discontinue their military training in Vieques. I hope that the Navy has already internalized this, and I would suspect that they are already looking for alternatives. So I think that if events are allowed to run their course, then the Vieques issue will be resolved this year, 2001, with a final decision by the people of Vieques itself.

What the Navy does in terms of its needs to train its forces is another question and has to be answered by the Navy. At the same time, a Vieques decision
should not be interpreted as affecting any other military operations in Puerto Rico. Those are not, in my opinion, a matter of controversy.

Many Puerto Ricans serve in the armed forces, and many Puerto Ricans have died serving. And many Puerto Ricans see participation in the armed forces as a natural element of their citizenship. So I would hope that the issue of Vieques is not confused with the broader issue of military service in Puerto Rico or the installations that the Navy and the Army have throughout the island.

**HJHP**

Over the years, many Puerto Rican academics and political figures have argued that the only reason the United States still holds on to Puerto Rico is because it has many military bases on the island. Do you think that this is true—and if not, why does the United States still hold on to Puerto Rico?

**Rosselló**

Well, I do not think that is true. First of all, I think that U.S. defense considerations today are not the same as half a century ago. And I think the military importance of places like Puerto Rico or Guam, or even Texas for that matter, in terms of defense has been diminishing. I think the reason the United States is interested in having Puerto Rico as part of the nation is that there are nearly four million U.S. citizens who live in Puerto Rico, and that Puerto Rico is integrated in economic and judicial and business terms with the rest of the United States.

So I think that Puerto Rico’s military importance is actually decreasing. It’s not the importance that Puerto Rico once had for Spain, certainly not the importance it might have had even in the mid-20th century.

**HJHP**

Talking about Hispanics in general, what is the difference in the situation of Puerto Ricans on the island and Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics on the mainland—and how do these differences translate into differences in the political agendas of Puerto Ricans on the island and Hispanics in the United States?

**Rosselló**

Well, when you talk about the Puerto Rican people—and when you talk about Hispanics in the United States—we should allow that there are differences, that there are subgroups that may have different views. Certainly, the economic situation of Puerto Ricans on the mainland is superior to that of Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico, although Puerto Ricans on the mainland also have the lowest economic condition among Hispanic groups.

In terms of voting patterns, there is a marked difference between participation in Puerto Rico—which routinely surpasses 80 percent of registered voters—and in Puerto Rican communities stateside—which is very low and therefore means they are underrepresented.

In terms of party affiliations—in terms of U.S. party association, it is still a question as to what Puerto Rico as a state would be mostly identified with.
Some people project that it would be mainly a Democratic state, though I must say that the communities stateside do not follow a similar voting pattern. The more traditional communities in New York and Northeastern states have been significantly Democratic, but if you look at the more recently established communities in Florida, particularly central Florida, you will see a greater tendency toward voting Republican.

So we should not conceive of Puerto Ricans as a monolithic type of a group—and the same is true about Hispanics. However, I think what unifies us is a common agenda all Hispanics seem to have—and that agenda is centered around opportunities for work, for earning a living for our families in an honest way, for educational opportunities for their children, for adequate health care for our families, and for a social safety net when crises arise.

The new census figures show that what was thought to be an event happening in 2010 is happening now, that Hispanics are becoming the largest minority group within the United States, more than 35 million Hispanics actually. I just saw today in the Boston Globe that Boston is no longer a white, Anglo-Saxon majority city. Now Boston is a city composed of multiple minorities. So what is happening here in Boston, what already has happened in California and in Texas, of an ethnic multicultural society, is the basis for attaining the goals of that Hispanic society throughout the United States.

**HJHP**
Do you think that Hispanics in the states, including Puerto Ricans on the island, have the political power to influence the U.S. political system?

**Rosselló**
Well, they certainly have the potential power. I say potential because, as I mentioned before, we are not yet full participants. There is a common thread throughout American history among different ethnic or racial or cultural groups that come to the United States. Initially, in that history, there is isolation, there is non-participation, there is bias and prejudice—all based on the fact that these groups, these people, at some point were not integrated into the political system and were not able to express their needs and aspirations.

You can change the name. At one point it was the Irish. At another point it was the Italian or the Jewish people, or the African American. The common thread is that unless and until each one of these groups obtained full participation, until then, it was marginalized, but once that participation and political will was expressed, then it became part of the political power system and certainly could influence important decisions. Hispanics—and Puerto Ricans in particular—have a tremendous opportunity, not just because we are growing demographically, but because we can double our influence almost immediately by doubling our voting participation, which is something very doable in the short term. Demographic changes take longer, but to go from a 20 percent to a 40 percent voting participation—which essentially would be the same as doubling your population—can be done in a very short period of time.
HJHP
As a governor, what lessons does your experience offer current and aspiring policymakers?

Rosselló
Well, I would hope that policymakers would become policydoers. We all have a tendency to look at, analyze, and examine issues and situations perhaps beyond what we have to. I think it is good to have a concept of policymaking, but the most important thing is policydoing. At some point you have to recognize that decisions are made on the basis of imperfect information, that you will never be able to have all elements needed for a judgment, and that given that reality, it is better to err by commission than by omission. So I would recommend to policymakers that they be aggressive policydoers.

HJHP
What was the most difficult thing about being governor of Puerto Rico?

Rosselló
I think the most difficult was dealing with things that had nothing to do with the people’s business. Let me explain what I mean by that.

There is a significant perception among the press and in parts of our society that politicians and the political system have dubious motivations. And so, if you start with the assumption that whatever you’re doing as a governor has some motivation other than honestly trying to improve the quality of citizens’ lives, then you spend an awful lot of your time trying to fight against all sorts of allegations and obstacles that are placed in your way.

For me, I think the most difficult and frustrating part of my job was to having to spend energy and time on things that were foreign to doing the job for the people. I sometimes think of how much more we could do if we could eliminate sterile discussions and controversies, which add nothing to the benefit of other people.

So if I were to characterize the most difficult and the most frustrating part of being governor, I think it has to do with dealing with the cynicism, the suspicion, and the sometimes-personal agendas that go against the people’s benefit.

HJHP
What can we expect from Pedro Rosselló in the near future? Do you envision yourself being involved in politics again, and if so, to what extent?

Rosselló
No, I do not envision myself involved in politics, in elective politics. Politics is a factor in everyday life, but I have done my share in participating in elective politics. I still hold on to the concept that a citizen should at some point in life enter public service, and in particular elective politics if appropriate, but I do not see myself a professional politician. It might be good for others, but certainly I don’t share that vision.
I would hope that from other perspectives and other positions, I might still be useful in advancing the aspirations of the Puerto Rican people. This could be through academia; this could be in the private sector, but certainly this does not mean that I will divorce myself from what I feel passionately has been an issue for me, which is the betterment of the living conditions of all my brothers and sisters in Puerto Rico. How this will come to happen, I have no idea at this time, but I hope that I will have the opportunity in the future to keep advancing those aspirations and those ideas that unite the Puerto Rican people.

HJHP
I would like to thank you once again, on behalf of the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy, for granting this interview to us. It has been a real learning experience for me, and I am certain it has been for our readers as well.

Rosselló
Thank you.
All Politics Is Local: Latinos and the 2000 Elections

Michael Jones-Correa, Ph.D.

Michael Jones-Correa is associate professor of government at Harvard University, having received his doctorate in politics at Princeton University in 1994. His research and teaching interests include immigrant politics and immigration policy, issues of ethnicity and ethnic politics in the United States, urban politics and social movements. He is the author of Between Two Nations: The Predicament of Latinos in New York City (Cornell, 1998), as well as various articles on, among other things, Latino identity and politics, religion and political participation, the role of gender in shaping immigrant politics, dual nationality, immigrant naturalization and voting, and Hispanics as a foreign policy lobby. He is currently at work on a book looking at the renegotiation of ethnic relations in the aftermath of civil disturbances in New York, Los Angeles, Miami, and Washington, D.C.

Abstract

Throughout much of the 2000 presidential campaign, Hispanic Americans were called the new “soccer moms” of American politics. Like suburban women in the 1996 election, they were expected to play a role as key swing voters, turning out in great numbers and splitting their votes between the two parties. Because of their role as potential swing voters, the Democratic and (in a departure from past behavior) the Republican National Committees indicated that they were going to be spending significant amounts of money vying for the Latino vote.

Yet while the Latino vote did increase overall turnout in the 1996 election, they were arguably not the swing vote that the Republican Party might have hoped for and the Democratic Party might have feared. Hispanics continued to weigh their votes two to one for the Democratic Party. And in few areas could it be said that Latinos decisively swung the elections in their states.
Should we conclude then that Hispanics are irrelevant to the American political process? The answer presented here is, of course, no. It is true that Latinos have been more successful at the state rather than national elections. The progress of Latino political influence at the state level will, however, have a significant impact on national outcomes in the longer run.

Throughout much of the 2000 presidential campaign, Hispanic Americans were called the new “soccer moms” of American politics. Like suburban women in the 1996 election, they were expected to play a role as key swing voters, turning out in great numbers and splitting their votes between the two parties. Because of their role as potential swing voters, the Democratic and (in a departure from past behavior) the Republican National Committees indicated that they were going to be spending significant amounts of money vying for the Latino vote.

However, while the Latino vote did increase over turnout in the 1996 election, they were arguably not the swing vote that the Republican Party might have hoped for and the Democratic Party might have feared. Hispanics continued to weigh their votes two to one in favor of the Democratic Party. And in few states could Latinos have been said to have decisively swung the elections. Should we conclude then that Hispanics are irrelevant to the American political process?

The answer presented here is, of course, no. It is true that Latinos have been much more successful in gaining influence at the state level than in determining the outcomes of national elections. However, over the longer run, Latino gains in state-level politics may well have a decided impact on national electoral outcomes.

The Soccer Moms of 2000

“We’re the soccer moms of 2000,” said Antonio Gonzalez, president of the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project. “The vote that has been spiraling upward in real numbers and has reached critical mass now is the Latino vote.” This view was echoed by the media, which carried stories that the Hispanic vote was going to be crucial to the 2000 election. Early in 2000 there were reasons to think this would be the case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hispanic Origin Population in the United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>22,372,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>27,099,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>35,305,818</td>
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The first was simply demographics. By the time the 2000 campaign got under way, it was clear that Hispanics—U.S. residents of Latin American origin—were if not already, then would be shortly, the largest minority group in the United States. In sixteen states Latinos were already the largest minority group. Because of the very size of their population, and the rate of its increase, it was assumed that Hispanics would have a major impact on politics in the United States, and that this impact would only increase over time.

There are approximately thirty-five million persons of Hispanic origin in the United States (see table 1). The Hispanic population grew 63 percent between 1970 and 1980, 53 percent between 1980 and 1990, and another 58 percent between 1990 and 2000. The Mexican-origin population nearly doubled between 1970 and 1980, nearly doubled again between 1980 and 1990, and continued growing rapidly in the next decade. Between 1980 and 2000 the Cuban and Puerto Rican populations grew at rates four times as fast as the general population. Growth was due both to higher birthrates and substantial immigration from Latin America during this period.

Since 1970 about 40 percent of the more than one million immigrants entering the United States in any given year have been from Latin America. Forty percent of all Latinos in the United States are first generation immigrants; more than 65 percent are immigrants or children of immigrants.

The size of the Latino population was one reason why pundits and politicians began to pay increasing attention to the Latino vote. But the Latino vote in the United States is not only growing rapidly, it is also heavily concentrated. In 1990 nearly 90 percent of all Hispanics lived in just 10 states (see Figure 1). Those 10 states have among them 214 electoral votes—80 percent of the total needed to win the presidency.

The four states with the largest proportion of Latinos are California, Texas, New York, and Florida. Nearly 40 percent of New Mexican resi-

![Figure 1. Latino Population by State](Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Census)
dents are Hispanic. About 26 percent of Californian and Texan residents are Latinos as well as more than 10 percent of the residents of Colorado, New York, Florida, and Nevada. By their concentration in some of the nation’s largest and fastest growing states, Latinos have the potential to be a significant voting bloc.

This potential has been accentuated by the increase in number of Latino voters. Latino registration and turnout has been increasing, in absolute numbers, over each election cycle (see Table 2). In the 20 years before the 1996 election, the number of votes cast by Hispanics jumped 135 percent, compared with 21 percent for the rest of voters.

**Table 2. Latino Voter Turnout, Presidential Year Elections**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>2,453,000</td>
<td>3,092,000</td>
<td>3,710,000</td>
<td>4,238,000</td>
<td>4,928,000</td>
<td>5,513,000 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tomás Rivera Policy Institute.

Even in 1996 Latinos were still only 5 percent of the national electorate. In the 2000 elections, only four years later, Hispanics accounted for approximately 7 percent of the electorate, a 40 percent increase. In California, the state with the largest number of electoral votes, 16 percent of registered voters—about 2.35 million people—were Latinos in 2000, compared with only 10 percent in 1990.

These increases are largely attributable to the naturalization of new Hispanic immigrants. From 1991 to 2000, 5.6 million immigrants naturalized. Between 1994 and 1996 naturalization rates increased threefold across all immigrant groups in the United States, to 1.05 million. In California a record 879,000 immigrant adults were naturalized from 1994 to 1997, and another 623,000 had applications pending at the end of 1997. In 1997 the number of new citizens dropped off to 598,225 and to 463,060 in 1998. But in 1999 the number again nearly doubled, to 872,427. By the fiscal year ending in September 2000, the number had risen even further to 898,315. A plurality of these new citizens was born in Latin America.

Forty-five percent of likely Latino voters in the 2000 election were foreign-born, compared with 20 percent in 1990. Because many Latinos were first time voters in 2000, the impression among political commentators and the media was that Hispanics could be recruited by either party. New citizens were not expected to have formed deep party attachments. Their political affiliations were malleable. As voters, some speculated, they might be up for grabs.

This view was encouraged by Latino policy elites. During the campaign, some Latino activists and elected officials sought to increase the leverage of Hispanic voters with both parties by emphasizing their availability. Hispanic activists like Antonio Gonzalez of the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project actively spread the word that Latinos were open to being
wooed. "I think Latinos will vote for the candidate—regardless of party—who speaks directly about the issues affecting us as a community," Gonzalez was quoted as saying.14 There was a feeling that the Democratic Party had taken Latinos for granted, and that Hispanics were open to being courted by Republicans. As one California activist put it, "[Latinos have] always harvested the crop with the Democrats, but we haven't enjoyed the feast. We're cooking and serving, not sitting at the table."

The Bush campaign was receptive to the argument. They had poll numbers showing that Latinos, particularly the most assimilated, were more conservative than they appeared at first glance. For instance, in a national survey conducted by the Kaiser Foundation/Washington Post, 26 percent of Hispanics called themselves liberal, 34 percent moderate, and 34 percent conservative. On a number of key social issues associated with the Republican Party, Latinos were more conservative than the public as a whole.

| Table 3. Public Opinion on Selected Issues Among Latino and Non-Latino Adults |
|--------------------------|-------|-----|
| Percent                  | Latinos | All |
| Divorce unacceptable     | 41     | 33  |
| Gay sex unacceptable     | 73     | 68  |
| Abortion is wrong         | 58     | 49  |
| Approve of school vouchers| 40     | 32  |
| Religion most important thing in life | 64 | 63 |
| Disagree with gender equality in marriage | 38 | 27 |
| Elderly should live with parents | 64 | 49 |
| Would advise young person to join military | 66 | 58 |

Note: The survey had 2,417 Latino respondents and 2,157 non-Latino respondents.

For example, Latinos were more likely than the general public to think that religion was the most central aspect of their lives (see Table 3). Consequently, a greater percentage of Latinos than other Americans believed that divorce was unacceptable, and that gay rights were wrong. More than other respondents, Hispanics disapproved of gender equality in marriage, and more believed the elderly should live with their children rather than being taken care of outside the home. Latinos approved of school vouchers in greater margins than other Americans, and more said they would advise a young person to join the military.

These views did not exactly mean that Hispanics were proto-Republicans. On a number of other key issues—the role of government, health care, discrimination, employment, and welfare rights—Latinos looked a lot more like
Democrats. However, these numbers on social issues signaled to Republican pollsters that Latinos might be open to overtures from the Republican Party.

In his run for the U.S. presidency, Texas Governor George W. Bush—having won up to 49 percent of the Hispanic vote in his 1998 re-election as governor of Texas—was prepared to make a try for the Latino vote nationally. Early in his campaign, Bush assembled Latino leaders in Pennsylvania’s Lehigh Valley and attended a U.S.-Mexico Foundation breakfast in San Diego. During a stop in Santa Ana, California, he called himself “Jorge” and attended a Catholic Mass, although he is a Methodist. In Bush’s first foreign trip as a candidate, he ventured a few hundred yards into Mexico to meet Mexico’s president. He worked the crowd at the National Hispanic Women’s Conference and visited Latino schools in Sacramento. Bush made it a practice early in the campaign to answer at least one question in Spanish in his news conferences. He even ran Spanish-language ads in Iowa before the January 2000 straw poll to signal his symbolic commitment to the Hispanic vote (which was insignificant in that state).

By the summer of 2000, the Republican National Committee indicated it was going to commit up to 10 million dollars on ads designed to appeal to the Hispanic vote. During the campaign both Republicans and Democrats had operations to target Hispanic voters and donors, with steering committees, youth organizations, materials, and Web sites in English and Spanish, all targeting Latinos. Bush’s campaign ran a parallel Spanish-language operation, with translated speeches, position papers, and a weekly news summary called Que Hay De Nuevo Con Bush (“What’s New With Bush”). There was even a list of dichos, Bush’s favorite inspirational sayings, including Si se puede. Juntos si se puede, which his campaign translated as, “Where there is a will, there is a way,” and Tenemos mucho en común (“We have much in common”).

**Republican Self-Delusion?**

Was the Bush campaign kidding itself? Was the Latino vote that important, and even if it was, was it open to being swayed by Republican entreaties?

If the Latino vote was growing, historically it has also underperformed expectations. In spite of their concentration and numbers, the Achilles heel of Latino electoral influence has always been voter participation and turnout. In the 1996 presidential election, only 36 percent of voting-age Hispanics was registered. That compares with 64 percent of African Americans and 68 percent of Whites. Of registered voters, only 44 percent of Hispanics voted, compared with 53 percent of African Americans and 60 percent of Whites. The full realization of Hispanic political power lies with those yet to become naturalized citizens. Consider: Although more than 5.8 million Hispanics voted in November of 2000, more than 7 million Latinos did not participate because they were not U.S. citizens.

While the numbers of Hispanic voters have been increasing steadily, the picture is considerably less optimistic if one views Latino voter registration and turnout as a percent of Latino voting-age population (see Figure 2).
Even as the absolute numbers of Latinos turning out to vote have increased, Hispanic registration and turnout as a percentage of the Latino voting aged population has held steady or actually declined. In other words, increases in registration and turnout have simply not kept up with the increasing numbers of non-citizens.

![Graph showing Latino Registration and Turnout](image)

**Figure 2. Latino Registration and Turnout**


Because of new immigration, a sizeable percentage of the Latino population is not citizens and therefore cannot vote. The rapid increase in naturalizations in the mid- to late 1990s could not keep pace with the rate of new immigration (see Table 4).

Only 22 percent of foreign-born Latinos are citizens (compared, for example, with a naturalization rate of 44 percent for Asian immigrants). In California, two-thirds of Latino adults are not registered to vote—in large part because many of them are still not citizens. Low naturalization rates—the result of a sometimes obtuse naturalization process, resistance from within immigrant communities themselves, and neglect from political parties and other actors mobilizing players in the political system—are the bane of Latino political mobilization.

In short, the glass of Latino participation could be seen either as half full or half empty. At least initially in the 2000 campaign both parties seemed to see it as half full. But were Latinos really open to GOP entreaties? To an objective observer the proposition seemed dubious at best. If Latino naturalization rates were increasing in the 1990s, it was at least partly in reaction to perceived threats from policies advocated by the Republican Party. A number of factors came together to encourage naturalization by immigrants in the 1990s—the large numbers of permanent legal residents created by the 1986 amnesty who became eligible for citizenship beginning in 1992, the efforts by the INS to reduce naturalization backlogs, and the introduction of replacement green cards for permanent residency that cost only a little less than the naturalization procedure. However, welfare legislation passed by the Republican-con-
Table 4. Non-U.S. Citizens as a Share of the Adult Latino Population, 1976-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Latino Adults</th>
<th>Non-U.S. Citizens</th>
<th>Percent Non-U.S. Citizen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>6,594,000</td>
<td>1,876,000</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8,210,000</td>
<td>2,645,000</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>9,471,000</td>
<td>3,027,000</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>12,893,000</td>
<td>4,815,000</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>14,688,000</td>
<td>5,910,000</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


trolled Congress in 1996 also seems to have played a major role in nudging legal permanent residents to naturalize as U.S. citizens. This legislation was designed not only to keep undocumented immigrants from accessing federal public benefit programs, but more drastically, to bar permanent legal residents from participating in Social Security and Food Stamp programs and to ban all new resident non-citizens from federal means-tested programs such as AFDC (Aid for Dependent Children). The reasoning was that social services were not intended for non-citizens—even if these individuals resided permanently in the United States. Immigrants were meant to contribute to the well-being of the nation, and not to burden the taxpayer. In addition, cutting immigrants off from federal social programs would supposedly save the U.S. government tens of billions of dollars a year, a not insignificant amount in the atmosphere of budgetary constraint that pervaded Congress at the time.

The politics of immigration during the 1990s pushed newly naturalized Latino citizens into the voting booth. California’s Proposition 187, for example, galvanized Latino political participation in that state. The proposition, which was designed to deny undocumented immigrants access to public education and state social services, was widely interpreted by Latinos as an anti-immigrant, anti-Latino vendetta. Its immediate effect was to mobilize already-registered Latino voters in California. 78 percent of those who voted against the proposition. However, because Latinos made up only 8 percent of the statewide electorate in 1994, their votes were overwhelmed by the 59 percent of the voting public in California who favored its passage.

Nonetheless, over the remainder of the decade, Latinos increased their voting numbers and their percentage of the electorate, with the mobilization of the newly naturalized an important component of Latino vote expansion. The 1996 and 1998 elections gave further evidence of the politics of immigration at work in Latino voting. A 1996 survey found that, in California at least, 83 percent of the recently naturalized had registered to vote. Polls indicated that...
recently naturalized immigrants constituted up to 40 percent of the 2 million Latino voters in the 1996 election in California.28 Again, in 1998, almost 37 percent of all Latinos who voted in that election reported being foreign-born. As new citizens added their numbers to the growing Latino voter registration rolls, they also made up a sizeable percentage of those who cast ballots in those elections. Although still underrepresented in the California electorate in relation to their proportion of the state’s population, Latinos made up 12 percent of the state’s voters by 1998, up from less than 8 percent in 1990.29 Nationwide, once registered, Hispanics proved to be reliable voters—75 percent of those registered in 1998 turned out to vote.

While Proposition 187 and the anti-immigrant backlash in California were critical in mobilizing the Latino immigrant vote in that state, passage of national immigration and welfare reform legislation, both restricting the rights and benefits for permanent legal immigrants, had broader effects, influencing how Latinos voted in national elections in 1996 and 1998. Perceiving that Republican Party candidates were using the politics of immigration, affirmative action and bilingual education as wedge issues in state and national elections, Latino voters responded by backing the Democratic Party. In one striking example, Cuban Americans, who historically have voted Republican in overwhelming numbers, gave 40 percent of their vote in 1996 to President Clinton, the Democratic candidate. Similarly, in the California 1998 gubernatorial election, Latinos overwhelmingly supported Democrat Gray Davis over Republican Dan Lungren, by a margin of 61 points. The 14.4 percent of the Latino vote that California Republicans received was far worse than what Republican candidates had garnered in the 1986 race for California governor (33 percent) and in the 1994 race for the U.S. Senate (22 percent). Latino voting in 1998 signaled a repudiation of the tactics of Republican Governor Pete Wilson, who had championed Proposition 187 and adopted an anti-immigrant agenda during his brief presidential run in 1996.

The anti-immigrant backlash of the 1990s helped reinforce the link between Latinos (particularly Latino immigrants) and the Democratic Party. The sense that existed in the 2000 campaign that Hispanics might not be attached to any one party was somewhat at odds with the record. Latino’s historically have tended to identify and vote Democratic in U.S. elections, though this identification varies across national origin groups. For example, 1989 Latino National Political Survey found that 66.8 percent for Mexican Americans had some leanings toward the Democratic Party, compared with only 25.5 percent of Cuban American voters (see Table 5).

Cuban Americans are much more likely to identify with the Republican Party, with 68.8 percent professing some leaning toward the Republicans. In short, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans are somewhat stronger Democratic Party supporters than the non-Hispanic population,30 and Cuban Americans are considerable stronger Republican Party backers than the population as a whole.31

Party identification is reflected in voting patterns. Latinos as a whole have consistently turned out for the Democratic Party at rates 60 percent or
higher (see Figure 3). The exceptions, of course, are Cuban Americans. Latinos in Florida routinely direct more than 70 percent of their vote to the Republican Party.

Therefore, as the 2000 elections approached, the Republican Party could hardly have expected that the Latino vote would swing its way. The partisan attachments formed by each of the three major Latino national groups were unlikely to change drastically in the short run. If anything, events in the 1990s cemented Hispanics’ attachment to the Democratic Party in states like California. In the longer run, however, class differentiation, the increasing number Hispanic business entrepreneurs, and views of crime, family, and abortion may offer Republicans a chance to capture portions of the Hispanic vote. All the Republican Party could have hoped for in 2000 was to chip away at the Democratic lead among Latinos and begin to reverse the perceptions linking the Republican Party to the anti-immigrant proposals of the 1990s.

**Disenchantment with the Latino Vote**

However, by fall of 2000, most political observers’ views had shifted—there was a growing disenchantment with the prospects for the Hispanic vote. Latinos, it seemed, were not going to be essential to the election after all. In states where Latino voters had become powerful, the presidential race was not much of a contest, and in contested states there were not many Latino voters. As political scientist Rodolfo de la Garza noted: “You’ve got to have a very, very tight election for small groups to influence them. Anglos would have to be divided 49.8–49.8. If the majority population is going in one direction overwhelmingly, Latinos don’t make much of a difference. It’s only when the majority is divided can Latinos realistically hope to influence the outcome.” Gilberto Ocana, deputy director of the Democratic National Committee and the manager of the party’s Latino campaign, pointed out: “It is one of the ironies of this race that it is not California or Texas or New York that matters most now. Now the emphasis [for Latinos] is on… those states… where the race is tight.” In the closing weeks of the campaign, Bush and Gore concentrated their time and resources on 10 battleground states (mostly in the mid-West) with 134 of the 270 electoral votes needed for victory-states
like Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Missouri. The Latino voting-age population in those states was less than 3 percent.\textsuperscript{37}

In the 2000 presidential campaign, the concentrated Latino population was a double-edged sword. Their concentrated numbers made them a significant force in four critical states—New York (8 percent of voters), California (14 percent), Texas (10 percent) and Florida (11 percent). However, as it turned out, only one of these states—Florida—was truly “in play” in 2000. The other states were seen as uncompetitive by one party or the other and thus were ignored. Consequently, even though California had about a third of the nation’s Latinos, more funds were probably spent on Spanish-language political advertising in Illinois than in California. The race was also very close in New Mexico (where Latinos made up 32 percent of voters) but with only 5 electoral votes, New Mexico was unlikely to decide the election.\textsuperscript{38}

The logic of the campaign seemed to argue for discounting the importance of the Latino vote. Moreover, the results seem to have borne the analysis out: Of the 10 states with the most Latinos—Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Texas—the Latino vote was arguably decisive in only a few (see Table 6). For example, if all Latino voters in Arizona had voted for Gore, would Gore have been able to reverse Governor Bush’s victory there? The answer is no. Therefore, Latinos in Arizona were not a true potential swing vote in the 2000 elections.

Latinos were a potential swing vote in only three states: New Mexico, Florida, and (perhaps surprisingly) California. In New Mexico, Hispanics made up 38 percent of the voting-age population and 32 percent of those who actually cast their ballots. If every Latino who cast his ballot for Gore in New Mexico had cast it for Bush, Bush would have won New Mexico. However, Bush winning New Mexico would not have changed the results of the election.
### Table 6. ABC and CNN Exit Polls: 2000 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>% Electorate</th>
<th>% Gore</th>
<th>% Bush</th>
<th>% Buchanan</th>
<th>% Nader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Latino vote in Florida, on the other hand, might truly be said to have changed the results of the elections. Latinos in Florida split their votes 49 to 48 percent for Bush. Gore, like Clinton, took Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, the Cuban American strongholds in South Florida. However, Gore won these counties by 100,000 fewer votes than Clinton did in 1996. The shift back of the Cuban American electorate to the Republican Party arguably cost Vice President Gore the election. However, Cuban Americans were not unique in this respect; with the election results for the state so close, almost any Florida voting group could be said to have been a key swing vote. The really interesting case is California. If Latinos who voted for Gore had instead voted for Bush in California, Bush would have won the election resoundingly. In fact, Bush needed only 60 percent of the Latino vote to win California, but he received only 29 percent. In the near future, it is unlikely that the Republican Party will be able to erode much of the Democratic Party’s lead in California. Nonetheless, California and Florida will remain critical battle-grounds for both parties seeking the Latino vote.

**The Real Story: State and Local Results**

If the story at the national level is that the Latino vote in 2000 mattered less than initially thought, Latinos, nonetheless still had a political impact. The real impact of the Latino vote will continue to be played out not in national presidential contests, but in state and local races. At the local level, the con-
cenetration of the Latino population, together with the ongoing effects of 1965 Voting Rights Act and its amendments, make the Hispanic vote an increasingly potent electoral force.

The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act required drawing minority-majority districts for Latinos whenever feasible. Yet the effects of these amendments did not really make themselves felt until after the state and local reapportionment following the 1990 census. The 1991 reapportionment led to significant increases in Latino representation (see Figure 4). The number of Latinos in Congress jumped from 10 to 17 in 1992 and from 17 to 19 by 1998. By 1998, there were 16 Hispanic Democrats and three Hispanic Republicans in Congress.

Texas and California each have six Latino members of the U.S. House; Florida and New York each have three. However, note that more than 23 states have no Latinos elected to national-level office. Note also that since the dramatic jump in representation in 1991, there have been few gains at the congressional level. The 2000 election was no exception. There was some turnover, but no new Hispanic seats, in the 109th Congress.

However, the number of Hispanics elected to federal offices, does not begin to capture the full extent of the changes that have taken place in Latino representation since 1970. Indeed, it is in the relatively little-noticed state and local elections that the most dramatic changes have occurred. Here, the increase in the Latino population, in conjunction with term limits legislation and the Voting Rights Act, has had real effects on the number of Latinos elected to state legislatures.

In California, for instance, Latinos comprised 13.4 percent of voter turnout in 1998, up from 9 percent in 1996 and 7.9 percent in 1992. In Los Angeles County, home to about 15 percent of the nation’s Hispanic population, the

![Graph](http://example.com/graph.png)

**Figure 4. Latinos Elected to the U.S. Congress**
number of Latino voters increased by 50 percent between 1994 and 1998.\textsuperscript{40} In the 2000 election, 80 seats in the California State Assembly were up for re-election. Twenty-eight of these seats (a record high) were contested by a Latino candidate. In 1992 California had only seven Latino state assembly members; in 1999 there were 16. With the 2000 elections there are now 20. For the first time, the speaker of the state assembly is a Latino, and Latinos hold key committee chairmanships.\textsuperscript{41} One in four members of the California state assembly is now a Latino.

In 2000, Latinos also picked up two additional seats in New Mexico’s state legislature. The Arizona and Colorado state houses also added one more Latino each. Even states with relatively small Latino populations made gains, with Hispanic candidates elected to state house seats in Rhode Island and New Hampshire (a first for New Hampshire). In total, Hispanics picked up eight additional seats in state legislatures in the 2000 elections (see Table 7).\textsuperscript{42}

Latinos have also increased their share of elected local positions. In California, Latinos elected to municipal offices have increased 90 percent from 1984 to 1994, and Latinos elected to school boards increased 72 percent in the same period.\textsuperscript{43} Nonetheless, the number of Latino elected officials remains quite small relative to the total number of locally elected officials in the United States. In 1987, only 4,704 out of a total of 419,074 local officials—or a little more than 1 percent—were Latino. Of these more than a third (36 percent) were elected in one state—Texas—that has had a long history of Hispanic incorporation into the state-level Democratic Party. Virtually all the rest were in California, New Mexico, Arizona, and Colorado.\textsuperscript{44} While these figures are now more than 10 years old, even the doubling of these numbers in states like California in the intervening period still implies that Latinos account for only about 2 percent of all locally elected officials.

In spite of their small number, the growing cadre of Hispanic state and local officials has implications at the national level. Federal appointments and candidates are drawn from this widening pool of talent. The increase in the Latino demographic presence and political influence has made itself felt in the numbers of Hispanics appointed to federal posts. Lauro Cavazos, the first Latino cabinet member, was appointed as Secretary of the Interior under Bush in 1989. Clinton appointed two Latinos to his cabinet in 1992—Henry Cisneros as secretary of HUD and Federico Peña as secretary of transporta-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seats held in 2000</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Potential Gains</th>
<th>Actual Gains</th>
<th>Seats held in 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. House</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Senates</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Assemblies</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most recently President George W. Bush named two Latinos to his cabinet; one, Linda Chavez, quickly withdrew from consideration as secretary of labor, when her relationship with an undocumented alien was questioned.

But these cabinet level appointments are only the tip of the iceberg. The percentage of Latinos appointed to the federal executive level (grade G-16 or above) has quintupled since 1970 to 2.5 percent of all federal appointments (see Table 8).

The same is true of the numbers of Latinos appointed to judgeships in U.S. courts of appeals. In Clinton’s first term, Latinos made up 8.4 percent of appointments at this level (see Table 9).

Although past Democratic administrations have been more likely to appoint Latinos than Republican administrations, the indications from the new Bush administration are that the number of Hispanic appointees will continue to increase. Nonetheless, because appointed and elected officials are drawn from experienced candidates at lower levels of government, the pool will remain much deeper and wider for the Democratic Party than for the Republican Party, at least for the foreseeable future. In California, for example, out of 3,000 locally elected mayors, city council members and county supervisors, about 35 are Hispanic Republicans. “That gives us a pool of about 1 percent to draw our potential congressional candidates from,” noted one Californian GOP strategist. Nationwide Democrats outnumbered...

Table 8: Latinos Appointed to the Federal Executive* Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent of Total Appointees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Executives are defined as grade GS-16 or above from 1970 to 1990 and all senior pay levels after 1990.

Source: Table 7.4, Cavanagh 2000, 175. Compiled from unpublished data from Office of Personnel Management.
Table 9: Latinos Appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals Judgeships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Total Number of Appointments</th>
<th>Percent Latino</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johnson 1963-1968</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon 1969-1974</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford 1974-1976</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter 1977-1980</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan 1981-1984</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan 1985-1988</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush 1989-1992</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton 1993-1994</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Republicans four to one in the U.S. House of Representatives, seven to one in state senates, and by five to one in state assemblies (see Table 10). Therefore, local and state outcomes have incremental results, eventually affecting politics at the national level. Success at the federal level depends on success at the state and local level. In this sense, the root of all politics is truly local.

Concluding Thoughts

Latinos are just beginning to leave their mark on American politics. In spite of talk about the 2000 elections being the “year of the Hispanic,” Hispanics had little effect on the presidential election. The impact of Latinos in American politics is unfolding more in elections at the state and local levels, as well as through civil service hires and administrative appointments. While the numbers are still proportionally small, the relative increase of Latinos in these positions has been very rapid.

In any case, these increases are significant beyond their numbers. With the devolution of responsibilities from the federal government to the states, Latino influence in state government will become increasingly important. This importance is only magnified by Hispanic concentration in key states.

Table 10. Latino Elected Officials after the 2000 Election, by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. House</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Senates</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Assemblies</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, the growing number of Latinos in local and state level politics is critical for their success in national politics. It is from these office holders and appointees that candidates are recruited and appointments are made by both the Democratic and Republican parties.

Note that the increase in Latino representation at all levels has been due in part to the impact of civil rights legislation—such as the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act—which has made it easier for Hispanics to be hired by government and for electoral districts to be drawn in a way that would make it easier for Latinos to be elected. Recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court narrowing the impact of the Voting Rights Act suggest that redistricting may not be as favorable to minorities in 2001. How redistricting plays out across the states over the next couple of years, therefore, will be a key indicator in gauging the future political influence of Latinos.

This analysis suggests five conclusions:

1. Latinos’ next best chance to improve their state and national level representation will be in 2002, the first national elections after redistricting in 2001.
2. Due to increased Republican control of state houses since 1991 and increasingly restrictive interpretations of the Voting Rights Act by the courts, 2002 will see significant but not earth-shattering gains for Latinos at all levels—federal, state, and local.
3. If past trends continue, the real gains made by Latinos will be in state and local elections, where there are more political opportunities than at the federal level. This will be true across all states—for instance, in percentage terms, Hispanic political gains may even be greater in Kansas or Georgia than in California—but will continue to be clustered in states where Latinos are already concentrated in significant numbers: California, Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, New Jersey, and Massachusetts.
4. The fact that most Hispanic political gains will occur at the local and state levels favors the Democratic Party, at least in the short to medium run. Given the disproportionate share of local and state Latino elected officials who are Democrats, the Democratic Party will have a much easier time of candidate recruitment; the more candidates they run at the local and state levels, the more experienced the pool of candidates they have for federal office. Except for Florida, Republicans have a lot of catching up to do.
5. Nonetheless, the Bush campaign did succeed in reversing the eroding share of Republican votes among Latinos. Bush’s 35 percent share of the Latino vote was a significant improvement over Dole’s 21 percent. While not cutting into Democrat’s historical advantage, at least it made up for the GOP’s dismal showings in the mid-1990s.

If these conclusions hold true, then the best strategy for both parties is to aggressively recruit new Latino voters at the local and state level by strengthening partisan ties. These voters can then be mobilized, first in state and local elections, consolidating gains for Hispanic candidates, and second in national contests, where they will become an increasingly important voter bloc. State
and local elections, however, while less glamorous, are key-elections won at this level provide the building blocks for candidate recruitment and party mobilization at the national level.

Endnotes


4 The terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” are used interchangeably and are used to describe the population of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Central or South American origin residing in the United States.

5 As was confirmed by the 2000 census figures released in the spring of 2001.


13 Irvine 2000; Bustos 2000b.

14 Bustos 2000a.


18 Latinos demanding more this election: As their voting rolls swell, they want less lip service and greater attention paid to their issues. 2000. *The Orange County Register*, 8 May.


21 Bustos 2000a.


25 Though the legislation included numerous exceptions for emergency Medicaid, disaster relief, child nutrition, and some training and education, etc., it also allowed states to deny state and local benefits to some categories of immigrants if they wished.


30 Though not as loyal to the Democratic Party as African Americans (90 percent Democratic) or Jewish American (79 percent Democratic) voters. See: Connolly,


32 There are indications that the anti-immigrant campaigns of the late 1980s and early 1990s are still resonating among Latino voters, particularly the recently naturalized. Those Hispanics who naturalized after 1995 are considerably more favorable to the Democratic Party than those naturalized before that date. See: Bustos 2000b.

33 Milbank 2000; Booth 2000.

34 Bustos 2000a.


37 Herman 2000.

38 Milbank 2000, B1.


42 Still, in spite of these successes, Latinos clearly have a lot of room to increase their representation. Although the numbers of Latino state legislators has dramatically increased, in 1993, only 2.2 percent of state legislators across the country were Hispanic, compared with their 9 percent share of the population. New Mexico has the highest total number of Latino elected officials at the state level with 41 high-level state officeholders. In 1999, however, 30 states had no Latinos elected to the state legislature, 23 had no Hispanics elected to a state-wide public office of any sort, and an additional 12 states had only one Latino elected to a state-wide public office. See: Cavanagh, Thomas E. 2000. Political Representation and Stratified Pluralism. In *Immigration and Race: New Challenges for American Democracy*, edited by Gerald Raynes. New Haven: Yale University Press.

43 Arteaga et al. 1998, 4.

44 Cavanagh 2000, 168.


46 Latinos demanding more this election . . . 2000.
Substantive Representation for Hispanics: Explaining Congressional Support for Hispanic Issues

Adolfo Santos, Ph.D.

Dr. Adolfo Santos is assistant professor of political science at the University of Houston-Downtown. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Houston in 1998. Currently he teaches and conducts research on congressional behavior and minority representation.

Abstract

While the focus on Hispanic representation has tended to emphasize the number of Hispanics in governmental bodies (i.e., descriptive representation), less emphasis has been given to public policy that affects Hispanics (i.e., substantive representation). This article attempts to remedy this difficulty by identifying factors that explain Congressional support for issues that benefit Hispanics. Using regular OLS, a variety of empirical models are tested. The evidence suggests that support for Hispanic issues can be explained by the ethnicity and party affiliation of the members of the House, as well as the number of non-U.S. citizens living in the district.

Introduction

As Hispanics are projected to become the single largest minority group in the United States by the end of the decade, it becomes increasingly important to evaluate the extent to which Hispanics are receiving representation in the U.S. Congress. Currently, 12.5 percent of the U.S. population is Hispanic, while the number of Hispanics in the U.S. House of Representatives is 19 (less than
5 percent of the 435 members). The extent and nature of Hispanic representation however, remains unclear. In this article, the degree to which Hispanics receive substantive representation from the U.S. House of Representatives is analyzed. Substantive representation is defined here as congressional support for Hispanic issues. The goal is to identify the factors that influence the level of support that members of Congress give to Hispanic issues.

In the process of addressing this issue, other questions arise. For example: Does electing a Hispanic member of Congress lead to greater substantive representation? Does a Hispanic constituency impact members of Congress' support for Hispanic issues? And does partisanship play a role? These are the questions that will be addressed in this study. The findings indicate that the percentage of Hispanics in a congressional district has no significant influence on congressional support for Hispanic issues, once other variables are included into the model. The size of the non-U.S. citizen population living in a congressional district, on the other hand, does play a meaningful role in explaining support for Hispanic issues. The evidence also indicates that Hispanic and Democratic members of Congress are more likely than non-Hispanic and Republican members of Congress to support such issues. However, Republican support for Hispanic issues rises with increases in the size of the non-citizen population living in their districts.

Representation and Hispanics

Works on political representation have attempted to define representation in one of two general ways. From one perspective, political representation occurs when legislative institutions reflect the makeup of the people they represent in a descriptive sense. It is generally descriptive representation that commentators point to when suggesting that minority groups are underrepresented. If representation is to be understood in this descriptive sense, then it might follow that Hispanics are underrepresented in the U.S. Congress.

Minority groups have attempted to maximize their political power by increasing their presence in legislative and bureaucratic organizations. This strategy has been conducted with the hope that descriptive representation in the various political institutions may lead to greater substantive representation. One way in which greater descriptive representation has occurred has been through the creation of majority-minority districts. The Voting-Rights Act of 1965, in conjunction with subsequent revisions, issued a mandate to the states to maximize the number of “minority districts whenever a geographic area contains a large, politically cohesive group.” In part, this Act has contributed to an increase in the number of Hispanics in Congress.

Some scholars, however, are beginning to speculate that descriptive representation, while providing symbolic utility to minority groups, may actually be a hindrance to more meaningful representation. Pitkin suggests an alternative conceptualization of representation—one that reflects “acting for others” in a substantive sense. She writes, “the activity of representing as acting for others must be defined in terms of what the representative does and how
he does it, or in some combination of the two.”12 It is this type of representation, some critics argue, which is being undermined by majority-minority districts. Overby and Cosgrove write, “minorities may lose sight of or even subvert their own substantive political interests by trading off greater (if more diffused) influence for a larger (albeit still small) number of safe minority seats.13 They find evidence that as minorities have been “packed” into more homogenous districts, the surrounding districts have become whiter and less concerned with issues that have an effect on minorities.14 This strategy to help insure descriptive representation for minorities has been assisted by Republican administrations because it has insured safe seats for Republicans.15

Weissberg has suggested that there are two types of substantive representation—dyadic and collective.16 Dyadic representation, or what Hero and Tolbert call “dyadic-direct substantive representation,”17 occurs when the representatives’ voting patterns in the House are congruent with those of their constituents. Collective, or indirect representation occurs in spite of the congruency between the member’s voting patterns and the constituency. While Hispanics may reside within the district of a Congress member who ignores their concerns, there will be other members of Congress who will represent their interests. In this sense, substantive representation may occur in a collective sense, taking the entire institution into account.

Hurley echoes Weissberg’s suggestion, pointing out that while individual members of Congress may ignore the concerns of a minority within a district, the political parties may not. “A Democrat living in a district represented by a Republican may find himself or herself at frequent odds with the district’s own representative, but may have his or her view taken by the majority of Democrats in the institution.”18 Weissberg and Hurley’s conceptualizations of representation suggest that substantive representation occurs indirectly through the presence of representatives or parties that are not directly accountable to those individuals. It is conceivable, therefore, that substantive representation may occur because of partisan support for Hispanic issues even when particular representatives with Hispanic constituencies do not support Hispanic issues.

The focus of this study is on direct substantive representation, here defined as actions that members of Congress take to benefit their Hispanic constituency. These actions take the form of votes on issues that impact Hispanics most directly. It is hypothesized that several factors will explain members’ level of support for Hispanic issues. For example, Welch and Hibbing and Hero and Tolbert,19 hypothesized that the number of Hispanics in the district will have an impact on whether the member of Congress will support issues that are beneficial to Hispanics. The larger the Hispanic population in the district, the more likely the member of Congress will support such issues mostly as a result of the fear that the Hispanic population will mobilize and vote the member of Congress out of office. In this study, the size of the Hispanic population is measured as a percentage of the total number of people living in the district.
It is also theorized that the size of non-immigrant populations will significantly influence the support for Hispanic issues. Kristi Anderson has found that immigrant populations can have a major impact on the outcome of U.S. elections. The immigrant populations arriving in the U.S. at the turn of the century had a dramatic impact on the electoral base of the Democratic Party in the 1920s and 1930s. The recent influx of new immigrants may have a similar impact on the outcome of future elections. These populations often have not had sufficient political experience, thus making their partisan commitments more volatile than those who have greater exposure to U.S. politics. This makes non-U.S. citizens prime political targets for parties and candidates interested in expanding their electoral base.

In 1997, nearly a tenth of the U.S. population was foreign born. Of this group, roughly 51.3 percent were born in Latin American countries, including the Caribbean. I hypothesize that members of Congress hoping for electoral advantage will attempt to appeal to non-U.S. citizens who live in their districts by voting for legislation beneficial to Hispanics. This should follow, given that some of the bills and amendments used to rally support for Hispanic issues have a direct impact on immigrant populations—Hispanic and otherwise. Since one-third of foreign-born residents become U.S. citizens, members of the House with large numbers of non-U.S. citizens in their districts may be inclined to support legislation that will benefit this possible future base of support.

Like Hero and Tolbert, it is also expected that the member of Congress’s ethnicity will also impact the level of support s/he gives to issues that benefit the Hispanic population. It is assumed that substantive representation may be impacted by descriptive representation, i.e. Hispanic representatives will support Hispanic issues. However, there is evidence suggesting that Hispanics do not necessarily feel as though they receive better representation (or at least better treatment) from Hispanic officials than from non-Hispanic officials. Using the data collected in the National Latino Political Survey, De La Garza and DeSipio report that citizen and non-citizen Hispanic sub-groups respond as being treated more favorably by non-Hispanic public officials than Hispanic officials. This may shed light on why, in the same study, it is reported that Hispanics are inclined to indicate that the public official’s ethnicity is not relevant in determining their electoral choice. However, it should be noted that of the 18 Hispanic members in the 105th Congress, only one has a Hispanic population of less than 50 percent. Fifteen have populations exceeding 57 percent Hispanic, indicating that while Hispanics profess not to have ethnic preferences, the behavior may indicate something different.

House members’ party affiliation is also expected to affect support for legislation that is beneficial to Hispanics. Members who score high on the national Hispanic Leadership Agenda (NHLA) congressional scorecard are more likely to be Democrats than Republicans. Democrats on average support Hispanic issues 88 percent of the time compared to Republicans who support-
ed Hispanic issues 20 percent of the time. Moreover, as the parties in Congress have become more ideologically consistent, it stands to reason that partisanship measures a certain level of ideological consistency on the part of the members.33

It is also likely that the representative’s ethnicity may interact with his or her party affiliation. Whether a representative is Hispanic or not may have an impact on whether the representative will support Hispanic issues, depending on whether the representative is a Democrat or a Republican. While we certainly expect Hispanics to support Hispanic issues, we also expect Hispanic Democrats to differ from Hispanic Republicans in their support of Hispanic issues. Table 1 shows the average level of support for each of the four groups. We see clear differences among the four groups, with Hispanic Democrats and non-Hispanic Democrats demonstrating the greatest level of support for Hispanic issues—each supporting Hispanic issues 96.8 percent and 87.6 percent of the time, respectively. While Hispanic Republicans and non-Hispanic Republicans support Hispanic issues 57.3 and 20 percent of the time, respectively. Thus clearly delineating differences among the four groups. This preliminary evidence provides the reasoning as to why it is necessary to control for the interaction between the party and ethnicity variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hispanic Democrats (N=15)</th>
<th>Non-Hispanic Democrat (N=190)</th>
<th>Hispanic Republican (N=3)</th>
<th>Non-Hispanic Republican (N=225)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Score</td>
<td>96.81</td>
<td>87.60</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Standard Dev.)</td>
<td>(3.88)</td>
<td>(11.38)</td>
<td>(13.64)</td>
<td>(15.09)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is also likely that politicians who have won elective office by relatively slim margins will be more likely to be responsive to the concerns of cohesive groups like Hispanics. In those elections where the outcome is determined by one or two electoral percentage points a representative would certainly be unwise to ignore the concerns of minority groups. With this in mind, it is hypothesized that a smaller electoral margin of the representative’s last general election will lead the representative to support Hispanic issues with greater frequency than those from safer districts. The more competitive the district, the more likely the representative is to be responsive to the wishes of Hispanics. Finally, we also test for the typical demographic characteristics of the district—education levels, income, and the average age of the residents.

In sum, nine hypotheses will be tested in this study. 1) The larger the percentage of Hispanics in a district, the more likely the member of Congress will support Hispanic issues. 2) The larger the number of non-citizens living in the district, the more likely the member of Congress will support Hispanic issues. 3) The Hispanic ethnicity of members of Congress will impact support for Hispanic issues. 4) Democrats will be more likely to support Hispanic issues.
than Republicans. 5) The interaction between the member’s ethnicity and party will impact support for Hispanic issues. 6) The competitiveness of the congressional district will impact support for Hispanic issues. 7) The district’s levels of education will explain support for Hispanic issues. 8) The income levels of the district’s residents will affect support for Hispanic issues. 9) The average age of the residents of the district will affect support for Hispanic issues. These nine hypotheses will be tested on several multivariate models.

Research Design

In order to operationalize Hispanic substantive representation, I rely on the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda’s (NHLA) congressional scorecard. The NHLA is a non-partisan association that identifies and attempts to build consensus among Hispanics around issues that impact Hispanics at a national level. Among its tasks, the NHLA creates a congressional scorecard, which evaluates the extent to which members of Congress support or oppose bills and amendments that impact the Hispanic community. Hispanic organizations have lobbied for these bills and amendments, and members of the NHLA strongly agree on whether these bills and amendments impact Hispanics positively or negatively. The various bills and amendments could have symbolic or substantive utility for the Hispanic community. These Hispanic organizations consist of groups looking out for the interests of U.S. residents of Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, Central, and South-American origins. Because the NHLA represents such a wide array of interest groups, the bills and amendments that make up the dependent variable capture the interests of the subgroups making up the Hispanic population.

The NHLA has identified a total of 24 bills and amendments in the House during the 105th Congress. The NHLA has categorized these 24 bills and amendments into six broad policy areas—civil rights and environmental issues, education, budgetary matters, immigration, income security and family support, and voting rights issues. Eight of the 24 bills and amendments deal with civil rights and environmental concerns. These eight bills and amendments are: H.R.1853, which includes an amendment to promote gender pay equity. Within the same bill is the second vote, which is a motion to recommit to promote gender pay equity. The third bill dealing with civil rights issues is H.R.856, which forbids an English-only policy in Puerto Rico. The fourth bill is H.R.2400, which includes an amendment to eliminate the disadvantaged business enterprise program. The fifth and sixth votes are found in H.R.6, which includes an amendment to eliminate affirmative action in higher education, and an amendment to eliminate affirmative action in science and engineering education. The seventh bill on which members are called to vote is H.R.629, which calls for the creation of a nuclear waste dump in Sierra Blanca. Finally, the ninth bill is H.R.4276, which calls for funding for census sampling.

In addition, there are four bills that deal with education matters that impact the Hispanic community. The first of these is H.R.2264, which restricts funding for standardized testing education. Also strongly supported by Hispanic
groups is H.R.2646, which increases public school improvement bonds. There are two education bills that Hispanic groups have opposed—H.R.3892, which eliminates bilingual education programs, and H.R.3248, which blocks grant education funding.

The NHLA identifies two immigration bills that affect Hispanics—H.R.2267, which is a motion to instruct against adjustment status for legal immigrants, and H.R.3616, which allows for military on the U.S.-Mexico border. Later however, when omitting immigration issues from the dependent variable, I exclude three additional bills that have a direct bearing on immigrants. In terms of the federal budget, one of these bills is House Concurrent Resolution 284, which reduces discretionary spending.

There are three bills dealing with income security and family support—H.R.2, which proposes reform of public housing programs, H.R.1469, which extends Supplemental Security Income payments for elderly and disabled legal immigrants, and H.R.446, which prohibits the restoration of food stamps for legal immigrants.

The last six congressional votes deal with voting rights. All but one of the votes is believed to diminish the number of Hispanics voting. For instance, H.R.1428 creates a voter verification system. Meanwhile H.R.2183 requires photo identification at polling booths, prohibits bilingual voting assistance, and once again attempts to create a voter verification system. H.R.2183 repeals the “Motor-Voter” law, making it more difficult to register to vote, and would also prohibit campaign contributions by legal immigrants.

Members of Congress were given a score measuring how frequently they vote the “pro-Hispanic” position on the issues.

This measure of substantive representation for Hispanics is consistent with that used in previous research, namely the work of Hero and Tolbert. They rely on congressional scorecards for the 100th Congress. The independent variables used in this analysis have been gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau’s data and from the Library of Congress Web site. The latter identifies the Hispanic members of Congress.

Four models are tested using OLS regression. The first two models (Tables 2 and 3) differ from the second two (Tables 4 and 5) in how the dependent variable is measured. The first two models evaluate the impact of the various independent variables on all 24 Hispanic issues that have been identified by the NHLA. The second two models test the same independent variables on a slightly different dependent variable. In this second set of models, all those issues with a direct impact on immigrants have been excluded from the equation. These five votes have been excluded because they overwhelmingly impact immigrants. Given that the purpose of this paper is to explain support for Hispanic issues, it seems prudent to exclude those issues that may sway the meaning of the dependent variable from one of Hispanic issues to one of immigrant issues.

Each of the two models within each set also differ from one another in that the first model in each set (Tables 2 and 4) include the maximum number of House seats possible, while the second model of each set (Tables 3 and 5) excluded all those congressional districts with less than a 5 percent Hispanic
population. This means that only 160 to 166 congressional seats were included in this part of the analysis. Excluding those districts with less than a 5 percent Hispanic population is done so as to allow for comparison with previous research.\footnote{42}

**Findings**

*Including All Hispanic Issues*

To test the hypotheses, I first ran a regular bivariate correlation between the dependent variable support for Hispanic issues, and each of the nine independent variables. The bivariate correlation coefficients are presented in each of the tables. What becomes clear is that at the bivariate level all of the variables are significantly correlated with the dependent variable with the exception of age and income. The per capita income of the district and the average age of the residents of the district have no direct bearing on the representative’s support for Hispanic issues. This is the case for each of the four scenarios presented in each of the tables. It is not surprising that income and age have no direct impact on support for Hispanic issues given the weak theoretical grounds for including such variables.

*All Districts Included*

The bivariate test gives reason to reduce the model to include only those seven variables that are statistically significant. Turning to Table 2, in the multivariate model I included all of the variables that are significant at the bivariate level. What becomes evident is that the impact of education and size of the Hispanic population is statistically insignificant. The latter is surprising, although there has been previous research showing that the size of the Hispanic population has no significant impact on support for Hispanic issues.\footnote{43} This is the case in all of the models in tables 2 through 5, both the fully specified model and the reduced models.

In the reduced model in Table 2, I include the size of the Hispanic population in the equation, and choose to exclude only the education variable. What we find is that no explanatory power is lost with the exclusion of the education variable. The reduced model explains 84 percent of the variance—the same as the fully specified model. However, in the reduced model the electoral competitiveness of the district becomes statistically insignificant with the exclusion of the education variable. Districts with higher levels of education tend to produce slightly more competitive elections.\footnote{44} However, this should not be surprising given that districts with a better-educated population tend to have a bigger pool from which to select candidates. Furthermore, given that districts with lower levels of education tend to elect Democrats, these districts are less likely to present a viable challenger from the opposing party.

As in the fully specified model, the reduced model also shows that the size of the Hispanic population in the congressional district has no statistically significant effect on support for Hispanic issues. Members of Congress are sup-
porting Hispanic issues but primarily in response to the non-citizen population's interests. When we look at the non-citizen population's support for Hispanic issues, we find a significant relationship between the two variables. For every percentage increase in the size of the non-citizen population, support for Hispanic issues rises by 55 percent. Controlling for other factors, members of Congress are supporting Hispanic issues in relation to the size of the non-citizen population in their districts. This seems as if members of

Table 2. Explaining Support for Hispanic Issues, Multivariate Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bivariate Correlation Coefficient (N)</th>
<th>Multivariate Model 1: Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Multivariate Model [Reduced] Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Final Model Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member's Party</td>
<td>.91** (434)</td>
<td>63.82*** (1.45)</td>
<td>63.5*** (1.4)</td>
<td>63.9 (1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic in District</td>
<td>.242** (434)</td>
<td>.034 (.113)</td>
<td>.0018 (.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Representative</td>
<td>.214** (434)</td>
<td>46** (18.33)</td>
<td>46.05** (18.36)</td>
<td>47.21** (17.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Non-Citizen in District</td>
<td>.32** (434)</td>
<td>.44* (.22)</td>
<td>.55** (.22)</td>
<td>.53*** (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.23** (434)</td>
<td>-.20.86* (9.48)</td>
<td>-.21.67* (9.48)</td>
<td>-.21.73* (9.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Competitiveness</td>
<td>.133** (428)</td>
<td>.036 (.06)</td>
<td>.023 (.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.11* (434)</td>
<td>2.82 (.86)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.04 (434)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.02 (434)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.95 (.837)</td>
<td>18.1*** (4.06)</td>
<td>19.37*** (1.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error of Estimate</td>
<td>14.57</td>
<td>14.59</td>
<td>14.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>428</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are b-coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001
Congress are supporting Hispanic issues in anticipation that the non-citizen populations will someday become U.S. citizens and perhaps even voters.

The other variables playing a significant role in the reduced model in Table 2 are the member’s party affiliation, whether the representative is Hispanic or not, and the interaction term which is made up of these two variables. Not surprisingly, the member’s party affiliation is perhaps the single best predictor of support for Hispanic issues. Democrats, who have traditionally enjoyed Hispanic support, overwhelmingly support the Hispanic position on the NHLA issues. Republicans, on the other hand, oppose those same issues. Similarly, Hispanic representatives are more likely to support Hispanic issues than are non-Hispanic representatives. Whereas the Hispanic representatives enjoy sizable Hispanic constituents, it is understandable that the Hispanic representatives will support the Hispanic position on the issues.

It is also hypothesized that the interaction between the party variable and the ethnicity variable is significantly correlated with the dependent variable. It is expected that there will be differences between Hispanic Democrats and Republicans. The effect of the interaction term, once the members’ party and ethnicity have been controlled for, is that it produces a statistically significant negative effect with support for Hispanic issues. While this may seem counterintuitive, there is a reason for this relationship. The interaction term takes into account all of the unexplained variance that is not explained by the party variable or the ethnicity variable. And for the most part, party and ethnicity explain most of the variance. What these two variables are unable to explain are the Hispanic Republican members of Congress. Hispanic Republicans on average support Hispanic issues 57 percent of the time—supporting Hispanic issues less frequently than eight of their non-Hispanic Republican colleagues. When Hispanic Republicans are removed from the equation, the interaction term ceases to have a significant effect. So, the interaction term takes on a significant and negative coefficient because Hispanic Republicans are less supportive of Hispanic issues than some of their Republican colleagues.

The final model in Table 2 demonstrates that congressional support for Hispanic issues can be explained by the partisan and ethnic characteristics of the members of Congress as well as the interaction between partisanship and ethnic characteristics and the percentage of the non-citizen population. These four variables can explain 85 percent of the variance, and thus suggests that no explanatory power is lost in the final reduction of the equation. In summary, we may say that members of Congress will support Hispanic issues if they are Democrats, Hispanic and have a sizable non-U.S. citizen population living in their district. The size of the Hispanic population or even the electoral competitiveness of the district has no significant effect on support for Hispanic issues. Districts with large numbers of Hispanics also tend to be represented by Democrats, or at least by Hispanic representatives. Therefore, given that these two terms have been included in the equation, it is understandable that the role of the Hispanic population in predicting support for Hispanic issues has been reduced.
Including Only Those Districts with a 5 Percent Hispanic Population

Given that previous researchers have analyzed similar data while excluding those districts with Hispanic populations that constitute less than 5 percent of the district’s population, I similarly tested the above model in this way. Given that many congressional elections are won and lost by relatively small margins, a district with a cohesive Hispanic population of 5 percent can have a significant effect on the outcome of an election. Therefore, it might be assumed that those districts with a significantly large Hispanic population will also have representatives that are more sensitive to Hispanic issues. Table 3 presents the results from the model when only those districts with a 5 percent Hispanic population or greater are included. What becomes immediately clear is that the same variables that are significant in Table 2 are also significant in Table 3. The members’ party, ethnicity, the interaction term, and the size of the non-citizen population living in the district are all statistically significant in the fully specified model, the reduced model, and the final model, which only includes the statistically significant variables. It should be noted that the explanatory power remains very high, explaining 88 percent of the variance with the four statistically significant variables.

The evidence indicates that the exclusion of those districts with less than a 5 percent Hispanic population does not change the outcome of the model. The member’s party and ethnicity continue to explain a sizable share of the variance, as does the interaction term. The interaction term in Table 2 continues to express a negative coefficient for the same reasons as discussed previously. Also worth noting, the size of the Hispanic population residing in the district continues to have no significant effect on whether members of Congress support Hispanic issues. On the other hand, the size of the non-citizen population continues to have a significant effect.

Excluding Immigration Issues

One possible explanation for the significant effect of the non-citizen population on congressional support for Hispanic issues is that there may be a flaw with the dependent variable. It is possible that members of Congress are supporting specific Hispanic issues dealing with immigration—an area that may be of prime concern for non-citizens. Therefore, the likelihood that my measure of Hispanic issues may be laden with immigration issues, may explain the effect of the non-citizen population on support for Hispanic issues. In fact, there are a total of five votes included in the NHLA scorecard that effected immigrants directly. Although presented previously in note 40, two of these issues dealt with extending welfare benefits, adjusting the status, and permitting legal immigrants to contribute to political campaigns. Additionally, they permitted the installation of military troops at the U.S.-Mexico border. In an attempt to control for the possibility that the immigration issues are driving the effect of the non-citizen population, in the following two tables I have removed those issues from the measure of the dependent variable. This new dependent variable—non-immigration Hispanic issues—is the percentage of times that members of Congress voted the pro-Hispanic position on issues.
identified by the NHLA, but that did not affect immigrants exclusively. There were a total of 19 such issues.

**All Districts Included**

As in the previous tables, I first ran a bivariate correlation to determine which variables were statistically significant. As in the earlier examples, the age and

| Table 3. Explaining Support for Hispanic Issues in Districts with a Five Percent Hispanic Population or More, Multivariate Analysis |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                  | Bivariate Correlation Coefficient (N) | Multivariate Model 1: Coefficient (Std. Error) | Multivariate Model [Reduced] Coefficient (Std. Error) | Final Model Coefficient (Std. Error) |
| Member’s Party   | .931** (166)     | 67.22*** (2.05)  | 67.72*** (1.95)  | 67.72*** (1.95)  |
| % Hispanic in District | .328** (166) | -.0043 (.122)    | -.05 (.1)        | .57 (.1)        |
| Hispanic Representative | .3** (166) | 56.54*** (17.34) | 57.06*** (16.54) | 57.06*** (16.54) |
| % Non-Citizen in District | .45** (166) | .363* (.22)      | .33* (.164)      | .33* (.16)      |
| Interaction      | .32** (166)     | -26.01** (8.87)  | -26.57** (8.66)  | -26.57** (8.66) |
| District Competitiveness | .241** (160) | -.0092 (.08)    | .4 (2.58)        | .4 (2.58)        |
| Education        | -.281** (166)  | 1.4 (.25)       | .15 (.15)        | .15 (.15)        |
| Income           | -.093 (166)     | 1.3 (2.58)      | 1.3 (2.58)       | 1.3 (2.58)       |
| Age              | -.03 (166)      | 1.3 (2.58)      | 1.3 (2.58)       | 1.3 (2.58)       |
| Constant         | 14.60 (12.02)   | 19.1*** (1.5)   | 19.1*** (1.5)    | 19.1*** (1.5)    |
| R²               | .87             | .88             | .88             |
| Std. Error of Estimate | 13.28     | 13.2            | 13.2            |
| N                | 160             | 166             | 166             |

Note: Entries are b-coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001
income variables are not statistically significant, so they are excluded from the fully specified model. In the fully specified model, the size of the Hispanic population, the district’s competitiveness, and the district’s level of education fail to show statistical significance. Even with the concentration of Hispanic issues, the effect of the Hispanic population fails to register a meaningful impact on support for non-immigration Hispanic issues. This is due to many of the same reasons mentioned above. The size of the Hispanic population has no

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Bivariate Correlation Coefficient (N)</th>
<th>Multivariate Model 1: Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Multivariate Model [Reduced] Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Final Model Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member’s Party</td>
<td>.92** (434)</td>
<td>68.45*** (1.45)</td>
<td>68.52*** (1.43)</td>
<td>68.57*** (1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic in District</td>
<td>.23** (434)</td>
<td>-.02 (.11)</td>
<td>-.06 (.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Representative</td>
<td>.20** (434)</td>
<td>44.83** (18.33)</td>
<td>45.9** (18.13)</td>
<td>44.23** (17.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Non-Citizen in District</td>
<td>.31** (434)</td>
<td>.47* (.23)</td>
<td>.55** (.21)</td>
<td>.47** (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.22** (434)</td>
<td>-20.01* (9.48)</td>
<td>-20.48* (9.37)</td>
<td>-21* (9.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Competitiveness</td>
<td>.13** (428)</td>
<td>.02 (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.11** (434)</td>
<td>2.34 (1.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.04 (434)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.01 (434)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.97 (8.37)</td>
<td>16.70*** (1.06)</td>
<td>16.56*** (1.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td></td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>434</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are b-coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
significant impact on support for non-immigration Hispanic issues because of the inclusion of the non-citizen population in the models. Controlling for party, ethnicity, and the interaction term, members of Congress are more inclined to be responsive to their non-citizen population than to their Hispanic population.

Even with the removal of the immigration items from the model, support for Hispanic issues is partly a function of the non-citizen population. In fact, Table 4 looks relatively similar to Table 2. The same variables continue to show similar relationships with the dependent variable. Partisanship continues to show a strong relationship with support for the non-immigration Hispanic issues, with Democrats being strong supporters of such issues. Hispanic Members of Congress also continue to be strong supporters of non-immigration Hispanic issues, and the interaction between these two terms—party and ethnicity—continues to show a significant and negative effect on support for Hispanic issues. As in the earlier tables, the effect of the interaction term disappears with the exclusion of Hispanic Republicans, and, although insignificant, the coefficient is positive with the exclusion of Hispanic Republicans.

**Including Only Those Districts with a 5 Percent Hispanic Population**

In Table 5, those districts that do not have at least a 5 percent Hispanic population are removed from the analysis. I conduct the same tests as in the previous models using the non-immigration Hispanic issues measure as the dependent variable. As before, the model holds. Support for non-immigration Hispanic issues can still be explained by the four main independent variables—party, ethnicity, the interaction, and the non-citizen population.

The evidence presented thus far suggests that Hispanic substantive representation is not a function of whether a congressional district includes a meaningful number of Hispanics. While this is not a surprise given that previous research has arrived at the same conclusion, what is surprising is that the size of the non-citizen population does serve as a significant predictor of whether a member of Congress will support Hispanic issues. What appears to be happening is that members of Congress are trying to appeal not just to the Hispanic population but also to non-U.S. citizens. One might speculate that there is an understanding that many of these non-citizens will one day become U.S. citizens. Given that many of these non-U.S. citizens are also of Hispanic ancestry, it is not surprising that their size in a congressional district will affect the level of support that a member of Congress will give Hispanic issues. Members of Congress appear to be courting future voters who have not yet been “immunized” by the political system. This appears to be even more so the case among Republican House members.

**Republican Support and Non-Citizens**

When looking at districts controlled by Republicans and Democrats separately and controlling for both the size of the Hispanic population and the size of the non-citizen population, the evidence suggests that Republicans with non-U.S. citizens in their districts will be more likely to support issues that benefit
Hispanics than Republicans with fewer or no non-citizens in their districts. Although by no means a rigorous analysis, Table 6 shows that for every percentage increase in the non-citizen population, there will be a 1.01 percent increase in support for Hispanic issues. While there is a statistically significant relationship between Republican support for Hispanic issues and having non-citizens in the district, there once again seems to be no significant relationship between Republican support for Hispanic issues and the percentage of Hispanics residing in the district.

### Table 5. Explaining Support for Non-Immigration Hispanic Issues in Districts with a Five Percent Hispanic Population or More

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bivariate Correlation Coefficient (N)</th>
<th>Multivariate Model 1: Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Multivariate Model [Reduced] Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Final Model Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member's Party</td>
<td>.94** (166)</td>
<td>71.17*** (2.34)</td>
<td>72.01*** (2.25)</td>
<td>71.86*** (1.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic in District</td>
<td>.31** (166)</td>
<td>-.047 (1.13)</td>
<td>-.08 (.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Representative</td>
<td>.29** (166)</td>
<td>56.59** (17.3)</td>
<td>56.68*** (16.68)</td>
<td>52.33** (16.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Non-Citizen in District</td>
<td>.44** (166)</td>
<td>.37* (.21)</td>
<td>.49* (.22)</td>
<td>.32* (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.31** (166)</td>
<td>-25.96** (8.75)</td>
<td>-25.18** (8.49)</td>
<td>-24.68** (8.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Competitiveness</td>
<td>.24** (160)</td>
<td>.021 (.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.27** (166)</td>
<td>.65 (2.78)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.08 (166)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.02 (166)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>16.22 (13.23)</td>
<td>17.11*** (1.96)</td>
<td>16.04*** (1.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error of Estimate</td>
<td>12.81 (166)</td>
<td>12.72 (166)</td>
<td>13.21 (166)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>166</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are b-coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001
Table 6. Factors Affecting NHLA Congressional Score for Members of the 105th Congress—Republicans and Democrats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Hispanic in District</td>
<td>.0007</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Non-Citizen in District</td>
<td>1.01*</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.44)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>17.38***</td>
<td>85.6***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are b-coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001

Even more interesting is the relationship between Democratic support for Hispanic and non-citizen population issues. Neither of the coefficients for the two independent variables is statistically significant. Democrats seem to support Hispanic issues in large part, because they are Democrats—not because they have large Hispanic or non-citizen constituents. Note however, that the y-intercept for Democrats is considerably higher than for Republicans. When Democrats have no Hispanics or non-citizens in their districts they, on average, vote in favor of Hispanic issues 85.6 percent of the time, while Republicans who have no Hispanics or non-citizens in their districts will support Hispanic issues 17.38 percent of the time. This data thus shows that Democrats as a whole start out supporting Hispanic issues, while Republicans without Hispanics and non-citizens in their districts are considerably less likely to support Hispanic issues.51

Conclusion

It was mentioned above that substantive representation might occur both directly and indirectly. I have measured the extent to which direct substantive representation has occurred for Hispanics in the 105th Congress. The evidence shows that the ethnicity of a member of Congress does matter. Descriptive representation does contribute to greater substantive representation. Hispanic members of Congress are stronger supporters of Hispanic issues, even beyond that explained by their partisan ties. The evidence presented here is consistent with previous research, which finds little evidence between Hispanic populations and congressional support for Hispanic issues.52 However, the evidence also suggests that something more complex is occurring. The evidence presented here suggests that while the Hispanic population itself has not played a significant role in explaining support for
Hispanic issues, the non-U.S. citizen population has indeed played a significant role. The non-citizen population, in spite of the fact that it cannot vote, nevertheless helps explain support for Hispanic issues.

What is perhaps most surprising is that when looking at the two political parties separately, one notices that Republicans are making an effort to target this group. With the influx of new immigrants from Latin America, the composition of the Hispanic population has changed. Currently, the Hispanic population is in large part immigrant and relatively young. Young people and immigrants tend to have relatively low partisan commitments,\(^5\) making them prime targets for either party. Republican members of the House seem to be voting on issues beneficial to Hispanics if they have immigrants in their districts, suggesting that there is a kind of direct substantive representation occurring for future citizens.

While it is mere speculation, the evidence seems to suggest that members of Congress are supporting Hispanic issues for electoral reasons. The fact that Democrats almost overwhelmingly support such issues, even when their constituents are neither Hispanic nor non-citizens, indicates that Democrats are supporting these issues for ideological reasons, rather than out of fear for electoral concerns within the district. Republicans, on the other hand, are less supportive of Hispanic issues unless they have non-citizens within the district.

Endnotes


2 On 16 November 1999, Joe Baca won a special election to replace deceased Congressman George Brown, making him the nineteenth Hispanic member of the Congress. In this analysis, I only include the 18 House members who served in the 105th Congress.

3 It should be noted that while at the bivariate level the size of the Hispanic population does help explain support for Hispanic issues, this relationship disappears with the inclusion of any other single independent variable. In separate OLS analyses, just the inclusion of party and percent Hispanic, or Hispanic ethnicity and percent Hispanic, or even percent non-citizen and percent Hispanic is sufficient to wash out the percent Hispanic effect.

4 See Pitkin 1967, 12, 60-91; Welch and Hibbing 1984; and Hero and Tolbert 1995.

5 See Vigil 1984; Vigil 1994; Welch and Hibbing 1984; and Swain 1993, 16.

6 This, however, largely results from the fact that a large number of Hispanics are not U.S. citizens and are consequently ineligible to vote.

7 See Swain 1993, 5; and Pachon 1983, 211.

8 Butler and Cain 1992, 36.


10 Overby and Cosgrove 1996, 541.

11 Pitkin 1967, 12.
12 Ibid., 143.
13 Overby and Cosgrove 1996, 541.
14 Ibid., 549.
15 See Brace, Grofman, and Handley 1987, 169; and Davidson and Oleszek 1994, 56.
17 Hero and Tolbert 1995, 649.
19 Welch and Hibbing 1984, 329; and Hero and Tolbert, 642.
20 Anderson 1979, xiv.
21 See Lubell 1951; Degler 1964, 43.
22 See Anderson 1979, 13. For a discussion on participation see De La Garza and DeSipio 1993.
25 It should be noted that the Census Bureau does not provide a distinction between citizen and non-citizen Hispanics by congressional district. A more ideal data set would make a distinction between the two types of Hispanics, unfortunately such data was not obtainable.
26 Hero and Tolbert 1995, 642.
27 The ethnicity variable only measures Hispanics and non-Hispanics.
28 For a study, which analyzes the impact of descriptive representation on substantive representation, see Dye and Renick 1981.
29 De La Garza and DeSipio 1993, 1532-1533.
30 Ibid., 1533-1534.
31 Kerr and Miller 1997, 1067.
32 See Grebler, Moore, and Guzman 1970; Levy and Kramer 1973; and Welch and Hibbing 1984, 331-332.
33 See Rohde 1991 for a discussion on the ideological homogenization of the Democratic and Republican parties. Given that the ideological position of members of Congress is largely determined by their roll call votes, and the dependent variables included in this study are also a function of roll call votes, I do not feel comfortable hypothesizing that the overall voting behavior of members of Congress causes the member’s voting behavior on a smaller set of issues. It would be as tautological as stating that roll call votes cause roll call votes. Nor do I feel comfortable knowing that ideological measures include items that are also measuring Hispanic issues in my dependent variable. My measure of direct Hispanic substantive representation is built into the common measure of ideology. For these two reasons, I have chosen to exclude ideology from the equation.
34 The NHLA Scorecard Committee uses the following three criteria for evaluating
the extent to which legislation before Congress benefits Hispanics: 1) Substantive and symbolic importance of the vote to the Hispanic community. 2) Notification of the member of Congress regarding the Hispanic community’s position on the issue. 3) Consensus among NHLA member organizations regarding the “pro-Hispanic” position (http://www lulac.org/NHLA/Method.html).

35 The percentage does not take into account the instances in which the members failed to vote.

36 Hero and Tolbert 1995, 642.

37 Ibid. In that study the authors used congressional scorecards created by the Southwest Voter Registration Institution (SWVRI). Since this time, the SWVRI no longer gathers the data, instead it is gathered by the NHLA.

38 http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/congress/chron.html

39 In the analysis only two House members are excluded: Bernard Sanders from Vermont and Robert A. Brady from Pennsylvania. Bernard Sanders was the only Independent member of the 105th Congress, and Robert Brady entered in May 1998 by special election to replace Thomas Foglietta. Congressman Brady did not receive a score from NHLA.

40 The excluded items include the two immigration issues H.R.2267 and H.R.3616 as well as H.R.1469, which extends supplemental security income payments for elderly and disabled legal immigrants; H.R.446, which would prohibit restoring food stamps for legal immigrants; and H.R.2183, which would prohibit campaign contributions by legal immigrants.

41 In some instances, missing cases prevented analyzing all 435 districts. Much of the missing data comes from the inclusion of the variable measuring the electoral competitiveness of the district. In those instances where the representative was not elected to office the data was excluded.

42 In earlier work, Welch and Hibbing 1984, 333, the authors study only those congressional districts that have a Hispanic population of at least 5 percent. Their reasoning: “This restriction seems appropriate since there is no basis for an expectation that an extremely small Hispanic constituency will have a discernible impact on the roll call voting or representatives.”

43 Hero and Tolbert 1995, 640. They write, “Latino constituencies have little impact on how representatives vote.”

44 Although data not shown, the bivariate relationship between levels of education and competitive districts is -0.13 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

45 In order to test for multicollinearity, two approaches have been taken. First, the correlation matrix of the various independent variables has been evaluated. The matrix shows that the two independent variables most strongly correlated are the representative’s ethnicity and the size of the Hispanic population. This correlation is 0.76. The second strongest bivariate correlation is that between the non-citizen population and the size of the Hispanic population. This correlation is 0.73. Using Michael Lewis-Beck’s test, it could be concluded that there is no multicollinearity problem. In Applied Regression: An Introduction, Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1980, 60, Michael Lewis-Beck writes, “A frequent practice is to examine the bivari-
ate correlations among the independent variables, looking for coefficients of about 0.8, or larger.” The correlation matrix passes this test. To further test for multicollinearity, all of the independent variables have been regressed on one another. The highest R² is produced when the dependent variable is the size of the non-citizen population. In this instance the R² is .78. In all other instances, the R² is less than 0.7. The results indicate that multicollinearity is not a factor. Once again, relying on Lewis-Beck, multicollinearity is a problem if the R² is at or near 1.0. Given that the highest R² is 22 percent from the 1.0, I conclude that there is no multicollinearity problem.

46. The coefficients for the interaction term in the various models are -21 in Tables 2 and 4, and -26 in Tables 3 and 5.

47. Coefficient -20 in the fully specified model and -21 in the reduced models.

48. Data not shown.


50. Of the 228 Republicans in the 105th Congress, 33 percent had significant Hispanic constituencies (exceeding 5 percent of the overall population in the district).

51. In a comparison of means test, Democrats on average support issues that are of interest to Hispanics 88 percent of the time, compared to Republicans who on average support issues of interest to Hispanics 20 percent of the time. Democrats are also less likely to deviate from the mean than Republicans, 11 to 16 percent respectively. This indicates that there is greater variance among the Republicans than among the Democrats. Democrats cluster together, strongly in support of Hispanic issues. Republicans, on the other hand vary widely—from no support to 92 percent support for Hispanic issues.

52. Hero and Tolbert 1995, 640.

53. See Anderson 1979. For partisan tendencies of young people, see Jennings and Niemi 1975.

References


Dye, T., and J. Renick. 1981. Political Power and City Jobs: Determinants of
Ignored Migrant Voices—Mexican Political Refugees in the United States

Luis F. B. Plascencia, M.A.

Luis F.B. Plascencia is project coordinator for the Public Policy Clinic and associate director of the Texas office of The Tomás Rivera Policy Institute, both affiliated with the Government Department at The University of Texas at Austin. He has conducted graduate study at the University of Chicago and the University of Texas at Austin and is currently completing his doctorate in social anthropology at the latter institution. He has a long-term involvement in the analysis of U.S. immigrant and immigration policy.

Abstract

The article discusses the rise in the number of Mexican nationals seeking political asylum in the United States from 1992 through 1998. An analysis of data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Executive Office of Immigration Review, and a sample of cases reveals that U.S. denials of Mexican applicants represent an intermestic policy decision, rather than a decision on the merits of each case. It also suggests that U.S. policy on Mexican political refugees is analogous to the position in the 1980s regarding Central American refugees. U.S. interests in maintaining positive relations with Mexico and continuing the “war on drugs” seem to direct our asylum decisions.

Introduction

Political asylum and Mexican immigration are two policy issues not often discussed together. The former is commonly associated with refugees from Central America, China, Cuba, Haiti, or the former Soviet Union. The latter, on the other hand, is most often framed in reference to the unauthorized entry
and presence of Mexican nationals to the United States. Policymakers, immigrant advocates, and researchers have traditionally focused on the economic dimensions of Mexican immigration and, consequently, have paid limited attention to other determinants such as political factors and human rights violations. International organizations concerned with refugees are sensitive to human rights violations and the forced exile of individuals from their homelands but have generally not placed much interest on Mexican refugees. Consequently, Mexican political asylum applicants and the processes that motivated their emigration have remained largely unexamined.

The conjunction of the two issues is particularly apparent when we take into account the growing importance of Mexican asylum applications. The emergence of Mexico within the top 10 source countries for asylum applications in 1993 and its position as the leading country four years later did not draw much attention from the media, nor did it evoke a broad discussion of its significance. Moreover, researchers have generally ignored the implications of the volume of asylum applicants in explanations of Mexican emigration.

A review of the volume of asylum claims by Mexican nationals and the low number of actual cases granted, as well as the limited academic and policy discussion of the issues, suggests the need for examination. A fuller understanding of the issue can provide policymakers and other interested parties with a firmer foundation in current and future debates about asylum and Mexican claimants. This essay aims to contribute to that understanding. Secondly, it also aims to expand and offer a context for an important observation made by de la Garza and Szekely (1997) regarding the role of political factors in stimulating the emigration of Mexicans to the United States.

This study addresses three critical issues. First, it provides a summary of the volume of political asylum cases filed by Mexican nationals, as well as the number of individual applications granted. Second, it offers a summary of the explanations put forth regarding the rise in applications and the limited number of cases approved. Third, it reviews governmental and non-governmental documents regarding conditions in Mexico and the experiences of a small sample of political asylum applicants. The essay concludes by suggesting that current U.S. asylum policies regarding Mexican nationals are converging with those in the late 1980s and early 1990s affecting asylum applicants from El Salvador and Guatemala. It is a position that places greater importance on unarticulated foreign policy concerns than on the actual merits of the individual claimants, despite the stated public position that all claimants are treated equally and on a case-by-case basis. It also notes the important policy implications for individuals with compelling need for protection against persecution and for stimulating undocumented immigration to the United States.

Recent Trends in Political Asylum Claims and Cases Granted

The reporting of selected asylum cases by the media during the second half of the 1990s drew attention to the presence of Mexican nationals claiming fear
of persecution if returned to their native country. The application by Antonio (last name not reported) is one such case.³

Judge Nathan W. Gordon’s decision in March 1999 to grant Antonio asylum in the United States attracted attention because of its precedence in combining the claimant’s role as a political activist against the ruling PRI party, or Institutional Revolutionary Party, and as a homosexual. Antonio’s attorney argued that his return to Mexico would make him a target for persecution on both grounds. In the interim between Antonio’s case and that of Ernesto Pobiano, municipal president of Ojinaga, Chihuahua, and a member of the conservative PAN, or National Action Party, (a successful asylum case in 1991)⁴ there have been several publicized cases. The following are some of the cases noted by the print media.

1. The favorable ruling on the asylum application of Lieutenant Jesús Valles, who deserted from the army after opposing orders regarding civilians in Chiapas.
2. The granting of asylum to the mother and six other relatives of Mario Aburto Martínez, the man charged with the assassination of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in 1994.
3. Ana María Guillén, former leader of the PRD, or Party of the Democratic Revolution, in Matamoros, was able to prove a “well-founded fear of persecution” if returned to Mexico.⁵
4. José García, a homosexual that had been harassed, beaten, and raped by Mexican police because of his sexual orientation was also granted asylum by an immigration judge.⁶

In addition, the media has also reported on some notable denials and claimants such as the following.

1. Pablo Chapa Bezanilla, former top Mexican prosecutor, who for a short period of time was considered a “hero” for the arrest of Raul Salinas de Gortari (Chapa, however, now faces grave-robbing charges and witness tampering charges) was denied asylum.⁷
2. Vicente Mayoral and his son, Rodolfo, after spending seven months at an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) facility, withdrew their appeal to an immigration judge of the initial asylum denial by INS. The two had been part of the plainclothes security during the Tijuana shooting of Luis Donaldo Colosio.⁸
3. The denial of the request for asylum by Mario Ruiz Massieu, former deputy attorney general and brother of the murdered José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, secretary general of the PRI.⁹

While all of these cases have attracted public attention, they represent a small fraction of the political asylum cases filed, as well as of those cases granted. Table 1 (see page 72) summarizes the recent trends in political asylum applications by Mexican émigrés. It reports the activity for the two
avenues in the asylum process. The most common path is direct application to 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), generally through 
the filing of an application at an INS district office, or after apprehension by 
the Border Patrol. Most media reports and researchers tend to cite these as 
representing the total asylum activity (this is likely due to the ready availability 
of the data from INS published reports and unfamiliarity with the overall 
asylum process). All newspaper articles reviewed made this error.

An important second source is the asylum decisions by immigration 
judges. This includes cases that come before a judge due to either an appeal of 
a previous asylum decision by an INS official, or if the person is apprehended, 
placed in removal (previously known as “deportation”) proceedings, and then 
requests asylum. The data on cases heard by immigration judges are main-
tained by the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), U.S. 
Department of Justice, and reported separately.

In reviewing the two columns on asylum cases received, the reader should 
be aware that the EOIR cases overlap with those received by INS. 
Consequently, the two columns should not be added to arrive at the “total” 
number, but instead be viewed as indicators of the level of activity within 
each process.

Table 1 highlights four important facts. One, the surge in asylum applica-
tions between 1991 and 1997. Two, the significant decline from 1997 to 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>INS* Received</th>
<th>EOIR** Received</th>
<th>INS Granted</th>
<th>EOIR Granted</th>
<th>Total Granted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>614</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>6,390</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>9,266</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9,148</td>
<td>3,454</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7,280</td>
<td>6,139</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>13,663</td>
<td>12,879</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>4,460</td>
<td>10,113</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* INS data are derived from the INS Statistical Yearbooks for fiscal years 1991 to 1996, and 
** The U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), made 
available the data related to asylum decisions by immigration judges. The abbreviation “n/a” 
indicates that data were not available.
in INS asylum applications. Three, the low number of individuals actually granted political asylum (299), despite the volume of claims (a total of 51,549 under INS, or 32,822 for EOIR). Lastly, it underscores that while INS-granted cases predominate, the positive determinations by immigration judges are an important part of the total—in the years 1996, 1997, and 1998, immigration judges contributed close to 40 percent of the total.

Moreover, the significant number approved in 1995, the years following Mexican presidential elections, raises the question of a possible link between presidential elections and emigration of Mexican nationals who later seek asylum. While some may see this as a farfetched notion, a 1994 report by the INS Western Regional Office, titled “Mexican Election Threat Assessment,” expressed such a concern. The combination of the suggestion in that report argues that “[r]iots, deaths, and general chaos . . . could push Mexican immigrants to the U.S.,” and Mexico’s pre-election purchase of water cannons, armored personnel carriers, and riot control equipment suggests the possibility of a link.11,12

While it is important to consider the significant increase in the number of asylum claims by Mexican immigrants, it is equally important to place that rise in the context of a rise in all asylum applications, particularly within the 10 leading countries of origin. The top 10 nationalities, in 1997 and 1998 for example, accounted for two-thirds to three-fourths of all cases filed (74 and 67 percent, respectively). Table 2 reports the INS political asylum cases filed between 1992 and 1998 for the countries with the 10 highest numbers of claimants during that period. In the case of Mexico, the table shows the progression from being absent from the top 10 ranking in 1992, to becoming the country with the highest number of political asylum claimants in 1997 and 1998.

**Explanations of the Trends**

*Why has there been a surge in the number of applications?*

Like other controversial policy issues, such as the cost-benefit impact of undocumented persons, there are multiple explanations for the surge in asylum applications by Mexican émigrés. Rather than discuss each explanation at length, this section focuses on summarizing the three most common explanations.

The first explanation is that offered by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials and others. According to this explanation, the dramatic surge in applications is largely due to two factors. One, individuals are opting to remain in the United States by directly filing “frivolous” or “fraudulent” applications. This is attributed to the fact that individuals know that there is a large backlog and that they can obtain authorization to work while their case is placed in the queue for a hearing. Two, some financially-motivated individuals have been filing fraudulent applications for undocumented persons, partly to take advantage of opportunities extended to Central Americans, by promising INS work permits for those that pay the $100 to $1,000 to have documents filed on their behalf. An example of this is the three people in the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cases Filed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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Los Angeles area who were served a 17-count indictment for filing 17 fraudulent applications. A second reported case was the couple in San Bernardino who are charged with fraudulently filing 2,600 applications.13

In a letter to the editor of the New York Times, Congressman Lamar Smith (R-Tex.) echoed this sentiment when he noted that “[b]ased on the rate of approvals, we can assume that the majority of these applications [those filed in 1995] are frivolous and have been filed by illegal aliens solely to delay their departure from the United States.”14 INS officials have asserted that “about 5 percent of all cases” may have merit and have referred these to asylum adjudicators; and most of these (about 80 percent) were forwarded to an immigration judge for judicial determination. If this estimate is correct, it suggests that the number of political refugees since 1991 has fluctuated from a high of 683 in 1997, to a low of 9 in 1991. This would represent a total of 2,576 asylum petitions regarded as meritorious by INS (this of course excludes those cases that went directly to an immigration judge).

The second explanation is offered by immigration attorneys working with asylum cases and by human rights advocates concerned with country conditions in Mexico. They argue that political conditions and human rights abuses (including extrajudicial executions, torture, disappearances, sexual violence, and others) have worsened in Mexico and that Mexican nationals fleeing these conditions meet the 1980 U.S. Refugee Act’s asylum criteria of having a “well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.”

Reports from numerous sources such as Amnesty International, Americas Watch, the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, as well as Mexico-based entities such as the Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos and Red Nacional de Organismos Civiles de Derechos Humanos, and newspaper stories are cited to support the position that the “culture of impunity” still dominates all levels of police and security forces and creates a real fear of persecution for those that are returned to Mexico.

Mexican authorities strongly challenge such assertions. In 1999, then Attorney General Jorge Madrazo (appointed by former President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León), for example, stated to a reporter with the New York Times, that “the age of impunity has ended” in Mexico.15

The third explanation is an important but less common observation. This explanation focuses on Congressional and regulatory changes in U.S. immigration policies, and has been made only by law practitioners involved with asylum cases.16 The core of the explanation is that legislative changes brought about by the 1988 Omnibus Anti-Drug Act, the Legal Immigration Reform of 1990, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and, especially IIRIRA (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996) have radically transformed the asylum process.

A central change generated by IIRIRA was the reconfiguration of the previously available remedy whereby an undocumented person with seven or
more years in the United States and with family and other “roots,” could seek and likely receive a “suspension of deportation” and be allowed to become a permanent resident. IIRIRA replaced “deportations” with “removals,” and “suspension of deportation” with “cancellation of removal.” Though on the surface they appear to be simply linguistic changes, the changes are more fundamental. The change makes it possible for only extreme cases to be granted cancellation of removal (an example of an “extreme” case would be an illness so rare or unusual that only a small number of physicians, most of whom practice in the U.S., could take care of the condition).

In the context of the issue of asylum, this means that the previously available suspension of deportation “door” was permanently closed for those fearing their removal to Mexico because of the likelihood of persecution there. The asylum door was transformed into a last option. In other words, Mexican political refugees previously requested suspension of deportation as a more expeditious option, but were now requesting protection under the more complicated and lengthy asylum process.

**Why have there been so few cases granted?**

As with the question about the volume of applications, there is more than one explanation. There are two dominant answers. First, given the previous explanation for the increased volume on the part of INS officials, the same officials logically argue that few petitions are granted because most are frivolous or fraudulent. Since only a small number (recall the estimated 5 percent noted by INS officials) appear to have merit, it is expected that a small number will actually be approved. In the case of immigration judges, because of the privacy and confidentiality of the individual cases, it is not known what they view as the reason for the limited number of cases granted.

Second, human rights advocates, immigration attorneys, and some specialists on Mexico argue that the United States grants asylum to so few Mexican nationals because of foreign policy concerns, including the upholding of NAFTA and other commercial ties. In other words, the United States would negatively impact its “good neighbor” ties if it were to approve a significant number of political asylum claims by Mexican nationals. To do so would send a message that the democratization of Mexico was not progressing to our satisfaction and that it could be simultaneously creating a high level of political instability and continuing the “culture of impunity.”

To directly acknowledge the severity of these internal political problems would then create pressure for the incumbent administration to re-evaluate Mexico’s “most favored nation” status, as well as its certification of making progress on the “war on drugs.” Additionally, it would raise questions regarding the adherence to the labor provision in the NAFTA side-accords and jeopardize the political support in the United States needed to provide additional loans and other assistance to Mexico.

Also, as has been noted by a few Mexican human rights advocates, a strong U.S. stance on political asylum cases could raise the thorny issue of the sale or
transfer of military hardware and knowledge to Mexico. The argument is that, to the extent that the United States is selling or transferring military equipment, though under the category of a “war on drugs,” and the Mexican government is actually using the equipment to violate the human rights of its nationals, then the United States has a direct role in the political conditions in Mexico. This is further complicated by the use of military units on behalf of drug lords, such as was the case with Amado Carrillo Fuentes, against other drug competitors.

Furthermore, to the extent that this may be the case, it suggests that the United States may be directly stimulating political emigration and refugee flows, yet it does not want to accept responsibility for those that are fleeing the conditions fostered by U.S. policies.

**Mexican Domestic Conditions: How Good, How Bad?**

Again, there is no clear consensus. Mexican officials tend to emphasize the control and stabilization of the economy, the transfer of formerly public enterprises to private investors, the election of opposition parties to the bicameral Mexican congress, and the mayorship in Mexico City. In sum, in light of the evidence of significant improvements, they emphasize the substantial progress in Mexico’s road to democracy and “modernity.”

Reports by the Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, on the other hand, note some lingering problems regarding human rights violations, but emphasize that they have acted and issued “recommendations” to the state-level human rights offices and to other officials.

U.S. State Department country reports for Mexico for 1993 to 1998 also reveal a mixed picture. In addition to expressing positive and optimistic views of the Mexican government’s effort to improve economic and political conditions in 1998, such as “[t]he Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens,” and the fact that the 1994 elections were “largely free and fair,” these reports also express strong criticism on some issues. Some of the critical statements noted in the 1998 report are as follows: “Corruption is widespread within police ranks and a growing problem for the military. Military personnel and police officers continued to commit human rights abuses;” “[m]embers of the security forces, both the military and police, committed extrajudicial killings;” “[t]he Constitution prohibits torture, however, it continues to be a serious problem;” and “the Government had limited success ending the culture of impunity that pervades the security forces.”

The State Department reports for 1994 to 1997 echo most of the above statements. The 1993 report, however, was a somewhat more strongly-worded document. In that report, the State Department notes the presence of “outright violations of electoral laws” in some elections; “the security forces . . . continued to commit serious human rights violations;” in “1993 there continued to be widespread human rights abuses;” “torture is still used by members of the security forces . . . the most commonly used methods of torture were threats,
beatings, asphyxiation, and electric shock;” and noted “an entrenched system of corruption,” all of which contributed to the “culture of impunity.”

In sum, State Department reports on conditions in Mexico praise efforts by Mexico’s leadership, but also point to continuing abuses of human rights. What is not stated is whether conditions in Mexico, with its “culture of impunity,” can be linked to the emigration of the Mexican citizens they consider the targets of that impunity.

The third perspective is that presented by human rights organizations. Rather than relate the details of the large number of reports that have been produced on Mexico, I will simply summarize the general picture they present. Overall, most report a high level of human rights abuses by municipal police, state police, highway police, federal police, military, private security groups, and vigilante groups. Killings, torture, disappearances, illegal arrests, persons in custody being held beyond the 72-hour limit set by law, and other forms of abuse are reported. Particular social groups, such as indigenous communities, peasants, homosexuals, women, activists in opposition parties, and human rights advocates, are often noted as the targets of these abuses.

Human rights organizations thus present a strongly negative picture of the political conditions in Mexico, and highlight the numerous incidents of human rights abuses. They also note their criticism of the Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos and the state commissions for their limited effectiveness in actually pursuing the resolution of cases brought to their attention. Additionally, they note the central complicity of the judicial system in actually tolerating the unconstitutional behavior of police and prosecutors.

**Backgrounds to a Sample of Asylum Applicants**

To better understand the individual dimensions of asylum applicants, the author initiated an effort to explore this dimension. With the cooperation of the Human Rights Documentation Exchange, the author reviewed the organization’s case files for Mexican cases between 1994 and 1998. From among the hundreds of cases processed for that period, a total of 22 cases corresponding to Mexican nationals were identified. With respect to source of origin or place where asylum was requested, the cases refer to events in eight Mexican states and asylum was requested in at least five U.S. states and Washington, D.C.

Appendix A presents a summary of the key elements of the 22 individuals and the basis for their political asylum claim. Although no claim is made to their representativeness among all Mexican claimants, the data source, nonetheless, provides information that surfaces only in publicized cases. It thus serves to provide a partial “face” to the asylum statistics reported by INS and EOIR. Also, it should be noted that one limitation of the data source is that the files do not indicate whether the claimant was granted asylum or not and the actual amount of data on each case vary significantly.

The major reasons for seeking asylum among the 22 applicants are the following: a) treatment of military deserters; b) fear of drug traffickers; c) fear of
sexual abuse; d) religious persecution; e) official corruption; f) persecution of indigenous communities; g) persecution because of sexual orientation; h) persecution of peasants; i) threats by PRI and PRD officials, and political persecution; j) fear of organized crime; k) treatment of journalist critical of officials; and l) persecution by organized labor officials. The most common problem reported is related to political persecution. This includes persecution of PAN and PRD members, as well as threats and violence by PRD officials.

Although it is not possible to assess the veracity of the details regarding the 22 cases, the situations reported by the claimants converge with most of the issues noted by the State Department as problems that remain and reinforce the Department’s conclusion regarding the “shadow of impunity” in Mexico.

**Discussion**

This paper provides a description of the recent trends in the level of asylum cases being filed by Mexican nationals and the few cases granted, as well as the multiple, and often contradictory, explanations for these patterns by the key actors in the process—INS, immigration attorneys, human rights advocates, U.S. State Department, and Mexican officials.

For those familiar with the asylum process in the case of Salvadorans and Guatemalans at the height of the civil wars in those nations (i.e., the denial of asylum to individuals based on unacknowledged foreign policy decisions), the situation in Mexico suggests a certain parallel. Some will argue that the two situations cannot be compared because there is no outright national “civil war” in Mexico. While this is true, this does not diminish the abuses noted in the State Department reports or the human rights reports regarding the pervasive abuses reported (from extrajudicial killings of individuals or segments of communities such as the case in Acteal, to torture and disappearances). The extent and nature of human rights abuses in Mexico creates a close equivalent. Indeed, with reference to the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca, some have called the situation one of “low-intensity warfare.”

The combination of issues discussed here suggest that the current U.S. policy regarding the asylum applications filed by Mexican nationals seems to be converging with our earlier policy towards Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees. It is a policy that asserts that all asylum cases are treated equally, on a case-by-case basis, and that foreign policy concerns are not part of the decision in denying or granting political asylum. Yet the problem remains of why so few cases, a level even below the official 5 percent estimate of potential meritorious cases, have been granted.

In the case of Mexico, and partly based on the social science literature that has overwhelmingly explained Mexican emigration as driven by economics, it has been relatively easy to continue to claim that economic factors drive the trek “al norte.” However, this ignores the critical role of political factors, as has been suggested by de la Garza and Szekely (1997).

In order to fully confront the reality of U.S. ties to Mexico and the importance of having a politically stable southern neighbor, it may be of greater
benefit to the human rights of individuals in Mexico and the United States to honestly confront the problems facing Mexico, our nation’s role in those problems (such as our demands regarding the “war on drugs”), and the consequences that they may engender (such as undocumented immigration to the United States). Currently, the United States is pursuing a course wherein we assert, on the one hand, that our foreign policy concerns do not affect our asylum-granting decisions, and yet, on the other, continue to grant asylum to only a fraction of applicants, despite the fact that we acknowledge a significant level of human rights abuses in Mexico.

Although it is premature to assess what the impact of the newly elected presidencies in Mexico and the United States will have on politically motivated Mexican emigration and the granting of asylum in the United States to Mexican nationals, the fact that Presidents Bush and Fox have not explicitly noted these issues suggests that previous policies will remain in place. The higher priority of other issues at the February 2001 meeting at Fox’s hacienda in Guanajuato, such as an expanded bracero (guestworker) program and a revised energy agreement, suggests that the voices of Mexican political refugees will continue to be ignored. Moreover, the fact that President Fox has largely been silent on the subject of human rights abuses by Mexican officials and the role of the courts in tolerating these also suggests that the “age of impunity” will remain despite the shift in ruling party.

In summary, there is a critical need to closely examine the asylum process with reference to Mexican nationals, and to openly debate whether current asylum decisions are being driven by our wish to maintain positive foreign policy relations with Mexico. If that is our position, then we should explicitly articulate that foreign policy does matter in the review of Mexican asylum claims and acknowledge that our national and foreign policy concern with “the war on drugs” may be implicated in the violations of human rights, as well as the emigration that may be fostered by these violations.

The continuation of the status quo has important policy implications. The most important is that the denial of asylum to individuals who merit such protection places their life and those of family members in jeopardy of continued persecution and violation of their human rights.
## Appendix A. Sample of Political Asylum, Suspension of Deportation and Cancellation of Removal of Mexican Nationals, 1994-1998

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<th>Type of Case</th>
<th>Location of Alleged Persecution</th>
<th>Summary of Case</th>
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<td>El Paso, Tex.</td>
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<td>Fear of mistreatment of military deserters. Medical resident in the military who did not want to be stationed in Chiapas and refused some orders (conscientious objector).</td>
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<td>Santa Ana, Calif.</td>
<td>Political Asylum</td>
<td>Guadalajara, Jalisco</td>
<td>Woman was fearful of drug traffickers and gangs. Five year-old daughter had been sexually assaulted; assailant's family threatened mother.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>San Diego, Calif.</td>
<td>Political Asylum</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Fear of religious persecution. As a member of the Jehovah Witness religion, person was arbitrarily arrested and forced to pay bribes to police officials for being allowed to proselytize.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>El Paso, Tex.</td>
<td>Political Asylum</td>
<td>Torreón, Coahuila</td>
<td>Corruption within the D.I.F. and threats from them regarding the custody of her children.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>El Paso, Tex.</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Las Tesquitas, Chihuahua</td>
<td>Persecution of Tarahumara Indians and the participation of state police in aiding drug traffickers displace individuals working collectively owned land (ejidos) from their lands for drug production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Region</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
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</table>

Persecution of homosexual males and those with AIDS. Persecution of *campesinos* ("peasants"); the young man’s parents, who were *campesino* activists, were executed in their home. He discovered their bodies after coming home from school (nothing was taken from the home).

Threats by PRI members for working with an opposition party.

The Mexican “mafia” and officials blamed the accountant for their heavy financial losses in the stock market.

Political persecution on the part of PRI officials for having switched his support to the PRD; received threats upon his life; attempted arson of his home; his children were shot at and attempted kidnapping of his children.

Violence on the part of police officers; beaten up and threats made against his life.

Political persecution on the part of PRI officials. Members of a community organization were promised plots of land for their support of the PRI; however, when members began to ask about the promise of land, they were threatened and told to leave the country.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Role Indicated</th>
<th>Location Indicated</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>San Antonio, Tex.</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Indicated</td>
<td>Matamoros, Tamaulipas</td>
<td>Political persecution of PRD officials by the PRI and police. The woman was a local PRD official and in the 1992 elections, local police in front of the electoral offices attacked her and other PRD members. The office was burned, and a warrant was issued for her for being an alleged “terrorist.” [She was granted asylum; this is one of the cases that received media attention.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>San Francisco, Calif.</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political persecution by PRI supporters. The individual was a leader in an organization fighting for the rights of rural communities. The person was fearful of “porros” (PRI “hit men/infiltrators”—“goon squads”) who had tried to disrupt the leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td></td>
<td>Persecution by Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM). The individual worked with an independent union and was fearful of the violence by CTM supporters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Michoacán</td>
<td>Political persecution by PRD officials. The individual worked at a pharmacy where PRI coupons for medical care were distributed to persons without incomes. PRD officials demanded that the pharmacy destroy the PRI coupons and replace these with PRD coupons. When the workers did not destroy the PRI coupons, the pharmacy was arsoned and workers received death threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Union City, N.J.</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Chiapas</td>
<td>Political persecution of persons seeking to remain neutral in the conflict between Zapatistas and the Mexican government. Pressured by both sides.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Lancaster, Pa.</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Toluca, México</td>
<td>Persecution by landed elites and supported by local police. A local cacique (political boss) appropriated the land of ejidatarios (individuals working collectively owned land) and police issued death threats against those displaced.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>San Francisco, Calif.</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Toluca, México</td>
<td>Political persecution by PRI officials. The person was assaulted and threatened by PRI supporters.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Houston, Tex.</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Political persecution against journalist on the part of PRI officials. After the person wrote a report documenting crimes committed by President Salinas de Gortari, the PRI issued death threats against him.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Human Rights Documentation Exchange, case files of Mexican nationals.
Endnotes

1 The suggestion is not that key organizations such as Amnesty International, do not concern themselves with human rights issues in Mexico, but rather that greater sustained attention is generally given to the situations in other countries or areas of the world such as China, Burundi, Sudan, or West Africa.


3 See Los Angeles Times, 13 March 1999.

4 See Schmidt and Spector 1999.


8 See The San Diego Union-Tribune, August 13, 1996.


10 I am grateful to Mr. Carlos Spector Calderon, Esq., for the reminder that immigration judges also make asylum determinations. Mr. Spector Calderon has successfully represented two well-known cases: the cases of Mr. Ernesto Poblano and Lieutenant Jesús Valles. Telephone interview by author.


16 Telephone interview with a small number of immigration attorneys. See also Schmidt and Spector (1999).


24 The Human Rights Documentation Exchange, a national organization that assists attorneys with asylum cases, allowed the researcher to review the files between 1990 and 1998 and identify the cases of Mexican nationals. For each case identified, the researcher copied only the background data in order to assure the anonymity of the claimants. The actual information on each case varied significantly: Some cases included a two- to three-page typed background of the case, others were about a half page of handwritten notes. Moreover, the decision was made to include the cases where it was not clear if the case was one of suspension of deportation (now cancellation of removal) or political asylum. My appreciation for the support is gratefully acknowledged here.

**References**


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The Race Is Not Even: Minority Education in a Post-Affirmative Action Era

Gilberto Q. Conchas, Ph.D., and Kimberly A. Goyette, Ph.D.

Dr. Gilberto Q. Conchas is a sociologist and an assistant professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. His research concentrates on race and ethnic differences in school motivation and engagement. He is the author of Structuring Failure and Success: Variability in Latino School Engagement, Harvard Educational Review, forthcoming fall 2001.

Dr. Kimberly A. Goyette is an assistant professor of sociology at Temple University. Her main fields of interest are stratification, education, Asian Americans, and immigration. Her recent publication, with Yu Xie, Educational Expectations of Asian American Youths: Determinants and Ethnic Differences, appeared in Sociology of Education, January 1999.

Abstract

Affirmative action policies are intricately linked with the long history of social stratification and racial inequality in the United States. Despite the fact that inequality persists today, these policies were wrongly eliminated with the passing of Proposition 209. New initiatives must re-conceptualize how best to educate American children to circumvent the damaging effects of Proposition 209. In an effort to take us in this important direction, this mixed-methods case study concentrates on two racial and ethnic groups: Vietnamese American and Mexican American.

Both groups share similar demographic and socioeconomic profiles but diverse educational outcomes. Hence, the case study shows how inequality exists and plays out in American schools. Contrary to popular and academic views, Vietnamese American youth do not outperform Mexican American youth because of resources gained at home. Rather, the peer and teacher relationships that these youth form at the school level matter most. Most signifi-
cantly, these relationships are mediated through race and ethnicity. These results led us to suggest that affirmative action was abandoned too early since inequality in schools mirrors stratification and racial inequality in larger society. Hence, there remains an urgent need to redirect legal and policy debates away from misleading notions of "reverse discrimination" to the unquestionable reality of race and ethnic segregation in American schools.

Introduction

The history of American racial and ethnic relations is one of inequality. Affirmative action policies attempted to address discrimination in education and in the work force. The aim was to help ensure equality of opportunity for minority groups. Affirmative action programs in the form of student aid, recruitment, and retention dramatically changed the face of American higher education. The college-going rate for African American and Latino groups increased dramatically but was still not on par with the White and Asian rate. Nonetheless, on 20 July 1995, the University of California regents voted to remove consideration of any minority status in admissions, contracting and hiring (SP-2). Thereafter, then Governor Pete Wilson filed suit to challenge affirmative action programs in the state of California. In 1996, Californians advocated a color-blind society based on meritocracy and passed Proposition 209. The text of the principal provisions of Proposition 209, which took effect in 1997, reads:

The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting (Section 31 of Article I).

This ill-understood "Civil Rights Initiative" along with *Hopwood v. Texas* promptly began a national movement to dismantle race- and gender-based affirmative action.

The anti-affirmative action movement downplays the significance of institutionalized forms of discrimination. The anti-affirmative action movement claims that discrimination is a thing of the past. This movement further suggests that affirmative action policies discriminate and allow for preferential treatment that results in "reverse discrimination." Reverse discrimination based on the experiences of a few individuals does not preclude the elimination of policy that addresses inequality targeted at specific racial and ethnic groups.

The main goal of this case study is to show how inequality prevails in American educational institutions, despite the claims to the contrary of the anti-affirmative action movement and many well-intended educational programs. This particular case study investigates the extent to which the resources gained from outside factors play a role in the variation across Vietnamese American and Mexican American students for their motivation
and achievement. Although many academic and other sources have argued that families are largely responsible for differences between these two recent immigrant groups, our research illustrates relationships outside the family—e.g., the school environment—may contribute to variation between the two groups. The school context in particular plays a strong role in educational achievement. Moreover, racial and ethnic perceptions mediate access to better forms of schooling. The case study clearly suggests that discrimination—even between non-White groups—persists today. Racial and ethnic discrimination is not a thing of the past but very much part of American reality. The race for educational mobility among distinct populations in American society is not even.

**Data and Methods**

The results presented here are based on previous collaborative research (Goyette and Conchas, forthcoming). In that research and this study, we use a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. The qualitative data is derived from a two-year research project (1996 to 1998) of the sociocultural mechanisms that construct school success for 80 racial minority students in a large, California, urban, comprehensive high school: Mexican American, Vietnamese American, and African American. This particular case study draws from interviews and observations of the schooling experiences of 27 Vietnamese American students and 13 Mexican American students with very low socioeconomic (SES) backgrounds—both boys and girls, immigrant and native-born. It also includes interview data from 45 teachers and administrators at the high school.

The quantitative information is drawn from the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS), 1988 to 1994, collected for the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) by the National Opinion Research Center. In 1988, the NCES surveyed 24,599 U.S. eighth graders. These same respondents were re-interviewed in 1990, 1992, and again in 1994. Information was collected from the sampled students and their parents, teachers, and school principals. The NELS 1988-1994, contains an over-sample of both Asian American and Hispanic students, including a sample of about 165 Vietnamese American and approximately 1,250 Mexican American students.

Mexican Americans and Vietnamese Americans provide an interesting comparison because these groups are socioeconomically and demographically similar. Vietnamese and Mexican Americans are both groups composed of many first- and second-generation immigrants, and both have less English proficiency and lower socioeconomic status than do Whites. Despite this, these two groups have disparate educational outcomes. Vietnamese American students maintain better grades, graduate from high school at higher rates, and enroll in college more than do Mexican American students (Mehan et al. 1996). Popular press and academics alike pose the question: Why do these two racial groups with similar demographic and socioeconomic profiles perform differently in school?
"It All Starts in the Family...": Variations in School Engagement

A Chinese American counselor from Baldwin High School, the high school we studied, explained the differences she sees between Vietnamese American and other students as follows:

It all starts in the family. . . . That is where students get their foundation. . . . A lot of it has to do with the home. . . . Like when I think of the Chinese culture, even though they may not be at the higher or even the middle class economic level, there is this real thing about education. I remember once sitting at the dinner table with my two brothers and my parents, and my brother said he wanted to be a truck driver. I could just see the look in my father’s face, and he just said, “No, you are going to college!” (24 April 1998, 26).

Differences in student achievement often are attributed to differences in family practices (Carbonaro 1998; Coleman 1988a; Hagan et al. 1996; Mehan et al. 1996; Teachman, Paasch, and Carver 1997, 1996). Little attention is given to the practices of schools and communities. In this study, we choose to compare two immigrant groups, Vietnamese Americans and Mexican Americans, because differences between them have been attributed to family relationships and not differences in school structures. We find substantial differences in the school environments of these two groups that contribute to differences in motivation and academic achievement.

In previous research, we examined one indicator of differences in motivation between these two groups: their study habits. Using the NELS data, we present the mean number of hours that Vietnamese American and Mexican American students spend on homework outside of school in the first line of Table 1. These tables are reproduced from the above-mentioned research. For a more detailed account of this research and methodology, see Goyette and Conchas (forthcoming).

Vietnamese American students spend approximately two hours more per week on homework (5.9 hours) than do Mexicans American students (3.9). Is this solely because Vietnamese American families value schooling more than Mexican American families?

Researchers have often noted that Asian American parents hold higher expectations for children than do Whites and other minorities (Chen and Stevenson 1995, Goyette and Conchas forthcoming, Goyette and Xie 1999), though this may be due to their higher socioeconomic status compared to Whites and other minority groups, and to immigration status (Goyette and Xie 1999). In contrast, Mexican American families are often "blamed" for the academic failures of their children because close bonds between nuclear and extended family members are perceived to place obligations to the family above academic success. Schoolwork is compromised when conflicts arise between family obligations, such as providing additional income or child care to the unit, and academic responsibilities (Heller 1966; Horowitz 1981; Kuvelesky and Patella 1971; Sanchez-Jankowski 1991; Vigil 1988).
However, another and perhaps equally important, source of differences in motivation and achievement between Vietnamese American and Mexican Americans may be found in school structures and environments. Relationships with peers, teachers, and others within schools may influence students’ motivation and academic achievement. For instance, Steinberg, Dornbusch, and Brown (1992) recognize that peer groups are an important influence on students’ educational outcomes. In fact, they note that Asian Americans, who often associate with other high-achieving Asian American students, receive most of their information, norms, and support from peers. Similarly, students who have many friends who drop out of school are negatively influenced (Fine 1991; Gandara 1995; Mehan et al. 1996; Valenzuela 1999; Vigil 1988).

Teachers also encourage students whom they believe are talented or hard working (Conchas forthcoming; Farkas et al. 1990; Mehan et al. 1996;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics by Ethnicity, NELS 1988-1994 Panel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours Spent on Homework Outside of School*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These variables are means (not percentages) as in the rest of the table. Missing values are excluded for the calculation of means.

p This information comes from parents’ questionnaires.

Note: All variables except hours spent on homework are measured at the base year. Hours spent on homework are measured at the first follow-up. Results are weighted according to the sample weights provided by NELS.
Stanton-Salazar 1997; Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch 1995). Principals and guidance counselors may provide information about college preparation courses, applications, and financing for students who do not have access to this information at home. Guidance counselors may take students on trips to colleges in an attempt to help them make informed choices. Education personnel may choose students whom they believe worthy to “sponsor” and thus enable their educational achievement (Mehan et al. 1996). This type of helpful “sponsorship” may depend on the race of the student. Teachers and other school personnel may judge students differently based on their race (Conchas forthcoming; Matute-Bianchi 1986; Mehan et al. 1996; Valenzuela 1999; Wong 1980).

This research differs from our previous research in that we are guided by students’ voices describing their perceptions of how school environments shape their motivation and achievement. Tables from previous research are presented to support these students’ perceptions with a nationwide sample, generalizable to the eighth graders in 1988 that were still in school in 1990. Students’ voices from the case study show that it may be as or more important to consider the resources students gain from schools in explaining the disparities in motivation and achievement between these Vietnamese Americans and Mexican Americans. Our research shows that school relationships are mediated through race and ethnicity, and that American schools mirror stratification and racial and ethnic inequality present in larger society. Given this, policy and practice may be better informed on how best to educate American minority children to evade the damaging effects of structural inequalities in their school environment.

“Some Teachers Treat Us Equally, But a Lot of Them Treat Us Differently”: Results Explaining Differences in Achievement

Student voices reveal how relationships in school influence their motivation and achievement. For example, peers give them information, influence them to study harder, and encourage their school success. Although this is true for both the Vietnamese American and Mexican American high school students, the Vietnamese American students, more so than the Mexican American students, formed relationships in school to support one another’s academic achievement. Vietnamese American youth provided information to one another as a strategy to gain access to prestigious academic programs within the school. A Vietnamese American student, for instance, remarks how “[Vietnamese] believe in all this brotherhood thing where if one [Vietnamese] needs help, . . . the whole group of [Vietnamese] come out to help” (Fred, 4 March 1997, 14).

Even though mostly low-achieving, Mexican American students also suggest how peers are a powerful influence on their schooling experiences. One Mexican American student in the study, Jorge, stated that if he had positive friends to push him, then perhaps he would have done well. However, distinct institutional processes within a school place Mexican American students in
various positions within the school’s stratification system. In turn, this mediates positive and negative forms of peer support and school engagement (see Conchas forthcoming). Students recognize this process. Said Ana, a Mexican American junior at Baldwin, “Students segregate themselves based on how they are treated. Like you go out for lunch . . . and you see . . . a group of Asian people right there in the classes with some Whites, and then you see a group of Blacks in the front, and then you see a group of Latinos by the gym.” Peer networking is a powerful tool in gaining the social and academic support necessary for subsequent Mexican American school success.

To support this, Table 2, reproduced from our previous research, shows that there are large racial and ethnic differences in peer group norms and behaviors. Vietnamese American students have friends who drop out of school less and consider studying more important than do the friends of Mexican Americans. Almost 73 percent of Vietnamese American students reported having no friend that dropped out of high school, while only 53 percent of Mexican American students reported having no friends drop out of high school. Another 34 percent of Mexican Americans report having some friends that have dropped out of high school compared to only 22 percent of Vietnamese Americans. On the other hand, nearly 53 percent of the friends of Vietnamese Americans report that studying is very important to them compared to 32 percent of the friends of Mexican Americans. These results are consistent with the previously mentioned findings of Steinberg, Dornbusch, and Brown (1992), who find that Asian Americans’ peers are more likely to encourage their academic success than are the peers of other groups.

Relationships with teachers are also an important source of encouragement and information that enables the academic achievement of students. Overwhelmingly, teachers and administrators in Baldwin High School perceived Vietnamese American students positively, while Mexican American students were seen negatively. Said one white, female Spanish teacher, Vietnamese American students “are . . . the most motivated in this school, and anyone here knows that . . . African Americans and the . . . Hispanics and Latinos are kind of split between who are least motivated” (Spanish Teacher, 23 April 1997, 3). The same Chinese counselor we heard from earlier stated, “We place students in academies based on what they are capable of doing . . . and it also depends on what the student wants. . . . Many Asian students want to be engineers, as opposed to Black students who do not think about engineering, and as opposed to how many Latino students don’t either.” (24 April 1998, 26). Hence, some adults strongly believe that race and ethnic hierarchies exist that relate to educational expectations and social mobility.

Students were aware of these perceptions. Vietnamese American students commented that teachers expected great things from them simply because of their appearance. “Teachers look at appearance and just because we are a certain thing, they expect us to do good all the time,” stated Genie, a Vietnamese American student. Similarly, the following dialogue illustrates Vietnamese American students’ awareness of teachers’ perceptions and how that influences them:
GC: Do teachers have the same expectations of all students?

Lisa: Not always... People around you, they just don’t see us different, like teachers just assume we are all the same;... that means us, Asian people, have to set a higher standard, since you want to live up to what they... are calling you or what they assume that you are.

GC: So you think that Vietnamese Americans are stereotyped in different ways?

Kim: Okay, it's like they treat us in some different ways because we are Asian. We are supposed to be smart, so they, they want you to be smart in some ways, and they think that you are smart by looking at you... all they want to see is the stereotype (3 March 1997, 5-6).

Table 2. Non-Familial Sources of Social Capital among Vietnamese and Mexican Students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vietnamese</th>
<th>Mexican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Friends that Have Dropped Out</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most or all</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among Friends, How Important is Studying?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other private</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Urbanicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ Expectations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No college</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher doesn’t care</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 163 1,237

Note: All variables except teachers’ expectations are measured at the base year. Teachers’ expectations were only available starting with the first follow-up survey. Results are weighted according to the sample weights provided by NELS.
Mexican American students are also aware of teachers’ perceptions of them, though these perceptions are often negative. A Mexican American junior, Diego, is sympathetic to his teachers when he states:

I don’t think any of this is done directly. All this racial segregation in the school. I don’t think there is any one person or group that are out to do this at school, but I think just the ways things have shaped up, things that happen... are the way they are because the stereotypes that people hold and they get turned into who gets the best and most challenging things here. Teachers have also been influenced by this... I think that over the years, they have seen it over and over again and after a while they help in making stereotypes come true.

Marisa, another Mexican American student, says, teachers “think we’re all the same, they think we don’t exist.” Teachers’ expectations of students differ by race and ethnicity. These relationships are influenced by teachers’ perceptions of Vietnamese American and Mexican American students’ characteristics and abilities, and students are aware of this.

Table 2 shows some differences between teachers’ expectations for Vietnamese American and Mexican American students nationally. At first glance, teachers’ expectations of these students appear to be similar. More than 56 percent of Vietnamese American students report that their teachers expect them to graduate from college, compared to 52 percent of Mexican American students. However, among students who report that they do not know their teachers’ expectations or that their teachers do not care, there are greater racial and ethnic differences. More than 22 percent of Mexican American students report that they do not know teachers’ expectations or teachers do not care, compared to less than 16 percent of Vietnamese American students.

“[Teachers] and Programs Push us and Motivate Us”:
Unraveling Differences in Study Habits

Both Vietnamese American and Mexican American students in the qualitative data identified several important resources they gained from their relationships with teachers and friends. These included support and information for achieving their educational goals. Furthermore, they felt that acquisition of these resources often differed by race and ethnicity.

Students clearly detailed the ways in which divergent perceptions about them influenced their relationships with teachers and the resources that could be gained from these interactions. Tran, a Vietnamese American, suggested that some teachers’ negative attitudes toward African Americans and Mexican Americans resulted in less academic support than was given to both Vietnamese American and White students. “Some teachers treat students equally, but a lot of them treat us differently... Asians and whites get more attention and better classes... Most teachers treat Blacks and Mexicans kind of bad because they think they are lazy, that they don’t do nothing (Tran, 10 March 1997, 8).
Vietnamese American students perceived institutional support as integral to the achievement of academic success and future advancement into rewarding careers. Tran, for instance, believed that “the [school] program pushes us and motivates us and tells us by giving support and lets us know when we are doing well” (Tran, 10 March 1997, 4). Similarly, Sandy, another Vietnamese American, captured this structural advantage:

...the [program] makes you focus on what you really want to do, you know, like especially for students who want to do something in the medical field. They motivate you, they put you in the right classes ... and in the right level. They put you in everything, they give you a whole bunch of packets, and they take care of you (Sandy, 10 March 1997, 11).

Institutional support such as this may motivate students into working hard to achieve their academic goals, and the Vietnamese American students perceived that they benefited from it. While Mexican American students also believed this, the majority of Mexican American students at Baldwin High School were not as academically motivated and successful.

Mexican American students at Baldwin High School were enrolled in the lower-level ability track with little support from teachers and peers. These were the Mexican American students who associated with other low-achieving youth. These students were frequently seen smoking by the gym, and many may also have been involved in youth gangs. They found school boring and disengaging. They were often truant because, as Blanca explains, “there ain’t nothing else to do.” Most attributed their lack of academic motivation and achievement to their marginalized status and lack of guidance from adults and other students (Conchas forthcoming; Stanton-Salazar 1997; Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch 1995).

This group of Mexican American students was relegated to a position of invisibility within the larger high school setting. Most of these students expressed that teachers and counselors only cared for the academic concerns of Asian students. Jorge for instance expressed the sentiment that counselors did not care for his concerns: “I don’t think they care because I have been filling out slips to go see my counselor. I sent like four from September, and they still have not called me. Every time I go there, he’s at lunch or is with other students and during class he has no time for me.” Ricardo, a Mexican American sophomore, commented on how perceptions of students by race and ethnicity influenced his ability to improve his schoolwork:

For instance, my teacher, and I’m in Graphics, he goes up to Asian students, looks at his work and says, “You could do better.” With me, however, he simply says, ... “It’s all right.” But he never says I can do better, right? He is like telling me, for me (as a Mexican), it is all right. Like if I cannot do better than that, that is the best I can do. And I do not like that.

In short, the students believed that their invisibility in school was linked with their sense of helplessness and lack of motivation to succeed.
These Mexican American students were given little guidance and support from what Stanton-Salazar (1997, 1995) calls key “institutional agents,” such as other peers and adult staff members. During interviews and informal conversations, some expressed an interest in becoming computer technicians, nurses, doctors, astronauts, and small business owners, but they did not know how to achieve these goals. Miguel, for example, wanted to eventually marry, have children, and run a small business. “I have lots of goals,” Miguel explains. “I want to be a lot of people and do lots of things... I want to have my own shop, like a high performance shop dealing with engines. I know a lot about that.” However, he articulated his awareness of the limitations schooling and society imposes upon Mexican Americans, believing that these obstacles would likely impede him from achieving his goals. “I have no support, man, no way of doing it.” These students understood the importance of positive peer relationships and caring teachers in the schooling process but had little experience of either. Miguel explained that “good teachers and good school programs could help.” Although there were plenty of good programs and teachers at Baldwin, these Mexican American students did not feel they had access to them. Their sense of alienation and invisibility translated into a lack of motivation, poor study skills, failure to plan for college, and pessimism about lifelong career goals.

The qualitative data, with support from national survey data, overwhelmingly illustrate that school context is partly responsible for the differences in motivation and achievement between Vietnamese and Mexican Americans. We find that Vietnamese American students more than Mexican American students benefited from structural arrangements that allowed them to work with more motivated peers and more responsive teachers. This finding strongly suggests that family alone is not responsible for educational achievement, and that the school context is very important as well. What does this all mean?

**Discussion About Education and Education Policy**

*Many minority students come to school fully motivated, but they encounter the effects of a long history of poverty and disadvantage. In effect, they fall victims to structural inequality. Gandara (1999) conceptalizes these structural limitations as a “footrace with hurdles placed on the track” (169). Students, upon encountering these hurdles, decide that they cannot win and remove themselves from the race. While both groups of students in this study encounter many forms of discrimination, their perceptions and subsequent reactions depend upon how they are treated. At Baldwin High School, like in many other urban schools, Mexican American students have much optimism but realize the effects of inequality and consequently become disengaged. Vietnamese American students, on the other hand, are given structural advantages within the same setting and are more likely to flourish.*

*The various academic niches in schools place students in distinct hierarchies that are highly associated with larger social, economic, and racial and ethnic divisions. Adult perceptions about students based on race and ethnicity...*
heavily influence school achievement and eventual entry into higher education. Unfortunately, education policy has not acknowledged the significance of present day forms of institutionalized race and ethnic inequality. How can we make the race even given that education policy and other policies that affect educational opportunities, e.g., Proposition 209 and the repeal of affirmative action programs, do not acknowledge an unequal playing field?

To date, many invigorating programs have sought to address these limitations in many high schools. These programs, usually housed as schools-within-schools in large high schools, serve as interventions against these hurdles. Programs such as Advancement Via Individual Determination (AVID), The High School Puente, and Career Academies provide students with the necessary factors to pursue higher education. These students are provided with smaller class sizes, rigorous multicultural and college-preparatory curriculum, motivated peers, strong teacher relationships, individualized counselors, adult mentors, and paid internships. For the most part, these programs have shown to be effective across race and ethnicity (Conchas forthcoming; Gandara 1999; Kemple and Snipes 2000; Mehan et al. 1996). Most importantly, these intervention programs boast a high graduation rate, and the majority of graduates pursue higher education. Perhaps, as Gandara (1999) suggests, these programs work to keep more “students in the race for higher education” (193).

While these positive forms of school mechanisms exist, there are limitations to this approach. First, these programs serve a limited population. There are too few programs available to equally meet the needs of all students. Secondly, we should not be naïve to overwhelmingly embrace such approaches when, in fact, schooling reflects larger race and ethnic inequality and social stratification. This case study, for example, shows how micro forces explaining the variation in achievement between Mexican American and Vietnamese American students mirror the reality of larger structural and cultural forces.3 In effect, race and ethnicity mediate who has access to better forms of education. These larger sociocultural forces that impact schooling on a micro-level must be confronted to fully challenge inequality. Outreach initiatives work for the few who are chosen, but these programs do little to combat the powerful forces that preserve the status quo within the dominant structures of inequality.

Conclusion

This case study has focused on two race and ethnic groups, Vietnamese Americans and Mexican Americans, who share similar demographic and socioeconomic profiles but diverse educational outcomes. The aim has been to show how inequality exists and plays out in American high schools. The school context and particular perceptions of youth based on race and ethnicity appear to be an important part of the explanation for differences in minority student motivation and achievement. In this regard, academic hierarchies are highly associated with race and ethnic divisions present in larger society. Regrettably, the intervention programs we discussed earlier—like AVID, Puente, and Career Academies—cannot, alone, meet the needs of all students.
As we have suggested, there are simply too few programs and they do not tackle larger structural forces.

Policy and practice must recognize and remedy the damaging effects of structural inequality present in schools. Policymakers need to rethink how best to educate American children and recommend policy initiatives that attempt to circumvent the damaging effects of these structural inequalities. In addition, there remains an urgent need to redirect legal and policy debates away from the misleading notions of “reverse discrimination” raised by opponents of affirmative action to the unquestionable reality of race and ethnic segregation in American schools. Education policies must be grounded in an understanding of the insidious practice of social stratification and race and ethnic inequality in American society and culture.

Endnotes

1 Following Omi and Winant (1994), we define race as a social construct that is “always and necessarily a social and historical process” (55). Ethnicity, on the other hand, is understood “as a result of a group formation process based on culture and descent” (15).

2 Much of the research appearing in the following sections is presented in more detail in our forthcoming (fall 2001) publication: Goyette, Kimberly Ann, and Gilberto Quintero Conchas. Forthcoming. Should families be praised or blamed? A look at the relative influences of family and non-family social capital on Vietnamese and Mexican Americans’ study habits. In Sociology of Education Annual Review of Empirical Research and Commentary, edited by Bruce Fuller and Emily Hannum. Elsevier Press.

3 It is important to note, however, that not all of the Vietnamese American students at Baldwin High School were high achievers or that they all benefit equally from these structural arrangements. In fact, many Vietnamese American students were low achieving and were completely disengaged from school. This suggests that there is much complexity and variation within the Vietnamese American student population. For further discussion on the variability of Asian American school experiences, see Lee 1996.

References


Alejandra Montenegro

Alejandra Montenegro is currently a 3L at the law school. Last semester she was elected president of the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau. She is also articles editor of the Harvard Latino Law Review. Montenegro received her bachelor's in political science from Columbia University in 1998, where she was also president of the student council. After graduation from the law school, she will be working for Arnold & Porter in Washington, D.C.

Though Out of the Barrio was published in 1991, the issues it addresses remain at the heart of Latino politics. Indeed, given her recent nomination to the post of labor secretary, one could argue that her book may preview the agenda for Latino politics under the Bush Administration. Though Linda Chavez may have resigned, the anti-immigrant, conservative ideals for which she was nominated live on. As the number of Latinos in the United States continues to rise, the devastating implication of these ideals will grow exponentially.

Introduction

In her book, Out of the Barrio: Toward a New Politics of Hispanic Assimilation, Linda Chavez unabashedly fuels the conservative ideals of rugged individualism and cultural assimilation. Contrary to what the title of her book may imply, Linda Chavez's agenda for the Latino community in the United States is anything but new. Rather, it perpetuates the centuries-old "love it or leave" anti-immigrant, conservative ideology that has given rise to English-only legislation and Proposition 187, to name a few. At the core, Chavez argues that political advances such as federal funding of bilingual education programs, the expansion of the Voting Rights Act, and affirmative
action have created a culture of dependency from which Latinos must break in order to become full and active participants in American society. Chavez highlights bilingual education and affirmative action programs as creating in Latinos a mentality that to succeed, we must first establish our failure.¹

Thus, Chavez criticizes the current Latino agenda as creating a permanent Latino underclass.² Chavez argues that Latino leaders today consciously ignore, or understate, the economic success that many Latinos have achieved, independent of government programs, as a strategy to protect the policies of the Civil Rights movement—namely affirmative action and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Moreover, she criticizes the policies themselves as hindering, rather than furthering, Latino social and economic advancement. Rather than rely on government programs and policies, Chavez prescribes a politics of assimilation akin to that adhered to by European and Asian immigrants of the 19th century.

This book review will focus on three areas discussed by Chavez: bilingual education, political participation, and affirmative action. Chavez’s treatment of these areas best illustrates her thesis and analysis of the Latino condition, but by no means illustrates the extent to which Chavez’s proposals fuel conservative agendas. One must read the book in its entirety to fully appreciate the devastating effect that implementation of Chavez’s “new politics” would have on the Latino community. As a whole, Chavez’s analysis of the Latino condition in the United States is simplistic at best, and at times dismissive of and offensive to new immigrants and other communities of Latinos.

**Bilingual Education**

An ardent critic of federally funded bilingual education programs, Chavez argues that such programs have abandoned their original purpose of preparing Latino children for academics and replaced it with one of maintaining and strengthening “their ethnic identity by teaching them their native language and by inculcating in them their native culture.”³ Building on her premise that strong ethnic identification perpetuates a cycle of dependency and failure, Chavez argues that bilingual education programs retard, rather than accelerate, the assimilation and academic success of Latino students.⁴ To bolster her claim, she relies on the findings of a 1977 report released by the American Institute for Research (AIR). According to this report, which sampled 286 classrooms of bilingual instruction, Latino students “scored more poorly on tests of English proficiency than comparable students who were not enrolled in bilingual education, and scored no better than such students in math.”⁵ Chavez concludes from these statistics that the federal government should play no role in advancing the goals of cultural preservation and language retention. However, the findings of the AIR do not mandate the death of federally funded bilingual education in the United States.

Chavez’s conclusion that bilingual education and strong cultural identification leads to lower rates of academic success among Latino youth is tenuous. First, she ignores the fact that schools with large Latino and other minority
groups tend to be drastically under funded. The human, technological, and financial capital necessary for Latino children to compete against their non-minority peers are lacking from schools with high minority populations. High faculty-student ratios, overcrowded classrooms, and outdated textbooks all contribute to Latino students’ inability to fully compete against non-minority peers. Second, Chavez’s claim that strong cultural instruction places Latino or other minority children at an academic disadvantage remains wholly unsubstantiated. She presents no sociological or psychological evidence to support her claim that inculcating in Latino or other minority children a sense of ethnic identity and pride is in any way detrimental to children’s ability to grow and function as fully active and productive citizens. In short, Chavez’s attack of bilingual education glosses over the complexities of the subject and thus results in little more than a conservative attack on culture per se.

**Political Participation**

In her analysis of political participation in the Latino community, Chavez criticizes the efforts of Latino leaders at expanding the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to include Latinos arguing that, “Hispanics had never been subject to the same denial of their basic right to vote that blacks had suffered.”8 Ignoring all evidence of discrimination against Latinos, Chavez cites “apathy and alienage” as the “real barriers to Hispanic political power.” Moreover, she criticizes Latino leaders for emphasizing the right to representation, rather than encouraging greater participation.

Here too, Chavez’s analysis of voting rights law and political participation lacks insight and understanding of the Latino situation. First, movements to extend protection of the Voting Rights Act to Latinos focus entirely on the process of elections, rather than on the outcome. Nowhere does the Voting Rights Act, or any case interpreting it, grant any group, minority or otherwise, a right to proportional representation. In *Whitcomb v. Chavis*, and again in *White v. Regester*, the Supreme Court rejected claims of discrimination by Black and Mexican American voters respectively in districts with no minority representatives, holding that every racial group does not have a constitutional right to be represented.8 Thus, Chavez’s claim that the right to vote has been equated with the right to elect minority candidates misstates judicial opinion on the issue.

Second, Chavez ignores the notion that process fuels participation. If electoral processes are structured in ways that dilute minority votes, focusing on increased levels of participation appears to be a futile effort. For instance, though Latinos and other minorities voted in record numbers in the last election, the effect of increased minority participation was diluted by faulty counting machines, elimination of minority voters’ names from the voting polls, and failure to report changes in polling places in minority areas to name a few setbacks. Chavez’s conclusion that more emphasis should be placed on participation rather than on process would only fuel what apathy may already exist in the Latino community. Apathy arises not only from disinterest, but also
from frustrated efforts at participating in a system unwilling to channel that participation.

Affirmative Action

Once more ignoring the existence of racial discrimination against Latinos, Chavez argues that there is no longer any reason to treat Latinos as a permanently disadvantaged group. Chavez’s argument here is twofold.

First, she denies a history of discrimination against Latinos. Invidious racial discrimination has been replaced by more subtle inequalities. Even though this discrimination results from the same unwillingness to grant minorities full access to social and economic resources, the Supreme Court maintains that this is beyond its jurisdiction. Ironically, as discrimination takes on a subtler, less invidious form, the Supreme Court has heightened the standard of proof for victims of discrimination. In *Washington v. Davis*, the Supreme Court introduced a "purpose test" as the standard for findings of racial discrimination, and with it legitimated laws and practices that, though not on their face, do have a discriminatory effect on people of color.9 *Washington v. Davis* stands for the proposition that laws or practices having a discriminatory impact on Blacks must also be shown to be the result of purposeful discrimination. Thus, *Washington* makes purpose the *only* basis for establishing discrimination, leaving more subtle forms of discrimination beyond the scope of judicial intervention.

Latinos are left without legal recourse for everything but the most egregious forms of discrimination. Thus, the only hope for remedying social and economic inequality rooted in discrimination lies in programs such as affirmative action, and even here our hope is narrowing. Just as the Supreme Court raised the bar for minorities to make successful racial discrimination claims, the Fifth Circuit lowered the bar for Whites attempting to do the same. In *Hopwood v. State of Texas*, the court held that to justify an affirmative action program, states must show that there are present effects of past discrimination.10 The court then limited the scope of past discrimination to discriminatory practices by the institution adopting the affirmative action program. The school’s interest in remedying past societal discrimination was deemed insufficient to justify the implementation of an affirmative action program.

Secondly, she argues that it is "inherently patronizing to assume that all Hispanics are deprived and grossly unjust to give those who aren’t preference on the basis of disadvantages they don’t experience."11 Affirmative action programs are no longer tailored toward assisting the "deprived." Within the last decade, goals of diversity and minority visibility have replaced restorative justice as the main justification for affirmative action. For example, many universities have replaced their criteria for eligibility for affirmative action programs. Today, schools look to criteria other than membership in a disadvantaged group for admission through affirmative action. This shift in programmatic goals affirms Chavez’s second stated concern that perhaps the beneficiaries of affirmative action are not the people most in need of it. This fact,
however, does not lead to the conclusion that affirmative action programs should be abolished.

The social and economic inequality between Latinos and Whites remains stark. In 1999, 22.8 percent of Latinos were living in poverty as compared to 7.7 percent of the White, non-Latino population.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, 29.9 percent of Latino children were living in poverty as compared to 8.8 percent of White, non-Latino children.\textsuperscript{13} A proposal to end affirmative action ignores the reality that access to opportunity means little if the inequality of condition is not addressed. Rather than abolish affirmative action programs, schools and universities should adopt proactive recruitment strategies within underprivileged schools and communities. Simply because a large percentage of our children are poor does not mean that, given the resources, they would not be qualified.

**Conclusion**

In her introduction, Chavez states that the purpose of her book is “to tell the story of progress”; to emphasize that Latinos have come far and that we have the potential to go even further.\textsuperscript{14} Chavez is correct. Individually and collectively, Latinos have overcome tremendous obstacles, and our potential increases with every college graduate, every newborn child, and every immigrant that enters these borders. With almost 30 percent of our children living in poverty, however, our story is far from over.

**Endnotes**

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 10.
4 Ibid., 9-38.
5 Ibid., 19.
6 Ibid., 40.
7 Ibid., 165.
11 Ibid., 169-170.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 6.
Mike Davis, Magical Urbanism: Latinos Reinvent the U.S. Big City, 2000

Claudia Milian

Claudia Milian, a Ph.D. candidate at Brown University, served as legislative aide to U.S. Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo., retired). She has been published in The Nation, C. L. R. James Journal, The Americas Review, American Book Review, and Frontera.

The last decade of the twentieth century shifted to public discourses that emphasized—and indeed warned about—the upcoming growth and visibility of Latinos in the United States. Periodicals such as the Atlantic Monthly, Newsweek, Time, and the New York Times stressed, in the words of Christy Haubegger, president and publisher of Latina, that the “Latin” presence “truly” creates a brighter “mañana in America.”¹ The media made such pronouncements after the U.S. Census Bureau projected that the nation would begin the twenty-first century with growing Latino and Asian populations and that Latinos will soon become the largest ethnorracial group.² Building on these projections, the National Center for Health Statistics released a report, “Births of Hispanic Origin, 1989–95,” addressing the increase of babies born to Latinas.³ The report published in 1998 noted that in 1995, Latinas gave birth to 679,768 babies, an increase from the 532,249 “Hispanic-origin” births in 1989.⁴ Against this great numerical backdrop, the focus on Latinos shifts from their promising political clout, to their captivating consumer demographic, to their inviting cultural practices.

That Latinos have to be justified with reference to their numbers and consumption speaks volumes. According to the cultural revisionists, these untapped peoples (in effect, an untapped mass) must be “re-represented” through a dominant and reductive language which has yet to fully grasp where Latinos stand in the first place. The repetitive prefix in “re-represent” is used to work through contemporary texts like Mike Davis’s Magical Urbanism—texts that try to explain Latinas and Latinos in one comprehensive narrative.
Magical Lives, Enchanting Peoples: Recreating the “American” City Landscape

As Magical Urbanism exemplifies, this re-presentation of Latinos occurs within a progressive, leftist discourse that assumes a posture of (white) sincerity toward Latinos. Yet, in the process, it sidesteps the critical reflection, assertion, and development of distinct Latino identities and their relation to improving socio-economic and cultural conditions. Davis’s “little book”5 (as he calls it) first surfaced in a 1999 new left review as a 40\textperpage article.

The summary nature of Davis’s analysis cannot be overlooked—particularly when compared to the encyclopedic editions on Latinos that have become the de facto norm (e.g., Earl Shorris’ Latinos: A Biography of the People (1992); Ilan Stavans’ The Hispanic Condition: Reflections on Culture and Identity in America (1996); Geoffrey E. Fox’s Hispanic Nation: Culture, Politics, and the Constructing of Identity (1997); Himilce Novas’s Everything You Need to Know About Latino History (1998); and Juan Gonzalez’s Harvest of Empire: A History of Latinos in America (2001). Yet, while these cultural and political works allude to the heterogeneity of Latinos, their explanatory renditions of what a Latina or Latino “is” demonstrate that the space allotted to Latino concerns is not a prescription for success. These commentators do not elevate matters surrounding Latinos to a level of discourse that forges a dialogue with activists, cultural workers, educators, and politicos concerning such realities as civil rights, education, employment, health, housing, human rights, and immigration.

Davis begins: “Sometime during 1996, at the very least, Latinos surpassed African Americans as the second largest ethno-racial group in New York City. (They had long been the largest census group in the Bronx.) There were no street celebrations in El Barrio or Quisqueya (Washington Heights), nor did the mayor hold a conference from the steps of Gracie Mansion.” The expectation that New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani would hold a press conference to announce the rise in the Latino population seems extravagant and naïve, for what do Latinos themselves gain from such a news brief? Clearly, the only advantage in such a press release would be to Giuliani. As a Republican, Giuliani could appear compassionate by celebrating the minority presence in his city. Just to the contrary, Latinos should reject such tokenism and demand that politicians respond to the changing demographics in their districts. Individuals attuned to the complexities and struggles of ethnoracialized groups should work with the Mayor’s Office to identify and rectify neighborhood concerns throughout the various Latino sections of the city.

In Magical Urbanism, the textual hypervisibility of Latinos is in their invisibility. It is important to emphasize the problematic nature of such configurations; Latinas and Latinos remain an anonymous brown lump to the U.S. mainstream. The call for rigorous public scholarship as well as critical engagement with voices “of color” on equal grounds, is a powerful dimension present in American life from W. E. B. Du Bois through Guillermo Gómez-
Peña. In *The Souls of Black Folk*, Du Bois demanded recognition and equal participation for minorities within the U.S. systems of culture and knowledge. Du Bois comments that the objectives, or strivings, by blacks are to be “co-worker[s] in the kingdom of culture, to escape both death and isolation” and to use their “best powers . . . and latent genius.” Gómez-Peña similarly proclaims, in *Warrior for Gringostroika*, that Latinos in the United States “want understanding, not publicity. We want to be considered intellectuals, not entertainers; partners, not clients; collaborators, not competitors; holders of a strong spiritual vision, not emerging voices; and, above all, full citizens, not exotic minorities.”

These aspirations remain largely ignored as Latinas and Latinos are repeatedly cast exclusively in otherizing terms. Davis certainly illustrates the hyper anonymity of Latinos by labeling certain chapters “Spicing the City” and “Tropicalizing Cold Urban Space.” If Latinas and Latinos are a serious political and intellectual force, why pepper the narrative with titles that reduce the subjectivity and saliency of Latino identity into consumptive “Latin” signifiers? This form of “Latin Style” is simplified in *Magical Urbanism* by stating that the debate over the “Hispanic” and “Latino” ethnic labels will “unlikely . . . be resolved;”9 that “Hispanic” and “Latino” can no longer be decoded synonyms for “Catholic;”10 and that in Los Angeles—The Latino Metropolis—“Spanish is the idiom of daily life in 80 percent or more of households.”11

It is difficult to separate Davis’s intellectual endeavor from the context through which *Magical Urbanism* emanates. In 1999, Latinas and Latinos were exposed to a summer of high “Latin” profiles, as manifested in the “Latin Music Goes Pop” issue of *Time* (May 1999); *Newsweek’s* “Latin U.S.A.” (July 1999); George’s “Latin Heat” theme (July 1999); and “The Latin Explosion” in one *New York* magazine (which renamed its September 1999 issue “Nueva York”). Davis’s play on magical urbanism, which is not linked to any Latin American literary tradition, reflects depoliticized configurations of celebratory Latino experiences, which are easily portrayed in the U.S. corporate press. For example, prior to changing its logo to “Nueva York,” one weekly magazine noted in a 1972 headline, “The Big Mango: Latin Impact on New York Style.”12

**Un-Magical Lives, Un-Magical Peoples**

Halfway through his book (Chapter Nine, “Falling Down”), Davis takes a compelling turn to engage the meanings of Latin and Latino labor in the American city landscape. Davis’s analytical contribution to Latino Public Policy and the Latino Social Sciences is evident as he explores the implications of federal disinvestment in cities as well as the effects of statewide legislation in California. For example, Davis focuses on California Proposition 187, which denies health benefits and education to undocumented immigrants (passed in 1994), and Proposition 227, which seeks to dismantle bilingual education (voted in 1998). “Unfortunately,” Davis notes, “most Latino elected officials are too timid or solicitous of non-Hispanic voters to openly champi-
on the idea that bilingualism is the solution not the problem.”

Although this claim may certainly be true, Davis neglects to note that not all Latinos speak Spanish, or, for that matter, that bilingualism does not only operate in English and Spanish. Davis should thus propose that Latino politicians, along with sympathetic non-Hispanics, should champion the idea of bilingualism not merely out of “Latin” courtesy. Rather, they should do so because citizens in other places of the globe, such as Europe, speak more than one language, and because insufficiently engaging minority groups forces monolingual Americans to lag behind.

Davis is well intentioned, and his arguments head in the correct direction. Yet in tackling Latina and Latino cultural, political, and economic realities, why advance the idea (so advanced in the book’s title) that Latins are a happy people? Davis demonstrates that much work remains to be done for Latinas and Latinos to truly redefine and reclaim, more than reinvent, the U.S. big city.

Endnotes


4 Ibid.


6 Ibid., 1.


9 Davis 2000, 12.

10 Ibid., 13.

11 Ibid., 48.


13 Davis 2000, 127.
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