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Editor’s Remarks

The Latino community has now had more than one year to reflect on the U.S. Census Bureau’s January 2003 announcement that Latinos surpassed Blacks as the largest minority group in the United States. The changing demographics have served as a wakeup call to legislators, academics, community activists, business leaders, educators, and the American populace in general. Latinos have arrived and are beginning to move from the margins of society to the mainstream, and the community’s interests can no longer be ignored. The onus is also on us. We must recognize that despite our growing numbers, we are sorely underrepresented in the areas of politics, academia, and corporate America.

As we continue to grow, we must assess the great strides which we have made as a community and the tremendous challenges that lie ahead. The approaching 2004 presidential election has sparked political parties’ inclusion of Latino issues in their platforms. The Latino community is beginning to use its increasing political influence to effect change both at the local and national levels. Latino scholars are emerging as the pioneers of change by educating the community and advising its leaders.

This 16th edition, Strength in Numbers: A Closer Look at America’s Growing Latino Population, analyzes the implications of being the new “majority minority.” Through interviews, articles, commentaries, book reviews, policy updates, and a list of top Hispanic policy Web sites, we present a clearer picture of what the Census numbers actually mean for our community. It is our hope that this edition will guide both policy makers and community members in assessing where we are headed as a community and what issues must be addressed along the way.

Our interviews feature four influential policy makers whose dedication to the Latino community and activism is paving the way for increased political, economic, and educational opportunities for Latinos throughout the country. We contrast state leadership from representatives at opposite ends of the political spectrum: State Representative Pete Gallego (D-Alpine), a Texas Democrat, and State Representative Manuel Prieguez (R-Miami), a Florida Republican, offer their views on party representation and the interests of their distinct Latino
constituencies. Congressman Robert Menendez (D-NJ), chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, highlights the priorities of the Democratic Agenda and reflects on issues ranging from affirmative action and immigration to coalition-building between the Latino and African American populations. Finally, Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico describes his efforts to raise educational standards, increase wages, and mobilize Latinos to engage in the political system.

This volume’s feature articles examine three issues that are inextricably related to the Latino community’s new “majority minority” status. First, Brown University professor Edmund T. Hamann provides an ethnographical study of an educational policy initiative in Dalton, GA—a community that has seen a tremendous influx of Latino immigrants in the last decade. Second, U.S. Congresswoman Hilda L. Solis (D-CA) examines the racial and ethnic health disparities affecting the Latino community through the lens of environmental health and domestic violence. Lastly, Stanford University professor Luis Ricardo Fraga and University of Southern California professor Ricardo Ramírez explore the relationship between the Latino community’s demographic changes and its growing political influence, discussing the implications for the 2004 elections.

The journal also presents four commentaries covering a wide range of issues affected by the Latino community’s growing numbers. U.S. Congressman Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX) underscores the importance of increasing the number of Latinos pursuing advanced degrees and suggests federal policy initiatives to provide Latinos with better access to a graduate-level education. Former U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce president George Herrera examines the barriers to Latino entrepreneurship and the Latino community’s potential for growth and success in corporate America. University of California, Los Angeles professor Chon A. Noriega looks at Latino representation in the media and new Latino media advocacy efforts, assessing the challenges ahead for national and local advocacy groups. Finally, Dr. Philip M. DeChavez investigates the Latino community’s access to health care services and the need for more Latino physicians as a means of addressing current health care disparities.
The volume offers three book reviews on recently published literature relating to Latinos. First, Antoinette Hurtado reviews Ian F. Haney López’s *Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice*. This book provides an in-depth look at the Chicano civil rights movement and examines the relationship between the development of racial identity and social justice. Miguel A. Segovia reviews *Black-Brown Relations and Stereotypes*, by Tatcho Mindiola, Jr., Yolanda Flores Niemann, and Nestor Rodriguez, a volume that explores the history of Black-Brown relations and ways in which the African American and Latino communities can work together to pursue common goals. Juan Lázaro Peña reviews Martin G. Urbina’s *Capital Punishment and Latino Offenders: Racial and Ethnic Differences in Death Sentences*. This book studies the discrepancies of capital punishment outcomes among different racial and ethnic groups, thus providing policy makers with a deeper insight into the criminal justice system and possible policy options.

This year, the journal includes a new section entitled “Inside the Beltway,” which provides our readers with brief, accessible information about issues facing our community. This section highlights two new proposals that, if passed, will undoubtedly shape the reality of Latinos in this country. The proposals include the *DREAM Act*, which would grant in-state college tuition to undocumented students, and President Bush’s new temporary worker program. We also offer a list of top Web sites addressing issues crucial to the Latino community, thus giving our readers a starting point to research the issues that matter to them.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the *HJHP* staff, authors, publisher, advisers, and professors for their invaluable contributions to this publication. Their dedication and passion enables *HJHP* to give a voice to our community and provide crucial insight into policies that will affect it for years to come. Most importantly, I would like to thank our readers. It is our sincere hope that this volume sparks discussion, debate and dialogue, thus generating the creativity necessary for progress.

Elena Chávez
Editor-in-Chief
Harvard Journal of African American Public Policy

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The 2004 issue of the Harvard Journal of African American Public Policy, Politics & Progress: A Presidential Platform for the 2004 Campaign, is currently available. The journal is a must-read for scholars, students, social scientists, and practitioners with an interest in the American political landscape. This volume focuses on issues relevant to African Americans in the upcoming 2004 presidential elections. Contributors to this volume include:

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Representative Gallego (D-Alpine) is a seven-term member of the Texas House of Representatives from District 74 in West Texas. The 74th house district stretches nearly 39,000 square miles and contains over half of the Texas/Mexico border.

Elected in 1990, Representative Gallego is the first Hispanic to represent this vast border district. In 1991, he became the first freshman member and the first ethnic minority member ever elected as chair of the House Democratic Caucus, a post he held until January of 2001.

In January of 2001, Representative Gallego was unanimously elected by his colleagues to serve as chair of the Mexican American Legislative Caucus. The caucus is a group of 40 House members who are of Mexican American descent or who serve a significant Mexican American constituency.

His distinguished career has included a chairmanship of the General Investigating Committee and membership on the Committees on Elections and Appropriations. He is currently vice chair of the Committee on Government Reform, member of the Insurance Committee, member of the Texas Sunset Advisory Commission, and one of seven state representatives chosen by the speaker of the house, Tom Craddick, to serve on the House Select Committee on Ethics for the 2003 legislative session.

The National Council of State Governments awarded Representative Gallego a prestigious Henry Toll Fellowship, recognizing him as one of the outstanding young leaders in the nation. He has also been honored by the Texas State University System, the University of Texas System, and the Independent Colleges and Universities of Texas in appreciation for his support of higher education. Following the 1999 session, Texas Monthly named him one of Texas’s “Ten Best” legislators.

Representative Gallego graduated from Sul Ross State University in 1982 with a bachelor degree in political science. In 1985, he earned a doctor of jurisprudence from the University of Texas School of Law. Representative Gallego still lives in Alpine, where he was born and raised.


**HJHP**

Representative Gallego, you’re finishing your 14th year as a Texas state representative. Why did you run for office in 1990, and why do you continue to serve?
Gallego

I think there were several reasons. The first is that I saw a lot of areas where my part of the world needed help. We were pretty far behind. Second, I thought I could make a difference, and I wanted to do as much as I could. The sentence that I’ll always keep in mind, personally, is that I’ve been very lucky in my life. I have a debt to pay to the community that helped me.

HJHP

According to the 2000 census, Latinos have become the largest minority in the United States. What influence will Latinos exert in national politics?

Gallego

Well, I think we are going to grow into our role very slowly. Our biggest problem is lack of participation in the process. Latinos don’t vote in big numbers, with the exception of perhaps when they’re really angry. Proposition 187 proved that in California. In Texas the turnout among the Latino community has been low. If you look at Harris County, it has a really significant Latino population, but that population cast maybe just 8 to 10 percent of the votes in the last major election.

We have the potential to exert a lot of influence. We have the potential to really be the kingmakers. But whether we can grow into that role—whether we can convince people to participate in the process—is another story entirely.

HJHP

In Texas there was a Hispanic gubernatorial candidate who received significant national media attention, but it is questionable how much Hispanic support he received. What are the barriers to Hispanic participation?

Gallego

One of the bigger barriers is completely a barrier of our experience. If you look at politics in Mexico, it didn’t matter who you voted for. You knew who was going to win. Your vote didn’t really matter.

That attitude of “your vote doesn’t matter” pervades the Latino community in Texas, and whether Rick Perry is governor of Texas or Tony Sanchez is governor of Texas, Hispanics wonder y mi que—how does my life change? We think it makes no difference.

You see that attitude and you have to make an effort to convince people that it does matter. For example, tuition just went up by 28 percent at the University of Texas. I can guarantee you that if Tony Sanchez had been governor of Texas, tuition wouldn’t have gone up 28 percent. So first, they have to know that their vote makes a difference. Second, they actually have to feel like nobody takes them for granted.

And I think people have to go out and work the community. It’s not enough to show up for a few minutes and shake hands. It is not enough to come in, have a little reception and then leave town and go back to your house. You have to cultivate relationships, you have to cultivate the support from the Latino community, and nobody has really bothered to do that yet.
The Democratic and Republican parties are vying for Hispanic support. National political candidates from both parties attempt to demonstrate their outreach by sprinkling their speeches with Spanish phrases. Which political party, if any, best represents Latino issues?

Gallego

You know, the history in Texas is clear cut. One political party wanted us to participate, and one political party didn’t. If you look nationally, one political party has been very supportive of diversity and bringing people to the table, and one hasn’t.

Now, as a Hispanic, as a Latino, I feel like I won the lottery. Now suddenly everybody wants me. Well, nobody wanted me before. For me, I feel some loyalty to the people who helped me get into law school because Latinos weren’t allowed at UT. I feel loyal to the people who fought to open the door so that people like me could serve in the legislature. Everything from housing to affirmative action, one political party—the Democratic Party—has been very supportive, and one political party—the Republican Party—has been opposed.

So now all of a sudden, because they see the numbers, the Republican Party wants to be Latino-friendly. Well, it’s a little late, and it just doesn’t wash with me.

Gallego

I would simply say, “Remember your roots.” You have these opportunities; chances are that you have these opportunities because somebody like Franklin Roosevelt reached out and did X. Somebody like Bill Clinton had this initiative, and it allowed for X. The reality is that those programs—such as the Voting Rights Act and the Montgomery GI Bill—that empowered so many people and gave them an opportunity, were Democratic initiatives.

Remember your roots, and don’t stray too far. If you do that, then you’ll always be a Democrat.

Gallego

President Bush hails from Texas, and you served in the legislature here when he was governor. How would you evaluate the Bush administration’s record on Hispanic issues?

Gallego

He’s a good friend of mine. The person who was governor of Texas and the person who is the president of the United States are two different people. He clearly has not been as open nor has he been as bipartisan as president of the United States as he was as governor.

A lot of that is that the right-wingers in the Republican Party don’t want to change anything. They want to build a fence, and they want to lock the doors and throw away the key. And while that may not be the president’s personal position,
the conservative wing of his party holds that view. So I don’t think he’s done very well.

**HJHP**

Your counterpart in Florida is being interviewed. Where do the concerns of Hispanics in your state, Texas, converge with the concerns of Hispanics in your counterpart state, Florida?

**Gallego**

Here in Texas, Hispanics have traditionally been Democrats. In Florida, the Latino community is largely Cuban. And they always felt that the Republican Party was more responsive to their concerns than the Democratic Party. Their experiences are very different than ours.

Our cultural values are similar, but Latinos in Florida don’t see the Democratic Party as the entity that gave them a seat at the table. This stands in contrast to the beliefs held by myself and many other Latinos from Texas.

**HJHP**

Is the fact that Hispanics are now the largest minority in the country somewhat a misnomer in the fact that this is not one homogenous voting group?

**Gallego**

I think anybody who assumes the Hispanic community is homogeneous is mistaken. You can’t paint us all in the same brush stroke. The Hispanic community is a mosaic. We have Cubans and Mexicans and Guatemalans, and all of us view things a little differently. The Cubans are voting Republican, and other groups such as Puerto Ricans are voting Democratic for the most part.

You cannot say that all Hispanics are X or all Hispanics are Y. I think you have to meet each community and make a judgment based on the community.

**HJHP**

As this is a journal of public policy, we’d like to discuss a few policy-specific issues. What are your thoughts on U.S. immigration policy and President Bush’s recent proposals for a temporary worker program?

**Gallego**

I think it’s a great discussion that he’s initiated. It’s a step in the right direction. It’s amazing to me that we waited so long for so little. Even with September 11, he could have done that earlier. Whether we want to talk about it or not, there are some smaller Mexican states in which much of the state’s population is in the United States.

And so, as they send money home, they help Mexico’s economy. But the reality is that they do a job here, they pay sales taxes here and contribute to our economy.

**HJHP**

Polls show that the issue of school vouchers tends to divide minority communities. Opponents argue that a voucher program would take needed state funds away from public schools. Supporters argue that it would help students who are trapped in failing public schools. Do you feel that a program that uses state funds for par-
ents to send their children to private schools benefits Hispanics—especially those Hispanics who are trapped in under-performing public schools?

**Gallego**

No. I think the reason many Hispanics support vouchers is that many Hispanics are Catholic and the beneficiaries of a voucher program would be Catholic schools. In my view, you spend the resources to fix the problem. Vouchers would drain valuable resources away from people that don’t have enough to begin with. If you explain it in those terms and you have that conversation with people, they understand why vouchers are a bad idea.

**HJHP**

President Bush touted his reforms in Texas schools as the “Texas Miracle.” Similar reforms are now part of the federal *No Child Left Behind Act*. You’re on the front lines here in Texas. What are your thoughts on the so-called Texas miracle?

**Gallego**

Well, I don’t think it was as miraculous as everybody touted. The miracle is clearly over, and the chickens have come home to roost. It gave the illusion of prosperity because we were spending some money at the time; however, lack of money is the single biggest crisis that Texas is facing right now. Our school finance system and high dropout rates—especially for minorities—is a problem. Texas cut funding for kindergarten and higher education. Education is critical, and it’s suffering tremendously right now. It’s really one of the areas of the budget I think is in the most trouble here in Texas.

**HJHP**

What do you think are the most important issues to the Hispanic community nationally?

**Gallego**

Education and access to health care are important. The third thing is increasing political influence.

But where we fall far short is economic influence and economic independence. We need more entrepreneurs. We need more Hispanic-owned businesses. Sometimes you may see a Spanish language television station or television network, but it’s not necessarily owned by Latinos. I’d like to see more Latino business ownership and more Latino leadership in Fortune 500 companies.

**HJHP**

Your district spans 658 miles of the Texas-Mexico border. What do you think officials in Mexico City and in Washington, DC, tend to forget about the border region?

**Gallego**

They see us as statistics many times. They don’t see us as real people, and they don’t see our problems. For example, I represent a town called Lajitas and across the river is Paso Lajitas. When the U.S. government implemented reforms after
September 11, the reforms completely decimated the tourism industry, both on the Texas side of the border and on the Mexican side. All the people that depended on Texas business and tourism for their livelihoods had to essentially go elsewhere, because they couldn’t support themselves any longer.

Foreign policy actually impacts people. I think it doesn’t necessarily dawn on somebody sitting at a desk in Washington, DC. I think their failure to think of us as people rather than as statistics is very telling.
Across the Spectrum: Shining Latino Leadership in the States

Interview with the Sunshine State’s Manuel Prieguez
State Representative (R-Miami) and Chairman of the House Business Regulation Committee

Representative Prieguez serves the people of Miami by representing House District 113 to the Florida House of Representatives since 1998. He serves as chairman of the Business Regulation Committee and is a member of the Appropriations, Health Care, Policy, and State Administration committees as well as of the Health Services and Commerce and Local Affairs Appropriations subcommittees. Representative Prieguez is a seafood exporter and is an active member of his community. He graduated from Florida International University in 1993.


HJHP
According to the 2000 census, Latinos have become the largest minority in the United States. What influence will Latinos exert in national politics?

Prieguez
I think that as the years pass, not only in this election cycle (2004) but in future election cycles, their importance will be more pronounced, as time goes on and as the numbers increase. I think certainly the influence that Hispanics have in this election cycle in 2004 is more pronounced than whatever influence they may have had in 1998 or in 1994, 10 years back.

As Hispanics work and live longer in the United States, they become eligible for citizenship. That’s when they truly make their mark in politics, when they’re able to vote. And so I think they’ll have a pronounced effect. I think that, for the most part, they stand to help the Democratic Party a little bit more than the Republican Party. But the Republican Party... sees the opportunity to reach out to Hispanics and give them a sales pitch as to why their candidates and their national platform should be the one they support.

HJHP
How have Latinos in Florida influenced policy?

Prieguez
In our state, in particular, there are a decent number of elected representatives and senators that are of Hispanic descent or are Hispanics. And the fact of the matter is that in south Florida, Hispanics are not a minority per se because there
are so many of them. Especially in Miami-Dade County and the city of Miami, there are as many—if not more—Hispanics than there are Anglos.

This means that the number of elected representatives reflects the Hispanic numbers. And so what happens is that you have approximately 12 elected state representatives who are Cuban or Hispanic. And that’s 12 out of 120. You have three in the state senate out of 40. The interesting fact is that in Florida most of those Hispanics are Republicans. For example, in the rest of the state, there are only one or two other elected Hispanics, and they are Democrats. The other 12 Hispanics come from south Florida. They’re Republicans.

It just so happens that the Republican Party is in control of the state legislature. And that means we’re able to do more for our constituents and the people that we represent, whether that means bringing more money down from the state capital for local projects or through any number of laws or bills that we may want to propose.

I don’t know how it is in other states in the union. I don’t know if the Hispanics who are elected representatives in those other states also happen to be in the parties that control those state legislatures and are able to do as well as we are able. But the fact remains that that’s the way it is here in the state of Florida.

**HJHP**

What are the three most important issues facing the Hispanic community in south Florida?

**Prieguez**

Because there are so many Cubans among the Hispanic population here in south Florida—in Miami in particular—the Cuba issue becomes very, very important for those folks. There was a mass migration from Cuba in the early 1960s. Throughout the 1960s, there were more migrations, in the 1970s as well, [and] in the 1980s through the Mariel boat lift.

So the fact that 90 miles away, there still is a tyrannical, communist regime that has its grip on the island is probably the number one issue among Hispanics, especially Cubans, in South Florida. With later generations coming about, it’s not as important, but then again, those generations become more Americanized. They’re not as Hispanic, so perhaps that question won’t be as relevant to them as first-generation Hispanics or actual immigrants that came from Cuba. Certainly, that’s one big issue.

I think [one of] two other big issues would probably be, for other Hispanics who are not Cuban, the ability to find work. I think this is a big issue for folks that come from Central America, South America, Mexico, etc. They come here, and they’re looking for work. They’re looking for better opportunities than what they had in their home countries.

Work, and probably education is also important. Those three issues . . . come into play, depending on the year. For Cuban Americans, certainly it’s the whole issue of the island.
Aside from the Cubans, the other two big issues of getting jobs and education seem to be big Hispanic issues all over the country.

Sure. For sure.

Which political party, if any, best represents Latino issues?

I think that generally speaking, if you look at nationwide politics, certainly you could make the case that the Democratic Party happens to have a lot more support from Hispanics around the country than the Republican Party does. Generally speaking, I guess the reason why that is so is because most of the Hispanics, or a great number of Hispanics that live in the United States, unfortunately work at lower-end jobs.

And especially in California, look at all the immigrants from Mexico that work out of the farms . . . Here, also in Florida, you see those folks belonging to unions and belonging to labor organizations. And certainly, there is a strong relationship between the labor organizations and the unions and the Democratic Party. That’s the way it’s been historically, and that’s the way it still is.

So if you had to say which party more “represents” the desires or the philosophies of immigrants or Hispanics in the United States, most people would probably agree that it’s the Democratic Party. I don’t know if I personally would agree point blank with that, without thinking about it some more. But I think the reality is that’s the alliances are set up at this point.

What would you tell those Hispanics that are voting against your political party?

To me, this becomes a very philosophical issue. You have the Republican Party, which is the pro-business party. And then you have the Democratic Party, which is the pro-union party, the pro-labor organization party.

On face value, you certainly can argue that the Democratic Party does more for—or perhaps is viewed as doing more for the rights of immigrants and Hispanics. However, if you’re not pro-business, if you don’t foster business, if you don’t foment initiatives to create business, then those people don’t have work. If you don’t have the business first, then you’re not going to need employees.

So I think what’s important for the Republican Party is trying to create a better balance between supporting business and its needs and desires, but at the same time not creating a situation for labor where [Hispanics] might feel exploited, where they might feel that they’re not getting their fair share. The Democratic Party is very good at exploiting that. Their propaganda is all about how big business is greedy and all [Republicans] want to do is suck every ounce of energy from labor, so that [the rich] can fill their pockets and become very wealthy, while [Hispanics] continue staying poor as they work for the big interests.
That’s the way I break it down. I think that what I would tell folks is that the Republican Party is not necessarily that way. That, first, I think you need to understand that if we don’t foster business, the jobs are not going to be there for you to complain about. You can then complain that there aren’t any jobs, whereas before maybe you were complaining about how bad the situation is. But once you get into that position where you’re supporting a party because they do more for business, at the same time, you have to be very wary and you have to make sure that labor is not exploited.

But you see, the Democratic Party only worries about whether the immigrants or the Hispanics or any other person for that matter is being exploited. But they don’t necessarily create the jobs. They don’t necessarily endorse legislation that will create business. The ideal thing is to create business with high-paying jobs. But there’s a segment of the population that’s not going to be able to adapt to those high-paying jobs because of the requirements that are necessary.

So then [Democrats] only focus on the propaganda of the greedy big interests of big business. Well, if [big business] wasn’t there, then a lot of folks wouldn’t be able to put bread and milk on the table. So the Republican Party has to do a better job of outreach to folks saying, number one, thanks to us, you’re able to have a job.

But our job is not finished simply by doing that. We have to then ensure that the working conditions are good. We have to ensure that you’re getting paid a fair salary. We have to ensure that overtime is being paid, those kinds of things. And I think that the Republican Party in general could stand to improve a little bit on those policies.

**HJHP**

President Bush hails from Texas, a state on the U.S./Mexico border. You are both from the same political party. How would you evaluate the Bush Administration’s record on Hispanic issues?

**Prieguez**

Generally speaking, I think that they’ve done a good job. I think that he is more sensitive to those issues because he’s from Texas than a governor who comes from Rhode Island or from another part of the country.

The fact is that when Bush ran for governor, he had to reach out to the large Hispanic population in Texas, and the fact is that when he was governor, he had to deal with the immigrant issues. I think that’s sort of piggybacked onto his presidential administration.

I’ve been in a sort of universe of my own when it comes to politics, in that I’m very entrenched in state politics and my responsibilities. But I think that for the most part, based on what I’ve read, I think he’s done a decent job. And I think that, more than anything, comes from the fact that he’s from Texas.

**HJHP**

Your counterpart in Texas is being interviewed as well. Where do the concerns of Hispanics in your state converge with the concerns of Hispanics in Texas? And where do they diverge?
Prieguez

The whole issue is about creating jobs for those immigrants that come over from Mexico and Central America and ensuring that when they’re here, they get adequate education. The United States is a country that was built by and is as strong as it is because of the immigrants that came—because we’ve been able to maximize and capitalize on the strengths of people who have come from all over the world and who are not just from one place.

Having said that, a lot of those people who come are in need of help. They need support and better education, and they need help finding jobs. So I think that those are some similarities you would find between Hispanics in south Florida, Texas, California, and anywhere else.

Specifically, how do they diverge? Going back again to national politics, I think that the Cuba issue certainly is not something that Hispanics on a national level may care a lot about. And if they do, I couldn’t venture to think what their position would be. Hopefully, it would be an anti-Castro position based on common sense, in my view. But certainly, it’s not a big issue for them. Whereas here in south Florida, that is a big, big issue.

HJHP

That is a great segue into my next question. Two days ago, President Bush announced his immigration policy. How will the reform affect Latinos in south Florida, both illegal immigrants and voters?

Prieguez

First and foremost, I think it helps the illegal immigrants more than anything. I think that’s the more important focus of what he’s proposing. Certainly, there are a large number of illegal immigrants. Of the immigrant-rich states, Florida is probably the one that has the least amount of illegal immigrants. I would venture to guess that both Texas and California have more illegal immigrants because it’s so easy to get in, compared to Florida.

Having said that, we still have our fair share of illegal immigrants. And I guess what it boils down to is that it’s unrealistic to think that you’re going to be able to track down all these illegal immigrants and you’re going to be able to toss them out. It’s not going to happen. So if they’re here already, if one assumes that most of them are working—I would personally feel that most of them probably are working—legalize it.

Remember, border controls nowadays are much better than they were in years past when all of these immigrants theoretically were able to get in illegally. So in a way, it makes sense that the ones that are in now, that have come in, you make them legal, you give them rights. Eventually they’ll be able to become voters, but at the same time there are things in place to prevent more of them from coming in. We’re a country that opens our arms, but at the same time, we can’t have half the world breaking into our borders. I think generally speaking, it’s a good thing what the president is proposing. Now, let’s see if Congress passes it because that’s still up in the air.
To those aspiring to run for office in districts with a large Hispanic population, what advice do you give them?

My advice is to work hard. The advice that I would give would apply to anybody running for office in any district. You’ve got to meet the people. You’ve got to walk door to door. You have to open your eyes and your ears and see what it is that most affects the folks that you may one day represent.

In my campaigns, the district is not very big, so you’re able to have a strong impact by walking door to door. In other districts, when it’s a much bigger district, it’s more difficult to reach out to people on that one-on-one basis. Honestly speaking, I don’t see much difference between what you would do as an Anglo in an Anglo community... than what a Hispanic would do in a Hispanic district. You send good mail out. You work hard. You do all the things that presumably will help you get elected.

You’ve been in the House since 1998. And then I know that 2006 is your term limit. What are your aspirations for the future?

I’m going to hopefully finish out my term. And after that, I don’t know. I don’t think I’m going to be a career politician. So maybe these eight years in the state-house will be enough for me, and I’ll just be able to move on and do other things. For right now, I’m concentrating on my next election, getting elected, and finishing up my last two years. And then see what happens after that.

I’m not the type of person to be in politics for a really, really long time. I think eight years is a long time. In Florida, there are term limits that were passed by the voters in 1990. Before then, you had people that were in the legislature 20 and 30 years. I could never imagine myself being 20 or 30 years in politics in the state legislature, going to Tallahassee.

It’s good—very good—that there are term limits. I am a huge proponent of term limits, and I’m glad that the voters passed the term limits. Maybe a 10-year term limit would have been a little bit better. But the fact that term limits will allow new people to come in, I think, is overall a positive thing.

And so what the future will hold for me, I don’t know. Probably not politics. Maybe, who knows? If I remain in politics, it won’t be in the state legislature or federal or anything like that. It wouldn’t include having to travel outside Miami because I’ve been traveling to Tallahassee now for the last six years. And you have to live in Tallahassee for two months. And I love Miami. Miami’s my home. It’s paradise, and so I would prefer the city commission or something like that. But again, I’m not a career politician, so it would take the right situation for me to consider that.

You also have another job—
Prieguez
Yes, state legislators, both senators and state representatives, technically are part-time workers with the state. And so I have my own business with my father, not too far from here, as a matter of fact. We’re in the seafood business, mostly exporting, and local products, local Florida lobster and stone crabs.

HJHP
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Crafting an *American Agenda* for Hispanics and for the Nation

*Interview with Congressman Robert Menendez (D-NJ)*

Chairman of the House Democratic Caucus

Congressman Menendez is chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, the Democratic Party organization that brings together for deliberation and decision making all Democratic members of the House of Representatives. The position, to which he was elected by his colleagues in November 2002, makes Congressman Menendez the third-ranking Democrat in the House and a senior member of the party’s legislative leadership. He is the only Hispanic ever to have been elected to a Congressional leadership post of either party in either chamber. He is the highest-ranking Hispanic member in Congressional history.

As Democratic Caucus chairman, Congressman Menendez is actively involved in molding nearly every aspect of national policy and national political life. As the son of Cuban immigrants and a member of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, he has also been a vigorous champion of Hispanic American aspirations throughout his decade in Congress. He is one of the Democratic Party’s leading voices on education and homeland security, having headed Democratic Party task forces on these subjects. He is also a staunch advocate of international human rights, for which he received in 1998 the prestigious Ellis Island Medal of Honor.

Congressman Menendez represents New Jersey’s ethnically diverse 13th congressional district, which winds along the Hudson River and overlooks southern portions of New York City, including lower Manhattan. He is a member of the House International Relations Committee and the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.

Prior to his election to Congress in 1992, Congressman Menendez served as a state assemblyman and state senator in the New Jersey legislature. He is also a former mayor of Union City, NJ.

Alain L. Sanders, a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Saint Peter’s College in Jersey City, NJ, and a former senior reporter for TIME Magazine, interviewed Congressman Menendez on behalf of the HJHP on 19 August 2003. Mr. Sanders has a B.A. from Princeton University and a J.D. from Columbia University.

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**HJHP**

This past summer, House and Senate Democrats announced the Democratic Party’s Hispanic agenda. Why?

**Menendez**

There was a combination of desires. We wanted to let the Hispanic community in the country know what we were working on, and we also wanted to present our vision for enhancing the opportunities and overcoming the challenges facing the Hispanic community. We have had a long history with the Hispanic community.
We have been its greatest policy advocate in Congress. But sometimes you have
to remind people what it is that you’re pursuing on their behalf.

_HJHP_  
What would you say are the top three priorities of the agenda?

_Menendez_  
Education is at the top of the Democratic agenda. It is at the top of the agenda of
Hispanic families in this country. Education is a fundamental value shared by
Hispanic Americans throughout the country regardless of what part of the kaleido-
scope of Hispanic Americans we are talking about. Hispanic Americans
understand that a world-class education for their children is ultimately the key to
upward mobility in this country. Quality education involves getting teachers to
dramatically reduce the dropout rate in the Hispanic community—which is still
significantly higher than for other groups in the country. It also means obtaining
greater access to college, and maintaining college retention and affordability.

The second top priority, because we are an entrepreneurial community, is clearly
economic empowerment opportunity: opportunity for access to capital and for
obtaining market share. Corporate America needs to understand that it is in its
interest to have us sitting not only in the mail room but also in the board room,
where we can help corporations make important decisions concerning the
Hispanic American community. That community is the fastest-growing part of the
marketplace, with a trillion dollars in domestic spending power [projected by
2005], and it is incredibly brand loyal and younger by a decade [than the rest of
America].

The third top priority is immigration. Immigration issues are not unique to
Hispanics, but they are very important for the Hispanic community. They involve
the reunification of families and the creation of opportunities for millions in this
country to come out of the darkness and into the light to fully participate in
American society. This is important for both security reasons—knowing who’s
here and why they’re here—and for economic reasons. It is Hispanic labor, for
example, that is fueling the construction industry in North Carolina, picking the
fruits and vegetables in the South and Southwest, plucking chickens in Arkansas,
and servicing the service industry on both coasts.

_HJHP_  
Is one of the motivations for the Democratic agenda a perception that Hispanic
voters may be drifting towards the Republican Party?

_Menendez_  
I think the concept that there is a drift towards the Republican Party is somewhat
contrived by the Republican Party. The reality is that the Hispanic community is
not monolithic, and so we should expect a diversity of views. The challenge for
the Democratic Party is not only to remind the community of the party’s proud
past—its struggles alongside the community and its list of accomplishments—but
it is also to paint a continuous vision of what we hope to achieve for this part of
American society. That’s our challenge for any part of the electorate. So the
Democratic agenda is not a response to Republican efforts.
You also need to consider some recent Republican history: a Congress that won’t deal with immigration reform and that strips out provisions of law, like Section 245(i), which permits families to stay united while they adjust their immigration status; references to Hispanic legal permanent residents as “enemies of the state” on the House floor by some Republicans during campaign finance reform debate. Some of these “enemies of the state” are serving in our armed forces. They fight for the country, they shed blood for the country, and, in some cases, they die for this country. They are also protecting our airports, our seaports, and our borders. They risk their lives daily in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places around the world to protect us here at home. Why would Republicans try to strip these residents of the legal right [to contribute to campaigns] when they are willing to sacrifice and die for their country? [Other negative Republican actions include] Bush Administration policies dismantling the Hispanic education action program that was put together by the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and the Clinton Administration, as well as the Republican pursuit of a variety of English-only options that attack bilingualism in an ever-growing integrated world. These are just some of the examples of why the Democratic agenda comes not in response to but despite the Republican Party.

**HJHP**

So how do you account for the fact that President Bush has scored so high in polls among Hispanics?

**Menendez**

I think it reflects an attitude that is present among all Americans. The president received very significant popularity numbers as a result of September 11 and the subsequent military conflicts abroad. Those numbers reflect to some degree a natural response and the great patriotism of Hispanic Americans. Plus, as a Republican candidate, President Bush seemed to be *un amigo*—a friend of the Hispanic community as a result of his relationship in Texas with Hispanic Americans and with Mexico. However, we’ve seen since then that he’s really not accomplished anything with [Mexican] President [Vicente] Fox. He hasn’t done anything about a migration accord with Mexico. And while President Bush smiles at us, his administration has done things that actually hurt us. Sergio Bendixen, who is one of the nation’s leading Hispanic pollsters, has just shared a poll with us. It clearly shows that the honeymoon is over with the president. It’s based on promises made, promises not kept.

**HJHP**

Which are the promises not kept?

**Menendez**

I think the relationship with Mexico and the breakdown of a migration accord with Mexico. Also the promise that educational opportunity was going to be a hallmark of this administration. The poll I mentioned showed a clear concern among Hispanic Americans over the reduction of federal resources channeled to public education. While we passed historic legislation that says no child will be left behind, the president shortchanged the promise by billions of dollars. The poll
said that Hispanic Americans are clearly concerned about those as examples of promises made, promises not kept.

_HJHP_

What are your priorities regarding immigration?

_Menendez_

As Democrats, we seek a program of earned legalization. What we mean by that is the following: if you have resided in this country for five years, if you have been working and paying your taxes, if you have no criminal record, and if you have not been a public charge—if you meet all of those requirements—then you have earned your way towards the possibility of legalization. We would then create an opportunity for you to move out of the darkness, into the light, and onto the road to becoming a full participating citizen. We would create an opportunity to move from undocumented to documented status and to become a permanent resident. This would not only provide a great economic opportunity for those who have come to this country, but it would also provide great security for the country. It would allow us to determine who is here and why, and to focus our concern on a much smaller universe of people: those who don’t want to come forth.

We seek to have a permanent return of Section 245(i), which was the law of the land. It permitted someone who is a family member of a United States citizen to ultimately adjust [his or her] status while staying here. It maintained a fundamental goal of immigration policy: keeping families together.

We seek the _DREAM Act_, or _Student Adjustment Act_, as a proposition through which some of the brightest students in the country would be granted the opportunity to contribute to America. These students are barred from opportunities through no fault of their own, as they were brought to this country as children by their families. Due to their immigration status, they cannot ultimately go to a public or private university because they don’t have the resources to do so, and they cannot receive loans or scholarships. Through these bills, we seek for them to be allowed to have access to these resources and to federal monies and opportunities.

_HJHP_

How has the post-September 11 security environment impacted Latino immigration to the United States?

_Menendez_

Prior to September 11, we had created an unprecedented immigration movement. It included religious institutions. It also included, for the first time, labor, which came to understand that immigrants don’t take jobs away from average Americans—they perform jobs that average Americans don’t want, and they can be organized by labor. We had also managed to get several elements of the private sector—growers and the service industries, for example—to understand that it was in their interest to obtain a legalization program. But then September 11 came along and impacted us in two ways. It made us lose the momentum, which we’re trying to rebuild. And it made our country more concerned about security. The question now is how to balance security and civil rights, how to develop an immigration policy that does not isolate us in the pursuit of security.
How important do you think it is for the next Supreme Court justice to be Latino?

The reason we seek to have diversity in our government—in the president’s Cabinet and in our judicial system—is because of what diversity brings to those institutions. It brings an array of experiences. The Supreme Court can make fundamental decisions that affect the lives of all Americans, and certainly Hispanic Americans. I think it would be incredibly important to have a justice of Hispanic descent—hopefully someone who, beyond having a Hispanic surname, would through experience, practice, or knowledge brings to the position the experiential factor of Hispanic Americans and their interaction with the system of justice. As someone who used to practice law, I often saw how the judicial system could pejoratively affect Hispanic Americans—on language issues, on cultural issues, on how people present themselves before a court, on how, for example, someone could almost be convicted on the false interpretation of something said in Spanish in response to an officer’s command. I certainly hope that the opportunity to have the first Hispanic American on the Supreme Court is realized, but I also think it needs to be someone—and there is a vast array of individuals to choose from—who has the judicial temperament, the intellectual ability, the analytical ability, and the experience to serve on the Supreme Court.

Is the ethnicity or the ideology of the justice more important? How, for example, would the Hispanic community react to a Hispanic Clarence Thomas or a Hispanic Antonin Scalia?

The reality is that the community would look to the experience of the candidate. Not only the experience of how many years did the person practice law or sit on the bench, but also did this person come from the community? Did he or she personally, or through parents, siblings, neighbors, friends, or relationships experience some of the travails? If they didn’t personally live it, have they ultimately experienced it by representing others? Or by participating in the community through local, state, or national organizations? Does the candidate view being Hispanic as something that is relevant, unlike Miguel Estrada [the unsuccessful Bush federal appeals court nominee], who says that being Hispanic is irrelevant? It’s more than ethnicity. I think the community would be looking for what ethnicity based upon experience brings to the position.

From what you say, I take it that you welcomed last term’s Supreme Court decision on affirmative action.

Absolutely. I’m glad to see that the Court understood the value of real diversity in our system of education. To have a system of education that would become more segregated, that would not lend itself to the experiential factors of dealing
with people of other backgrounds—not only in terms of race and ethnicity but also in terms of social class and standing, and all of the things that create ferment in the process of education—would be a great detriment to the country. I’m glad the Court ruled as it did.

**HJHP**

Historically the Latino community has had a low rate of participation in U.S. elections. In 2000, only 45 percent of Hispanics turned out to vote, compared to 62 percent of Whites and 57 percent of African-Americans. Why is the voter turnout rate of Hispanic Americans significantly lower?

**Menendez**

Well, of course, I assume we are talking about Hispanics who are citizens and eligible to vote. The challenge is to give Latinos not only someone to vote for, but also something to vote for. We need to emphasize what an election for an official at any level—local, state or federal—means for their lives. Many Hispanic Americans, particularly more recent immigrants, don’t necessarily see a connection between what government does and those who are elected to serve. We need to emphasize that elections are a process in which you ultimately get to select an individual who is going to make major policy decisions about your life, your family’s life, your hopes, your dreams, your aspirations: How much money from your hard work will stay in your wallet? How will it be used? Will it be invested for a world-class education? Will it be spent to provide greater health care? Will it be used to create small business opportunities for our entrepreneurial class?

Having candidates come increasingly from the community is beginning to build enthusiasm and a connection, I think. A number of candidates, from the grassroots levels of school boards and municipal council, are now percolating upwards. This will lead to greater opportunities. We are beginning to see successful statewide candidacies: Governor Bill Richardson in New Mexico, Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante in California, and Susan Castillo, the new superintendent of public instruction in Oregon. We are also seeing additional successful Congressional candidacies: Linda Sanchez (D-CA) and Dennis Cardoza (D-CA), both from California, and Raul Grijalva (D-AZ) from Arizona. Those are all examples of a growing process.

Hispanic Americans are also struggling to make it economically. While we have made great strides in economic advancement, a good part of our community is still struggling to make it economically. Those members of the community are fixated on working multiple jobs, realizing the dreams of their families, getting their children through college. They are fixated on economic issues, and they are thinking less about what the results of these elections are going to mean in their lives. These are some of our challenges.

**HJHP**

How do you reach out to the grassroots level? You are the third-ranking Democrat in the House. You are in contact with the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee folks. How do you grab the voters?
Menendez
We’ve actually done some things here in New Jersey that I think are examples for the rest of the country. Working with Hispanic clergy is one opportunity. Unlike the Black clergy in this country, the Hispanic clergy have never really been involved in politics and the electoral process. Well, in the last gubernatorial election, for the first time, we created a connection between Hispanic clergy and what elections mean and how important it was for their parishioners. Making schools a venue for engaging people in civic discourse is another grassroots effort. Spanish-language media, bilingual media, as well as the incredible pickup in Spanish-language Web sites offer still other opportunities for dialogue. We are also looking for people who are at the cusp of local issues, and who are capable of transforming those issues into an engagement in participatory democracy.

HJHP
What is your assessment of relations between African Americans and Hispanic Americans? What are the tensions, and what are the opportunities?

Menendez
I have always said that there is much more that unites African Americans and Hispanic Americans than that which divides them. There is much more that unites us in terms of economic challenges, access to capital, home ownership, and good education [in] our public schools. We should be joining in our struggle to achieve greater success on these issues, rather than believing that success for either group will be obtained by denying opportunity to one part of America so that the other part of America can achieve. Instead of fighting over scraps, we should be growing the pie.

I think the African American community believes that the Hispanic community does not have an appreciation of its historical struggle in this country, and that Hispanics may take for granted some of the great challenges and the great struggles that took place during the Civil Rights Era. I think that there is also an issue of language that sometimes can be a concern for African Americans. And I think that there also may be some challenges to understanding the differences as to why people are discriminated in this country. But at its root, discrimination—whether on the basis of race, religion, ethnic origin, or gender—is discrimination. It may come from a different basis, but it is always discrimination, and it is abhorrent. And so we need to work to build greater coalitions. And we have in some regards. The Congressional Black Caucus is working with the Congressional Hispanic Caucus on many key issues.

HJHP
How is the relationship between the two groups?

Menendez
We have a good relationship. The Congressional Black Caucus has committees, and the Hispanic Caucus has task forces. The Health Task Force of the Hispanic Caucus, which is chaired by Hilda Solis (D-CA), for example, has been working with its Congressional Black Caucus counterpart chaired by Donna Christensen (D-VI). Instead of fighting over resources for historically black colleges and
Hispanic-serving institutions, to give you another example, we have sought to expand the resources for both entities. So we’re working to build a better understanding of our two communities and seeking legislative opportunities to pursue our mutual interests. And of course, when the Black Caucus joins with the Hispanic Caucus, it is a significant bloc in the Congress.

**HJHP**

Let’s consider some demographic issues. Hispanics, taken as a whole, are the largest minority in the United States. As a group they are also younger by about a decade than the rest of the U.S. population. What opportunities and challenges does this situation present?

**Menendez**

How well educated, how well trained the next generation of Hispanic Americans [is] will be incredibly important not just to the Hispanic community but to all Americans. As the rest of the nation grays, America will increasingly depend for the quality of life upon the significantly growing Hispanic part of American society that’s younger by a decade. This is a community that will have a trillion-dollar domestic-market spending power by the end of the decade and that is brand loyal at percentages higher than any other American group. This is a community that corporate America needs to be engaged with, not for the sake of philanthropy, but for the sake of the bottom line. Corporate leaders need to realize that Hispanic Americans are going to be a big part of the workforce. Corporations will also need Hispanics in senior executive management positions, and even in corporate board rooms, to speak about how to reach out to this vast and growing part of America’s marketplace. The reality also is that the natural ambassadors for American companies in this hemisphere will come from among Hispanic Americans because they understand the language and business customs of the region, both of which are incredibly important in Latin America.

**HJHP**

It has been said that because Hispanics who come to the United States are younger, America should welcome continued Hispanic immigration at the current rate. This would create the influx of a younger workforce that would significantly help resolve America’s Social Security problem. But it would also create a situation in which a workforce of significant Hispanic proportions would be paying into a system that supports a largely White and Black retired population. Could this be problematic?

**Menendez**

Our Social Security system is challenged because we used to have, in essence, a pyramid of many workers at the bottom paying for very few retirees at the top. That pyramid has now been inverted. Since Hispanics are younger by a decade, if we had an earned legalization process, we would have a significant flow of resources into the government. Hispanic Americans are proud of the contributions that they have made from the beginning of this country. We could talk about the all-Hispanic regiment during the Korean War, which was one of the most decorated. We could talk about the incredible number of Congressional Medal of Honor
winners [who are] Americans of Hispanic descent. We could talk about America’s entrepreneurial system, and people like Roberto Goizueta, the late CEO of Coca-Cola. Or we could talk about Hispanic contributions to entertainment, which have permeated American life now. So working and having a chance at the dream is not a challenge or a concern for Hispanic Americans in terms of who they may be supporting at any given time. What we have is a tremendous opportunity for all Americans, for those who come for the dream, for those who are living the dream, for those who are in the twilight of that dream.

**HJHP**

Let’s turn to foreign policy. You serve on the House International Relations Committee. What is your assessment of U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America? Are we doing what we should to maintain good relations? Or are we falling short?

**Menendez**

How much time do you have? I am the ranking Democrat on the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, and for the last decade I have been disappointed by American policy towards the hemisphere. The hemisphere is a stepchild of America’s foreign policy. America’s foreign policy towards the hemisphere is reactive: We react towards problems that pop up; we are not pro-active. Hence, this administration is almost at the end of its first term, and only now does it finally have an assistant secretary of state for the western hemisphere who is permanent in nature. We spend billions of dollars to promote democracy in Central America, and then we walk away after we plant the seeds and don’t fertilize those seeds to strengthen democracy. We believe that trade—which admittedly is very important—is the only element of our foreign diplomacy in the western hemisphere. When nearly 50 percent of the people in the southern part of the hemisphere live below the poverty level, trade alone will not ultimately achieve the opportunities.

If you travel in the hemisphere, and you talk to leaders and average citizens, you will hear that we are losing the fight for the belief that democracy and free markets ultimately bring good things to life. This is because our policy is one-dimensional. It is gauged by trade alone. We should be coupling trade with economic development—sustainable development—and looking at the tremendous possibilities that exist in the hemisphere on biodiversity, on new products that can be developed from rain forests, on alternative crop development for the poor who grow coca to sustain their families.

If you look at some of the health issues that are resurfacing along the border with the United States, if you look at some of the biodiversity challenges stemming from the depletion of the rainforests in this hemisphere and the ozone consequences of that, and if you look at the possibilities of creating markets of middle class families that would buy more American goods and products—because they’re more likely to seek American goods, products, and services than people from any other part of the world because of their affinity—then you would understand that it is in the national interest of the United States to engage Latin America in multi-dimensional ways—based on trade, yes, but also based on foreign assis-
tance concerned with sustainable development, economic development, rule of law, government transparency, and the work of building civil societies. This would ultimately create a more prosperous Latin America, and that in turn would mean fewer people likely to flee their homes to come illegally to the United States. It would also create a growing middle class likely to buy more American goods and services. So we would have a safer hemisphere, a more stable hemisphere, a more prosperous hemisphere. That vision, however, has not been pursued by America. Certainly not in the decade that I have spent in the Congress.

HJHP

A personal question. Although you have succeeded very well in the American political system, you must have faced some challenges as a Latino on your way to the top. What were your toughest challenges, and how did you overcome them?

Menendez

I have never run for an office in which the Hispanic part of the electorate was the majority. So whether I ran for school board, mayor, state legislator, or Congress, the majority of the community was not Latino. I have always had to meet a broader cross-section of the electorate and to convince voters that a Hispanic American could equally and successfully represent them their hopes, their dreams, their aspirations and do so as well as someone from their own ancestry, ethnicity, or race. When I ran for mayor, I had a picture of Jose Marti, who is sort of like the George Washington of Cuba, where my parents are from.

One lady asked me, “Why don’t you have a picture of a great American in your office?”

And I said, “I do. I have pictures of two great Americans: George Washington and Abe Lincoln. But if you know Jose Marti, you would know that he’d also be the type of person that you would admire. Because freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights is what he was all about.”

The challenge for Hispanic Americans is in part cultural and in part language. Creating understanding has been a challenge over the past nearly 30 years, but it has also been an opportunity.

HJHP

One last question. You are now part of the establishment. How open and receptive are the higher councils of government to the exercise of real power by Hispanic Americans?

Menendez

You know, power is never given. It has to be earned. It’s not handed over. No one who has it readily shares it or gives it up. In most of the positions I’ve ever held, the opportunity was never handed to me. I had to go and earn it. But I sense, certainly within my party, that there is an increasing understanding of how important this community is to the party as well as to the country. There is a real desire to listen, to learn, and to adopt some of our views. Now are there challenges? Are there enough of us sitting at the table to press some of the things that we think are important? No. Have we made progress? Yes. Will we make more? Yes. Are there still challenges to overcome? Absolutely. But that’s the great history of this country.
This experience is not unique to Hispanic Americans. Hispanic Americans presently occupy a point in time during which they will play a pivotal role, both in parties, in government, and in our society. I get a sense increasingly that people understand that we are all interconnected. Our future is delicately intertwined with each other. As our concerns about each other prove unrealized, we will find an American society that is more accepting, more trusting, and more engaged to what Hispanic Americans can bring. That’s true for my party. I’d like to believe it’s true for the other party, though I don’t quite see it. But it’s certainly true for my party, and I think it’s true for American society.

Following Congressman Menendez’s interview with the HJHP, President Bush announced on 7 January 2004 a new immigration proposal that would provide temporary legal status for illegal immigrant workers. Congressman Menendez was not able to answer questions about the plan before HJHP went to press, but on the day of the announcement, he did issue a statement about the plan, which is reprinted below.

While I welcome the news that President Bush is finally—three years after promising to act—announcing a proposal to reform our immigration laws, today’s announcement appears to be the brainchild of the White House political operation, instead of its policy shop. The president’s proposal is nothing more than a glorified guest worker program with no new path to legalization or family reunification. We welcome a program that is based on work, but it, again, fails the expectations of the Latino community because it has no route to earned legalization. In a three-year period, a willing worker who has been employed by a willing U.S. employer—for a job a U.S. citizen is unwilling to do—will find himself in the same undocumented position he was prior to this proposal. If anything, this program will provide documentation of such a worker, who could then be deported more easily—a disincentive for undocumented workers to step forward and enlist. Today, President Bush spells out that while he wants their sweat and labor, he ultimately doesn’t want them. The proposal will be a rotation of human capital, to be used and discarded, with no hope of permanently legalizing one’s status.

This proposal is nothing more than election-year politics by a president who has refused to invest his political capital within his own party in Congress, as is clearly reflected by the Republican leadership’s unwillingness to step forward and support this proposal or any other proposal in the past that would actually bring a just and meaningful change to our immigration laws. This is an immigration proposal that was crafted with no input from the Congressional Hispanic Caucus or any of the advocacy organizations that represent our community. This is the same strategy [Karl] Rove and the Bush campaign used in 2000 within the Hispanic community. It’s the old bait and switch. Tell Latinos you are going to help their community and then deliver nothing—I wish the president would respect our community more than that. His actions—and inactions—explain why the president is doing so poorly in the polls in the Hispanic community: the community believes that he has repeatedly broken his promises.
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Launching Policy Initiatives That Improve Latinos’ Lives

Interview with Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico

Bill Richardson was elected governor of New Mexico in 2002 by the largest margin of any candidate since 1964. During his first year in office, he made good on his campaign promises to improve education, cut taxes, build a high-wage economy, develop a statewide water plan, and make New Mexico safer by getting tough on DWI, domestic violence, and sex crimes. He is continuing to move New Mexico forward in 2004, working to improve access to quality health care, implement an ambitious school reform plan, and make the state a leader in renewable energy and clean energy technologies.

At the Department of Energy (DOE), Richardson made improving security and counterintelligence his top priority. He led the administration effort to combat rising oil prices; enhanced nuclear safety and security in Russia by signing a series of nonproliferation agreements; developed electricity restructuring legislation; streamlined DOE’s organization and management structure; and initiated the Scientific Simulation Initiative to provide a computational system to advance the nation’s missions in energy, environment, and basic service.

While serving as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Governor Richardson addressed a number of difficult international negotiations including Iraq, unpaid U.S. United Nations dues, peaceful transfer of power in the former Zaire, and Afghanistan. As a diplomatic “troubleshooter,” he negotiated the release of hostages, American servicemen, and prisoners in North Korea, Iraq, Cuba, and Sudan.

Governor Richardson served for 15 years in northern New Mexico representing the 3rd congressional district. He held one of the highest-ranking posts in the House Democratic leadership serving as chief deputy whip. He was a member of the Resources Committee, the Commerce Committee, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Helsinki Commission on Human Rights, and also chaired the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. He also served as President Clinton’s special envoy on many missions. Governor Richardson served in 1997 as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and in 1998, he was unanimously confirmed by the U.S. Senate as secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy. He was nominated four times (1995, 1997, 2000, and 2001) for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Carmen J. López, a native New Mexican and HJHP senior editor, interviewed Governor Richardson on 5 January 2004. Ms. Lopez will receive a masters in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 2005.

HJHP

I’m interviewing you on behalf of the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy, which publishes interdisciplinary work on policy making and politics affecting the Latino community in the United States. I want to ask you a couple of broad questions about Latino policy in the United States as well as some questions specifically about education.

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What are the top issues affecting the quality of life of Latinos in the United States?

Richardson
First is raising wages for Latino workers. Second is raising educational standards for Latinos and improving schools, specifically closing the achievement gap between Latinos and non-Latinos.

HJHP
Do you think that the No Child Left Behind Act is doing a good job of moving American schools in that direction?

Richardson
No, because it’s not funded. I do think it makes sense to have a series of standards, but you have to have resources and you have to have follow-through to make those standards work.

HJHP
If you could make three changes to the No Child Left Behind Act, what would they be?

Richardson
The first would be to fully fund the mandate. That is critically important. Secondly, I would have more of an incentive initiative for schools that are not closing the achievement gap, instead of just penalties. I would focus more on teacher enhancement than the No Child Left Behind currently does. Specifically I would fund more teacher enhancement programs like advanced placement, Baldridge initiative, and international baccalaureate programs. I think we’ve got to be more innovative.

What else would I do with No Child Left Behind? I would provide teacher incentives. Full funding is critically important. I’m not one of those that thinks No Child Left Behind is a bad initiative. I think it’s a decent initiative. At least it sets some broad standards. Currently, however, it is an unfunded mandate in the states that is causing added tensions between school boards and schools and state departments of education.

HJHP
How are you addressing the three critical quality of life issues that you noted earlier, specifically in New Mexico? I know a little bit about the pay banding for teachers and about increasing educational funding and making changes to the state department of education, but are there a few specific areas that you would like to highlight as most important?

Richardson
Changing the governance of the education policy practice is critical. In other words, changing the governance and the budgeting are important. The fact that it’s now centralized and less politicized is also critical. We’ve undertaken a massive spending shift from administration and bureaucracy to the classroom.
Next, it is very important that we use some innovative programs to improve the schools. And that’s where, right now, we’re in a very quick transition period. What I’ve done is put half of the reform money into what is called a lock box account, and we will refrain from spending it until we know where the reform dollars should go.

What do I want to focus on? I want to focus on early childhood education, full-day kindergarten, dropout prevention programs, advanced placement, core teachers’ salaries, and licensure provisions.

I’m a big supporter of charter schools. They make our public schools more competitive.

It is important to figure out how we can effectively spend reform dollars to continue our efforts to make our teachers’ salaries competitive. We did that with the recent 6 percent raise. In addition, I proposed a 4 percent bonus for teachers in higher education. The proposed 4 percent bonus is an alternative to additional salary increases because we just don’t have the dollars this year.

The next challenge in New Mexico is going to be higher education. We have a very diffuse higher education system. And we want to bring a new system of governance to higher education and an integrated strategic strategy for our community colleges, our four-year universities, and our vocational schools.

Another major initiative that I want to study is charter vocational schools through our community colleges. These are for kids that are not going to college, kids that need a trade, need to be trained for the new, higher-wage jobs that we’re trying to bring in.

**HJHP**

So these would be startup programs that would request a charter from the state and would train people in specific professional areas?

**Richardson**

Right, like in the oil and gas area. Some examples would be training people to become oil field workers, accountants, etc.

**HJHP**

And then do you want to speak to what you’ve done in New Mexico to address the pay issue for Hispanics? That was the third issue that you brought up.

**Richardson**

New Mexico’s wages are still among the lowest per capita. Although, I’ve only been [governor] a year, workers’ wages are going up and we have created positive job growth.

We’re trying to attract high wage jobs. We are pushing tax credits through the legislature. These tax credits are for businesses that provide high-wage jobs, that move into depressed areas, and that pay higher than the average salary of a depressed county. This is slow, however. We still have a state with a lot of poverty, but we’re moving forward.
The interests and backgrounds of U.S. Latinos are diverse, and both parties seem to be encountering difficulty in registering, mobilizing, interesting, and even addressing Latino issues. How can each party do a better job to address the issues of Latinos in this country?

Richardson
I think the Democrats have a big advantage, but they’re taking the Latino vote for granted. The Democrats have the traditional core Hispanic issues of immigration, civil rights, and affirmative action. There is no lessening of the core in the Democratic Party for those key Latino issues.

Republicans generally only mouth those issues. Republicans have made some strides on affirmative action, though. When it comes to immigration and civil rights issues, there’s always a fringe in the Republican Party that prevents moderates in the Republican Party, like Bush, from doing the right thing.

When it comes to issues of mobilizing and turnout, both parties really have not captured the Latino vote.

Richardson
That’s right. I think it is very important for Democrats to first focus on younger Hispanic voters, on Hispanic voters who are starting their first jobs, starting their first families, who are interested Hispanic voters. The problem with the Democrats is that they don’t work to broaden their appeal. Democrats need to talk to Hispanic voters about entrepreneurship, economic growth issues, home ownership, starting businesses, and not just about the traditional immigration and civil rights issues. This is where Democrats are weak and Republicans are a little stronger.

But the good news is that Republicans don’t follow up. It’s just a lot of rhetoric and a lot of money. It’s a lot of fanfare.

What we’re trying to do with our PAC, Moving America Forward, is to register more Latinos, train more Hispanic political workers, and focus on just four key states: Nevada, Florida, Arizona, and New Mexico. We want to use those states as a starting point.

The front-loaded primary process in racially homogeneous states really disadvantages Latinos in the electoral dialogue, up front. What ideas do you have about how the process might be opened up to include the issues of Latinos and Native Americans and other minority groups?

Richardson
This is no longer the case with two primaries, Arizona and New Mexico. In the Democratic primary, California, New York, Florida, and other big Latino states had late primaries. So we changed the timing during this primary in at least two states, Arizona and New Mexico, such that they have primaries or caucuses on 3 February. So, we are front loaded now.
And for the first time, Democratic candidates have addressed Latino issues. They participated in Hispanic debates in Arizona and New Mexico, both of which are battleground Hispanic states getting a lot of attention. So that is changing. And we realized that, at least in our party, we were not getting that early visibility. So we changed that.

**HJHP**

So, do you predict a big bump in Latino turnout because of this change in bylaws?

**Richardson**

Yes, absolutely. Absolutely. And there’ll be more attention to Latino issues by presidential candidates, by having earlier primaries, and courting of Latino political issues.
HARVARD JOURNAL of HISPANIC POLICY

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The Local Framing of Latino Educational Policy

Edmund T. Hamann

Edmund “Ted” Hamann (Ph.D, University of Pennsylvania) is a research and evaluation specialist at Education Alliance and an adjunct lecturer at the Center for the Study of Race and Ethnicity in America, both at Brown University. He studies and supports the implementation of comprehensive school reform at the high school level, examines inclusion/exclusion of English language learners from academic programs, and studies how educational policy is changed by its conversion into practice. He is author of The Educational Welcome of Latinos in the New South (Praeger, 2003), co-author of Claiming Opportunities: A Handbook for Improving Education for English Language Learners Through Comprehensive School Reform (The Education Alliance, 2003), and co-editor of the book Education in the New Latino Diaspora (Ablex Press, 2001). He can be e-mailed at Edmund_Hamann@brown.edu.

Abstract

In many parts of the country, Latino newcomers are encountering educational policies that were framed by non-Latino local leaders. This study, an ethnography of educational policy, depicts an unorthodox assemblage of policy framers from both the United States and Mexico who shaped the local education policies aimed at Latino newcomers in Dalton, GA, in the 1990s. The study considers the evolving underlying understandings of these framers and the strategies that resulted, considering also why a temporary consensus that launched an impressive initiative—the Georgia Project—ultimately fractured.

The Local Framing of Latino Educational Policy

Latino educational policy or, more specifically, the educational policies developed to respond to the presence of Latino students in schools often have a substantial local imprint. This has certainly been the case in the “New Latino Diaspora” (Wortham et al. 2001)—those sites in the South, Midwest, and Northwest that have not traditionally hosted Latinos but now find themselves home to growing populations of Latino newcomers. In such sites, where proportions of foreign-born and native Spanish-speaking Latinos are high and locally-born adult Latinos are few, mostly non-Latinos shape the schooling experience of Latino youngsters. Non-Latino teachers, district administrators, and board members decide whether the presence of the newcomers is seen as an opportunity or a problem, whether schools try to be sites of unilateral assimilation or some more pluralistic vision, and whether newcomer parents feel welcome, have access to bilingual interpreters, and/or are expected to have input in how their children’s
schooling is shaped. Local policy makers also decide who is hired and what curricula are used.

Nonetheless, the ways largely non-Latino local education policy makers shape the schooling of Latinos has not been a topic of much study. Derived from Hamann (2003), this article helps fill the current gap, describing local education policy development in Dalton, GA, which in 2001 became the first school district in that state to enroll a majority Latino population, though its Latino enrollment was just 4 percent as recently as 1989. Dalton is also a site that has seen White flight from its schools (See Figure 1).

Dalton, which bills itself as the “Carpet Capital of the World” because of the local concentration of mills, is a specific place, and the change in the demographics of who came to work at its mills in the 1990s (i.e., thousands of Latino—mostly Mexican—newcomers) is a story particular to Dalton and surrounding towns and counties. Yet changes in construction, food-processing, and other industries have prompted similar processes to those depicted here in other locations (Lamphere 1992; Griffith 1995). As recent newspaper reports in the Atlanta Constitution and Charlotte Observer make clear (Bixler 2003; Bolling 2003; Winston 2003), Dalton is hardly the only community in the South negotiating a linguistic, cultural, and demographic transformation.

Just as demographic changes in Dalton have been akin to those encountered in many other locations, schooling decisions in Dalton precipitated by those changes have occurred in contexts similar to those encountered elsewhere. New students in Dalton have often been Mexican immigrants or children of immigrants, English language learners (ELLs), highly mobile, and from economically vulnerable households. Nationally, each of these labels describes a growing number of students. A recent map in Education Week (Uneven Growth 2000) showed that hundreds of counties across the former Confederacy saw the proportion of Hispanic school-age children grow by at least 75 percent between 1990 and 1998.\(^1\) Nationally, the number of identified ELLs rose 95 percent between 1991-92 and 2001-02 (NCEL 2002). Unfortunately, these labels too often describe students who perform less well and are served less well by schools than are “mainstream” students (see, for example, Rumberger and Larson 1998; Valenzuela 1999; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001; Valdés 2001). By the mid-1990s it was increasingly apparent in Dalton that a growing number of newcomer students would fare poorly unless their schooling differed substantially from that encountered by similar students elsewhere in the United States.

But then Dalton acted; it started the Georgia Project, an unorthodox binational partnership that linked Dalton schools, the Universidad de Monterrey in Mexico, and several leading Dalton citizens. Within its first year of operation, the Georgia Project coordinated the temporary assignment of bilingual Mexican teachers in Dalton schools, the training of Dalton and other Georgia teachers in Mexico, and the first-ever inventory/needs assessment of Dalton’s rapidly growing Latino community. Since then, the Georgia Project has drawn international attention—its founder has been recognized by the National Association for Bilingual Education and the National Education Association, while Georgia Project partners at the Universidad de Monterrey have accepted the invitation of the Mexican teachers...
union to partner in a broad effort to train Mexican teachers to work in U.S. schools (Muñiz 2003). Moreover, the Georgia Project has grown from its original involvement in just Dalton to include several northwest Georgia school districts. Yet as it prospered on many fronts, the Georgia Project in Dalton suffered on others. By 2001, after battles over direct instruction and other issues, the Georgia Project had converted from a three-way partnership to a stand-alone not-for-profit, and the relationship between the project’s originators and the original host district had sufficiently foundered, such that the district withdrew almost all involvement with the project. Both the temporary overlap in problem diagnoses that gave rise to the Georgia Project partnership and the growing deviation in those problem diagnoses that ultimately led to its schism shed light on local Latino education policy making and praxis.

The Ethnography of Educational Policy

Meier and Stewart (1991) claim that investigating the interaction between layers of the educational hierarchy provides the key to understanding the politics and prognosis for Latino education. The research design of this study offered such an interstitial vantage point. Crafted as an ethnography of educational policy (Sutton and Levinson 2001, Shore and Wright 1997), its main focus was on the evolving understandings and related recommended policy responses of less than a dozen differently situated crafters of the Georgia Project.

This study shares with Sutton and Levinson (2001) the premise that, at their most rudimentary, all policies are a combination of a problem diagnosis and a strategy of action intended to rectify the problem. As such, policies change as problem diagnoses are refined and/or as strategies are combined, implemented, and assessed. Policies can be explicit and formal, but as practiced they also embed unarticulated problem diagnoses and unexamined habits of action. As Rosen, another important promoter of this perspective has noted,

In the domain of education, when we perceive that children or schools are not performing as we imagine they should, we seek or construct stories to explain why, and to orient our efforts at addressing perceived problems. Education policy is implicated in these myth-making processes: any plan of action, recommendation for change, or statement of goals involves (either explicitly or implicitly) an account of purported conditions and a set of recommendations for addressing them (2001, 299).

The account that follows weaves together data gathered from interviews, observations at meetings, written surveys, newspaper accounts, and “member checking” (that is, the checking of emerging interpretations with those involved to see if there found to be on target or off—[Lincoln and Guba 1985]). The author came to Dalton in 1997 with two explicit identities: (1) as a researcher carrying out fieldwork for a dissertation and (2) as a grantwriter. For the latter, he helped the Dalton schools leverage $500,000 by leading the drafting of a Title VII system-wide bilingual education grant that the district insisted it wanted to support the nascent
Georgia Project. For the former, he documented the actions and arguments of a number of key individuals—none of whom, it must be emphasized, acted maliciously. One can agree or disagree with the decisions made by various individuals depicted and the premises they acted upon, but part of what is important about this account is that it sheds light on how real people, faced with partial knowledge and not always consistent understandings of what should be, shaped educational policies that affected thousands of Latino students.

Getting to March 1997: Crafting a Policy to Respond to Latino Newcomers

The individuals who first crafted and guided the Georgia Project were policy makers, though not all were in positions that one would normally associate with educational policy making. They embedded the Georgia Project with particular beliefs about the constituencies they were addressing, the struggles the community faced, the needs their program should attend to, and the strategies that could be pursued. Those who were Georgia-certified educators also assured that state policy parameters (e.g., the fact that Georgia only permits standardized testing of students in English) and those policies’ underlying assumptions were part of the calculation of local policy and practice.

Among the key crafters of the Georgia Project were an attorney who had previously served in the U.S. Congress and Georgia Senate, a new superintendent who came to Dalton in 1996 from a superintendency in south Georgia that included only two ELLs among its 8,000-plus students, a veteran district administrator (here called the curriculum coordinator) who was one of the Georgia Project’s key early champions and then its earliest important skeptic, and a sociologist from the Universidad de Monterrey who collaborated with a changing rotation of four other Monterrey-based important project partners. A local carpet executive, a Mexican businessman, a state education administrator, a principal who piloted many of the ideas that the Georgia Project tried to scale up at her Dalton elementary school, and the author of this article also played notable smaller roles.

In 1993, when Dalton’s daily newspaper ran a feature story with the subtitle “Schools Key to Assimilating Hispanics” (Hoffman 1993), there was no Georgia Project. In the article, school leaders were quoted as saying that limited English proficient immigrant students needed from one year up to three years to learn adequate English to be successfully mainstreamed (a claim contrary to most second-language acquisition research, e.g., Cummins 1981; Collier 1987, 1995; Hakuta et al. 2000; Mitchell et al. 1997; Thomas and Collier 2001). The extra challenges such students encountered at school were reduced to issues of language difference. In the article, “Hispanic” families were distinguished from “American” families in a simplistic and exclusionary way of noting cultural difference. At that time, the small but expanding English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) program was the district’s only major curricular accommodation to the newcomers. The community response around then was mostly passive, but included opening a local INS office, raids at local plants (Rehyansky 1995a, 1995b), and
enough bitter letters to the editor in the local newspaper that there was a temporary moratorium on letters about newcomers.

As the Georgia Project was getting started, Dalton schools’ longtime record of high quality still seemed to be intact, at least as measured by the district’s average SAT scores, which were frequently cited. The 1997 average was Georgia’s second highest and well ahead of the national average (Georgia Department of Education 1998). The high SAT average was a misleading indicator of district quality and health, however, because graduation data—particularly Hispanic graduation data—suggested a sizable portion of Dalton’s potential SAT-taking population was not taking the test because they were not staying in school. According to district data, in September 1996, the Hispanic proportion of the ninth-grade enrollment was 30.5 percent (113 out of 371) and 10th grade 30.0 percent (82 out of 273), but 11th grade was only 17.3 percent (46 out of 266) and 12th grade 11.8 percent (27 out of 229). Those 11th and 12th grades would have been the SAT-takers that generated the scores previously noted.

As the enrollment data hint, all was not well with schooling in Dalton in the mid-1990s, of which teachers, paraprofessionals, and administrators were all increasingly aware. Just before the end of the 1995-96 school year, an Anglo attorney and some colleagues responded to a tearful invitation by the attorney’s daughter to observe classes at the elementary school where the attorney’s daughter was a paraprofessional. According to the daughter, the educators at this school (practically all monolingual English speakers) were struggling to understand their rapidly growing numbers of Spanish-speaking students and parents. During the visit, a frustrated teacher complained that she was about to pass Hispanic students on to the next grade level, even though she thought they were only just ready to begin the grade level they were officially finishing. Whether the teacher intended her comment to generate any reaction beyond sympathy quickly did not matter; that conversation and others like it between the attorney and her colleagues were precipitous. The attorney determined the school district should be confronted and its plans for educating Latino newcomers made clear.

He quickly arranged meetings with district leaders to ask how the district was responding to the influx of Latinos. The retiring superintendent said there was no district-wide plan but added that the district was open to suggestions. Hardly pausing, the attorney set out to generate some recommendations. Working openly with the school system but according to his own dictates, he contacted a client who was a longtime family friend and the wealthy CEO of one of Dalton’s large carpet manufacturers. The CEO agreed to pursue a NAFTA-related business link in Mexico on behalf of the emergent project. The CEO called a Mexican business partner asking that partner how Dalton could be assisted in its efforts to accommodate its influx of Mexicans. The Mexican business leader then contacted the rector of the Universidad de Monterrey to discuss creating a partnership between Dalton schools and the university. Though the Mexican business leader had no official affiliation with the university, his grandfather had played an instrumental role in the founding and the development of the Universidad de Monterrey, and several executives in the corporation he headed were university trustees. Though what was being proposed was pretty nebulous, the rector asked one of his sociology
professors if he would be willing to head up a collaborative project in Georgia. Making the whole proposition seem slightly more real, in September 1996 the Dalton attorney called the designated professor in Monterrey.

With evidence that one of Dalton’s most important business leaders was on board, in September the attorney also successfully petitioned Dalton’s new superintendent to draft a letter in support of the nascent project that would clarify some of the district’s wishes and needs. The letter marked the first substantive direct communication between Dalton schools and the Universidad de Monterrey and was disproportionately important for the shaping of Monterrey leaders’ conceptualizations of the school district’s wishes, understandings, and expectations. The superintendent wrote that he had queried the principals at each of Dalton’s eight schools, and they had expressed interest in 68 bilingual teachers. He also wrote that district leaders were committed to long-term bilingual education and claimed the district’s sought to provide first-language support to native Spanish-speakers in various academic content areas with the goal of literate, bilingual graduates. The letter did not indicate that the superintendent’s understanding regarding bilingual education, or education of ELLs more generally, only was rudimentary, nor that he and his colleagues were less disposed to fight for it than they appeared.

The first meeting between Dalton and Mexican university officials was 12 December 1996 (the holiday for the Virgin of Guadalupe) at the Universidad de Monterrey. Present from Dalton were the chair of Dalton’s school board, the attorney, the new superintendent, the curriculum coordinator, and a principal who had recently written a dissertation on the professional development needs at schools that were newly enrolling large numbers of ELLs.

Though Dalton leaders and the attorney had sufficient hopes for the partnership to go to Monterrey, Universidad de Monterrey participants recalled that the only solid item on the Dalton side’s agenda was to ask for the Universidad de Monterrey’s help bringing bilingual teachers to Dalton.7 (Efforts by another Dalton district administrator to recruit bilingual teachers domestically at the National Association for Bilingual Education annual meeting, for example, had previously attracted few.) The Monterrey leaders felt Dalton’s one-dimensional proposal, on its own, was not something they were particularly interested in. After humorously offering to place a help-wanted ad in a Monterrey newspaper if it was just recruiting assistance that Dalton was seeking, they offered to help Dalton find bilingual instructors provided the school district and attorney would also welcome three additional components for the project—training in Mexico for Georgia teachers, development of a bilingual curriculum, and an ambitious but loosely defined community initiative that included needs assessments, workplace literacy initiatives, and identification and organization of local Latino leaders. Dalton project partners accepted this more encompassing design. The day the Dalton delegation left for Monterrey, the local paper on the front page told the attorney’s story about how his daughter’s frustration with language barriers impeding the learning environment at a Dalton elementary school had led to the project (Hamilton 1996).

In January 1997, the first visit was reciprocated when the Dalton carpet CEO’s corporate jet was used to bring a team from Monterrey to Dalton. That visit, which included stops at local carpet mills (where hundreds of Mexican newcom-
ers now worked), visits to local schools, and meetings with leading business figures, was a chance for the Monterrey leaders to refine plans for the four components and for Dalton leaders to generate publicity and momentum.

It was also an occasion for project proponents to encourage the local newspaper to print stories about the initiative and the problem diagnoses and strategic responses it embedded. Headlines corresponding with this visit to Dalton included: “Communication Revolution Arrives in Dalton Today” (Hamilton 1997a), “Visiting Professors Shocked by Size of Communication Problem” (Hamilton 1997b), and “Business Involvement Aids Georgia Project” (Daily Citizen-News 1997). Reiterating ideas that Hispanic students and Anglo teachers in Dalton faced a communication gap and that the Georgia Project would bridge that gap, thus resolving Hispanic students’ problems, the “Visiting Professors Shocked” story described a lengthy conversation (presumably in Spanish) between one of the Monterrey visitors and a young Hispanic student. The student’s teacher claimed shock at the exchange because she had never seen the girl particularly expressive; in fact, the teacher had worried that the girl had a speech or learning problem. The article’s intended conclusions were easy to draw: If only somebody could communicate with these newcomer students, the students’ general talents could be displayed and cultivated.

**Policy in Practice: The Hazy Consensus Fractures and Latino Education Policy Changes**

To the extent that mobilization of the local business community and the local paper’s favorable coverage are proof, the Georgia Project was already becoming a successful four-component Latino education policy in the winter of 1997. Some key obstacles remained, however, including finding the resources to launch those programs. Much of the winter and spring was devoted to this, with a signing ceremony at Dalton High School formalizing the partnership as a mid-March highlight.

Three strategies were pursued to obtain resources. Following the lead of the CEO who had lent his plane to bring the Monterrey visitors to Dalton in January, several other carpet industry leaders made substantive financial and in-kind pledges. Second, the attorney lobbied the city council to set aside a portion of an unexpected $12 million windfall to support the project. Third, the district determined to seek a federal Title VII system-wide bilingual education grant. Each of these required articulation, of greater or lesser detail, about what the resources were intended for, and that articulation became a further occasion for refining policy.

The local carpet executives appeared mostly satisfied with the description of the project to that point, asking only for a further clarification of what the community and workplace initiative was to entail. That winter one carpet executive rented an apartment (that visa problems kept from being used) to house visiting teachers from Mexico. He also donated more than a dozen frequent flier vouchers to help Dalton teachers participate in a summer 1997 training in Monterrey. Ironically,
this support proved exceptional. In the late ’90s several of the project’s earliest champions literally sold their businesses and left Dalton as the industry consolidated.

The attorney’s entrees with the city council bore more fruit. In April, the Dalton City Council committed $250,000 a year for each of the next three years to the Georgia Project. But these first substantial resources came with an unexpected cost. According to the local paper’s editorial (Daily Citizen-News 1997b) published two days after the public funds for the Georgia Project had been approved, there had been a demonstration against Georgia Project funding outside of the city council meeting. Using the Georgia Project as a new excuse for protesting the presence of immigrants in Dalton, one of the demonstrators asked, “Will the last person to leave Whitfield County please take the American flag with them?” Though the comment was illogical and dismissed by the editorial writers as racist fear, in the same editorial the writers offered a different and much narrower rationale for the Georgia Project than those that had circulated before: “Again, the goal of the Georgia Project is teaching English. There may be reasonable arguments against the Georgia Project. Maybe it costs too much money, or maybe there are simpler ways to teach English to these students” (4A). The newspaper’s perspective opened the door for criticizing any part of the Georgia Project that was not oriented toward English-language acquisition. Still, $750,000 was in hand for three years of work.

The quest for Title VII funds originated with the advice of an administrator in another district to Dalton’s curriculum coordinator, who began drafting the Title VII system-wide bilingual education proposal in mid-February. On 27 February, she faxed to the Georgia Department of Education’s coordinator of ESOL and migrant education programs (who also oversaw Title VII) a six-page draft that included references to Thomas and Collier’s bilingual education research, a declaration that English immersion was inadequate, and a claim that Dalton students in its single two-way immersion classroom were achieving at a higher level than their peers. This state administrator had communicated with the Georgia Project’s instigating attorney and had worked with ESOL teachers in the district, so she was aware of Dalton’s demographic changes and the nascent Georgia Project. In her comments on the Dalton coordinator’s draft, she scribbled, “Add GA Project.” She also suggested that the Dalton administrator seek assistance with the drafting. This led to your author being hired. His instructions from the district were explicit: obtain funding for the Georgia Project. The submitted proposal dutifully described the four intended components and promised other tie-ins to several existing district initiatives.

Mid-drafting, the Dalton curriculum coordinator asked that the proposal seek support for direct instruction—a fully scripted, phonics curriculum (Adams and Engelmann 1996) that, as Goode (2002) points out, made no claim about being effective with second-language learners. The submitted draft, however, included just one passing reference to direct instruction, as direct instruction’s lack of apparent acknowledgment or use of non-native speakers’ first-language skills seemed inconsistent with the federal request for proposal. In the summer word came that $500,000 of Title VII funding would be directed to Dalton.
In June 1997, the Georgia Project began converting from being a plan to being a series of loosely coordinated actions. A team of scholars from Monterrey began a rapid assessment of the local Latino community. That effort, in turn, led to the publication later that year of a report that included the first public sphere articulations by Latino parents, not all of whom were happy with their children’s Dalton school experiences. The report also identified a cadre of incipient Latino leaders (successful entrepreneurs, organizers of soccer leagues, and the like) who were invited to a November training in Dalton led entirely by staff from Monterrey on community organizing. That group later formed Dalton’s first Latino-organized community organization.

In June also, a team of Dalton and Whitfield County educators (Whitfield County surrounds Dalton) traveled to Monterrey for an intensive four-week training in Spanish, curriculum development, Mexican history, and other topics related to improving schooling for Dalton’s new Latino students. At the elementary school that sent 10 of Dalton’s 17 participants, the training had a cathartic effect during the 1997-98 school year, adding classroom materials and improving communication with many students and parents.

Finally, during the summer of 1997 Dalton stopped trying to unilaterally break the logjam keeping prospective bilingual instructors from Mexico from obtaining visas. It hired an immigration attorney who succeeded at arranging for a first team of 14 to come to Dalton in October 1997. When those instructors, all young women, arrived, they immediately became the most public and prominent face of the Georgia Project. All were trained and certified bilingual educators, yet because their Mexican credential was not recognized in Georgia, all officially served as paraprofessionals, supervised by Dalton teachers. Acknowledging their more advanced training, they were provided free housing and transportation.

The original idea had been to have the visiting instructors support implementation of the fourth component, the bilingual curriculum, but that was not ready (and never would be, as the district unilaterally discarded the idea), so their tasks instead were improvised and varied substantially school by school. Both the paraprofessional status and the absence of a coherent plan for their use emerged as important problems. Nonetheless their contributions were heralded by all of the Georgia Project initiators, even as those initiators’ consensus started to fracture.

On 27 March 1998, with a “coming out party” initiated by the attorney, the project reached an apex in Dalton. Thereafter, the Georgia Project would receive national accolade, obtain substantial additional resources, and begin exciting collaborations with other districts, but never again would the Dalton school district prove as willing and proud a partner. Almost 70 education and business leaders attended the event, many coming from Atlanta. They saw children at a school for pre-kindergarten to grade two sing for the guests in English, Spanish, and American Sign Language and then saw Monterrey and Dalton teachers collaborate in their classrooms. At the high school, attendees saw other Monterrey instructors, and some noticed signs on the wall, in Spanish, encouraging votes for a Latino student’s bid for student council president. The attendees then were hosted for lunch in the corporate dining room of Dalton’s largest carpet manufacturer, where the attorney delightedly announced that his daughter—the one who had voiced the
original precipitous complaint—had that morning been back for the first time in two years to the elementary school she had previously worked at, only to be amazed at how much more inclusive it had become.

Visitors also saw visiting instructors using the direct instruction curriculum. That activity did not appear to draw any negative comment, but it could have. Direct instruction was a strange thing to have trained bilingual educators from Mexico implementing. Not only were their modelings of pronunciation heavily accented (which is only really a problem if one is trying to teach standard phonetic forms), the full scripting of the curriculum meant that technically the visiting instructors were not to use either their native language capacities nor their knowledge of Mexican culture and educational systems as tools to assist their students’ comprehension. Non-district-based partners increasingly questioned this usage, publicly and privately.

During the 1998-99 school year, the attorney joined in the emerging stand-off between the Georgia Project and direct instruction. When he learned that Title VII funds were being used to pay for high-cost direct instruction training, he publicly questioned this use of the funds (in the process breaking a 100-year-old precedent of public mutual praise between the school system and community leaders) and demanded an audit of all of the district’s Georgia Project-related expenditures. He accurately claimed that the Title VII proposal had sought funds for the Georgia Project, not direct instruction. But the district countered that the U.S. Department of Education had agreed to the way they expended the Title VII funds. The ambiguous but friendly collaborative governance of the Georgia Project, with the attorney’s team on one side and the district on the other—an arrangement that had led Monterrey-based collaborators to comment, “We were never sure who to send the fax to”—had become quarrelsome.

This led to small antagonistic gestures and larger ones. As two examples of the former, Dalton formally denied further interest in a Georgia Project bilingual curriculum development component (a project which they had never aggressively welcomed), and the superintendent’s assistant turned over to the attorney the checkbook that had been used to authorize doubly signed expenditures of the city council’s contribution to the project. More substantively, and perhaps with an eye to the growing cost of direct instruction and continued criticism of it (much of which had little to do with the Georgia Project), the district moved to curtail the project’s signature visiting instructor initiative. This effort led to a public showdown at a June 1999 school board meeting, in which the superintendent’s bid to curtail the initiative met an unprecedented rebuke by the board after members who the superintendent thought supported his position opted not to. (No one could remember a superintendent’s recommendation being publicly rejected by the school board before; prior practice had all disagreements privately rectified before the public performance of a board meeting.)

Dalton’s Georgia Project visiting instructor program was saved at that 1999 board meeting, but only temporarily and without a resolution of the complaint about the visiting instructors being used to teach direct instruction. In 2000, the superintendent who had come to Dalton in 1996 opted to retire, and his successor refused to have the district continue carrying the costs of providing the visiting
instructors with free housing and transportation. In turn, the Universidad de Monterrey announced that under those conditions it would no longer provide visiting instructors to Dalton. (Ironically, this same new superintendent also started dismantling the expensive direct instruction program that had not, as promised, improved test scores.) Of the original four components, only the summer training institute continued to involve Dalton.

Implications for Understanding Latino Educational Policy

The previous paragraphs of the Georgia Project implementation story in Dalton may read like a soap opera, but while clearly bared emotions and personal and professional frustrations are part of the story, such a reading misses a far more serious point. The education policy crafted for Latinos was vulnerable to change and revision not just because of a contest of pedagogical ideas (which led to the initial disagreements), but because Latino education policy can ultimately be derailed/transformed by factors that have little to do with Latino education. Instead of the dominant question remaining—what would best serve newcomers?—questions or arguments about the prerogatives of superintendents, district administrators, community leaders, and scholars from a Mexican university to craft policy prevailed.

The Georgia Project was initiated with a hazy consensus that nothing was happening and that something needed to happen to help the schools and larger community negotiate their rapid demographic change. Bilingual education seemed like a good idea until it was more closely considered, and then some withheld their favor for it. The premise of informal shared management of the Georgia Project also seemed wise until contests for authority revealed its weakness. The superficiality of the original consensus became apparent.

To district administrators in a culturally conservative part of the country, it stopped being easy to stay loyal to a program beyond their ken of expertise, championed mainly by a local attorney and Mexican university personnel. The passage of California’s Proposition 227 initiative suddenly called into public question (not scholarly question) the premises of bilingual education. In turn, alternatives like direct instruction, which claimed a grounded research base and a solid record of achievement and, to boot, reiterated the prerogative of administrators and not outsiders to select and develop policy, sounded like a preferable option. The emotional tit-for-tat of the project implementation further disposed district personnel to find rationales for distancing themselves from what they did not control.

So Dalton stayed with direct instruction (at least for a while) and moved away from involvement in the Georgia Project. In turn, the attorney, the small professional staff he assembled, and the partners from Monterrey devoted their attention to more receptive districts. One of those districts—Whitfield County—soon helped its Latino students become the highest-scoring Latinos (on average) of all the Georgia districts with significant Latino enrollments (i.e., first out of approximately 40). Dalton’s score outcomes were not as favorable, but district personnel were increasingly proud of a new newcomer school (that new arrivals attended for
up to a year) and other steps they had taken “after” the Georgia Project. Dalton personnel who had previously been involved in the crafting of the Georgia Project insisted that the project had been a useful intermediate phase for the district and that they subsequently were doing something better. Perhaps they were right. That is an issue for a future study that can also consider how well-intended, savvier, but still partially informed non-Latino local policy makers understand what Latino students need and should receive. That is how local educational policy for Latinos is being shaped, at least in Dalton.

References


———. 1997b Georgia Project’s Aim Is to Teach English, 24 April: 4A.


**Endnotes**

1 Only Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas did not substantially follow this trend. In the case of Texas this was because a large existing Latino population base meant that the proportional growth between 1990 and 1998 was smaller, though actual growth was substantial. In contrast, Mississippi’s and Louisiana’s economies were less robust and generated less growth and fewer new jobs.

2 Three years after this meeting, the attorney’s recollection of the rationale for the Georgia Project supported the interpretation that importation of bilingual and bicultural teachers was the Dalton initiator’s primary goal: “We decided we needed instructors who were of the same ethnic origin as the bulk of the students, who were wise in the culture and bilingual. That’s a very simple proposition. Now, how do we find them?” (Wexler 1999).

3 A negative reaction to a draft workplace literacy report had led Monterrey to refrain from generating the additional reports promised as part of the community initiative, an action that other partners did not protest.
Figure 1.
Dalton Enrollments by Race/Ethnicity (1989-2001)
Health Disparities: A Growing Challenge in the Latino Community

Congresswoman Hilda L. Solis (D-CA)

First elected to Congress in 2000, Congresswoman Hilda L. Solis (D-CA) is serving her second term in the U.S. House of Representatives. She represents parts of the San Gabriel Valley and East Los Angeles. Solis is the first Latina to serve on the powerful House Energy and Commerce Committee and is the ranking member of the Environment and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee. Solis is also chairwoman of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Task Force on Health and Democratic Vice-Chair of the Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues. Solis’s hard work and passion to fight for environmental justice is nationally recognized. In August 2000, she was awarded the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award for her pioneering work on environmental justice issues in California. She has proven her dedication to women’s issues by pursuing legislation to combat domestic violence. Her priorities are protecting the environment, improving the quality of health care, and fighting for the rights of working families.

Abstract

The landmark Institute of Medicine (IOM) report “Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare” was published in 2002 and brought national attention to a quality chasm plaguing our public health system. Racial and ethnic minorities were found to have a poorer health status and to receive a lower quality of health care than non-minorities. This article explores two important aspects of public health that particularly affect Latinos within the context of racial and ethnic health disparities—environmental health and domestic violence. It examines the growing body of research on the health implications of these disparities, points to examples of public policy initiatives, and outlines policy objectives to improve the health of Latinos nationwide.

Introduction

The most recent U.S. Census figures indicate that Latinos, an estimated 38.8 million people, have become the nation’s largest minority group (Bernstein and Bergman 2003). Over the past 20 years, even cities such as Raleigh, NC, and Atlanta, GA, have experienced Latino “hypergrowth” with an 1,180 percent and 995 percent increase in Latinos, respectively (Suro and Singer 2002, 6). The rising numbers of Latinos in the United States will lead to increased political and social influence on public policies. We must take these demographic changes into consideration when we address public policy issues like health care.
Although many factors contribute to poor health status, U.S. Latinos experience unique health challenges and disparities that must be addressed. Creating and supporting public policies that create a direct, positive impact on Latino health will contribute to a sound future for America’s public health. Policies must increase education and awareness about health and health care disparities that disproportionately affect minority communities, as well as acknowledge health disparities as a public health concern.

Over the past few decades, significant advances have brought national awareness to minority health issues. Federal agencies created within the past 15 years such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Office of Minority Health and the National Institutes of Health National Center on Minority Health and Health Disparities demonstrate the notable progress in recognizing the disproportionate burden of illness and death experienced by Latinos, African Americans, Native Americans, Alaska natives, Asians, and Pacific Islanders as compared to the United States population as a whole. Even though the wider acknowledgment of health disparities denotes progress, minority communities (especially the Latino community) continue to face health access and outcome challenges.

Public health policy must recognize the scope of issues impacting Latino communities. Two areas of particular importance often overlooked in the discussion of Latino public health and health disparities are environmental health and women’s health, particularly domestic violence. If we are to meet the needs of Latino communities, we must not only understand visible, well-documented problems such as lack of access to health insurance and health care, but we must also address less visible issues such as environmental health and domestic violence.

**Current Latino Health Status**

The number of uninsured people in the United States grew during the 1990s by an average of about one million each year until 1999, when the number of uninsured dropped by 1.8 million (KFF Commission 2002, 10). Although the number of uninsured was expected to decline given the strength of the economy in 2000, our nation continued to experience an increase in the number of uninsured. The most recent census estimates that 15.2 percent of the population was uninsured in 2002, up from 14.6 percent in 2001 (Bureau of the Census 2003, 1).

An alarming one in three Latinos is uninsured, which is a higher percentage than any other racial or ethnic group (Bureau of the Census 2003, 7). One study found that more than half of all Latinos and almost two out of five African Americans were uninsured at some point between 2001 and 2002, compared to less than a quarter of Whites. Communities of color continue to be disproportionately uninsured.

As one would expect, being uninsured has serious consequences. Lack of insurance compromises the health of the uninsured because individuals receive less preventive care, are diagnosed at more advanced disease stages, and once diagnosed, tend to receive less therapeutic care and have higher mortality rates than individuals with health insurance. Uninsured individuals are less able to
afford prescription drugs or follow through with recommended treatment (KFF Commission 2003, 1-12). Predictably, the health status of the Latino population in the United States is greatly influenced by a lack of access to medical services. Several diseases disproportionately impact Latinos, including diabetes, HIV/AIDS, obesity, cardiovascular disease, cancer, asthma, and others. For example, it is estimated that the prevalence of type II diabetes is 1.5 times higher in Latinos than in non-Latino Whites (ADA n.d.). Although Latinos represent approximately 14 percent of the U.S. population, they account for 18 percent of the 816,149 AIDS cases reported since the beginning of the epidemic and 19 percent of the 43,158 cases reported since 2001 alone (KFF 2003). Likewise, obesity rates among Latinos have more than doubled in 10 years. In 1991, 11.6 percent of Latinos were considered obese. This obesity rate rose dramatically in 2001 to 23.7 percent (CDC 2001). Such studies demonstrate that Latinos in the United States face a critical and urgent health crisis in health access, status, and the quality of care received.

**Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities**

Minority health disparities are complex and rooted in historical and contemporary inequities. The highly publicized 2002 IOM report entitled “Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare” illustrated that racial and ethnic minorities tend to receive lower-quality health care than non-minorities, even when controlling for access-related factors such as patient insurance status and income (Smedley, Smith, and Nelson 2002, 1). A large body of published research reveals that racial and ethnic minorities experience lower quality health services and fewer routine medical procedures than White Americans. The IOM report also spotlights bias, stereotyping, prejudice, and clinical uncertainty on the part of health care providers as contributing factors to ethnic disparities in health care. Such factors hinder improvements in health status for many Latinos, including those with health insurance, and must be addressed by increasing awareness about racial and ethnic health disparities.

The interaction between health, biological, environmental, social, cultural, behavioral, educational, and socioeconomic factors are imperative to the health policy debate. We cannot challenge health inequities facing communities of color without understanding the complex social realities that contribute to poor health in Latino communities. Latinos’ health and the health of the environment are inextricably linked and must be understood as such. In other words, when we address health inequities in the Latino community, we must focus on the whole picture instead of only one element of the problem.
Health Concerns in the Latino Community

Environmental Health

In 1994, President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12898, “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.” Advocates of environmental justice recognize that clean air and water, open spaces, and healthy living conditions must be viewed as basic civil rights—no less important than freedom of speech or freedom to vote. This order required federal agencies to incorporate precepts of environmental justice that impact minority and low-income populations into their mission and develop their own environmental justice strategies. This executive order sent a strong public message: the long-term health and well-being of the United States is contingent upon recognizing environmental impacts on our health, especially in our minority and low-income communities.

Many oppressive factors contribute to the poor health status of U.S. Latinos, including poverty, polluted air and water, hazardous waste sites, and lack of access to fresh, healthy food, open parks, and other recreational spaces (Conis 2003). Latino families, many of whom reside in low-income neighborhoods, bear the burden of poor environmental conditions. Of Latinos in the United States, 21.4 percent live at or below poverty level, which is nearly double the national poverty rate (Ramirez and de la Cruz 2003). Many studies show the frequent placement of pollution-intensive industries and hazardous waste sites in low-income and minority communities (Hood and Townsel 2000). Thirty-six percent of the U.S. Latino population lives within 30 miles of a coal-fired power plant, the distance in which the greatest health impacts occur.

A healthy community, as described by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Healthy People 2010 report (2000), is one that continuously creates and improves both its physical and social environments and helps people to support one another in all aspects of daily life and to develop to their full potential. If our goal is to improve Latino health, we must gain a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the places where people live and their health.

Environmental Health Matters

A 2003 California survey demonstrated that the Latino community has strong concerns about environmental issues. About 70 percent of Latinos surveyed prioritized environmental issues and felt that the personal health threat of air pollution in their region was at least somewhat serious, compared to only 54 percent of non-Latino Whites (Baldassare 2003, 5, 9). Latino support for the environment builds upon a long legacy of struggle, including early grassroots movements in the 1960s and 1970s led by two of my greatest heroes, César Chávez and Dolores Huerta. Through the United Farm Workers, their work to ban harmful pesticides like dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) and Parathyon paved the way for broad recognition of the importance of environmental justice.
within the Latino community. These great humanitarians and social justice leaders remind us that our struggles, whether improving the lives of farm workers, ensuring chemical-free environments, or simply guaranteeing neighborhood parks in minority and low-income communities, address fundamental human rights issues.

A Closer Look at Asthma, Latino Children, and the Environment

Latino children represent 18 percent of all children in the United States but comprise 30 percent of all children in poverty (Ramirez and de la Cruz 2003, 6). Mounting concerns over the consequent health impacts of living in low-income neighborhoods are only increasing; by the year 2050, Latino youth are expected to comprise 29 percent of the youth population (Bureau of the Census 2001).

One of the most prevalent and urgent health concerns for Latino children remains the increasing rate of asthma. Asthma is a chronic disease that is exacerbated by the social, environmental, and economic realities of the communities in which many Latinos live. Asthma is more common among Latino children, in particular Puerto Rican children, and must be understood as an illness that is linked to both indoor and outdoor air (Lara 2001, 6). Over 70 percent of Latinos live in areas where the air is unhealthy to breathe, and the air in these communities violates federal standards for clean air (EPA 2000, 15-16). This exposure to poor air quality disproportionately increases these communities’ risk for asthma. Some of the most significant factors that make asthma a bigger burden in Latino communities include limited access to health care; inadequate health insurance; inability to diagnose asthma; lack of culturally and linguistically appropriate asthma education programs; overuse and inappropriate use of medication; geographic concentration in areas with poor air quality; indoor environmental agents, such as sub-standard housing conditions; and outdoor environmental agents, such as air pollution (Donoso and Reyes 2002).

A California study on the health effects of children’s chronic exposures to southern California air pollution found that children living in communities with higher concentrations of nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, and acid vapor have lungs that develop and grow slowly and are less able to process air (Cal EPA 2002). Particulate matter is a mixture of very tiny solid or liquid particles, which can include smoke, soot, dust, salts, acids, and metals that float in the air, and causes respiratory illness and shortened lives. Latinos are more than twice as likely than either Whites or Blacks to live in areas with elevated levels of particulate matter pollution (Metzger et al. 1995).

Los Angeles is a perfect example of a community where children are at elevated risk for asthma and other environmental health problems. Last year, I requested that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) study 17 gravel quarries in the San Gabriel Valley area of Los Angeles, the community I represent in Congress. There are 260,000 people living near these pits, as well as many neighborhood schools and a public hospital. Unfortunately, the EPA found a lack of information to draw a conclusion about how the gravel industry impacts the health of working families in the area. Since that time, air monitoring has begun at those sites, and serious air violations have been found. Violations include fugitive dust,
which is the most harmful for humans and contributes to countless asthma attacks, respiratory illnesses, and other diseases each year. According to the Multiple Air Toxics Exposure Study II (MATES-II), the lifetime risk of cancer from toxic air pollutants in the Los Angeles basin is more than one in one million, which is generally considered an unacceptable level of carcinogenic risk (SCAQMD 2000). The sites with the greatest risk levels are in south-central and east-central Los Angeles County. The latter area, home to more than 260,000 people, includes these quarries. Unfortunately, low-income families are disproportionately likely to live in a community where harmful environmental exposures negatively impact human health.

Another important consideration when understanding environmental health concerns such as asthma is the availability of open green space in Latino communities. Despite Los Angeles’s status as one of the largest cities in the nation, it has the fewest number of parks available for children to play. According to the University of Southern California’s Sustainable Cities Program, three to four acres of open or green space are needed per 1,000 people for a healthy environment. Yet in communities in the San Gabriel Valley in Los Angeles County, there is less than one-half acre per 1,000 people. Recognizing the environmental health concerns for children living in communities crowded by toxic waste sites, gravel pits, refineries, superhighways, hazardous waste disposal sites, and power plants must be a priority for the future health of our nation’s youth.

Confronting Environmental Challenges

Improving the environment contributes to improving public health. Latino communities are on the front line of adverse environmental health impacts. However, our knowledge remains limited by significant inadequacies in data collection focusing on environmental hazards and exposures affecting Latino communities. Furthering scientific research on environmental health issues that affect low-income, minority communities is a critical step in actively addressing environmental health disparities. Without scientifically sound information on which to base decisions, complex issues surrounding human exposure to environmental pollutants and health outcomes will remain unclear and will lack credibility.

It is also important to recognize that in order to use this science and develop public strategies, we need to delegate responsibility between government, industries, and local communities. Creating partnerships between these different facets that contribute to and are concerned about environmental health issues will help us create workable and effective policies. The EPA the DHHS should prioritize the goals of Clinton’s Executive Order 12898 to further our understanding of environmental exposures within minority communities. To solidify these efforts, Rep. Mark Udall (D-CO) and I introduced the Environmental Justice Act of 2003 (H.R. 2200) that codifies Executive Order 12898. This bill seeks to remedy environmental injustice within existing federal laws and regulations by prohibiting discrimination in programs that receive federal funds. It also creates an Interagency Environmental Justice Working Group to develop strategies, provide guidance, coordinate research, convene public meetings, and conduct inquiries.
regarding environmental justice issues. Although federal agencies and offices have begun to comply with the 1994 implementation of Executive Order 12898, disproportionate impacts related to human health and the environment continue to plague many minority and low-income communities. These impacts must be vigilantly addressed over the long term.

On the state level, there are also innovative ways that environmental justice has contributed to improving the health of Latino and other minority communities. On 10 October 1999, an environmental justice bill I introduced (California State Bill 115) as a California state senator was signed into law, making California the first state in the country to prioritize the protection of environmental justice communities when making laws and regulations. According to a study by Occidental College, minorities are significantly more likely to live within a one-mile radius of a large capacity hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility. Of all sub-minority groups studied, Latinos are the most likely to live in close proximity to these hazardous waste sites (Boer et al. 1997). This study also demonstrates that areas within half a mile of major hazardous sites had fewer registered voters and more people with a high school education or less. This groundbreaking California law has served as a model for other states and the federal government to start protecting the environment and health of minority communities.

A bill that I introduced shortly after I arrived in Congress exemplifies how a seemingly local initiative can improve the environmental health of minority and Latino communities. The San Gabriel Valley Watershed Act (U.S. Public Law 108-042) was signed into law on 1 July 2003 and calls for the U.S. Department of the Interior to conduct a special resources study of the San Gabriel River and portions of the San Gabriel Mountains to look for ways to improve open and green space in urban communities. This area in Southern California is disproportionately crowded with superhighways and toxic waste sites but has tremendous environmental potential. The study will look for ways to preserve and restore the existing natural environment. By involving the federal government in efforts to maintain open green space for our working, low-income families, including many Latino communities, we can directly improve the health of individuals. Federal input designed to revitalize and protect local environmental quality directly benefits and protects our communities and our health. This public law exemplifies ways in which public policy can simultaneously improve urban living environments and health for Latino communities nationwide.

Women’s Health: Domestic Violence

Although the scope of women’s health incorporates a variety of general health issues, such as diabetes, cardiovascular disease, or obesity, there are also unique women’s health concerns that include domestic violence, reproductive health, and breast cancer. Domestic violence requires special attention because of its silent yet widespread prevalence among women in the United States. Costing the nation between $5 million and $10 million each year in medical expenses, police and court costs, shelters and foster care, sick leave, absenteeism, and non-productivity, as well as accounting for approximately 15 percent of the total crime costs in the
United States, domestic violence is a serious public crisis that must be actively addressed (House 2003a, 2003b).

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention defines domestic violence within the context of intimate partner violence, or more specifically, the actual or threatened physical or sexual violence or psychological and emotional abuse directed toward a spouse, ex-spouse, current or former boyfriend or girlfriend, or current or former dating partner (CDC n.d.). Domestic violence is a public health concern that does not discriminate among women of different races, backgrounds, or socio-economic status. It can and does happen to all types of women. Though men can be victims of domestic violence, it predominately affects women.

Nationally, one in three adult women experience physical assault by a partner during adulthood (APA 1996, 10). Understanding the impact of domestic violence on minority women, however, requires a broader comprehension of their social realities and the barriers they often face. Thus, including domestic violence as a health disparity issue in the context of Latino health policy will help advance legislative action that considers the complex factors contributing to domestic violence.

Defining the Domestic Violence Disparity

Minority women are less likely to report instances of domestic violence than White women, which means that the prevalence of intimate partner violence can remain concealed from data collection or reported statistics (Tjaden and Thoennes 1998, 2). It also means that these women can remain trapped in abusive relationships. There is a severe lack of data on the incidence of domestic violence among minority women, especially reported by both ethnicity and race. Without adequate information reflecting the extent of and barriers to escaping domestic violence among Latinas or other racial and ethnic minority groups, it will be difficult to effectively address the needs of these victims. Many Latinas, for example, face numerous obstacles to seeking and attaining services, impeding their ability to escape violent situations or relationships. Latina women are the most likely racial and ethnic minority subgroup to be uninsured and therefore lack consistent medical services. Therefore, their ability to receive prevention or intervention treatment is limited. It is also important to consider challenges such as restrictions on public assistance, immigration status, poverty levels, language, and cultural differences that also keep many Latina women from seeking services and ultimately escaping domestic violence (KFF 2001).

Although domestic violence is a criminal act of violence, the health consequences only further contribute to health disparities. Immediate physical injury has been found to affect almost one in three victims of domestic violence. Furthermore, other common health concerns such as sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS risk, chronic stress and anxiety disorders, and mental health disorders all contribute to minority health disparities as a result of domestic violence (Weaver and Resnick 2000).
Community Matters: Latino Domestic Violence Issues

Addressing domestic violence in Latino communities must take into consideration a broad array of contributing factors that are interwoven with a Latina woman’s experience of domestic violence. It is important to recognize the prevalence of domestic violence in the Latino population within a framework of contributing oppressions, including poverty, discrimination, immigration status, etc. Many hard-working Latinos and their families continue to live at or below the poverty level and reside in low-income communities where they confront a variety of challenges on a daily basis. Conditions such as high unemployment rates, poor housing, poor nutrition, poor environmental quality, high morbidity and mortality rates, and low educational attainments in comparison to non-Latino Whites influence the likelihood for domestic violence and compound the barriers facing Latinas seeking to escape domestic violence.

The impact of the community and the environment on the prevalence of domestic violence is an issue that deserves increased attention, especially when addressing domestic violence as a public health disparity. It is no surprise that because of these social settings, low-income communities have higher rates of domestic violence than affluent communities. In fact, domestic violence rates are five times higher among families below the poverty level (National Latino Alliance for the Elimination of Domestic Violence n.d.). If we look specifically at the types of surroundings contributing to these elevated rates of domestic violence among low-income populations, we find rates of domestic violence increase in communities that have less open park space. Research examining poor, inner-city neighborhoods shows that levels of domestic violence were significantly lower among individuals who had nearby open spaces outside their apartments than among their counterparts who lived in barren conditions (Sullivan and Kuo 2001, 558).

These social, economic, and environmental inequities that contribute to domestic violence are only intensified by the fact that many low-income communities lack adequate resources to address domestic violence. However, even communities with domestic violence shelters have institutional barriers (such as a lack of adequate language and translation services and of bilingual and culturally sensitive materials and resources) that hinder a Latina woman’s ability to safely escape domestic violence situations. Equipping our communities with culturally and linguistically sensitive resources is an important step in the elimination of domestic violence.

Immigration status is also an important consideration when understanding the scope of many Latina women’s experience with domestic violence. Legal status can play a large role in affecting a woman’s choice and ability to seek help or report domestic violence abuse. Many immigrant domestic violence victims confront unique problems that are not necessarily experienced by non-immigrant victims. Although there is a critical lack of research on both the prevalence of domestic violence in immigrant communities and how immigration status impacts women’s risk for abuse, we do know from recent studies that the rates of domestic violence among Latina immigrants is alarmingly high. For example, recent studies
have demonstrated that 30 to 50 percent of Latina, South Asian, and Korean immigrants have been sexually or physically victimized by a male intimate partner (Raj and Silverman 2002, 367; Dutton et al. 2000, 252). Some of the most important domestic violence considerations for immigrant Latina women include recognizing their increased risk due to their lack of legal rights, fear of deportation, traditional cultural beliefs, and lack of linguistically and culturally appropriate services (West n.d.).

The lack of legal rights and subsequent fear of deportation are two of the most powerful influences keeping battered Latina immigrant women from escaping domestic violence. One study of undocumented immigrants found that for 64 percent of Latinas, a primary barrier to seeking help from social service agencies is the fear of deportation (Anderson 1993). Other research confirms that an abuser’s control over a battered immigrant’s immigration status and threats of deportation virtually block the victim from seeking any legal or health service. Another survey among Latina immigrants found that 49.3 percent reported physical abuse by an intimate partner during their lifetimes, and 42.1 percent reported severe physical or sexual abuse. Despite the fact that 50.8 percent of the battered immigrant participants in the survey were married to citizens or permanent residents who could file immigration papers for them, an overwhelming 72.3 percent of abusive citizens or permanent resident spouses never filed immigration papers for their abused spouses (Orloff and Kaguyutuan 2002). Thus, we can see that using immigration status as a controlling factor against a partner can deny the immigrant victim the ability to escape violence.

There are unique and complex needs and barriers of immigrant as well as non-immigrant Latina victims of violence in seeking or attaining protection against their assaulters. These unique challenges—including fear (especially of deportation), difficulty in navigating the legal system, lack of economic resources, shelter shortages, traditional cultural values and beliefs, and a lack of appropriate resources for women of color—continue to perpetuate domestic violence against Latina women in the United States (Yick Flanagan n.d.).

**Addressing Violence against Women**

The Center for the Advancement of Women (2003) found that 92 percent of women believe that reducing domestic violence and sexual assault should be a top priority for women. Recognizing that domestic violence is not just a woman’s issue, however, is key in efforts to eliminate this criminal and public health injustice. Domestic violence affects families, especially children, and friends. All too often, innocent children who witness domestic violence suffer poor health and low self-esteem and are at risk of alcohol and drug use, running away from home, and suicide (Jaffe et al. 1990, 28-29).

U.S. domestic violence policy materialized through the passage of landmark legislation titled the *Violence Against Women Act* (VAWA) of 1994. This bill, included in Title IV of the *Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act*, was the first piece of federal legislation in the United States specifically designed to help curb domestic violence. VAWA established formula and discretionary grant
programs for state, local, and Indian tribal governments, as well as private entities, which were to be distributed by the Department of Justice and DHHS. The goals of this legislation were to enhance justice system protection for battered women and to expand collaboration and cooperation between battered women’s supportive services and the criminal and civil justice system (Orloff and Kaguyutuan 2002, 108).

VAWA included immigration provisions that allowed immigrant women and abused immigrant children whose abusive citizen and permanent resident spouses or parents attempted to use their immigration status as a means of inflicting physical, emotional, and economic abuse, to file for lawful immigration status without the approval, assistance, or cooperation of their abusive spouses or parents. Although the original VAWA helped a significant number of battered immigrants, many of the protections were incomplete. Not only were many categories of battered immigrants denied protection, but battered immigrants who self-petitioned for protection under VAWA had to prove they would suffer extreme hardship if forced to return to their countries of origin. In 2000, VAWA was reauthorized, new grant programs were created, and many of the immigration provisions were strengthened and improved. For example, the new bill deleted the extreme hardship requirement and expanded access to a variety of legal protections for battered immigrants (VAWA 1994; Public Health and Welfare Act of 2002; Dutton et al. 2000, 252).

Although this legislation made broad advances in federal actions to stem domestic violence, more needs to be done—especially for Latinas and other women of color. As already noted, many racial and ethnic minority women and immigrant women face institutional barriers to reporting abuse or seeking help for domestic violence, including but not limited to restrictions on public assistance, limited access to immigration relief, lack of translators or bilingual professionals, little educational material in the woman’s native language, treatment programs that do not take into account ethnic and cultural differences, and inflexible or inconvenient hours of operation. There is an increased need to improve the support system for battered women, including providing them with temporary housing, access to job training, affordable childcare, and the necessary counseling to help them and their children regain their lives. Thus, continuing efforts are needed to help inform communities of color about domestic violence and how to get help.

That is why I have introduced the Domestic Violence Prevention, Education, and Awareness Act (H.R. 3425) to provide grants for organizations to develop media campaigns about domestic violence for under-served minority and immigrant communities. These campaigns would address the growing problem of domestic violence in multiple languages and in a culturally sensitive manner. Without adequate information or knowledge about how to attain help, domestic violence victims will remain trapped even with the best possible shelters or resources. This bill addresses that need by supporting outreach that will raise awareness in communities of color and immigrant communities about why domestic violence is a problem; the effects domestic violence has on women, children, and families; and ways victims can seek help. Breaking the silence surrounding domestic violence can only begin with enhanced public awareness and information.
Another aspect in addressing domestic violence is supporting the legal action against domestic violence abusers. For example, specialized domestic violence courts have been credited with cutting the processing time of domestic violence court cases, decreasing the backlog of court cases, and raising the conviction rate. First developed in the 1980s, they also allow prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges to focus solely on the intricacies of domestic violence, thus allowing them to work as a team to combat the problem.

I believe the *Domestic Violence Courts Assistance Act* (H.R. 3424) that I introduced on 30 October 2003 will help communities develop specialized domestic violence courts to cut down on the backlog of court cases and help increase conviction rates. The bill would amend VAWA to provide grants for municipal court systems to develop and set up these specialized domestic violence courts. The grant money would also pay for translators and interpreters to facilitate many of the communication barriers faced by Latina immigrants and other limited English proficient victims of domestic violence. This bill supports the criminal conviction of domestic violence abusers and ensures that abused women are swiftly protected under the law.

The policy changes proposed by these bills point to critical weaknesses in the national attempt to combat domestic violence, especially for women of color. Currently, our system fails to adequately fund domestic programs and outreach to women of color in culturally and linguistically appropriate ways. Our system also must guarantee prompt and decisive action against abusers who break the law—especially when a victim’s life remains at stake while the abuser is being processed through the legal system. The specific needs of Latina women confronting domestic violence situations must be addressed through these types of legislative initiatives.

**Conclusion**

Latinos now represent the largest minority group within the United States, and the number of Latinos is expected to jump from the current estimate of 35 million people to 60 million people in 2020. Although this national influence represents increased voting power and representation within the political arena, it also serves as wake up call for domestic policy makers to focus on the needs, obstacles, and disparities facing Latino communities nationwide. One such disparity is the broad yet significant range of health disparities affecting our Latino communities. Ranging from elevated rates of obesity, diabetes, and heart disease to the poor environmental quality in low-income Latino communities to the domestic violence barriers and prevalence rates, our Latino communities face an uphill battle. Supporting increased federal and state accountability and responsibility for Latino public health begins by recognizing the connections between our environment, our neighborhood, and our health. Without recognizing all the factors that contribute to health and health disparities, health policymakers will miss the boat and only temporarily address the symptoms. It is time to get to the root of these health disparities.
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**Endnotes**

1 In this article, the term Latino will be used instead of Hispanic, unless otherwise noted.

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Demography and Political Influence:
Disentangling the Latino Vote

Luis Ricardo Fraga and Ricardo Ramirez

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Abstract

We investigate the relationship between Latino demographic growth and their rising political influence over the last decade in the nation and seven specific states. We find that the steady and sustained increase in demographic growth is closely paralleled by increases in statewide electoral influence. We also find that this influence has been translated into similar increased and sustained representational gains in the U.S. House of Representatives and in state legislatures. There
are, however, noticeable differences in the magnitude and election cycle sustainability of these increases across states. The Latino vote is rarely determinative to statewide electoral outcomes, and in only two states are Latino state representatives sizeable components of majority parties in the state legislature. We then consider how these electoral and representational gains help us understand the attention that Latino voters are likely to receive in the 2004 election and how significant Latino voters might be in affecting the outcome of that election. We conclude that optimism about the increased political influence of Latinos must be tempered with an acknowledgement of Latinos’ continuing vulnerability to marginalization and manipulation by competing electoral majorities, oppositional political parties, and the strategic parameters characteristic of competitive national elections for both major political parties.

Introduction

Understanding the impact of Latino voters on the 2004 election has become a focus of much national attention. Reporters, pundits, and Latino leaders have all made claims of the growing political influence of Latinos as their numbers continue to increase in our population (Meyerson 2002; Schmit 2001a). Additionally, the attention that major national and many statewide candidates have placed on Latino voters seems to confirm these claims (Peterson 2003; Alvarez 2000; Bruni 2000; Fountain 2000). In fact, it has almost become the accepted wisdom that a major part of President Bush’s 2004 reelection campaign will focus, as it did in 2000, on reminding voters of his concern for Latinos, as demonstrated by his recent statement of principles regarding undocumented workers in the United States (Bush 2004; Schmit 2001b). Similarly, the Democratic National Committee recently established an office of Latino affairs where strategies are to be developed to attempt to make sure that Latino voters are not taken for granted, as some claim was the case in the previous presidential election (DNC 2004). How accurate is this assumption that population growth can directly lead to increased political influence? Additionally, what variations by state might better help us understand the conditions under which increased political influence can reliably be predicted for the 2004 election?

In this essay we examine the growth in Latino population across the last 10 years to systematically assess the accuracy of claims made regarding increased Latino electoral influence. We examine three specific dimensions of this influence. First, we analyze patterns of Latino electoral influence at national and statewide levels. It perhaps goes without saying that the Latino presence in California is quite distinct from that in Texas, New York, or Florida. What is less clear, however, are the precise patterns of this differentiation. Moreover, this decade-long analysis for seven states with some of the highest percentages of Latino population also allows us to see whether gains are consistent across the decade. Second, we assess the representational consequences of Latino electoral influence as reflected in the election of members to Congress and each state house. Again, the longitudinal analysis allows us to assess the consistency of patterns of representational gain.
We also analyze the partisan distribution of this influence in the 2003 legislative session. In this part of the analysis, we are especially interested in whether Latino representational gains have occurred in states where the legislative majority party is the party preferred by a majority of Latino voters. Lastly, we use our findings on the above two dimensions to inform a consideration of the strategic role Latinos may play in the 2004 election. That is, whatever the actual electoral influence of Latinos in any specific state, their impact in 2004 must be assessed within current understandings of the presidential competitiveness of specific states and even the possibility that the focus on Latinos may have more to do with larger strategic concerns of major parties and candidates than with securing Latino votes. We refer to this as symbolic mainstreaming.

**Patterns of Statewide Influence**

The Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS) 2002 [http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-545.pdf] continued to confirm the upward trend in Latino population growth that has become a mainstay of national demographic analysis since 1980. The CPS reported that Latinos now comprise 13.5% of the national population, up from an estimated 12.5% in 2000. Two elements of this growth are of special significance. One, this was the first time that the Census Bureau’s research documented that the percentage of Latinos in the population exceeded the percentage of African Americans, which was estimated at 12.7%. Two, it was the first time that Latinos were estimated to have the highest growth rates in the country. The Latino growth rate was estimated at 9.8% when the growth rates for the nation were at 2.5%, African Americans at 3.1%, and Asians at 9.0%.

In Figure 1 we trace the patterns of this growth in the nation and in the seven states of New Mexico, California, Texas, New York, Florida, Arizona, and Nevada. It is estimated that half of all Latinos living in the United States live in California (31.1%) and Texas (18.9%). Just under three-quarters of all Latinos, 73.1%, live in these seven states. The upward trend is apparent in each of our states. Growth rates from 1992-2002 ranged from a low of 30% in New Mexico to a high of 207% in Nevada.

It is important to also understand this population growth in terms of percent of each of these states’ populations. Examination of Figure 1 indicates that growth as a percent of the statewide population from 1992-2002 was highest in Nevada at 6.9%, where Latinos went from 12.8% of the population to 21.3%. Nevada is followed by Arizona (7.3%), Texas (6.8%), California (6.8%), Florida (5.2%), New Mexico (4.1%), New York (3.2%), and the nation (3.9%).

Interestingly, the states that experienced the highest rates of population growth from 1990-2000, with the possible exception of Nevada, were not states that have traditionally been identified with Latino populations. As demonstrated in Table 1, the state with the highest rate of Latino population growth was North Carolina at 394%, followed closely by Arkansas at 337%, and Georgia at 300%. Of the ten states that experienced the highest rates of Latino population growth, six are in the
South, two are in the Midwest, and only one is in the Southwest. The remaining state in the top 10 is Kentucky. With the exception of Nevada, the percent that Latinos comprise of those states’ populations still remains small, ranging from 1.5% in Kentucky to 5.5% in Nebraska. Nonetheless, the impact that this growth has had on specific cities and towns where the populations often concentrate has been considerable.

The electoral consequences of this decade-long trend of population growth are specified in Figure 2 for the years 1992-2000. Using estimates provided by the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) and based on CPS post-election surveys of voter participation, one can see that in no state does the percent of the statewide electorate equal the percent of the population. However, the upward trends in population growth are also reflected in upward trends in percent of the electorate. The magnitude of the increase in electoral presence is roughly equal to the increase in population, with Nevada being the only exception. In New Mexico, California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Arizona, the increases differ from one another by less than 1%, and nationally the difference is 1.3%. In New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona, the increase in percent of the electorate is slightly greater than the increase in percent of the population. In California, New York, Florida, and the nation, gains in electoral influence are slightly under the gains in population. Nevada is a clear exception in this regard. Although Latinos increased as a percent of the population by 6.9%, they increased as a percent of the electorate by only 1%, a difference of 5.9%.

Again, in every state there is a clear gain in potential electoral influence from 1992 to 2000. However, only in Florida, New York, and the nation is there a consistent upward trend over the years examined as evidenced in each election year. In New Mexico, California, Texas, Arizona, and Nevada, the trends vary over the years examined with some election periods demonstrating either stagnation or decline. What these data demonstrate is that there is considerable variation in the pattern of Latino presence from election to election. Although overall increases are apparent nationally and in each state examined, these patterns vary across the decade and periods of gain made in any one election cannot be assumed to continue in any subsequent election.

These data also further verify conclusions reached by a number of analysts of Latino politics, such as DeSipio and De La Garza (2004), that the translation of Latino population growth into immediate electoral influence is likely to continue to be constrained by several demographic and legal parameters, including age distribution, citizenship, and levels of formal education. In no state does the Latino percent of the electorate come within 10 percentage points of the Latino percent of the population. Latinos tend to be younger on average than the overall population, and one must be 18 years of age to vote. Younger voters tend to be much less likely to vote than older voters. The 2002 CPS estimated that 28.8% of all Latinos currently residing in the United States are not U.S. citizens. Latinos have the lowest average levels of formal education as compared to non-Hispanic Whites, African Americans, and Asians.

To better estimate this disparity we calculate a population/electorate disparity ratio (PEDR) for each state based on the 2000 election. The disparity is estimated
by dividing the percent that Latinos are of the electorate by the percent that they are of the overall population (percentElectorate / percentPopulation). As this figure approaches 1.0, parity is attained. The PEDR’s for the nation and each of our states are noted in Table 2. Not surprisingly, New Mexico has the highest parity ratio at .76. This state has very little immigration and a long history of Latino political participation in state politics. It currently is the only state with a Latino governor, Governor Bill Richardson. California and Nevada have the lowest ratios at .43 and .36, respectively. California is the state with the highest percentages of both documented and undocumented immigration. As stated previously, Nevada is a state that has experienced Latino population growth over the decade of over 200%, which suggests that many Latinos here may have yet registered to vote and become active members of the electorate.

It is, however, possible for a minority segment of the electorate to still be influential in determining statewide outcomes. This depends on two primary conditions. One, the group must vote as an identifiable block for one candidate, and two, the vote margin of difference between the candidates must be sufficiently close to make this minority block a major contributor to the winning candidate. For example, if the vote margin between two candidates is 5% and the minority block, although a small segment of the overall electorate, is just over 5%, then this segment of the electorate becomes significant despite its overall small statewide numbers. Building on Fraga and Ramírez’s (2003) analysis, Figure 3 presents the pattern of Latino statewide electoral influence in California from 1994-2003. These data are estimated from Los Angeles Times exit polls and CPS reports of voter turnout. Through this method, we are able to fully contextualize the partisan impact of the California Latino vote in relation to the partisan distributions of other major ethnic-racial segments of the California electorate. We demonstrate that since 1994, Latinos are the primary growth segment of the rising success of the Democratic Party. Since 1992, a consistent 65-75% of Latino voters support Democratic presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial candidates (Barreto and Ramírez 2004). This has led to Democratic candidates winning every presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial race in California from 1994-2002, with the exception of Governor Pete Wilson’s reelection in 1994. It was in 1994 that Governor Wilson ran a reelection campaign that in large part focused on his support for Proposition 187, a statewide initiative that prevented a wide variety of public services, including social services, health care, and education, to be given to undocumented workers.

The analysis also reveals, however, that this growth is still vulnerable to block voting by White voters. Although declining from a high in 1990 of 82.3%, Whites still constitute just under three-quarters of the California electorate at 72.5% in 2003 (Barreto and Ramírez 2004). African Americans average 5-7%, and Asians increased from 3% in 1990 to an estimated 7% in 2003 (Barreto and Ramírez 2004). If a sufficient number of Whites choose to vote as a block against the preferences of a majority of Latino voters, as occurred in the 2003 gubernatorial election of Arnold Schwarzenegger, Latino voters are unable to elect their candidate of choice. Exit polls reveal that Latino voters supported Schwarzenegger by 31%, and conservative Republican candidate Tom McClintock by 10%. The per-
cent of Latinos who have consistently voted for Republican statewide candidates over the decade ranges from 19 to 25%. Assuming that the 10% vote received by McClintock is the base of the 19-25% consistent Latino Republican vote, Schwarzenegger received 15-20% more of the Latino vote than normal. Much more significant to Schwarzenegger’s victory was the overwhelming support he received from White voters. Schwarzenegger received 52% of the White vote, which, when combined with the 14% White vote received by McClintock, left the Democratic candidate Cruz Bustamante having received the lowest level of White support of any major Democratic candidate in the decade. Bustamante only received 27% of the White vote, whereas Democratic candidates consistently receive between 41-52% of the White vote.¹

This pattern of Latino electoral influence in California as vulnerable to an opposing White vote also appeared in the passage of Proposition 187 in 1994, Proposition 209 in 1996, and Proposition 227 in 1998. Each of these race-based propositions received a sufficiently supportive block of White votes to surpass the opposition votes cast by White, Latino, African American, and Latino voters (Fraga and Ramírez 2003).

In sum, Latino electoral influence has increased across the entire decade although there is considerable variation in the patterns of this growth. It is not uncommon for Latino electoral influence to remain static or to decline from one election to another. Moreover, this electoral growth in no instance comes close to equaling the larger population distribution. Lastly, although percentages of the electorate do not necessarily predetermine electoral impact, even in a state like California where Latinos have been the primary contributor to the rising electoral success of Democratic candidates, Latino voters are still very vulnerable to a White block vote in opposition to their preferences.

Representational Gains

What patterns exist regarding the representational consequences of upward trends in electoral influence? We examine these trends in the election of Latinos to the U.S. Congress and to each relevant state’s house of representatives and state senate.

Latino representation in the U.S. Congress received a noticeable boost as a result of the 1990 redistricting, as is evident in Table 3. There were only 11 Latinos in the House of Representatives in the 102nd Congress (1991-92), and that increased to 17 in the 103rd Congress (1993-94). There were continued gains in states with existing Latino members of Congress, such as California, Florida, and New York, each witnessing an increase of one. Illinois and New Jersey also witnessed growth, in that a Latino was able to get elected to Congress for the first time in these states’ histories. There were no gains but continued representation in Arizona and New Mexico.

What is most apparent in the pattern of representation in the U.S. House is stability. The total number of Latinos remained at 17 from 1993 to 1998 and
increased to 18 in 1999 with one additional member elected in both California and Texas, and with New Mexico losing its one Latino member.

Noticeable gains were again made as a result of the redistricting in 2000. No state lost Latino members of Congress as a result of redistricting, and only in California was one more Latino elected to the House in 2001, making the total number of Latinos 19. This is a very small 4.4% of the U.S. House. In 2002, three additional Latinos were elected to the House with one additional member of Congress from each of Arizona, California, and Florida. At present, Latinos account for 32% of all Latina/o members in the U.S. House. It is also important to note that only four of the current 22 Latino members of Congress are Republicans, three from Florida and one from Texas. All other members are Democrats. Since 1994, this has meant that 82% of all Latino members of the U.S. House are affiliated with the minority Democratic Party. Opportunities to hold influential party and committee positions are therefore extremely limited.

In sum, representation in the U.S. House has increased over the decade, and the greatest increases occurred during the first elections after redistricting (i.e., 1992 and 2002). The greatest levels of representation are in the two states with the largest Latino populations, California and Texas. Together these states account for 59% of all Latinos and Latinas currently serving in the U.S. House.

How distinct are state-specific patterns to those in the U.S. House? The patterns are displayed in Figures 4a and 4b. Election of Latinos to state lower houses increased in every state after the 1990 redistricting. These gains were most dramatic in Texas, where the house delegation grew from 20 to 26, an increase of 30%. From 1992 to 2002, each state had a sizeable increase of Latino representatives, with the exception of Nevada. Nevada had no Latino representatives until 2000 and now has only one. New Mexico and Texas had the most modest increases, 7% (28 to 30) and 15% (26 to 30) respectively. New Mexico did have a noticeable drop in its Latino representatives from 1992 to 1994 but steadily increased representation throughout the decade. Sizeable increases occurred in Florida at 30% (10 to 13), Arizona at 43% (7 to 10), and New York at 57% (7 to 11). The most dramatic increased occurred in California. In 1992 there were only seven Latina/o members of the state assembly; this increased to 20 in 2000, and by 2002 there were 18, an overall increase of 157% over the decade. California clearly stands out as an anomaly of representational gain in the lower house of state legislatures.

The patterns in state senates, by contrast, are much more stable. No increases occurred as a result of 1991 redistricting in Florida with its three Latino state senators, in California with three, or in Nevada with its one. Gains did occur after redistricting in New Mexico (15 to 17), Texas (five to six), and especially in New York, where the number of Latino senators doubled (two to four). Arizona actually experienced a decline from five members to three.

However, from 1992 to 2002, a stable pattern emerges with gains or declines of only one senator with, again, the exception of California. In 1992 there were only three Latino members of the California State Senate. By 2002 there were nine, an increase of 200%. California stands alone across the last decade in experiencing
the greatest gains in Latino representation in both its state assembly and state sen-
ate.

Do these gains in absolute numbers reflect even greater gains in state-level parti-
san influence? At least three conditions must be met before increased Latino
presence can translate into influence in state legislatures. First, Latino legislators
must be members of the majority party. Majority parties select institutional leaders
such as speaker, majority leader, and chairs of key policy-making committees.
Second, Latinos must comprise just over 25% of majority party membership. If
Latino legislators constitute just over 25%, their preferences can be determinative
in the development of the majority coalition that chooses institutional leaders.
Third, Latinos must vote as a unified block. Any individual defection might limit
the capacity of the group to be an important player in the development of partisan
legislative influence.

Table 4 presents the partisan presence of Latinos in our seven states in the 2003
legislative session. While it is clear that Latinos have a growing presence in each
state’s legislative chambers, except Nevada’s, one must consider whether this
presence occurs in the majority or minority party. In California, Florida, and New
Mexico, Latinos currently constitute a significant share of the majority party coali-
tion in both legislative chambers. Latino Democrats in New Mexico constitute
more than half of the majority party in the lower house, 66.7%, and in the state
senate, 58.3%. In California, Latino Democrats comprise 31.3% and 34.6% of the
state assembly and state senate respectively.

The Latino Vote 2004

It is already apparent that Latino voters will be the focus of attention of both
Republicans and Democrats in the 2004 presidential election. The announcement
by President George W. Bush of a set of principles that might guide transforma-
tions in our immigration policy, especially his call for a new guest-worker
program that is largely targeted at Mexican immigrants, is understood by many as
a clear signal that he will continue his attempt to increase his support from Latino
voters (Bush 2004). Although none of the current major Democratic candidates
have formally made any major policy pronouncements that may be of special
interest to Latino voters, it is expected that they too will make special efforts to
secure the votes of this segment of the electorate.

There are three distinct reasons that major presidential candidates and their par-
ties may be focusing attention on Latinos. One, as the fastest-growing
ethnic-racial segment of the American population, both major parties want to
make sure that this group does not become solely identified with its competitor.
The power of parties is determined by the number of votes they receive. Any party
that does not specifically try to incorporate Latinos runs the risk of alienating the
largest and fastest-growing ethnic-racial segment of the population. Two, Latinos
may be positioned in states that are particularly critical to developing the neces-
sary minimum winning Electoral College coalitions for presidential candidates. In
this scenario, despite the relatively low levels of Latino voter participation relative
to Whites and African Americans, Latinos could still be a key swing vote in states
that may be crucial in determining the outcome of the election. Three, and rarely
considered, it may be that the focus on Latinos has less to do with securing their
votes than it does with using a demonstrated sensitivity to Latinos as a way of
securing the votes of moderate White swing voters in key competitive states. This
scenario works differently for Democrats than it does for Republicans. Although
the interests of the candidates of both major parties are the same (i.e., securing the
votes of moderate White swing voters), the Democrats must do this by softening
their image as the party of special interests such as those of racial and ethnic
groups, and by contrast, the Republicans must soften their image of social conserva-
tivism on issues such as race, choice, and concern for the poor. In the Democrats
case, they must limit their ethnic specific campaign appeals, such as to Latinos,
and speak in broader terms of community and common interest. That is,
Democrats want Latino votes but must limit the risk of alienating moderate voters
by making ethnic-based appeals. Republicans, however, focus instead on demon-
strating that their conservatism is compassionate by showing respect for the
Latino work ethic, language, and culture. We assess each of these three reasons in
turn.

The population growth of Latinos, as previously discussed, is unquestioned.
Figure 5 displays how this growth is expected to continue throughout the century.9
Based on assumptions of current rates of birth, death, and immigration, Latinos
are projected to be 24% of the national population by 2050 and one-third (33%) of
the population by 2100. By contrast, non-Hispanic Whites will comprise a
decreasing percent of the national population throughout this period, declining to a
bare majority, 52.8%, in 2050 and only 40.3% in 2100. Of special note is that
African Americans are estimated to remain constant at 12-13% and Asians will
just about equal the number of African Americans in 2100.

With the exception of Florida, Latinos tend to roughly split their votes between
major candidates two to one in favor of Democrats. On average, the Democratic
candidate receives 65-70% of the Latino vote in any state and the Republican
receives 25-30%.10 By comparison, Latinos in Florida are estimated to split their
statewide votes 60-40 in favor of Republicans.11 This split suggests that growth in
the Latino electorate could equally serve both parties. Democrats have incentives
to maintain and try to increase their base in this group. Republicans also want to
maintain their 25-30% and have the special incentive of working to bring even
more Latino voters into their party since their base among White voters will con-
tinue to decline as the percentage of Whites in the country declines. This is a
different situation than that presented by strategies to secure votes from African
Americans. African Americans have tended to consistently support Democratic
presidential candidates at rates of 85-90%, and they are not growing as a percent
of the national population. In sum, the demographic growth of Latinos, stability in
the African American population, and decline in the White population defines
clear future-oriented benefits to both parties in incorporating as many Latino vot-
ers as possible.

The second possible reason that Latinos are likely to be a significant focus of the
campaign efforts of the candidates of both major political parties focuses on the
strategic geographical location of current Latino voting strength. Are Latinos important swing votes in key competitive states that have traditionally determined the outcome of recent presidential elections? We use the results of the 2000 presidential election to consider this possibility.

Figure 6 displays the vote results for the 2000 election in states where Latinos are significant segments of the electorate. Bush did receive a higher percentage of Latino votes (35%) than his father in 1992, who received 24%, or Bob Dole in 1996, who received 21%. In the 2000 election, the Latino vote was a major and perhaps critical factor in determining the outcome of the election in only two states, Florida and New Mexico. In no other state can a claim be made that the Latino vote was significant in determining the outcome of the election. In New Mexico the Latino vote clearly compensated for Gore’s limited support from White voters. In Florida, Latinos who voted Republican were very important contributors to Bush making any claim to having won a majority of that state’s vote. Much is made about the sizeable Latino support, 43%, that Bush received from his home state of Texas. It is clearly evident in Figure 6, however, that this vote was completely insignificant to his victory in this state. He received such an overwhelming percentage of the White vote in Texas, 73%, that he did not need any Latino votes to win in this state. If the expectation of the Bush campaign was that Latino votes would further expand their electoral base among critical Latino swing voters, this did not occur in the 2000 election. There is, at present, no reason to expect this to change in 2004.

This leads us to the third reason that Latinos were a special focus in the 2000 campaign and why they may again be a focus in 2004. To assess this possibility, one must begin with the median voter theory. Under this theory, the key to winning the White House is securing the votes of moderate voters in key competitive swing states. States that are usually placed in this group include Iowa, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Missouri, and, of course, Florida. Moderate voters are not interested in supporting candidates that come from either the extreme liberal wing of the Democratic Party or the extreme conservative wing of the Republican Party. Each party’s presidential candidate, therefore, must soften their perceived positions on issues that traditionally identify them as overwhelming supportive of the most extreme wings of their base.

This is the driving vision of the Democratic Leadership Council’s (DLC) Third Way that has guided Democratic presidential politics from 1992 to the present. The DLC was formally established in 1985 after five years of planning and organizing. The explicit goal of this group was to redesign the image of the Democratic Party from being perceived as the party of counter-cultural, entitlement-oriented interest groups and tax-and-spend, racial, ethnic, and counter-cultural liberals with origins in the party reforms of 1972 that led to the stunning defeat of George McGovern to being seen instead as committed to the principles of “sustained economic growth, equal and expanding opportunity, and the aggressive defense of freedom with the promotion of democratic values abroad” (Baer 2000, 68).

The nomination of southerner Bill Clinton as the Democratic candidate in 1992 was the culmination of these efforts. He had been an early and consistent supporter of the DLC. His selection of Al Gore, another early and consistent DLC
member, as his vice presidential running mate made it even clearer that the Democratic Party would appeal to middle America. Among the most significant policy positions taken by Clinton-Gore were to promote economic growth and to “reform welfare as we know it.” It is hard to imagine two issues more different from what had become the liberal tradition of the Democratic Party.

The DLC-based strategy of Clinton-Gore clearly expanded the electoral base of the Democratic Party, especially in the South. The Democratic ticket won in Louisiana, Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, and West Virginia in 1992. In 1996, after Clinton signed the *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act*, which allegedly reformed welfare, Clinton-Gore again won in Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Of greatest surprise, they were even able to win in Florida.

Notice that the making of explicit race-related appeals during the campaign is not possible under the DLC median voter strategy. Notice as well that Latino voters are not a specific target and especially not a part of the image promoted by Democratic presidential campaigns. This is not to say that Latino voters are ignored. They are not, however, a clear and consistent part of the most public campaigning of the candidates, and Latino appeals are limited to appearances at audiences that are overwhelmingly Latino. Notice as well that mobilizing Latino voters is not a critical part of this strategy. The states that are the primary focus of DLC strategy are not states where Latinos are significant segments of the electorate. Florida would be the one exception, as it is the only Southern state where Latinos are a significant segment of the electorate.

The strategy pursued by the Bush campaign in 2000, and especially the focus on “compassionate conservatism,” can be understood within the same set of strategic necessities demanded by the median voter theory. However, unlike the invisible role that Latinos play in the Democratic DLC strategy, Latinos play a central role in the strategy of the Republican Party.

It must be remembered that the Republican Party’s recent national prominence, and especially national success of its presidential candidates, is fundamentally dependent on the party securing the votes of increasing numbers of Southern Whites, many of whom had traditionally voted Democrat. Ronald Reagan’s impressive victory in 1980 throughout the South built upon the inroads made by Richard Nixon in 1972, which were themselves reflective of the White South’s concern with racial issues as represented by the success of George Wallace’s 1968 segregationist campaign of the Independent Party. Reagan’s campaign was masterful in linking the concerns of many Southern Whites with the Democratic Party’s alleged embrace of African American civil rights interests to concerns regarding the growth of an activist federal government. But the key linkage he made was with taxes. As well described by Edsall and Edsall (1992), Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party used race-coded language to link “race, rights, and taxes.” The causal logic was masterful: The national government had grown to proportions that threatened the liberty of every individual citizen. Special interest groups and their advocates had been given excessive entitlement rights by an interventionist Democrat-dominated federal government. It started with the integration of schools, was transformed into forced busing, and quickly spread to a hodgepodge
of programs to serve every narrow interest imaginable in education, employment, social welfare, housing, and voting rights.

The beauty—and power—of this logic was that it linked “race, rights, and taxes” in a way that was not socially offensive and could even be understood as racially neutral, albeit just on the surface. The catch phrase of the Reagan campaign was that “government was the problem, not the solution.” In a race-bound South, this appeal was especially convincing. This logic was again pursued successfully by the Republican ticket in 1984, 1988, and 2000.

No one can question the rise of the Republican Party in the South. In the 1980 election Reagan won every state in the South except Georgia. He won all Southern states in 1984 as did George H.W. Bush in 1988. In 1994, under the leadership of Newt Gingrich and his Contract for America, victories in the South were critical to the taking of the House by the Republicans. As Black and Black (2002) so carefully outline, not only have Republican presidential candidates been increasingly successful in the South, Republican gubernatorial, senatorial, and state legislative gains have been equally impressive.

This transformation of the South into a Republican stronghold has direct implications for the median voter strategy of the Republican Party. The White South now represents one of the primary foundations of a nationally competitive Republican Party. Without sufficient majorities in the White South, Republican presidential candidates cannot compete effectively in national politics (Black and Black 2002). The Republican Southern strategy clearly expanded the base of the party by promoting the switch and incorporation of sizeable numbers of White Southerners. It is likely that a number of these Southern Republicans were socially conservative on various issues, especially race, prayer in the schools, abortion, and now gay marriage, positions consistent with what would become known as the Christian Coalition.

There is one other aspect of the transformation of the Republican Party in the post-civil rights era that is insufficiently acknowledged by scholars of party politics, and directly related to Latinos. Although much less successful than the effort to transform Southern politics, it nonetheless was also driven by the strategic response of the Republican Party to increase its competitive position within the median voter theory. Not only did Richard Nixon have an articulated Southern strategy in 1972, he also had an explicitly articulated Hispanic strategy.

Among the most insightful discussions of this effort is provided by reporter Tony Castro (1974). Nixon wanted to be fully competitive in Texas during his 1972 reelection effort. As a result, his administration focused on providing high-level administrative appointments and program funding targeted at Mexican Americans. Castro refers to this strategy to cut into traditional Democratic voters as Nixon’s “Republicanization of Mexican America” (199). In 1971, Nixon appointed Henry M. Ramirez, an educator from Whittier, CA, to revive the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-Speaking People. Nixon also directed administrative agencies to hire more Latinos. In that same year he also appointed Phillip V. Sanchez, an unsuccessful candidate for Congress from California, to be the head of the Office of Economic Opportunity. He also appointed Romana A. Bañuelos, a businesswoman from Los Angeles, to be treasurer of the United States—an
appointment that made her, at that time, the highest-ranking Latina to ever serve in an administrative position. Castro estimates that by 1972 there were at last 50 mid- to senior-level administrative appointees who were Latina/o (Castro 1974, 200-201). Castro also estimated that Nixon’s Cabinet Committee was also responsible for providing at least $20M in projects serving Latinos in Texas and another $17M in California (Castro 1974, 211).

This strategy produced a greater Latino vote for Richard Nixon than anyone could have predicted. Although the precise methodology used to make the flowing calculations is not specified, Castro reports that CBS showed that the president received 49% of the Latino vote in Texas and Florida, and 11% in California. CBS analysis also showed that the Nixon received an estimated 31% of the Latino vote nationally.

Unfortunately, soon after the election, the Nixon administration decided to dismantle the Office of Economic Opportunity, and many of the recent Latino administrative appointments were not able to keep their positions. Castro concludes that although this appeal to expand the Republican base did not ultimately produce long-lasting gains for Latino communities, it did “produce . . . a remarkable transformation in the politics of Mexican-Americans from a predictable, homogeneous bloc into a fluid, ticket-splitting electorate” (Castro 1974, 214). The similarity of this effort to aspects of the 2000 Bush campaign is instructive.

As previously stated, it is imperative that a Republican presidential candidate win every Southern state if he wants to win. It was Clinton’s success in winning a number of Southern states in 1992 that gave him necessary margins of victory in the Electoral College. If the Black-White racial divide, whether explicit in expressed racial animus or coded as in elements of social conservatism and related opposition to an activist government in social welfare policy, is still a primary basis for how many Whites cast their votes in the South, Republican candidates risk losing White votes to the extent that they are perceived to cater to the interests of African Americans. However, this posturing of Republican candidates with Southern social conservatives also runs the risk of alienating a sufficient number of moderate White voters in the South, and especially outside of the South, whose votes are critical to a Republican candidate winning enough electoral votes to be president. Based on the 2000 election, such states outside the South might include Iowa, Ohio, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Oregon.

It is possible that Bush’s catering to Latino voters in 2000 precisely served the purpose of softening his socially conservative image that was critical to his dual goals of mobilizing his base of support in the South and moderating his socially conservative image to also appeal to moderate White voters. Speaking Spanish, talking about his relations with “Hispanics” in his home state, and developing effective Latino-focused campaign ads all could have served to soften his Southern-focused social conservatism. These demonstrations of sensitivity to Latinos were not restricted to his campaigning in Latino-concentrated states. They became part of his entire campaign to demonstrate his “compassionate conservatism.”

It is important that we not be misunderstood. We are not suggesting that Bush was disingenuous in demonstrating understanding and especially respect to cultur-
al and other aspects of Latino communities. It is certainly the case that his demonstrations of understanding and respect were unique for major presidential candidates. What we are suggesting, however, is that there can be a systematic electoral gain by a Republican candidate using Latinos as a way to soften the clear marginalization of African American interests required by the Southern strategy. Latinos are positioned as the preferred ethnic-racial group of the Republican candidate, not African Americans. The Republican candidate, in other words, can appear sensitive to ethnic-racial concerns through Latinos, who do not currently constitute a significant segment of the electorate in any Southern state, with the exception of Florida.

We refer to this effort to appear to be responsive to Latino communities as symbolic mainstreaming. Mainstreaming occurs because Latinos are placed at the center of elements of national politics and perhaps at the center of the decision making of some moderate White voters. Mainstreaming occurs because Latino voters are written about in major press analyses as an important focus of presidential campaigning. We refer to it as symbolic because rarely are there specific policy proposals that underlie the demonstrations of understanding and respect for Latino communities. Specific proposals regarding issues such as immigration, bilingual education, health care, housing, education, and crime are rarely discussed in Latino-specific terms. There is certainly no attempt to justify policy positions on the basis of their being supported by a majority of Latino voters.

We already see this symbolic mainstreaming in the 2004 campaign with Bush administration’s pronouncement that it was calling for a reconsideration of elements of our current immigration policy by announcing a possible set of principles that could be used to consider providing legalization to a small number of undocumented immigrants and establishing a broader guest worker program (Bush 2004; Allen 2003). This is an issue of central concern to many Latinos, especially those from Mexico and Central America. The language the president used is instructive:

He indicated that he was making “an announcement that I believe will make America a more compassionate and more humane and stronger country.” He also said, “As a Texan, I have known many immigrant families, mainly from Mexico, and I have seen what they add to our country. They bring to America values of faith in God, love of family, hard work and self-reliance—the values that made us a great nation to begin with.”

He continued, “Workers who seek only to earn a living end up in the shadows of American life—fearful, often abused and exploited. When they are victimized by crime, they are afraid to call the police, or seek recourse in the legal system. They are cut off from their families far away, fearing if they leave our country to visit relatives back home, they might never be able to return to their jobs.”

Lastly, he stated that “[t]he situation I described is wrong. It is not the American way. Out of common sense and fairness, our laws should allow willing workers to enter our country and fill jobs that Americans . . . are not filling” (Bush 2004).

However, the statement made no mention of specific proposals and left the development of these specifics to the Congress.

As of yet, it is unclear what role Latinos will play in the campaign by major Democratic candidates. They have all committed themselves to greater ethnic-
racial inclusion. It is not uncommon to hear them refer to both African Americans and Latinos when they talk about race and ethnicity in the United States today. Attaining higher levels of “social justice,” “fairness,” and “an America for all Americans, not just the privileged” are terms often used by a number of these candidates. Their explicit reference to ethnic-racial issues has largely been restricted to when they were speaking at forums specifically devoted to these issues.

**The Uneven Consequences of Demographic Growth**

Our analysis of the relationship between Latino demographic growth and political influence over the last decade allows us to reach two firm conclusions. First, population growth is related to increased electoral influence, and that influence does seem to result in incremental and sustained representational gains. Latinos have steadily increased as a percent of the population, as a percent of the electorate, and as a percent of those elected to the U.S. Congress and to both the lower houses and the senates of individual states; however, the precise pattern of this growth and related influence varies from state to state. Interestingly, California, where one-third of the Latino population lives, is distinct. Latinos have noticeably increased as a percent of the population, increased by even greater rates as a percent of the electorate, and have had the most dramatic increases in the election of Latinos to the state assembly and the state senate as compared to any other state. Perhaps most significantly, Latino state legislators have reached numbers that allow them to be a very powerful bloc of decision makers within the Democrat-dominated legislature. There is every reason to think that this influence will be maintained. New Mexico also stands out as the state where Latinos have had the greatest levels of influence and representation. Although only 2.2% of all Latinos live in this state, it continues to be the arena where Latinos are given among the greatest opportunities to hold positions of importance as both voters and holders of public office. Our other states have a much longer way to go before they begin to translate population growth into electoral influence and related representational gains as has occurred in these two states. An optimistic view would argue that if the trends in Latino population growth continue, it is only a matter of time before these states also reflect noticeable gains by Latinos both in the electorate and in public office. Current efforts that focus on maximizing voter turnout in the 2004 election (Bai 2003), especially those coming from the Democratic Party, which is still the party of first choice by large and consistent majorities of Latino voters in every state except Florida (Meyerson 2003; Blumenfeld 2003), may well exacerbate growth rates of Latino voters.

Our second conclusion, however, requires that we temper the above described optimism. Our analysis also reveals that despite growth in Latino electoral influence and related representational gains, they are still very vulnerable to being marginalized and manipulated in the political process. As demonstrated by our discussion of California, even in a state that is overwhelmingly Democratic and where Latino gains have been both substantial and sustained, a competing White block vote can easily defeat candidates and issues preferred by majorities of Latino voters. The Texas experience demonstrates that Latino gains can also be thwarted by even greater gains in the success of an opposition political party.
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, our discussion of the possibility that Latinos and their policy interests can be marginalized and manipulated by both major political parties through strategic decisions to increase national competitiveness with moderate, largely White voters (whether through deracializing by Democrats or symbolic mainstreaming by Republicans) shows that Latinos might still be very much at the margins of some of the most significant elements of American electoral politics.

Latinos are likely to be increasingly salient in many distinct aspects of American politics. What is much less clear is how that salience will be manifested. Perhaps most important for many Latinos, least clear of all is whether or not the policy interests of most Latinos will be served by any such manifestation. The 2004 presidential campaign and election will be very instructive to further understanding how much the optimism should be tempered by possible vulnerability.

References


Endnotes

1 Electoral data for 2002 are not yet available. As a result, all comparisons between population and electorate in this section of the essay are only from 1992-2000.

2 For a general discussion of conditions under which Latinos can be influential segments of the electorate, see Guerra and Fraga (1996).

3 The only other time that the white support for the Democratic candidate deviated from this range was Kathleen Brown in her 1994 gubernatorial bid, when she received only 35 percent of the white vote. See Barreto and Ramírez (2004).

4 Proposition 187 limited the access that undocumented workers had to public education, social services, and health care. It also imposed state penalties for the use, forging, and distribution of false residency documents. Proposition 209 severely limited the use of affirmative action programs. It outlawed the use of race and ethnicity in admissions to state colleges and universities, as well as in the awarding of contracts by state agencies and substate governments. Proposition 227 effectively eliminated the use of bilingual instruction in California public schools. Under this law, bilingual instruction was limited to one year for all students, regardless of language ability. Parents could petition for exceptions. See Fraga and Ramírez (2001, 2003).

5 In California, the lower house of the state legislature is known as the state Assembly. There are no Latinos currently serving in the U.S. Senate.

6 Our most recent representational data is for the 2002 election; therefore, the representatives would have served in 2003 legislative session.

7 In Florida, the presence among the majority party is less, but still significant. Latino Republicans in Florida constitute 14.6% of the majority in the lower house and 21.4% of an evenly split state senate. In the lower house in New York, Latino Democrats are 10.7% of the majority party.

8 This section relies heavily on Fraga and Leal 2003.

9 We are well aware of the hazards of projecting so far into the future. These projections do, however, allow us to appreciate why it might make sense for both parties to see their future strength as tied to securing the votes of the fastest-growing and largest segment of the population.

10 Latino support for Democratic presidential candidates tends to be closer to 75-80% in New York and New Jersey.

11 The split in the Cuban vote cuts much closer to 75-25 in favor of Republicans.

12 The data in this graph are derived from CNN exit poll results. The races in New Mexico and Florida were so close that the results fell within the sampling design margin of error. This is why the graphed percentages do not match with the actual electoral outcome. This is not the case for any other state. In New Mexico, it is also understood that Native American voters were additional contributors to Gore’s margin of victory.

13 For a very comprehensive discussion of this theory, see Frymer 1999 and Downs 1957.

14 See the excellent analysis of the Democratic Party by Kenneth S. Baer (2000).

15 See Carmines and Stimson 1989; Edsall and Edsall 1992; and Black and Black 2002. For a critique of this view, see Abramowitz 1994.

16 The preferred term in New Mexico is Hispanics or Hispanos.
Figure 1. Latino Pct of the Population. 1992-2002


- Nevada
- Arizona
- Florida
- New York
- Texas
- California
- New Mexico
- Nation
Figure 2.
Figure 3. Electoral Influence in California Races, 1994-2003
Figure 4(a): Latinos in State Legislatures. 1990-2002

State Houses

Figure 4(b): Latinos in State Legislatures. 1990-2002
Figure 5. Population Growth 2000-2100

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections Branch
Figure 6. The Vote for Gore and Bush, 2000

Table 1. Highest Rates of Latino Population Growth, 1990-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>% Change 1990-2000</th>
<th>Latino Population, 2000</th>
<th>Latino % of State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>378,963</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>86,666</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>435,227</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>123,838</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>393,970</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>95,067</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>75,830</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>59,939</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>143,382</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>94,425</td>
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000

Table 2. Electorate Parity Ratio, 2000

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<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
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<td>Arizona</td>
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<td>Texas</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>0.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
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### Table 3. Latinos in U.S. House of Representatives

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<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>5</td>
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Table 4. Latino Partisan Presence in State Legislatures, 2003-04

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<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>State House of Representatives</th>
<th>State Senate</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct Latino</td>
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<tr>
<td>California</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pct Latino</td>
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<td>9.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct Latino</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct Latino</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct Latino</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pct Latino</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
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Hispanics in Graduate Education: Advancing the Next Generation

Congressman Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX)

In 1996, Rubén Hinojosa was elected to the United States Congress representing the 15th congressional district of Texas. He currently serves on three House committees: Committee on Education and the Workforce, where he is the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Select Education; the Financial Services Committee; and the Committee on Resources. He also serves as co-chair of the Education Task Force for the Democratic Caucus, as well as chairman of the Education Task Force for the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. Congressman Hinojosa is married to Martha López Hinojosa and has five children.

It is a national imperative that we raise the level of educational attainment of Hispanic Americans. In the face of the major demographic shifts that we have seen over the last 20 years and that will continue into the foreseeable future, the United States cannot afford to passively maintain the present course of the educational trends for the Hispanic community. Nothing short of our economic prosperity and national security are at risk. Changing these trends will require seeding and sealing the educational pipeline from pre-school through graduate school.

The most recent data from the U.S. Census estimates that the Hispanic population in the United States has reached 37.4 million or 13.3 percent of the total (Ramirez and de la Cruz 2003). Hispanics are also fueling the growth of America’s workforce, accounting for one of every three new workers over the last 10 years. The rate of growth of the Hispanic workforce is projected to increase at a rate 10 times greater than the White, non-Hispanic workforce by the year 2012 (DOL 2004). Ominously, Hispanics continue to have the lowest levels of educational attainment of any group in the country. In the 1999-2000 academic year, Hispanics earned only 6 percent of the bachelors degrees, 4 percent of masters degrees, 3 percent of doctoral degrees, and 5 percent of first professional degrees (Llagas 2003).

Major leaks in the pipeline have put Hispanic Americans at the bottom of the educational attainment ladder. Only 52 percent of Hispanic adults over the age of 25 have completed high school, compared to 80 percent nationally. Only 10 percent of Hispanic adults have attained a bachelors degree, and less than 4 percent have achieved an advanced degree. In the general population, over 24 percent of adults have bachelors degrees and nearly 9 percent have advanced degrees (Bauman and Graf 2003). Not until the 1996-97 academic year did Hispanics break the 1,000 mark in doctorates awarded; of the 44,780 doctorate degrees awarded for the 1999-2000 academic year, only 1,291 went to Hispanics (Llagas
We will not see overall, sustained improvement if we just focus on discrete points at the front end of the pipeline. Federal policy to date has largely focused on elementary and secondary education and access to college. It is time to look for ways to seed the pipeline at the advanced degree level where the acute Hispanic under-representation threatens to retard growth in other areas such as teaching, health, research, and economic development. Thus far, only the Hispanic press seems to have picked up on the looming crisis. Last May’s issue of *Hispanic Outlook in Higher Education* sounded the alarm: “Looking at the minuscule numbers, Hispanics with doctorates seem about as rare as fetal stem cells approved for research, and like the stem cells sure to be hungered after in many venues and for many laudable purposes . . . Examining the small numbers, too, of Hispanics graduating with degrees in medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, optometry, and other professional-level health-related fields, the goal of culturally competent health services seems distant, especially given the projected growth in the Hispanic population” (Hixson 2003).

Our nation’s Hispanic-serving institutions (HSIs) are uniquely poised to address this need. Between 1991 and 2000, the number of Hispanic students earning masters degrees at HSIs grew by 136 percent, the number receiving doctorate degrees grew by 85 percent, and the number earning first professional degrees grew by 47 percent (Stearns and Watanabe 2002). HSIs, established in the 1992 amendments to the *Higher Education Act*, are degree-granting, nonprofit institutions that serve a high proportion of needy students and have at least a 25 percent full-time equivalent enrollment of Hispanic students. According to current enrollment data, 242 institutions meet the enrollment requirements to be considered HSIs, and roughly one-third of them offer post baccalaureate degrees (DOE 2002). Collectively, these institutions enroll nearly half of all Hispanics in higher education (Stearns and Watanabe 2002). Through a competitive grant program authorized under Title V of the act, HSIs receive federal support to build capacity to better meet the needs of low-income and Hispanic students, primarily at the undergraduate level.

The federal investment in HSIs, which began with $12 million in 1995 and has increased to nearly $95 million for 2004, has clearly paid off. Between the years 1990-1999, the growth in enrollment at these institutions was double that of all institutions nationally. During that same period the number of degrees awarded by HSIs grew by 36 percent, compared to 13 percent for all other institutions, with a 95 percent increase in the number of Hispanic students receiving degrees. Strengthening HSIs not only promotes access and degree attainment for Hispanics, but also builds the capacity and strengthens the economic development of the communities that are home to these institutions.

It is time for a similar investment in graduate education at HSIs. As the 108th Congress considers the reauthorization of the *Higher Education Act*, the timing is perfect to expand the federal support for HSIs to post-baccalaureate programs. That is why I have introduced H.R. 2238, the *Next Generation Hispanic-Serving Institutions Act*, to establish a long-overdue graduate program for these institutions. This legislation will establish a competitive grant program for HSIs that offer post-baccalaureate degrees to increase graduate opportunities for Hispanics and to
expand and enhance the post-baccalaureate offerings at HSIs. Grants will support graduate fellowships and support services for graduate students, facilities improvement, faculty development, technology and distance education, and collaborative arrangements with other institutions. This legislation has broad, bipartisan support with over 100 cosponsors—both Democrats and Republicans. A federal focus on advanced degrees in the Hispanic community will help erect a scaffolding to support the construction of an educational infrastructure that will catapult the Hispanic community to the educational levels needed to meet our knowledge-economy-based workforce needs. We must seize this opportunity. Our future depends on it.

References


Access to Procurement and Capital Opens Doors for Latino Businesses

George Herrera

Mr. George Herrera is president of Herrera-Cristina Group, Ltd., a multi-media communications firm, and is a member of the board of directors of Cendant Corporation. Mr. Herrera is also the former president and chief executive officer of the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC), where he was responsible for communicating the interests of over 1.2 million Hispanic-owned businesses across the country to both the private and public sectors, and addressing critical economic issues that impact Hispanic entrepreneurs. He was also the creator of the national syndicated television show Hispanics Today. He has received numerous awards, including the Mickey Leland Humanitarian Achievement Award by the National Association of Minorities in Cable and the Cesar Chavez Community Service Award by Minorities in Business Magazine, Inc. He has also been recognized by Black Enterprise Magazine as one of the 30 future leaders for economic empowerment of minority communities and was named a fellow of the Society of Fellows, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. He serves on various boards and committees, including the advisory board for the GE Center for Financial Learning and the SCORE Association Counselors to America’s Small Business board of directors.

Introduction

Despite the U.S. Hispanic community’s purchasing power of $600 billion and a population of more than 38 million, major obstacles to the growth of Hispanic entrepreneurship continue to center around a lack of access to equity capital, procurement opportunities, and access to corporate America’s board room. As the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC) enters its 25th year, it will continue to work closely with corporate America and the federal government to level the playing field for Latino-owned businesses by ensuring that they have access to new contract opportunities and that Latino professionals are placed on the boards of Fortune 1000 corporations. To thrive and succeed, it is equally important that Hispanic-owned firms have sufficient capital to expand their businesses.

Hispanic Businesses: An Afterthought in Corporate and Federal Procurement?

Hispanic businesses are far from being on an equal playing field when it comes to procurement opportunities and leadership positions. The annual Congressional Scorecard Report by Congresswomen Nydia Velazquez (D-NY), ranking Democratic member of the House Small Business Committee, found that while federal government buying increased by more than $15 billion over the last year, the share of contracts awarded to small businesses has declined. Unfortunately, the statistics for corporate America are not much better. According to the Hispanic
Association for Corporate Responsibility (HACR), most Fortune 1000 companies spend less than 3 percent of their nearly $12 trillion in annual purchasing on minority businesses and even less on Hispanic-owned businesses. I am equally alarmed that when it comes to positions of power and true decision making, Hispanics are not at the table. In fact, only 1.7 percent of all board seats in Fortune 1000 companies are held by Hispanics and only 15 percent of all Fortune 1000 companies have Hispanic representation in their governing bodies.

This is particularly unsettling when you consider the increasingly vital role Hispanic businesses play in the U.S. economy, generating more than $200 billion in revenues annually and employing nearly 4 million workers. Add to that the Hispanic community’s $600 billion in purchasing power, and we have a major issue on our hands. To remain competitive, Hispanic-owned companies must expand globally and be granted access to the capital and procurement opportunities that will sustain their growth. This means that both the federal government and corporate America must step up efforts to open their doors to the Hispanic small business community. Hispanics are consumers and investors and contribute greatly to this country’s economy.

While many corporations have stepped up to the plate by creating supplier diversity programs and actively seeking Hispanic-owned businesses for contracts, a recent report developed by the USHCC and HACR found that true inclusion of Hispanic businesses in the procurement process can only be achieved by building an inclusive culture within a company from the ground up. A corporation must have active support from senior management, ongoing measurement, solid infrastructure to support minority firms at different levels of the supply chain, and accountability of both prime suppliers and corporate managers.

To ensure that corporations are heeding these recommendations, the USHCC created its own procurement council. Comprised of leading procurement representatives from corporate America and the Hispanic and small business community, the council educates, provides guidance, and develops strategies to increase procurement opportunities for Hispanic businesses within corporate America and the prime contractor/supplier community. In addition, the USHCC recently partnered with the Congressional Hispanic Caucus on its Corporate America Task Force, which aims to build greater Hispanic representation on corporate boards, increase procurement opportunities for Latino-owned businesses, and develop mentoring programs to help Hispanics advance in corporations.

**Hispanic Firms: Good for Business**

Actively supporting Hispanic-owned companies is not only socially responsible, it’s good for business. The Latino community is a brand-loyal consumer, which means long-term profits for major corporations. And today, the Small Business Administration estimates that Hispanic businesses number closer to 2 million, meaning that they form an invaluable talent pool that can provide the necessary experience for running effective business operations. It is also important to note that now more than ever, consumer purchasing decisions are made on perceived behaviors of corporations. A 2000 study by Walker Research demonstrated that 88 percent of consumers would be likely to buy from a company that is socially responsible.
Capital Equals Success for Hispanic Businesses

To survive in today’s competitive marketplace, Hispanic firms must gain access not only to corporate and federal contracts, but also to capital to invest in their enterprise. That’s why the USHCC cosponsored a private equity fund known as Hispania Capital Partners. The fund provides Latino entrepreneurs much-needed capital for growth and expansion and is the first private equity fund dedicated to Hispanic-owned businesses that is licensed by the Small Business Administration. A joint venture between the USHCC and Duff & Phelps, Hispania Capital Partners invests in later-stage companies serving the U.S. Hispanic market in the areas of print and broadcasting, business services, financial sector, information technology, and food manufacturing and distribution. Its first investment was made to Rossi Publications, publisher of La Raza newspaper, the leading Spanish-language newspaper in Chicago, IL, and the largest circulated Spanish-language Sunday newspaper in the nation. Hispania’s investment will enable the 33-year-old company to accelerate its ongoing expansion in Chicago’s suburban areas, where the Hispanic population has grown by close to 70 percent over the past 10 years.

Conclusion

The time has arrived for the Hispanic community to no longer allow corporate America to dictate its investment strategy for our community. With a purchasing power of more than $600 billion, we have the financial strength to ensure that the investment is one that is truly reciprocal in nature. If we are good enough to expend $600 billion annually in consuming corporate America’s products and services, then we are good enough to bring products and services to the marketplace. A future relationship based on anything other than a reciprocal business relationship is one that our community cannot afford to entertain.
Strategies for Increasing Latinos’ Media Access

Chon A. Noriega

Chon A. Noriega is a professor in the UCLA Department of Film, Television, and Digital Media, and director of the UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center. He is author of Shot in America: Television, the State, and the Rise of Chicano Cinema (University of Minnesota Press 2000) and editor of nine books dealing with Latino media, performance, and visual art. For the past decade, Noriega has been active in media policy and professional development, for which Hispanic Business named him as one of the Top 100 Most Influential Hispanics. He is co-founder of the 500-member National Association of Latino Independent Producers (established in 1999) and serves on the board of directors of the Independent Television Service, the largest source of independent project funding within public television.

Despite the well-documented growth of the Latino community as a political and market force within the United States over the last four decades, Latinos entered the 21st century with a lower level of media access and representation than when protests first raised the issue in the 1960s. As the Hollywood Reporter noted in November 1999, “Hispanics have historically been the most underrepresented of all the minority groups in film and TV, and there is no sign that their numbers are increasing.”

Indeed, in the 2001-02 prime-time network television season, Latinos accounted for just 5.9 percent of actors, 1.7 percent of writers, 0.8 percent of directors, and 1.7 percent of network executives in charge of programming (Noriega 2002). Recent studies show little improvement in terms of employment (NAACP 2003). In looking at the social landscape represented on prime time, Latinos accounted for 4.1 percent of the regular characters in fall 2003 (Hoffman and Noriega 2004). Even worse, more than eight out of 10 series (84.5 percent) had no Latino regular characters, and nearly one-third (32 percent) of all Latino regular characters on prime time could be found on just two Latino-themed sitcoms, one of which was canceled early in the season. The mid-season cancellation of six series with Latino regular characters resulted in a 36 percent drop from the start of the fall 2003 season.

There is worse news. While representation of Latinos in film and television has remained almost constant for the last three decades, the Latino community itself has grown from 4.5 percent of the U.S. population in 1970 to 13.5 percent in 2004. Latinos now constitute the largest minority group. Latinos have grown by roughly two and half times relative to the national population, but they still get the same small percentage of the jobs. In other words, employment opportunity for the Latino community in the entertainment industry has decreased, relative to the population, to nearly one-third the 1970s level.
Meanwhile, the entertainment industry is going through a structural and technological revolution that has added new formats: cable, satellite, video, and DVD. Digital technology is further leading to the convergence of these formats with telephone, computers, and the Internet. The entertainment industry is not just big business; it also constitutes one of the primary ways in which we understand ourselves as a nation. But Latinos’ presence has decreased, relative to the population, while the power of the media has increased.

There is widespread consensus about the cause of the problem: Latinos are missing from decision-making positions in the industry. A Tomás Rivera Policy Institute survey conducted in 2000 found that Spanish-surnamed employees accounted for 1.9 percent of executive positions in major studios and networks. In no instance did a Latino executive occupy a creative decision-making position. Furthermore, roughly 60 percent of networks and studios did not employ any Latino executives (Noriega 2002a).

Why? According to the industry, the reason is simply economic. Although Latinos may constitute a disproportionately large market, they are not “distinct enough” as consumers to demand inclusion on the production side. The industry is arguing that it operates on economic rationale alone. Upon closer inspection, however, the industry has an extraordinarily high failure rate: around 75 percent for new television series and not much better for movies (Noriega 2000, 173).

The fact of the matter is that the industry is relatively small and its key players all tend to know each other. And Latinos have not been part of that crowd. In the absence of a formula for success, the industry has invented one around itself, going with the actors, producers, and formats it already knows. These do not provide a higher success rate, but they do provide executives with a greater comfort level than gambling on the unknown.

If 1999 signaled an all-time low for minority representation—best exemplified by the all-White casts for the 26 new primetime series scheduled for fall 1999—it also witnessed the first Latino national advocacy and policy efforts since the early 1970s. The National Council of La Raza, the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute, and the National Hispanic Foundation for the Arts released important studies on industry representation and employment. The National Hispanic Media Coalition joined with numerous Latino civil rights groups to stage a “Brown Out” of the networks in fall 1999. By the end of 2000—collaborating with African American, Asian American, and Native American groups—the coalition had negotiated comprehensive agreements with most major television networks. Under pressure, Nielsen Media Research agreed to implement a new protocol for measuring the Latino audience. Finally, the National Association of Latino Independent Producers emerged as a new professional organization, which brought together 300 producers at its annual national conference and serves as an advocacy voice within public and commercial media. These efforts were supported by established groups, including the following: Nosotros, Latino Entertainment Media Institute, Imagen Foundation, and Latino Public Broadcasting. What is most notable about the new Latino media advocacy efforts is the high degree of inter-group collaboration and coordination.
Following on the heels of these efforts, Latino series found a home on several cable networks: *Resurrection Blvd.* (Showtime), *The Garcia Brothers* (Nickelodeon), *Dora the Explorer* (Nickelodeon), and *Taina* (Nickelodeon). While these gains were offset by cancellations on broadcast networks that reduced the number of actors on prime time, they nonetheless signaled an increase in creative control, with *Resurrection Blvd.* becoming the first television series produced, written, and directed by Latinos (Adams 2000).

The primary media policy issue for Latinos continues to be one of access. One finds this issue expressed across the following specific areas:

1. The Nielsen rating system. Despite the implementation of a new protocol for measuring the viewing habits of the Hispanic community, Nielsen’s methodology remains a trade secret that is closed to independent evaluation. A recent study details a four-city market analysis that suggests Nielsen undercounts English-language Latino viewers, thereby undermining efforts to increase Latino-themed programming (Rincón & Associates 2004).

2. The Federal Communications Commission. There are two important areas worth highlighting. First, there are the efforts to eliminate cross-ownership and other ownership cap rules. Second, there is an absence of laws requiring employment data on minorities. The FCC is currently holding hearings on its diversity and localism principles. While these principles would appear to bear directly on minority groups, the FCC now understands diversity largely in terms of diversity of content.

3. U.S. Spanish-language networks. Media advocates have focused on the lack of U.S.-originated programming. Labor issues have also become more pronounced, especially after NBC acquired Telemundo, since wage disparities were now brought under the same corporate umbrella. According to a recent study, Spanish-language broadcasters earn 70 percent less than their English-language counterparts in the Los Angeles market (Valenzuela and Hunt 2002). This disparity occurs despite the fact that the Spanish-language news often dominates the Los Angeles market and advertising rates have reached rough parity.

4. Research. The lack of research data continues to be one of the major impediments to Latino media policy, especially insofar as the FCC and other agencies have become more empirically oriented around questions of economic impact. Given their ad hoc funding, media advocacy groups are hard-pressed to engage in such research, nor can they wait for scholars who generally work on a longer time frame than that of the policy arena. In the past year, dialogues between media advocacy groups and communications scholars have addressed this impasse and possible areas of collaboration.
While such dialogue marks an important step in media advocacy at large, a troubling gulf between key advocacy groups remains. The gulf remains between the big Washington, DC, issue advocacy groups that address the media’s vital role in a democratic process and the minority media advocacy groups that emphasize minority employment opportunities and creative control within the media industry. These are concerns that the media advocacy groups have jettisoned as politically and judicially unviable inside the Beltway. But while affirmative action has been removed as a potential remedy, the problem of Latinos’ limited access and representation within the media remains firmly in place.

References


This study compiles data through 2002. A study on 2003 employment figures has yet to be published.


Defense of Social Justice: Latino Physicians as a Means to Reduce Disparities

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And Contributing Authors:
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Dr. Philip M. DeChavez, a Chicano, was born in Albuquerque, NM, and went to high school in San Antonio, TX. After high school he became a medic in the U.S. Army. As such, he worked in an emergency room, ran an allergy-immunization clinic, and served in Operation Desert Storm. He completed a bachelor's of science at Morgan State University, a historically black college in Baltimore. Dr. DeChavez received his medical degree from the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine and interned at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania. He completed a residency in family medicine through Stony Brook University at South Side Hospital in New York in 2003. Dr. DeChavez is currently a masters in public health candidate at Harvard School of Public Health and a Commonwealth Fund/Harvard University fellow in minority health policy. He has developed several high school and college educational programs that aim to increase the number of underrepresented minorities in the medical profession. He plans to continue focusing his career in Latino health issues through research and committed community outreach. More information can be obtained at http://www.philipdechavez.com/.

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Disparities in clinical care and health outcomes for Latinos are a significant public
health problem in the United States. As a result of the difficulties many Latinos face in accessing health services, Latinos are more vulnerable to preventable diseases, resulting in population-wide health disparities. For example, Latinos are twice as likely to develop type 2 diabetes as patients from other groups, and Latino women lag behind White and African American women in mammogram and pap testing (Diaz 2002, 511). The health of Latinos is directly related to access to health care providers and services for a number of reasons. First, according to recent studies, Latino physicians tend to locate their practices in areas with higher proportions of residents from Latino backgrounds (Komaromy et al. 1996, 1308). The same study reported, “Although all physicians tend to treat higher proportions of Black and Hispanic patients if they practice in areas where there are more minority residents, Black and Hispanic physicians consistently care for disproportionately high numbers of these patients” (Komaromy et al. 1996, 1309).

Second, there is evidence that a language barrier impacts the disparities in Latino access to health care. Among Latinos, 42 percent factored language into their choice of a Latino physician (Saha et al. 2000, 79). This statistic reflects the importance of language to many Spanish-speaking patients when choosing a physician. The language barrier prevents some Latinos from seeking care at all. A study by the Commonwealth Fund found that among Latinos “33 percent report one or more problems communicating with their physicians” (Beale et al. 2003, 4).

Third, there is evidence that culture, including racial and ethnic concordance, is a factor that exacerbates the disparities in Latinos’ access to health care. It is important to understand that the label “Latino” does not mean that a health worker is automatically culturally congruent with his or her population. The Latino population is very diverse. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Mexican Americans make up approximately 58.4 percent of the Latino population, Puerto Ricans make up approximately 9.6 percent, and Cubans make up 3.2 percent. The remaining 28.8 percent is comprised of “other” Latinos (Bureau of the Census 1998, 43). It is likely that Latino patients will be more comfortable seeing a physician with a similar cultural and social background. Nearly a quarter of Latinos whose physicians are also Latino reported that they explicitly considered physician race or ethnicity when selecting their physicians (Saha et al. 2000, 79).

Studies have suggested that minority physicians are more culturally sensitive to their populations and organize the delivery system in ways more congruent with the needs of a minority population (Diaz 2002, 80). In a recent study by Cooper et al., patients who were of the same race as their physicians rated their visits as significantly more participatory than patients in race-discordant relationships (Cooper-Patrick et al. 1999, 583). The Institute of Medicine, in its 2002 report Unequal Treatment, examines the communication between providers and patients. The institute reports that providers’ existing beliefs and stereotypes about Latinos prevent them from acquiring accurate information from patients and results in greater clinical uncertainty. The report also asserts that in response to such beliefs and stereotypes, Latino patients may refuse treatment, misunderstand advice, or not trust providers (Smedley, Stith, and Nelson 2002, 161).
For these reasons, Latino physicians who speak the language and share the culture of marginalized Latinos can help to bring such patients into the health care system. It is therefore a worthy goal to increase the number of linguistically and culturally congruent Latino physicians. A 1999 study in California found that Latino physicians accounted for 4.8 percent of all physicians licensed in the state, when the Latino population comprised 30.4 percent of the state’s population (Hayes-Bautista 2000, 727). The American Medical Association (1999, 1) projected that, although the ratio of all physicians to the general population would narrow by the year 2000, the number of Latinos in the medical profession would not keep pace with the rate of growth of the Latino population. Having Latinos significantly underrepresented in the nation’s physician workforce will contribute to unequal access to health care for the Latino population.

As shown, Latino physicians are a possible remedy for the disparity of access to care with regard to Latino patients when language and culture are considered. A pipeline starting from early education feeding to the level of the Latino physician needs to be built and studied. The first step to build this pipeline starts with an assessment of who currently comprises the workforce. Residency is an excellent short-term predictor of the emerging physician workforce. Resident programs currently receive federal funding; however, the programs are not required to report race and/or ethnicity to the public. In order to assess the current workforce status, it is imperative that publicly funded programs report, to the public, the racial and ethnic backgrounds of their residents. From a policy standpoint, it is important to develop methods to ensure that Latino physicians are enumerated. A record of the physician’s race and ethnicity will aid in the surveillance of the pathology of under-representation. When a cure to a problem is possible, we should look for ways to ensure it has the chance to prove its success.

References


The Chicano civil rights movement in the United States is generally seen as a reformation of Mexican identity emphasizing reclamation of pride in the racial and cultural roots of Mexicans. In his book *Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice*, Ian F. Haney López studies the change in racial politics brought about by the Chicano movement. He examines why Chicano activists embrace their identity as members of the Brown race—an action that is a rejection of previous generations' attempts to gain civil rights by claiming to be White. He analyzes this racial transformation in the context of race as a socially constructed idea meant to preserve power dynamics. López questions how those considered non-White, either by society or by themselves, will work within the American conception of racial difference to combat inequality.

López’s book proposes a theory for understanding the persistence of racial discrimination despite the advances of the civil rights era and a decline in overt, purposeful acts of racism. His theory of race describes how society’s racial conceptions operate as “common sense” thoughts and behaviors that have become so accepted that they are taken as truth and need no explanation. Racial common sense informs how we think about others, whether or not we consciously choose to discriminate. This automatic set of ideas perpetuates discrimination that may not be intentional, but nonetheless permeates institutions in American society. This is otherwise known as institutional racism, and López suggests that it is harder to challenge because overcoming common sense racism requires people to question their basic views of the world.

Part One of *Racism on Trial* describes the Chicano movement generally, highlighting two specific legal cases where Chicano activists were arrested for their protest activities: the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six. The defense lawyer for both cases, Oscar Acosta, argued that the arrests were cases of discrimination, as shown by the lack of Mexicans who sat on grand juries. Legally, he also had to prove that “Mexicans constituted an identifiable and distinct minority group in Los Angeles” against whom acts of discrimination could be committed (5). López
uses the process of proving that Mexicans existed as a distinct group as an opportunity to discuss the evolution of a racial identity for Mexicans. The Census Bureau, the Supreme Court, and earlier Mexican generations who all claimed that Mexicans were racially White complicated this identity. Although they were labeled as White, they were not afforded the same privileges and rights as Whites.

In Part Two, López explores the connection between this inequality that Mexicans experienced and the development of their non-White identity. He illustrates how legal violence and discrimination against Mexicans led to their self-perception as non-White and how society’s view of Mexicans as non-White led to legal violence and discrimination against them. López observes that there is this causal relationship between law and race: “Because Mexicans were non-white, they suffered legal mistreatment . . . [and] because Mexicans suffered legal discrimination, they came to see themselves as brown” (175). He believes that this dynamic further proves that race is socially constructed. He introduces the notion of race as “common sense,” in that race informs how we view and treat the different people with whom we interact, even if we are not consciously thinking about them in racial terms.

Part Three of the book claims that the tripartite linkage among protest, repression, and race during the Chicano civil rights movement reemphasized racial common sense and further contributed to the rise of a Brown racial identity among Chicanos. Events of the civil rights era (e.g., the Selma march and the Watts riots) demonstrated that Whites would respond violently to minorities who protested against social inequality. This manifested itself through a spectrum of activities ranging from physical abuse to legal repression. The repression led Chicanos to reject “Whiteness” in all its forms and claim a cultural and racial pride based on a Brown identity. They began to embrace their indigenous roots physically and culturally, emphasizing the beauty of the Indian, the achievements of the ancient Aztec and Mayan civilizations, and their property claim to Aztlán, the mythical homeland of the Aztecs today considered to be the U.S. Southwest. Chicanos also embraced their mestizo ancestry as a mixture of European and indigenous “blood” and proclaimed themselves proud members of the resulting Brown race. In doing so, Chicanos contributed to racial common sense by believing that they were members of the Brown race by descent—by blood—and not by choice or social construction. This still feeds into race as a biological category although López notes that in a time when race still “powerfully defines social and material relations in the United States,” non-Whites emphasizing race may be “the only way to directly challenge and remake racial knowledge” (250).

Conclusion

Ian F. Haney López’s book is an excellent analysis that challenges readers to question their basic assumptions about race and see the development of racial identity not as a biological fact but as a response to social injustice. López writes that, even where intentional racism is hard to prove, racism still exists in the form of common sense preconceptions about race, and, unfortunately, this is a form of
discrimination that the courts do not recognize. Policymakers and activists should ask themselves how they plan to advocate for civil rights for Latinos in a racially charged country and what kind of identity Latinos should claim to facilitate their success. Latinos are at a critical point where they can redefine their identity based on ethnicity or culture, and not race. The Census Bureau now acknowledges that Latinos can be of any race, but has this awareness spilled over into the public discourse of how race affects civil rights? López sees the Chicano movement as stemming from “an effort to respond to the problem of race in this country” (249). The question remains: How will Latinos in general confront the social construction of race and “remake the racial common sense that perpetuates inequality” in the United States (x)?

1 For convenience, I will hereafter use the term “Mexican” (as the author does) to refer to people of Mexican descent living in the United States.
Inter-group Affairs in the United States: Tatcho Mindiola, Jr., Yolanda Flores Niemann, and Nestor Rodriguez’s Black-Brown Relations and Stereotypes

(University of Texas Press 2002)

Reviewed by Miguel A. Segovia

Miguel A. Segovia, a HJHP Editorial Advisory Board member, is a doctoral student in contemporary religious thought in the Department of Religious Studies at Brown University. He received his masters of arts degree in sociology from Boston College (2001) and his masters of divinity degree from Harvard Divinity School (2001).

The volume Black-Brown Relations and Stereotypes offers six compelling case studies that corroborate past research on group race relations as well as comparative ethnic relations. In important and interesting respects, the book directs our attention to minority-minority relations and to the future of Black-Brown affairs in the 21st century (31, 33, 35). Through concise, detailed chapters, the authors take up “a systematic comparison of attitudinal and behavioral trends” of Black-Brown interaction and stereotypes in the country, particularly by looking at U.S. Hispanic, foreign-born Hispanic (mainly Mexican, Salvadoran, and Colombian), and African American groups in Houston, TX (5).

The book explores the tensions that transpired throughout the 20th century and that continue to inform the future of social relations among Hispanics, African Americans, and Whites. It amply surveys their histories of contact, struggle, and negotiation, particularly around the Mexico-U.S. border. The sociologists not only evaluate these interactions, but they also draw attention to the history of immigrant labor and the increasingly expanding population of Hispanics. They detail the various multifaceted sociodemographic “changes and their implications for Black-Brown relations” (xi). The authors insightfully demonstrate how the conflicts that have occurred among the groups have varied “according to the specific situation and locale and according to whether interaction is at the group or individual level” (xii, 22-23, 28-29, 113-114). Rather than collapse each of the groups into unproblematic categories and labels, the authors call attention to the diversity and range of goals, understandings, and perceptions among the various groups and communities. They describe the contradictions, analyze the commonalities, and untangle the relevant differences. On the whole, the studies offer penetrating and useful investigations of the ways groups sustain stereotypes, how cultures and caregivers shape their children’s attitudes, the media’s role in generating fear of immigrants and ethno-racial groups, and how other social institutions are utterly
complicitous in maintaining prejudices. Although the researchers find that women are central to the inculcation of stereotypes, the researchers clarify how the process of learning and understanding is shaped by a web of institutions and practices within the larger cultural, social, and political context (82-93).

Through a complex, sociocultural, sociohistoric, and sociopolitical approach that is sensitive to differences, Mindiola, Flores Niemann, and Rodriguez give ample consideration to both national and individual concerns. They attend to both dimensions in their “research- and theory-based solutions” (40). The organizing lenses through which they analyze Black-Brown relations and stereotypes include the thorough investigation of demographic dimensions between the groups, as well as in-group and inter-group perceptions and attitudes (xii-xiii). These comprehensive dimensions allow them to address the issues through multiple sociological methods that range from census data and focus groups to surveys both of their own devising as well as those produced by other scholars (5). The most significant and salient issues for the authors is the need to stimulate, encourage, and generate political coalitions that promote a shared view of struggle against multiple oppressions and their manifestations within Hispanic and African American groups and communities (11, 95-96). Through political solidarity, the authors argue, Black-Brown relations can thrive amidst uneven social development, discrimination, racism, and stereotypes (23-24, 121-132).

Although the findings of this notable study indicate that even among communities of color racism and stereotypes abound, they also demonstrate that the positive perceptions outweigh negative attitudes and beliefs (34). The sociologists critically engage the various challenges by highlighting how “the historical framework of structural, institutional, and societal racism in the United States” works to both produce and reproduce uneven social development, disparities in quality of life, political representation, adequate health care, social services, and education (21).

By focusing on the positive dimensions between Black-Brown relations and interactions, Mindiola, Flores Niemann, and Rodriguez suggest that group leaders can “help their constituents to understand the relationship between stereotypes and the social inequalities that underlie the contexts in which the groups are situated and perceived,” and in so doing, leaders can promote positive interactions for effective social and political power, change, and representation (24). The authors argue that leaders and politicians should work together to promote common agendas and mutual support networks in order to mobilize communities and “build on their commonalities” (24-26, 109-110). They conclude that African Americans and Hispanics can not only enhance group relations but “will increase the chances that, working together, [both groups] will accomplish their shared goals of enhanced quality of life, including improved health care and access to education and diminished ethnic-racial oppression and discrimination” (121).
Defining the Problem:  
Martin G. Urbina’s Capital Punishment and Latino Offenders: Racial and Ethnic Differences in Death Sentences  

(LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2003)

Reviewed by Juan Lázaro Peña

Juan Lázaro Peña, a contributing writer for HJHP, graduated from Middlebury College with a degree in international politics and economics and French. Mr. Peña will receive his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 2006.

In Capital Punishment and Latino Offenders: Racial and Ethnic Differences in Death Sentences, Martin G. Urbina ambitiously attempts to provide a history of race and ethnic relations vis-à-vis the criminal justice system and to analyze race and ethnic differences in death sentence outcomes in the United States. Using a data set of 6,228 cases obtained from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR #6956), Urbina compares sociodemographic variables and criminal history records to determine the role of race and ethnicity in different contexts. Despite the breadth of his topic and the complexity of his original study, Urbina succeeds in presenting statistical analysis within an accessible narrative.

Capital Punishment and Latino Offenders is organized into five chapters, although only the final two focus on Urbina’s original work. Chapter Two explores theories associated with sentencing and includes the race issue in its description of each of five major criminological theories. When discussing the normative theory, for example, Urbina notes its tendency to attribute the high number of minorities in prison solely to the fact that minorities are more likely to break the law. This theory does not address factors leading to the rise in minority crime, such as substandard education systems, discrimination, etc. Another theory, the desert theory, discusses sentencing and the assertion that criminals should be sentenced according to the severity of their crimes. In light of these deficiencies, Urbina juxtaposes the major theories with newly developed ones, discussing factors that ultimately lead to disparities in crime rates and sentencing among minorities. This chapter is particularly valuable when Urbina discusses his own research later in the book, allowing the reader to see why previous studies may have failed.

In Chapter Three, Urbina discusses prior studies concerning death sentences and death sentence outcomes. Although most of those studies point to some sort of racial and ethnic differences, the disparities between the conclusions given the
similarities in studies illustrate the importance of Urbina's original work detailed later in the book. The author also considers other factors affecting outcomes such as prior criminal history and demographic variables. Some previous studies found that the correlation between age and the likelihood of execution is statistically significant. The highest frequency of execution occurs between the ages of 20 to 24 years, while the highest frequency of commutation occurs to those between the ages of 15 to 19 years and those above the age of 55 (Wolfgang et al. 1962). Similarly, education level has an influence in death sentence outcome, as one study found that the median completed school grade of executed prisoners was seventh grade (McCafferty 1962).

Urbina's attempt to summarize the history of U.S. race and ethnic relations (as he titles the fourth chapter of his book) leaves too many gaps and is inappropriately biased. He describes each group (African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Cuban Americans) according to his own preconceptions. Cuban Americans, for example, are largely treated as arrogant and self-interested, and Urbina makes little effort to discuss discrimination against that group. When referencing such discrimination, the author only goes as far as to discuss racial prejudice among Cuban Americans, not against them from outside groups. Conversely, in regards to Mexican Americans there is much reference to oppression and their status as "secondary-citizens" (121) but very little discussion on the successes of this group. Even the subsection entitled "Social Change: How Far Have We Come?" does little to acknowledge the increasing number of Mexican Americans in positions of power. These shortcomings are an attempt by the author to describe the citizens in a certain light to make the results of his study more poignant.

The final chapter of the book focuses exclusively on Urbina's own study of the variations of capital punishment outcomes. The author succeeds in filling the gaps of studies addressed earlier in the book by paying closer attention to a number of variables in determining what inconsistency can be attributed to racial and ethnic differences. The author’s findings confirm a number of past studies and delve deeper into the question of differences between states. Although supportive in some respects, the author becomes too dependent on state differences. For example, when he cannot locate the race of a particular inmate, he uses state-residence as a proxy, assuming—for instance—that because an inmate was from Florida, he would be Cuban American, or because he came from Texas or California, he was Mexican American. In terms of ethnic and racial differences, Urbina found that Latinos were less likely than African Americans and Caucasians “to have their sentences overturned or declared unconstitutional by the courts” (199). The study did not show a difference in the treatment of Cuban Americans and Mexican Americans, but Urbina attributes this flaw to the inadequacy of his state-proxy system, which could have underestimated the number of Mexican Americans in Florida.

Although Capital Punishment and Latino Offenders contends its sole purpose is to determine the discrepancies of capital punishment outcomes, it is unquestionably valuable to policy makers. The book is an indispensable read for those who advocate the abolition of capital punishment, or at least a modification of the current system, as it reveals the inherent discrimination associated with execution.
outcome. Despite some shortcomings in Urbina’s study and biased historical account of U.S. race relations, the work moves closer to finding a solution by helping to move toward a more clearly defined problem.

References


Inside the Beltway

The following are two important proposals affecting the Latino community to watch out for in the upcoming months. HJHP does not have a position on these issues. Rather, we seek to provide our readers with basic information and let them decide for themselves.

The DREAM Act
S. 1245

Section 505 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IRRIRA) discouraged states from providing in-state tuition and other higher education benefits to undocumented immigrants. An undocumented immigrant student who attended a U.S. high school would be ineligible for in-state college tuition because of their immigration status. In 2001, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) filed the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act to repeal Section 505 of IRRIRA (8 U.S.C. 1623). The 107th Congress concluded in 2002 without considering S.1291, which received bipartisan support.

In 2003, Senator Hatch reintroduced the DREAM Act. The bill—now numbered S.1245—again proposes the repeal of Section 505 of IRRIRA. If passed, S.1545 would permit qualifying undocumented students to apply for conditional permanent resident status, thereby making them eligible for in-state tuition. Students of good moral character who came to the United States prior to the age of 16 and five years before the passage of S.1545 would qualify for up to a six-year conditional permanent resident status. Students would acquire eligibility to apply for the conditional status upon graduation from high school, receipt of a general equivalency diploma, or acceptance to college. At the end of the conditional period, students could apply for permanent legal status if they complied with appropriate residency requirements, maintained good moral character, and completed at least two years in a bachelor of arts program or served in the U.S. Armed Forces for at least two years.

The bill awaits consideration in the U.S. Congress and—as of this printing—has the bipartisan support of 42 senators. To read the specific language of the legislation and check its status in Congress, go to http://thomas.loc.gov/ and type the bill number in the search engine.

Temporary Worker Program

On 7 January 2004, President Bush proposed a temporary worker program granting legal status to millions of undocumented workers in the United States. According to the White House, the program would pair workers with U.S. employers for jobs that Americans do not fill. Currently employed undocumented workers in the United States would receive legal status as temporary workers that would last three years and would be renewable, but not permanent. The legal sta-
tus would also apply to those in foreign countries who wish to participate and have been offered employment in the United States.

Participants would receive a temporary worker card allowing them to travel back and forth between the United States and their native countries. Participants must follow the program’s rules and abide by U.S. law; otherwise, they would be forced to return to their native countries. After their temporary visas expire, workers would be required to return to their home countries. The president has emphasized that the program does not amount to amnesty for undocumented immigrants and says that participants would receive no preference in applying for permanent residency.

The president’s proposal also included a number of other immigration reforms, including an increase in the number of green cards available and a reexamination of citizenship testing requirements. He will work with the Congress in the hopes of making the temporary worker program and his other immigration proposals a reality. To find out more about the president’s specific proposals, visit http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-1.html.
On the Web: HJHP’s Picks for the Year’s Best

HJHP Editorial Committee

United States Census Bureau—Hispanic Population of the United States

http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic.html

In step with this year’s HJHP theme, Strength in Numbers, the editorial staff selects the U.S. Census Bureau’s Hispanic Population of the United States. With facts and figures from the 1990 and 2000 Census, Current Population Survey data from 1994 to the present, and estimates and projections, the Census Bureau’s Hispanic Population is an easy-to-reference Web site rife with information.

League of United Latin American Citizens

http://www.lulac.org/

The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) regularly lists policy issues of interest to Latinos. With a listing of policy issues, press releases, and events around the country, LULAC keeps visitors updated on legislation, judicial appointments, and Hispanic influence in media and business.

Latino Vote.com

http://www.latinovote.com/

In light of the 2004 presidential election, the editorial staff selects LatinoVote.com as a resource for political news reports of interest to the Hispanic community. A small grassroots effort results in a plethora of information that allows visitors to review and comment about the news on the site.

National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials

http://www.naleo.org

An organization with increasing influence in elections is the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials. The organization’s Education Fund provides training to elected and appointed Hispanic officials and conducts research on issues of interest to the Hispanic community. NALIEO cites its commitment to develop programs “that promote the integration of Latino immigrants into American society [and] develop future leaders among Latino youth.” The simple Web site provides contact information for anyone wanting to learn more.
Back Issues of the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy

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Call for Papers

The Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy (HJHP) accepts unsolicited articles year round and is currently accepting submissions for Volume 17, to be published in June 2005. Submission deadline is 1 November 2004.

HJHP is an annual, non-partisan scholarly review published by graduate students at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. HJHP’s mission is to educate and provide leadership that improves the quality of public policies affecting the Latino community. In so doing, HJHP hopes to further the economic, social, and political empowerment of Latinos.

HJHP is interested in manuscripts that emphasize the relationship between policymaking and the political, social, and economic environments affecting Latinos in the United States. Topics that will remain important for some time are:
- Political participation of the Latino community in local, state and national elections
- Health care reform debates and policy decisions (finance, quality standard, et cetera)
- Economic security and welfare policies and programs
- The changing demographic of the United States driven by the growth of the Latino population

Submission Guidelines

To be eligible for the editorial review, an article must satisfy the following requirements:
- Articles must be original and unpublished
- Articles should be 15-25 double-spaced pages
- Articles should be formatted in any version of Microsoft Word
- Citations should be formatted according to the author-date guidelines in the Chicago Manual of Style

HJHP also accepts commentaries of 750-1,000 words on relevant and current issues affecting the Latino community.

In addition, HJHP requests that all authors submit the following:
- a cover letter with the author’s name, address, daytime phone number, email address, and a brief biography
- five hard copies of the article
- a copy of the article on 3.5” IBM disk
- a 100-word abstract

Authors are required to cooperate with editing and fact checking.

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The Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy is a non-partisan, scholarly review dedicated to publishing interdisciplinary work on policymaking and politics affecting the Latino community in the United States. Its mission is to educate and provide leadership that improves the quality of public policies affecting the Latino community with the intention of furthering the community’s economic, social, and political empowerment.