Furthering Prosperity: The Impact of Latinos on the United States

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Across the Spectrum: Latino Leadership in the U.S. Senate
  Senator Ken Salazar (D-Colorado)
  Interviewed by Milagros “Mimi” Aledo, Rafael J. López and Liz Montoya
  Senator Mel Martinez (R-Florida)
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Educational Training and Diversity for Better Business
  Jovita Carranza, Vice President of Air Operations/WorldPort Manager, UPS
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Shades of Belonging: Latinos and Racial Identity
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Health Coverage for Immigrants
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Editor’s Remarks

The Latino influence on the United States is evident. With popular culture embracing Latin music and more Latin American restaurants opening their doors across the country, it is easy to mistakenly limit the Latino influence to music and food. From the infusion of Latin vernacular into the English language to America’s history, the Latino community continues to impress its indelible mark on the United States. Recognizing that the influence existed in the days of America’s westward expansion into the Southwest to today’s influx of immigrants from Latin American countries, many view the growing Latino population as a Hispanic opportunity—rather than a Hispanic challenge—that will add even more to the American culture.

Latinos have ascended the ranks of leadership in politics, nonprofits, business, the military and academia. Those positions of power, however, did not come without a struggle; Hispanics fought—and continue to struggle—for civil rights alongside other minority groups, challenging institutions that failed to provide them with equal opportunity. Raul Yzaguirre, former president of the National Council of La Raza, characterized the Latino struggle by saying, “I believe that we seek power to help this nation fulfill its destiny to live up to its ideals and to go beyond the sometimes narrow definition of what it means to be an American.”

This seventeenth edition of the *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy*, “Furthering Prosperity: The Impact of Latinos on the United States” seeks to examine the Latino influence in different sectors and different geographic settings. Through articles, commentaries, book reviews and interviews, we provide insight and analysis on America’s growing Latino influence as well as the impact of public policy on the Latino community. We hope this edition serves as a resource for assessing the Latino community’s progress “to help this nation fulfill its destiny... and to go beyond the sometimes narrow definition of what it means to be American.”

This edition’s interviews feature influential Hispanics in government and business. Continuing last year’s interview format, we speak with a prominent Democrat and Republican in “Across the Spectrum: Latino Leadership in the U.S.
Senate.” As the first Hispanics to serve in the U.S. Senate in over twenty-five years, Sen. Mel Martinez of Florida and Sen. Ken Salazar of Colorado provide their insights on Latino leadership. Connecticut State Representative Felipe Reinoso talks to us about the influence of small Latino groups in new communities. Finally, one of the country’s top business leaders, Jovita Carranza, shares her business world experience.

We continue with articles that examine three areas of importance in assessing the Latino impact on the United States. In “Latinos as Foreign Policy Actors: Myth or Reality?” by Dr. Rodolfo de la Garza and Jeronimo Cortina review Latino perceptions of their home countries and counter a common argument that Latinos favor their countries of origin over the United States. Sonya M. Tafoya’s piece for the Pew Hispanic Center examines how Latinos identify themselves racially. Finally, Dr. Lisa García Bedolla evaluates the development of social capital in the Latino community to increase political engagement.

This volume also features three commentaries that analyze specific public policy issues involving the Latino community. Dr. Manuel Orozco explains the use of remittances by Latino immigrants to hometown associations. Dr. Aída Hurtado and Dr. Craig Haney evaluate the concept of merit in education in “Achieving Educational Equity: Beyond Individual Measures of Merit.” A report from The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation outlines issues pertaining to immigrants and health care.

Our journal finally reviews three recently published books dealing specifically with the Hispanic community. First, Jordana Barton and Dr. Lisa Montoya review George I. Monsivais’s *Hispanic Immigrant Identity: Political Allegiance vs. Cultural Preference*. Monsivais explores the political and cultural views of immigrants toward their home countries and how it impacts their experiences in their adopted country. Second, Miguel Santana and his daughter Brigitte review *Legacies of Brown: Multiracial Equity in American Education*. Brigitte Santana recounts her own classroom experiences as she and her father evaluate the collection of essays and articles on the effects of Brown vs. Board of Education. Finally, Frankie Cruz reviews *Boricuas in Gotham: Puerto Ricans in the Making of*
Modern New York City, which chronicles the impact of the Puerto Rican community on America’s largest city.

This volume contains pieces on a wide array of issues impacting the diverse Latino communities nationwide and highlights how Latinos continue to engage the American cultural landscape in search of their American dream. The journal draws on the talents of authors, interviewer subjects, reviewers and staff members, each possessing a rich collection of interests, cultural backgrounds and geographical origins. The diversity of the journal’s content reflects the very diversity in the Latino community that makes it difficult to define us.

I would like to thank our managing editor, Julio Cortez, for his dedication to this volume. Julio and I extend our thanks to all the senior editors, editorial staff, business staff and publisher for their dedication and passion. Through their work, we further our mission to educate and provide leadership that improves the quality of public policies affecting Latinos. Most importantly, we would like to thank you, the reader. We hope that this edition contributes to the discussion and debates involving the impact of the Latino community on our country.

Adrian J. Rodríguez
Editor-in-Chief
First published in 1970, Aztlán publishes high-quality, original research relevant to or informed by the Chicano experience. This interdisciplinary, refereed journal is published semi-annually in 200-300 page issues and edited by Chon A. Noriega, UCLA professor and influential Latino leader. While the journal has a focus on scholarly essays in the humanities, social sciences, and arts, it also publishes thematic clusters of shorter articles in its dossier section, an artist’s communiqué, and a review section.

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Ken Salazar was elected to the United States Senate in November 2004 as Colorado’s thirty-fifth U.S. senator, making history as one of the few Mexican Americans to serve in the United States Senate.

Prior to the Senate, Salazar served as the thirty-sixth attorney general of Colorado for six years. He has served as chief legal counsel to the governor, executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, and chairman of the Rio Grande Compact Commission.

Salazar is a fifth-generation Coloradan born on 2 March 1955 and is one of eight brothers and sisters. He and his family have been farmers and ranchers in the San Luis Valley.

He attended St. Francis Seminary, graduated from Centauri High School in Conejos County in 1973, and received a political science degree from Colorado College in 1977 and his law degree in 1981 from the University of Michigan. Salazar also received honorary doctorates of law from Colorado College in 1993 and the University of Denver in 1999.

Salazar has been a farmer and rancher in the San Luis Valley, natural resources lawyer, and small business owner much of his life. He and his wife have owned radio stations in Pueblo and Denver, and own and operate a Dairy Queen in Westminster, Colo. He also practiced water, environmental, and public lands law for eleven years in the private sector.

The senator currently serves on the Senate Committees on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry; Energy and Natural Resources; and Veterans Affairs.

Senator Salazar and his wife, Hope, have two teenage daughters, Melinda and Andrea. Ken’s older brother, John Salazar, was elected to the United States Congress in November 2004 from Colorado’s third congressional district.

Milagros “Mimi” Aledo and Rafael J. López, senior editors of HJHP, and Liz Montoya interviewed Sen. Ken Salazar on 17 February 2005. Ms. Aledo, a native of Florida, recently spent a year serving as an AmeriCorps volunteer in Lafayette, Colo. She will receive a master in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 2006. Mr. López, a native of Watsonville, Calif., most recently served as an elected council member of the Watsonville City Council and was the founding executive director of First 5 Santa Cruz County. Ms. Montoya, a native of Santa Fe, N.M., most recently served as a special assistant to President William Jefferson Clinton in the Office of Presidential Personnel. Mr. López and Ms. Montoya will both receive a master in public administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 2005.
Thank you so much for agreeing to be interviewed by the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy. We know how busy you are as a new senator and are honored to include you in this year’s Journal. Sen. Salazar, what motivated you to run for the United States Senate, and what are your three top priorities during your first term?

Salazar

I ran for U.S. Senate because Colorado deserves a U.S. senator who will always fight for all of [its citizens]. My entire life I have had a saying that the joy is in the journey—I truly find joy in working towards solutions that make life better for people. I grew up poor, one of eight siblings, in a rural agricultural community in southern Colorado. My parents worked hard to ensure that all of us received a college education. I understand the hopes, dreams and needs of all the people of Colorado. Being a U.S. senator presents a tremendous opportunity to continue that journey and build upon the progress of past generations.

First, above all else, my number one priority is to always put the interests of the people of Colorado first, above partisan or any other interests. As senator, I want to prioritize what I think is our number one domestic issue—homeland security. I want to shine a spotlight on the forgotten America—our rural communities—because for a long time now they have been left to wither on the vine while other, more populous areas get needed attention. Finally, I think we need to take steps to address what I feel is the real crisis in America today, our health care system, and begin to ease that crushing burden.

Education remains a central issue for Latinos across the country, yet access to high-quality schools, at every level, remains a challenge for most communities. What role do you anticipate playing as the newly elected senator from Colorado?

Salazar

I think education is a keystone to opportunity for all of us. In my own family, my parents never had an opportunity to get a college degree, in part because of the economic circumstances and limitations of those days in the 1930s and ’40s and ’50s. In contrast, all eight of their children became first-generation college graduates. We all became first-generation college graduates because my parents strongly believed in education, and they knew that if their children were educated, they would have an asset with them that nobody could ever take away. We grew up in a place that was very isolated and very poor, in southern Colorado…south of Denver, ten miles north of New Mexico. We had no electricity, we had no light, no telephone or television in our home as we were growing up. But I often remember sitting around the table with a kerosene lamp and many of my siblings, doing our homework at night. And my father would tell us all in Spanish, “No tenemos ranchos grandes para dejarles . . . pero quiero que reciban una buena educación porque nadie se la puede quitar . . . su educación es su herencia . . . .”

[Translation: We don’t have large ranches to leave you . . . but I want you to receive a good education because no one can take that away from you . . . your education is your inheritance . . . ]
I think [education] is a key cornerstone issue for our future as Latinos in America. We need to have a lot of champions of good education for our children. I think we need to look at it as an education that starts earlier than it probably does for most children right now. I think early childhood education is incredibly important.

Secondly, in the K-12 arena, we need to do more to help recruit quality teachers into the classrooms. Teachers are the keystone of good schools, and we need to be able to pay our teachers in a way that’s commensurate with the responsibility that they are entrusted with. So we need to invest more in the physical infrastructure of our schools, including the school buildings themselves and computer technology.

Finally, getting out of high school isn’t enough. If you don’t get your college degree, you’re always going to be limited in life. And so I think that we need to make sure there is access to higher education for all Americans, and for Latinos. For me and for those of my generation, we think back to our parents—they were smarter and worked harder. Yet they were never able to go to college because they didn’t have the economic means to go. So we talk about Pell Grants and Perkins programs and other kinds of programs to make higher education accessible to all. It’s incredibly important that we maintain a sense of urgency with respect to those opportunities.

**HJHP**

What opportunities do you see for reaching across the aisle and collaborating with Senate Republicans on this issue, particularly with Sen. Mel Martinez from Florida?

**Salazar**

I have not talked to Sen. Martinez specifically about education. I have a good relationship with him. We have had numerous conversations since we first got to Washington a few weeks ago. And I look forward to working with him on issues that are of common concern, and certainly education has got to be one of the issues that he cares about a lot for the children in Florida.

**HJHP**

Along the same lines of education, Sens. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) introduced the *DREAM Act*. The *DREAM Act* would give young undocumented students who have lived in the United States for most of their lives, stayed out of trouble and graduated high school the chance to go to college. If and when the *DREAM Act* is reintroduced in the 109th Congress, do you anticipate supporting this piece of legislation?

**Salazar**

Yes. I have seen and known many young people who have been here in this country for a long time and who are undocumented because their parents were undocumented and came here illegally. I don’t think it does our society any good to keep these young people from having an opportunity to receive an education. I think it actually creates more problems because what we end up doing is we don’t maximize the potential of students and forfeit their opportunity to succeed. So I would join Sen. Durbin and Sen. Hatch in supporting the *DREAM Act*. 
Along the lines of immigration, President Bush is proposing an immigrant worker program that many have compared to the Bracero Program of the 1960s. What impact will such reforms have on our national economy, as well as on the Latino community?

You know, the President’s temporary guest worker program is what he has put on the table as a piece of what he wants to do with immigration reform. I think there are lots of other ideas out there, and I think we need to wait to see how those other ideas are actually put on the table. The president’s own initiative on the guest worker program has already been met with significant political opposition from Republicans in the House of Representatives. My colleague from Colorado, Tom Tancredo, is one of those people who is highly critical of the president’s own initiative. Despite these criticisms, there are other pieces of the immigration puzzle that will have to be worked on in this year’s Congress. For instance, we need to ensure that our borders are secure, and we need to reduce the immigration backlog, so that families who have played by the rules do not have to wait years to be reunited with their families.

For my part, I have joined with Republican Sen. Larry Craig (R-Idaho), as well as Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.), a Democrat, in putting forth a legislative proposal called the AgJOBS Act. This legislation would allow hardworking farm workers who come into this country to work in jobs that Americans workers do not want to be here on a legal status. And then, if they were here over a period of time, they would have an opportunity to gain a permanent residency. I am also cosponsoring another piece of legislation that would increase the number of H-2B visas for small businesses who are struggling to stay afloat find workers to fill seasonal jobs. Those bills are supported by a whole host of groups—not only Hispanic groups, but also the business community—because they understand the importance of having a quality workforce in this country.

This next question has to do with the role Latinos played in the 2004 presidential election. There’s been significant debate among advocacy groups and within the Democratic and Republican parties about the percentage of Latinos that voted for President Bush. Regardless of the exact percentage, in the end, the Republicans were able to capture a larger percentage of Latinos than ever before in the history of presidential elections. What kind of impact do you believe this is going to have on the Democratic Party, which has traditionally looked at Latinos as a base within the Democratic Party?

I think it should be something of concern to the Democratic Party. I also think that the Democratic Party is a party that stands up for fairness and equal opportunity, and that’s why I’m very proud to be a Democrat. I think that for most of us from the Latino community who understand that the American dream comes through the creation of opportunity, the Democratic Party frankly delivers a lot more on those issues than does the Republican Party.
I still don’t know exactly what happened in the 2004 election. I know that in my own state, the numbers—there was a huge voter turnout among Hispanics in Colorado. They voted in very significant numbers to support my candidacy for the U.S. Senate, and they also voted in very large percentages for John Kerry for president. I don’t know how verifiable the statistics from other parts of the country are, but in my own state I think John Kerry was well received by Hispanics.

**HJHP**

There’s been a lot of debate over “red state” and “blue state” values, which has ultimately avoided the more fundamental discussion of what is really happening with the American voter. Some argue that “purple America,” or the union of red and blue America, is the future of American politics. Do the values that Latinos represent speak to this new America?

**Salazar**

I think they do. In my own view, I think my own campaign didn’t shy away from faith. I believe strongly in God, country, family and community. Those are major values that I represent, and they are values that the Hispanic community in general embraces. I expect that’s how we’ll see the messages of both political parties unfold in the future.

In my own frank sense of what the Republican Party has done, they have created fictions to have the Hispanic community believe that the Republican Party is on their side. And yet when you go down issue by issue, I don’t think that they have been there for the Hispanic community. They have not been there on education. They have not been there on health care.

Even the current debate on Social Security, I think, is going to have a huge impact on Latinos. I think it’s offensive to the values we hold dear and cherish within all of our communities. But I think particularly in the Latino community, we are a community that strongly believes in family and helping others. In my days as attorney general, one of my highest priorities was protecting the elderly. I had a summit with hundreds of people and published a report based on discussions that came out of that summit titled “Respecting Our Elders”—*respeto* in Spanish. I feel that what’s happening with Social Security in today’s current climate is offensive to the very fundamental values of our country and of the Hispanic community.

**HJHP**

Most political analysis of race and ethnicity in American politics involves a Black/White dichotomy that treats populations of color as homogenous groups. Where do Latinos fit in this political analysis? Are Latinos a solution to this puzzle, a way to expand the conversation?

**Salazar**

I think Latinos have been a part of this country for a long time, and in most cases, our struggles are tied to those of the African American community. As a nation, we cannot ignore the unique history of this group of Americans. We had to fight a war to end the terrible injustice and mistreatment of these individuals as less than human. We had to wait another one hundred years for African Americans
to be truly afforded equal rights and protections under the law, and in practice we are still grappling with this.

However, when political scientists and historians examine our country’s political landscape, they cannot ignore Latinos and other groups, like Asian Americans and Native Americans, who are also active participants in our political process. More and more, I see academics, politicians and journalists examining these issues. Your journal is a part of this group who is helping to expand and increase the discussion, and I commend you for your work.

**HJHP**

The theme of this year’s *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* is “Furthering Prosperity: The Impact of Latinos on the United States.” How would you characterize the status of Latinos in the United States? What impact have Latinos had in shaping national policy?

**Salazar**

I believe the Latino community has always had a significant role to play in furthering the prosperity of this country. If you look to the great cities of our country—New York, Los Angeles, Chicago—Latinos were instrumental in building up all of these communities. My own family has a long history in the Southwest—we helped found the city of Santa Fe, N.M. And when we settled in Colorado, we became a part of the community and continue to farm the land and contribute to the local economy.

However, when I reflect on the status of Latinos in the United States, I am both proud of our history and the progress we have made and mindful of obstacles and challenges we have yet to overcome. More and more Latinos are attending college today, yet we still have the highest dropout rate. Latinos live longer than any other group of Americans, yet we are less likely to be insured and more likely to depend on Social Security as our sole source of income in our retirement years. Thousands of Latinos are serving our country in Iraq and Afghanistan, but when they return home, they may not receive the quality health care and full benefits they should receive.

I think Latinos have and will continue to help determine the course our country takes. They will do so by participating in our electoral process, starting their own businesses and choosing to become active in public life. But we need to provide them with the tools to succeed—we need to make sure that all children have a quality education, access to high-quality health care. I also believe that if we wish for Latinos to be a part of shaping public policy, we need to mentor our youth and expose them to the highest levels of government. In my own Senate office, I have hired Latinos and others that represent the diversity of our state. I believe they are our future public leaders and hope that when other senators or public officials see the diversity of my office, they will actively work to hire and promote a diverse staff.

**HJHP**

Thank you so very much for your time, Senator.
Across the Spectrum: 
Latino Leadership in the U.S. Senate 

A Life of Public Service 

*Interview with U.S. Senator Mel Martinez (R-Florida)* 

Officially sworn in on 4 January 2005 as the thirty-third senator of the state of Florida, Mel Martinez made history when he assumed his role as the first Cuban American U.S. senator.

Prior to the Senate, Martinez served President George W. Bush in his Cabinet as the nation’s twelfth Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary. After serving three years as the HUD secretary, Martinez returned to Florida in 2004 to seek the Republican nomination for the United States Senate.

Prior to serving President Bush in Washington, D.C., Senator Martinez was the first popularly elected Republican to serve as Orange County Chairman.

Senator Martinez was born in Sagua la Grande, Cuba, on 23 October 1946. At the age of fifteen, Martinez came to Florida from his native Cuba as a part of Operation Peter Pan, a humanitarian program led by the Catholic church that helped over fourteen thousand Cuban children escape communist Cuba.

Martinez graduated from Bishop Moore High School in Orlando and went to Florida State University in Tallahassee where he earned his undergraduate and law degrees. Upon graduating from law school, Martinez returned to Orlando and went to work with a law firm.

The senator currently serves on the Senate Committees on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; Energy and Natural Resources; and Foreign Relations; and the Special Committee on Aging.

Senator Martinez and his wife of thirty-four years, Kitty, have three children: Lauren Shea, John, and Andrew. Lauren, 27, and her husband, Tim Shea, live in Jacksonville with their two children, Jack and Kaley; John, 23, is a law school student at Florida State University in Tallahassee; and Andrew, 11, resides in Orlando with his parents.

Milagros “Mimi” Aledo and Rafael J. López, senior editors of HJHP, interviewed Sen. Mel Martinez on 18 February 2005. Ms. Aledo, a native of Florida, recently spent a year serving as an AmeriCorp volunteer in Lafayette, Colo. She will receive a master in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 2006. Mr. López, a native of Watsonville, Calif., most recently served as an elected council member of the Watsonville City Council and was the founding executive director of First 5 Santa Cruz County. He will receive a master in public administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 2005.

HJHP 

Thank you so much for agreeing to be interviewed by the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy. We know how busy you are as a new senator and are honored to
include you in this year’s journal. Sen. Martinez, what motivated you to run for the United States Senate?

Martinez
My motivation is rooted in my life story, my desire to give back to people who were so dear and helpful to me in my life when I immigrated here, and giving back to this country. Running for the Senate is an extension of that. It’s a great place in which I have now an opportunity to do for the nation, to do for others. I am very, very thrilled to have that possibility now come to be a reality.

HJHP
Education remains a central issue for Latinos across the country, yet access to high-quality schools, at every level, remains a challenge for most communities. What role do you anticipate playing as the newly elected senator from Florida?

Martinez
First of all, I think the key to success is education. I am distressed by the high dropout rate among Hispanic children in our country. I think that it is something that has got to be curtailed, that we have to do something to reduce it. I believe that education is the key to opportunity, to a better life and a better future. Without a doubt we have to work across party lines. We have to work with Democrats and Republicans, particularly on something like education. As you know, President Bush, I think partnered with Sen. Kennedy (D-Mass.) on the education bill that was passed about three years ago, the No Child Left Behind Act. And while people might criticize [the act’s] implementation, it was a good step forward. It was a step towards accountability, and it was a good thing that they both worked together to [achieve] that.

HJHP
What opportunities do you see for reaching across the aisle and collaborating with Senate Democrats on this issue, particularly with Sen. Salazar from Colorado?

Martinez
I look forward to working with Sen. Salazar. Not only on something like the education bill, but on a whole host of issues. I find him to be a wonderful person, a good friend, and someone that I know I can work with.

HJHP
Along the same lines of education, Sens. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) introduced the DREAM Act. The DREAM Act would give young undocumented students who have lived in the United States for most of their lives, stayed out of trouble, and graduated high school the chance to go to college. If and when the DREAM Act is reintroduced in the 109th Congress, do you anticipate supporting this piece of legislation?

Martinez
I’m very empathetic towards giving opportunity to children who have lived in this country all of their lives . . . to reach their dreams and not be held back in any
way. I think it’s good for our country to provide an opportunity, a vehicle, an avenue for education to children who can make a contribution. And I think also a vehicle for citizenship and legalization ought to be available to them. So I’m not familiar with all the nuances of the DREAM Act, but I think the general principles of what it’s trying to do, I think are a good thing.

**HJHP**

Along the lines of immigration, President Bush is proposing an immigrant worker program that many have compared to the Bracero Program of the 1960s. What impact will such reforms have on our national economy, as well as on the Latino community?

**Martinez**

I think it’s going to have a tremendous impact, a very positive impact, because it would allow people to work in a legal way. On top of the table, not under the table, you know. I think there would be a tremendous opportunity for better wages as well as for benefits that today may be denied to many people in these situations. I think it also would allow for families to be able to see each other. People would be able to travel back and forth across the border, take things, and bring money to their families – without having to do it in the surreptitious ways of border crossings. I think just that alone would be such a positive thing. I think it would be a great thing for the Hispanic community of America.

**HJHP**

This next question has to do with the role Latinos played in the 2004 presidential election. There’s been significant debate among advocacy groups and within the Democratic and Republican parties about the percentage of Latinos that voted for President Bush. Regardless of the exact percentage, in the end, the Republicans were able to capture a larger percentage of Latinos than ever before in the history of presidential elections. What is your perspective on the role Latinos played in electing George W. Bush?

**Martinez**

I think it’s undeniable they played a huge role. And I think that, paint it as you might wish, the fact is that the increase in Republican support from Latinos was pretty dramatic and I think frankly will be ongoing and growing. I know that President Bush has great support from Hispanics in Florida, and I think it was a crucial factor in his comfortable margins of victory here. I know that I would not be in the United States Senate today had it not been for the huge support that I received in the community. I was not only greatly supported by Cuban Americans but by other Hispanics. Many crossed party lines to vote for me. So I think that both President Bush and myself received great support.

**HJHP**

As a last question, a follow-up, many people argue that you in fact were the key individual in Florida to help bring Latinos to the polls who ultimately helped President Bush. That, in fact, you were the star of the ticket. What’s your take on that perspective?
Martinez

Well, we drew people to the polls that had never voted before. The turnout was immense in Hispanic precincts throughout Florida, and I got in the high eightieth percentile of those voters. The president dropped off a little bit, but he still got in the sixtieth percentiles for many of those precincts. So I think it was a tremendous boost to his election, and without a doubt it was a factor in my being elected, the fact that he also helped me in the panhandle and other parts of the state. So I think he and I worked together to promote very large turnouts in different sectors of the state. But I think, without a doubt, Hispanic turnout was higher because I was on the ticket.

HJHP

Thank you so very much for your time, Senator.
Educational Training and Diversity for Better Business

Interview with Jovita Carranza, Vice President of Air Operations/World Port Manager at UPS

Jovita Carranza was named vice president of UPS Air Operations in April 2003. She is responsible for Worldport, UPS’s package processing facility and international air hub located in Louisville, Ky. Today, Carranza is the highest-ranking Hispanic female executive at UPS, a $33 billion business that is the world’s largest package-delivery company. Hispanic Business magazine named Jovita Carranza the 2004 Woman of the Year for her business success and service to the Hispanic community.

Carranza grew up in Chicago in a first-generation immigrant Mexican American family. She studied political science at California State University and earned both bachelor and master degrees in business administration from the University of Miami. When Carranza joined UPS in 1976, she started as a part-time, night-shift hub clerk in Los Angeles. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Carranza relocated to Texas, Illinois, Florida and Wisconsin for progressive promotions. In 1991, she received her first package operations position. In 1999, Carranza began her international UPS work as the Americas region district manager. A year later, she became president of operations of Latin America and the Caribbean.

While at UPS, Carranza has been actively involved in fund-raising activities for the UPS Foundation’s grant program. She has worked with several nonprofits, including the United Way, Boys Scouts of America, Habitat for Humanity, YMCA and Junior Achievement. Carranza also serves on the boards of the National Center for Family Literacy, the National Council of La Raza and the Library Foundation of Louisville, Ky.

Founded in 1907, UPS has grown into a $30 billion company that transports goods across the world. Publications have rated UPS as one of the fifty best companies for minorities.

Aimeé V. Wilczynski, senior editor of HJHP, interviewed Jovita Carranza on 8 February 2005. Ms. Wilczynski, a native of Chicago, works in the field of education policy. She will receive a master in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 2005.

HJHP

Before we start, I just want to say good morning and thank you for agreeing to be interviewed by the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy. We’re looking forward to having you included as one of our journal’s first business interviews.

You have worked in many different areas of UPS and achieved progressive positions in operations, moving from a hub clerk position in 1976 to your current position as VP of UPS air operations. That makes you the highest-ranking Hispanic female executive at UPS. How did you achieve such rapid progression? To what do you attribute your success?
Carranza

Well, I don’t consider twenty-eight years really rapid. When you look back, you wonder where those years have gone. Time goes by so fast. To your point, holding others and myself accountable for our work, results and contributions [leads to] success.

Also, I attribute my success to hard work, solid experience and surrounding myself with very capable individuals. We consider ourselves a team. We always commit to raising the bar by embracing change and [being] continuously attracted to challenges.

HJHP

What achievement are you proudest of in your career?

Carranza

They’re numerous. But in contemplating your question, it’s been both gratifying and rewarding to have the responsibility of developing our future leaders of UPS. Also, being instrumental in perpetuating the UPS legacy of always striving for excellent service.

What that does is to transcend into your personal practice. As we create an environment where people are motivated to achieve and are inspired to perpetuate the UPS legacy, [being] very productive is also quite rewarding.

HJHP

What do you mean by developing new leaders?

Carranza

Let me start out with saying future supervisors, managers and division managers. Someone took interest in my development early on. I can’t help but perpetuate those same practices that made me successful. That is, you’ve assisted in an employee’s training, given them access to policies and practices, general company information, an environment of inclusion, recognized and rewarded accomplishments. So by practicing these methods of acknowledging a person’s valuable contribution to the organization, it inspires them to achieve higher levels. As a result of that, they acquire greater areas of responsibility.

HJHP

In there any turning point in your career that stands out?

Carranza

In thinking about my past, I tend to think, “What was the most inspiring moment for me while working for UPS?” And it was when I was offered a supervisor position. I graduated to working in a role where I would make a significant impact in the company. I went from just working within a small group to actually leading work teams.

HJHP

I’m interested in knowing, what first brought you to work at UPS?

Carranza
Initially it was one of survival. I was a twenty-six-year-old single mother attending college. I had to find ways to make ends meet. So my objective was to find employment compatible to my immediate needs.

**HJHP**

You have been praised for your career success and your determination, drive and innovation in many publications. In these publications, you’ve mentioned momentum as a factor contributing to your success. What do you mean by “momentum,” and how do you maintain it?

**Carranza**

The last part is an interesting question. I’ll start out by stating that as I continue on with my career at UPS, momentum has continuously gained traction. I gained [momentum] from the energy, inspiration and motivation of each success.

You go from having a desire to succeed to a more meaningful and explicit desire to excel. And once you have the momentum, you keep going. And I’m going to compare it to an athlete who is continuously improving his or her track record. [An athlete] just keeps going and plugging away, no matter how many times [she is] knocked down. [She keeps] striving for that next level of perfection. Really that’s what has driven me.

**HJHP**

You grew up in a first-generation Mexican immigrant household. Has your background provided any possible advantages or disadvantages in your career?

**Carranza**

I would say my background has aided in my career success, not because I’m Hispanic but because I’ve had enriching character-building experiences. I didn’t speak English until the first grade. I was fortunate to grow up in a diverse neighborhood where I had to find ways to overcome the language barriers.

I was raised to respect other cultures and differences growing up in an inner-city community. The early experiences I had were ones of adjustments and accommodation.

**HJHP**

In addition to achieving career success, you have also worked with several nonprofit organizations and served on a number of boards, including the National Center for Family Literacy, the National Council of La Raza and the Library Foundation of Louisville, Kentucky. What have you gained from working with these organizations? What has been the most meaningful to you?
Carranza
My work with nonprofits is motivated by a strong desire to give back to the community. When I worked part time at UPS, I volunteered in an inner-city school that my daughter attended. It was a way for me to affect young lives, to guide and develop the next generation and to give back to the community.

I’ve had the opportunity, as you mentioned, to work with a number of nonprofit agencies. As my career has advanced, I’ve been asked to take leadership roles in groups whose missions align closely with UPS and my personal objectives. Participating in these nonprofit agencies has developed my experience with committees while also [allowing me to meet] more of our consumer base in the communities.

HJHP
UPS has been recognized as one of the best fifty companies for minorities by Fortune magazine for six consecutive years and as a top-ten company for Latinos in 2004 by Diversity Inc. magazine. Moreover, Hispanic Magazine has recognized UPS for its recruitment program that promotes diversity and provides opportunities to Hispanics. How has UPS achieved diversity?

Carranza
Before being assigned to operations, I actually worked in human resources for approximately nine years. We drew our workforce from the local communities, local universities, junior colleges and many of the high schools.

Our workforce is representative of the demographics of our communities where we typically operate. Our customers and our vendors are diverse, and so are the companies that we have recently acquired in the United States and off-shore.

You know, diversity, having a multitude of cultures, opinions, specializations and traditions make good business sense. Our diverse workforce will be able to more readily relate to our consumer base and the community that we help.

We also want to be considered [the] employer of choice. So based on the rankings that you’ve just shared with us, we’re striving to be considered the employer of choice.

HJHP
UPS has also been widely recognized for its employee training and education programs. I believe there is a training center in Louisville, Kentucky. How does UPS’s commitment to providing educational opportunities help UPS succeed?

Carranza
I’m tangible evidence of the numerous internal workshops, seminars and training sessions that UPS has afforded me. So from the day that you are employed, you are experiencing some form of training with UPS, whether it’s your first thirty-day training, whether it’s your part-time supervisory training [or your] full-time managerial training. Throughout my twenty-eight years of history, I have developed in employee relations, financial models and logistics exposure. That’s just to name a few of the ones I have personally experienced.

UPS’s progressive basic management trainings, which are the ones that I just referred to, prepare our management team to handle employee relations and the
dynamics that go beyond just production levels. It’s more than just being efficient. Training and education, [especially] continued education, is a valuable proposition for UPS. We also offer what we call internal tuition reimbursement, so that people can continue their education outside of UPS. So that will give them a competitive edge or upward mobility opportunities.

I want to refer to some of the education programs in Louisville. We have the School-to-Work program, the Earn and Learn program, and a program called Metro College where we [partner] with the local government. Our Metro College model is being touted in other states. We have had visitors from other states come in and assess the model to see if it would be applicable for their local communities. Since not every one of our employees will be interested in staying with UPS, there are partnerships being developed locally with other companies, so they could work in their field of study. So that particular employer will partner [with Metro College] and support their education, like a rebate of some sort.

HJHP
We are interested in hearing your advice to Hispanics and women in business. In your opinion, are there barriers to Hispanic and female participation in the higher ranks of corporate America? And if so, what are the top barriers?

Carranza
One of the barriers, if you want to use that term, is that we don’t typically as Hispanic women seek out successful Hispanics, regardless of gender, to serve as mentors. We don’t attract and we don’t refer to successful Hispanics. It’s possibly more widespread today than in the past.

Another point I’d like to make is, for Hispanic women to get beyond using the word “barrier” and develop early in their educational experience as well as work experience a risk-taking attitude, to minimize the fear of hurdles, obstacles, unfamiliar ground. As you know, the Hispanic ethnicity is well-grounded in tradition [while] corporate America moves very fast. It’s not conventional. Therefore, Hispanic women must anticipate that type of work environment and prepare for it. Our success as Hispanic women depends on how well we deal with issues that appear to be barriers.

HJHP
If not “barriers,” what term would you use?

Carranza
Opportunities, challenges. I’m not a total optimist. I’m just sharing with you what twenty-eight years of work experience, motherhood and continued education has taught me.

HJHP
In your opinion, how can obstacles be reduced in corporate America?

Carranza
I’ll give you an example of what United Parcel Service has as part of their business model. We as employees take advantage of employer programs, on-site training and educational programs. The UPS business model offers invitations to
seminars and conferences. And so that exposure reinforces or expands what is being learned at the work site. So UPS, like many other companies, externally supports educational activities to further enlighten their workforce, their leaders.

Another method that UPS [implements] to overcome some of these obstacles and stereotypes is [having] a diversity steering council that’s co-chaired by our senior vice president of human resources, Lea Soupata. She reviews company policies on equal employment opportunities and recommends ways to foster diversity throughout the company year-round.

**HJHP**

According to the 2000 Census, Hispanics are now the largest minority group in the United States. In your opinion, how can U.S. Hispanics exert influence in the business world?

**Carranza**

We need to leverage the education that’s being acquired by Hispanics. We also need to leverage the political position that Hispanics have acquired. And in the business sector, we should set the example by continuously taking advantage of the opportunities availed by corporate America and excelling in every opportunity that’s awarded to us.

So we should demonstrate leadership and a high level of integrity. We should embrace change. And we should lead change and capitalize on the trust that corporate America has placed on the Hispanic employee.

When you have a position like the position that I have, and the position that you have, there’s a lot of trust and confidence placed on overall output. One should be consistent in their performance.

Once you have been able to excel in a particular position of leadership, don’t ever compromise it. And attract other very capable Hispanics or any other diverse group, any other person. Don’t demonstrate biases or preferences in your role as the leader. That’s the impact that you can make in business, by setting an example.

**HJHP**

Lastly, I would like to talk about Louisville, Kentucky. Hispanics are no longer just arriving at large urban cities, but also to new gateway cities. From 1990 to 2000, the Hispanic population of Louisville, Kentucky, where UPS Air Operations is based, grew 171 percent. Despite this growth, Hispanics only constitute 2 percent of Louisville’s population. In your opinion, how has the Hispanic population affected the economy and culture of Louisville?

**Carranza**

Let’s see. I’m living in a community where there aren’t as many Hispanics, but the individuals that I have observed in the community are those that are building the infrastructure of Louisville. So that is a really impressive sight.

The Hispanic population will no doubt become more integral to Louisville’s economy in terms of the labor force, which I just mentioned, and labor force productivity. They will become a significant, sizeable labor force. They will also make a significant contribution to the tax structure of Louisville and support government services.
As a by-product of their labor, they also become a viable consumer. And as a service provider, we definitely would be interested in shipping their consumed goods. Obviously the growth in Louisville has given us a wider pool of potential job applicants. They are seeking the education programs that UPS offers as well as the government programs that are available to them.

HJHP
Thank you for your time.
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Political Dynamics of Small Latino Groups in New Places

Interview with Felipe Reinoso
Connecticut State Representative, 130th District (D-Bridgeport)

Felipe Reinoso is presently serving his third term in the Connecticut State Legislature. He serves as vice chair of the Education Committee and is also a member of the Finance Revenue and Bonding Committee and Labor and Public Employees Committee. Reinoso was born in Peru and immigrated to Connecticut in 1969. He is a graduate of Sacred Heart University and Fairfield University. Reinoso is the principal and co-founder of Bridge Academy, a charter school serving high school students in Bridgeport, Conn. It provides a college preparatory curriculum designed to overcome challenges in the inner city and to foster a sense of community and self-respect. As a legislator, he has introduced many bills in support of education.

He has contributed as a volunteer or board member to several organizations: Community Responding to Others in Poverty, American Red Cross, Habitat for Humanity and the United Way. President Bill Clinton presented the President’s Service Award, the highest honor for volunteerism, to Felipe Reinoso in 1999. Currently, Reinoso also serves on the board of directors of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR).

Hillmer H. Reyes, HJHP staff member, interviewed Felipe Reinoso on 24 January 2005. Mr. Reyes, a native of Peru, most recently worked at the technology consulting firm Accenture. He will receive a master in public administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 2005.

HJHP
When did you first come to Connecticut?

Reinoso
I came to Connecticut [from Peru] because the University of Bridgeport had a very interesting program for exchange students, for international students. And my parents knew a family, a Peruvian family, the only Peruvian family in town, actually, in those days in ’69. So I came as an exchange student to America. I came to Bridgeport, and I [have] never moved from Bridgeport.

HJHP
You were recently re-elected to the Connecticut Legislature. How did you first become involved in politics?

Reinoso
When I was very young I was introduced to community service. My mother was very active in Peru. She was involved in pursuing affordable housing for low-income families. And I attended several meetings with my mother when I was eleven [and] twelve years old.
But I was also very lucky to have excellent high school teachers. They [helped] us high school students understand that getting involved was the best way to help our communities, rather than talking and making arguments or just going to meetings. The most important thing was to do something.

When I came to this country, obviously the first two or three years were very difficult for me. In the early ’70s, I started getting involved. First, I got involved with the Puerto Rican Democratic Club in Bridgeport. After that I started working for former councilman America Santiago, who later became a state representative. I was his campaign manager for four terms. I helped candidates from city council to mayors, even at the [U.S.] senatorial level, [volunteering] and learning.

In 1995, the opportunity came, and I ran. And unfortunately I lost the election by eight votes. But understanding the causes and understanding that it was very close, I knew that the community was probably ready for something new, understanding that I’m not a typical Latino running for office. Most of the time, [we have] Puerto Ricans in this area, African Americans or Caucasians.

So I ran again in 2000, and that’s when I won the election.

Reinoso

Before I respond to that question, I have to say that I was welcomed by the Puerto Rican community. I have excellent, good friends because this has been my community for the last thirty-four years. And also the closest allies that I’ve had in my campaign were Puerto Ricans. So I am very grateful to them.

From my perspective as a minority of minorities, being Peruvian American, it is very difficult. But my involvement in the community for many years—in programs, teaching initiatives in the city—led to having some type of name recognition. Also I think my [message] had to be very clear, very community oriented, because I was being observed closely by the leadership.

I challenged the Democratic Party, and I challenged the established [players]. I remember vividly when I approached the leadership in the city, they told me, “This is not your time, probably in a few years. Just wait for your time.” Those were the excuses. But I expressed my intention clearly, and I was very strong in my statements, and I decided to run. They didn’t expect me to win, but since I [had been] the campaign manager for a state rep and worked for many, many campaigns, I knew the community well, especially my district. It’s a district that I walked over maybe six, seven times. So I knew very well the people, the business community, and all the institutions of faith in the district.

But there is another aspect of this experience. As an educator, I organized community forums and activities for youth, especially leadership training for the youth. And this was one of my statements to the kids: “In order to move forward you have to sacrifice a little bit, [and] you have to also put all your efforts into being sincere. If I really want to, I can accomplish [this].”

And I’m hoping that I’m leaving a legacy to Latinos—regardless, it could be Dominican, Peruvian, Puerto Rican, Cuban, anyone. It is possible: working hard,
trying to maintain a good record, being honest with people and having a good understanding of what you want. You can accomplish it. And I’m hoping that I’m leaving this legacy for the future leaders.

HJHP

How difficult is it to engage recent immigrants? What are some of the related issues?

Reinoso

Well, it is difficult. One of the issues is bilingual education. Being bilingual should be a plus, and it shouldn’t be denied in this country. So I defend bilingual education strongly.

Another issue is the new undocumented community [that is] arriving to our shores. I don’t accept and I don’t use the word “illegal.” I think we should always say that they are undocumented, in the process of becoming legal, because that is the reality. The great majority are honest, hard-working individuals who are coming to work and contribute to the prosperity of, in this particular [case], Connecticut.

This particular year, I’m proposing two bills. One of them is very similar to the DREAM Act in Washington. We have a bill here that I proposed in order to help children of immigrants [attend] college and be able to apply for grants [and] scholarships and, if they have to, pay in-state tuition. So for those children of immigrants who are undocumented, I’m hoping that they will be able to continue their aspirations to higher education.

Another bill that I’m proposing for immigrants is the trial licenses or some type of ID for those individuals who are undocumented. It is very appropriate for them to have an ID, [for example, if] they need to drive and take their kids, husbands or wives to school, to work, to the doctor or for any emergencies. We need to provide these services and recognize that these people are here and they’re not going home. They’re going to stay, and they need those services. Not providing those services, we are probably forcing them to—because one way or the other they will have to drive—go against the law. And that is something we should avoid.

So those are the two initiatives that I have on the table, and I’m working very hard with other groups on these endeavors.

HJHP

Speaking of the DREAM Act, why do you think it’s having such a hard time at the federal level? Can it help address the problem of insufficient skilled labor in the country?

Reinoso

I think we have a number of members of the House in Washington that are in favor. [But] we don’t have the numbers now, at this moment, to pass the DREAM Act.

[The opposition] wants the students who are born overseas to be at the age of thirteen or fourteen, for them to be able to apply. But my problem, and the problem of some legislators in Washington, is that if you’re sixteen or seventeen, you should be able to apply as well.
I do have my experiences with students that are arriving from Central and South America, or the Caribbean. They’re arriving to Connecticut at the age of sixteen, seventeen. Some of them are ready to come in for the last year of high school. They’re seniors and think they’re ready to go to college. Many of these kids who come with strong family values and also understand the value of education are finishing high school in the upper levels of their [graduating class]. And it is sad to see these kids not be able to continue their education at the end. The country needs the workforce, a good strong workforce, well educated. So let’s provide these kids the opportunity.

**HJHP**

You’re the co-founder of the Bridge Academy, a charter school in Bridgeport. How important are charter schools for education in general and to Bridgeport in particular? How can the issues that public schools have a tough time dealing with be addressed?

**Reinoso**

Charter schools started in 1992 in Minnesota. In Connecticut, in 1997, twelve charter schools were given charters to open. In the case of our charter school, [we] avoided the red tape and the bureaucracy that is typical. We develop our own curriculum. We have the option to hire our [own] staff. We have control of our budget. I’m one of the co-founders and also the principal of the school. We decided from day one that all teachers [and administrators] would get the same wages. There’s no difference between administrator and teacher. We get the same amount of money.

We decided to allocate the monies to the programs for the kids. That is the major difference. At Bridge Academy, we decided to have no more than sixteen students per class, stating that more interpersonal contact with the students would help our kids [since] some of them come from disadvantaged families where there is only one parent at home.

In many classes, we have a teacher and a teacher’s assistant. If the teacher is absent because he’s extremely ill or is attending a professional development day or activity that forces him or her to be out of the class, we still have the teaching assistant in class. So we have a continuity—we don’t have substitutes that show up from time to time, not at all. That is the decision we made in this school.

The dropout rate in this school is only 1 percent. We don’t drop a student. We transfer [a student] if the family insists. Ninety percent of the kids here are accepted to different colleges.

**HJHP**

Turning to immigration, the new trend is for new Latinos to settle in smaller cities. What roles do established national organizations play versus grassroots efforts in organizing these communities and getting them involved in the political process?

**Reinoso**

I think both groups have responsibilities. The organizations that are already in place, like the National Puerto Rican Coalition or National Council of La Raza,
are extremely important organizations. They advocate at the national level, and they also breed the leadership for training in advocacy. They’re doing an excellent job.

But also at the grassroots, we have to get involved. I dislike the idea of having little islands, little groups, rather than trying to integrate the Latino community. It’s not an easy task, but I’m starting to see groups moving in that direction.

When I came to Bridgeport, Connecticut, in the early ’70s, I requested to be accepted as a member in the Puerto Rican Democratic Club. And they did. So it is the initiative of the individual and also the responsibility of groups to attract and accept the new immigrants that are arriving.

In my view, an immigrant who came to this country twenty years ago, forty years ago, or came last week, has the same rights. We should provide the opportunity and the benefits and never forget where we’re from.

I’d really like to see the integration of the Latino community because we have a responsibility to the next generation. In Connecticut, we get together a group of Latinos called Juntos. [It] is a political action committee and an organization trying to attract and bring the Latino leadership into the group. At Juntos, we have a variety of different groups coming to learn about issues, and we’re also trying to develop a leadership academy [that] will probably graduate twenty-five to thirty students [and] leaders that will probably run for office or consider being active.

**HJHP**

Given the dynamics of new immigrants, what are the political prospects for Latino politicians and policy makers in Connecticut?

**Reinoso**

At this point we have, at the state level, six state representatives. That does not reflect the Latino population in the state of Connecticut. We are 10 percent of the population in the state. We are supposed to be at least fifteen state representatives, [but] we only have six. So we have a long way to go. In the senate, we don’t have any representation, so it is very unfortunate. I’m hoping [that] in the near future, we can elect a senator.

In different communities, we have for the first time city council members of Latino origin. We [also] have the honor to have a mayor for the first time in Connecticut—Mayor Perez in Hartford. He is also part of Juntos.

I see two things in the near future. One is voter registration of Latinos. We’re going to see a good number of new citizens, new voters, and I’m hoping that they will be very vocal and elect their representatives at the local level and state level, maybe at the national level. The other one is the redistricting that takes place every ten years. The next one is going to be in 2010. We have to start getting ready for that particular moment. All the groups of interest should start getting together to be ready to fight and start working on how we’re going to change the lines in different districts to provide the opportunity for Latinos or minorities to run for office [and] hopefully be elected.
You now serve on the board of directors of the National Council of La Raza. How did you become involved with the organization, and how has this experience been?

Reinoso

The National Council of La Raza, as you know, is one of the leading Latino organizations in the country. I’ve been attending their conferences for at least fourteen years, and I’m very active with the advocacy and lobbying they do to address issues in Washington. It’s a unique experience.

I was asked to join the board a year ago. It was an honor to be nominated and then elected to the board. I respect the work of NCLR, in particular Raul Yzaguirre, whose record is impeccable in terms of civil rights and always looks for possibilities for the Latino community to move forward.

You are involved in a great number of things. What keeps you motivated to keep going?

Reinoso

I’m blessed to have good health. But also I have a conviction. I try to motivate myself. I reflect on the things that I’m doing and the purpose of why I’m doing them. There are three things that I have always considered. One is the access that we should have to the decision making. The other one is equity, not only equity for Latinos. I don’t join any board if I don’t see women in those boards in good numbers. In some cases, I ask if there is any representation of seniors or youth. So equity, access and obviously the other element that I always keep in mind is justice. Those are the three elements that help me reinvigorate my energy. But I also play soccer on Tuesdays, when time permits, with the old guys.

What are your plans for the future?

Reinoso

I’m enjoying the office in which I am now. I’m one of the senior Latino legislators at this point. This is my third term. So I’m very pleased, and I’m hoping that I will accomplish the deals and initiatives that I propose. I’d like to maybe go over for one more term and then reconsider or carefully see if there are other options.

There are some interesting proposals that from time to time come to my desk. And a couple of them come from D.C. But I don’t see them being possible at this moment. They are very interesting options, and I will consider them probably in the next two years.
Latinos as Foreign Policy Actors: Myth or Reality?

Rodolfo de la Garza, Ph.D., and Jeronimo Cortina

Rodolfo de la Garza, Ph.D., is a professor of political science at Columbia University. Dr. de la Garza combines interests in political behavior and public policy. In political behavior he specializes in ethnic politics, with particular emphasis on Latino public opinion and electoral involvement. His primary interests in public policy include immigration and immigrant settlement and incorporation. He has edited, co-edited and co-authored numerous books including Sending Money Home: Hispanic Remittances and Community Development; Latinos and U. S. Foreign Policy: Lobbying for the Homeland?; Bridging the Border: Transforming Mexico-U. S. Relations; At the Crossroads: Mexican and U. S. Immigration Policy; Awash in the Mainstream: Latinos and the 1996 Elections; Ethnic Ironies: Latinos and the 1992 Elections; Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics; Barrio Ballots: Latinos and the 1990 Elections; and The Chicano Political Experience. He has also published in leading professional journals such as the American Journal of Political Science, Latin American Research Review, Social Science Quarterly and International Migration Review. Dr. de la Garza conducts research on policy issues affecting the Latino community for the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute and previously taught at the University of Texas at Austin. In 1991–92, Dr. de la Garza was a visiting professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. In 1998, Dr. de la Garza was named one of the one hundred most influential Hispanics by HISPANIC Magazine. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Arizona.

Jeronimo Cortina is a political science Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University. He previously earned a master in public policy from Columbia University’s School of Public Affairs and International Relations. His current publications include work on measuring the impact of remittances on economic development in Mexico and El Salvador, Latino political mobilization and Latinos as swing voters.

Abstract

There are increasing claims regarding the attachments that Latin American immigrants have to their home countries and their potential roles as lobbyists for their countries of origin. These claims are not based on systematic analyses of immigrant perspectives and behavior but reflect instead the rhetoric and aspirations of home country and immigrant leaders. The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which such claims reflect immigrant attitudes and behavior. Specifically, it will draw on surveys of Latin American immigrants that examine how they view home country issues, their levels of involvement in activities related to home countries and the strength of their attachments to U.S. institutions and society. This paper will pay particular attention to attitudes and behaviors directly linked to politics as distinct from those tied to cultural and social realms.
Introduction

What is the role that immigrants play as foreign policy actors in the United States? Since the early 1990s, there has been a widespread fear that immigrants may become effective advocates for policies favoring their countries of origin over U.S. interests. Particularly, and given the rapid increase of the Latino population, this debate has been colored by simplistic assumptions and conspiratorial images regarding Latino loyalties toward their home countries. The purpose of this paper is to measure Latino involvement in U.S. and home-country politics. Our analysis is based on the results of two surveys conducted by the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute in 2002 and 2003.

The paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, we review the literature on this issue to explicate both sides of the argument. In the second, we analyze the extent to which Latinos engage in U.S. politics and home-country politics paying particular attention to the extent to which Latinos are incorporated into mainstream American political life. The third part of the paper is related to the connections that immigrants have with their home countries at the individual and national level.

We will locate our analysis within three major approaches to international relations, the pluralist, the institutionalist and the transnationalist. The pluralist approach (Jervis 1976; Moravcsik 1997) argues that to understand the relationship between the domestic and international level we should look at the social structures that compose states in order to depict the type of “societies” that exist within a state’s territorial boundaries. In this view members of society with similar concerns form interest groups to influence foreign policy. In turn, policy makers incorporate interest groups preferences into foreign policy decisions. Foreign policy thus reflects societal rather than elite preferences. This argument challenges Marxist claims that foreign policy, like other policies, reflects the interest of capital rather than of society.

The institutionalist approach (Krasner 1978; Katzenstein 1978) argues that what matters most is the way in which states as institutions are built. That is, it is the characteristics or institutional features of states, which are autonomous from society, that explain how they behave at the international level. Following this logic, if the institutional characteristics of a state allow interactions between interest groups and policy makers, then the former could influence the latter in the construction of foreign policy (Milner 1997).

Neither the pluralist nor institutionalist perspectives has incorporated contemporary views in which Latinos not only constitute a domestic interest group but an international or home-country interest group. The transnationalist approach, which incorporates this view, suggests that Latinos may engage in the foreign policy debate as lobbyists for their countries of origin due to their individual and collective attachments. The logic of this perspective is that Latinos may be interested in the politics of their home countries and in U.S. foreign policy towards them (Glazer & Moynihan 1975; Rothenberg 1978; Rendon 1981; de la Garza et al. 1997).
In sum, the pluralist, institutionalist and transnationalist perspectives acknowledge the impact that Latinos as a domestic interest group may have on domestic and foreign politics. Unlike the pluralist and institutionalist approaches, the transnationalist approach does acknowledge that Latinos may also constitute a home-country lobby pursuing favorable U.S. foreign policies toward their home countries. In these cases, however, the claim requires that Latinos are well organized to influence foreign policy toward their home countries.

**Latinos as Foreign Policy Actors**

The debate regarding the role that immigrants play as U.S. foreign policy actors is centered on the extent to which they support core American values such as democracy, economic self-reliance and freedom of speech, as well as the nature of their ties to their countries of origin. Schlesinger (1992) argues that increased immigration has fueled the development of multiculturalism, which hinders the Americanization of Latino immigrants and therefore poses a threat to national unity. Americanization in this context is defined as the assimilation of American political values and ideals.

Similarly, Weiner (1995) argues that high levels of unwanted immigration will destabilize the political system within industrial democracies and therefore increase the probabilities of security crises. Huntington (1996) further argues that Latinos as immigrants “continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, costume and cultures of their home societies” creating “trans-state cultural communities” that do not share and support the American ideology (Huntington 1996, 304–305). Huntington also contends that in times of crises such as major future wars, the nation will not be able to count on Latino support because Latinos will not share the same values. In our view, arguments like these are essentially chauvinistic and rhetorical because they rely on a definition of the “national interest” that is so amorphous and subjective that any behavior that does not comply with Huntington et al.’s characterization may be defined as undermining the “national interest.”

de la Garza, Falcon and Garcia (1996) and Dowley and Silver (2000) challenge these arguments by showing that even though immigrants tend to create and maintain “trans-state cultural communities,” there is no evidence that these undermine immigrant support for American core values or that this transnational phenomenon leads Latino immigrants to be alienated from the American polity. As these authors have shown, Latino immigrants do not function as home-country lobbyists (de la Garza and Pachon 2000) and Latino foreign policy priorities resemble those of the U.S. government, i.e., promoting free trade and strengthening democratic values and practices in the Americas. Domínguez (2005) further argues that the reason that Latinos are not actively advancing home-country issues is that they “may not form a moral community” with their home countries, i.e., they differ regarding political values and policy preferences. In other words, Latinos are focused on issues affecting their daily lives in the United States, such as the economy, unemployment, housing and educational issues (de la Garza and Cortina 2003; Domínguez 2005) rather than home-country problems.
The transnational literature claims that Latino immigrants will refuse to join the American mainstream and will instead remain loyal to their home countries. In short, it argues that Latino immigrants will not follow the historical paths of full socio-cultural, economic and political incorporation of earlier immigrants. Although institutions like political machines, labor unions and the Catholic Church that incorporated immigrants between about 1880 and 1940 either no longer exist or have substantially evolved (Sterne 2001), new social, cultural, economic and political vehicles now play these incorporating roles. These new vehicles are schools, the mass media, programs focusing on immigrant naturalization and teaching English, parent-teacher associations and initiatives promoting political activities such as registering, voting, canvassing, wearing campaign buttons and writing letters to elected officials. How effectively are these and related types of activities promoting Latino political incorporation? This is the question to which we now turn. Specifically, we will gauge Latino immigrant incorporation by determining their political attachments to their home countries and to the United States through an analysis of political interests and participation.

The 2002 Survey of Immigrant Political and Civic Activities indicates that although an overwhelming majority of Latino immigrants are equally concerned about public affairs in their home country and in the United States, more than twice as many are primarily concerned with public affairs in the United States. More noteworthy is the fact that Latino immigrants feel more politically efficacious in the United States than in their respective home countries. Overall, 59 percent of the survey respondents felt that they had more influence in U.S. local governments than in home-country local governments, and 58 percent agreed that their influence in the U.S. national government was greater than the influence they could exert over their home country’s national government. “The perceived lack of political influence in combination with a lack of interest in the home country’s public affairs per se could lead to low participation in activities that are related to their home countries” (de la Garza and Cortina 2003), such as lobbying for foreign policies that would benefit their home countries over U.S. interests.

Moreover, as Table 1 shows, a vast majority of Latino immigrants rarely or never participate in cultural activities, such as promoting home-country national culture through culinary, dance and folklore festivals and art expositions, or home-country-oriented political activities, such as getting together to discuss politics of the home country, voting in home country elections or contributing money to political campaigns in the home country.

It is also important to highlight that immigrant participation in U.S. affairs is constrained by citizenship status. Only U.S. citizens may vote, while non-U.S. citizens may participate in all other types of political activities. This helps explain why a vast majority of Latino legal residents are interested in U.S. politics, but only a small proportion actively participate in political activities.

When comparing Figure 1 with the second column of Table 1, we can see that Latino political participation both in the home country and in the United States is
very low. This may reflect the lack of socialization of immigrants into being politically active as well as the impact of a wide range of social and economic factors\(^4\) that influence political participation such as education, Americanization, unionization and discriminatory experiences that are positively correlated with political participation among immigrants. As individuals move up from one level of education to the next, the likelihood of participating in U.S. political activities increases. Similarly, as immigrants become more Americanized, which we measure in terms of years living in the United States, they are more likely to participate in U.S. political activities (de la Garza and Cortina 2003). Experiences with discrimination also stimulate U.S. political participation. Moreover, and contrary to what transnationalist theorists and anti-immigrant advocates claim, participation in cultural and political home-country-related activities stimulates involvement in U.S. political activities rather than damps it. This does not mean, however, that these activities favor home-country interests over the United States, as we will note subsequently in this paper. These findings are similar to those by de la Garza and Pachon (2000) and de la Garza and Hazan (2003) that indicate that immigrant participation in these behaviors targets U.S. domestic policies rather than U.S. foreign policies toward home countries and, more significantly for our purposes, do not reflect immigrant efforts to advance the agenda of the home country.

Overall, the evidence presented so far suggests that there is no empirical support for the claim that Latinos refuse to join U.S. society or engage in lobbying for policies that would favor their countries of origin over U.S. interests. To the contrary, only very few immigrants are solely involved with cultural and political activities of the home country, a pattern that is surely conducive to their engaging in American society.

**Transnationalism**

Although immigrant transnational ties were evident in the last wave of immigration (1880s–1914) to the United States (Morawska 2001), the advent of new communication technologies and the ease of transportation has simplified and intensified the interaction between immigrants and their home countries. According to transnational theorists, these linkages between immigrants and their home countries contribute to slow immigrant incorporation while helping immigrants retain their home-country ties (Sassen 1996). This claim has been challenged by DeSipio et al. (2003), who show that on average, Latino immigrants were more likely to participate in activities that were related to the United States than in activities that promoted transnational ties. One way by which we can gauge the impact of Latino immigrant political participation and assess if Latinos could become effective advocates for policies favoring their countries of origin over U.S. interests is by analyzing Latino home-country attachments.

Here we use remittances as a proxy variable for multiple types of behavior to indicate how attached Latino immigrants are to their home-country communities. Remittances are selected because they have grown dramatically in the past decades, because they are essential to those left behind, because they reflect both
familial and community-level ties with home country and because they are considered important by home countries from which immigrants come.

The distinction between familial and community or collective remittances is crucial to our analysis. Familial remittances refer to those monies sent to family or friends for basic consumption, capital investment or other purposes that target the individuals who are the primary beneficiaries. Money sent for these purposes is not intended to contribute to the benefit of society per se though it does by alleviating extreme poverty and helping family members acquire a variety of social benefits, such as private medical attention. The second category targets community- or collective-level activities that include sending money for public works, economic development projects and improvement of social services, such as paying for improved water supplies or medical clinics. These types of remittances are explicit indicators of transnational political ties.

When Latino immigrants contribute to community projects in their home countries, they are making investments linked to home-country internal politics and policies. Thus, we expect that Latino immigrants who send funds for collective purposes to be more likely than those who do not make collective investments to try to influence U.S. policy toward their home country. Our hypothesis, then, is that immigrants who send collective remittances are more likely to be politically active in the United States (i.e., as lobbyists) and the home country. We use data from the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute 2003 Immigrant Remitting Behavior Survey to test this claim. Although respondents could send familial and collective remittances, a great majority send only familial remittances. Of these, 67 percent sent money home to contribute with expenses related to food and basic consumption, almost 12 percent sent money for education and health, and the remaining sent money for diverse purposes such as paying debts, buying land, paying for events, expanding or starting a business, buying a car, saving money and making home improvements. The rest did not know how the money they sent was primarily spent.

When we correlate sending familial remittances with participating in U.S. activities such as contributing money to a candidate, going to political rallies, voting in an election or even wearing a campaign button, we found that 98 percent of Latino immigrants who sent familial remittances did not actively participate in such activities. Clearly, as a group, Latino immigrants who send familial remittances are not engaging American politics in an attempt to shape U.S. foreign policy in ways that will serve their specific purposes.

We also found that approximately one-third of Latino immigrants sent money for both familial and collective projects. As stated previously we expect those Latino immigrants who invest in their home countries via collective remittances to be more engaged with U.S. political activities that will enhance the chances of having an impact regarding foreign policies that would benefit their countries of origin. The logic of this proposition is that they have more at stake in their home countries than those who remit for family purposes exclusively and therefore have more interest in U.S. policies toward their home countries than those who do not engage in these activities. However, 97 percent of the respondents who sent money
home for both familial and collective projects did not actively participate in U.S. politics.

Immigrant active political participation in the United States is clearly not shaped by home-country concerns. Moreover, those who remit to support home-country issues such as economic development are not politically active in the United States. This suggests that transnational ties do not result in immigrants engaging U.S. politics to advance home-country ties. This may be because, as Table 2 shows, Latino immigrants have different policy preferences in the United States than in their home countries. For instance, national security and education are issues that are salient only in the United States, and political corruption significantly decreased in salience as a policy concern in the United States in comparison with the saliency in their home countries.

With the evidence presented so far, can we argue that Latino immigrants “continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, costume and cultures of their home societies” or that Latinos are becoming effective advocates of policies favoring their communities of origin over U.S. interests? The answers to both questions is no. First, “transnational communities” are primarily based at the familial rather than at the political level, and this link does not hinder U.S. political participation or immigrant incorporation into the polity. Second, the very small number who form a political connection with their home countries are slightly more likely to participate in U.S. political activities. However, rather than seek to advance the agendas of their home countries, our analysis shows that even these Latino immigrants are primarily concerned with U.S. domestic policy issues, which are different from those policy issues that they had before they came to live permanently in the United States.

**Conclusion**

In this paper we have shown that there is no empirical evidence that Latino immigrants are actively involved in home-country affairs or that they are becoming advocates favoring their home countries over the United States. First, the literature reviewed shows that Latinos are not interested in engaging in foreign policy issues regarding their home countries simply because they are more concerned with familial issues rather than problems affecting their home countries as a whole. These relationships are based on individual rather than political ties. Consequently, Latinos do not continuously invest in the home country. Instead, their remittances are used for basic consumption. This helps explain why they are not motivated to become advocates for policies that may favor their home countries over U.S. interests. Second, Latino policy concerns are centered upon economic, health and educational issues, which are issues that affect them in their daily lives in the United States.

We would note, however, that given the U.S. institutional scaffolding, Latino participation in the foreign policy-making process is possible. One way to realize it is by forming organizations like the Israel lobby, by which they could influence foreign policy makers. To date no institutions have been developed to play that role.
To summarize, we have analyzed if Latinos are engaged with their home countries to the extent that they could be effective advocates for policies that would favor their home countries over U.S. interests. We have engaged this debate both theoretically and empirically. International relations literature gives us a theoretical framework by which we can analyze this phenomenon. The pluralist approach would not expect Latinos to be involved in the foreign policy-making process because their interests are not organized in interest groups capable of influencing decision makers. Moreover, given the fact that Latino interests are centered in U.S. domestic issues, they are not very likely to engage in foreign policy making because of a lack of organization and a lack of interest. The institutionalist approach predicts that all groups are allowed to participate in shaping policy makers’ decisions, but for Latinos this is a meaningless right because they cannot exercise it due to low levels of institutionalization (i.e., organization). The transnationalist perspective predicts that given Latino attachments to their countries of origin they would be motivated to participate in U.S. politics to advance their home-country interests over U.S. interests. The evidence presented in this paper shows that this is not the case simply because Latinos are not concerned with home-country issues per se. In addition, transnational communities or attachments to the home country are based and sustained at the familial rather than at the collective or community level.

The findings of this paper are important because they discredit unfounded and ideological arguments regarding Latino immigrant incorporation into mainstream American life. They strongly reject transnationalist arguments about the creation and maintenance of unincorporated Latino communities and also suggest that the theories regarding how any interest group engages foreign policy apply to Latino foreign policy involvement.

Endnotes

1 In this paper, we use the terms Latino and Hispanic interchangeably to refer to persons in the United States who can trace their ancestry to the Spanish-speaking regions of Latin America and the Caribbean.

2 The Tomás Rivera Policy Institute conducted interviews with a total of 1,602 Latino immigrants in the United States over a thirty-day period from 22 July to 28 August in 2002. Samples were drawn from four nationality groups: Mexicans, Dominicans, Salvadorians and Puerto Ricans, who although not immigrants because of the Jones Act, they experience similar process of political adaptation as other migrants do. The interviews were conducted via phone in the language of respondent’s choice—either English or Spanish.

3 The Tomás Rivera Policy Institute conducted interviews with a total of eight hundred Latino immigrants who remitted money in the United States over a thirty-day period from 4 November to 3 December in 2003. Samples were drawn from two nationality groups: Mexicans and Salvadorians. The interviews were conducted via phone in the language of respondent’s choice—either English or Spanish.
For a review of the literature regarding political socialization, electoral and non-electoral behavior and electoral engagement see Rodolfo de la Garza 2004.

Calculations available upon request.

References


Figure 1
U.S. Political Participation, Citizens and Legal Residents

Table 1
Cultural and Political Participation Related to Home Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Cultural Participation</th>
<th>Political Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2
Latino Immigrant U.S. and Home Country Policy Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Policy Issues In the U.S.</th>
<th>Policy Issues in U.S. Local Community</th>
<th>Policy Issues In Home Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Issues</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime and Drugs</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Corruption</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race Relations</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Values</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Immigration/Emigration</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Colonization</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Issues</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Actions</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Something Else</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tomás Rivera Policy Institute (TRPI), Survey of Immigrant Political and Civic Activities, 2002,
Resources and Civic Engagement: The Importance of Social Capital for Latino Political Incorporation

Lisa García Bedolla, Ph.D.

Lisa García Bedolla, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of political science and Chicano/Latino studies at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. in political science from Yale University and her B.A. in Latin American studies and comparative literature from the University of California, Berkeley. She is author of Fluid Borders: Latino Identity and Politics in Los Angeles, which is forthcoming from the University of California Press. She has also recently published articles in the Journal of Politics, Latino Studies and State Politics and Policy Quarterly. Her research focuses on the political incorporation of Latinos and other racial/ethnic groups in the United States, with a particular emphasis on issues of race, class and gender.

Abstract

With the publication of Robert Putnam’s book Bowling Alone, the decline of social capital in the United States and the need to find ways to address the decline have become regular topics within American political discourse. Yet what exactly these commentators mean by social capital and the degree to which Putnam’s model can be applied to marginal communities remain open to debate. Given that studies of political incorporation have found socioeconomic status to be the main factor driving political behavior, an examination of the positive role high levels of social capital can play in communities with low levels of socioeconomic status—like the Latino community—may help us find alternative routes to Latino civic engagement. A review of the social capital literature shows the importance of group identity and social networks to the development of Latino social capital and provides a framework to develop policy initiatives that could help foster an increase in Latino social capital and political engagement in the United States.

Introduction

Few social science concepts have achieved the popular attention and acclaim of the idea of social capital. With the publication of Robert Putnam’s (2001) book, Bowling Alone, the decline of social capital in the United States and the need to find ways to address the decline have become regular topics within American political discourse. Yet what exactly these commentators mean by social capital and the degree to which Putnam’s model can be applied to marginal communities remain open to debate (Hero 2003; Chávez and Fraga 2003). Given that studies of
political incorporation have found socioeconomic status to be the main factor driving political behavior, an examination of the positive role high levels of social capital can play in communities with low levels of socioeconomic status—like the Latino community—may help us find alternative routes to Latino civic engagement. This article examines the social capital literature with a specific focus on how it can, and cannot, be applied to the Latino political experience.

**Social Capital and Latino Participation**

To begin, it is important to consider what we know about the factors driving Latino political activity. While findings from studies looking at Latino participation rates have varied, a few results have been consistent: (1) socioeconomic status—education, occupation and income—explains much of the difference between Euro American and Latino participation rates; but (2) education and income seem to have different effects on participation for Latinos than they do for Euro Americans; and (3) after controlling for socioeconomic status and citizenship, a gap remains in terms of Latino participation in electoral and nonelectoral activities (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; García 1997; García, Falcón and de la Garza 1996; Wrinkle et al. 1996; Verba et al. 1993; Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Based on these studies, the assumption among scholars has been that we can expect no major changes in Latino participation rates until there is a significant improvement in community socioeconomic status (DeSipio 1996).

Yet enhancing Latino levels of social capital may be a way to increase Latino political engagement in the absence of significant changes in socioeconomic status. Putnam (2001) argues that there is a direct relationship between levels of community-level social capital—which he defines as people’s memberships in voluntary associations, newspaper readership, expressions of trust in authorities, etc.—and their political engagement. He believes decreases in these kinds of associational memberships since the 1960s go a long way towards explaining declining American electoral turnout and engagement. So, if Putnam is correct, increasing associational membership and other forms of social capital within groups and/or local communities could increase their political engagement.

However, critics of Putnam have pointed out that it is very difficult to determine causal direction within his model—does organizational membership lead to engagement, or does engagement lead to greater associational membership (Portes 1998)? In addition, Lin, Cook and Burt (2001, 12) point out the difficulty of determining whether social capital is an individual or collective good and argue that social capital is “rooted in social networks and social relations, and must be measured relative to its roots.” They go on to define social capital as an “investment in social relations by individuals through which they gain access to embedded resources to enhance expected returns of instrumental or expressive actions” (Lin et al. 2001, 17). While it is true that the causal mechanisms underlying social capital development are unclear and that drawing distinctions between individual and collective forms of social capital is difficult, I would argue that a
focus on the contextual nature of political communities is useful, particularly when considering the political socialization and engagement of marginal groups. The two areas that seem most critical are an individual’s development of a positive collective identity and the politicization of their social networks. I will address each in turn.

In terms of the role of collective identity, social psychologists looking at inter-group relations and group identity posit that human beings need to develop a positive group identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1986). For members of negatively stigmatized groups, establishing that positive attachment within the context of social stigma can be problematic. In order to have a positive collective identity, they have to find a way to create a more positive understanding of themselves and their group within their own social categorizations. Some scholars call this phenomenon the existence of a “group consciousness,” which has been found to have important effects on African American and Latino political participation (Stokes 2003; Leighley 2001). Studies of political engagement within marginal groups, particularly women of color, have supported this idea that positive group identity can be a source of internal social capital that facilitates political incorporation. Much work on the political experiences of women of color, particularly, has found that the women studied needed to develop a positive sense of personal and group identity before they developed a broader political consciousness (Naples 1991; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Pardo 1998; hooks 2000).

It is also important to note that, for members of racialized groups, the development of this collective identity occurs within a context marked by social stigma (Crocker, Major and Steele 1998). Link and Phelan (2001) and García Bedolla (forthcoming) show that members of racialized groups are highly aware of the negative attributions assigned to their group. This sense of a person’s relative power in society and levels of stigmatization affects how they perceive and interact with members of their own group and of other groups (Luhtanen and Crocker 1992; Crocker, Major and Steele 1998; Link and Phelan 2001). Thus, joining an ethnically based social organization requires a particular identification and understanding of one’s collective identity. Similarly, for a member of a racialized group to join a Euro American-dominated social organization also requires that they have a particular understanding of themselves and their group, vis-à-vis Euro Americans (Weigl and Reyes 2001). This is simply another way of saying that it is helpful if we see organizational memberships and social networks as being related to collective identity. So I would argue that this sense of positive identity is a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for the associational activity and membership of members of marginal groups (Sanders 2002).

This supposition is supported by studies of immigrant incorporation and adaptation that have found that the ability of immigrants to develop a positive group identity has positive effects on their adaptation, self-esteem and academic success. In their study of second generation Vietnamese youth in New Orleans, Zhou and Bankston (1994, 821) find that “strong positive immigrant cultural orientations can serve as a form of social capital that promotes value conformity and constructive forms of behavior, which provide otherwise disadvantaged children with an adaptive advantage.” They argue that this kind of individual-level social capital is
more important than human capital for the successful adaptation of younger-gener-  
gation immigrants. Similarly, Rubén Rumbaut (1994, 756) finds that how immigrant youth “think and feel about themselves is critically affected by the parents’ modes of ethnic socialization and by the strength of the attachment that the child feels to the parents and the parents national origins.” Finally, Matute-Bianchi (1986) finds that Mexican American youth with strong ethnic identification are more likely to be successful in school. So if Latino immigrants can feel positive attachments to their group, despite any negative attributions they may be aware of, that may help them to become better adapted in the United States.

So while Lin, Cook and Burt and other social capital theorists want to emphasize the collective aspects of social capital, these studies suggest that for marginal communities positive racial/group identification can be seen as an important source of individual social capital, which can serve as an individual as well as collective resource. This insight raises the larger point that it is important not to assume that findings from studies made up of largely Euro American respondents can be applied “whole cloth” to racialized groups. In Bowling Alone, Putnam bases his inferences on national-level statistical samples, which almost always over-represent Euro Americans and under-represent people of color. Yet he presents his findings as if they apply to all Americans. But recent work by Hero (2003) and Costa and Kahn (2003) suggests that high levels of social capital “possibly cause, possibly affect, or at least are associated with, certain types of [racial] inequality” (McClain 2003, 101). So “what might be positively related to social capital for whites may in fact be negatively related for blacks” or other racial groups (McClain 2003, 101).

So we should not assume that social capital functions in the same ways, and for the same reasons, among different racial groups. We also should not assume that all associational memberships have the same effect on political socialization and engagement, particularly for members of marginal groups. In his work, Putnam does not distinguish among associations—for him, membership in a union is the functional equivalent of membership in a bowling league. Yet studies within marginal communities have found that participation in neighborhood associations has a greater positive effect on participants’ sense of community and civic engagement than participation in other kinds of associations (Portney and Berry 1997; Small 2002). Similarly, a study of the effects of mobilization on Asian American electoral turnout found that get-out-the-vote contact was more effective in areas with a larger presence of Asian American social, political and cultural institutions, such as ethnic newspapers, social service organizations and Asian-centered political organizations (Wong 2003). This suggests that not all associations are “created equal” and that particular types of organizations can have greater positive effects on the political engagement of racialized groups than other types.

It is possible that these associational members have different effects on engagement because of the different impacts they have on of politicizing individuals’ social networks. The nature and function of individuals’ social networks, particularly the degree to which those networks engage in political discussions, have been found to have an important effect on their political engagement (Knoke 1990; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998). Both Knoke (1990) and Lake and Huckfeldt (1998)
find that the existence of political discussion and information sharing within social networks has significant positive effects on political activity and engagement. Of course, it is difficult to know whether politically interested individuals seek out networks that engage in political discussion or become more interested in politics because of the political discussion they are exposed to within their networks. At the very least, however, we can say that the presence of political discussion within social networks is a way of enhancing human capital, like socioeconomic status, “on the cheap” (Lake and Huckfeldt 1998, 581).

A look at recent studies of Latino political engagement shows the important roles that social identity and politicized social networks play in Latino political activity. Using a large-scale phone survey of Euro Americans, African Americans and Latinos in New York City, Marschall (2001) finds that social ties have a significant effect on Latino political participation and a more consistent effect than education. She defines social ties as attachments to neighborhood and religious institutions. For Latinos, length of residence in the neighborhood and church attendance were especially important. She concludes, “The real key to understanding political participation lies in the social and institutional context that shapes political engagement” (Marschall 2001, 244). Similarly, Hritzuk and Park (2000) find that what they call “social structural variables”—voting rates among the respondent’s social network, organizational affiliations, frequency of religious service attendance and mobilization—have an important effect independent of that of socioeconomic status. In fact, they find that the politicization of the respondent’s social network has the strongest contextual effect. They argue that “sociodemographic variables tell only an abridged version of the Latino participation story” and that “different means are required to draw Latinos into the political process since, due to their predominantly immigrant status, they tend to be less integrated into American society than are blacks” (Hritzuk and Park 2000, 162-164).

In California, studies of political attitudes and turnout using varied methodologies have had similar results. In her qualitative study of Mexican American community activists, Mary Pardo (1998) finds that their positive identities as mothers, their engagement in social networks at church and their previous political experiences combined to motivate Latina women to engage in politics. Similarly, in an in-depth study of Latino political attitudes in working class and middle class Latino areas of southern California, García Bedolla (forthcoming) finds that positive collective identity and the existence of Latino organizations, even if not explicitly political, have important effects on Latino feelings of political efficacy and nonelectoral political activity. Likewise, in her two experimental studies of the effects of door-to-door canvassing on Latino electoral turnout, Michelson (2003a; 2003b) finds that Latino-to-Latino contact has an especially significant effect when the canvasser and the voter share ethnicity and political partisanship. She finds this to be especially true in low-income Latino neighborhoods in Fresno (Michelson 2003b). Like Wong’s (2003) similar findings among Asian Americans, Michelson’s findings suggest that the effect of voter contact is shaped by the racial and social context of the particular Latino community being targeted. All these studies indicate that social capital and other contextual factors have important
effects on Latino political participation that are related to, yet separate from, the
effects of socioeconomic status.

But when considering the roles of group identity and social networks in the
political engagement of marginal groups, we should not forget the structural fac-
tors that affect both. I discuss above the importance of remembering that Latino
collective identity development occurs within a stigmatized context. In addition,
Latino social networks occur within a highly segregated U.S. society. As a result,
people’s social networks tend to be remarkably homogenous, especially in terms of
race (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). This has been found to be espe-
cially true of people’s conversation networks. A national probability sample found
only 8 percent of adults mention having a person of another race with whom they
“discuss important matters” (Marsden 1987, 123). Knoke (1990) argues that, as a
result, the “collectively shared thoughts and deeds of network members are power-
fully compelled toward uniformity by universal desires to conform to group norms
and to avoid social sanctions for deviant behavior.”

So it is reasonable to assume that Latino social networks are fairly homogenous
and that therefore it is unlikely that Latinos have the opportunity to engage in
racially heterogeneous social networks. As a result, the political attitudes and
interest expressed by other Latinos are likely to have important effects on Latino
political socialization and engagement. Recent studies of the political attitudes and
interest of Latino youth, however, raise concerns regarding the amount of political
discussion occurring within Latino family and social networks. In a recent nation-
al survey, Latino youth were less likely than Euro American or African American
youth to report discussing politics with their parents (López 2003). Latino youth
were also most likely to say that voting was difficult, were least trusting of gov-
ernment and expressed the least confidence in their ability to solve their
community’s problems (López 2003). These findings raise concerns about the kind
of political discussion and political socialization occurring within Latino family
and social networks. So recent studies of Latinos and other members of racialized
groups have indicated that contextual factors can have important effects on the
political engagement and mobilization of group members. But we should always
keep in mind that racialization, segregation and social stigma also play important
roles in the creation and maintenance of these forms of social capital.

Fostering Latino Engagement: Building Social Capital

The work on social capital in general, and studies looking at the relationship
between Latino political participation and social networks in particular, strongly
suggest that psychological and contextual social capital—which I define here as a
positive collective identity and politicized social networks—can have significant
positive effects on Latino political engagement that can counter the negative
impact of Latino low socioeconomic status (García Bedolla, forthcoming). Given
these findings, it is useful to take some time to consider what kinds of policy pre-
scriptions would help foster these two kinds of social capital within the Latino
community. I have two suggestions: (1) encourage the development of positive
group identities by decreasing stigma and increasing group members’ opportunities to encounter positive images of their group; and (2) enhance the political discussion within social networks by reconceptualizing how we teach civic engagement.

Create a Positive Group Identity

As we saw above, previous studies have shown that developing a positive collective identity is an important precursor to Latino political engagement (Hardy-Fanta 1993; Pardo 1998; García Bedolla forthcoming). These and other studies show that the development of this kind of affective attachment to a social group is related to experiences of negative stereotypes and social stigma (Link and Phelan 2001; Crocker, Major and Steele 1998; Tajfel and Turner 1979). So the most direct way to facilitate the development of a positive collective identity is to lessen the amount of stigma a group experiences. Currently, the most common approach to addressing stigma is to target one particular practice—employment practices, for example, by encouraging employers to hire members of stigmatized groups. The assumption is that this ongoing interaction among members of different groups will lead to a change of attitude and decrease of stigma. Unfortunately, this approach is doomed to fail because it ignores the fact that stigma is created and reinforced by a larger context that exists beyond the scope of a particular employment environment. That larger context serves to reinforce the negative attitudes of the dominant group, which eventually will erode any positive effects that arise from the change in hiring practices.

Because of this, Link and Phelan (2001) argue that any attempt to change stigma must be multi-faceted, multilevel and address the fundamental causes of stigma. They contend such an approach should be

- multifaceted to address the many mechanisms that can lead to disadvantaged outcomes . . . and multilevel to address issues of both individual and structural discrimination . . . , [and] it must either change the deeply held attitudes and beliefs of powerful groups that lead to labeling, stereotyping, setting apart, devaluing, and discriminating, or it must change circumstances so as to limit the power of such groups to make their cognitions the dominant ones (Link and Phelan 2001, 381).

So to adequately respond to stigma, we must choose interventions that “either produce fundamental changes in attitudes and beliefs or change the power relations that underlie the ability of the dominant group to act on their attitudes and beliefs” (Link and Phelan 2001, 381).

While working towards this long-term goal, there are some things that can be done in the short term to help make members of stigmatized groups feel more positive about their own groups. In his study of second-generation immigrant youth, Rumbaut (1994, 756) finds that “how these youths think and feel about themselves is critically affected by the parents’ modes of ethnic socialization and by the strength of the attachment that the child feels to the parents and to the parents’ national origin.” Similarly, García Bedolla (forthcoming) finds that those Latinos who had a strong grounding in their cultural history, either from their par-
ents, school or the local area at large, had a more positive social identity and also higher feelings of political efficacy.

The importance of having an attachment to the history and/or culture of the social group could be a reflection of the fact that, within a context of knowing that your group has stigma attached to it, having a positive group identity reflects the individual’s ability to construct for themselves an alternative narrative to the dominant one. In this vein, hooks (2000, 92) argues that “one of the most significant forms of power for the weak is ‘the refusal to accept the definition of oneself that is put forward by the powerful.’” That new definition, or narrative, would include a positive sense of the group’s history, accomplishments and place in society. Many pundits dismiss the inclusion of multicultural curricula and development of a broader spectrum of positive role models for youth as simply superficial “political correctness” and argue that these do little to improve intergroup relations. While it is true that these kinds of efforts are largely symbolic, that symbolism actually may have important effects on the self-esteem and social identity of stigmatized groups. At the very least, the findings from this and other studies of immigrant youth indicate that encouraging parents to talk about their culture and history with their children and encouraging schools and localities to add curricula and hold events that present positive images of stigmatized groups could go a long way towards reducing feelings of stigma and encouraging youth to feel good about themselves and their social group. That positive collective identity could, in turn, facilitate their adaptation into American society on a number of different levels.

**Politicize Social Networks**

Recent studies of Latino participation have shown that the politicization of social networks has an important impact on their engagement, but that Latinos often report little political discussion and/or interest among their peers (Hardy-Fanta 1993; López 2003; Gimpel, Lay and Schuknecht 2003; García Bedolla forthcoming). One simple way to encourage the politicization of Latino social networks is to incorporate these concerns into school curricula. As Niemi and Junn (1998) point out, schools are one of the most important links between education and citizenship. The logic here is that if Latino youth see politics as relevant to their lives and discuss it with their friends at an early age, it is more likely that these kinds of discussions will continue to be parts of their networks later in life. Additionally, findings from the Kids Voting program show that civic engagement activities that include parental discussions with children about politics had positive, and unexpected, socialization effects on the parents. McDevitt et al. (2003) find that participation in this program has a circular effect. It increases peer-to-peer political discussion and enhances political exchange at home, and then the products of the home conversations get shared with peers, creating a “loop of influence in which the family and the school enliven the political discussion of each other” (McDevitt et al. 2003, 2). Of particular relevance here is their finding that participation in these programs significantly narrows the political engagement gaps between Euro American and Latino students. So the implementation of new programs and approaches to encouraging student political engagement could have important positive effects the political socialization of Latino adults as well.
But how do we do this most effectively? A recent report, *The Civic Mission of Schools*, reviews the extant literature on civic education and makes six recommendations for what schools can do in order to ensure the political engagement of their students. (1) “Provide instruction in government, history, law and democracy.” Having this subject matter taught has been shown to increase engagement, so long as it is not done in a rote fashion. (2) “Incorporate discussion of current events (local, national and international) into the classroom.” They find it is especially important for these discussions to be framed around issues that young people see as relevant to their lives. (3) Provide students the opportunity to perform community service that is linked to formal classroom curriculum and instruction. (4) Offer extracurricular activities. (5) “Encourage student participation in school governance.” (6) “Encourage student participation in simulations of democratic processes and procedures,” such as voting, trials, legislative deliberation and diplomacy (Gibson and Levine 2003, 6).

This is not to suggest that a one-size-fits-all program would be appropriate. Zaff et al. (2003, 1) caution that programs to promote citizenship among youth of color must focus on the “information interactions in youths’ lives, such as with parent and peers, and on the culture in which youth are raised.” They find that “ethnic-related experiences and attitudes that are salient or matter to the youths’ self-concepts appear to be important predictors of later citizenship engagement” (Zaff et al. 2003, 2). Gimpel, Lay and Schuknecht (2003) also emphasize the importance of the larger school environment to the effectiveness of any civic education program, particularly the students’ perception of the school as “fair.” So a successful approach to youth civic engagement would have to be context-specific and include within its curriculum programs and projects that are relevant to the collective identities of the particular youth involved.

This kind of approach to teaching civic engagement would be very different from the situation today. Only twenty-nine states in the United States currently require some kind of civics course before graduating. For example, in California, students are only required to take one semester of U.S. government in order to graduate from high school. The California civics curriculum focuses on learning about the structure and function of government and does not require that students practice civic skills outside the classroom. Some schools have adopted community service requirements for high school graduation, but many of those programs are not in any way connected to actual coursework or curricula. While the California History-Social Science Content Standards encourage “the development of civic and democratic values as an integral element of good citizenship,” these lessons are not part of the state assessment exam students must pass in order to graduate high school. With the emphasis on testing present in the current school environment, it is unlikely that students will see civic education as a high curricular priority. So we are a long way from what has been found to be most effective.

There is reason to believe that such a program could work. While studies have found that today’s youth are less interested in voting, political discussion and political issues than their predecessors, youth have been found to be highly involved in community service and express high support for the principles of tolerance and free speech (Keeter et al. 2002; Levine and López 2002; Levine and López 2003).
Of course, such a program would require significant investment at a time when schools are being asked to do more with less. For this kind of program to become an academic priority, we would need to reconceptualize the role schools play in preparing youth to be members of the polity. In addition, as a society we would need to accept responsibility for ensuring that we have an engaged and participatory citizenry. While it will be difficult to create such a consensus, the potential payoffs are too great to be ignored.

**Conclusion**

This brief overview has shown that increasing levels of Latino social capital, particularly in terms of developing Latino collective identity and politicizing Latino social networks, could prove to be an effective route to increasing Latino political engagement and activity. The analysis of this literature also shows the importance of ensuring that studies designed to analyze social capital in Latino and other racialized communities not adopt a one-size-fits-all approach. Studies need to consider the effects of social stigma on the development of group identity and individual attitudes towards associational and collective activity. In addition, scholars need to ensure that their research designs are sensitive to local contextual variables that are often excluded from large-scale studies. The move towards studying social capital within social science allows political behavior scholars to move beyond individual-level factors to include important contextual variables in their analyses. As we do this work, however, we must remain sensitive to the differences that exist among the groups and local communities that we study. Only by so doing can we develop a more accurate picture of the potential positive impact social capital can have on the political engagement of Latinos and members of other racialized groups.

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**Endnotes**


2 Here I am assuming that there is a consensus within American society that we want full inclusion in political participation. The states’ unwillingness to adopt same-day registration laws, despite proof of its positive effects on turnout, and our unwillingness to have election day be a national holiday suggest that it is not necessarily the goal of our electoral institutions. Our strong history of political exclusion of women and people of color also calls this assumption into question. So it is possible that a first step towards this approach to civic engagement would be to develop a national consensus regarding the need for full participation.
References


Executive Summary

When census takers, pollsters or bureaucrats with application forms ask people to identify their race, most have no problem checking a box that corresponds to one of five standard, government-defined racial categories. In the 2000 Census, for example, 90 percent of the U.S. population was counted as either White, Black, Asian, American Indian or Pacific Islander. Hispanics were the exception. While a little more than half picked one of the standard categories, some 15 million, or 42 percent of the Hispanic population, marked “some other race.” Census 2000 and much other evidence suggest that Hispanics take distinctive views of race, and because their numbers are large and growing fast, these views are likely to change the way the nation manages the fundamental social divide that has characterized American society for four hundred years.

According to federal policy and accepted social science, Hispanics do not constitute a separate race and can in fact be of any race. The 2000 Census asked respondents first to mark off whether they were “Spanish/Hispanic/Latino” and then in a separate question to specify their race. Among those who identified themselves as Hispanics, nearly half (48 percent) were counted as White. Blacks made up 2 percent. The American Indian, Asian, and Pacific Islander categories each accounted for small fractions. Surprisingly, given the large number of Latinos whose parentage includes combinations of White, African and indigenous ancestries, only 6 percent described themselves as being of two or more races. The only racial identifier, other than White, that captured a major share of the Latino population (42 percent) was the non-identifier, “some other race” (SOR). That is a
sizeable category of people, outnumbering the total U.S. population of Asians and American Indians combined.

“Some other race” is not exactly a political slogan or rallying cry. Nor is it a term anyone ordinarily would use in conversation or to describe themselves. So who are the some-other-race Hispanics? And what are they trying to tell us with their choice of this label?

In order to explore these questions, the Pew Hispanic Center examined microdata from the 2000 Census as well as information from surveys and focus groups conducted by the Center. The Census numbers show that Latinos who call themselves White and those who say they are some other race have distinctly different characteristics, and survey data show they have different attitudes and opinions on a variety of subjects. Consistently across a broad range of variables, Hispanics who identified themselves as White have higher levels of education and income and greater degrees of civic enfranchisement than those who pick the some other race category. The findings of this report suggest that Hispanics see race as a measure of belonging, and Whiteness as a measure of inclusion, or of perceived inclusion.

Given immigration’s important role in shaping the Hispanic population, nativity—whether a person was born in the United States or abroad—is a key characteristic. More foreign-born Latinos say they are of some other race (46 percent) than native-born (40 percent). Cuban-born immigrants are the exception. More importantly, Whiteness is clearly associated with distance from the immigrant experience. Thus, the U.S.-born children of immigrants are more likely to declare themselves White than their foreign-born parents, and the share of Whiteness is higher still among the grandchildren of immigrants. In addition, U.S. citizenship is associated with racial identification. Among immigrants from the same country, those who have become U.S. citizens identify themselves as White more often than those who are not U.S. citizens. It seems unlikely that the ability and willingness to become a U.S. citizen are somehow linked to skin color. Thus, it may be that developing deeper civic bonds here can help an immigrant feel White.

The full extent to which race is a measure of belonging for Latinos becomes apparent in examining the native-born alone. Immigration status and language do not play a direct role in determining economic or social outcomes for Hispanics born in this country, and their conceptions of race are primarily home grown. Among U.S.-born Latinos, Whiteness is clearly and consistently associated with higher social status, higher levels of civic participation and a stronger sense of acceptance.

- The share of native-born Latinos without a high school diploma is higher for those who say they are some other race (35 percent) than for those who call themselves White (30 percent).

- Unemployment runs two percentage points higher among native-born Hispanic males who declare themselves some other race compared to those who say they are White, and poverty rates are four percentage points higher among adults.
• The share of native-born Latino men earning more than $35,000 a year is a third higher for those who say they are White compared to the some other race group (24.7 percent vs. 18.5 percent).

• Among all Hispanics, those who say they are some other race tend to be younger (median age 24) than those who say they are White (median age 27).

• More of those native-born Hispanics who say they are White (85 percent) are registered voters than those who say they are of some other race (67 percent).

• When asked whether they consider themselves Republicans, Democrats, independents or something else, more native-born Latinos who say they are White (22 percent) pick Republican compared to those who say they are some other race (13 percent). The same pattern prevailed among the foreign-born.

• When asked to choose between the terms “American” versus “Hispanic or Latino” versus a national origin identifier such as “Mexican,” far more native-born Latinos who say they are White (55 percent) pick “American” compared to those who say they are some other race (36 percent).

• About a quarter of native-born Latinos who say they are White complain that discrimination is a major problem for Latinos in the United States compared to a third of those who say they are some other race.

These findings suggest that Latinos’ choice to identify as White or not does not reflect exclusively permanent markers such as skin color or hair texture, but also relates race to characteristics that can change, such as economic status and perceptions of civic enfranchisement. Also, social context and the nature of race relations in a given place appear to play a role. Hispanics of Mexican origin, who compose about two-thirds of the total Hispanic population, are almost evenly divided between those who identify as White and those who pick some other race. However, in Texas many more native-born Latinos of Mexican descent say they are White (63 percent) compared to those who live outside of Texas (45 percent). Again, it seems unlikely that skin color is the determining factor. Instead, one can suppose that the unique and complex history of race relations in Texas is a major influence. This is the only state where a large Latino population was caught up both in Southern-style racial segregation and then the civil rights struggle to undo it.

Understanding Latinos’ views of their racial identities involves much more than defining a series of demographic subcategories. Rather it helps illuminate the ways that race is being lived in the United States today. In the commonplace view, Latinos are an additional “group” that has been added to the American mix of White, Black, Asian, etc. And, in particular, Latinos are categorized as a minority group that is significantly different from the White majority due to factors including a history of discrimination and persistently lower educational outcomes and incomes on average. The temptation is to racialize this population, to make it fit in the traditional American social paradigm that assigns people to race or at least race-like categories. But the growing Hispanic population may compel a reassess-
ment of the common view of a racial or ethnic group as a readily identifiable category of people who share a common fate and a common identity.

Categorizing Hispanics as a minority group becomes much more difficult once you realize this population is almost evenly divided between those who identify with the White majority and those that have trouble seeing themselves in any of the standard racial categories. It is not that some are more Hispanic or Latino than the others because they all have taken on that mantle. Nor are they saying that race does not matter to them. Rather, the message seems to be that Latinos in the United States experience race differently. For them, it is not something that pertains exclusively to skin color, let alone history and heritage.

For Latinos the concept of race appears to extend beyond biology, ancestral origins or a history of grievance in this country. The differences in characteristics and attitudes between those Hispanics who call themselves White and those who identify as some other race suggest they experience racial identity as a measure of belonging: feeling White seems to be a reflection of success and a sense of inclusion. The fact that changeable characteristics such as income, versus permanent markers such as skin color, help determine racial identification among Latinos does not necessarily mean that the color lines in American society are fading. On the contrary, these findings show that color has a broader meaning. The Latino experience demonstrates that Whiteness remains an important measure of belonging, stature and acceptance. And Hispanic views of race also show that half of this ever-larger segment of the U.S. population is feeling left out.

1. Introduction

In a now familiar decennial ritual, Americans completed their census questionnaires in the spring of 2000. Most identified their race by selecting one or more of the five standard race categories—White, Black, American Indian, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. But for millions of Americans the standard race categories did not fit (Figure 1). By the millions, these Americans ticked the last available box, identifying themselves as “some other race” (SOR). Numbered at 15 million, these “some other race” Americans constituted a group larger than Asians and American Indians combined. And size was not the only distinguishing characteristic of the SOR population. The vast majority is also of Hispanic origin.¹ Their Hispanic ethnic origin was clear because the census makes a distinction between the concepts of race and ethnicity and therefore tabulates Hispanic origin separate from race (Figure 1).²

Among the 246 million non-Hispanic Americans, the SOR category was far less attractive. Fewer than half a million non-Hispanics ticked off “some other race” (Table 1). And these half-million respondents amounted to less than 1 percent of all non-Hispanics. In contrast, the SOR category drew in 42 percent of the Hispanic population. In fact, among Hispanics only White Hispanics comprised a larger share of the Hispanic population (48 percent). Even with 31 different standard single and multiple race combinations to choose from, the vast majority of Hispanics in the United States fell into just these two categories. Nearly half iden-
tified themselves as White, a racial identity that they shared with the majority (69 percent) of non-Hispanics. And most of the remaining Hispanics selected SOR, a category only sparsely populated by non-Hispanics.

This pattern of Hispanic race responses was not the result of an organized political campaign. In fact, estimates of the size and potential political clout of the Hispanic population are tied to the Hispanic origin question, not to the race question. So why do some Hispanics choose White while others choose SOR? Are these two groups of Hispanics one and the same in other respects? Evidence from several sources suggests that SOR Hispanics are different than White Hispanics, and the differences fall into a consistent pattern.

This report details those differences using data from the 2000 Census, showing that SOR Hispanics are less educated, less likely to be citizens, poorer, less likely to speak English exclusively and less often intermarried with non-Hispanic Whites. Focus group responses and attitudinal survey data support these findings. The socioeconomic profiles, the attitudes, the language usage and even the reported political behavior of SOR Hispanics consistently place them at a distance from non-Hispanic Whites. In comparison, White Hispanics consistently occupy the intermediate ground between SOR Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites. Even after removing immigrants from the analyses, compared to White U.S.-born Hispanics, SOR Hispanics occupy a more marginalized socioeconomic position, more often report having experienced discrimination and less often report behaviors consistent with strong civic bonds.

These results are significant because they show that for Hispanics racial identity is not immutable. Rather, it is at least partially a function of education, citizenship, civic participation and economic status. However, these results do not necessarily mean that the color lines in American society are fading. With the growth of the Hispanic population, the boundaries are shifting, at least for Latinos, to encompass factors other than skin color. The Latino experience suggests that Whiteness remains an important measure of belonging, stature and acceptance. And a large segment of the Hispanic population, SOR Hispanics, may be feeling left out.

Much of the following data is derived from the 2000 Census, 5 percent sample. These data provide the best estimates of Hispanic population characteristics when the population is subdivided by factors such as nativity, country of origin and race. Table 2 details the race and national origin of the nation’s Hispanic population. Focus group responses and the 2002 National Survey of Latinos (NSL) are also cited in this report. The NSL is a nationally representative sample of Hispanics in the United States. The characteristics of the population as measured by the 2002 NSL are consistent with the 2000 Census results reported here.

In some parts of this report the foreign-born, which comprise about 40 percent of the Hispanic population, are treated separately. We do this because unlike the native-born who are citizens at birth, an immigrant’s conceptions of race may have been formed prior to his or her arrival in the United States. Also, many behaviors and attitudes related to civic engagement may depend on immigration status. The following section addresses some of these issues. In other sections, where the emphasis is on the native-born, results for the foreign-born are also presented for comparison. In many of these comparisons, the differences between SOR
Hispanics and White Hispanics are more exaggerated in the native-born than in the foreign-born.

2. Immigration and Citizenship

Whether a person was born in the United States or abroad is a key demographic characteristic. Foreign-born Latinos more often say they are “some other race” (46 percent) than the native-born (40 percent). Cuban-born immigrants are the exception. And, for reasons including intermarriage, Whiteness is associated with distance from the immigrant experience (Edmonston, Lee and Passel 2002). In the 2002 National Survey of Latinos, the U.S.-born children of immigrants more often identified as White than their foreign-born parents, and the share of Whiteness was higher still among the grandchildren of immigrants.

Among the foreign-born, the extent to which White versus SOR identity predominates varies by national origin (Table 3). For example, at one extreme, 90 percent of naturalized Cubans and 84 percent of non-citizen Cubans identified as White, and at the other extreme only 23 percent of naturalized Dominicans and 21 percent of non-citizen Dominicans identified as White. Yet, with the exception of Central Americans, there is a consistent pattern. A greater share of naturalized immigrants, from 2 to 6 percent more depending on national origin, identify as White when compared to their non-citizen counterparts.

3. Education, Employment and Earnings

For both the native- and the foreign-born, feelings of inclusion and civic engagement are related to socioeconomic status, which in turn can be related to race. For example, one Cuban American focus group respondent stated it this way,

When it comes to money, social classes think of themselves as higher or lower. The White always [have] the highest social prestige, and the darker-skinned always have the lower social prestige because you have some very dark-skinned people who earn a lot of money, and you tell them you’re dark skinned . . . oh, no, I’m White. One thing has nothing to do with the other.

The idea expressed by this respondent is consistent with many indicators of socioeconomic status consistently showing that SOR Hispanics have a somewhat weaker economic mooring than White Hispanics in the United States. Educational attainment is fundamental to these differences. Whereas very few (14.6 percent) of non-Hispanic Whites have less than a high school education, a larger share of the Hispanic foreign-born population does not have a complete secondary school education (Table 4). The share without a high school education is higher for SOR Hispanics (65.5 percent) than it is for White Hispanics (55.3 percent). Among the native-born, also a greater share of native-born SOR Hispanics (35 percent) lacks a high school diploma when compared with White Hispanics (29.8 percent), although the difference is narrower.

Educational differences between national-origin groups do not drive this pattern of lower educational attainment for SOR Hispanics as compared with White
Hispanics. Indeed, the pattern prevails for native-born household heads of all national origins (Table 5).

Generally, unemployment rates are higher for all persons lacking high school diplomas. Thus, it is not surprising that both foreign- and native-born SOR Hispanics have higher unemployment rates than White Hispanics (Figure 2). For example, native-born SOR Hispanic men have an unemployment rate of 9.9 percent while the figure for native-born White Hispanics is 8.0.

The poverty rate for Hispanics as a whole was 22.6 percent in 1999, more than double the rate (8.1 percent) for non-Hispanic Whites. When Hispanics are disaggregated into race groups, those Hispanics who are White have lower poverty rates than those who identify as SOR, and the difference is greater among the native-born than among immigrants (Figure 3).

A consistent pattern emerges across Hispanic national origin groups: Hispanic Whites have a lower poverty rate than SOR Hispanics although it is still greater than for non-Hispanic Whites. The difference in poverty rates between Hispanic Whites and SOR Hispanics is particularly striking for Puerto Ricans and Cubans (Table 6).

While children in the United States typically have higher poverty rates than adults, excluding children and examining poverty among working-age adults still reveals race differences between White and SOR Hispanics (Figure 4). For example, 18 percent of native-born SOR Hispanic adults live in poverty, while fewer (14 percent) of White Hispanics live in poverty. The importance of limiting the sample to adults is illustrated in a subsequent section on the age profile of White versus SOR Hispanics.

Earnings data for Hispanics are also consistent with the above findings on education, unemployment and poverty. For example, Figure 5 shows that for both men and women the share of SOR Hispanics earning at least $35,000 per year is lower than for White Hispanics. Since much of the wage gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites is driven by educational differences, it is likely that the lower educational attainment of SOR Hispanics as compared with White Hispanics drives a large share of these earnings differences (Smith 2001). Focus group respondents expressed a link between these objective socioeconomic differences by race and a sense of inclusion. A third generation respondent from Texas expressed the following:

If we are saying mainstream is White American culture, how much money do they have? Hispanics with more money maybe fit into mainstream culture better than people that have just come from Mexico.

4. Race and Place

Settlement patterns, regional historical legacies and current cultural trends also influence Hispanic race responses. Given the preponderance of Mexican origin respondents in the SOR category, the distribution of the SOR Hispanics is highly skewed to the western United States (Figure 6). In fact, California alone accounts for over 5 million of the nation’s SOR Hispanics. The geographic concentration of
SOR Hispanics in the west is reinforced because, in Texas, the southern state with the largest Hispanic population, many Latinos identify as racially White. In Texas nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of native-born Latinos of Mexican descent say they are White, compared to less than half (45 percent) of those who live outside of Texas. One can suppose that the unique and complex history of race relations in Texas is a major influence. This is the only state where a large Latino population was caught up both in Southern-style racial segregation and then the civil rights struggle to undo it.

Similarly, among the native-born of Cuban origin in Florida, 91 percent identify as White, while only 5 percent identify as SOR. Among native-born Cubans living outside of Florida, only 66 percent identify as White and 13 percent as SOR.

Focus groups also suggested the importance of place in racial identification. In Miami, a majority of respondents took their Hispanic identification for granted and expressed pride in their origins. Yet in a discussion of whether Hispanics are accepted in the United States, one Cuban-origin respondent who agreed that Hispanics were accepted in Miami, New York and California said:

> If I apply somewhere else, Tennessee, and the application says, “Are you Hispanic or White?” I put White because I want to at least have an interview.

This statement suggests that in this respondent’s mind, the consequences of identifying as White vary from place to place.

5. Age and Race

For the most part, SOR Hispanics are young. While the median age of White Non-Hispanic Americans is thirty-eight years old, for SOR Hispanics it is only twenty-four, and for White Hispanics it is twenty-seven. The association between youth and SOR identity holds true for both the native- and foreign-born populations. The median age for native-born SOR Hispanics is sixteen years old and for native-born White Hispanics the median age is twenty. And for the foreign-born population the median age for SOR Hispanics is thirty-one years old, while that of foreign-born White Hispanics is thirty-four years old.

The major difference between the native- and foreign-born populations is that the bulk of native-born Hispanics (70 percent) are either children or very young adults (Figure 7), while the foreign-born are more often either young or middle-aged adults (Figure 8). Many of the foreign-born adults in Figure 8 are the parents of the youth shown in Figure 7. Because it is generally one parent who fills out the Census questionnaire, the youth are typically assigned a race by their parents. As these youth mature into adulthood, they may or may not choose to self-identify in the way that their parents currently identify them. These second-generation Hispanics are important because they are replacing immigrants as the major drivers of Hispanic population growth (Suro 2003).

Leaving aside the youngest group of native-born Hispanics, about 30 percent of native-born Hispanics are older than twenty years of age. Rather than being identified by their parents, this group is less likely to have recent immigrant parents and
more likely to live independently. Thus, their Census race responses are more likely to reflect their self-identification.

Older native-born Hispanics—those born prior to 1945—most often identified as White (60 percent) in 2000 (Figure 9). In contrast, those born during the post-war baby boom showed a lower level of White racial identity and a greater preference for SOR identity. Thus, even excluding the numerous young native-born children of immigrants, a transition in racial identity appears to have been underway. This transition coincides with the Civil Rights era and the growth of the Latino immigrant population. An analysis of age cohorts from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 censuses suggests that for Hispanic baby-boomers—those born before the beginning of large flows of Asian and Latin American immigrants into the United States—race responses do not change over time. In other words, it does not appear that young Hispanic baby-boomers switch their racial identities as they get older. Rather, their race responses seem to be stable characteristics related to the era in which they were born. Within this cohort, responses for White Hispanics are very stable, and to the extent that SOR Hispanics have changed, the shift appears to be from SOR to a non-White or multiple-race option in 2000. Despite the differences between Hispanic native-born baby boomers and their elders, the increase in the share of Hispanics who identify as SOR would not have been as great without the large inflows of immigrants who identified themselves and their children as SOR.

6. Language Usage, Intermarriage and Generational Status

As shown in Figure 10, language usage diverges between SOR Hispanics and White Hispanics. Among the native-born, 73 percent of SOR Hispanics were bilingual compared to 62 percent of White Hispanics.

While second-generation adults (native-born of foreign-born parents) cannot be distinguished from the third and higher generations (native-born of native-born parents) in the 2000 Census, data from the NSL indicate that White Hispanics are more often found in the third generation than SOR Hispanics. Among native-born White and SOR Latinos in the NSL, 45 percent of White Hispanics belonged to the second generation while 55 percent belonged to third or higher generations. In contrast, 55 percent of SOR Hispanics belonged to the second generation while 45 percent belonged to third or higher generations.

Another rough indicator of generational status is the probability of intermarriage. Estimates of intermarriage rates are 8 percent for foreign-born Hispanics, 32 percent for the second generation and 57 percent for the third and higher generations (Edmonston, Lee and Passel 2002). Again, census results on intermarriage for SOR Hispanics and White Hispanics are consistent with the idea that among the native-born, SOR Hispanics are more likely to be of the second rather than the third generation compared to White Hispanics.

For both foreign-born and native-born Hispanic male householders, the racial and ethnic identities of their spouses are most likely to be identical to their own (Table 7). This trend is more pronounced among foreign-born men.
88 percent of White Hispanic males are married to White Hispanic females. In terms of out-marriage, Hispanic males who identify as White have non-Hispanic wives more often than SOR Hispanic men.

7. From Aggregate Statistics to Attitudes

The 2002 National Survey of Latinos (NSL) provides both general demographic data on the Latino population as well as attitudinal information on such issues as identity, discrimination, incorporation into the mainstream of society, and experience with the health care and financial systems. While the 2002 NSL sampled only adults and focused on the attitudes and experiences of Hispanics in the United States in terms of age, household size, household income and educational attainment, the picture that emerged from the 2002 NSL coincided with Census 2000 results, showing that SOR Hispanics were younger and occupied a more tenuous socioeconomic position than did White Hispanics. The following section details the dimensions on which these somewhat distinct groups, SOR Hispanics and White Hispanics, differed in the survey data.

On Identifying as American

To the extent that identity conveys a sense of belonging, results from the 2002 NSL show that SOR Hispanics seem to experience a greater duality in their identity than their White Hispanic counterparts. When asked which descriptors they used first to describe themselves—country of origin, Hispanic/Latino, or American—foreign-born SOR Hispanics did not differ from White Hispanics. Over two-thirds of both groups reported that they identified first with their countries of origin. On the other hand, when the same question was asked of native-born Hispanics, among White Hispanics over half (55 percent) reported that they identified first as an American. For SOR Hispanics a significantly smaller share (36 percent) responded that they identified first as an American.

After the native-born are broken down into their second-generation versus third- and higher-generation components, the same pattern prevails. White Hispanics in the second generation are more likely (48 percent) to identify first as American while among SOR Hispanics only 29 percent identify first as American. Even though over half (51 percent) of SOR Hispanics in the third and higher generations identify as American first, significantly more White Hispanics of the third and higher generations (68 percent) identify first as American.

Focus groups reveal that to many Latinos, the term American is viewed less in the context of an overall identity and more in specific reference to citizenship or birthplace. For example, both second-generation Mexicans in Los Angeles and Puerto Ricans in New York reported that they referred to themselves as unhyphenated Americans when they were crossing the border or when they were outside of the United States, but within the United States they saw themselves as Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans.
Hispanic Views of the United States

When asked to compare their countries of origin with the United States, Hispanics agreed generally that the United States offered more opportunities to get ahead, that treatment of the poor was better in the United States and that family ties were stronger in their countries of origin. These generalizations held true for the native-born and the foreign-born, as well as for SOR and White Hispanics. Questions related to morality elicited more variable responses.

For example, with regard to the future of their children, the only question that yielded differences between White and SOR Hispanics was one that asked, “Are you confident that your children will have the same moral values as you?” Overall, nearly 30 percent of SOR Hispanics were very confident that their children would share their moral values while only 22 percent of White Hispanics expressed the same level of confidence. When nativity was introduced as a factor, there was no difference between foreign-born SOR Hispanics and foreign-born White Hispanics; rather, differences between native-born SOR Hispanics and native-born White Hispanics drove the overall difference. Native-born SOR Hispanic adults in this instance expressed more confidence in their moral sway over their children.  

Views on the Government of the United States and Political Participation

When asked how much of the time they trust the government in Washington to do what is right, SOR Hispanics did not differ significantly from White Hispanics. This was true both when the sample was limited to the foreign-born or to the native-born. Generally about 29 percent of Hispanics answered “most of the time,” while about 47 percent answered “some of the time.” While SOR and White Hispanics expressed similar levels of trust, when asked if based on their experiences, political leaders are interested in the problems of particular concern to Hispanics living here, the responses diverged by race. Foreign-born White Hispanics were more likely (46 percent) than foreign-born SOR Hispanics (39 percent) to answer yes, political leaders were concerned. Among the native-born, SOR Hispanics (59 percent) were more likely than White Hispanics (51 percent) to say no, political leaders were not concerned.

The 2002 NSL also provides data on why White Hispanics might feel more politically enfranchised than SOR Hispanics. For example, among the native-born, only 67 percent of SOR Hispanics reported that they were registered voters, while a significantly larger share of White Hispanics (85 percent) reported that they were registered voters. Here again, even when divided into second versus third and higher generations, race was significant. In the second generation 66 percent of SOR Hispanics versus 90 percent of White Hispanics reported that they were registered voters. And in the third and higher generations among SOR Hispanics 65 percent reported that they were registered to vote while among White Hispanics a significantly greater share (83 percent) answered that they were registered voters. Similarly, differences on reported voting behavior were also significant and displayed the same qualitative pattern.

For the foreign-born, the share of citizens among SOR Hispanics (30 percent) and White Hispanics (34 percent) was not significantly different. However, relative
to SOR Hispanics, more White Hispanics reported that they were registered to vote (89 percent) and had ever voted (81 percent) in a U.S. election. Among SOR Hispanics, 79 percent reported that they were registered voters, and 66 percent reported that they had ever voted.

When asked whether they considered themselves Republicans, Democrats, independents or something else, a greater share of White Hispanics identified themselves as Republicans, and this held for both native- and foreign-born respondents. Among native-born SOR Hispanics, only 13 percent reported that they were Republican while among native-born White Hispanics, 22 percent reported that they were Republican. About 12 percent of foreign-born SOR Hispanics and 21 percent of White Hispanics reported that they were Republican.

**Views on Discrimination toward Hispanics**

With regard to their views about discrimination, nativity seems to supercede race for foreign-born Hispanics. About half of both White and SOR Hispanic immigrants view discrimination as a major problem in schools and in the workplace and view discrimination as a barrier to success in the United States. On the other hand, within the native-born Hispanic population, views of discrimination diverge between White Hispanics and SOR Hispanics. For example, more native-born SOR Hispanics (30 percent) report that discrimination against Hispanics is a major problem in schools. Only 22 percent of native-born White Hispanics report the same about schools. Likewise, 35 percent of native-born SOR Hispanics report that discrimination is a major problem in the workplace whereas only 22 percent of White Hispanics report discrimination as a major workplace problem. Similarly, one-quarter of native-born White Hispanics reported that discrimination was a major problem preventing Hispanics from succeeding in America while over one-third of native-born SOR Hispanics felt that discrimination was an obstacle to success in America.

When asked how often particular incidents of discriminatory treatment had befallen them, native-born White Hispanics were significantly more likely to answer never. For example, 68 percent of native-born White Hispanics reported that they had never been treated with less respect than other people, 73 percent that they had never received poorer service than other people at stores or restaurants, and 77 percent had never been called names or insulted because of their ethnic or racial background. In response to the same list of incidents, native-born SOR Hispanics were less likely to have answered never. In the same order presented above, 51 percent, 56 percent and 66 percent of SOR Hispanics answered never. Dividing the native-born into second versus third and higher generations did not eliminate the significant effect of race on the answers reported for these questions. Among the native-born, the second generation reported experiencing more discrimination than the third and higher generations.

8. **Conclusions**

The profile of SOR Hispanic detailed above describes a population composed of both native-born and immigrant members. While census data indicate that the gulf...
between SOR and White Hispanics is certainly not as wide as that between non-Hispanic Whites and Hispanics, results consistently show that SOR Hispanics have a weaker economic mooring relative to White Hispanics. Although no specific difference may be overwhelming, the striking consistency in the pattern of differences is impressive. Furthermore, the NSL suggests that these aggregate differences translate into important differences with regard to partisan loyalties, political participation and perceptions about discrimination in America.

While some of these differences are surely driven by the relative proportion of American newcomers in each Hispanic race group, the NSL indicates that even among third-generation Hispanics, those whose concepts of race were most likely to have been shaped exclusively in the United States, race differences are apparent. And these differences appear to play a role in shaping attitudes and opinions. While the data presented indicate that SOR Hispanics have lower socioeconomic status and that they are less politically engaged and more often feel discriminated against, what cannot be discerned is whether SOR Hispanics choose that identity because they possess these characteristics or if these characteristic lead Hispanics to the adopt the SOR label.

Appendix A. Consistency of Race Responses and Race Allocation

Distinguishing the differences between the largest Hispanic groups, White Hispanics and SOR Hispanics, is an imprecise exercise. Even among Hispanics who checked White in Census 2000, fewer than half (49 percent) also reported that they were White in a follow-up questionnaire (Bentley et al. 2003). Many White Hispanics (45 percent) offered a response of SOR in the follow-up study. Among SOR Hispanics identified in the 2000 Census more (67 percent) offered the same SOR response in the follow-up study.

Another source of imprecision is non-response. About one in every seven Hispanics is allocated to a race category because they skip the race question. When compared to White Hispanics, more SOR Hispanics skip the race question. In general, fewer White Hispanics skip the race question, but more offer an inconsistent response upon follow-up. On the other hand, among SOR Hispanics, more skip the race question, but fewer change their response upon follow-up.

In spite of this imprecision, there appear to be small, but persistent differences between White Hispanics and SOR Hispanics. Due to the large sample size of the 5 percent public-use microdata samples (PUMS) dataset, t-tests for significance were nearly universally significant at the 5 percent level. The differences are significant when all census respondents are used in the analysis and also when the data are limited to only those for whom race was not allocated. Furthermore, the differences can be identified using data from different sources, and the generalization that SOR Hispanics occupy a somewhat less favorable socioeconomic status than White Hispanics holds true.
Appendix B. Data Sources

A. The Integrated Public Use Microdata Series was used in the analysis of Census 2000 data from the 5 percent sample (Ruggles et al. 2003).

B. The Pew Hispanic Center/Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2002 National Survey of Latinos was conducted by telephone between 4 April and 11 June 2002 among a nationally representative sample of 4,213 adults, eighteen years and older, who were selected at random. The sample included 2,929 Hispanics. International Communications Research of Media, Penn., conducted the fieldwork in either Spanish or English, based on the respondent’s preference.

C. Pew Hispanic Center/National Academy of Science Focus Groups 2004. International Communications Research (ICR) conducted these focus groups in February and March 2004. The purpose of the groups was to explore the opinions and experiences of first-, second- and third-generation Hispanics in the United States. The focus groups were held in Miami, New York, Houston, Raleigh and Los Angeles in order to maximize the number of national-origin groups participating and to encompass a broad geographical range. Participants were male and female Hispanics eighteen to twenty-five years of age. ICR conducted first-generation groups in Spanish and second- and third-generation groups primarily in English. About ten respondents participated in each ninety-minute focus group session. The general focus of all groups was Hispanic identity. Specific topics ranged from labels and terminology, components of identity, language, cultural and racial identity, interpersonal relations and societal relations.

Endnotes

1 For the purposes of federal data collection, Hispanics constitute a unique ethnic group. They are the only one identified with a specific question. The Hispanic origin question helps satisfy a 1976 law (Public Law 94-311, 16 June 1976) that requires the collection, analysis and publication of statistics on persons of Spanish culture, origin or descent, regardless of race.

2 The Census Bureau defines ethnicity or origin as the heritage, nationality group, lineage or country of birth of the person or the person’s parents or ancestors before their arrival in the United States. Although the race categories used by the census do not conform to any biological, anthropological or genetic criteria, they are used because they conform to those outlined by the Office of Management and Budget, and they generally reflect a social definition of race recognized in this country (President 1997; www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/raceqandas.html).

3 For a discussion of the other Hispanic category in Table 2, see Suro 2002.

4 See Appendix B.
The fact that the majority of couples have the same racial and ethnic identity is probably overstated since only one member of the couple generally completes the census form.

The race question used in the 2002 NSL followed the Hispanic origin question and was asked as follows: “What race do you consider yourself to be? White, Black or African American, Asian or some other race?” If the respondent offered “Hispanic or Latino” in response to the question, they were coded as “some other race” for the purposes of this analysis.

Questions relating to country of origin were modified to accommodate foreign- and native-born respondents. Immigrants were asked their own country of origin. Children of immigrants were asked about their parents’ country of origin. Third-generation respondents were asked about their grandparents’ country of origin.

Sample size does not permit native-born distinctions between second generation and third and higher generations.

Asked of the citizen and non-citizen foreign-born.

References


Figure 1
Reproduction of Questions on Race and Hispanic Origin From Census 2000

- NOTE: Please answer BOTH Questions 5 and 6.

5. Is this person Spanish/Hispanic/Latino? Mark [ ] the "Yes" box if not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.
   - No, not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino
   - Yes, Puerto Rican
   - Yes, Mexican, Mexican Am., Chicano
   - Yes, Cuban
   - Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino — and group.

6. What is this person's race? Mark [ ] one or more races to indicate what this person considers himself/herself to be.
   - White
   - Black, African Am., or Negro
   - American Indian or Alaska Native — First name of enrolled or principal tribe
   - Asian Indian
   - Japanese
   - Native Hawaiian
   - Chinese
   - Korean
   - Guamanian or Chamorro
   - Filipino
   - Vietnamese
   - Samoan
   - Other Asian — First name of enrolled or principal tribe
   - Other Black and African
   - Other Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander — First name of enrolled or principal tribe
   - Some other race — and race.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 questionnaire.

Figure 2
Unemployment Rates for White Hispanics, SDR Hispanics and Non-Hispanic Whites by Nativity and Sex
2000

Source: Author's calculation of the 2000 integrated public use microdata series (IPUMS).
Figure 3
Percentage in Poverty by Race, Hispanic Origin and Nativity
1999

Source: Author's calculation of the 2000 IPUMS and Census 2000 SF3.

Figure 4
Adult Poverty Rates by Hispanic Origin, Race and Nativity
1999

Source: Author's calculation of the 2000 IPUMS and Census 2000 SF3.
Note: Restricted to adults aged eighteen to sixty-four.
Figure 5
Share of Hispanic Labor Force with Annual Earnings from Wages of $35,000 or more, by Race, Nativity and Sex 1989

Source: Author's calculation of the 2000 IPUMS.
Note: Restricted to civilian workers, who reported working forty or more weeks per year and usual working hours of thirty-five or more per week.

Figure 6
Regional Distribution of White Hispanics, SOR Hispanics and Non-Hispanic Whites 2000

Source: Author's calculation of the 2000 IPUMS.
Figure 7
Native-born Hispanic Population by Age and Race
2003

Source: Author's calculation of the 2000 IPUMS

Figure 8
Foreign-born Hispanic Population by Age and Race
2000

Source: Author's calculation of the 2000 IPUMS.
Figure 9
Share of Native-born Hispanic Population Identified as White or SOR by Age Group
2000

Source: Author's calculation of the 2000 IPUMS.

Figure 10
Language Usage for White Hispanics, SOR Hispanics and Non-Hispanic Whites by Nativity
2000

Source: Author's calculation of the 2000 IPUMS.
Note: Restricted to the population five years of age or older.
### Table 1
Population of the United States by Race and Hispanic Origin

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<th>Percent Hispanic Population</th>
<th>Not Hispanic Number</th>
<th>Percent of Non-Hispanic Population</th>
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<td>353,909</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or more races</td>
<td>14,891,303</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>467,770</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 2
Race by Hispanic Origin Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>SCIR</th>
<th>Other Single Race*</th>
<th>Two or More Races</th>
<th>N weighted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>20,867,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3,400,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1,248,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central American</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1,821,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South American</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1,406,493</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>115,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>795,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Hispanic</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5,548,307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations of the 2000 integrated public-use microdata samples (IPUMS). Note: * Other Single Race refers to Asian, American Indian, Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islanders.
### Table 3
Percent Distribution of White, Black and SOR Hispanic Householders by National Origin and Citizenship Status
2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>SOR</th>
<th>N weighted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naturalized</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>906,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not a citizen</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>1,866,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naturalized</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>273,831</td>
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<tr>
<td>not a citizen</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>126,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central American</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naturalized</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>159,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not a citizen</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>311,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South American</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naturalized</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>188,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not a citizen</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>206,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naturalized</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>100,436</td>
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<tr>
<td>not a citizen</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>114,680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculations of the 2000 IPUMS.
Note: Sample limited to foreign-born householders who immigrated prior to 1995.

### Table 4
Percentage of Adults with Less Than a High School Education by Race, Hispanic Origin, and Nativity
2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Hispanic Total</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOR Hispanic Total</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Non-Hispanic Total</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Hispanic</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOR Hispanic</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign-born</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Hispanic</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOR Hispanic</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculations of the 2000 IPUMS.
Note: Restricted to adults 25 years of age or older.
Table 5
Percentage of Native-born White and SOR Hispanic Householders by Origin and Education
2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mexican White</th>
<th>Mexican SOR</th>
<th>Puerto Rican White</th>
<th>Puerto Rican SOR</th>
<th>Cuban White</th>
<th>Cuban SOR</th>
<th>Central/South American White</th>
<th>Central/South American SOR</th>
<th>Dominican White</th>
<th>Dominican SOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less Than High School</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors Degree +</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculations of the 2000 IPUMS.
Note: Sample restricted to native-born Hispanic male and female householders age twenty-five or older.

Table 6
Percentage of Hispanics in Poverty by Race and Origin
1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>SOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central American</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculations of the 2000 IPUMS.
Table 7
Race and Ethnic Distribution of Wives by Husband's Nativity, Race and Ethnicity
2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race and Ethnicity of Wife</th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>Foreign-born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hispanic White</td>
<td>Hispanic SOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic White</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic SOR</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic White</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculations of the 2000 IPUMS.
Note: Sample is limited to married, Hispanic male householders.
Migrant Hometown Associations: Putting a Face to Globalization

Manuel Orozco, Ph.D.

Manuel Orozco, Ph.D., is currently executive director of the Remittances and Development Project funded by the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development of the United Nations. He is also chair of Central America and the Caribbean at the United States Foreign Service Institute (http://www.state.gov/m/fsi/) of the State Department and senior researcher at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University (http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isim/). He was project director of Central America (and now a senior fellow) for the Inter-American Dialogue (http://www.thedialogue.org). Manuel Orozco taught political science at the University of Akron, Ohio. He has also been a researcher for the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute working on issues related to migration, ethnicity, international relations and their implications for the United States. In addition to his academic work, he has worked as a policy consultant for various organizations in Central America, the United States and South Africa developing programs on democracy and governance issues, as well as on migration and remittances. He has also taught international relations in Costa Rica and served on various boards in Nicaragua and the United States. His areas of interest include Central America, globalization, democracy, migration, conflict in war-torn societies and minority politics. Dr. Orozco holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Texas at Austin, a master in public administration and Latin American studies and a B.A. in international relations from the National University of Costa Rica.

Millions of migrants abroad today maintain their social and familial obligations to their country of origin through remittances. Managed cleverly and in joint community ventures, these ties are increasingly helping to draw the home economies into the global economy, with migrants becoming active agents of the “globalization” of their home countries.

Immigrants are joining forces with one another to support practical social projects back home through small grassroots organizations, known as hometown associations (HTAs). Hometown associations are organizations of immigrants that raise funds to better their places of origin. HTAs are growing in importance in Latin America and the Caribbean because of the support to their communities. The relationship between development and migration is complex, as it reflects a combination of initiatives and motivations: cultural, economic, political and social (Orozco 2004a).

Diaspora communities create these groups to strengthen links with their communities of origin and to fund raise in support of local community development projects. While primarily philanthropic in nature, HTA work sometimes overlaps with economic development and represents an important link between countries of

79
origin and emigrants. HTAs address the need for economic aid in their home countries, seek to retain cultural ties and aim to improve home country communities.

In addition to $45 billion in annual family remittances in 2004, immigrants have also become an interesting crucible for development through collective donations for local projects (Orozco 2002). In the United States, there are thousands of Latin American and Caribbean HTAs. For example, according to the Mexican Consulates, there exist over seven hundred registered Mexican clubs (although government officials in Mexico and Latino community leaders estimate a much higher and increasing number). Figure 1 shows the increase in Mexican HTAs based in Chicago alone over the past six years.

However, the presence of HTAs is not restricted to Mexico. Most Latin American immigrants are organized in HTAs around the purpose of helping their communities. Salvadoran HTAs, for example, have existed in greater numbers since the ’90s. Salvadorans in the Washington, D.C., area, who are from Eastern El Salvador, are organized in more than twenty groups that raise money to provide assistance in areas like San Miguel Province.

Comunidad Unida de Chinameca, created in 1991, is a typical Salvadoran HTA. This HTA began activities in the city of Chinameca by constructing the school’s water tower, as well as twelve restrooms. From there, they went on to construct a laundry facility, a recreational park for the town, as well as painting and putting a roof on the local church. Comunidad gathers around $30,000 annually, raised mostly through fund-raising events. After El Salvador’s earthquake in 2001, Comunidad received donations of construction material from the French embassy to build a wall for the Red Cross building in the town, and the town participated by donating labor (Orozco 2004c).

Guyanese HTAs focus on projects similar to those undertaken by Central American and Mexican migrants. These associations are based in Canada and the United States—New York in particular—and have a longstanding organizational base. Guyana Watch, founded in 1992 and based in Queens, N.Y., conducts an annual medical outreach clinic in Guyana. They organize a group of twenty to twenty-five doctors and nurses to travel to three cities in Guyana (Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice) and work at a clinic for one day, attending between twenty-five hundred and three thousand people (Orozco 2004b).

HTAs vary in level of organizational formality, but most have governing boards of ten or fewer elected members that include a president, secretary, treasurer and auditors. This core membership generally selects projects and prioritizes hometown needs to be supported. Projects and needs are based on submissions by any club member who, upon returning from a visit to the hometown, can propose three to four projects to the president, who then initiates discussion and calls a vote among active members. Elected members also mobilize more extensive support for fund raising, often attracting two hundred or more participants.

HTAs are motivated by a practical desire to improve economic and social conditions in the hometown. The leaders and those providing funds argue that they seek to develop their communities in order to reduce migration. They engage in a wide range of projects, including, in order of preference, health and education (e.g.,
constructing or repairing health centers and school facilities, equipment donation),
public infrastructure (road pavement and electrification), support to the town
church or cemetery and town beautification (such as constructing parks).

While they attract wide support for being concrete and assisting the town’s most
vulnerable populations—the elderly and children—HTA interventions can be both
philanthropic and developmental, depending primarily on the immediate economic
needs of a given town.

As shown in Table 1, HTAs undergo a learning process, generating new ideas
and learning lessons from previous experiences. Older associations continue to
support more traditional activities dealing with recreation or town beautification
whereas clubs formed after 1995 support a wider variety of projects, from church
repairs to public works to health and education.

HTAs are conscious of their limited fund-raising base and choose activities
appropriate to their resources: the majority of Mexican HTAs fundraise around
$10,000 a year although some groups generate up to $100,000 annually. This has a
substantial impact on the rural receiving communities, as most HTAs work in rural
towns with populations below one thousand, average annual per capita incomes
below $400, and highly underdeveloped public and financial infrastructures,
including an absence of any type of commercial center forcing residents to travel
at least 50 kilometres to purchase goods.

In this context, HTA donations, combined with migrant remittances sent to at
least one third of hometown households, may be essential in improving the quality
of life. As shown in Table 2, HTAs enable projects that would otherwise be impos-
sible for the receiving communities to undertake: in towns with fewer than three
thousand people, HTA donation represents over 50 percent of the municipal public
works budget. For localities with populations under one thousand, HTA donations
can amount to seven times this budget.

Matching Grant Opportunities
The influence of hometown associations in some rural communities in Latin
America, as well as their outreach to state, local and even national government
officials, has led to the implementation of partnerships on different projects. Two
examples are the 3x1 program in Mexico and a matching fund with the govern-
ment of El Salvador.

After years of informal engagements of HTAs with various public institutions,
the government of Mexico created Iniciativa Ciudadana 3x1, a program aimed to
match HTA donations with funds from the three levels of government (federal,
state and municipal). In 2002, the Iniciativa Ciudadana projects totaled $43.5 mil-
lion, a quarter of which came from the contributions of Mexican HTAs. Zacatecas
received over one-third of the amounts allocated. Jalisco, Guanajuato and
Michoacan, which are also major emigration areas with labor-intensive agricultur-
al economies, have also participated significantly in the program. Together, these
four states represent nearly two-thirds of the total allotment for the 3x1 program at
the national level (see Table 3).

Another example of partnership with government institutions took place in El
Salvador. The Salvadoran government has worked closely in forging partnerships
with HTAs to work on a range of development projects in rural areas (see Table 4). One important example is the initiative managed by the Social Investment and Local Development Fund (FISDL) of the government of El Salvador through a program known as "Unidos por la Solidaridad." Of the forty-five partnership projects between the FISDL and HTAs, twenty-eight have benefited the provinces of La Union (eleven), La Paz (ten) and Chalatenango (seven). Ahuachapan, La Libertad, Morazan, San Vicente and Santa Ana have had one project each. The average cost of a project undertaken in these partnerships is $278,689.73. Salvadoran HTAs, on average, give 16 percent of the support (both in financial donations and in-kind support), but the percentage ranges from 1 percent in San Salvador to 57 percent in Usulutan.

**Impact on Development?**

Although the contributions of HTAs are relatively small when compared to the development needs and the structural transformations required to improve society, some of their philanthropic activities have a development effect that can meet certain goals.

First, providing tools that give ownership to a person and a community is central to development. The provision of projects must encompass not only a collective good benefiting all members, but also a means to transmit ownership or control of that project to the members—to legitimate the project as theirs. Second, a project’s goal must correspond with the reality of the needs and priorities of a community. The project must reflect the broad social needs of a community, including a clear understanding of the status of health, education, financial infrastructure and the economic base of the community. Third, a project needs to be sustainable. That is, it delivers the means to enable people to improve their lives, and the resources invested have a long-lasting impact that will not add or constitute a burden to the benefiting community. Finally, the development contribution of a project is met when its attributes and functions can be replicated with ease and do not depend on the local and unique circumstances of a community.

Looking at the experience of thousands of HTAs, many of these organizations generally give ownership of the projects to their communities and are gradually learning to focus in a correspondence between needs and desires. Not all projects correspond to the realities and priorities of a community. In Guanajuato, for example, at least one quarter of HTAs work in church-related activities that add little development to the community. Sustainability is also becoming a critical issue among HTAs, which realize that providing the means for long-standing development goals depends on long-term commitments.

**References**


Growth of Mexican Clubs in Chicago

Source: Orozco 2002.
Table 1
Relationship between Foundation of Club and Type of Activity by Percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church Work</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>100% (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ornamentation of Town</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>100% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>100% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100% (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Investment</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>100% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Education</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100% (57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Donations</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>100% (47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2
Mexico: Budget Allocation, HTA Donations and Population (Mean Values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Range</th>
<th>HTA Donation (in Dollars)</th>
<th>Ratio HTA and Public Works Budget</th>
<th>Population in Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 999</td>
<td>8,648</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 to 2,999</td>
<td>11,999</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000 to 4,999</td>
<td>8,397</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 to 9,999</td>
<td>9,602</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>7,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 to 14,999</td>
<td>11,072</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 15,000</td>
<td>14,589</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>57,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,864</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5,283</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Derived from author’s calculations.
### Table 3

**Distribution of 3x1 Funds by State in 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Amount (Thousands of US$)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>2,054</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>5,199</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michoacán</td>
<td>4,151</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puebla</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis Potosí</td>
<td>1,717</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>16,316</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other States</td>
<td>12,056</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>43,553</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 4

**FISDL-HTA Partnership Projects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>HTA Funds</th>
<th>FISDL Funds</th>
<th>Total Project Costs</th>
<th>Average Coat Project</th>
<th>HTA Donation</th>
<th>FISDL Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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Achieving Educational Equity: Beyond Individual Measures of Merit

Aída Hurtado, Ph.D., and Craig Haney, Ph.D.

Aída Hurtado, Ph.D., is a professor of psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Her areas of expertise include Latino educational issues, feminist theory and media images of Latinos. She received her B.A. in psychology and sociology from Pan American University and her Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of Michigan. Her most recent books include Voicing Chicana Feminisms: Young Women Speak Out on Sexuality and Identity (New York University Press, 2003) and Chicana/o Identity in a Changing U.S. Society: ¿Quién soy? ¿Quiénes somos?, co-authored with Patricia Gurin (The University of Arizona Press, 2004).

Craig Haney, Ph.D., is a professor of psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz. His academic specialty is psychology and law, and he studies a variety of justice-related topics, including the psychological assumptions that underlie a number of socially constructed legal practices. He received his B.A. in psychology from the University of Pennsylvania, and his Ph.D. and J.D. degrees from Stanford University. His book Death by Design: Capital Punishment as a Social Psychological System will be published by Oxford University Press this year.

How ironic that the dismantling of affirmative action in California resulting from the passage of Proposition 209 in 1996 has led to an opportunity: a new discourse has emerged on whether and how to create more meaningful measures of merit. Contextual aspects of learning—how history, setting and opportunity affect motivation and performance—are now finding a place in the discussion. Future generations may find that Scholastic Aptitude Test scores, grade point averages, and enrollment in advanced placement classes are no longer the primary measures by which their accomplishments are indexed and compared. Indeed, a new constellation of factors is being assembled that may reshape the definition of merit as we know it.

The theoretical basis for the radical reconstruction of merit has multiple sources of long-standing support in various academic disciplines (Tierney 1997). Feminist scholars have critiqued the derogation of “women’s way of knowing” (Goldberger et al. 1996). In ethnic studies, writers have bemoaned the lack of respect given to cultural variations in the definitions of what constitutes knowledge and the devaluation of experience as praxis for learning (Sandoval 1991; Pérez 1993). In the social sciences, researchers have offered data on the multiple ways of learning, including “instructional conversations” (Stanton-Salazar, Vázquez and Mehan 1996). And in the humanities, the power relations between groups in our society are understood to greatly influence what is regarded as “truth” and “knowing” (duCille 1996; Newfield and Gordon 1996). Furthermore, displacing the single-factor monolith, cognitive scientists now understand “intelligence” to be
multidimensional, context-specific and flexible in the problem solving it facilitates (Sternberg 1996). The current definition of merit must be broadened to incorporate these more recent understandings of learning, knowledge and group memberships.

For the first time in years, there is a public discussion of the basis and legitimacy of our meritocracy and the ways in which its socially constructed standards appear to be biased against various group memberships. While some version of “merit” no doubt will continue to be used to measure individual accomplishments, the role of group values, cultures and languages are also being discussed and considered in these more sophisticated equations. Ultimately, what we should mean by merit, in a system that values, implements and protects equity, will depend on the outcome of ongoing discussions between multiple constituencies. Although Latinos were the largest population to be adversely affected by Proposition 209 in California (because of their population size), the debate over its impact nonetheless was framed largely in terms of Black/White race relations (Moran 1996). As a result, to date, Latinos have had only a marginal voice in the subsequent discussion. Yet the persistent exclusion of Latinos, as well as other group constituencies, from prominent roles in this discussion and from equality-related policy making seems especially problematic as we move from a “multicultural state to a multicultural society” and as differences in numbers begin to translate into cultural transformations (Hayes-Bautista, Schink and Chapa 1988). The future definition of merit will need to be revised to reflect the complexity of these changing demographics.

The challenge will lie not just in developing but also in integrating and implementing the new conceptualizations of merit. Some small steps have already been taken in this direction. For a time, the administration of the University of California considered abolishing standardized testing as a measure of academic achievement (García and Hurtado 1997). Also considered was the use of a portfolio to evaluate students’ merits and to examine contextual factors. Another proposal was the construction of a composite index of “opportunities to learn,” consisting of parents’ higher education histories, number of advanced placement courses taken versus number offered, high school teacher-to-student ratios, etc. Unfortunately, once the affirmative action debates subsided after the Supreme Court appeared to resolve the issues in the University of Michigan case, the impetus for many of these innovative, experimental approaches diminished.

Nonetheless, in the continuing debate over access to higher education, proposals are emerging that use a context-specific measure of merit, rather than accepting the current generic standards. Even some conservatives who are unwilling to connect affirmative action to critical discussions of the nature of merit see the advantages of broadening the dimensions by which access and opportunity are granted. “Affirmative action—even race preference—has different meanings depending on the context, and that flexibility is critical” (Schrag 1995, 43). The rigid definition of merit without consideration of group memberships will result in a “thicket of legal combat and social division more bitter than anything generated by the policies we now have” (Schrag 1995, 43). A more complex, socially attuned definition of merit geared to specific equitable outcomes is our best chance of avoiding social turmoil and increasing social justice.
Economic Class as a Persistent Disadvantage

Proposition 209 prohibits the use of race as a factor in college admissions, regardless of what we know about the role that race and ethnicity play in limiting educational access to large segments of the population. We also know that ethnicity and race are not independent of socioeconomic class. Economic assets, including income levels and poverty levels, are unevenly distributed across racial and ethnic groups, and this fact, in turn, has significant consequences for access to higher education. A recent study of the University of Michigan’s student body indicates that more students than at any other time in the institution’s history come from predominantly wealthy families and that this trend is not limited to University of Michigan students.

More members of this year’s freshman class at the University of Michigan have parents making at least $200,000 a year than have parents making less than the national median of about $53,000, according to a survey of Michigan students. At the most selective private universities across the country, more fathers of freshmen are doctors than are hourly workers, teachers, clergy members, farmers or members of the military—combined (Leonhardt 2004, 1).

This trend is not specific to the University of Michigan. Indeed, the report continues:

Overall, at the 42 most selective state universities, including the flagship campuses in California, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan and New York, 40 percent of this year’s freshmen come from families making more than $100,000, up from about 32 percent in 1999 . . . Nationwide, fewer than 20 percent of families make that much money (Leonhardt 2004, 1).

Furthermore, in 2000 almost 55 percent of incoming freshmen at the “nation’s 250 most selective” public and private colleges came from “the highest-earning fourth of households,” up from 1985 when 46 percent of students came from such households (Leonhardt 2004, 1).

This shift in income levels (believed to be higher than reported since these figures were provided by incoming freshmen) reflects increasing tuition costs but also points to the costly resources provided by parents: the use of tutors, attendance of summer programs, preparatory classes for college entrance exams and even the hiring of private admissions counselors. All of these resources are obviously not equally available across income, racial and ethnic groups. In the words of one New York Times reporter, “Getting into the right college has become an obsession in many upper-income high schools” (Leonhardt 2004, 1).

A nationwide study, conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center, was reported shortly after the study cited above was released. The study documented that the most academically prepared Latino high school graduates are less likely to finish a bachelor’s degree because, despite their qualifications, Latino students tend to enroll in less selective colleges than their equally well-prepared White counterparts. Furthermore, Latino students have very different college experiences than
White students because of “delayed enrollment in college, greater financial responsibility for family members and living with family while in college rather than in campus housing” (Fry 2004, vii). All these factors are largely determined by social class and financial resources. The academic resilience of even the best-prepared Latino students cannot protect them from the negative effects of their working-class status.

**Group Memberships**

As we noted, discussions of diversity and affirmative action policy have focused primarily on race and secondarily on ethnicity. Gender has become less of a concern because women—mostly White women—now constitute at least 50 percent of enrollment in undergraduate institutions, professional schools and doctoral programs. The only programs in which White women are still underrepresented are the natural sciences, engineering and computer sciences. Significantly, other subordinate group memberships—based on sexuality, social class or physical disability—have been de-emphasized. This de-emphasis has occurred even though, as Chang (2002, 127) notes, “certainly a wide range of issues and interests in multiple facets of society pertaining to gender, class, sexual orientation and disabilities are critical parts of diversity-related efforts on colleges and universities.” New models of affirmative action should be broadened to include membership in subordinate groups—not necessarily as independent factors but as a constellation of attributes.

Debate over which group memberships should be considered in the application of affirmative action policies has helped to invigorate discourse in the social sciences and humanities over the concept of “intersectionality.” From this perspective, subordination is not seen as hierarchical nor additive simply based on the number of subordinated groups to which an individual belongs. For example, depending on the context, an African American woman is not necessarily more or less oppressed than a middle-class, blind Latino. Subordinate group memberships intersect in socially specific contexts in such a way that in some instances, an African American woman might be selected for the job while in others the Latino should be given consideration.

Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins broadly describes several components of intersectionality. She argues the concept arose in part out of the recognition that “inequality could not be explained, let alone challenged, via a race-only, or gender-only framework” (Collins 2002, 82). Instead, the notion of “interlocking oppression”—higher-level connections between systems of oppression (directed at categories such as race, class and gender) that form the social structures that create the social positions into which individuals and groups are placed—had to be taken into account. It was supplemented by an understanding of micro-level processes—“namely how each individual and group occupies a social position within the interlocking structures of oppression” (Collins 2002, 82). From this perspective, oppression is created from the joint operation of forces operating at both levels—their intersectionality.

Theories of intersectionality developed primarily as a reaction to White feminist analyses that privileged gender as the cornerstone of subordination uniting women
worldwide (Nesiah 2000). Intersectionality theorists, such as Collins, argue that “gender-only” or “race-only” analyses will not lead to understanding the position of all women, or of all men for that matter, nor to dismantling the structures that subordinated them. Intersectionality theorists also refuse to “rank the oppressions” (Moraga 1981, 29) and instead argue that group memberships in oppressed groups, such as being poor, of color or gay, intersect in significant ways that affect an individual’s experience of subordination, as well as their life chances, including the quality and quantity of education they can obtain.

The majority of Latinos can belong to several subordinated groups—being a woman, frequently coming from working-class backgrounds, often being immigrants, Spanish-speaking and at times lesbian, and appearing non-White and having non-White cultural backgrounds. All of these group memberships expose Latinos to racism, ethnocentrism, classism, heterosexism and sexism.

The experience of multiple subordinations also contributes to their degree of educational opportunities. In fact, University of California at Berkeley law professor Ian Haney López argues that the case most relevant to educational integration for Latinos was decided two weeks prior to Brown v. Board of Education. On 3 May 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hernandez v. Texas, extending constitutional protection to Mexican Americans. The case was unique in part because, at the time, both sides claimed that Mexican Americans were racially White, as were the juries from which they were being systematically excluded. Therefore, as Haney López noted, “Hernandez v. Texas forced the Court to confront directly a question it would sidestep in Brown [v. Board of Education]: under precisely what circumstances did some groups deserve constitutional protection?” (Haney López 2004, 1).

The Court’s rationale for extending constitutional protections to Mexican Americans recognized that “other differences from the community norm may define other groups which need the same protection” as those whose race or color justified intervention (quoted in Haney López 2004, A17). In terms much broader and, in retrospect, perhaps more legally powerful than Brown’s, the Court said that this question of fact—whether a group differed from the community norm in ways that required legal protection—was one that could be answered “by showing the attitude of the community” (quoted in Haney López 2004, A17).

In Hernandez, the structural subordination of Mexican Americans and the attitude of the community were established in various ways (including forcing Mexican American children into segregated schools and expelling them altogether after the fourth grade). But structural subordination works differently on different subordinated groups—ethnic, racial, gender, sexual, class and physical disability group memberships receive different discriminatory treatment that nonetheless are reflected in, among other things, the attitude of the larger community. Along with Haney López, we see this broader view of group-based subordination, which includes but moves beyond “formal racial distinctions” as a more valid and useful vehicle for creating a more equitable society. Somewhere in this process, as subordination is more broadly defined and understood in more sophisticated ways, the emerging, revamped, multidimensional concept of merit also will play a role.
References


Health coverage for immigrants remains a pressing policy challenge. Although most immigrants are in working families, many work in jobs that do not offer health insurance. Federal law has restricted Medicaid and State Child Health Insurance Plan (SCHIP) eligibility for many immigrants since 1996. As a result of limited private and public coverage, immigrants have high uninsured rates and, as such, experience difficulties accessing care. In response to the federal restrictions on Medicaid and SCHIP, a number of states have stepped in with replacement programs. As of 2004, some twenty-five states offered state-funded coverage to immigrants and/or used an available SCHIP option to provide prenatal care without regard to immigration status.

In 2003, about 33.5 million immigrants were living in the United States, representing about 12 percent of the population. While immigrant health issues have often been viewed as a concern for a few states, increases in immigration over the last twenty years, as well as increasing dispersion of immigrants around the country, have made immigrant health issues an increasingly important matter of national concern.

**Immigrants and Health Care Coverage**

Immigrants are significantly more likely to be uninsured than native citizens. Over half (52 percent) of recent immigrants were uninsured in 2003, compared to 15 percent of native citizens (see Figure 1). In 2003, non-citizens accounted for 22 percent of the 45 million people without health coverage.

These disparities in coverage are not explained by differences in work effort. Over 80 percent of immigrants have a full-time worker in the family, and low-income immigrant families are more likely to include a full-time worker than low-income native families. However, a disproportionate number of immigrants work in low-wage jobs that are less likely to offer health benefits. Thus, while nearly two-thirds of citizens had employer health coverage in 2003, about one-third of recent non-citizens had employer-based coverage (see Figure 1).

The disparity in health coverage between immigrants and citizens has widened since the enactment of restrictions on immigrants’ eligibility for public coverage under the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation
Act (PROWRA). The number of low-income legal immigrants with health coverage significantly declined despite an increase in the share of low-income immigrants with employer-based coverage. These increases were more than offset by sharp declines in Medicaid coverage among non-citizens. For example, the proportion of low-income non-citizen children with Medicaid and SCHIP decreased by 12 percentage points between 1995 and 2001 (see Figure 2). Immigrants have not been primarily responsible for the overall recent increase in the number of uninsured despite their significant coverage declines.

Lack of coverage has important health consequences and contributes to severe disparities in access to care between non-citizens and citizens. Immigrants are less likely than other individuals to have a regular source of care, to visit a doctor or to obtain preventive care.

**State Responses to Eligibility Restrictions**

A number of states have undertaken efforts to help address the coverage limitations imposed on immigrants by the 1996 PROWRA law. As of 2004, nearly half (twenty-three) used state funds to provide coverage to some or all legal immigrants who are ineligible for Medicaid or SCHIP because of the restrictions (see Figure 3). Some states also used these programs to extend coverage to undocumented immigrants—particularly children and pregnant women—who were ineligible for Medicaid prior to 1996. Additionally, seven states, including two states that do not provide any state-funded coverage for immigrants, used a recently available option to provide SCHIP-funded prenatal care regardless of the mother’s immigration status.

In total, twenty-five states provided state-funded coverage and/or used the SCHIP option to provide prenatal care without regard to immigration status. States most commonly provided coverage to some or all immigrant children or pregnant women (see Figure 4).

Most of the state-funded programs for immigrants have the same scope of coverage and rules as Medicaid (or SCHIP). However, some states only provide the coverage to very limited categories of immigrants. Further, a few provide coverage that is significantly more limited than Medicaid or SCHIP or that has rules that can limit participation, such as premiums, cost sharing, more burdensome enrollment procedures and enrollment caps.

In addition to providing state-funded coverage, some states have worked to reduce enrollment barriers for immigrants who remain eligible for Medicaid and SCHIP and to improve immigrants’ access to care. Some have made efforts to reduce confusion around eligibility, to reduce language barriers and to alleviate concerns about potential negative impacts of enrolling in coverage on immigration status.

State-funded coverage programs for immigrants and other state efforts appear to be effective in reducing uninsured rates among immigrants. Non-citizen children living in states with state-funded programs have lower uninsured rates than such children living in states without programs (see Figure 5).
Policy Implications

The 1996 limits on Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility for immigrants contributed to high uninsured rates, widened the disparity in coverage between immigrants and native citizens, and increased immigrant coverage disparities across states. In 2004, nearly half of states had replacement health coverage programs for immigrants, and it appears these efforts have been successful in helping to stem the impact of the restrictions. Overall, however, immigrants continue to face significant challenges accessing coverage and care. Further, as states have faced fiscal pressures, a few have cut or considered cutting these programs. The lack of federal funding for coverage of many immigrants means that individual states must bear the responsibility of financing their care. As a result, certain states disproportionately bear this responsibility, and immigrants’ coverage is vulnerable when states face fiscal problems.

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Figure 1

Health Insurance Coverage by Citizenship Status, 2003

Notes: Based on nonelderly population. Other includes private non-group, Medicare, and CHAMPUS.
Figure 2

Percentage Point Change in Insurance Coverage for Low-Income Children, 1995-2001

Citizen Children in Citizen Family

Non-Citizen Children

-2 %

8%

4%

Uninsured


Figure 3

State-Funded Coverage for Immigrants Who are Ineligible for Medicaid or SCHIP, May 2004

Notes: In some cases coverage is only available to limited categories of immigrants and/or is substantially more limited than Medicaid or SCHIP coverage. Arkansas, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Rhode Island use federal SCHIP funds to provide prenatal care coverage regardless of immigration status.
Figure 4

State Coverage for Immigrants, 2004

Number of States providing coverage:

- SCHIP Option of Providing Prenatal Care Regardless of Immigration Status
- State–Funded Immigrant Coverage

Notes: State policies as of May 2004. Some states provide comprehensive coverage similar to Medicaid and SCHIP. Others provide reduced coverage or restrict coverage to certain immigrants within these categories.
Figure 5

Health Insurance Coverage Among Low-Income Non-Citizen Children, 2002

Coverage in states WITH and WITHOUT state-funded coverage for non-citizens:

State-Funded Coverage

- Uninsured: 40%
- Private & Other: 20%
- Medicaid/SCHIP (including state replacement programs): 40%

No State-Funded Coverage

- Uninsured: 57%
- Private & Other: 21%
- Medicaid/SCHIP (including state replacement programs): 22%

Notes: Low-income is less than 200 percent Federal Poverty Level (FPL). Analysis excludes states that have state-funded programs that are more limited than Medicaid, are subject to enrollment or funding caps, or provide coverage to limited types of legal immigrants who are ineligible for Medicaid. States excluded completely from the analysis of children’s coverage are the District of Columbia, Florida, New Mexico and Texas. Other coverage includes private coverage and other public coverage, including Medicare and veterans’ benefits. Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities’ analysis of March 2003 Current Population Survey Data.
In his book *Hispanic Immigrant Identity: Political Allegiance vs. Cultural Preference*, George I. Monsivais investigates a paradox that is often exploited by the media and anti-immigrant interests. The paradox is this: why is it that Hispanic immigrants, most of whom plan to remain in the United States, identify themselves by their national origin and not as Americans or hyphenated Americans? This paradox raises concerns when, for example, the media show immigrants waving the flags of their mother countries. Dr. Monsivais argues that immigrants are making a cultural statement, not a political statement, and he offers substantial evidence to support his hypothesis.

The author first noticed this paradox when he was interviewing Latino immigrants in Miami and Houston. He later examined the National Latino Immigrant Study (NLIS) and found the same phenomenon. Many immigrants, although they planned to stay in the United States, had learned English, believed in the American principles of democracy and freedom but nevertheless identified themselves primarily with their country of origin. When asked, they say, “I am Cuban,” “I am Honduran,” or “I am Mexican,” more often than they say, “I am American,” or “I am Mexican American.”

Using data from the NLIS, Monsivais first constructs several measures, based on the extant literature, that specify the beliefs and behaviors necessary to be an American. In broad terms, they are, first, belief in the “American style of republican democracy” and its important values including liberty, equality, self rule, etc.; and, second, “living a moral civic life” through the practice of electoral participation and volunteerism, and proficiency in English (79). If an immigrant espouses these beliefs, values and behaviors, then she has adopted the necessary attributes of an American. What the data show is that there is no relationship between how
immigrants self-identify and their measures of “American-ness.” That is, an immigrant can demonstrate all the attributes of an American and still not refer to herself as an American. Next, Monsivais aims to show how the self-identification label is a cultural and familial label rather than a political one. He does this with focus group data gathered in California and Utah.

The interview data is, in many respects, the most compelling aspect of the book because the author acknowledges the complexity of self-identity. The author might also have taken the opportunity here to discuss the substantial literature on overlapping identities. For example, most of us identify simultaneously with our city, our town and our region, but context determines which we proclaim in any particular situation. These overlapping identities are not captured in most surveys. The author touches on these topics in the focus groups by asking participants what it means to be an American. Not surprisingly, there is a diversity of opinion, but many respondents focus on the cultural aspects of being American including diet, family relations and language. If this is their construct, it is not hard to understand why immigrants might not identify as American.

One of the strengths of the book is that it is ambitious in its exploration of the rambling literature on what it means to be an American. Monsivais focuses appropriately on the legal and social changes that remove race and ethnicity as criteria for determining who is an American. His discussion recognizes that Americans, no matter their nationality or creed, are bound by a “civic culture,” a mutually shared set of values, ideologies and practices consistent with our representative democracy. But Monsivais misses an opportunity to show explicitly that the civic culture makes the promise of voluntary pluralism. As Fuchs (1990) puts it, voluntary pluralism was the uniquely American idea that immigrant settlers and their children would be “free to maintain affection for and loyalty to their ancestral religions and cultures, while at the same time claiming an American identity by embracing the founding myths and participating in the political life of the republic” (quoted on page 33). This civic culture allows for other flags to be waved and other languages to be spoken as long as citizens and would-be citizens adopt the civic practices and beliefs of the United States.

The weakness of the book is that it tells too little of the immigrant story. The author acknowledges that this cross-sectional study provides just a slice of the immigrant experience and cannot describe how first-generation immigrants change over time. A missing component in the investigation and the discussion is whether the children of these immigrants identify as American or hyphenated Americans. In short, they do. This second generation speaks English, has learned U.S. civic traditions and is expert in American popular culture. They may speak Spanish and have some connection to their parents’ homelands, but as they enter adulthood, they do not have the same affinity for the mother countries as their parents do.

Hispanic Immigrant Identity is a detailed and technical reminder that immigrants are incorporating into the U.S. social and political culture, but the process can be slow, sporadic and at times messy. For example, we know that only 40 percent of naturalized citizens vote regularly ten years after citizenship. In those same ten years, however, more than 75 percent of immigrants are highly proficient in
English, and 32 percent are homeowners (Rodriguez 1999). While we might lament that incorporation is not proceeding more rapidly, this book and these data challenge the voices (such as Huntington 2004) who claim that Latinos are unwilling to assimilate and thus represent a threat to American democracy. Monsivais shows, rather, that the civic culture is alive and that immigrants display the values, beliefs and political loyalties of other Americans.

References


1 We use the words “Hispanic” and “Latino” interchangeably to refer to people who are from or trace their heritage to the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
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*Legacies of Brown: Multiracial Equity in American Education*


Reviewed by Brigitte Santana and Miguel Santana

Brigitte Santana is a native of Montebello, Calif. She is a junior at Cambridge Rindge & Latin School in Cambridge, Mass., and the eldest daughter of Miguel Santana. Mr. Santana, a native of East Los Angeles, Calif., recently served as chief of staff to Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina. Mr. Santana will receive a master in public administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 2005.

One year ago, during my sophomore year at Claremont High School, a predominately White high school in our Los Angeles middle class suburban town of Claremont, my Advanced Placement (AP) English class was engaged in a heated debate over the issues raised in Ralph Ellison’s *The Invisible Man*. The themes in the novel prompted an intense discussion on race in our country. At one point in the discussion, a White student pointed out the irony that while the novel was about the Black struggle for equality in America, there were no Black students in the classroom. Our class was known as an academically rigorous class, and there were no Black students in the room to contribute to the discussion. At that point, we realized how the issues raised in Ellison’s novel are relevant to current life in America. Even though 30 percent of the student body were students of color, I was the only one of a few minorities in all of my AP classes.

This year, I am attending Cambridge Rindge & Latin School in Cambridge, Mass., while my father pursues a master in public administration at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. In contrast to my California high school, the high school I am attending in Cambridge has an overwhelming number of students of color. In fact, minorities are the majority at our school. Despite this change in demographics, I continue to be the only Latina and one of two students of color in my demanding AP and honors curricula.

How can it be that inequality and segregation within this nation’s educational system persists fifty years after the landmark Supreme Court decision *Brown v. Board of Education*? The book *Legacies of Brown: Multiracial Equity in American Education*...
Education discusses this dilemma facing the American educational system through different commentaries written by scholars and civil rights activists. This collection of essays provides insight on what followed after this historic case and provides a framework for understanding the challenges that remain.

Part One provides a solid historical overview of the effects of the major legal cases involving desegregation in schools following the Brown v. Board of Education ruling. Particularly informative is the article written by Guadalupe San Miguel, Jr., and Richard R. Valencia, “From the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to Hopwood: The Educational Plight and Struggle of Mexican Americans in the Southwest.” This piece provides a survey of the major milestones in the struggle for educational parity among Mexican Americans, identifying the specific barriers being challenged and the results of the community’s interventions. The authors offer an unsettling conclusion: “As Mexican American and Latino populations grow dramatically, their educational conditions are, in fact, worsening” (161). By placing the current status of the educational system within a historical analysis, it is easier to understand why significant progress has not been made in advancing educational opportunities for Mexican Americans. However, where this piece falls short is in offering recommendations and solutions. The authors might also have taken the opportunity here to discuss what is next in this complex history.

Part Two seeks to explain the difficult process of integration following the Brown decision. By including essays and not simply academic articles, the editors effectively tell the human side of this difficult process and demonstrate through first-person narratives that desegregation and educational equality involve much more than race mixing. Particularly insightful are the essays by Imani Perry. Her first is a republication of a piece she wrote in 1988 as a sixteen-year-old for the Harvard Educational Review about her experiences attending both public and private schools in Massachusetts and the inequalities she observed in the quality of pedagogy. Today, Perry is a professor of law at Rutgers University. In her second piece, Perry reflects on her experience and offers a new legal and pedagogical theory of integration given the current context “in which de jure segregation has been abolished, but de facto segregation persists” (303). In short, she argues for what she calls “holistic integration” (304).

She reminds the reader about the larger vision so clearly articulated by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who said, “As America pursues the important task of respecting the ‘letter of the law,’ i.e., compliance with desegregation decisions, she must be equally concerned with the ‘spirit of the law,’ i.e., commitment to the democratic dream of integration” (309).

Perry’s essays, and those contained in Legacies of Brown: Multiracial Equity in American Education, resonate with me because they mirror much of my experience going from a majority-White, suburban, middle class school in Claremont, Calif., to an urban, minority-majority school in Cambridge, Mass. While Legacies of Brown: Multiracial Equity in American Education effectively answers why the goals of this historic Supreme Court decision have not been fulfilled from sociological, historical and legal perspectives, it misses an opportunity to challenge the reader to lead the next battle of fulfilling the dream of integration that is the essence of Brown v. Board of Education.
Past, Present and Possibility

Gabriel Haslip-Viera, Angelo Falcón and Félix Matos Rodríguez’s

*Boricuas in Gotham: Puerto Ricans in the Making of Modern New York City*  
(Markus Weiner Publishers 2005)

Reviewed by Frankie Cruz

Frankie Cruz, a native of Bronx, N.Y., recently served as the deputy executive director for leadership development & alumni/ae affairs at Prep for Prep in New York City. Mr. Cruz will receive a master in public administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 2005.

*Boricuas in Gotham: Puerto Ricans in the Making of Modern New York City* is a collection of essays that chronicle the challenges and achievements of the Puerto Rican community in New York City from 1945 to the present. For each section, two authors analyze the various demographic, socioeconomic, political and cultural forces impacting the advances of the Puerto Rican experience in New York. By approaching the subject matter this way, the editors empower the reader to gain a greater appreciation of the various Puerto Rican institutions and the leadership that developed in response to the challenges before them. Rather than focus solely on the sociological aspects of this community, the book recreates a general history that serves as a vital foundation for ongoing study of the future contributions of this community and its leaders.

The first set of essays illustrates the unique conditions under which Puerto Ricans started migrating to New York in significant numbers. Virginia Sánchez Korrol and Ana Cecilia Zentella describe the multiple forces in both Puerto Rico and New York City that facilitated this “Great Migration.” Because of Puerto Rico’s status as an unincorporated territory since 1898, Puerto Ricans arrive in New York City as United States citizens but with a unique set of challenges. The authors reference how social planners in the island’s government expected as much as one-third of its population to relocate to New York City as part of its own industrialization plan known as Operation Bootstrap. The authors illustrate how the Great Migration resulted in Puerto Ricans representing over 80 percent of all Latinos in New York City in the 1960s and 11 percent of the overall population. An important discussion closes the first portion of the book by contemplating the effect of city-led housing urban renewal efforts in disrupting and displacing stabilized segments of the Puerto Rican community throughout the city.
José Cruz and Angelo Falcón frame the second set of essays by examining the early process of building significant mediating institutions by various Puerto Rican leaders and communities. This chapter also examines the commonalities and differences between Puerto Ricans, Blacks and former immigrant groups. The collaboration between American Blacks and Puerto Ricans in struggles, such as the fight for community control of public schools in New York City, helped leaders appreciate the merits of organizing with others to achieve collective victories. The success of the coalition to win local control over schools emboldened young leaders in the Puerto Rican community to consider building organizations that addressed specific community needs. Encouraged to raise their voices and agendas, leaders in the Puerto Rican community started to confront the more individualistic and assimilation-modeled approach promoted by agencies like the Puerto Rico Office of Migration Services. Leaders in the Puerto Rican community began to embrace a more bicultural and bilingual construct, which came with a more direct pride in recognizing the need and desire to serve one’s own community. Long-term visionaries like Antonia Pantoja played leadership roles in organizations like Hispanic Youth Adult Association, the Puerto Rican Forum, the Puerto Rican Community Development Project and Aspira. The authors provide helpful background information on the initiation and further development of key Puerto Rican institutions and how these organizations achieved key victories for Puerto Ricans and other minorities.

The third set of essays, by Francisco L. Rivera-Batíz and Gabriel Haslip-Viera, features a look at demographic characteristics in an era when Puerto Ricans came under attack by conservative groups. This discussion is juxtaposed by successfully making progress in the area of elections and local politics. Following the election of the first Puerto Rican congressman, strides are made in various city and state offices. The authors highlight the significance of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund’s ability to successfully secure voting material in one’s own language. Further, the authors discuss the election of New York’s first African American mayor, which demonstrated the potential for Puerto Ricans to forge coalitions with other minority groups.

The fourth and final set of essays, by Angelo Falcón, Clara Rodríguez and the Honorable Fernando Ferrer, attempts to project the future trajectory of the Puerto Rican community and its leadership. Focusing on the fact that Puerto Ricans are gradually becoming a smaller portion of Latinos in New York City, the authors emphasize the important role Puerto Ricans can play in the future and ongoing “latinization” of New York City as important facilitators or power brokers for other Hispanic groups from Latin, South and Central America. The essays highlight how other communities would be well served by analyzing the unique Puerto Rican experiences in order to plan their future advances.

Boricuas in Gotham: Puerto Ricans in the Making of Modern New York City is an impressive collection of scholarly and community-relevant work that provides an incredible roadmap for scholars or students of community empowerment. Anyone interested in how Puerto Rican leadership and institutions are serving this community will be well served by this refreshing collection of essays. Rather than
rely on a superficial accounting on the successes and failures of this community, this work delves deeper into the overall context in which events unfolded.

Much of what is featured in this book is a result of a conference in 2000 organized by the late Dr. Antonia Pantoja, who worked to re-examine the past achievements, current conditions and future strategies for institutions and leaders serving the Puerto Rican community. *Boricuas in Gotham: Puerto Ricans in the Making of Modern New York City* honors the work of the incredible institution-builder, Dr. Antonia Pantoja.
The Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute
http://www.chci.org/
In keeping with the theme of this year’s journal, “Furthering Prosperity: The Impact of Latinos on the United States,” the editorial staff selects the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute (CHCI) as a resource for leadership development and educational opportunities. The mission of CHCI is to “develop the next generation of Latino leaders.” To this end, CHCI offers a number of leadership development programs, services and activities, including a summer internship program, public policy fellowship program and scholarship awards.

Senator Mel Martinez
http://martinez.senate.gov/
Senator Martinez (R-FL) was elected as Florida’s thirty-third senator in November of 2004 and joined Senator Salazar as the first Hispanics in the U.S. Senate in over twenty-five years. Prior to the Senate, he served for three years in President Bush’s Cabinet as the Housing and Urban Development Secretary. Senator Martinez serves on the Foreign Relations, Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Energy and Aging Committees.

Senator Ken Salazar
http://salazar.senate.gov/
Joining his colleague, Senator Martinez, Senator Salazar (D-CO) demonstrates the impact of Latinos on the United States. In November of 2004, Senator Salazar was elected as Colorado’s thirty-fifth U.S. senator. Prior to his election, he served as the attorney general for the state of Colorado for six years. Senator Salazar serves on the Senate Committees on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Energy and Natural Resources, and Veterans Affairs.

The Tomás Rivera Policy Institute
http://trpi.org/
The editorial staff selects the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute (TRPI) as one of best Hispanic policy Web sites. Founded in 1985, TRPI conducts and disseminates rigorous objective research on policy issues affecting Latinos in the United States and its implications. To date, the Institute has published over two hundred research reports and policy briefs on a wide scope of issues, ranging from education to information technology.
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The Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy (HJHP) is now accepting submissions for Volume 18, to be published in May 2006. HJHP is an annual, non-partisan scholarly review published by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. HJHP’s mission is to educate and provide leadership that improves the quality of public policies affecting the Latino community. One of the only policy journals dedicated to examining the effects of policy on Latinos, HJHP hopes to further the economic, social and political empowerment of Latinos.

HJHP is interested in manuscripts that emphasize the relationship between policy making and the political, social and economic environments affecting Latinos in the United States. Topics of interest include (but are not limited to):

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To be eligible for the editorial review, an article must satisfy the following requirements:

- Articles must be original and unpublished.
- Articles should be 15-25 double-spaced pages.
- Articles should be submitted in Microsoft Word.
- References and citations should be formatted in the author-date system via running text, according to the guidelines in the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Footnotes are not accepted.
- All figures, tables and charts should be submitted as entirely separate files.

The submission should also include the following:

- A cover letter with the author’s name, address, e-mail address, daytime and evening phone number, a brief biography and five hard copies of the article.
- A copy of the article on 3.5” IBM disk.
- A one-hundred-word abstract.
- Note: Authors are required to cooperate with editing and fact checking.

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