IN MEMORY OF

César Chávez 1927-1993

HARVARD JOURNAL OF HISPANIC POLICY

VOLUME 6 • 1992-1993

SPECIAL FOCUS
1992 Latino Electoral Participation

FEATURE ARTICLES
Latinos and the 1992 Presidential Campaigns:
A National Overview
Dr. Louis DeSipio
Dr. Rodolfo O. de la Garza

The Cuban Community and the 1992 Presidential Election
Dr. Dario Moreno
Dr. Christopher L. Warren

Latinos and the 1992 Election in Texas:
High Expectations for Political Gains
Dr. Valerie J. Martinez

The Impact of the Latino Vote in the 1992 Presidential Election in Arizona
Dr. Manuel Avelos

FORUM
Targeting Diverse Voters:
A Case Study of the Latino Community
The *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* is funded entirely through subscriptions and contributions. The John F. Kennedy School of Government is able to provide only in-kind assistance due to an official policy not to fund student coordinated publications. We thank the administration for that assistance. We would also like to thank the following donors who have made the publication of our sixth issue possible.

The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation

The Rockefeller Foundation

Donations provided in support of the journal are tax deductible as a non-profit gift under Harvard University’s IRS 501(c)(3) status. Contributions should specify intent for the use only by the *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* in order to facilitate the required accounting procedures.
EXECUTIVE ADVISORY BOARD

Chairperson
The Honorable Grace Flores-Hughes
President
Grace, Inc.

Arturo Madrid, Ph.D.
President
The Tomás Rivera Center

Raydean Acevedo
President and CEO
Research Management Consultants, Inc.

Ernest R. Marquez
Nuclear Information Systems Manager
Southern California Edison

Juanita Bordas
Senior Program Associate
Center for Creative Leadership

The Honorable Velma Montoya
Commissioner
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission

James R. Carr
Dean - EPA Institute
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Harry Pachon, Ph.D.
Kenan Professor
Claremont Colleges

Jane L. Delgado, Ph.D.
President and CEO
National Coalition of Hispanic Health and Human Services Organizations

Eduardo J. Padrón, Ph.D.
President - Wolfson Campus
Miami-Dade Community College

Fern Espino, Ph.D.
President & CEO
Bronze Enterprises

Henry A. J. Ramos
Founding Editor, 1984–86

Alfredo J. Estrada
Editor and Publisher
HISPANIC Magazine

The Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard
Congresswoman
U.S. House of Representatives

Giselle Fernández
Correspondent
CBS News

Raúl R. Tapia
Partner
Murray, Scheer, Tapia & Montgomery

Juliet Garcia, Ph.D.
President
The University of Texas at Brownsville

Victor Vasquez
Assistant Commissioner
Public Utility Commission
The State of Oregon

Francis D. Gomez
Director, Public Programs
Philip Morris Companies, Inc.

The Honorable Al Zapanta
Executive Vice President
U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce

The Honorable Jack Kemp
Director
Empower America
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Chairperson
Roberto G. Trujillo
Director of Ethnic Studies
Stanford University

Sonia M. Pérez
Policy Analyst
National Council de la Raza

Frank Bonilla
Director, Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños
Hunter College

Ricardo Romo
Professor of History
University of Texas at Austin

Alex Saragoza
Associate Professor, Chicano Studies Program
University of California, Berkeley

Raymond Buriel
Chair, Chicano Studies
The Claremont Colleges

Fernando M. Torres-Gil, Ph.D.
Prof. of Gerontology and Public Administration
University of Southern California

Angelo Falcón
President
Institute for Puerto Rican Policy

Angela Valenzuela, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Sociology
Rice University

Lisa Fuentes, Ph.D.
Sociologist in Residence
The American University

Lca Ybarra, Ph.D.
Chair, Chicano Studies
California State University, Fresno

David Hayes-Bautista, Ph.D.
Director, Chicano Studies Research Center
University of California, Los Angeles

Mario T. Garcia, Ph.D.
Professor of History and American Studies
Yale University
BOARD OF EDITORS

Editors
Alma R. Ayala
1993
Daniel Luna
1991-92
Lisa G. Baltazar
1993-94

Directors
Board Relations
Rita Jaramillo
Tomás Larralde
Distribution
Dale P. Johnson
Serena Cruz
Sylvia Trujillo

Production
Xavier Briggs
Ruth Román

Administration/Finance
María Díaz
Laura Detrès

Staff
Andrés Acevedo
Noel Bravo
Leonor Ehling
Rudy Fuentes
Bonnie Gonzalez
Katia Hetter
Carrie Lopez
Edmundo Rodriguez
Paul Roldán

We would like to acknowledge Jesse and Jan Martinez, for their assistance in
the production of this volume. A special thanks to the following former
editors of the journal whose legacy continues to be a source of inspiration for
Latino students at the John F. Kennedy School of Government:

Henry A. J. Ramos, Founding Editor, 1984-86
Adolph P. Falcon 1986-87
Marlene M. Morales, 1986-87
Kimura Flores, 1987-88
Luis J. Martinez, 1988-89
Genoveva L. Arellano, 1989-90
David Moguel, 1989-90
Carlo E. Porcelli, 1990-91
Laura F. Sainz, 1990-91
Diana Tisnado, 1991-92
CONTENTS

Editors’ Remarks ........................................................................................................................................ 1

FEATURE ARTICLES

Latinos and the 1992 Presidential Campaigns:
A National Overview
Dr. Louis DeSipio
Dr. Rodolfo O. de la Garza ................................................................. 5

The Cuban Community and the 1992 Presidential Election
Dr. Dario Moreno
Dr. Christopher L. Warren ................................................................. 27

Latinos and the 1992 Election in Texas:
High Expectations for Political Gains
Dr. Valerie J. Martinez ........................................................................ 37

The Impact of the Latino Vote in the 1992 Presidential Election in Arizona
Dr. Manuel Avalos ............................................................................. 51

FORUM

“Republican and Democratic Strategies in Targeting Diverse Voters:
A Case Study of the Latino Community” ............................................. 65

Panelists:
Dr. Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Professor of Community Affairs, University of Texas at Austin
Maria Echaveste, National Latino Coordinator and Deputy Policy Coordinator, Clinton for President Campaign
James Weber, Republican Political Consultant, Frank Luntz and Associates
Dr. Dario Moreno, Professor of Political Science, Florida International University
Charles Royer, Director, Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government


Editors' Remarks

Previous volumes of *The Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* have examined a range of political, economic, and social concerns impacting the U.S. Latino community. Volume VI marks the first time the *Journal* produces a publication with a thematic focus. The historic changes brought about by the 1992 elections and our good fortune in having Professor Rodolfo de la Garza agree to have the *Journal* be the first to publish the latest findings from a national project he is directing, "Latinos and the 1992 Elections," both contributed to this decision.

The *Journal* is still the only national public policy publication focusing exclusively on the Latino community and continues to serve as an important resource for policymakers interested in a complexified understanding of the major issues facing all Americans. The challenges posed by these articles, and specifically articulated by Dr. de la Garza in a Forum discussion held earlier this spring, is to recognize that "the study of Latino politics is not anything other than the study of American politics."

Specifically, this issue examines Latino electoral behavior and participation rates and the extent to which Latinos influenced the agendas of the Democratic and Republican parties as well as electoral outcomes. The studies in Volume VI build on research conducted during the 1988 and 1990 elections, providing valuable information and insights about the exercise of electoral power by Latinos.

Ironically, the large Latino communities in delegate-rich states that we traditionally focus on, e.g. New York and California, had their electoral might diminished by the overwhelming support candidate Bill Clinton received from other sectors of the population. Results of the national study show that in order for the Latino community to influence the outcome of a national election, the rest of the electorate must be evenly split between the candidates thereby leaving Latinos as the decisive political force. Close political races in Arizona and Florida created just such conditions during the 1992 presidential election and placed those Latino communities in a position to im-
pact the outcome in their states. The articles chosen for this edition, then, provide a national overview and focus on Arizona, Florida, and Texas. For an analysis of the results of the states that were part of the study, (including New York, California, and Illinois), please look for the “Latinos and the 1992 Elections” project’s upcoming book.

In the overview, Dr. de la Garza and Dr. Louis DeSipio delineate some theoretical requirements for increasing the likelihood that the Latino community could exert influence in elections. Based on that framework, the authors then look at dynamics impacting the primaries and the general election including the Clinton campaign’s decision to de-emphasize an ethnic appeal, possible benefits the Latino community could reap from this approach, and the fact that the Democratic ticket garnered its lowest share of the Latino vote in history.

In Dr. Manuel Avalos’ assessment of what happened in Arizona, we find that the opportunity to be a swing vote did not translate into electoral power. Dr. Dario Moreno and Dr. Christopher L. Warren, on the other hand, highlight the growing political muscle of the Cuban-American community in Florida, and the critical role it played in helping George Bush win in that state. In the process, they provide a nuanced picture of what it means to be a Cuban-American and Republican in Florida.

Dr. Valerie J. Martínez analyzes both the presidential and state campaigns in Texas. She found that some of the same principles which were outlined in the overview article hold true at the local level even when Latino voters make up the majority of a district. Her study highlights the problems arising from divisions within the Latino community and the way these divisions affected the community’s broader political aspirations.

Finally, Volume VI contains the transcript of a Forum hosted by the Journal at the John F. Kennedy School of Government in March entitled “Republican vs Democratic Strategies in Targeting Diverse Voters: A Case Study of the Latino Community.” Academics and practitioners came together to analyze, dispute, and defend the political significance—or lack thereof—of the Latino electorate. As always, we have tried to capture the spirited exchange that took place when some very provocative findings were discussed.

As we worked on the final sections of this issue, we learned that César Chávez had passed away. We felt that it would be fitting to dedicate this volume to a man who had dedicated his life to creating and mobilizing political resources in the Latino community. His tireless advocacy for the disenfranchised has left an indelible mark on politics and the policymaking process in this country. And his com-
mitment to the struggle for justice and human rights has inspired countless members of the Latino community, and other communities, to become politically active. We are proud to offer Volume VI as a small reflection of his enormous legacy.

You may have noticed several changes in this volume. We are now the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy, making our formal links with Harvard more explicit. The board of directors has also been restructured. We want to thank former members of the board for their tremendous support and guidance during the journal’s first six years. Current and former staff members are indebted to you. We welcome the new members joining us and look forward to exciting future editions. We also want to acknowledge the hard work of our two new chairpersons: The Honorable Grace Flores-Hughes, who has been a motivating force on the Executive Advisory Board and Roberto Trujillo, who, along with other members of the Editorial Board, has provided invaluable feedback on the articles in this issue.

This issue represents two years of staff efforts to consolidate day-to-day operations, increase communication links with our board, and increase the visibility of the Journal. Funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, and the work of previous staff members to obtain that funding, has immeasurably eased the burden. Last but certainly not least, a very special thank you to the staff and directors who have dedicated their valuable time, effort, creativity, and encouragement to the Journal. To those of you who served in several capacities during those years (y qué)—we are grateful. La lucha ha sido dura, pero el resultado ha valido la pena y nos ha llenado de orgullo. ¡Nuestra meta se ha realizado!

Lisa G. Baltazar
Alma R. Ayala
Daniel Luna

Cambridge, Massachusetts
May 1993
LATINOS AND THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS: A NATIONAL OVERVIEW

Louis DeSipio, Ph.D.
Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Ph.D.

Louis DeSipio is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Wellesley College. His research focuses on Ethnic politics, specifically Latino politics. He is co-author of Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics and the co-editor of volumes on Latinos and the 1988 and 1990 electoral campaigns.

Rodolfo O. de la Garza is the Mike Hogg Professor of Community Affairs and Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. His research focuses on both United States and Mexican politics. Most recently, he has been the principal investigator in the Latino National Political Survey, the first nationally representative study of the political values, attitudes and behaviors of major Latino national origin groups. He is the author of numerous books and articles on Latino politics.

Abstract
This article examines the role of Latino electorates in the 1992 presidential campaign. We examine both the role of Latino voters in deciding electoral outcomes and the degree to which the campaigns and the candidates sought Latino votes. This analysis reflects detailed study of the course of the 1992 campaign, but also benefits from comparisons to recent national and local campaigns in areas with high concentrations of Latinos. The findings reported here are also part of a larger national Ford Foundation financed study of Latinos and the 1992 elections.

INTRODUCTION

Relative to 1988, the Latino role in the 1992 presidential campaign was muted. At points where Latinos had played a significant
role in the 1988 contest—influencing the decisions of candidates to enter the race, determining key state votes in the party primaries, and receiving bipartisan attention and outreach before the fall campaigns—they were less involved in 1992. As with the 1988 election, Latino votes were not necessary to the winning candidate’s victory. Despite these differences, however, the Latino role may have indeed been greater in 1992.

Unlike 1988, the candidate receiving the majority of Latino votes won the election. This circumstance raises the likelihood that Latinos will be able to influence and shape policy outcomes over the next four years. At a more profound level, Latinos were more thoroughly incorporated into the campaigns than ever before. Importantly, Latino participation occurred throughout the campaigns and not simply in Latino constituency positions. Further, both parties solicited Latino votes and, in part, constructed their strategies around winning components of this vote. Thus, while Latino votes may not have determined victory at either the state or national level, they were sought after and, in some cases, Latinos designed the strategy to win these and other votes.

In this article, we examine the course of the 1992 presidential campaigns. Our particular emphasis is the perceived importance of Latino votes in each contest and the role of Latinos in shaping campaign strategies and outcomes. We should note at the outset that the analysis presented here is somewhat limited by the unavailability at the time of this writing of the Current Population Survey’s review of voting and registration in the 1992 election.

LATINOS AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: LESSONS FROM THE 1980S

A recurring theme in the study of impact of Latino votes in state and national elections is that they rarely influence outcomes. While this statement may seem stark, it acts as a counterweight to many unsubstantiated claims about the importance of the Latino vote that are based solely on the rapid growth in the Latino population over the past two decades.

A recurring theme in the study of impact of Latino votes in state and national elections is that they rarely influence outcomes.
Why is this impact so rare? There are two broad explanations. The first relates to Latinos’ demographic characteristics. Latinos are on average poorer, less educated, less affluent, and less likely to be U.S. citizens than other groups within the electorate. Each of these characteristics limits the likelihood of any electorate from voting. Among Latinos, these factors assure that, absent a community-wide mobilization to dampen their negative effects, the pool of non-voting adults will grow more rapidly than the pool of voters.

The second explanation looks outside of the Latino communities to identify society’s or, more specifically, electoral institutions’ failure to mobilize Latinos as voters and to seek their active participation. Areas of high Latino concentration, with the exception of South Florida, are often neglected by campaigns, candidates and parties. As a result, new voters, of which the Latino communities have a disproportionate share, are not socialized to electoral politics.

What then did we expect from Latino electorates in the 1992 presidential elections? As this discussion would indicate, our assumption at the outset of the election was that Latinos could play a key role in statewide outcomes only in exceptional circumstances. In his analysis of the 1988 California races, Fernando Guerra identifies six conditions necessary for Latino influence to be felt:

1) Latinos must be unified in their support for one candidate;
2) the contest must be very close and the state must be important to national victory;
3) long-term strategies for voter registration and mobilization must exist;
4) Latinos must be visible in the nominating convention and subsequent campaign;
5) the ballot must have Latino candidates and issues of importance to the Latino community;
6) either the party or the campaign must have a strategy for mobilizing Latino voters without alienating the general electorate.

These conditions present a narrow, but, we would argue, realistic range for potential Latino electoral influence.

The example of the 1988 election demonstrated, however, that influence could appear in forms other than determining the winner in November. Latinos, we found, were more influential in the primaries and in the period around the party conventions than in the general election. We also found that Latino elites served as intermediaries between campaigns and potential Latino voters. Finally, we
documented what had previously been anecdotal evidence of a slow migration by some Mexican-American Democrats to the Republican party and the Republican party's concomitant efforts to attract the Mexican-American electorate.

The study of Latinos and the 1990 elections reinforced and supplemented the factors identified by Guerra. Most importantly, local issues played a fundamental role in mobilizing Latino voters. In each of the five study sites, potential voters were primarily concerned with local problems and local issues. These discussions were frequently in the context of candidates and campaigns failing to discuss their concerns.

Going into the 1992 presidential race, then, we anticipated that Latinos would have a greater role in the primaries than in the general election. Mexican-Americans in Texas, Latinos in Illinois, and Puerto Ricans in New York could have filled this role. Further, as the race seemed destined to be close, we anticipated that the period around the party conventions would see outreach to the Latino electorates. This targeted outreach is a safety device candidates use to assure that they can turn to Latinos if needed later in the election. Finally, because the election remained close, we anticipated that both candidates would seek Latino votes in electoral college delegate-rich states. While the experience of 1988 demonstrated that the conditions under which the Latino vote plays a major role are rare, we anticipated that 1992 might meet these conditions, at least in some states. For all electorates, including Latinos, the 1992 election proved to defy expectations.

THE 1992 NATIONAL CAMPAIGN

The Primaries

The 1992 presidential campaign differed from many of its predecessors. The campaign season began quite late and many of the major potential Democratic candidates decided not to compete. While their reasons were never made public, party luminaries such as Jesse Jackson, Mario Cuomo, Jay Rockefeller, Al Gore and Lloyd Bentsen opted out of the race. The media characterized the eventual field—Bill Clinton, Paul Tsongas, Jerry Brown, Tom Harkin, Bob Kerrey and Douglas Wilder—as second string if not second rate.

The decision by the first tier of Democrats to avoid the race reinforced an image of George Bush as largely invincible. In addition to the benefits of incumbency, he enjoyed high popular support from the Gulf War. Yet, despite this perception of invincibility, Bush faced two Republican opponents—Pat Buchanan and David Duke.
While neither of these candidates lasted beyond the early primaries, they served to create an air of vulnerability around the incumbent president.

Latino voters did not play a decisive role in the Democratic party primaries in 1992. While Latinos did play a role in several primaries, their patterns of support followed the tendencies of other Democratic voters in these states, so they could not claim responsibility for a candidate’s victory. Likewise, none of the candidates created a specific message targeted to Latino voters in any of the primary states.

Of the campaigns, only Bill Clinton actively sought Mexican-American votes, particularly in Texas. During one of his first campaign trips, Clinton visited South Texas and earned endorsements from prominent local elected officials. Clinton attended the annual conference of the (Texas) Mexican-American Democrats (MAD). His strategy of seeking these votes early paid off. In January, he received MAD’s endorsement with an overwhelming 97 percent of the vote. This endorsement came the same weekend that the State Democratic Executive Committee endorsed him, making Clinton the odds-on favorite in the Texas primary.

Although not as strongly as the MAD delegates, Latino voters supported Clinton on primary election day. Clinton beat his two remaining opponents by a large margin—64 percent to 19 percent for Paul Tsongas and nine percent for Jerry Brown.

The following week in the Illinois primary, Clinton captured 60 percent of the Latino vote. Paul Tsongas received 23 percent of the Latino votes and Jerry Brown garnered nine percent. In the next major primary state with significant numbers of Latino voters, New York, Clinton again bested his opponents. Earning 63 percent of the Latino votes, Clinton beat Brown’s 26 percent and Tsongas’ ten percent. Prior to the final round of primaries, which included California and New Mexico, Clinton had already assured his nomination.

The New York Times aggregated the results of its primary election exit polls from the 29 states with primaries. They found that 51 percent of Latinos supported Clinton, 30 percent supported Jerry Brown, and 15 percent supported Tsongas. While this rate of support for Clinton appears to be somewhat lower and the rate for Brown somewhat higher than the other exit polls reported here, the Times recap indicates an important point about Clinton’s Latino support. Across all electorates, Clinton received 50 percent of the vote. Support among whites was 47 percent and blacks 70 percent. Thus, Latinos gave Clinton slightly more support than the population as a whole, but not too much more. This pattern holds in each of the states with large numbers of Democratic Latino voters.
Latino voters were also marginal to the outcome of the Republican primaries. George Bush relied on their support, but did not actively campaign for the votes of Republican Latinos. Instead, the Republican party machinery used the primary period to prepare a Latino campaign for the general election. Latinos did, however, play contrasting symbolic roles in the competition to unseat George Bush as the Republican standard bearer. Factions within the Republican right sought to garner Latino votes and to exploit Latinos, specifically Latino immigrants, to galvanize white Republicans against George Bush. There is neither polling data nor anecdotal evidence that either of these efforts succeeded.

George Bush did not need Republican Latino voters to win his party’s presidential nomination. Although his campaign was shocked by Pat Buchanan’s showing in New Hampshire, it had controlled the damage by the time Latino votes became important in Florida and Texas. According to a poll conducted the week before the election, Bush was handily beating Buchanan in Florida by a margin of 68 percent to 19 percent. Bush’s margin in Texas was much stronger—83 percent to 17 percent for Buchanan. Bush’s victory margin among Texas Hispanics exceeded his margin among white voters by 13 percent. President Bush did not face serious opposition in the primaries in the other states with large Latino Republican constituencies.

Despite President Bush’s seemingly wide support by Republican Latinos, both of his primary opponents attempted to use the Latino communities, though in very different ways. David Duke brought his presidential campaign to the Miami Cuban community early in the campaign. In December 1991, he visited the city and found the nexus of Cuban political discussion—the radio call-in show. Seeking to distinguish Miami’s Cubans (who are largely immigrant in origin) from his otherwise anti-immigrant position, Duke noted that Cubans have been a “tremendous asset” to the United States and that “they’re Christian people, they’re anti-communist.”

Pat Buchanan took a different tack with Latinos. Instead of courting the vote, he seemed to categorize Latinos as undocumented immigrants. His call for the “Buchanan Fence,” a fenced-in trench along the U.S.-Mexico border, promised to halt 90 percent of undocumented migration. The promise of the fence was just part of a broader, more cynical strategy to articulate the fears of a loss of American culture.

Between the Primaries and the General Elections: Establishing the Styles of the Presidential Race

By mid-April, George Bush was assured of winning his party’s nomination. Bill Clinton formally had to wait until late May. This
early conclusion to the primary season offered each campaign a long period to prepare for the fall election. The entrance of Ross Perot into the race, however, confused both candidates’ plans and created new imperatives that could not be anticipated in April.

With the end of the primary campaign season, Bill Clinton began to reach out to specific Democratic party constituency groups in preparation for the general elections. While he performed many of the traditional tasks used to court blocs of voters, Clinton also used this period to distinguish his effort from those of recent Democratic nominees, particularly Walter Mondale and Michael Dukakis. Clinton spoke of inclusion for all Americans and was less likely to appear to pand to groups within the society. This difference was particularly marked in his dealings with the black community, in general, and Jesse Jackson, in particular, but was also felt by Latino leaders.

Clinton’s new approach did not preclude some specific outreach to Latinos. As we have mentioned, Clinton sought MAD’s endorsement. He also appointed a Latino constituency director during the primaries. Like Bush, he spoke at the annual meeting of the National Association of Hispanic Journalists in April. After the primary season ended, he attended the national LULAC (League of United Latin American Citizens) convention and spoke at the annual meeting of the National Association of Latino Elected Officials by satellite. He also named José Villareal, a San Antonio attorney, as deputy campaign manager.

Despite these activities, Clinton’s campaign sought to speak to the needs of all Americans, not just Latinos or any other component of the Democratic coalition. This inclusiveness appeared both in the campaign’s rhetoric and actions. In a press release announcing the candidate’s attendance at the LULAC convention, Clinton is quoted as saying, “I come here to pledge to you an administration that looks like America, that feels like America, that understands the pain and promise of this country and will involve you and all Americans in the struggle to make it better.”

Clinton’s choice of Senator Al Gore as his running mate also reflected, to many, this conscious lack of concern for traditional Democratic efforts to balance tickets among party constituencies. Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina showed surprise (and in her case, disappointment) with Clinton’s choice by calling them “two white men from the South.”

The Democratic Party Convention demonstrated the dualism as well. Latinos were more fairly represented both as delegates and as convention officials than at any previous party convention. At the same time, Clinton did not reach out to specific groups as had
previous Democratic candidates. Latino leaders played major formal party and convention roles. Five Latinos served on platform committees and six spoke before the convention. Yet, there was little active outreach to Latinos or to specifically Latino issues. Hispanic delegates and alternates numbered approximately 373 out of the 4,928 delegates and alternates.

The Republicans and President Bush

The Bush campaign did not use the period between the primaries and the general election as well as it had in 1988 to reach out to non-traditionally Republican constituencies, such as Latinos. Two factors explain this failure. First, Ross Perot entered the debate, if not the race. Second, the Republican convention spoke more to core Republican adherents while alienating many moderates and liberals.

The impact of Ross Perot's consideration of a race for the presidency on the Bush campaign has been extensively analyzed and need not be discussed here. Instead, it is important to note that the Bush campaign feared the Perot challenge and, beginning in April, focused more on it and on preserving core Republican constituencies than on reaching out to new Republican voters.

Despite this lack of leadership at the top of the campaign, Republican party efforts to reach out to the Latino electorates did continue. While counting on high levels of support from Cuban-Americans, the Republican party also sought new levels of support from Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans. The Republican National Committee conducted "surrogate training sessions" for local Hispanic Republican leaders. These sessions, conducted by senior-level campaign professionals, were designed to provide individual Republican activists with the skills to spread the party message. Once trained, these activists received frequent fax messages discussing the daily message of the Bush campaign and providing them with talking points for the local press.

Despite this lack of leadership at the top of the campaign, Republican party efforts to reach out to the Latino electorates did continue.

The party also researched the Clinton record in preparation for the general election. They documented five areas of potential weakness: 1) Clinton signed a bill making English the official language of Arkansas; 2) during Clinton's tenure as Governor, Arkansas failed to
pass a civil rights law, one of just two states without such a law; 3) Clinton failed to appoint Latinos to positions in Arkansas government; 4) Clinton signed into law a bill that defined minority businesses as those owned only by African-Americans; and 5) the Arkansas state police implemented a policy during the Clinton administration that allowed them to stop cars with drivers meeting a profile that included ‘looking Hispanic’ and having Texas license plates. These points became the central theme in the Republican party’s effort to distance Latinos from Bill Clinton. By the end of the campaign, the Bush campaign and the Republican party distributed over 100,000 bilingual flyers noting these five Clinton weaknesses.

The strategy of nurturing a new generation of Latino Republicans also surfaced at the Republican convention. According to the party, 238 of the 4,414 delegates and alternates were Latino. Six Latinos served on the Republican platform committee and 13 spoke before the convention. Perhaps the strongest advocate of Hispanics for Bush at the convention was the most unexpected (he did not appear on the pre-convention schedules)—George P. Bush, the President’s grandson and the son of Jeb and Columba Bush. Speaking on family night, George P. presented a polished and loving defense of his grandfather’s devotion to family. “Family,” he said, “is what makes my grandfather tick.” He finished his statement, some said as an afterthought, with a shout of “Viva Bush!” After an evening of negative and narrow messages about family, George P. electrified the convention.

Despite these record-high levels of Latino participation in the Republican convention, the party’s ongoing turmoil affected the Hispanic delegates. The party platform called for the use of the “tools, technologies, and structures necessary to secure the border.” While advocating ethnic diversity, the platform also warned that illegal immigration “threatens the social compact on which immigration is based.” The platform language advocating ‘tools, technologies, and structures’ caused much concern among Latino Republican leaders and some Latino delegates. The party responded by passing a resolution stating that the platform explicitly did not mean a wall. Finally, one Latino added to the negative and moralistic messages of some convention speakers that alienated many non-Republicans. U.S. Treasurer Catalina Villapando dismissed Henry Cisneros’ support for Clinton because both were “skirt-chasers.”

Few outside observers noticed the prominent position for Latino Republicans. Instead, the strident conservative tone and intolerant message of many of the convention’s leading speakers shifted attention away from Republican efforts to include Latinos in newly prominent roles.

Louis DeSipio/Rudolfo O. de la Garza
Perot

As Ross Perot began to consider running for the presidency, the only sure thing was that his campaign would be different. In terms of outreach to Latinos, he was either different or retrograde depending on one’s reading of American history. Prior to his withdrawal from the race during the Democratic convention in July, he made no effort to reach out to Latinos as individuals or as a constituency. He spoke to no Latino groups and there is no record that he named any Latinos to his National Advisory Panel of 100 (the group was not fully formed at the time of his withdrawal). Although he did make more of an effort to reach out to African-Americans, the legacy of this attempt was his controversial “you people” comment in a speech before the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Despite the distance Perot maintained from Latinos, he interested many. Polls taken during the California primary indicated that 34 percent of California Latinos favored Perot. While this was less than the 44 percent of whites supporting Perot, it exceeded the 24 percent support indicated from the African-American community.

THE GENERAL ELECTION

Between January and Labor Day, the presidential election experienced three distinct shifts. As we have indicated, President Bush was perceived as largely invincible by all but the Republican right early in the race. Beginning in April, Ross Perot had come to lead in some polls despite not yet being a candidate. Beginning with the Democratic convention (and Perot’s withdrawal), Clinton led. This lead, though weak nationally, was particularly strong in several of the larger states with large numbers of electoral votes such as California, Illinois, and New York. Thus, the context of the discussion of the 1992 general election is Clinton leading Bush, at times by large margins in the electoral college, with Perot nearby on the sidelines.

The “Dukakis-Not” Campaign

As soon as the Democratic convention ended, Bill Clinton and Al Gore sought to distinguish themselves from the practices of the party’s 1988 nominee. Where Dukakis had returned to Massachusetts to attend to state business and to take a vacation, Clinton and Gore immediately took the first of their highly successful bus tours. Throughout the fall, Clinton did things differently than Dukakis and other Democrats before him. This difference extended to many aspects of the style of the Clinton Latino campaign. Specifically, the campaign included Latinos and relied on Latino campaign staffers throughout

14 Feature Articles
the campaign to a degree that had not been true of previous presidential campaigns. In addition to seeking Latino votes through the national campaign, it had a functionally autonomous strategy to win Latino votes. Clinton’s personal efforts to reach out to Latinos appeared only at the end of the campaign when the focus shifted to get-out-the-vote.

At a formal level, the most important aspect of the Clinton Latino campaign was *Adelante Con Clinton!* This effort was in the tradition of previous attempts by the Democrats to target constituency groups. Maria Echaveste, the campaign’s Latino coordinator, directed the effort. The model for *Adelante Con Clinton!* was the *Viva Kennedy!* clubs of the 1960 election. These clubs had galvanized and mobilized Mexican-Americans for President Kennedy and may well have assured his victory in Texas and New Mexico, which in turn assured his victory in the electoral college.

The impetus for the *Adelante Con Clinton!* effort was not the candidate or the party, but, instead, Latino Democrats who wanted symbolic outreach. Interestingly, Latinos within the campaign opposed its formation.

Once established, *Adelante Con Clinton!* prepared printed materials to distribute in areas with high concentrations of Latinos, reviewed (but did not create) English and Spanish language media directed to Latinos, assured that Latinos were appointed to senior positions within the state-level coordinated campaigns in key states, responded to the concerns of Latino leaders and elected officials, and, generally, troubleshooted.

The impetus for the *Adelante Con Clinton!* effort was not the candidate or the party, but, instead, Latino Democrats who wanted symbolic outreach. Interestingly, Latinos within the campaign opposed its formation. The tenor of the campaign also opposed its formation. As we have suggested, Clinton sought to unify as opposed to create distinct interest groups. For the most part, the campaign stuck to its philosophy; *Adelante Con Clinton!* was the only visible race- or ethnic-based support group that received campaign funds. Many African-American leaders complained that Clinton did not create a targeted black outreach effort.

The campaign’s ambivalence about constituency groups such as *Adelante Con Clinton!* may appear in its limited role in the day-to-day campaign. Field staff perceived it as a parallel effort that did not do
field work and merely produced some materials that they did not necessarily even use. It was viewed, however, as primarily a political necessity. While there was no resentment, its role in the campaign was not understood. Further, as the focus of the campaign shifted away from states with large Latino populations, the relative importance of *Adelante Con Clinton!* within the campaign declined.

The ambivalence may also be reflected in the products of the campaign. Clinton supporters reported that some of its Spanish-language materials were poorly translated and it was unclear who in the campaign was responsible for translation. The initial *Adelante Con Clinton!* poster featured the candidate with his left hand raised in a fist, a pose which alienated the Cuban community who associated the symbolism with communism. The poster had to be reprinted in reverse so that Clinton’s right hand was raised in the air. Thus, *Adelante Con Clinton!* should be seen as an effort by the campaign to respond to demands from Latinos, yet not to change the campaign’s basic opposition to constituency-based campaigning.

The fall campaign saw only one other effort at targeted outreach to Latinos as Latinos. Unexpectedly, perhaps, considering their high levels of support for Republican presidential candidates, Cuban-Americans were the target of this effort. In April, Clinton had endorsed the Cuban Democracy Act (also known as the Torricelli bill) at a fundraising event in Miami’s Little Havana. The legislation was designed to further tighten the economic embargo on Cuba. Clinton’s early endorsement put President Bush in a difficult position. Traditionally Bush had been very supportive of Cuban community interests. Many U.S. allies, however, opposed the bill because it limited the ability of international subsidiaries of U.S.-owned companies to trade with Cuba. Recognizing the political calculus and the need to carry Florida in the fall elections, Bush soon followed Clinton in endorsing the bill and signed it into law in October.

Clinton offered more than verbal support. Soon after Bush signed the bill, Clinton met with the president of the Cuban American National Foundation, Jorge Mas Canosa. After the meeting, Mas and three other CANF directors issued a statement saying, “Any fears that the Cuban-American community may have had about a Clinton Administration with regard to Castro’s Cuba have dissipated today.” Despite Mas’ previous endorsement of Bush, many saw this statement as a blessing to Cubans who wanted to support Clinton.

Despite the *Adelante Con Clinton!* campaign and the flirtation with the Miami Cuban community, the Clinton campaign largely held to its ideology of not conducting ethnic campaigns. Equal to the Clinton campaign’s theme of not running an ethnic campaign was a respect
for diversity. The idea of campaign institutions reflecting America echoes through many Clinton campaign speeches. As we have indicated, the campaign staff reflected this diversity. With the exception of Adelante Con Clinton! coordinator Echaveste, Latino staff members did not have positions tied to researching, polling, mobilizing, or otherwise interacting with Latino communities. Echaveste herself had many responsibilities beyond Latino outreach. There is some indication that toward the end of the campaign, field staff assignments may have been made based in part on ethnicity. Nevertheless, the Clinton campaign largely succeeded at broadly involving Latinos while not stigmatizing them as capable of doing only Latino outreach.

Nevertheless, the Clinton campaign largely succeeded at broadly involving Latinos while not stigmatizing them as capable of doing only Latino outreach.

The campaign included senior Latino elected officials in advisory roles. Soon after the Democratic Convention, Clinton named Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina as the campaign’s national co-chair. In August, former San Antonio mayor Henry Cisneros resigned from the board of the Federal Reserve Board of Dallas to campaign for Clinton. As mentioned previously, José Villareal served as one of Clinton’s Deputy Campaign Managers. Reports from both within and outside the campaign suggest that his role was substantive and not symbolic.

The direction that the competition took in October and early November facilitated the campaign’s ability to avoid ethnic campaigning. All but one of the states with the largest blocs of Latino votes were either largely assured as Clinton victories by mid-October (California, Illinois, and New York) or unofficially conceded to President Bush as unnecessary to assure an electoral college victory (Texas). The one exception among the states with large numbers of Latino votes was Florida where Clinton ran a more ethnically-aware campaign. This unexpected turn of events reduced the need for Clinton to campaign extensively or commit resources to these big states. So, the states with Latino votes sought by the Democrats were not those rich in electoral votes, but instead three states with few electoral votes—New Jersey, New Mexico, and Colorado. In these states, Clinton addressed his message to all voters, including Latinos.

Only one of the three highly contested Latino states used extensive Spanish-language media. In New Mexico, the Clinton campaign ran

Louis DeSipio/Rodolfo O. de la Garza  17
Spanish-language radio advertisements. Clinton campaign staff contended that these ads were run only because they had to respond to negative Bush Spanish-language ads. Spanish-language media did not play a role in Texas. Despite the use of Spanish-language radio by the Texas Bush campaign, the Clinton campaign limited its role in Texas to visits during the last weeks of the campaign (to keep the race close, not to win).

The combination of long-term Clinton campaign organization in key states and last minute get-out-the-vote campaigns in a wider number of states proved successful on election day. Clinton carried all but one of the states that he had targeted early in the campaign, including California, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, New Mexico and Colorado. The campaign was driven by a series of overlapping imperatives. Most important, of course, was victory. This dictated that resources be dedicated to states where Clinton could win, but where he was not assured of victory. Within these competitive states, Clinton concentrated on electoral jurisdictions likely to produce high numbers of Clinton voters. As a result, there was no unique Hispanic outreach effort, yet Latinos were among those constituencies who were recognized as being able to offer large blocs of votes on election day.

A Continually Shifting Focus and a Dirty Campaign

The Bush campaign was ill-prepared for the contest it was to face in 1992. The early challenge from Duke and Buchanan, the entrance of Perot into the race, the misunderstanding of the popular perception of the economy, and ultimately the lack of vision of Bush and his advisors united to cause a confused campaign uncharacteristic of the Republicans. Yet, behind this confusion was the well-oiled and well-financed Republican machine that had been organizing for years to move some traditionally Democratic Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans into the Republican fold. Interestingly, both the confusion of the Bush campaign and the long-term strategy of the Republicans to convert Democratic Latinos worked to assure outreach to some Latinos. Bush’s loss of support from middle class Anglos increased the importance of traditionally more marginal electorates. The long-term Republican strategy of outreach to Latinos continued despite the confusion in the presidential race and offered an alternative to the party to some of the core Republicans lost to Clinton and Perot.

The Bush campaign had polling data comparable to that held by Democrats. Early in the general election race, Republicans saw that they could not win several states with highly concentrated Latino electorates. Among the big states the Republicans usually win, Cali-
iformia was the first to be acknowledged as lost. By mid-October, Republican strategists also acknowledged Illinois as lost and withdrew staff. New York, often a Democratic state even in Republican landslide, also was recognized as an unlikely Republican victory early in the race. The Bush strategists viewed the remaining states with large Latino populations—Texas, Florida, New Mexico, New Jersey, Colorado and Arizona—as competitive. However, for a Bush victory, these states had to be more than just competitive. Because of the electoral college, the acknowledgement of probable loss in several of the largest states (as well as several others in the northeast, south, and west) required that Bush win virtually all of these remaining states. As the Perot campaign drained some traditional Republican support, the importance of Latino electorates to the Bush campaign increased.

Bush followed a more traditional pattern than did Clinton in terms of Latino outreach. His efforts involved both an ongoing party effort to move Latinos away from the Democratic party and a more localized Viva Bush! campaign that local parties could use to target Latinos. As we have indicated, the national party’s effort began with the training of local Latino activists. During the general election campaign, these trained local activists received faxed daily media messages from Washington. Their efforts were coordinated by the party’s national director of Hispanic affairs, Roberto de Posada. The national coordination efforts included preparation of materials (flyers, posters, etc.), design of the media campaign, assistance to Viva Bush! campaigns, and development of the media strategy.

The Bush Latino strategy was defined early. It was not to win the entire Latino vote, or even a majority. Instead, the party and the campaign hoped to enlist the support of components or coalitions within the electorate, e.g., business people or the religiously-motivated. The strategy was to develop any combination of Latino support that resulted in more than 30 percent of the statewide Latino vote in any state (except for Florida). Republican strategists perceived this goal as reasonable if the local parties cooperated with the Hispanic outreach efforts.

Like Clinton, Bush relied on surrogates to carry his message to Latinos. Reflecting, however, the relative weakness of Republicans among Latinos, these Bush Latino surrogates are less well-known than their Democratic equivalents. They include the president’s grandson, George P. Bush, and his daughter-in-law, Columba Bush. The Latino campaigners also included Treasurer Villapando, Secretary of Interior Manuel Lujan, Surgeon General Antonia Novello, Drug Czar Bob Martinez, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL), Orange County (CA) Supervisor Gaddi Vasquez, New Jersey Assembly-
man José Sosa and former Texas Attorney General candidate Roy Barrera. These surrogates carried two messages. First, they emphasized the accomplishments (particularly economic) of the Reagan and Bush years. Second, they highlighted the five Clinton negatives. Notably, this balance did not offer a vision for the future or a sense of what four more years of Bush and Republican rule would offer the Latino communities. One of these surrogates, Villapando, proved an embarrassment to the campaign. At the opening rally to the Texas *Viva Bush!* bus tour in Austin, she charged that Clinton had burned the American flag while abroad.

The Bush campaign also placed Latinos in prominent roles in the campaign. There were, however, fewer Latinos than there were in the Clinton/Gore campaign and for the most part they were more narrowly focused on Latino issues. Leonel Sosa, a leading Latino media consultant, oversaw advertising, media relations, and communications strategy. His responsibilities included both Latino and non-Latino media issues. Ernest Olivas directed the Bush Hispanic campaign. Shiree Sanchez, White House Director of Public Liaison to the Hispanic community, also served an unofficial campaign role.

The Bush campaign also placed Latinos in prominent roles in the campaign. There were, however, fewer Latinos than there were in the Clinton/Gore campaign and for the most part they were more narrowly focused on Latino issues.

These surrogate efforts supplemented a party-driven effort to bring attention to the five Clinton weaknesses. The party and Bush/Quayle Hispanic coordinators traveled to the competitive states with Latino populations to seek local press coverage for their anti-Clinton message. Again, this negative campaign did not speak to the future of a second Bush term.

Late in the campaign, the President supplemented his surrogates’ efforts with campaign trips to Texas, New Jersey, Florida, New Mexico, and Colorado. His daughter and son also visited New Jersey and Florida, respectively. These efforts reached Latinos, though they did not appear to be the unique targets in any state except for Florida.

The Bush campaign relied on a Hispanic media strategy to a greater degree than did Clinton. Where the Clinton campaign largely used the same message for everybody, Bush’s strategists designed a specific message for Latino voters. They also seemed more sensitive
to issues of language. Clinton relied almost exclusively on English to reach Latinos. The Bush strategists reported that the majority of their efforts were in English, yet Spanish constituted a significant minority. The ads targeting Latinos were attack ads emphasizing the five Clinton
negatives.

Like *Adelante Con Clinton!* *Viva Bush!* was a top-down grassroots mobilization effort. Officials in Washington coordinated local efforts and supplied them with materials. They also encouraged local Republican parties and Bush/Quayle campaign efforts to develop *Viva Bush!* campaigns. Among the most successful of these was the Texas campaign. In late October, it coordinated a fifteen hundred mile bus trip starting in Austin and moving through San Antonio to South Texas. At different points, the tour included First Lady Barbara Bush, George P. Bush and his mother Columba, Catalina Villapando, and Roy Barrera. The rallies drew Latinos and non-Latinos alike. At least one, the initial rally in Austin, drew more non-Latinos than Latinos. The message, however, was clearly aimed at Latinos—the speakers emphasized the membership of a Mexican-American, George P. Bush, in the first family and Governor Clinton's opposition to English Only. To some observers, it seemed like the Anglo Republicans in the audience were not quite sure what to make of the Latino message of *Viva Bush!* The Republican National Committee staffer responsible for *Viva Bush!* indicated that the campaign did not concern itself with providing conflicting messages to Anglos and Latinos. Instead, the mainstream campaign and the Latino campaign operated semi-autonomously. This contrasts with the careful effort of the Clinton campaign to speak to common American themes to the greatest degree possible.

As should be indicated by this discussion of different aspects of the Bush campaign, the Latino message was entirely negative. This message was delivered by surrogates, campaign staffs, and the *Viva Bush!* campaign. In the end, the strategy may have been effective. Clinton's support among Latinos was a historic low for a Democrat. However, much of this Democratic desertion went not to President Bush's reelection effort, but instead to Ross Perot.

The Savior

Little can be reported of the Perot Hispanic strategy for there does not seem to have been one. From his re-entry into the race on October 1 through election day, he made little effort to reach out to any specific electorate, including Latinos. He made only a few campaign appearances and dedicated most of his efforts to the three presidential debates, to talk show appearances, and to his infomercials.
His campaign organization was loosely organized and decentralized. His communications director reported that they did not try to reach out to any group. "The Perot message is for all Americans," he said. "The only thing that's different is that we're trying to make use of Spanish-speaking volunteers." In one possible exception to this pattern, National Public Radio reported that Perot ran advertisements in Spanish. Efforts by the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda to open a dialogue with the Perot campaign, on the other hand, had no success.

Conclusions

The experiences of the 1992 presidential race further refined the growing body of experience on the practice of Latino politics in state and national elections. As demonstrated in the 1988 presidential race, the circumstances under which Latinos can significantly influence electoral outcomes are rare. The 1992 campaign demonstrates, however, that the conditions under which this influence can be felt are somewhat more varied than we had originally calculated.

As demonstrated in the 1988 presidential race, the circumstances under which Latinos can significantly influence electoral outcomes are rare.

The Clinton campaign indicates that explicit outreach to Latinos may not be an absolute requirement for Latinos to play an important role. In Colorado, New Mexico, and New Jersey, the Democrats needed their core supporters to turn out in high numbers. These core supporters include these states' Latino electorates. While the campaign was sensitive to the presence of Latinos and offered some specific campaign materials, it maintained its strategy to run a campaign for all Americans and did not target the message to the audience. The Clinton campaign also offered an unanticipated election scenario in which Latinos in smaller states would be asked to play a role while Latinos in larger, electoral college-delegate rich states would not.

The lesson of the Clinton campaign is even broader. The decision to campaign on issues of concern to Latinos, yet to phrase the message in terms of all Americans, reduces the backlash of Anglos while in no way diminishing the ability of Hispanics to make demands on a Clinton, i.e., American, agenda.

Finally, the Clinton campaign integrated Latinos at all levels. While it did include a traditional Democratic constituency outreach, the
campaign also included Latino campaign professionals in virtually all components of the campaign. Thus, it could be argued that the Clinton campaign would instinctively be more sensitive to Latinos and Latino policy concerns than a campaign, such as George Bush’s, without a pervasive Latino presence.

The Bush campaign also demonstrated the complexity of developing rules for Latino political significance. Its strategy did not require majorities of the Latino vote or wholesale shifts of Latinos from Democrat to Republican. Instead, it sought incremental shifts of blocs of Latino voters to the Republican fold. The Bush campaign and its *Viva Bush!* efforts are part of a much longer-term Republican strategy to assure steadily increasing Latino support. Though 1992 did not witness Latinos moving in great numbers to the Republicans, party strategists can be pleased that the combined effect of the Bush and Perot campaigns gave the Democrats their lowest share of the Latino vote in history.

Underlying these partisan victories and defeats, however, is the continuing dilemma of low levels of Latino electoral participation. Those Latinos who participated in the 1992 race had much more of an impact than those who participated in 1988. However, the continuing limitations caused by community demographics and the dearth of voter mobilization among Latino citizen adults assure that many more adults did not participate in 1992 than did not in 1988.

ENDNOTES


2. We use the terms Latino and Hispanic interchangeably to refer to people who can trace their ancestry to the Spanish-speaking regions of Latin America and the Caribbean. When data are available, we discuss specific national origin groups. We also use the term Latino communities to recognize the perceived heterogeneity among the major Latino national origin populations in the United States, see de la Garza, et al. 1992.


Louis DeSipio/Rodolfo O. de la Garza 23
REFERENCES


24 Feature Articles


Sharp, Deborah and Judy Keen. (1992) “Cuban Vote Not Sure Bet for President.” USA Today, March 5.


THE CUBAN COMMUNITY IN THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Dario Moreno, Ph.D.
Christopher L. Warren, Ph.D.

Dario Moreno is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University. His areas of research and teaching are Cuban-American politics and U.S.-Latin American relations. Professor Moreno has published two books on Central America and numerous articles on Miami. His current research includes political empowerment and the incorporation of Cubans into American politics.

Christopher L. Warren is also an Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University. His areas of research and teaching are urban politics, the politics of ethnicity and class, and American political economy. Professor Warren has written extensively on Miami and Florida politics.

INTRODUCTION

Ambiguity continues to mark the debate as to whether there is a Latino politics in the United States that is both identifiable and separable from the politics of other groups or that of the nation as a whole. However, for analysts of Latino politics, the 1992 elections provide the clearest and most revealing indicators to date in illuminating political patterns evident within at least some segments of the Latino population.

For Hispanics in Florida, especially Cuban-Americans, the 1992 elections brought continued expansion of their conservative political base and enhanced political incorporation at the local, state, and even federal levels. Locally, in metropolitan Miami-Dade County, Latinos have consolidated their status as the core electoral constituency. They have also strengthened their local political position due to
the recent federal court ruling which overturned the county’s at-large election system on the basis that it prevented Hispanics and blacks from electing their “preferred candidates.”

In state politics, Cuban Republican legislators from Dade County have emerged as an important swing vote on matters ranging from the selection of state legislative leaders to the enactment or defeat of major policies. On the issue of reapportionment, Cuban Republicans were nothing short of catalytic in dramatically modifying the Democratic majority’s plans for Congressional and state legislative district lines. In statewide elections, South Florida’s Latino voters again demonstrated that in close statewide contests, their bloc voting can alter the outcome.

Nationally, the election of three Cuban-Americans to the U.S. House (two from South Florida and one from New Jersey), combined with the ongoing lobbying efforts of such groups as the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), has resulted in an expanded role in Washington, at least with regard to shaping policy toward Cuba. More generally, Cuban-Americans have emerged as a group whose support is actively courted by a growing number of officeholders from outside the state—from presidential candidates down to members of Congress seeking campaign contributions.

---

Cuban-Americans have emerged as a group whose support is actively courted by a growing number of officeholders from outside the state—from presidential candidates down to members of Congress seeking campaign contributions.

---

However, Cuban-American electoral victories in 1992 and the vigorous promotion of a broader political agenda that encompassed issues as diverse as trade with Cuba and legislative reapportionment, have not been the only gauges of political accomplishment. There are also some indications of a broadening of the partisan and ideological boundaries of the Cuban community, marked by an increase in the overtures made by political actors who previously would have had little expectation of attracting significant support from either Cuban elites or rank and file voters. The Clinton campaign’s effort to court Cuban support in Florida was only the most visible manifestation of such activity. Collectively, such developments have resulted in the emergence of a group that has increasingly found its niche in American politics, is still in the process of securing its base, and now
has regular access to the corridors of power at all three of levels of government.

CUBANS AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Notwithstanding indications of growing political diversity and complexity within the ranks of Miami’s Cuban voters, the 1992 elections once again underscored the phenomenon of strong Cuban loyalty to the Republican party. Repeating a pattern especially evident in presidential elections since the Reagan victory of 1980, George Bush carried the Hispanic precincts of Dade County with approximately 70 percent of the vote, far surpassing his proportion of the vote either nationally or statewide (see table 1).

Table 1
Ethnic Polarized Voting in Dade County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bush</th>
<th>Clinton</th>
<th>Perot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of County Vote</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Black Vote</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of non-Latino White</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Hispanics</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimates are based on homogeneous precinct analysis.

Anticipating strong support, Cuban-Americans were a particularly important element in the re-election strategy of George Bush. Texas and Florida were considered the two states most vital to a Bush re-election and were at one time considered “safe” states for the Bush ticket. Jeb Bush, chair of the Bush-Quayle Campaign in Florida and the President’s son, expressed the importance of Florida in the GOP’s electoral college strategy, “We can’t win without winning Florida unless some new math gets invented between now and then (election day).” However, as polls showed Clinton gaining ground in Florida, heavy Cuban support for the GOP was considered increasingly essential for victory in the state.

On election day, Bush’s margin of victory in Florida was less than 86,000 votes, a dramatic reduction from his almost one million vote margin in 1988. Clearly, the Dade County Hispanic voters who cast 70 percent of their votes for Bush provided a critical edge in the state. Had Clinton and Perot, either individually or together, seriously split the Cuban vote, the state likely would have gone Democratic for the first time since 1976.

Dario Moreno/Christopher L. Warren 29
The importance as well as the distinctiveness of the Cuban-American vote for Bush in Dade county was illustrated by the fact that he lost to Clinton county-wide, faring poorly among Dade’s two other major ethnic groups. Non-Hispanic whites in Dade gave Clinton approximately 55 percent of their vote, while black precincts supported the Democratic candidate with upwards of 85 percent of the vote (see table 1).

Bush’s margin of victory in Florida was less than 86,000 votes, a dramatic reduction from his almost one million vote margin in 1988. Clearly, the Dade County Hispanic voters who cast 70 percent of their votes for Bush provided a critical edge in the state.

Although, as discussed below, Clinton made the first concerted effort ever by a Democratic presidential candidate to court the Cuban vote, he still received only about 22 percent of that vote in Hispanic precincts. Yet, this weak showing must be measured against the fact that the Democratic candidates in the 1984 and 1988 elections had only 12 and 15 percent of the Hispanic vote respectively. Moreover, Clinton, despite being in a three-man race, often ran ahead of local Democratic candidates in the Latino precincts, reflecting the weakness of the local Democratic party among Cuban-American voters. Perot, who made virtually no direct appeal to Cuban voters in 1992, received less than 6 percent of the vote in the same Latino precincts, although he received 20 percent of the state-wide vote (see tables 1 and 2).

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>% Received in Hispanic Precincts</th>
<th>% of County Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980: President (Carter)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984: President (Mondale)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988: President (Dukakis)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992: President (Clinton)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimates are based on homogeneous precinct analysis.
Even in the face of such bloc voting, it is important to note the subtler changes that mark contemporary Cuban-American politics in Florida. The 1992 elections saw a broadening of the political space in Miami’s Cuban-American community, and the challenging of at least some previous stereotypes regarding the political and ideological uniformity of Cuban voters. Indeed, as the campaign continued, and Bush’s standing in polls fell, what was remarkable was that a point was reached at which overwhelming Cuban support for Bush could no longer be taken for granted.

Miami’s Cuban-Americans have been among the most loyal voters for recent GOP Presidential candidates, especially if one examines the Reagan era and his enormous popularity. Florida has been a state of consistent Republican support in recent presidential elections, with the Republican nominee winning in nine of the last 11 presidential elections (losing only in 1964 and 1976). But even in that context, Hispanic voters supported the Republican nominee for president in 1980, 1984, and 1988 by extraordinary margins, ranging from four to one, to seven to one (see table 2).

By 1992, however, there were signs of Cuban disaffection with the Bush presidency. Similar to other regions in which Bush had lost his political capital, South Florida was especially hard hit by the 1991-92 economic downturn. Two airlines with large operations in Miami, Eastern and Pan American, went bankrupt costing the city thousands of high-paying jobs. Unemployment in Dade County was above the national average for the first time in many years.

Bush more directly displeased his anti-Communist Cuban supporters by not enthusiastically backing a tougher policy toward Castro. The administration was slow to support the Cuban Democracy Act (popularly known as the Torricelli bill, after its Democratic sponsor from New Jersey) which angered the powerful Cuban American National Foundation and its chairman Jorge Mas Canosa. The legislation tightened the decade old U.S. economic embargo against Cuba, while at the same time increasing phone and mail contacts. The Bush administration, at first opposed key provisions of the bill that would deny U.S. aid to countries providing assistance to Cuba and bar U.S. subsidiaries abroad from trading with Cuba. Bush did not endorse the bill until mid-1992, well after Clinton had indicated his support for the proposed law while making a campaign swing through Little Havana in April.

Many Cuban-Americans were also angered by revelations that the U.S. State Department was cooperating with Cuba to curb exile attacks on the island. Three ranking State Department officials, told the Miami Herald, that the U.S. was informing the Castro government...
of planned exile attacks against Cuba. Two of the unidentified officials said there had been cooperation with Cuba on three occasions during a six month period. The official claimed that when they learned of plans that violated U.S. law, "We would inform the Cubans beforehand."

The policy was widely condemned in the Cuban community. The administration responded by having its top Latin American officials claim that staff members had overstated the degree to which the United States was cooperating with Cuba. Bernard Aronson, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, told the Miami Herald that, "Our policy is to enforce the laws of the United States, including the neutrality law, but there's no ongoing policy of cooperating or collaborating with the Castro regime. There have been isolated incidents in the past when it was necessary to exchange information, but there is no ongoing or regular process of cooperating with Cuba as implied by an unnamed State Department official." Acting in both his political and familial capacities, Jeb Bush went on Miami's Spanish language radio to defend his father on the issue, disputing the idea that the administration had been systematically involved in tipping Cuba off with regard to possible exile attacks.

The net impact of these incidents, combined with Bush's general downward slide in the polls in Florida, left the Clinton-Gore campaign with a political entree in Florida, and again, Cuban-Americans played an important role in campaign strategy. Clinton was the first Democratic presidential nominee to actively court the Cuban community. Indeed, in many respects, the Clinton campaign went far beyond previous state and local Democratic party efforts to make any inroads with Cuban constituents. In making several visits to Florida, Clinton attempted to assure Cuban-American voters that he would maintain a hard-line policy toward the Castro regime. His early endorsement of the Torricelli bill became only the most visible Clinton overture.

Clinton was the first Democratic presidential nominee to actively court the Cuban community. Indeed, in many respects, the Clinton campaign went far beyond previous state and local Democratic party efforts to make any inroads with Cuban constituents.

The political role and significance of Florida's Hispanic community was amplified in the 1992 presidential election given that Florida
was now viewed as a competitive state for the first time since 1976. In 1984, Democratic candidate Walter Mondale made only one visit to Florida after his nomination, and that was to a safely Democratic condominium community in a predominantly Jewish section of North Miami. Dukakis made even less of an effort in the state, effectively conceding Florida to Bush by mid-September in the 1988 election. The Massachusetts governor withdrew all but a handful of campaign workers and lost the state by almost one million votes. However, the combination of Clinton and Gore’s southern base, and their relatively secure status in most of their “must win” states, meant that there was a rare opportunity for a serious campaign and a possible Democratic victory in Florida.

The focus on Cuban-Americans was but one important ‘angle’ pursued by the Clinton-Gore campaign in Florida, albeit one that had many secondary objectives. The overall Clinton strategy for the state was to keep Bush pinned down trying to protect his own base. One pundit described it as, “the political equivalent of a full-court press, of in your face campaigning, of going right after the other guy’s strength.” The overall strategy was then accentuated by focusing on important in-state constituencies. In North Florida Clinton cited his “son of the south” roots, telling voters that the region felt like south Arkansas. Among Florida’s Jewish voters he criticized the Bush administration for its reluctance to back a $10 billion loan guarantee that would provide Israel with assistance in dealing with its refugee problems. However, the campaign’s focus on the Cuban community was particularly intricate, and even given the lopsided vote against him, can be considered a successful strategy from the standpoint of other objectives.

While not even the most optimistic Democrat believed that Clinton could win a majority of Cuban-American voters, the strategy was aimed at cutting into the huge GOP margins of the last three elections. The Democrats believed they could win Florida if they could reduce Cuban support for the GOP to two-to-one, a margin which would translate approximately into two to three additional percentage points for the Democratic ticket in the state wide vote. State party leader Simon Ferrero, himself a Cuban-American, said Clinton “is the candidate we have been waiting 20 years for. I think for once we’re going to make a dent in this vote.”

As the first highly publicized overture by a Democratic presidential candidate toward the Cuban community, Clinton’s campaign promised to lay the groundwork for reversing some of the bitterness that still lingers from President Kennedy’s withdrawal of support for exiles who attempted to retake Cuba at the Bay of Pigs some 30 years ago, as

Dario Moreo/Christopher L. Warren 33
well as the Carter administrations’ controversial dialogue with the Castro regime in 1977. Clinton based his Miami strategy on addressing Cubans’ fears that a Democratic administration would revisit U.S.-Cuban policy and lift the economic embargo against the Castro regime. Moreover, Bush’s hesitancy in embracing the Democratic Torricelli bill combined with 12 years of unfulfilled Republican presidential rhetoric on the need to hasten Castro’s demise, actually seemed to at least temporarily place Clinton to Bush’s right on the issue of Cuba. That Bush ceremoniously came to Miami to sign the Torricelli bill into law, inviting neither the bill’s author nor its Senate sponsor, Florida Democrat Bob Graham, was widely viewed as petty partisanship—even during an election year. Few credited Bush’s eventual support as having anything to do with the bill’s passage.

Soon after his endorsement of Torricelli’s legislation, Clinton raised $275,000 in one night at two Miami fundraisers attended predominantly by Cuban-Americans. Follow-up visits by both Hillary Clinton (whose sister-in-law, Maria Victoria Arias, is a Cuban Republican living in Miami who mobilized fellow Cuban-Americans for the Clinton campaign) and Tipper Gore were also considered successes.

While formally endorsing Bush, Jorge Mas Canosa, head of the influential Cuban American National Foundation had numerous contacts with Clinton and attended the Little Havana fundraiser, suggesting a strong pragmatism even within an organizations often inaccurately depicted as singularly tied to the Republicans. The Free Cuba Political Action Committee, which is the foundation’s vehicle for campaign contributions, contributed twice as much to Democratic candidates for office nationwide than to Republicans during the 1990-92 election cycle. Mas Canosa himself stated, “Although I’m voting for Bush out of loyalty, Clinton’s decisive support of the Cuban Democracy Act turned the Cuban-American community around.”

THE OUTCOME

The Democratic strategy appeared to pay off. The Hamilton Poll taken in August showed that while the Arkansan still trailed Bush 72-23 percent among Cuban voters, Clinton was doing twice as well as Dukakis had done. An October Mason Dixon/Media Research poll showed a 55-36 percentage split between Bush and Clinton respectively. Mas Canosa, no doubt seeing the even more important national poll figures, issued a near-endorsement of Clinton, stating that, “any fears that the Cuban-American community may have of the Clinton administration with regard to Castro’s Cuba have dissipated.”
However, election day saw Cuban-Americans return to the Republican fold in numbers greater than some of the polls had predicted. Although George Bush did not match his 1988 showing among Cuban-Americans he was still able to carry the Hispanic precincts by approximately a seven-to-three margin. Cuban-American voters were an important factor in Bush's Florida victory in a contest that proved to be closer than anyone genuinely expected.

While the Clinton campaign's effort to cut into Bush's margin of victory among Cuban voters fell short of the two-to-one target, the inroads with the Cuban elite were unprecedented. Beyond opening lines of communication with CANF, in early September, 13 Cuban-American members of Dade County's 120 member Republican Executive Committee endorsed Clinton, expressing their belief that the Democrat would do more than Bush had to rid Cuba of Castro.

Perhaps most importantly, the Cuban-American community's clout has shown itself to be significant not only when actively asserted at the polls or through lobbying and campaign support, but is also increasingly a status that is voluntarily recognized and actively courted by candidates at all levels of government.

Thus, while the Cuban vote can prove to be the decisive element in an otherwise close state election (as it was in the election of Senator Connie Mack in 1988 and as it seems to have been in the 1992 presidential contest), the community's impact transcends the number of votes cast for any one candidate. Latinos in Florida constitute 7 percent of the nation's Hispanic voters, but the state's Cuban community is responsible for 15 percent of all Hispanic campaign contributions nationwide. Influence within the Spanish language media is also proportionately greater than population alone would indicate.

That the Hispanic voters of Dade County figured heavily in the Florida strategy of both presidential candidates speaks to the enhanced political role of the community. Perhaps most importantly, the Cuban-American community's clout has shown itself to be significant not only when actively asserted at the polls or through lobbying and campaign support, but is also increasingly a status that is voluntarily recognized and actively courted by candidates at all levels of government. Such voluntary recognition reduces the future costs of exercising influence over the political process. Cuban political elites and rank and file voters are demonstrating that they are not entirely
“knee-jerk” in their support for the Republican party or in promoting a conservative line on all issues of public policy. Political maturation and enhanced effectiveness and clout are the likely outcomes, at least in the short term, of expanded political dialogue within Florida’s Cuban community.

ENDNOTES

1. In analyzing 1992 election data, Hispanic precincts have been chosen on the basis of having at least 60 percent Hispanic registration, with Hispanic registration being defined by the county as including only those who were foreign-born. On this basis, 107 Hispanic precincts were identified out of a total of 516 in Dale County. References to voting patterns among blacks or non-Hispanic whites are based on analysis of precincts with 85 percent black or non-Hispanic white registration.

REFERENCES

LATINOS AND THE 1992 ELECTION IN TEXAS:
HIGH EXPECTATIONS FOR POLITICAL GAINS

Valerie J. Martinez, Ph.D.

Valerie J. Martinez is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas, specializing in public policy analysis, program evaluation, and survey research. Her major research interests focus on social welfare policies for children and the elderly. She is the principal investigator for an ongoing study, funded by the U.S. Department of Education, which examines the consequences of educational choice policy for low-income minority families in San Antonio, Texas. Her published work has centered on health promotion and education for aging populations.

INTRODUCTION

The 1992 elections seemed to provide numerous opportunities for political gains among Texas Latinos. The more obvious opportunities included: doubling the number of Latinos ever elected to statewide office, electing the first Latina at the statewide level, increasing the size of Latino delegations to the U.S. House of Representatives, the Texas House and the Texas Senate, and delivering the Latino votes necessary for the Democratic presidential candidate to win the state. The only electoral gains to come from these opportunities, however, were one additional Latino representative and seven additional Latino state legislators.

What is the significance of these electoral results? Were the expectations for Latinos political gains unrealistic? To what extent do the outcomes accurately reflect the political influence of Texas Latinos in the 1992 elections? The answers are found by examining the role of Latinos in the primaries, and in the period around the conventions, as well as in the general election. The dynamics of the various campaigns, such as the presidential race, state-wide races, and other

Valerie J. Martinez 37
races with salient Latino candidates, are likely to be as important as the political actions of the Latino community in answering these important questions.

LATINO OPTIMISM

Texas Latino political expectations were high in the months leading up to the 1992 elections. The growth in population was one source of optimism. Except for Asians, which make up less than 2 percent of the population, Latinos are the fastest growing Texas subgroup according to the 1990 census. The Latino population is now conservatively estimated at 25.5 percent of the total population, up from 21 percent in 1980.

Although the relative youth and number of noncitizens reduces the ranks of Latinos eligible to vote, Latinos still comprise 19 percent of the adult citizens in the state. Obviously, not all of the people who were eligible will register. Approximately 15 percent or 1,273,981 of the 8,438,874 people on the Texas registration roll in 1992 had Hispanic surnames, up from 14 percent in 1990 and 13 percent in 1988.

While the Republican party has tried to make inroads in the Hispanic vote with a message of shared conservative values regarding family and other social issues, less than 10 percent of Texas Latinos identify with the Republican party. Identification with the Democratic party has declined from 1990, but about two-thirds (67%) still identify with the Democrats. According to the Southwest Voter Research Institute, a growing number of Latino voters refuse to identify with either major party.

Due to the growth in the Latino electorate and their historically high affiliation with the Democratic party, several political observers expressed their belief that Latinos would provide the margin of victory for Democratic candidates in Texas.

Due to the growth in the Latino electorate and their historically high affiliation with the Democratic party, several political observers expressed their belief that Latinos would provide the margin of victory for Democratic candidates in Texas. Governor Ann Richards felt that Latinos had the chance to be, “key players in the Texas Democratic game plan for victory” which fueled Latino optimism.
Redistricting was a final reason for Latino confidence going into the elections. The 1990 census determined that Texas would get three new congressional districts. The strength in Latino numbers and the support of the U.S. Justice Department enabled Latino leaders to press for better representation in the design of the districts. Responding to such pressures, two of the new congressional districts were created with majority Latino populations. State districts were also redrawn with the intention of being more representative of minority concentrations in urban areas.

Through redistricting, Latinos significantly improved their chances for electoral victory, especially in certain regions of the state. In the southeast region, near Houston, House District 145 and Senate District 15 were redrawn to include 60 percent Latino populations. It also was the site of one of the new Latino congressional districts.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST

With the exception of Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, no presidential candidate seemed to make much of an effort to court the Latino vote during the primary campaigns. He was the first Democratic presidential candidate to establish an organizational presence in Texas when he opened a regional office in San Antonio in October, 1991. He was the only candidate in either party to make multiple trips to Austin, San Antonio, and the southern region in the early months of the primary contest. During that time, he made a concerted effort to recruit Latinos who were active in local politics to work in his campaign.

Clinton’s early strategy paid off with the endorsement of a major Latino political organization. The Texas Mexican-American Democrats (MAD) held their Screening and Endorsement Convention in Laredo, Texas, in February of 1992. Shortly after Clinton addressed the convention, the 300 delegates representing 1,950 association members overwhelmingly voted to endorse his candidacy. A two-thirds vote was required for the endorsement. Clinton received 97 percent of the delegates’ votes.

Clinton also received the personal commitments of several key Latino leaders. Besides Roberto Alonzo, chairman of the Texas Mexican-American Democrats, Clinton enlisted the support of Henry Cisneros, former mayor of San Antonio, Regina Montoya, president of the Democratic Forum of Dallas and others.

The only other Democratic candidate to make overtures to the Latino community was California Governor Jerry Brown. He cam-
paigned in south Texas accompanied by United Farm Workers' leader César Chávez in the weeks leading up to the primary election. He arrived too late to secure critical endorsements because most of the Latino leadership was already committed to Clinton. Brown's appeal for grassroots support also appeared to make little difference in the outcome of the election.

Brown received only 9 percent of the Latino vote in the Democratic primary, while former Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas, who waged a very limited campaign in Texas, garnered 19 percent. A large Latino majority (64 percent) voted for Clinton. The Latino percentages were very similar to the statewide Democratic tally: 66 percent for Clinton, 19 percent for Tsongas and 8 percent for Brown. Thus it does not appear that Latino votes were decisive in Clinton's primary victory. Moreover, the divided popular vote among Latinos was in sharp contrast with the united endorsement given to Clinton by MAD and other state Latino leaders. Thus the vote indicates that the strength of support for Clinton among Latino elites was not an accurate reflection of his popularity among Latino Democrats in general.

Latino turnout for the primary was reportedly higher than the general population, 27 percent to 19 percent. Exit polls also found that Hispanic women voted at a higher rate than Hispanic men. Interestingly, except for those with college degrees or with annual incomes of $60,000 or more, Clinton was the majority choice of all categories of Texas Latinos regardless of gender, age, income, education or ideology. Education, the economy and jobs were most frequently mentioned by Latino primary voters when asked which issue mattered most in making their selection for president. Those voting for Clinton were more likely to cite the economy or jobs as the most important issue.

Following the primary, Clinton continued the strategy that emphasized early contact in courting the Latino vote. In July, 1992, he spoke at the League of United Latin American Citizens' (LULAC) national convention in San Antonio. In his remarks, he emphasized education reform—a top priority of LULAC—and also pledged to appoint Hispanics to key cabinet posts and federal judgeships. After his speech Clinton met privately with LULAC officials and Latino political leaders. Significantly, he was the only 1992 presidential candidate to speak to LULAC.

The potential role Texas Latinos could play in the presidential election was evident in their prominence at the 1992 Democratic National Convention. There were 47 Latino delegates from Texas at the convention, up from 39 in 1988. Thirteen of the delegates served
on standing committees: five on the platform committee, four on the rules committee and four on the credentials committee. Texas Attorney General Dan Morales was also a co-chair of the credentials committee. In 1988, there were only three Texas Latinos on the platform committee, three on rules, and three on credentials. In 1988, no Latinos from the Lone Star State were asked to speak at the convention. In 1992, there were three speakers: Morales, Railroad Commissioner Lena Guerrero, and U.S. Representative Kika de la Garza.

After the convention, Clinton seemed to step away from minority populations. Whether he wanted to distance himself from special interests or was concentrating on attracting Anglo Democrats who had previously supported Bush, Clinton did not personally campaign for Texas Latino support after the convention until the last few days before the election.

Latino leaders in the state, especially Henry Cisneros, took up his campaign among the Latino community. In early September, MAD and other Latino groups under the auspices of the Adelante Con Clinton! organization launched a combination voter registration and get-out-the-early-vote drive targeting Latinos in 33 Texas counties. Although much of the financial support for these activities was expected to come from local sources, the Clinton campaign provided critical start-up funds and promised to provide more money as needed. Surprisingly, funding from the Clinton campaign was withdrawn before the drive was completed.

At the same time Clinton’s campaign was cutting back its Hispanic outreach, Bush’s forces were gearing up for a major grassroots mobilization targeting Texas Latinos. Starting in October the Viva Bush! campaign began a fifteen-hundred mile bus trip from Austin to south Texas. Among the bus riders at various times were First Lady Barbara Bush, her Latino grandson George P. Bush, his mother Colomba Bush and most of the Latinos who served in the Bush administration.

Although there is no direct evidence to use in evaluating the impact of campaign activities, the sizeable difference in the proportion of Latinos who voted early in 1992 (33%), compared to the 1988 (25%), is worth noting. A more salient indicator could be the 6 percent increase in the overall Latino turnout for the general presidential election, from 46 percent in 1988 to 52 percent in 1992 documented by the Southwest Voter Research Institute.

The three-way presidential contest for Texas’ thirty-two electoral votes developed into a tight race between Democratic challenger Bill Clinton and Republican incumbent George Bush. With Anglo support sharply divided, some still felt a high Latino turnout could tip
the vote in favor of Clinton. Forty-six percent of the registered Latinos in Texas turned out to vote in the 1988 presidential election. According to Harry Pachon, director of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), an increase of “only 4 percent of the statewide Latino vote [would] shift the overall Texas vote by 1 percent in the November [1992] elections.”

Latinos did turn out in record numbers on election day, but so did Texans in general, and the numbers that voted for Clinton were not enough to defeat Bush. Seventy-three percent of Texas’ registered voters turned out for the 1992 presidential election, a seven percent increase from the 1988 election and the highest proportion since 1968. Although the turnout among Texas Latinos increased, their support for the Democratic ticket declined. In 1988, 85 percent of the Hispanic vote went to Democrats Dukakis and Bentsen. According to estimates by the Southwest Voters Research Institute, in 1992, only 70 percent of Hispanic voters cast ballots for the Clinton/Gore ticket, with Bush/Quayle and Perot/Stockdale splitting the other 30 percent. Even with more than two-thirds of the Latino vote, Clinton/Gore received only 37 percent of the overall Texas vote, compared to 40 percent for Bush/Quayle and 22 percent for Perot/Stockdale. One percent voted for other candidates.

STATEWIDE RACES

There were two viable Latino candidates competing for statewide offices in 1992. Pete Benavides sought to secure his place on the state’s highest criminal court. Lena Guerrero was seeking a full term on the powerful three-member Railroad Commission that regulates oil, gas and transportation industries. Both were Democratic incumbents appointed by Governor Ann Richards.

Justice on the Criminal Court of Appeals

Fortunato “Pete” Benavides had twelve years of judicial experience when he was appointed to the Court of Criminal Appeals by Governor Richards in April 1991. He was serving his second term on the 13th Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi at the time of his appointment. A conservative judge with high ratings from the Texas Bar Association, Benavides was unopposed in the Democratic primary. In the general election, he faced Republican justice Larry Meyers from the 2nd Court of Appeals in Fort Worth.

While other judicial races were grabbing the newspaper headlines with charges of ethics violations, the race between Benavides and Meyers received little media attention. Benavides was well-known in
south Texas, but was never able to establish any grassroots support in other regions of the state. He lost to Meyers by a narrow margin, 49 percent to 51 percent.

Voter turnout for the Benavides-Meyers contest (64%) was considerably lower than the state turnout for the presidential race (73%). Yet, even in defeat, Benavides received more Texas votes than Bill Clinton (2,677,996 to 2,281,815). Thus it is difficult to judge whether Clinton could have helped Benavides if Clinton had committed more personal attention and financial resources to his Texas campaign.

---

His (Benavides) defeat points up the fact that even solid support from the Latino community is not likely to be decisive in a statewide race unless the non-Latino vote is fairly evenly split between the two candidates.

---

Benavides received strong support from Latino voters getting 89 percent of their vote, but he still lost the election by over 54,000 votes. His defeat points up the fact that even solid support from the Latino community is not likely to be decisive in a statewide race unless the non-Latino vote is fairly evenly split between the two candidates. In Benavides’ case, he received 44 percent of the non-Latino vote to Meyers’ 55 percent.

**Railroad Commissioner**

Lena Guerrero, at 33 years of age, was a three-term state representative from Austin when Governor Ann Richards appointed her to the Railroad Commission in January 1991. Her appointment received national media attention due to the historical significance of her being the first woman and first minority member to serve on the commission in its 100-year history.

Considered to be a rising star by the Democratic National Committee and the National Women’s Political Caucus, Guerrero was able to amass a sizable financial base for her campaign from nationwide contributions. She collected more than $1,000,000 in early contributions and still had about $800,000 eight days before the primary.

Guerrero’s most visible supporter was her mentor, Governor Richards. The Governor accompanied her to several campaign functions throughout the state. Guerrero’s strategy during the primary did not appear to include courting the Latino support. She was already well-known within Latino communities, so she focused her...
efforts on other counties with high Democratic concentrations. Guerrero did, however, attend the Mexican-American Democrats Convention in Laredo. She, and Richards, spoke to the assembled delegates. The association responded with their endorsement of Guerrero's candidacy. She soundly defeated her opponent receiving 58 percent of the total votes cast in the Democratic primary. She ran much stronger among Latino Democrats, capturing 88 percent of their votes.

Lena Guerrero's general election chances looked extremely promising through early September of 1992. Her Republican opponent, Barry Williamson, was a political newcomer with close ties to the Texas oil industry. Guerrero's tough campaign was already hurting his credibility when revelations from the *Dallas Morning News* began to surface about her misrepresenting her educational background. By the end of September, Guerrero admitted allowing, "misperceptions, embellishments and errors of fact" concerning her academic record and resigned her position on the Railroad Commission. While vowing to continue in the race for her seat, most observers agreed with political consultant Bill Miller's assessment of her chances, "... I would have to say a win by Lena would be one of the greatest political comebacks in Texas history."

With the House of Representatives banking scandal still fresh in the minds of voters and a widespread disgust with politicians of every stripe, 1992 was a particularly bad year to have integrity problems. Not surprisingly, Guerrero was soundly defeated by Williamson, by a margin of 54 percent to 39 percent (7 percent went to a third party candidate) even though Latinos remained strongly supportive of her, giving her 80 percent of their aggregate vote.

If Guerrero and Benavides had won, they would have been the third and fourth Latinos elected to statewide office in Texas with Guerrero the first Latina ever to win at this level.

**OTHER Salient RACES**

**Congressional Contests**

As was previously noted, three new congressional districts were added in Texas after the 1990 census. Two of the new districts, Districts 28 and 29, were created with majority Latino populations. Assuming Latinos retained the seats currently held by incumbents: Henry Gonzalez, Solomon Ortiz, Kika de la Garza and Albert Bustamante; the new districts were expected to increase the number of Latino representatives in the Texas congressional delegation from four to six.
Frank Tejeda, a Democrat, was the only declared candidate for District 28 in the primary contest. A popular, highly-rated legislator, Tejeda served ten years in the State House and six years in the State Senate before running for Congress. During his time in Austin, he acquired the reputation of having conservative, pro-business views coupled with a streak of social activism. He built strong ties to the Hispanic and business communities around San Antonio as he worked effectively to pass bills that built housing for veterans, increased protection for crime victims and assisted minority and women-owned businesses. He also successfully led the effort to revise the state’s worker compensation law to reduce the employer’s share of costs of injuries without dramatically changing the benefits paid to workers.

The Hispanic majority district was reportedly ‘tailor-made for Tejeda’ because he assisted in the drafting of the district with the bulk of its population residing in Bexar County, which he represented in Austin. Unchallenged in the primary, Tejeda faced only Libertarian David Slatter in the general election. With no major-party opposition, he hardly had to campaign and was able to find the time to organize and lead a National Veterans Task Force for Clinton (Tejeda is a former marine and decorated Vietnam Veteran) when the Bush campaign attacked Clinton for avoiding service in Vietnam. Tejeda easily defeated Slatter capturing 87 percent of the votes cast.

Latino candidates were not successful, however, in winning the Democratic or Republican nominations in District 29. Former state representative Gene Green narrowly defeated Councilman Ben Reyes in the Democratic runoff election. Clark Ervin, an African-American, defeated Freddy Rios in the Republican primary.

With Latinos comprising less than 3 percent of Republican voters in the district, Rios’ loss to Ervin can hardly be explained as the failure of Latinos to turn out for a Latino candidate. Ervin’s victory can instead be more likely attributed to voters’ perception that he was better qualified (Ervin was a former White House aide, while Rios was a small business owner) and to the fact that Ervin had considerably more money to spend on the contest.

On the Democratic side, the saga of District 29 illustrates how generalized political power does not automatically translate into electoral victory. Indeed, if one were looking for the opportunity to increase Latino representation in Congress prior to the 1992 elections, the 29th would fit the bill admirably. As an open seat, there would be no well-heeled, well-recognized incumbent to unseat. Demographically, the district looked extremely attractive to Latino activists, with the 60 percent Latino, 10 percent African-American, and 30
percent Anglo breakdown, coupled with a solid blue-collar, staunchly Democratic voting profile.

The long term opportunity for Latino political power represented by this district was underscored by University of Houston political scientist Richard Murray, who noted before the general election, "It's a prize. It's not just a two year term here; it is a seat that probably can be held by the winner for a long time." The eventual defeat of the Latino candidate for the Democratic nomination in the 29th Congressional District in Texas serves as a virtual case study of how the dynamics of a particular campaign can ultimately overshadow favorable demographics and the hard fought gains of redistricting. This is not to suggest that the creation of a new Latino district failed to mobilize Latinos into greater political activity, but that greater activity must be relatively unified to be decisive, and in this case it was not.

The eventual defeat of the Latino candidate for the Democratic nomination in the 29th Congressional District in Texas serves as a virtual case study of how the dynamics of a particular campaign can ultimately overshadow favorable demographics and the hard fought gains of redistricting.

Real people run for political office, not idealized ethnic profiles, and for Latinos in the 29th congressional district of Texas, the man that emerged as the Latino standard bearer, Ben Reyes, was not the perfect candidate. Reyes came into the primary with high negatives in opinion polls. He filed for personal bankruptcy in 1991 and pleaded no contest to misdemeanor theft and election code violations.

Nevertheless, Reyes was not without his supporters. As a former four-term state representative and a twelve-year member of the Houston city council, Reyes had built an impressive army of volunteers for his campaign run, and he was clearly the favorite going into the Democratic primary. Perhaps Reyes’ eventual undoing can be traced to the particularly strong set of candidates that lined up to take a shot at the open congressional seat.

His opponent in the run-off election, Gene Green, was a 20-year veteran of the State House who apparently did not want for campaign funds. The fact that Green even made it into a runoff can be attributed in part to vote splitting between Latino candidates. The final vote tallies showed Reyes with 34 percent of the vote to Green’s 28 percent, but Chief Municipal Judge Sylvia Garcia finished a strong
third with 21 percent, and longtime Reyes rival, Al Luna, garnered a respectable 15 percent. Clearly, had Reyes received even half of the votes given to the other two Latino candidates in addition to his 34 percent, he would have won the primary without a runoff.

Another factor which would impact the runoff election especially was that even with Latino candidates finishing one, three and four, this predominantly Hispanic district turned out in extremely low numbers—about 5 percent of registered Democrats actually voted. And while exit polls indicated a larger share than ever before of Latino voters, this may have been due more to Anglo disinterest than Latino activism. Indeed, even with a higher Latino percentage of the total turnout, Anglos still accounted for most of the vote.

The task facing Reyes in the runoff election with Green was clear: mobilize enough of the support garnered by the other two Latino candidates without actively mobilizing the more participatory Anglo voters against him. At the outset this would not appear to have been a difficult task, but events would demonstrate otherwise. Apparently there existed considerable longstanding animosity between Reyes, Luna and Garcia, especially Luna and Reyes, as was clearly demonstrated immediately following the primary. Reyes talked of registering 3000 new voters, and bringing in Henry Cisneros to help heal the rift within the community. Luna’s campaign manager, Marc Campos, responded by declaring, “The reason for the divisiveness among the Hispanic Community is Ben Reyes. It all seems to center on his style of leadership.” Sylvia Garcia expressed similar misgivings about Reyes’ strategy, “He wants an Hispanic from out of town to come bring Houston Hispanics together?”

A month later, on April 15, Reyes narrowly lost the bitterly fought runoff election to Green by 186 votes. And while Reyes would successfully contest the runoff, (some Republicans who had voted in the Republican primary, illegally “crossed-over” and voted in the Democratic primary), he would eventually lose the second runoff by an even larger margin, 1132 votes. In both runoff elections Reyes was unable to effectively mobilize enough support within the Latino community to prevail. Low voter turnout proved decisive, as the second runoff still attracted only 6.7 percent of registered Democrats, an abysmal number given the controversy generated over a four and one-half month period in which the stakes for the Latino community could not have been more clearly defined.

Moreover, though 55 percent of the district’s voting age population is Latino, nearly 60 percent of its registered voters are Anglo. The bulk of the Anglo voters live in an area of the district known as “Redneck Alley,” where Green grew up and which he had repre-
presented in the state legislature since 1973. With overwhelming Anglo support, Green easily defeated Ervin in the general election.

Ethnicity is not a simple causal agent, however, but must be mediated through the intervening variables of candidate characteristics, the unity of the Latino community behind the candidate, and the strength of the opponent.

What does Reyes’ loss signify? On a surface level, it could be said that the Latino community was unmoved by the opportunity to fill a gerrymandered Latino seat, and that ethnicity failed to translate into real political gain. Ethnicity is not a simple causal agent, however, but must be mediated through the intervening variables of candidate characteristics, the unity of the Latino community behind the candidate, and the strength of the opponent. In retrospect, the Ben Reyes candidacy failed on each of these three counts.

In the other congressional races with Latino candidates, Albert Bustamante was the only incumbent to lose his bid for reelection. He lost his seat to another Latino, political newcomer Republican Henry Bonilla. The remaining Latino incumbents were easily reelected and with the addition of Frank Tejeda, the Texas Latino delegation to Congress increased by one.

State Legislative Contests

With the boost from redistricting, a record number of Latinos vied for seats in the state legislature in 1992. Between 1984 and 1990, the most Latinos (based on Hispanic surnames) to ever run for legislative office was 35 in 1988. On the combined Republican and Democrat primary ballots in 1992 there were 38 House candidates and ten Senate candidates with Hispanic surnames.

Latino majorities did not necessarily guarantee Latino victories in the primary. In Senate District 15, the Houston district previously mentioned, state Representative Roman Martinez was defeated by state Senator John Whitmire in the Democratic runoff, 47 percent to 52 percent. Nonetheless, 39 Latinos won the right to compete for six senate seats and 29 house seats in the general elections.

Latinos finished strong in those contests, winning all of the senate seats and 26 of 29 house seats. All of the winners were Democrat. In only three instances were Latino candidates defeated by non-Latino candidates. Before the 1992 elections, there were 20 Latinos in the
house and five in the senate. Overall, Latinos increased their representation in the Texas Legislature by seven members.

CONCLUSIONS

The optimism of Texas Latinos (based on growth in numbers, their importance to Democratic victories, and the creation of additional Latino majority districts through redistricting) going into the 1992 elections was understandable but unrealistic. While the growth in Latino population provided the raw material for greater political influence via increasing the pool of potential voters and strengthening the constitutional argument for greater representation based on population, the raw numbers were not adequately transformed into a critical mass of Latino voters. In the general election for president and other statewide races, Hispanics comprised only 10 percent of the total voting population. The Benavides defeat illustrates the disheartening truth that even with a united Latino electorate, the number of Hispanic voters was not large enough to decide the outcome of the election.

Furthermore, the Latino electorate was not as likely to vote as a unified front as it has been historically in Texas. The decline in Democratic identification and the increased number of Republican Latino candidates are two of a variety of reasons that can be offered to explain the fissures in the block of Latino support for Democratic candidates.

Finally, the defeat of Latino candidates in Latino majority districts (i.e., Reyes and Martinez) indicates that redistricting, although it served to tilt the playing field in favor of Latino candidates, was not a panacea for increasing their representation in government. The quality and number of candidates, and their ability to mobilize Latino support, especially at the ballot box, appeared to be as important as the ethnicity of the candidate.

REFERENCES


Valerie J. Martinez 49

Hinojosa, Mike. (1992) Interview with Chairman of Denton chapter of Mexican-American Democrats, January 21.


THE IMPACT OF THE LATINO VOTE IN THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN ARIZONA

Manuel Avalos, Ph.D.

Manuel Avalos is an assistant professor of political science in the Social and Behavioral Sciences Program at Arizona State University - West Campus in Phoenix. His areas of research and teaching are public policy, race and ethnic politics, and urban politics. Current projects include research on the impact of structural factors on Latino(a) earnings inequalities. The research for this paper was partially funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation to examine the role of Latino electorates in the 1992 presidential election.

INTRODUCTION

Arizona is one of the three small electoral states in the Southwest (including New Mexico and Colorado) that have an old yet cohesive Mexican-American population which has not played a significant role in recent presidential elections. However, the closeness of the 1992 race, due primarily to the decline in Republican support for president Bush in favor of Ross Perot, created the speculation among many political observers that the heavily registered Democratic Latino population might act as a swing vote and tilt the election in favor of Bill Clinton.

The Arizona electorate, which had not cast a majority of its votes for a Democratic presidential candidate since 1948, seemed on the verge of repeating that performance in 1992. Public opinion surveys in Arizona throughout the campaign suggested that the presidential election in Arizona would be one of the closest in over three decades. One week before the election Arizona voters had already requested over 70,000 early ballots from Maricopa County election officials. This unprecedented interest in early balloting led election officials to predict a 70 percent voter turnout.
The National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) estimated that a 7 percent increase in the Latino vote could effect a 1 percent shift in the statewide vote. Seventy-five percent of Latinos registered to vote in Arizona are Democrats, but the key factor in determining the Latino impact was voter turnout, particularly in Maricopa County. While Arizona’s voter participation rates were markedly higher in the 1992 presidential election, in other fundamental respects the race in Arizona did not alter electoral precedent. The majority of Arizonans cast their ballots for the Republican candidate and Latino voters did not function as a swing vote. Before analyzing the outcome of the presidential election in Arizona, I will examine the key demographic, political—national, state and local—and economic factors that limited Latinos’ impact on the 1992 election in Arizona.

DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LATINO POPULATION IN ARIZONA

Demographics

Arizona has one of the fastest growing populations in the United States. The state’s Latino population grew at a more rapid rate (35.9% increase between 1980 and 1990) than its overall population growth in the last decade (25.8%). Currently, Latinos represent 18.8 percent of the state’s population, an increase of 2.6 percent since 1980. Arizona has the eighth largest Latino population (668,338) and ranks fourth nationally in Latino concentration (the proportion of Latinos in the population). Most of Arizona’s Latino population (about 90%) is of Mexican origin.

Approximately three-fourths (73.9%) of the entire Latino population in Arizona lives in the state’s two largest counties—Maricopa (50.2%) and Pima. (23.7%). Maricopa with 57.9 percent of the state’s population and Pima with 18.2 percent also have the two largest cities in the state—Phoenix and Tucson. Over 90 percent of the Latino population lives in urban areas.

The State Economy

While Arizona continues to be one of the fastest growing states in population, almost every economic indicator marks a decline in the state’s economy during the last decade. The economy slumped badly in the last half of the decade. The consequences of the state’s economic woes have touched most Arizonans, but some minority groups felt the sting of the recession more keenly than others. Latinos, in general, were worse off in 1990 than they were in 1980: Latino
households earn less today than they did a decade ago ($26,332 in 1989 compared to $27,623 in 1979 in 1989 dollars); Latino poverty rates (28.3% in 1989) have steadily increased; more than one-third of the AFDC families in Arizona are Latino; and levels of educational attainment are extremely low across the Latino population.

Previous research on national elections has shown the increasing importance of economic issues in determining voting patterns of Americans. Given the decline in the Arizona economy as well as the attention the national media gave to the great differences in policy solutions among the candidates with regard to the economy, the presidential election could be expected to prompt a larger voter turnout among the Latino electorate in 1992.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE LATINO VOTE IN THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN ARIZONA

The preceding section outlined some key economic factors and characteristics of the Latino population that may have regulated both voter interest in the 1992 presidential election and the level of political participation on election day. There were, however, other statewide political issues and events that may have played a role in determining the impact of the Latino vote in the 1992 election. The most significant of these factors were: (1) the failure of the State legislature to enact a single member district plan for state legislative districts; and (2) the reapportionment of Latino Congressman Ed Pastor's Second Congressional District and the creation of the new Sixth Congressional District in Arizona. Before analyzing these issues however, I will present a brief description of the Latino electorate in Arizona.

The Latino Electorate

The Latino community in Arizona now comprises 18.8 percent of the state population and approximately 16 percent of the voting age population. However, data on voter registration from the Southwest Voter Research Institute show that Latinos make up less than 11 percent of Arizona's registered voters. In a state where overall party registration favors Republicans (45.1%) over Democrats (42.5%), Latinos show a marked preference for registering as Democrats (75%). Yet, low registration and voter turnout and the low percentage of U.S. citizens among Latinos have lessened the potential of the Latino electorate to function as a swing vote in presidential elections.

The potential mobilization of the Latino electorate in Arizona is heavily dependent on factors such as voter registration, voter turn-
out, and citizenship. Historically, the Latino electorate in Arizona (as well as in the rest of the United States) has had low rates of political participation due to low rates of registration and voter turnout in presidential elections. In 1990 only 41.8 percent of Latinos eligible to vote were registered to vote. In the statewide gubernatorial election in 1990, only 32.2 percent of Latino registered voters actually cast a ballot.

The largest single factor contributing to low Latino electoral participation in Arizona—as well as the rest of the nation—is the low percentage of U.S. citizens within the Latino population. Nationwide, the number of Latino non-citizens doubled from 2.6 million in 1980 to 5.2 million in 1990. However, immigration rates outpaced naturalization rates. Since 1980, the non-citizen segment of the Latino population has grown by 96.2 percent—almost twice as fast as the adult Latino U.S. citizen population grew (53.9%). Though Latino naturalization rates increased significantly nationwide in the 1980s, 30.9 percent of adult Latinos in Arizona are still not naturalized. Therefore, despite increasing rates of immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries into Arizona, low naturalization rates will continue to check Latino voters' emergence as a political force within the state.

Reapportionment and Single-Member Districts

Controversies over reapportionment of Arizona's legislative districts and its U.S. congressional districts have been a feature of state politics since the mid 1960s. Several times in the last three decades federal district courts and the U.S. Supreme Court have intervened to settle unsuccessful attempts by the Arizona state legislature to reapportion its U.S. congressional districts (Klarr v. Goddard, 1964; Klarr v. Williams, 1969). Reapportionment following the 1990 census proved to be no less controversial than in past decades. This time the debate centered on two major issues: the creation of the new 6th Congressional district and the attempt by Latino legislators and Latino community based organizations (CBO's) to establish single-member state House of Representative districts (SMD's).

Reapportionment in the 1990's marked Latinos' introduction as key agents in the state's redistricting process. Many Latino community groups played a significant role, including the Arizona Community Forum (a community based organization), the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), the Southwest Voter Research Institute and the Arizona Hispanic Chamber of Commerce.
Reapportionment in the 1990's marked Latinos' introduction as key agents in the state's redistricting process.

**Single Member Districts**

One of the two major controversies emerging from the 1990 reapportionment process that affected the Latino population directly was the issue of single versus at-large elections of members to the state House of Representatives. The 60 members of the Arizona House of Representatives are drawn from 30 legislative districts. House candidates run at large. A change to single-member House districts would require a constitutional amendment by voters or a court order. The Arizona Community Forum proposed the creation of 60 SMD's to replace Arizona's 30, two member at-large districts. The argument made on behalf of the Latino community was that SMD's would enhance the ability of minority groups to elect a candidate of preference.

The main advocate for single-member districts in the Arizona legislature was Representative Ruben Ortega, a Latino Democrat from Sierra Vista (a rural community in southeastern Arizona). During my interview with Representative Ortega, he argued that the single-member district plan would increase Hispanic registration and give smaller communities a bigger voice in the state legislature. (Ortega has also argued publicly that he believes that single-member districts could increase the number of minorities in the House of Representative from 11 members to 16 members.)

Ortega believed that the U.S. Department of Justice would not initiate the move to require the state of Arizona to change the state constitution. Thus, with the assistance of the Hispanic Community Forum, he submitted two house bills (HB2007 and HCR2001). Both bills would have amended the state constitution to install a 60 single-member district plan for the state House of Representatives. Under the Ortega proposal the number of 'majority-minority' districts—that is, those dominated by ethnic minorities—would have increased from five to eight and the number of districts with a Latino majority would have increased from six to ten. Native Americans would have gained a third district in which they constituted a majority; and one additional district would have become a high minority influence district.

The state GOP leadership never considered the two bills seriously and the Democratic party was unenthusiastic about the proposals.
Many members of the Hispanic Caucus of the state legislature and the Hispanic Community Forum voiced their disappointment with the state Democratic party's lack of support for single-member districts. Edward Valenzuela, the statewide chairperson of the Hispanic Community Forum, noted that the state Democratic party's inattentiveness to Hispanic concerns had prompted Latino political leaders and organizations to concentrate their efforts on increasing Latino voter registration. Indeed, the failure of the single-member district plan has drawn several Latino CBO's together in a collaborative effort to establish a Phoenix office of the Southwest Voter Education Project. The objective of the organization is to increase Latino voter registration by the 1994 elections and to revive the campaign for a single-member district plan for the state House of Representatives. As José Solarez, Community Empowerment Chairperson for the Phoenix chapter of the Arizona Community Forum, stated, "our people don't vote because they feel used, abused by some politicos. [S]ingle member districts could be the instrument to turn around Hispanic voter apathy."

Reapportionment

The significant increase in the population from 2.7 million in 1980 to over 3.6 million in 1990 entitled Arizona to a new, sixth congressional district. The Arizona House and Senate responded with congressional redistricting plans, but failed to agree on a single plan. Consequently, a panel of three federal court judges convened in late February, 1992 to determine the boundaries of Arizona's congressional districts.

The panel included one Democrat and two Republicans: District Judge Alfredo Marquez of Tucson; Reagan appointee, District Judge Stephen McNamee of Phoenix; and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Charles Wiggins of Reno, Nevada. The plaintiffs in the redistricting battle were Arizonans for Fair Representation, the House of Representatives, and the Governor of Arizona. The court allowed three groups to submit alternative redistricting plans: the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce and Arizona Community Forum appeared on behalf of the Latino community; several Native American tribes spoke for the Native American community; and Congressman Ed Pastor, participated on behalf of his Congressional District 2.

Districts 2 and 6 (the newly created district) were the hub of the controversy over congressional redistricting. The critical question in this debate was the number of minority-majority districts emerging from reapportionment. The Democratic plan would have created two minority-majority districts; the Republican plan would have made only one.

56 Feature Articles
Under the Democratic plan, Ed Pastor’s District 2 would have lost some of its heavily Latino precincts in south Phoenix, which would have been absorbed into the new sixth district. However, the composition of District 2 would have remained about 60 percent minority (mostly Latino). The sixth district would have encompassed some Latino precincts in south Phoenix taken from District 2 as well as the Apache, Navajo and Hopi reservations. This proposed new district would have swept west just north of Flagstaff and then jutted out to include the Hualapai and Havasupai reservations. The resulting district would have contained a 50 percent minority population, predominantly Native American. Under the Democratic plan, both District 2 and the proposed District 6 would have had 59 and 56 percent Democratic majorities, respectively. Additionally, District 5 in the southeastern corner of the state would have remained a swing district.

In contrast, the Republican plan would have created only one majority-minority district (District 2) with a 70 percent minority population. The new District 6 would have included the Navajos, Hopis and Apaches, but excluded much of metropolitan Phoenix’s Native American populations and the Hualapais and the Havasupais. Consequently, the district’s minority count would have been around 34 percent. Under this plan, District 6 served as a swing district.

On April 30, 1992, the federal judges rendered their decision detailing a redistricting plan that incorporated elements of the Democratic and Republican models as well as their own modifications. The court memorandum of decision and order cited three criteria used to evaluate the various congressional plans in rank order; 1) the U.S. Constitution, 2) the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1982, and 3) neutral principles of redistricting (Azorinans for Fair Representation, et al. v. J. Fife Symington, 1992).

The applicable Constitutional standard of “one person, one vote” [Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), Baker v. Carr, 369, U.S. 186 (1962)] guaranteed citizens an equal voice in the selection of a representative. Adhering to the principle, the judges found that the redistricting plans fulfilled this criterion, with the maximum deviation of the population being one person (the deviation was caused by Arizona’s population being non-divisible by six).

The amended Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits denying protected minorities an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. The court emphasized that the purpose of the VRA was to prohibit the dilution of minority groups’ voting strength. [Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), cited in Arizonans for Fair Representation et al. v. J. Fife Symington, 1992].

Manuel Avalos 57
Using VRA criteria, the court rejected the submitted redistricting plans and drew up their own districts. The court’s plan favored the Native American interveners who had claimed widespread practices of discrimination against them. The judges also stressed the importance of employing neutral criteria in drawing district boundaries that would preserve communities of interest, provide geographical and contiguous districts, and avoid unnecessary or invidious outdistricting of incumbents.

The key feature of this judicial plan was the creation of a Democratic and Latino majority within District 2. Both the Republicans and Democrats favored this result, but they disagreed over how many Latinos should be placed in the district. The court’s decision made the district 50.46 percent Latino (the Republicans had asked for a 56 percent Latino majority, the Democrats had asked for 51 percent). As redrawn, District 2 is 61.8 percent Democrat and 27.6 percent Republican. The balance of the voters in this district are either independents or members of other minor parties. The court refused Representative Pastor’s request for the towns of El Mirage and Surprise, which are heavily populated Latino communities.

The court rejected the Democrat’s proposed majority coalition of Native Americans and Latinos within the new District 6. Instead, the court decision evenly distributed Latinos outside District 2 throughout the other five districts, giving Democrats only a slight edge over Republicans in District 6. Consequently, Native Americans now hold a critical swing vote in that district—if they have a strong voter turnout.

The court also honored the Hopi nation’s request to be moved from the new District 6 into Republican Representative Bob Stump’s District 3. Under the old congressional maps, the Hopi nation had been divided between Districts 3 and 4. The Hopis had argued that a single federal Representative could not represent both the Hopi and the Navajo nations in their decades-long land dispute. The court plan placed the Navajo nation in District 6. The redistricting plan solidified a Latino majority-minority district for Ed Pastor in District 2, but the plan fell short of the Democratic goal to make the new District 6 a swing vote district in which Latinos rather than Native Americans could play a prominent role.

STAGES IN THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Latino Participation in the Nomination Process

It is difficult to examine the extent of Latino involvement in the state presidential nomination process in Arizona. There is little infor-
mation on this subject and the nomination process is quite complicated. However, in 1992 there were clear differences in Latino representation within state Democratic and Republican delegations. Latino membership in the Democratic party’s delegation was directly proportional to the state’s Latino population (18.8%). Eight of the 43 delegates were Latino. However, only three of the 37 member Republican party delegation were Latino. John Reyna, chairman of the state Republican Hispanic Committee pushed for eight Latino delegates which would have matched the state’s 18.8 percent Latino statewide population. He was unsuccessful. In an newspaper interview, Reyna bemoaned the fact that the Republican party’s campaign strategies focused on white middle class voters. He was also critical of the party platform’s acquiescence to Patrick Buchanan’s demand for a more secure border between Mexico and the United States. Reyna stated, “We just tore down the Berlin Wall. Why are we talking about building a concrete wall along the 1,200 mile border between the U.S. and Mexico? It doesn’t make sense.” Reyna also stated that it was a constant struggle to get the GOP hierarchy to keep its doors open to minorities. Yet he added, “we don’t want any window dressing, we don’t want any patronization. We want a meaningful and full participation in the political process.”

It is clear that Latinos play a much more significant role within the state Democratic Party than in the Republican party as participants in the presidential nomination process. However, it is also evident that the Latino voice in either party is diluted by a lack of proportional representation in the state legislature (5 of 60 members in the state House of Representatives and 4 of 30 in the state Senate).

The Latino Vote and the General Election

Public opinion polls taken during the last month preceding the general election indicated that Clinton and Bush were running in almost a dead heat. In early October, those polls had showed that Clinton held a six point lead, but Bush closed the gap over the last month of the campaign. The general election produced one of the highest statewide voter turnouts in the state’s history (77.6%). In the final statewide tally, Bush edged out Clinton (37.7% to 35.8%)—less than two percentage points. It was the closest presidential election in Arizona since the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy race.

In the 1992 election, the predominantly Democratic Latino electorate did not materialize as a swing vote. The narrow margin separating Bush and Clinton was a reflection primarily of the impact of the Perot campaign. Perot siphoned off a significant number of Republican supporters and received 25.3 percent of the statewide vote (in the
Table 1  
Voter Turnout, Vote for President in Maricopa County Precincts with High Latino Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct</th>
<th>Percent Latino Population</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Percent Bush</th>
<th>Percent Clinton</th>
<th>Percent Perot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Mountain</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>65.9%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sky Harbor</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glendale2</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sullivan</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issac</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprise</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almeria</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadway</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunland</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Vista</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latham</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolleson</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lassen</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalupe1</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edison</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalupe2</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayden High</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garfield</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKinley</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashion</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Mirage</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkview</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glendale21</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilton</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct Ave.</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated from Summary Tape 3A, U.S. Census, November 3, 1992 General Election Data, Maricopa County Elections Department
1988 election Bush received 60% of the popular vote in Arizona. It was more Republican losses than Democratic gains that made the 1992 presidential race in Arizona the closest in more than thirty years.

In the 1992 election, the predominantly Democratic Latino electorate did not materialize as a swing vote.

The major reason why the predominantly Democratic Latino electorate was not able to affect the outcome of the presidential election was its extremely low voter turnout. An examination of statewide voter turnout by congressional district indicates that Ed Pastor’s heavily Latino populated district (District 2) had the lowest voter turnout (63.3%) of any congressional district in the state which was almost 15 percentage points lower than the statewide voter turnout average. While no statewide voting data by race or ethnicity is currently available to directly examine Latino voting and turnout patterns, I used census data of population characteristics (percentage of Latinos living within precincts) and precinct registration and voting data for the November election to indirectly analyze the impact of Latino vote within Maricopa County.

Table 1 reports voter turnout and vote counts for the presidential election for the twenty-nine precincts in Maricopa County with a Latino population of at least sixty percent or greater. Voter turnout ranges from a low of 43.4 to a high of 64.5 percent, with an average voter turnout of only 57.7 percent for all 29 precincts. This figure was well below the statewide voter turnout average of 77.6 percent. If one looks at percentages rather than raw numbers, Clinton’s greatest support within Maricopa County came from heavily Latino populated precincts. Support for Clinton averaged 57.6 percent of the vote in these 29 precincts compared to 21 percent for Bush and only 11.4 percent for Perot. However, Bush won Maricopa County with 40.1 percent of the vote to 32.1 percent for Clinton. Perot received 24.8 percent of the vote in Maricopa County. From this analysis it is clear that if the Latino voter turnout in Maricopa County had equalled the statewide average turnout of 77 percent the presidential race would have been much closer in what has historically been a secure Republican state.
CONCLUSION

Arizona’s Latino community has always been marginalized and factionalized politically. The Latino political leadership in the state is dominated by an ‘old guard’, a condition which seems to have had a deadening effect on Latino political mobilization. In contrast to California, very few young rising Latino political activists are on the Arizona horizon especially in Maricopa County (and for the most part in Pima county as well). Without an injection of new blood running for elected offices, a development which could vitalize political activity, Arizona’s Latino community will continue to be politically marginalized.

While many Latino community organizations and Latino state legislators are keenly aware of the importance of voter registration and mobilization, they are severely hampered by a lack of political party funds at both the state and national level particularly within the Democratic party. National party funds are almost never available for these activities because of the historically poor record of support for Democratic presidential candidates. More than one Latino state legislator indicated to me that the national party writes off the state in presidential elections and Latino political activists are forced to raise money on their own to support voter registration drives and mobilize voters. While Latino candidates have utilized organizations like the Southwest Voter Rights Education Project to help with voter registration drives, the chronic lack of funds and volunteers make effective mobilization difficult to achieve. As one legislator explained, it is very cheap to simply register people to vote, but it is very labor intensive and expensive to deliver people to the polls.

Without a tremendous increase in both voter registration and voter turnout, there is not much opportunity for the Latino electorate to have an impact on many presidential races in a state that has voted overwhelmingly Republican in every presidential election since 1948.

Even when Latinos do turn out to vote in Arizona, they do not vote as a bloc. It is hard to determine exactly what the voting threshold would have to be in order for the Latino vote to have a major effect on a presidential election outcome. It appears that the Latino electorate gravitates toward Democratic candidates. However, because of low voter turnout among the Latino electorate, it has been estimated
that it would take a 7 percent increase in the Latino vote in order to create a 1 percent shift in the outcome of a statewide election. Without a tremendous increase in both voter registration and voter turnout, there is not much opportunity for the Latino electorate to have an impact on many presidential races in a state that has voted overwhelmingly Republican in every presidential election since 1948.

In retrospect, the 1992 election presented a missed opportunity for the Latino electorate to have an unprecedented impact in a national election within Arizona. Latinos’ persistent pattern of low voter turnout and state Democratic party indifference to the Latino voter stifled this opportunity. Arizona Latinos have yet to present themselves as a politically engaged and potent force within the state of Arizona.

ENDNOTES
1. In this article the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” are used interchangeably to refer to residents of the United States who can trace their ancestry to the Spanish-speaking regions of Latin America and the Caribbean.
2. Currently 30 states have exclusive single-member district elections and 15 states have varied forms of single-member district elections. Arizona along with Alaska, New Jersey, North Dakota and South Dakota are the only states that have only at-large elections state wide for House of Representative elections.
3. Currently the Latino legislative caucus consists of five members in the House of Representatives and four members of the state senate.
4. The Hopi and Navajo nations have had a two decade dispute over a small Hopi settlement on Navajo land. The two tribal nations are currently trying to settle this dispute at the federal level.

REFERENCES

Manuel Avalos  63


Republican and Democratic Strategies in Targeting Diverse Voters: A Case Study of the Latino Community

March 4, 1993
The ARCO Forum of Public Affairs, Harvard University

Presented by the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy. Co-sponsored by the Hispanic Student Caucus of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, the Student Advisory Committee of the Institute of Politics, and the Harvard Law School Alianza organization.

Rodolfo O. de La Garza, Professor of Community Affairs, University of Texas at Austin
Maria Echaveste, National Latino Coordinator and Deputy Policy Coordinator, Clinton for President
James Weber, Frank I. Luntz and Associates, Republican Political Consultant
Dario Moreno, Professor of Political Science, Florida International University
Charles Royer, Director, Institute of Politics (moderator)

Institute of Politics Director, Charles Royer: Good evening and welcome to the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. My name is Charles Royer, and I am Director of the Institute of Politics. Our Forum Event this evening is entitled, “Republican vs. Democratic Strategies in Targeting Diverse Voters: A Case Study of the Latino Community.” The Forum this evening is co-sponsored by the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy, the Kennedy School of Government Hispanic Caucus, the Harvard Law School Alianza organization, and The Institute of Politics Student Advisory Committee.
What we will do tonight is first introduce our guests and then have presentations from the panel, followed by some dialogue among the panel, and then, in the spirit of the Forum, open up a dialogue with all of you. On my immediate right is Maria Echaveste, the Associate Director of the White House Presidential Personnel Office. She was National Latino Coordinator and Deputy Policy Director for the Clinton campaign as well as Deputy Personnel Director for the transition team. She is a lawyer and has been a member of the Democratic National Committee in addition to working with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

On her right is Jim Weber, a former newspaper editor from Minnesota. He is a Republican political consultant and a partner of the Institute of Politics' fellow Frank Luntz, who was unable to be with us tonight. He was Chief of Staff to Senator John McCain of Arizona, and served as the Political Director for the 1988 Jack Kemp presidential campaign. In 1986, he was Southern Regional Political Director for the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.

On my immediate left is Dr. Dario Moreno, who is a Professor of Political Science at Florida International University. His research is in the area of Latin American politics, and he has published numerous articles and books regarding Cuban and Cuban-American politics. He was part of the 1992 Florida reapportionment case that established three African-American and two Hispanic majority districts in Florida. Now, he is working with the Cuban-American caucus to redraw the district to the Florida State House and the Senate.

Next to Dr. Moreno, is Dr. Rodolfo O. de la Garza, who was the Director of the 1992 Election Project which conducted the research we'll hear about tonight. Dr. de la Garza is a Professor of Community Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. He is an expert on ethnic politics and, in particular, the political mobilization of Mexican-Americans and other Latino communities. He has written about Latino politics in the 1988 election, and as already mentioned, he supervised the Latino national political survey involving several universities and funded by the Ford, Rockefeller, and the Spencer and Tinker Foundations. It is a significant piece of political research on the Latino communities in the country.

Let me begin by asking our two representatives from the political parties to provide some big picture ideas of where they see their party headed with regard to targeting the diversity in the country focusing, in particular, on the Latino community. And to talk some about how in the 1992 election, these strategies were carried out, what strategies there were, and what were the political goals of the Republican and Democratic parties with regard to the Latino community. Let us start with Ms. Echaveste.
Maria Echaveste: I would like to start by giving my view of the Democratic strategy in '92 and where the Democrats might go in the next four years. I am looking at it from the perspective of Presidential politics, and although the '94 elections are going to be important, am looking forward to the '96 elections which will be critical.

There has been a sense that what the Democrats and Bill Clinton did to put together a campaign resulting in victory, was to de-emphasize ethnic and racial outreach. Looking at it from my vantage point, the answer has to be, “Yes, that was in fact a very conscious decision in terms of the overall strategy for winning.” The fact is that in order to win the White House, you have to get the traditional Democratic voters, i.e., labor, minority, etc., but you also have to get a certain percentage of those Reagan Democrats who abandoned the party in 1980.

In order to do that, you have to fashion an approach that speaks to the needs and issues of the suburban and essentially white voters. It is just plain politics. You look at the numbers and ask yourself how you are going to win the election. The fact is that the issues that people talk about and what Bill Clinton talked about cut across racial and ethnic lines. If you really look at what the candidate was saying during the year, he was talking about issues that affected not only the suburban voter but also the urban environment and Latinos, as well.

The fact is that the issues that people talk about and what Bill Clinton talked about cut across racial and ethnic lines.

It was a delicate balancing act, and it is one that I think we successfully walked. The President promised that his administration, not only on policy issues but also on personnel issues, would have an administration that looked like America. People expect those promises to be kept and in many ways, the issues that he talked about—health care, the economy, job training, education—were ones that are very important to the Hispanic community. People were willing, to some degree, to accept the fact that they were not getting as much of the candidate’s time and as much of the campaign resources. That is a look at the overall strategy which was how do you keep the traditional base solidly in line and yet go after the other voters?

The problem that we had in '92, and one that we have to give serious attention to for '96, is that there was a three-way race. When you look at the overall vote the President received, to a great extent it was the traditional Democratic vote. So in some ways, traditional
labor, the African-American community, the Hispanic community, could say to the President, “Excuse me. We helped you get elected and you must respond to our concerns,” because the fact is that Perot received a significant percentage point.

That Perot voter was critical and will be critical for ’96. There is no assurance there will be a third candidate, but I think that the strategy that was used in ’92 will be very similar or some variation of it is going to be important in ’96.

How did that strategy actually play out? As a Hispanic coordinator on the campaign, it was my job to reach out to leadership around the country to get them to start listening to Bill Clinton. It was a constant battle because what Latinos distrust about the Democratic party is that it only comes around every four years and it does not support Latino candidates. Or at least, not to the degree that in the Hispanic community would say ought to be the case. Not only was it hard to sell a candidate who was the governor of a small state where there were no Hispanics, but we also had a problem because there was suspicion of the Democratic party. Hispanics wondered, “Why should we get behind a Democratic candidate if nothing ever changes?” That skepticism is on the line these next four years.

---

It was a constant battle because what Latinos distrust about the Democratic party is that it only comes around every four years and it does not support Latino candidates.

---

One of the things that I kept hearing was, “The candidate is not talking about Latino issues. He is not talking specifically to Latinos.” I would throw back something that we should consider, “Well, what are Latino issues? Is it that you have to say some Spanish words? Is it that he has to be speaking primarily to a Hispanic audience? What are Hispanic issues?” Because indeed, the issues that he ran on were ones that affect our community.

Take health care, for example, which is a major issue in this administration. The results of that policy development are going to affect our community much more than other communities because somewhere between 35 percent and 38 percent of our community does not have health insurance at all. Maybe he was not talking about health insurance for Hispanics specifically, but the policy direction is one that is going to benefit our community. On a policy level, what happens in the next four years is going to be important. But the thing
that our community keeps looking at is, “Where are the Hispanic appointments?” There is this sense that unless you have the appointments, there is not a Latino perspective or input in policy development.

Lastly, I just want to say that there is a danger in this country of becoming “balkanized.” By that, I mean, you get to the point where you look at progress in politics solely in terms of how well your specific ethnic group is represented.

So again, what happens in the next four years is critical to where the Latino community will be in its relationship with the Democratic party in ’96. I, for one, think that it would be very difficult to campaign in ’96 if the administration does not have a record to run on that says we recognized and paid attention to issues that were of concern to Latinos.

Lastly, I just want to say that there is a danger in this country of becoming “balkanized.” By that, I mean, you get to the point where you look at progress in politics solely in terms of how well your specific ethnic group is represented. I see this particularly in the Hispanic community when we get lobbied with questions like, “Where are the Cuban appointments? Where are the Puerto Rican appointments? Where are the Central American appointments? Why are there so many Mexican-Americans being appointed?” It becomes difficult to bring progress if the focus is at that level.

And it is not just the Hispanic community. It is the African-American community, it is the Caribbean community in New York which is where I lived before the campaign. There is a real tension between African-Americans and Haitians and others from the Caribbean. This is a danger that bears thinking about. If this is really a country which recognizes the diversity we have, then diversity should not be a mechanism for splintering. It ought to be something which brings us together. I think that what the President ran on is the notion that we can recognize and be respectful of all of our differences, but if we pay too much attention to those differences, we may, in fact, not work together as a country.

James Weber: I feel a little bit at a disadvantage here talking about outreach and representing the Republican party and President Bush, whom I did not support in 1988. And while I voted for him in 1992,
I tried to get my friend, Jack Kemp, to run against him, but he chose not to.

Really, to begin with let me tell you that while I am a Republican consultant, what I really am is a Republican Conservative consultant. I very much believe that the energy in our party and the energy to pull diverse groups together in this country, from my perspective, rests with a new energy that is developing in the Republican party among Conservatives. Men like Kemp and Bennett, and people like that.

I do not think that there can be any conclusion regarding the outreach of the Republican party or the Bush campaign put forward in this last election other than to conclude that there really was not anything. I was not involved with the campaign itself. I was doing other races at other state and congressional levels. What I can tell you is that in my interface with the Bush campaign and my interface with the Republican national community at that time, there really was not consideration that was given to reaching out to Hispanics or to blacks or minorities. Mainly, they were concerned about, “How do we fight off the inevitable abortion attacks? How are we doing on the economic issues? Are we holding our base together? Are those Reagan Democrats that you spoke about staying with us?”

The Bush campaign, I think, in a few cases probably produced some fairly generically worded Spanish language radio or television ads. But really, beyond that, I do not think that there was anything really meaningful getting out into that community. That is a problem for Republicans and has been for a long time. But the question has to be asked, “Why did Bush not apply the same level of methodology in targeting to non-whites that we typically and regularly do in the Republican party to the white voting population?”

We know, for example, those of us who are in the business, that there are real targetable differences that exist between groups, within groups, in all sectors of our society economically and racially. We use it all the time. Part of my business is direct mail. We use it all the time in direct mail. It is highly targeted. We ask for money from people. We know why we ask them for money. We know what they respond to and what they do not respond to. So why did not Bush do that? Why did he throw in the towel? Why did he lose nearly one-in-five Cubans in Florida when that group had been a solid block for Republican candidates in the past?

We know that these people, particularly Latinos, hold conservative social issues, social values. They are family oriented and on that point, they are in agreement with the Republican party. But what you saw in this last campaign was, of course, George Bush’s unwillingness to talk
about a lot of things that revolved around traditional family values. By the time the campaign rolled around, Dan Quayle and all his problems had made the whole idea of talking about traditional values or family values something that Republican candidates were being counselled to run away from.

I do not believe that Hispanics are different than white Americans at the same economic level. We had trouble attracting votes from a lot of white Americans at some lower income levels.

The reason, I think, that we have difficulty in outreach and actually garnering good levels of support from these groups is simply because they [minorities] display positions on economic issues that are dominant within the income and economic levels where they fall. I do not believe that Hispanics are different than white Americans at the same economic level. We had trouble attracting votes from a lot of white Americans at some lower income levels.

So what should we expect, and what do we have to do to earn some support in the years to come? First, I think it is important to understand that many G.O.P. candidates do not cultivate non-white voters or low income voters because they have become convinced that success among those groups simply is not in the cards so it is not possible for them. It becomes a cost-benefit analysis. You have limited resources in the campaign so you do what you think you can but you do not go a great deal beyond that, because you know you have to roll up a big vote among your own constituencies and try and get through the hoop that way.

The problem with that from my perspective is our own propensity to continue that pattern will only work against our own long-term interests as these groups and as these individuals become more assimilated into mainstream America and they just become part of the American voting population. Now, if we allow near-term economic concerns to take precedence over longer-term wealth accumulation and if we fail to leverage areas of agreement, which are social issues in particular, then we cannot reasonably hope to garner support from these voters, in my opinion.

So what, if any, is the prescription for Republican or Conservative gains in these communities and how can we go about doing it? There are four points that I think are important. First, it is not, as some in our party have suggested, to avoid and even run from discussions of
social issues. Even as the Clinton administration is bringing together its economic plan, which I think is a very aggressive expansion of government in the form of a Liberal social agenda, I believe pressing values, the needs of families, are not being met in a way that is going to satisfy them [Latinos and other minorities] over the long term. If you forget abortion for a moment, the Conservative social agenda—including educational improvement through choice, reform of assistance programs to encourage families to remain intact, the teaching of traditional values as a fire wall against the spread of violent crime and drug use, and the empowerment of local communities to better assume personal security—offer powerful magnets for future votes in these and any other communities.

Second, I think that we, as a party, have to recognize the real and significant differences that exist between groups within these broad communities. In short, we have to stop the campaign of tokenism that we see so often from the Republicans, and we have to target audiences with economic and social messages which offer real reasons to support Republican candidates.

Third, we have to recognize that the inherently long-term economic thesis that is held by many Conservatives, focusing on growth, does not adequately address the immediate pain being experienced by some people. Aggressive pro-growth policies can and do create real long-term opportunity which, as Ronald Reagan began to prove, can and does attract broad support. There are those of us who believe that only the Bush administration’s loss of public confidence, caused by his utter neglect of the domestic economic policy, prevented the partisan realignment that people were flirting with during the 1980s from becoming much more of a permanent fixture in American politics.

And fourth, we have to understand that while most Americans do prefer less government, this does not necessarily convey a license to ignore real need. Our movement can only succeed if we offer a workable path to prosperity which can be tolerated by those who will most benefit from it should it succeed.

Finally, let me say that I believe the real potential to attract support from Latinos—whatever specific part of that group they may come from—rests not with the mainstream Republicans or even with the traditional wing of the Conservative movement. It rests with the emerging new Conservative movement which prioritizes progress and growth through new ideas and risk taking, over rigid adherence to some creative ideological purity. We will fight passionately for smaller and less intrusive government. We will fight passionately for less burdensome government. But we will not do it because govern-
ment is inherently bad. We will do it because it cannot possibly, in our view, fulfill the economic and spiritual needs of a nation as broad as ours. Only communities free to prosper and willing to take risks can possibly do that.

**Dario Moreno:** I am going to do something a little different than anybody else on the panel. I am going to talk about a specific case. If you look at the numbers from the 1992 election in Dade County and in Florida, the Hispanic vote did not look very different from the way it looked in other elections. Bill Clinton ran about 7 percent better than Michael Dukakis. He carried 22 percent of the Hispanic precincts as compared to the 15 percent that Michael Dukakis did. The Cuban-American community still showed a close alliance with the Republican party. Another Cuban Republican, Lincoln Diaz-Balart was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, and through the redistricting process, Cuban-Americans picked up two additional seats in the Florida State House.

But I think when people look back at the 1992 election, it is going to be viewed as a watershed in Dade County politics for two reasons. First, the 1992 election, essentially because of the efforts of the Clinton campaign, broadened the political dialogue in Dade County. Bill Clinton was the first Democratic presidential candidate to seriously campaign in the Cuban-American community in Dade County. He made various trips into Dade County at strategic points in the campaign. And he made support for Democratic candidates respectable among Cuban-Americans.

Second, the 1992 campaign highlights the rapid political empowerment of the Miami Cuban community. The Cuban community in Miami now holds the balance of power, for example, in the Florida State Senate which is split 20/20, and the three Cuban Republicans in the State Senate have often voted with the Democratic party on education, health, and other issues.

---

**The 1992 campaign highlights the rapid political empowerment of the Miami Cuban community.**

---

Why did these changes occur? Why did Cubans play a larger role in the 1992 campaign than their numbers warranted? After all, there are probably something like 300,000 Cuban-American voters in Florida. Why did they attract so much attention? I think there were three reasons. First, Florida was a competitive state for the first time since

*Republican and Democratic Strategies in Targeting Diverse Voters* 73
the 1980 election and the Democrats had an excellent chance of carrying it. Bush carried Florida in 1988 by a million votes. In 1992, he carried it by 85,000 votes; that shows the dramatic change in Florida politics and the erosion of Bush's support.

So Clinton's strategy in Florida was not necessarily to win the state but to keep Bush pinned down in what was one of his bases of support. What is a better symbolic act than Bill Clinton, a democratic national candidate, going to the very heart of Little Havana to the Versailles Restaurant to support the Torricelli bill. One political pundit described it as, "in-your-face campaigning."

On the other hand, for Bush, Florida was a vital state. There was no way Bush could win reelection if he did not carry Florida. So for both candidates, Florida took on importance. When you look at the political map of Florida, if you are a Democrat and you want to win state wide office, one of the things you might want to do is reduce the high level of Cuban support for the GOP.

Cuban-Americans have probably been the most loyal group to Republican candidates of any other discernable group. They supported Ronald Reagan in 1984, 88 percent to 12 percent. They supported George Bush 85 percent to 16 percent in 1988. If you do a regression analysis of some of the Cuban precincts in Little Havana, you have a 100 percent Cuban vote for Republican candidates.

For Bill Clinton, the Cuban community was an important community to reduce Republican loyalty in. Moreover, there were rumblings in the Cuban community of dissatisfaction with George Bush. There were some areas of dissatisfaction—the Dade County economy suffered a major recession in the late 1980s and two large Miami-based airlines with large operation demands, Eastern and Pan Am, went bankrupt. So there was economic dissatisfaction.

There was also dissatisfaction because it was reported in 1992 that the State Department was warning the Cuban government of raids by the Cuban community in Miami against the island. The idea that the U.S. State Department was informing the Castro regime of Cuban exile raids against Cuba caused a major scandal among Miami Cubans.

The third reason for Cuban dissatisfaction with the Bush administration was Bush’s lack of support for the Cuban Democracy Act, or the Torricelli bill, which heightened the U.S. boycott against Cuba. Bill Clinton supported the Torricelli bill a month before George Bush and that gave him an entry into the Cuban community.

The fourth reason that the Cubans played a larger role in the campaign than the numbers warranted was that the Cuban political agenda is basically noncontroversial. Unlike other minority groups,
e.g., Chicanos, Afro-Americans, the Cubans are not calling for a redistribution of income policies. They’re calling for a hard line against Fidel Castro, something that for most Americans is exceedingly noncontroversial. Either candidate, George Bush or Bill Clinton, can give that to the Cuban community without suffering an Anglo backlash. So, in other words, what the Cubans were asking for was something very easily delivered by either campaign.

Now, if Bill Clinton ran such a brilliant campaign in the Cuban community, why did he only get 22 percent of the vote? I think there are basically two reasons. One is the issue of trust. Cuban-Americans still do not trust the Democratic party to do the right thing with regard to the Castro regime, or what they perceive to be the right thing. Cuban-Americans still remember the Bay of Pigs and still remember the controversial Carter dialogue with the Castro regime. So that historic memory still has resonance in the Cuban community.

The second, and I think more important, reason is that the Dade County Democratic party has been a disaster in appealing to Cuban-Americans at a local level. There are no Cuban Democrats in the State Assembly or the State Senate. The only declared Democrat elected to public office is County Commissioner Alex Tonelli. And the Democratic party has done a dreadful job of recruiting Cuban Democrats to run for public office. In a State Senate district created to elect a Latino, the Democratic party ran an Anglo Democrat, Andrew Kaufman. In three State Assembly districts created to elect Latinos, the Democrats came up with Anglo candidates.

The only Hispanic Democrat that ran in the general election in Dade County in 1992 was Magda Davis who ran on a very popular platform of lifting the embargo and allowing travel to Cuba. [laughter] She lost in the Cuban precincts 6-to-1. [laughter] And Magda Davis’ campaign proved, I think, a drag on the electoral numbers because it gave Cuban Republicans a reason to point to her and say, “This is the real Democratic position on Cuba, not the Bill Clinton position.”

Rodolfo de la Garza: I am pleased that this panel is beginning to represent a realization that the study of Latino politics is not anything other than the study of American politics. You cannot understand Latino politics but within the context of American politics, and for too long, the study of American politics excluded Latinos.

I want to do a couple of things. Describe some overall findings very loosely and then give you some interpretations of the findings. As I talk about this, you have got to keep a couple of things in mind. One is, whenever you try to assess the Latino roles and Latinos’ impact on
elections, you have got to begin with demographics. The most important thing about the Latino demographics is, with the exception of Cubans, Latino’s are young, they are poor, and they are noncitizens. Specifically, 40 percent of adult Latinos are noncitizens.

Now, with that backdrop, whenever you look at Latino numbers, consider those factors because each of those categories reduces voting. For Latinos to have an impact, the elections have to be competitive, Latino’s must vote cohesively, and they have to turn out in large numbers. If any one of those three things is absent, the Latino vote is irrelevant.

So what happened in 1992? I am going to break this up into three kinds of findings. Some new patterns, some old ones, and some ironies and contradictions.

---

I think one can say the following.

If no Latinos had voted, Bush would still have lost.

Clinton would still have won.

---

Let me begin with the old ones. First of all, overall, the Latino vote was irrelevant to the electoral outcome. When you recall the 1980s, everybody was saying, “This will be the decade of the Hispanic.” Well, the decade came and went and people kept talking about that and the rhetoric went down, essentially, and became more realistic. People did not quite say it was going to be the decade of the Hispanic, but they were hoping it might be.

I think one can say the following. If no Latinos had voted, Bush would still have lost. Clinton would still have won. Perhaps there might have been a few switches. I think it reasonable to say that if Latinos had not voted, Clinton would have taken Florida. If Latinos had not voted, perhaps New Mexico and Colorado might have gone Republican. At least, New Mexico would have gone Republican. We are not sure about Colorado. So that overall we can say, from the best evidence right now, Latinos influenced Florida but it did not matter and Latinos influenced New Mexico for sure and that was nice but unnecessary at the national level.

I can be more positive at other levels, but let me go on here to discuss a second continued pattern. There was a continued increase in Latino representation in both the Democratic and Republican conventions. This is quite impressive, actually. For the Democrats, this is predictable because the Democratic party has quotas in effect. You have to have so many people in and the Democrats are now
meeting their quotas so there are a lot of Latinos not only as dele-
egates but as important members of various party convention com-
mitees including the platform committee, etc. Latinos were present
and they were substantively present.

The Republicans do not have quotas. Interestingly, however, Latinos
had a higher representation at the Republican convention than they
did at the Democratic convention, controlling for the number of
Latino Republicans. So there is either an active outreach or an innate
affinity, as was suggested by Mr. Weber. I am not sure I would call it an
innate affinity, but perhaps there is now a real body of Mexican
Republicans. Something which did not exist when I was growing up.
It used to be an oxymoron.

A third point is the continued decline in Democratic support
among Latinos. This is, I think, quite interesting. President Clinton
received the lowest percentage of Latino votes of any Democratic
presidential candidate since we have been keeping count. That is
surprising, especially since you had a higher Latino turnout this time.
Turnout went up 9 percent and Clinton got, depending on how you
count, approximately 60 percent of the vote. That is lower by far than
any other Democratic candidate to date. Conversely, there is a con-
tinued increase in the non-Democratic vote. In this case, that in-
cludes Perot. Perot and Bush got close to 40 percent of the vote. If
Republicans win 40 percent of Latino votes, they will never lose an
election in the west. But it was not just a Republican vote. It was also a
Perot vote.

Another old, repeated theme is the continued low turnout relative
to other electorates. That is an old theme, so let me give you some
new ones quickly. Maria mentioned this already, and it is important. I
think it is very very important. The de-emphasis of ethnic appeal. This
was a conscious effort culminating, in the words of one senior Clinton
operative, with the Jesse Jackson-Sister Souljah speech. A senior Clinton
operative defined that as, “the crystallizing moment of the cam-
paign.” In that moment, President Clinton’s people made it clear
they were not going to make an ethnic appeal.

That speech did a couple of things. In my judgment, it slapped
Jesse Jackson on the hand and told him to understand where his
place was. It legitimized the more moderate, centrist Democratic
black officials, and reduced any anxiety, or a lot of the anxiety,
among white voters. It served three purposes, and I think it did it very
effectively. First, it was “the crystallizing moment of the campaign.”
Second, in the Clinton campaign it allowed Latinos and other ethnics
as well, perhaps, to play central, non-ethnic roles in the campaign. I
want to emphasize central, non-ethnic roles. To a substantial degree,
many of them came to the campaign without a history of Latino activism. Maria Echaveste, for example, was not a Latina activist. Other Latinos did not have historical Latina or Latino credentials, yet they became prominent within the campaign.

We asked one person how she became involved in the campaign. A very dynamic, assertive young woman. And she said, “Well, I sort of wanted to work in a presidential campaign and so I checked out how to do it and I figured out it would be safe,” and she said, “I organized Youth for Clinton.” This was a Mexicana from Texas speaking. So she became involved and ended up being very important in the campaign on a totally non-ethnic dimension. Now, I asked her, “Was your ethnicity ever relevant or salient in the way you conducted yourself?” After careful thought, she said, “No, no, no.” Yet later in the campaign, we found an interesting correlation between the states where she was assigned to work and the proportion of Latinos in those states. Now, she did not put those two together and she did not consciously act on that, but it sort of happened so perhaps either she is right or we are insightful. We do not know.

Another interesting development is that the Republicans, contrary to what our colleague said a few minutes ago, had the most obviously ethnic campaign. They had a concentrated, Spanish language campaign. We told the Clinton people, and the Republicans already knew it, that the Mexicans who vote know English so you do not have to reach them in Spanish. I do not know if that influenced Maria or not but we told her that. However, the Republicans still were using media in Spanish and they had an especially negative campaign message. The only place where the Democrats responded in Spanish was in New Mexico to counter a very effective, Spanish language, negative campaign.

Another point, and this is something that was talked about a few minutes ago, but I do not know how to conceptualize this. I will use the lexicon out of Mexico—the politicos and the technicos or the politicos and the dinosauros. In the American argot, you might call it the post-Chicano generation or the “Chuppies,” the Chicano “Yuppies.” [laughter]. It is a young generation which—whatever their own activist and ethnic commitments—in my judgment, is the beneficiary of the Chicano movement.

The Chuppies are the Latinos who are now titled or educated and professionally certified and who have as a cultural memory, the discrimination, but not necessarily as a formative, personal experience—thus lowering the edge and eliminating the chip, if you will. There is a cultural memory of racism and discrimination but not a personal, formative experience. That group was very different from
what I call the “dinosauros.” Maybe Tyrannosaurus Rex is a more real image because this is the old Chicano movement types—or the “old guard.”

The Chuppies are the Latinos who are now titled or educated and professionally certified and who have as a cultural memory, the discrimination, but not necessarily as a formative, personal experience.

The Chuppies were formed in a different era and do not necessarily see things the same way as the old guard. For example, the Chuppies have a different approach to politics. In my experience and judgment, the Chuppy, not that I am being unkind, prefers to be dealt with as an individual and a professional. They may be completely ethnic in identification but do not necessarily welcome carrying the responsibility of an ethnic affiliation.

To illustrate my point, I offer the following example. Work outside of issues pertaining to the Latino community was impossible for Latino political operatives between 1976-1979. In 1978, I interviewed a then protégé of Democrat Robert Strauss who was working in President Jimmy Carter’s White House staff. He expressed this terrible feeling that “they”—the White House leadership and the Democratic party—would not let him work on non-Latino issues. No matter what he tried to do, they kept making him a Mexican. And he was a Mexican, but he was also an effective political operative. However, he was solely allowed to take on Latino issues. Finally, he left the White House. He expressed his dissatisfaction in the following statement, “I want to be something more than a Mexican. I’m a Mexican at home. I do not have to be a Mexican on the job.”

In the 1990’s, Latino leaders are refusing to limit their efforts to Latino issues. Again, I do not mean to disqualify an ethnic identification. What I want to do is emphasize the professional identification of this new generation of leaders. The Chuppy group differs strongly in their views of politics over the old guard who traditionally push for the old fight. For example, I was told by a variety of sources, and perhaps Maria may want to talk about this, that the “Adelante con Clinton” campaign was initiated and pushed by the old guard and not by the new and younger generation of Latino leaders. The new group of Latino leaders were already central to the Democratic campaign. They were inside holding key positions. This left the dinosaurs in the outside asking, “How come there were no ethnics in the campaign?”
The persons receiving these inquiries were in fact Mexican. The ensuing answer from the party was, "It is a new style of politics." Simply, the old guard could not recognize the new style or understand the change.

Let me go quickly to a particular irony in the Republican approach to capture the Latino vote. Two quick points. First is an evident schizophrenia in the Republican campaign which became explicit in the launching of the "Viva Bush" campaign in Austin, Texas. The Republicans launched the "Viva Bush" campaign in Austin, a city with a very small Mexican or Latino population. That was not the ideal city to launch a presidential campaign to "get out" the Latino vote. Second, the Republican event attracted many members of Texas' traditional Republican party. Remember, Texas Republicans are very conservative. In particular, they support making English the official language of the state and are completely opposed to bilingual education. These are two important issues for Latinos in Texas.

Picture the crowd: there are a few Mexicans and a whole lot of traditional Anglo Republicans. The Republicans introduce, in a real touching way, Jeff Bush's son, George Bush, Jr., with phrases that emphasized, "one of ours is in the White House." As he stood I noticed that he looked like Henry Cisneros. George Bush, Jr. had those handsome Indian features that people like to romanticize. The reception of George Bush, Jr.'s ethnicity is represented by a question aired by a Chicano but shared by many Latinos in the crowd, "Who the heck is that?"

Then Barbara Bush stands, remember the makeup of the audience, and says, "You know, I'm glad for all you Latinos but do you know what?" She asked, "Clinton passed an official English bill... and we hate that." The Chicanos cheered and the Anglos not knowing what to say just froze. There were two conflicting messages being aired by the Republicans. It was obvious that they did not know their audience. The traditional Anglo Republicans felt offended while the Mexicans cheered. It was a wonderful moment of cognitive dissonance. [laughter].

The editorial said that, ironically, the de-emphasis of ethnicity would probably benefit Latinos.

I wrote an editorial right before the election results were released on the assumption that Clinton was going to win. The editorial said that, ironically, the de-emphasis of ethnicity would probably benefit
Latinos. If Latinos held Clinton to his campaign promises, to address the issues that he emphasized, they could hold him to the fire without being forced to make an ethnic claim. Latinos could win as Americans rather than as solely an ethnic community.

Charles Royer: Thank you, Rudy. One thing that jumped out at me from Professor de la Garza’s presentation was that the Latino vote was irrelevant to the 1993 Presidential election. Would anyone like to respond to his finding?

Maria Echaveste: I have a sort of philosophical response. What is relevant? I think when de la Garza says that the Latino vote is irrelevant, perhaps he is limiting his definition of importance on the determination of whether the Latino vote serves as a swing vote in individual state contests. My understanding of relevance is more basic.

The real question we should be asking is why as a Latino community we do not value political participation. Increased participation will result in greater accountability from our elected officials to our community. What has happened over the years is that we tried to generate electoral support by saying, “Your vote is really going to make a difference here” rather than saying, “Your vote in every election is not only a responsibility but is critical to getting our community needs met.”

My favorite example of why voting is something that we should engrain in our youth and in our communities is the perceived strength created by the Jewish community’s electoral participation. The Jewish community is six million strong and five million of them vote. That means something. Hispanic’s are 20-24 million strong, even if you assume say 40 percent are not citizens, that is a substantial number of votes. However, the reality is that our community votes at low rates.

We should not solely be thinking of the Latino vote as relevant to Colorado and New Mexico and any other state with a concentration of Latino voters. I thought I was going to spend the last two months of the election fighting in California. However, I spent the last two weeks in Colorado, New Mexico, and New Jersey. That is troublesome. Our Latino vote is only irrelevant if you measure its effect in terms of its impact to the outcome. The fact of the matter is, every single community that votes, when you add it up, matters. Rudy’s perspective is very critical and limited so I would disagree with his assessment.
Charles Royer: While there is some discussion generating here on the panel, why do not we ask those of you who wish to ask a question or make a comment, to go to the two microphones here on the floor. We will intersperse your questions and comments that still may exist with those from the panelists.

Maria Echaveste: Can I just make one observation? The other thing that Rudy was talking about was the dinosaurs—the old guard. There is the tendency in the Hispanic community to look for the Hispanic in the White House or the Hispanic in whatever agency. This search for the power brokers or the gate keepers is the most frustrating thing facing community activists. For the first time there is not a Special Assistant to the President for Hispanic Affairs. There just is not. Not only did the campaign de-emphasize ethnic politics, this strategy has carried over into the appointment of the Clinton Administration. The key now is to fully integrate the White House and the Administration.

People keep asking whom to contact in the White House to deal with Hispanic affairs? Our response is, “Well, if you want to talk about this issue, you call this person. If you want to talk about a different issue you talk to this other person.” It is a different administration in that sense.

Charles Royer: Well, I am intrigued. To what extent is the reluctance to bestow ethnic responsibility on people in the White House a kind of a Sister Souljah response to avoid scaring the majority community and to what extent is it a new way of doing business in the White House?

Rodolfo O. de la Garza: There were rumors out there that in fact, such a position like the traditional Assistant to the President on Hispanic Affairs was offered by the Clinton Administration to a very prominent organizational leader from Texas. I do not want to go beyond that but let me just say that those rumors are everywhere.

Maria Echaveste: I can tell you that rumors spread like wildfire around the country.

Rodolfo O. de la Garza: Does that mean that the rumor is not accurate?

Maria Echaveste: It is false. That position has never been offered. The Office of Public Liaison, which is where that position was normally housed, has been totally restructured.
Dario Moreno: Unlike other states, in Florida both campaigns played the ethnic card. One of the things that the Clinton campaign understood is that a fall out over Cuban policy exists with the Bush Administration. Bush played the Jeb and his family card as the “in” to the White House. The Clinton administration came back with Maria Arias-Rodham, Hillary’s sister-in-law, a Cuban-American, and the “there is a family connection with the Miami community” card. It was interesting because Miami was the exception as far as both candidates were involved.

Unlike other states, in Florida both campaigns played the ethnic card.

Maria Echaveste: I think that is true. Certainly in the Southwest, I do not think anyone knew Maria Arias-Rodham was in the Clinton family.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Question: Would our communities be better served by America’s leadership if it retained the emphasis on its differences and diversity given the present disempowered position of the Latino communities, in particular the Puerto Rican community, with regard to poverty and non-participation in the electoral process?

Maria Echaveste: If I may share a couple of points. I never meant to suggest assimilation is the better alternative. That is not what I was trying to express. Two things. One, for the first time in the Congress, you have three Puerto Rican Congresspersons. Indeed, two of them, Congresswoman Velasquez and Congressman Gutierrez, met with us this morning in Personnel to talk about the lack of Puerto Rican appointments. They were very vocal and very strong advocates for the Puerto Rican community. Their advocacy was not just for their districts but for the island. Another primary area they discussed was the importance of tending to the substantive needs of Puerto Rico. For example, Puerto Rico’s AIDS rate is devastating its population.

By voting these representatives into Congress, the Puerto Rican community has strengthened itself. I think Nydia Velasquez’s campaign was a classic and beautiful example of someone not being scared off by a $3,000,000 war chest or by the fact that there were four
or five other Latinos running. She made a commitment to run, got out there with her campaign, delivered the votes and won. Ultimately, the only thing that mattered was what happened at the voting booth.

We should be stressing political participation at the grass roots level and at every level. We could have a much greater influence on the agenda of this country if our community fully participated in the electoral process.

Sometimes our differences stem from the frustration that the potential political power for our community is just not being channeled in more effective ways. We should be stressing political participation at the grass roots level and at every level. We could have a much greater influence on the agenda of this country if our community fully participated in the electoral process.

**Question:** What do you see as adverse in maintaining the traditional structural separation based on ethnicity and race? The political structure has never backed away from playing to white mainstream interests. In fact it is very overt. What seems to be the problem with playing to the non-white interests other than the perceived white backlash?

**Rodolfo O. de la Garza:** In my judgment, it is all too easy in the contemporary arena, to make an argument of uniqueness of a community rather than proportionality. What do I mean by that? To argue that, as Mexicans, we have a unique set of problems is easy. However, through further analysis such a statement is tenuous, at best. One can argue that we have unique language issues. However, all kinds of immigrants have language issues. They also have poverty issues. They also have most other issues we claim as unique to our community. When we take the unique position conversation on the issue is impeded. I think that this impediment eliminates full discussion on the issues.

But let me go further. We also have structures out of the Voting Rights Act that allow the system to build on historic segregation and isolate ethnic officials so that they really have no electoral capacity to speak to non-ethnic officials. It can be argued, that one of the prices of increased representation through the VRA minority-majority districts is the position in which it places elected officials. Anglo officials can say, “look, you’re responsible for the Mexicans. I do not have any Mexicans in my district. No Mexican comes to talk to me. You deal
with their matters and I will deal with mine. You’ve asked for exclusivity. You’ve got it.”

I think that is one of the dilemmas facing our community post-VRA. On the other hand, if you argue based on proportionality, that is, “more Mexicans are poorer than Anglos so we have to deal with poverty, Anglos included,” you might have a better discussion on important social problems.

Weber: When you talk about addressing issues and addressing them mainly to a white constituency, I think that the reality, from the perspective of a Conservative Republican campaign, is that we do not target by race, any race. Republicans generally target by ideology and by issues. Wherever you might happen to fall on that spectrum, we are talking to you. If we see an opportunity to leverage votes and bring them away from the other side by creating magnets and wedges, we are absolutely going to do it. But, the moment that you start to break it down into smaller and smaller and smaller constituent groups, whatever constituencies they might happen be, the problems become evident.

Believe me, small business comes knocking at our door. So does big business and even labor unions knocks. Everybody does. But the bottom line is that, at some point you have to address the campaign to a broad enough cross section of issues. The campaign must make sense to enough people so that when they go out and vote there is some commonality to the vote that they are all casting. I would submit to you that there really is not that much white backlash going on or that much overt appealing to the general white voter. It is just what is important to America and what is important to most people in this country.

Question: Two very brief questions. One to the academic side and one to the political side. Given the passage of time, will the Latino communities, including the Cuban community, experience a fusion or an alignment of interests or will the differences as characterized by Professor de la Garza continue? Second, how do the mandates of Voting Rights Act fit into (1) the Democrat’s new organizational paradigm as evidenced by Clinton’s new approach to diversity and (2) the traditional Republican party organization model?

Durio Moreno: What you find in the Cuban-American community, is that younger Cubans tend to be more Republican than older Cubans. Which is a real contradiction. In 1980, 49 percent of Dade County Cuban-Americans were Democrats and only a third were
Republican. Reagan did a lot to mobilize and change the composition of the political parties. Today, Cuban-Americans are about 66 percent Republican.

Part of the reason is that young Cuban-American candidates, while liberal on most social issues, are conservative on the foreign policy front. Because there are not enough Cubans in the Democratic primary, the Anglos will run a candidate against the Cuban and are likely to win. But, if a Cuban runs as a Republican and wins the primary they will likely win the general election. The Cuban-American candidate’s moderate-conservative tilt makes him a viable candidate in the general election but not in the Democratic primary.

---

Young Cuban-American candidates, while liberal on most social issues, are conservative on the foreign policy front.

---

For example, Lincoln DeEspolar, was a first rate Democrat candidate who lost a race for the state assembly. Mr. DeEspolar reincarnates himself as a Republican and wins by overwhelming margins. For young Cubans, it is a very pragmatic, political act to run as a Republican. The effect of this type of candidate transformation has impacted all of Dade County. For example, at the retirement of Jack Gordon, a leader of the Civil Rights Movement in Dade County and a liberal Democrat State Senator, a leader of the state Democratic party said, “There is no future for Anglos in Dade County due to the Cubans.” That was the Democratic party that Dade County Cuban Democrats had to overcome. That is a real dilemma the Democratic party faces in Florida and in particular Dade County. There are no bright young Hispanic faces in the party’s leadership.

**Maria Echaveste:** That is not only true in Dade County. In San Diego, California, if you are an up-and-coming Hispanic you have a better chance of getting elected to a city or state office if you are a Republican. The switch in party affiliation is based on pragmatic considerations.

---

In fact the Republican party is using the redistricting to lessen the influence of Democrats. What were traditionally Democratic districts are now competitive due to the redrawing of the lines.

---

86 Forum
With respect to the Voting Rights Act, I think there is a very interesting phenomena created by the concentration of Hispanics and other minorities in a few districts. By mandating the concentration, the power of the Hispanic community seems to be limited to the representative of a particular Voting Rights Act district.

In fact the Republican party is using the redistricting to lessen the influence of Democrats. What were traditionally Democratic districts are now competitive due to the redrawing of the lines. Minorities, traditionally democratic voters, are now replaced by a segment of the general population not as partisan in their voting patterns. What results is a tension between the desire for increased minority representation and a concern for the decreasing number of ensured Democratic congressional seats. This is a tension that has really come to a head. There are now several cases working their way through court challenging the concentration imposed by the Voting Rights Act. One of them has also gone to the Supreme Court. I do not know how it is going to be resolved.

**Dario Moreno:** I am very familiar with the redistricting case in Florida. A major dilemma faced by minorities was that the Republican party initiated a plan establishing three majority African-American districts and two majority Hispanic districts. The Democratic plan had only one majority African-American district. The proposal split the black democrats down the middle and created a new alignment in favor of the Republican plan. The Republican plan was adopted. The net result was that Florida’s delegation went from an 11-10 Republican-Democratic makeup to a 13-10 makeup.

**Question:** My question is about ethnic politics. Historically, blacks and Hispanics have been used by both parties as pawns to further an agenda. At the same time, these communities seem to maintain their political preferences. What future issues do you expect that Latinos will further for either party? Are there particular future issues that you expect will rally the Latinos?

**Rodolfo O. de la Garza:** The most surprising result of our national survey is that no matter how we analyze the data, we find almost no ethnic dimension to the data. When we control for economic characteristics, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans essentially look like Anglos in their preferences. What that really tells us is that although proportionately, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans may favor a policy more than Anglos, it is because of an economic condition rather than an ethnic value.
The most surprising result of our national survey is that no matter how we analyze the data, we find almost no ethnic dimension to the data. When we control for economic characteristics, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans essentially look like Anglos in their preferences.

Now, there is a clear Latino domestic agenda. It is around social policy that has to be described as liberal. The point earlier about Latinos being conservative is not supported by evidence. When you think of religion, for example, this is the most religious country in the capitalist West, if I may still use that reference. Latinos signal religion as less important than Anglos, despite the mythology. Latinos are united around education policy, the role of the state in facilitating access to and providing health, education, and jobs. Those are the important policies that unify the community. We could get into a complicated explanation as to why that might be ethnic but, in the end, it does not take on an ethnic dimension.

Follow-up Question: The only reason I ask is because oftentimes, with issues like immigration or welfare, those are usually code words about Latino people, about black people, and I’m just curious if that . . .

Rodolfo O. de la Garza: Latinos are terrible on immigration. You do not want to assume Latinos are pro immigration. It is the worst assumption you can make.

Question: What is each political party doing to develop new leadership around a younger Latino population and about Latino registration?

Maria Echaveste: During the campaign, we had someone working on the Youth Vote. The reason why I was not surprised when Dario said that there were young Republican Cubanos in Florida is that the Republicans were successful at recruiting the 20-35 year old crowd. It may have something to do with the fact that the struggles of the ’60s and ’70s led to the excesses of the ’80s and when people reach a certain economic level, you become perhaps, more conservative. Admittedly, many other factors come into play.

One very important thing that the party and Clinton did was recognize that you needed to go after the youth vote. During the campaign and it is shown itself in post-election activities, we were
trying to find the media and the particular medium to effectively communicate with youth. It was no accident that MTV was used. For example, it was no accident that President Clinton was interviewed on MTV after his National Service speech. I think that the Democratic party will be focusing on increasing registration by means such as the “Motor Voter” bill. There is a real emphasis on trying to make it easier to register to vote.

In terms of leadership, however, speaking only as a Latina and not really focused on the party so much is, I think there is a tension between attracting young, bright people like yourselves, to party politics. I think that the election of someone like Clinton has brought government and politics back onto the positive side of a positive career. I think that for many years, politics and government was something that you just did not do if you were bright and intelligent. [laughter].

I think that for many years, politics and government was something that you just did not do if you were bright and intelligent. I think there is a new attitude about government.

I think there is a new attitude about government. There is a real desire to have talented people to come into party politics. Therefore, I think there are going to be some efforts but we, as a community, must also assume responsibility.

James Weber: With respect to what Republicans will do to try and attract youth votes or young Latinos, I think that what you will see is that we are going to be talking an awful lot about opportunity and ending dependency. You are just going to have a basic choice that you are going to have to make at some point. You are young. You have got your whole life in front of you. Your future is there. What kind of opportunities do you want?

Well, there are arms of the Republican party that deal specifically with outreach to various groups. Yes, there are young people. Yes, there are Hispanic Republicans. There are a whole slew of different Republican federations that work within those communities, specifically to bring them into the party. To get them involved in the party. Ultimately, our attraction is going to be on growth policies, not so much on some other artificial approach.
**Question:** The Clinton campaign’s decision to minimize race and ethnicity in the election had many effects on the population. One effect that is troublesome is the message of non-importance it gave to young minority activists. The message, whether intentional or not, was interpreted as minimizing the importance of issues of race. What will the Clinton Administration do to clarify its intent and rejuvenate the interests of these productive Americans?

**Maria Echaveste:** Well, I think your frustration was echoed throughout the campaign by many people of color. There were minority communities feeling that ours was a very different campaign when compared to the traditional model. We ran the risk of saying, “Well, you are not important. The only person who is important is the white suburban voter.” It is a very delicate balancing act.

However, by focusing on issues, as he did in his State of the Economy address, you will see that in fact the issues that he has committed to are very important to the urban environment, which is now a code word for minorities. I think that the way that balance has worked is to focus on issues thereby avoiding some of the problems of the past. But, I certainly agree with you that it is a risk that has to be watched carefully.

However, by focusing on issues, as President Clinton did in his State of the Economy address, you’ll see that in fact the issues that he has committed to are very important to the urban environment, which is now a code word for minorities.

It is a balance that everyone is seeking. When we are asked “Are you an American?” one likes to think that one can be both Latino and an American, but there is not a choice in the question. We all happen to be Americans of Hispanic descent committed to the political participation in this country’s future and demanding an equal voice in that development. How we make our goals happen is where we end up disagreeing.

**Charles Royer:** This might be an excellent place to bring this to a close. Let me say that this has been a fascinating look at the preliminary results of the Hispanic vote during the 1992 presidential election.
GENERAL INFORMATION

The *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* (ISSN 0892-6115) is published annually at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. The *Journal* is a non-partisan publication dedicated to the analysis and understanding of policy issues facing the U.S. Latino community.

The *Journal's* Editorial Board welcomes the submission of papers representing diverse perspectives of academics, politicians and practitioners year-round. Original research and analyses that propose innovative policy recommendations are given high priority. The views expressed by the authors, however, are their own and are not attributable to the Editors, the Editorial Advisory Board, the *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy*, or the John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Annual subscriptions are $15 for individuals and $45 for institutions. All correspondence regarding subscriptions, changes of address, purchase of back issues, requests to quote or reproduce material, or submission of articles should be sent to:

*Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy*
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138

The *Journal* staff can be reached at (617) 495-1311, or by fax at (617) 496-9027.

Copyright © 1993 by the *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy.*
All rights reserved.
WRITING FOR THE JOURNAL

Call for Papers Information

- Articles should present the results of original research and analysis on policy issues facing the U.S. Latino community.
- Papers should be 15-25 double-spaced pages.
- Three copies of the previously unpublished article should be sent with a cover letter stating title, author's name, address, and daytime telephone number. If accepted, we will request an MS Word™ file on 3.5" disk.

Please contact the Journal office for details on current deadlines and thematic focus.

HARVARD JOURNAL OF HISPANIC POLICY
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 495-1311
FAX (617) 496-9027