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Feature Articles

Gender and The Impact of IRCA
Terry Repak, Ph.D.

The Implementation of Public Policies in Latino Communities
Lisa Magana, Ph.D.

Immigrant Social Networks
Cecilia Menjivar, Ph.D.

Prospects and Barriers to Successful Latino and African-American Coalitions
Jerry Yaffe, D.P.A.
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Editors’ Remarks

On November 8, 1994, American voters voiced a mandate for change by ushering in a new Congress along with sweeping changes at the state and local level. With this newly elected Republican Congress, the United States is experiencing a time of new policies and paradigms. Much of the “new” in the Republican’s agenda addresses issues of concern to the Latino community: welfare, health care, immigration and many others. At the same time, the Latino community is growing in numbers and strength, requiring policy makers to seriously consider these voiced concerns. In developing new public policies which are sound and effective and which incorporate our needs, learning from previous public policy successes and failures can prove to be extremely useful. The current debate on immigrant policy provides a good example.

Now that the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) has been in place for almost a decade, policy makers and researchers are studying the impact of this law to learn some lessons. When this policy was developed in the early 1980s, broad assumptions were made about immigrants, leading to the treatment of this community as a monolith. Today, differences in gender, social networks, and reasons for coming to the United States lead to very different experiences for individual members of immigrant communities. In addition to these demographic differences, we also see differences over time. A female Salvadorian immigrant has a very different experience today from a female Salvadorian immigrant ten years ago. This is a result of differences in attitudes toward immigrants, changing economic trends, as well as the volatile political climate. Learning from IRCA’s mistakes and “best practices” will aid policy makers in developing future immigrant policies that adequately address the different realities and needs within the immigrant community. Our first three articles remind us as readers and policy makers that these realities and needs are very different today and that immigrant policy must be developed accordingly. The future of immigrants’ success in our society depends on it.

Most analyses of the impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act focus on immigrant groups as a whole: the number of immigrants who continue to cross our borders without documents, the number of undocumented immigrants who were legalized, and the number of undocumented immigrants who continue to work illegally. Terry Repak moves away from this monolithic treatment of immigrant communities and presents us with a study of the differing impact of IRCA on men and women in the Washington, D.C., area. She uses human capital theory as well as historical-structure theory to elucidate the reasons for this variation. Through her research on Central Americans in Washington, Repak finds that “gender is...a preeminent factor in determining wage levels and employment mobility, in conjunction with the structural context in which immigrants labor.” Indeed, she concludes that IRCA’s effects may be more harmful to immigrant women because their efforts to switch from informal to formal sector jobs are less successful than immigrant men’s attempts. Her pow-
erful analysis certainly should cause policy makers and others to reconsider how policies may affect not just the Latino community as a whole, but Latinas as an individual subgroup as well.

Our next author, Lisa Magaña, takes a step back and examines the theories of implementation of public policies. Her thorough treatment of implementation theory allows her to create a framework for implementing public policies in the Latino community. She cuts through the rhetoric often heard by policy makers and states, “In short, theoretical policy implementation has not adequately explored multicultural and multiethnic settings characterized by diverse Latino populations.” Magaña analyzes the implementation of the Legalization program, part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. She uses the elements of her framework (the need for clear objectives, targeting particular groups, commitment to the policy or program, messages sent into the community, and communication between the implementing agency and field workers) to show that more attention needs to be paid to how policies and programs are implemented in our community. Magaña’s framework is a useful place to begin for any agency (whether governmental or non-governmental) when planning to bring a new program or policy into the Latino community.

Moving forward from IRCA, policy makers are now faced with a complex environment and continually changing demographics when formulating new immigrant policies. Cecilia Menjívar challenges an assumption behind many of our immigrant policies — that most immigrants, when they arrive in the United States, find a supportive social network through family members already here. Through the compelling stories and comments by the Salvadorean in San Francisco she interviewed, Menjívar demonstrates that “there are...many cases where these social relations become conflictual and even break down. In [these] situations, the presence of relatives in the place of destination no longer represents the familiar comfort and mutual assistance that these networks supposedly embody.” She provides policy makers and researchers with concrete policy recommendations based on her observations and analysis. Given the current immigration patterns as well as the economic and political environment of the receiving communities, Menjívar’s article is timely and efficacious as policy makers struggle with the creation of policies to best serve the newest members of our community.

As we think about our immigrant brothers and sisters, we must also focus on the future of our community as a whole. The Latino community is growing in political and economic strength. However, we must also recognize that other minority groups are also growing in strength at the same time. What has resulted is the pitting of minority groups against each other in the fight for political clout and economic resources. In today’s climate where resources are scarce and rhetoric is abundant, the strategy to consider is the building of coalitions. Our fourth articles takes up this very issue.

Jerry Yaffe, in his thought-provoking article, alerts readers to the prospects and barriers to successful Latino and African-American coalitions. He
deftly delineates the theories of interethnic and interminority coalition-building. His focus, in this case, is the historic and contemporary patterns of racism held by both whites and African-Americans toward Latinos as one of the largest barriers to the formation of such coalitions. He believes that these historic and contemporary contexts of racism towards Latinos “introduce epistemological, social and political dilemmas and barriers that must be confronted and resolved before any promise of equity-based interethnic coalitions can ensue.” Yaffe succeeds in making the reader uncomfortable, but this, perhaps, is the first step toward both Latinos and African-Americans breaking down the barriers that exist in building coalitions.

The staff of the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy is proud to present Volume VIII. Our intention is to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and serve as a policy development resource. As the only national public policy publication focusing exclusively on the Hispanic community, the Journal becomes a vehicle for the inclusion and visibility of our community. Moreover, as a completely student-run publication, the Journal offers the staff a practical education unattainable in the classroom. The Journal provides us an opportunity to develop valuable skills and access to valuable information which will enhance our ability to be effective policy makers.

The publication of Volume VIII is a result of the tremendous effort of several individuals who deserve recognition here. A special thanks goes to the authors who contributed their work to this publication. Their efforts continue to inform the policy-making world about our community. Their participation and concern deserve recognition and praise. We would also like to thank our Executive Advisory Board, especially the Honorable Grace Flores-Hughes for her leadership as Chairperson. We must also express our gratitude to the Kennedy School Student Government for their support and to Assistant Dean Peter Zimmerman at the John F. Kennedy School of Government for his advocacy on behalf of the Journal and his consistent help. Finally and most importantly, the Journal staff deserves our deepest thanks. Their commitment, sense of humor, effort and friendship makes our job easy and enjoyable. We would especially like to recognize Mitch Lew, an unsung heroine at the Journal.

We welcome any comments about our publication and encourage members of our community as well as any others to contribute articles which advance the understanding of the intersection of public policy and the Latino community.

¡Hay que seguir avanzando nuestra causa!

Mark Fassold
1995

Claudia Jasín
1994-95
Gender and The Impact of IRCA: Central American Women and Men in Washington, D.C.

Terry Repak, Ph.D.

Terry Repak holds a Master of Science degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a Ph.D. from Emory University. She is the author of *Waiting on Washington: Central American Workers in the Nation’s Capital*, as well as many other articles on Central American migration patterns. She is currently living in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, where she is pursuing her research interests in women and migration patterns.

Introduction

The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act’s (IRCA) impact on undocumented immigrants and on labor markets throughout the United States has been much debated in recent years. Lawmakers intended to impose stricter controls on immigration levels when they signed the groundbreaking IRCA into law almost ten years ago, imposing sanctions on employers who knowingly hired undocumented immigrants. Congress aimed to eliminate employment as the “magnet” attracting immigrants—a proposition advanced by “Push-Pull” theories as well as other orthodox economic theories. Recent studies have shown that IRCA’s impact has varied widely in different cities in the United States, depending on such factors as the health of the local economy, the presence of labor unions, and other structural factors (Bach and Brill 1991; Fix and Hill 1990). But almost a decade since IRCA’s passage, little attention has focused on the different impact that such immigration legislation may have on immigrant women as opposed to immigrant men.

While it was not intentionally designed to impede the progress of one sex over the other in U.S. labor markets, IRCA was crafted with the assumption that men outnumbered women among undocumented immigrants. Both of the major provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 benefited and disadvantaged immigrant women and men to different degrees. Nationally, more immigrant men than immigrant women were able to apply for permanent residency in the United States under the general amnesty or the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program. This is largely due to the fact that (at least before 1982) undocumented men who migrated to U.S. cities and farms seeking work outnumbered undocumented women who came in search of jobs, and they were able to establish continuous residence in the United States since before January 1, 1982. This was not the case, however, among the early Central American immigrants to the Washington, D.C. area. Approximately 70 percent of Central and South Americans who migrated to the U.S. capital in the 1960s and 1970s were
women (Repak 1994b; 1995b; Cohen 1980). Many of them were recruited for work as housekeepers or child care providers for the diplomats and foreign service professionals residing in that city. A majority of these early immigrants had already obtained U.S. citizenship (or permanent residency) by the time IRCA took effect. Central American women in the Washington area tended to migrate legally in order to benefit from labor certification (since the families they worked for often agreed to “sponsor” them for permanent residency) and to bring along or to send for more family members in time than did Central American men (Repak 1994b; 1995).

IRCA’s second major provision, known as employer sanctions, required U.S. employers to request documents of all employees which authorize them to work in the United States. The intent of this provision was to prevent undocumented immigrants from taking jobs that U.S. citizens (or those qualified to work) might secure. Initially, by shifting the burden of proof onto immigrants to show that they were qualified to hold a job in the United States, the law appeared to enhance the difficulties equally for all undocumented immigrants who were seeking employment. But research focusing on Central American workers in Washington, D.C. revealed unforeseen gender differences in the repercussions that followed IRCA’s implementation. Differences were discernible in the process of securing and maintaining steady employment; in bargaining wage levels and benefits; in occupational mobility over time; and in the reverberations throughout immigrant households and communities.

According to human capital theory, immigrants most likely to secure employment and prosper in U.S. labor markets are those who possess particular personal characteristics such as higher levels of education, English-speaking ability, and legal status. If this were the case, then undocumented men and women should be equally disadvantaged by IRCA. Historical-structural theory, on the other hand, maintains that personal attributes are less important in determining occupational “success” in U.S. labor markets than structural factors such as the sector of the economy in which immigrants are employed, the ethnicity of the firm’s ownership, and whether the company belongs to the primary or secondary sector of the economy.

This study posits that Central American women in Washington suffered fewer adverse affects after IRCA’s passage than Central American men in the short run, largely because of the structural features of Washington’s labor market. IRCA proved to be ineffectual in the regulation of informal sector jobs such as domestic service, and it did not eliminate the “pull” of private household jobs that drew most Central American women to the nation’s capital. With their higher levels of human capital, women had less difficulty than men in locating and maintaining steady employment after IRCA. Women also reported fewer problems with legal documents and knew fewer people who were forced to return to their countries of origin after IRCA took effect. But due to structural constraints in the regional labor market, these women wielded less leverage and bargaining power for higher wages in the Washington area economy, and they failed to
achieve significant mobility in wage levels over time despite their higher levels of human capital and the possession of legal documents. While structural factors such as the gender-stratified labor market in the Washington, D.C. area are primarily responsible for women’s poorer earnings and mobility record (in comparison with men’s), IRCA complicated the switch from informal to formal sector jobs for immigrant women in particular.

**Methodology**

Three principal groups formed the basis for the research described here: an interview sample of 50 individuals who frequented social service agencies and a random survey of 100 Central American households in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area; interviews with directors of twenty social service agencies in the Washington area; and interviews with seventy-five employers in the three industries where Central American workers are concentrated (i.e. the construction, restaurant, and cleaning/domestic service industries). The employer interviews focused on labor market trends and changes in the workplace for recent international migrants since IRCA’s implementation. The surveys and interviews were conducted from 1988 through 1990.

In-depth interviews with the sample of 50 individuals were conducted primarily in three social service agencies based in Washington. The larger, more representative survey of 100 households was conducted in apartment buildings or complexes with a high proportion of Central American residents in the District of Columbia and the Maryland and Virginia suburbs. In ten apartment buildings, households were randomly selected for interviews and three Salvadoran research assistants made several attempts to contact tenants in targeted apartments. Interviewers used a standardized questionnaire written in Spanish to collect background information on demographic, family, education, and work histories, and on migration patterns.

In order to assess the impact of IRCA’s employer sanctions provision on the Washington, D.C. labor market, field work was divided into three sections. I interviewed employers in twenty-five large, medium, and small construction companies, ten of which were owned and operated by permanent residents or U.S. citizens of Hispanic origin, and fifteen of which were owned by U.S. citizens of non-Hispanic origin. Companies were selected so that the sample of small, medium, and large companies would be equally distributed among the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Northern Virginia.

Interviews were also conducted with employers of Hispanic origin in fifteen restaurants that served primarily Mexican or Central and South American cuisine and with employers in twenty restaurants owned by U.S. citizens of non-Hispanic origin. Again, they were selected so that comparable numbers of small, medium, and large restaurants located in Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Northern Virginia were represented. Employers in ten companies that provided domestic, cleaning, or maintenance services were also interviewed. Five of the
companies specialized in commercial and residential cleaning/maintenance, and the other five companies referred nannies, child care providers, and housekeepers for private employment.

**Employment Patterns**

According to the Central American men and women interviewed in Washington, IRCA initially posed a greater burden on men than women in their search for employment. Among the respondents in the survey of 100 Central American households, more of the men than women surveyed were undocumented (61 percent versus 51 percent), and more men than women claimed to be amnesty applicants (26 percent versus 16 percent). Only 11 percent of men claimed they had attained permanent residence status in the United States compared with 33 percent of women [See Tables 1 & 2]. In the first few years after IRCA’s implementation, more Central American men than women complained they had experienced difficulties in locating or maintaining steady employment because of the employer sanctions provision. More Central American men reported that employers required them to show documents at their job site or when applying for employment than did Central American women (61 percent versus 46 percent).

In effect, Central American women who work in private households are shielded from the immediate effects of IRCA since few private employers require documents to verify legal status, or fire workers who lack them.

[See Table 3]. Almost twice as many men as women were fired from their jobs after IRCA (seven men as opposed to four women), and an even greater number of respondents claimed to know more men who were fired from jobs—primarily in the construction and restaurant industries. Not one respondent knew of a woman who was fired from a domestic service job because of inadequate documentation.

Fewer than half of the fully employed women were asked to show work permits or legal documents at their places of employment. An overwhelming majority of women (65 percent) worked in domestic service, primarily in private homes as housekeepers and child care providers where Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) enforcement of IRCA is virtually impossible. In effect, Central American women who work in private households are shielded from the immediate effects of IRCA since few private employers require documents to verify legal status, or fire workers who lack them. But many women complained that the work environment isolated them from other colleagues and afforded few opportunities for employment mobility from informal-to formal-sector jobs.

A majority of the employers in the construction, restaurant, and cleaning industries who were interviewed in the Washington area claimed that they re-
quired all employees to show documentation allowing them to work in the United States. Because 86 percent of the Central America men in my survey worked in

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents [N=100]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex of Respondents</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Residents</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty Applicants</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level (Years)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

one of these three sectors (compared with only 23 percent of the women), more Central American men than women complained that IRCA complicated their search for employment or rendered job tenure less secure. [See Table 2] The directors of social service agencies interviewed in Washington affirmed that undocumented women who sought employment as private domestic workers were able to locate employment more readily than men after IRCA's passage. When respondents in the survey were asked whether women obtained jobs more easily than men after IRCA’s passage, an equal proportion of Central American women and men said yes. One respondent commented, “Of course, because women are more useful for Americans than men!” Another woman claimed that IRCA was equally bad for both employers and immigrants because “American people are not going to pick up papers off the floor anymore, but we Latinos will do that. And we need the work and we know how to work. The boss lost and we lost too, but we need more work!”

Central American men, out of necessity, were more active than Central American women in attempting to secure documents (whether legal or fraudulent) in order to obtain employment. Among respondents in the survey sample, more than twice the number of Central American men as women claimed to have purchased social security cards or other fraudulent documents (thirteen men as opposed to five women). Numerous employers admitted their awareness that fraudulent documents were profuse among Central American workers in the Washington area, but they claimed that it was impossible to verify whether documents were legal or fraudulent. One manager of a cleaning company explained: “We had a problem [locating qualified employees] for the first six months [after IRCA went into effect], but then all of these people started coming in with perfect documents. I don’t know where they’re getting them, but I would stand up in
Table 2: Current Employment Categories and Wages of Survey Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Wages*</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>$367</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscaping</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$252</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$240**</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning/Maintenance Firms</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$231</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housecleaning/Child Care</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td>$200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Retail</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>$255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretarial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>$423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Seamstress, Factory, Beautician)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>$177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed/Sporadic Employment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemaker</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Weekly wages are calculated on the basis of a 40-hour work week. The range for men’s wages was $169 to $550, while the range for women’s wages was $133 to $423. Those reported are median wages.

** Restaurant wages for men were probably underreported by those who worked as busboys and waiters and who relied on customer tips.

court and testify that they’re as legal as I can determine.”

As many as 40 percent of employers claimed that they were forced to fire workers because of inadequate documentation after IRCA took effect (although only 11 percent of Central American workers in my survey maintained that they were fired from a job because of IRCA). Most of the employers who asserted

The structural characteristics of the gender-segregated labor market block many semi-skilled immigrant women from occupational mobility because they encounter few alternative employment opportunities in the Washington, D.C. area where professional and service jobs predominate.

that they were forced to fire workers were construction industry employers. Publicly, almost all employers maintained that they required each of their employees to show work permits in order to secure employment. But privately, many employers (particularly in the restaurant industry) admitted that they continued to employ undocumented workers because they were unable to find qualified workers who were willing to take jobs as dishwashers and cleaners. Almost half of the employers in the thirty-five restaurants visited conceded that they retained undocumented workers on the payroll.

**Wage Levels and Occupational Mobility**

IRCA’s influence on wage levels in the Washington area was immediate
Table 3: Survey Responses to Questions Concerning IRCA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Men (N=57)</th>
<th>Women (N=43)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Required to show documents on job</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fired from a job because of IRCA</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that women find work more easily after IRCA</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both men and women have difficulty finding work after IRCA</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased social security cards or other fraudulent documents</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported some trouble with documents</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives/friends returned to country of origin because of IRCA</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives/friends deported after IRCA</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needed assistance from social service agency after IRCA</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and striking. Within the first year after implementation, IRCA forced many employers in the hotel and cleaning industries to increase hourly wages by approximately $1.50, according to the employers interviewed. Because documented workers were in great demand, immigrants with work permits were often able to bargain with their employers for higher wages, especially if they had to travel some distance from the city center to jobs in surrounding suburbs. Undocumented workers showed less leverage in bargaining over wages than documented workers. Central American men who worked in the construction sector were able to command higher wages than their counterparts in the restaurant and cleaning industries, and significantly higher than any of the employment sectors in which Central American women concentrate. For example, the average hourly wage for Central American men in the construction industry (where 61 percent of men were employed) was $9.18 in 1989. In contrast, the average hourly wage for women in domestic service (where 65 percent of women were employed) was $5.38. The immigrant women who worked as housekeepers and child care providers were among the lowest paid because of the negligible bargaining power they wield as isolated workers in private homes; because many of them were undocumented; and because this occupational sector remains among the most poorly remunerated sectors in the United States, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Overall, the Central American women surveyed in Washington showed negligible gains in wage levels and occupational mobility over time in comparison with Central American men. For example, only one woman in the survey sample demonstrated a high level of mobility in contrast to 40 percent of men who did so, and 73 percent of the women surveyed (versus 37 percent of men) experienced no significant mobility in wage levels (Repak 1994a). Eighty-seven percent of women with no mobility were domestic workers; half of them had
migrated to the Washington area before 1985 and still showed little or no mobility, whereas men who migrated before 1985 tended to move into higher-paying construction jobs. Legal status was less significant for men than women, as 60 percent of the men with mobility were undocumented, and they still moved into jobs in the highly-paid construction sector. For women who sought to move out of domestic service jobs and into white or pink collar positions, legal documents proved to be essential. The structural characteristics of the gender-segregated labor market block many semi-skilled immigrant women from occupational mobility because they encounter few alternative employment opportunities in the Washington, D.C. area where professional and service jobs predominate. Central American women in Washington, D.C. are unable to move into production and assembly work as many women of Latin American origin have in cities such as Los Angeles, New York, and Miami. Few alternatives to domestic service jobs were available to women apart from positions in highly-visible places where legal documents would be scrutinized closely—such as in social service agencies, banks, and offices (Repak 1994a). In this sense, IRCA complicated or delayed the transition from informal sector jobs (e.g. in domestic service) to formal sector jobs, and Central American women found themselves further stymied as they sought to attain occupational mobility.

Reverberations in Households and Communities

The reverberations into the family nexus from recent changes in U.S. immigration laws also tend to be shouldered unevenly by immigrant women over men. Because more men than women lost jobs or were deported after IRCA, many women became the primary or sole income earners in their households. Several women affirmed that after IRCA was implemented and their partners lost jobs, they (the women) became the sole supporters in their households. One woman blamed IRCA for causing many problems within immigrant families because: “the men from our countries are used to working, and if they can’t work they feel frustrated and jealous if their wives can still work.”

Counselors at several social service agencies expressed concern that unstable working conditions, particularly for men, contribute to the destabilization of immigrant families. One lamented the fact that “[t]here’s only so much counseling we can do to make people feel good about being unemployed. There’s not much we can do for them until they can work.” She noted that when women have to work full-time to make ends meet, often at two jobs outside the home, more children are left alone at home without supervision. According to social service agency directors, higher levels of unemployment, of alcohol and drug abuse, and of depression since IRCA’s passage have led to increasing incidences of domestic violence. Three women in the interview sample said that their husbands developed drinking problems after coming to the United States, and they attributed their problems to IRCA. A fourth had herself developed an alcohol problem and said she could hardly make ends meet to support three children on her own.

Directors at a number of the social service agencies in Washington ex-
pressed frustration over their inability to assist needy undocumented immigrants, as IRCA barred provision of certain services (such as employment or housing referrals) to "illegal" immigrants. Furthermore, some directors reported a marked increase in the number of women and children needing assistance with basic medical services and food for survival, particularly if someone in the household had been fired or was unable to find work after IRCA's passage. These directors also said that more clients frequent their agencies for counseling with drug or alcohol-related problems since IRCA passed. As one explained, "Women are more desperate for basic services now. After IRCA many of the men were cut from payrolls and they can only work on a daily basis or as self-employed individuals." Twice as many women as men surveyed said that they were forced to apply for public assistance or aid from a social service agency because of IRCA.

A majority of the Central Americans in the sample listed difficulties with legal documents as the worst problem they faced in their sojourn in the United States. Yet most social service agency directors as well as the Central Americans interviewed in Washington claimed that just as many undocumented people

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are coming to Washington (or to the United States in general) after IRCA as before and that the law does not deter those who are determined to find work. It did, however, force families and communities to support new arrivals in the extended period of document and job search.

IRCA did not have the intended effect of forcing large numbers of undocumented immigrants to return to their countries of origin. In the survey sample, 30 percent of Central American men said that they knew relatives or friends who returned to their countries of origin because of IRCA, compared with 17 percent of women. Twenty percent of both men and women knew someone who had been deported. Among informants in the interview sample, only two people had returned to their country of origin (El Salvador) because of IRCA, and both individuals were men. Ten informants claimed to know only men who had been deported or left voluntarily because of IRCA, and five knew both men and women who left. One insisted that "[n]obody's going to return because of the law. They just move in with other relatives and wait until they can find work again." Another woman claimed to know five men who had been fired from construction
johs, and two of her brothers had been deported by the INS after they were apprehended at construction sites. A third woman said she knew a young man who had been deported five times, but after each deportation he simply returned and found another job in the Washington area. He told her that “there is no way they can keep me out of this country!”

**Conclusion**

IRCA was based on assumptions advanced by push-pull and orthodox economic theories, which fall short of accounting for overall structural variations in U.S. labor markets that attract different types of immigrants. IRCA failed to eliminate the “magnet” of employment for prospective immigrants, and it has not prevented determined immigrants from securing employment since fraudulent documents may be attained easily in any major U.S. city. In accordance with human capital theory, more men than women who migrated to the Washington area without legal documents complained of difficulties in locating and in maintaining steady employment. Immigrant men must search for work in public places (i.e. in the formal sector) and are forced to acquire or purchase documents before they can secure employment (and risk lay-offs when their documents expire). IRCA did initially raise wages for men and women with legal documents in certain low-wage employment categories, although only marginally in informal sector jobs. But IRCA also spawned a prolific market for fraudulent documents, and in time both employers and workers found ways to circumvent it. The research on Central Americans in Washington indicates that gender is also a preeminent factor in determining wage levels and employment mobility, in conjunction with the structural context in which immigrants labor. Central American women displayed lower wage levels and very little mobility (in comparison with men) because of the gender-stratified local labor market. The narrow range of occupations open to them and the fact that they were confined to jobs in the secondary or non-regulated sectors made it difficult for any but the most highly-educated Central American women with legal documents to capitalize on their human capital advantages (Repak 1994a). In effect, IRCA became yet another element in the labor market that stymied immigrant women and hampered them in the switch from informal to formal sector jobs.

IRCA’s uneven effects on women versus men may be observed in other U.S. cities that attract immigrants from Latin American countries. While undocumented immigrant women may have an initial advantage over undocumented men in securing employment (because of the availability of domestic service jobs), movement out of informal to formal sector jobs may be as complicated as it was in Washington. But cities such as Los Angeles, Miami and New York offer a wider range of employment alternatives (such as in the garment and electronics industries) where immigrant women may seek employment. While the structure of the labor market and the nature of the work available to Central American women in Washington offer certain protections from immigration laws, these same factors impede employment mobility since the passage of IRCA.
Because the effects of immigration laws are complex and vary by regions, industries, and immigrant groups as well as by gender, these effects must be studied more closely with gender as a major component.

Endnotes

1. IRCA consisted of two main elements. The first entailed a general amnesty program that allowed for the legalization of undocumented immigrants who had arrived in the United States before January 1, 1982, and had been living here continuously ever since (farm workers were allowed more lenient dates of entry under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers [SAW] program). The second element of IRCA comprised an employer sanctions provision that would penalize employers who knowingly hired undocumented immigrants to work in the United States. The provision required for the first time that employers verify the legal status of every employee hired after November 6, 1986, and to complete (within three business days of the date an employee was hired) a one-page form (the I-9) for each employee, and retain the forms in their records. International migrants who arrived in the U.S. after 1981—too late to qualify for the amnesty program—but were hired before 1986 were covered by the so-called grandfather clause. Employers would not be fined for retaining such workers on their payroll and could apply for permanent residency for these employees, but the workers themselves could still be deported if they were apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).


3. Although legal status is not a variable conventionally employed in human capital models of income attainment, it is a factor which has become central to labor market insertion in the United States since the passage of IRCA and is considered a personal characteristic in this context. On human capital theory see Mincer 1970; Schulz 1961.

4. According to Dual Economy Theory, workers in the primary labor market (i.e., those who work in larger mainstream or multinational companies) should receive higher wages than those in the secondary market (generally associated with smaller private businesses). A majority of the Central American women interviewed in Washington worked in the informal or unregulated sector if they were privately employed as housekeepers or child care providers.

5. The employer interviews issued from my participation in a project studying the impact of IRCA on the U.S. labor market and economy. Under the direction of Robert L. Bach of the Institute for Research on Multiculturalism and International Labor, State University of New York at Binghamton, the project was commissioned by the U.S. Department of Labor to prepare a report to Congress. As a contributor to the study, I assessed the extent of IRCA’s impact on Washington-area businesses and workers by interviewing employers in the construction, restaurant, cleaning, and domestic service industries. See U.S. Department of Labor 1991.

6. The companies were chosen at random from the Guía Latina De Comercio 1989, from the D.C. area yellow pages, from the Washington Business Journal’s annual list of the largest commercial developers in the Washington area, and from The Blue Book of Major Homebuilders.

7. In response to the publicity surrounding Zoe Baird (President Clinton’s original nominee for Attorney General, who admitted to employing undocumented
immigrants), the INS issued a statement that no private households in the Washington area had ever been fined for IRCA-related violations.

8. This was the case before a recession (commencing in 1990) stifled the construction boom that gripped the Washington area throughout most of the 1980s. Wage levels in Washington were higher than those reported for Central American or Mexican workers in Houston and Los Angeles (See Cornelius 1987; Rodriguez 1986).

9. Mobility in wages was measured by the difference in wages between men’s and women’s first and current jobs. Based on the difference in wages, respondents were categorized into two mobility groups: high versus low or none. Those whose wages increased by less than $25 annually were categorized under the low/no mobility group.


11. In the survey sample, 43 percent of respondents were women and they reported higher education levels than men respondents (8.4 years versus 7.7). The majority of both women and men came from El Salvador.

References


The Implementation of Public Policies in Latino Communities: A Theoretical Framework

Lisa Magaña, Ph.D.

Lisa Magaña recently received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the Claremont Graduate School. While at Claremont, she was a researcher at the Tomás Rivera Center, a national Latino policy research institute. She is currently expanding her dissertation research on the implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, focusing on the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Introduction

Policy implementation research examines the process by which public policies, like federal acts, laws, court decisions or executive orders are carried out. Policy implementation research challenges policy analysts to consider theoretical variables such as organizational perspectives, administrative attitudes, policy formulations and underlying causal theories.

Very little research has been conducted on the implementation of public policies in Latino communities. That is, most theoretical research examines target populations who read and speak English or who have access to more formal channels of information. The theory also lacks any research on the implementation of policies for undocumented immigrants. In short, theoretical policy implementation has not adequately explored multicultural and multiethnic settings characterized by diverse Latino populations. Targeting Latinos for implementation schemes is important for implementation success, especially in large cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago and New York where ethnic enclaves flourish.

Proof of the importance of targeting groups within Latino communities took place in 1986 when policy makers implemented the Legalization Provision (hereafter referred to as “Legalization”) of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Legalization granted legalized status to immigrants who had met the following two conditions: (1) they had entered the United States illegally, prior to January 1, 1982 and could prove continuous residence in the U.S.; or (2) if they were non-citizen farm workers and could prove previous work experience in the country.

IRCA’s success depended on policy makers at the federal, state and local levels targeting immigrants who were generally apprehensive about dealing with
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or other formal authorities. In this effort, issues such as language, income and citizenship status all had to be considered for the first time by policy analysts and policy formulators that proved challenging.

Interestingly, the majority of these implementing procedures were conducted by the INS, an agency traditionally feared by the undocumented immigrant population. Immigrant advocacy groups, knowing the history of INS’s relations with immigrants, thought this to be a problem. The INS is responsible for keeping undocumented immigrants out of the country as well as assisting them with attaining legalized status. The agency’s law enforcement and legalization services are at odds. This duality of purpose subsequently hinders policy implementation (Bowsher, 1991; Morris, 1984).

Despite these challenges the implementation of Legalization proved to be one of the great successes of IRCA, especially in Los Angeles. Of the 3.1 million immigrants who applied for Legalization nationwide,\(^1\) 1 million applicants were from the Los Angeles District;\(^2\) of the 3.1 million, approximately half of these applicants were Latino, predominately from Mexico, El Salvador and Guatemala.

In order to examine the theoretical variables associated with the implementation of public policies in Latino communities, this paper is divided into several sections. The first section reviews the significant research that led to the development of theoretical implementation. The second section provides a theoretical implementation case study in Los Angeles. The last section provides some theoretical recommendations based on this case study as well as the literature. Although we cannot generalize the findings from the Los Angeles case study, we do acquire insight into public policy implementation in Latino communities.

**Methodology**

The research for this study relies on several types of analysis. (1) Policy evaluations conducted by governmental and non-governmental agencies—such as the Justice Department, the General Accounting Office, the INS, the Ford Foundation and the RAND Corporation—reviewed aspects of IRCA. These evaluations used extensive surveys and assessments of district-level service delivery which comprehensively describe the policy design, major actors and the implementation of IRCA at the federal, regional and local levels. (2) There are several surveys of immigrants who have dealt with the INS which were conducted during IRCA’s implementation. For instance, “A Survey of Newly Legalized Persons in California” and “The 1988 Los Angeles County Latino Assessment Study,” conducted by the Tomás Rivera Center, both provide an extensive understanding of immigrants who dealt with the INS during this period. (3) I conducted in-depth interviews with the federal commissioner of INS, and regional, district and local INS directors, which are integral to understanding the implementation of immigration policy in Los Angeles. I also interviewed key
players from immigrant advocacy groups, in order to understand some of the issues raised by immigrants going through the process (see appendix). (4) Finally, I conducted an extensive review of the public policy implementation literature, including academic journals, published books, dissertations and articles.

**Theoretical Implementation: A Brief Review**

In the 1960s and the early 1970s, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations enacted a series of “Great Society Programs” to improve educational, economic and social conditions within the United States. These programs were often referred to as “fix-it” programs and were developed conceptually to rectify social ills within the country. In the early 1970s, researchers began to explore whether these Great Society Programs were actually meeting their intended goals and whether there were identifiable reasons attributed to these successes or failures. During this period of program assessment, public policy implementation research began to flourish (Lauria, 1993).

Derthick (1972) examined the implementation of several Community Development Programs (CDPs) in the cities of Washington, D.C., San Antonio, Louisville, Clinton Township, New Bedford and San Francisco. The overall goal of these CDPs was to create housing for poor and underprivileged individuals. Derthick found that every one of these programs failed. She attributed these failures to the influence that local policy actors have on the implementation process. That is, local policy actors must be as committed as federal policy actors to implement the policy’s intended goals. Other factors also mentioned include the lack of support for the poor, difficulty in managing and organizing large objectives and the amount of discretionary power policy actors possess.

Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) examined the Economic Development Administration (EDA) in Oakland, California, and its attempt to provide employment opportunities for minorities. They found that in order for implementation to be successful policy makers should consider several factors: avoiding implementation schemes that require a multiplicity of organizations and actors; considering implementation as part of the policy making process; and not assigning program initiation to governmental amateurs or, as they call them, “fly by night administrators.”

These researchers also provided the first quantitative attempt at assessing implementation, finding that the number of clearance points has much to do with implementation success. In short, the simpler the implementation scheme, or in this case the less decisions made by the EDA, the more likely implementation will be successful. They concluded, like Derthick, that local policy actors do not have the same commitment or incentives as federal policy actors to implement a policy.

Building on the work of previous researchers like Derthick and Pressman and Wildavsky, Van Horn (1977), provided three implementation case studies by which to examine implementation schemes: the General Revenue Sharing
(GRS), the Comprehensive Employment Training ACT (CETA) and the Community Development Block Grant (GDBG). He found that implementation success is directly related to the commitment of local policy players. Much like the findings of Pressman and Wildavsky, he also asserted that implementation can be more successful if objectives are clear for policy actors to carry out.

Van Horn found that clear policy objectives and mandates have much to do with implementation effectiveness, but clarity is difficult to attain. He suggests that the complexity of objectives can be attributed to the political nature by which policies are enacted and formulated; that is, policy formulation centers around political compromises diluting initial policy objectives. Van Horn recommended that the policy implementation process could be made simpler if variables such as policy standards, resources, local policy environment, national policy environment and program performance are considered initially during policy formulation.

Maintaining that there still is not a definitive method to studying implementation, William (1982) contended that implementation research is based on a variety of approaches such as those found in psychology, anthropology, economics and political science. He noted that this research usually consists of case studies that include detailed investigations rather than disciplinary concerns.

Perhaps one of the most interesting suggestions is his backward mapping approach. Simply stated, this approach to implementation conceptualizes how a policy actor might interpret implementation. With this innovative approach to understanding implementation, the analyst formulates anticipated steps for achieving policy objectives. Therefore, final implementation decisions are considered by policy formulators.

Finding that there still was a gap in the literature, Mazmanian and Sabatier subsequently developed the first comprehensive approach to assessing implementation (1984). These researchers found that by considering issues such as the "tractability of the problem, ability of the statute to structure implementation and non statutory variables affecting implementation" a more systematic approach to assessing implementation would form. By having a consensus within the discipline, the researchers felt that other theorists could compare and contrast their findings which would result in a further exploration of implementation research. Their theoretical approach initiated a series of implementation studies.

Building on their previous research, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1984) developed their "implementation framework" comprised of a series of questions that examine variables associated with implementation schemes such as, technical difficulties, target group diversity, the target group as a percentage of the population and extent of behavioral change required. Interestingly, the authors contend that the impact of implementation success or failure can take several years. This gives analysts and legislators sufficient time to rectify implementation problems and time to bring about important "behavioral or systemic changes."
They also believe that long periods of time allow legislators a certain amount of experience with a program and the opportunity to decide if the program’s objectives are worthy of pursuing.

Finding that implementation schemes cannot be the same for all groups, particularly ethnic minorities, Bullock and Lamb (1983) compared the implementation of desegregation programs in African-American and Latino communities. For example, they found that language preference should be considered when formulating policies and implementation schemes for Latinos. They also maintained that Latinos are more dispersed and varied across the country than African-Americans; consequently, the researchers contend that it is more difficult to get federal policies targeted to Latinos.

In a review of the literature, Goggin and Bowman (1987) synthesized the chronological development of implementation research. They maintained that first generation implementation research includes detailed accounts of how single authority decisions are carried out either at a single location or multiple sites. Theorists in this category include the work of Derthick, Pressman and Wildavsky. Second generation implementation research, including Mazmanian and Sabatier, advances the development of analytical frameworks that guide research. Goggin and Bowman maintain that the time has come for a new generation of implementation researchers. They recommend that third generation researchers should be more scientific and rigorous, and explain why implementation behavior varies over time, policies and units of government. Finally, the authors contend that in order for implementation studies to be comprehensive, the policy must be viewed over time “to capture the effects of modification and redesign from feedback and policy learning.”

Messages that introduce public policies to target populations, like minorities, influence the way groups interact with their government, accept the policy, take advantage of its resources, and interact with their government in the future (Schneider and Ingram 1992). Implementation can be more effective if “words” are carefully selected when promulgating policy objectives to target populations. Schneider and Ingram also maintain that the way a policy is “announced or advertised” to target groups may also have a major impact on the success or failure of a policy. They go on to say that policies often fail to serve their democratic roles because they do not elicit the kinds of orientation and participation patterns that are needed. The issue of how a policy is presented to target populations is an important consideration of implementation schemes.

Finally, P. May (1993) proposes that as policy mandates become more complex it is crucial that strong signals for success be sent down to policy actors. Good policy design can form these strong signals that set the expectations about an agency’s actions and communicate desired implementation styles. In this case study, May finds that effective use of implementation variables rather than the agency having to change its overall organizational style made for effective implementation.
Overview

The field of policy implementation conceptually evolved as follows. First, theorists contended that there are certain causal reasons attributed to implementation failures, such as the lack of commitment by local policy players and complex policy objectives. Secondly, sophisticated frameworks or implementation checklists that assist analysts in predicting anticipated consequences of implementation flourished throughout the discipline. Today, the discipline is still evolving; there is still not a definitive consensus as to how to assess implementation schemes.

Furthermore, implementation research is based on a variety of approaches from a variety of disciplines. Case studies pervade implementation studies, however, theorists caution that the findings of one case study can not be applied to implementation issues uniformly.

For purposes of generalization, several theoretical findings seem consistent throughout this brief review. Implementation success is related to the clarity of policy objectives. The influence and discretion that local policy actors have on the implementation process should be carefully considered by policy formulators. Implementation schemes have failed because policy makers relied on the premise that policy actors have the same commitment to policy objectives as federal or upper-level policy actors. Moreover, by considering unanticipated consequences of policy implementation, researchers can improve the implementation process. Implementation schemes should be based on realistic expectations, considering that results can take years to surface.

The Implementation of the Legalization Provision: A Case Study in Los Angeles

The Legalization provision established a procedure for granting temporary resident alien status (TRA) to immigrants who have entered the U.S. illegally prior to January 1,1982, and who have lived continuously in the country since then. This provision also legalized the status of non-citizen farm workers, if they could prove previous work experience in agriculture in the country. Immigrants with TRA status can have their status adjusted to permanent resident alien status (PRA) after 18 months if immigrants demonstrated a minimal understanding of English, U.S. History and government, or can take classes on these subjects. Immigrants have a 12 month period to apply for Legalization (Montweiler, 1986). Focusing on some of the theoretical variables examined in the literature review, the following case study examines their application in Los Angeles.

Clear Objectives

INS representatives and immigrant advocates expressed that the overall objective behind Legalization was clear. According to the respondents, Legalization had a long formulation period. It was created after approximately ten
years of planning. Conceptions of IRCA or the major premises behind the provisions were developed prior to the Carter Administration in the 1970s. Policy players, like the INS and Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), were able to prepare for the implementation of these provisions long before passage. These preparations included disseminating information on the issues to the agency and interest groups, holding workshops, and updating policy actors on the legislative progress of the Act.

Key players were also part of the planning process. For example, Alan Nelson, the Federal Commissioner of INS during IRCA, maintained that he as well as other agency representatives sat in on key meetings, task forces and sessions when designing these provisions. This line of communication between policy writers and the INS was an important dimension for the agency when understanding overall objectives: many of the INS representatives acknowledged this procedure during the interviews.

Alan Nelson went on to say that the long gestation period was characterized as, “an efficient exercise in bipartisan politics where a lot of the bugs were worked out before enactment.” For example, he praised the Hispanic Congressional Caucus, characterizing their debate with INS as a thoughtful political process where both sides could articulate their needs.

MALDEF President, Antonia Hernandez made another interesting observation regarding the objectives behind the provisions of IRCA. She maintained that when examining employer sanctions and the Legalization provision it would seem that employer sanctions was the enforcement provision, and that Legalization was the service provision. However, Hernandez believed that Legalization was another enforcement policy because “it was a way of getting a large group of immigrants under legalized, policing scrutiny.” She explained that in the long run the sanctions program was going to be an expensive policy to implement because it was on-going; whereas legalization was a “one shot only chance.” By legalizing many immigrants, it was a good way of reducing the costs of enforcing sanctions in the long run. “These are underlying contradictions and these lead to an agency that is schizophrenic.” Hernandez explained that because of these enforcement benefits derived from Legalization, immigrant advocacy groups, like MALDEF, possessed considerable lobbying power when formulating the legalization provision.

**Targeting**

It was extremely difficult to target groups for implementation. Fear of deportation is just one of the many reasons why undocumented immigrants do not get counted in census-related estimates. Consequently, it is difficult to prepare adequately when developing programs.

During the implementation of IRCA, the respondents all maintained that they found it very challenging to prepare for the number of undocumented immigrants wishing to apply for legalization. For example, the 1980 census estimated
that 1,000,000 of the nation’s undocumented population lived in the Los Angeles area, and that 65 percent of this population was eligible for legalization. The INS estimated that there was approximately 576,000 to 1,248,000 immigrants that would be eligible for legalization. And immigrant advocacy groups felt that there were over 2,000,000 undocumented immigrants who were eligible for legalization.

Today, it is clear whom the INS was targeting. Assessments of those individuals who eventually applied for legalization are as follows: 92% of all legalization applicants in Los Angeles were Latino, of which 78% were from Mexico. The “typical individual” who applied was male, 18-24 years old, had lived in the U.S. for approximately 5 years, and had 4-6 years of education.

The INS also found it difficult to estimate the different types of ethnic groups that would request legalization assistance. For example, the INS was criticized by Asian-Pacific leaders for not adequately soliciting Asian-Pacific applicants; they claimed that too much attention was placed on Latino immigrants (Baker-Gonzalez, 1990). In Los Angeles, it was estimated that there were 120,000 to 150,000 Asian-Pacifics of whom 36,000 to 75,000 would have been eligible for legalization (Gonzalez-Baker, 1990).

The INS maintained that unlike the Latino community the Asian-Pacific community was more widespread throughout Los Angeles and the community does not share the same language bond of Latinos. For example, there are approximately 15 Asian-Pacific countries represented in Los Angeles; however, there is not one major radio, television or religious community organization.

Commitment

In terms of commitment, all of the respondents felt that legalization was to be given first priority. Respondents repeatedly stated that INS’ motivation and job morale was incredibly high during the implementation of legalization. The INS representatives felt that overall legalization was an opportunity to provide a benefit for the immigrant community. Anita Maker, for example, head legalization officer in Los Angeles, expressed that “these immigrants could really benefit from this program, and it was a chance to change the image of the agency.” Respondents contended that there has not been that same type of interest or enthusiasm in promoting other immigration policies.

The INS respondents further expressed that the tangible directives indicative of Legalization resulted in a stronger commitment on the part of policy players to meet the intended goals. That is, Legalization was a “one shot only chance” for a large group of undocumented immigrants to become legalized; policy players were aware of this.

The public appeal that characterized Legalization was another important theoretical variable, particularly to respondents on the service side of the agency. Respondents recalled the extensive attention they received by the public and
media during this period, expressing that the INS had never experienced so much outside support for agency activities. Respondents maintained that job morale during the implementation of Legalization was “very high.” Respondents also contended that the public support resulted in the INS being more committed to meeting policy objectives.

The Western Regional commissioner of the INS, Hal Ezzell, stated that since Legalization was a new program, a new bureaucracy had to be created in Los Angeles. The INS opened 16 offices, hiring 20-25 people for each office. According to respondents, the agency took advantage of its new staff and attempted to create an atmosphere of service orientation. For example, offices were set up in more immigrant-friendly locations, such as in shopping malls and neighborhood centers. The INS also changed its practice of “first come, first serve.” This practice would require long lines and, at times, clients would never receive assistance. During this implementation phase, the INS mandated that INS centers only see immigrants on scheduled appointments in order to ensure better service.

Messages

The director felt that one of the most important objectives of Legalization was to establish a good rapport with the Spanish speaking media. The INS’ outreach approach included representatives making appearances on local television and radio. The director recalled one occasion when a popular Spanish newscaster interviewed him, inquiring about the benefits of Legalization. The newscaster herself was not a legalized immigrant. She returned with her own questions regarding Legalization the next day. He exemplified that by assisting her and other Spanish celebrities the INS was establishing a positive image within the immigrant community. Interestingly, the INS district and regional directors as well as a popular Spanish radio disc jockey, El Tigre, began a massive public relations campaign on television, radio and at community events; the group was named “El Trio Amnestio.” Elizabeth Rolph from the RAND Corporation exemplified this outreach:

The local effort concentrated on ethnic media, the distribution of informational pamphlets and mailers in nine languages (Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, Samoan, Tai, and Tongan) informational meetings with community groups, and the convening of 17 conferences in the region to inform groups who might encourage the eligible population to apply. ...For a period of time, 25 to 30 percent of all district staff were allocated to public relations appearances including such occasions as soccer matches, kite flying contests, masses and church programs, legalization fairs, and medical examination days. ...There was also the Thursday Night Live program and extensive Spanish language radio programs conducted by the district director. (Rolph, 1990)
Immigrant advocacy groups were also fearful that the image of the agency would diminish the pool of potential legalization applicants. Angelo Ancheta, director of the Coalition of Humane Immigrant Rights in Los Angeles (CHIRLA), complimented the INS during this phase. He believed, however, that recent sting and deportation operations conducted by the enforcement side of the agency have tarnished these positive images established during IRCA.

**Communication**

Because the majority of INS' initial implementation activities occurred in the field, it was important that upper management within the INS be in touch with field concerns and events (GAO, 1991). The issue of communication becomes another important variable for this case study. Most of the respondents expressed that during initial implementation communication between the federal, regional and district director was an important dimension. Since the Los Angeles district was the largest within the country, the federal and regional commissioners were particularly interested in its success. The federal, regional and district director discussed issues several times per week; this allowed updated input on street level delivery service, awareness of unplanned consequences of implementation and alteration of procedures when necessary. Policy managers expressed that the initial implementation phase was somewhat chaotic, particularly for the service side. This communication process allowed for timely input and much needed flexibility during implementation.

**Discretion**

The theoretical variable of discretion examined in this case study was defined as "being able to think on your feet," or "the ability to make decisions without supervisor input." When Legalization was implemented part of its success was directly related to the ability of INS representatives to make quick decisions without central support. If there was any doubt about an application, the INS representative in the Western region was told "to hold a generous and liberal view."

**Discussion of General Findings**

The findings of this case study imply that given the right theoretical variables the INS can be effective at implementing service-type policies. These findings are important because the INS has clearly been distinguished more for its enforcement-directive than its service-directive. The findings of this case study provide recommendations that policy analysts may apply to implementation scenarios in Latino communities.

Implementation schemes can be much simpler if policy actors can rely on the reputation of implementing agencies. Policy analysts should consider the reputation of an agency, and what kind of messages and signals are communicated within Latino communities.
When policy actors are delegated the task of implementing policies in Latino communities, the agency should clearly articulate objectives for policy players. Agency guidelines should include tangible directives, such as “who is being targeted” and “specified timelines” for implementation. The Legalization experience illustrates that policy actors' awareness of time settings and tangible directives generated significant commitment on the part of policy actors to meet desired objectives, resulting in implementation success.

Policy actors must fit implementation schemes to the unique needs of communities. For instance, policy actors should consider local mediating structures such as ethnic enclaves, religious organizations, language and media—all particularly important in Latino communities. The agency should also offer services at sites in community settings in addition to formal offices.

Discretionary decisions and input rather than standardized organizational guidelines should characterize implementation scenarios in Latino communities. Standardized procedures often impede the effectiveness of implementing actors by not allowing them to address the varied needs and circumstances of various Latino groups, such as immigrants or non-immigrants. Implementing actors should also be able to make quick decisions on applications without supervisor feedback.

As evidenced by this case study, during the initial implementation phase unplanned consequences and alteration of procedures surfaced. This suggests that a communication process between the federal, regional and district policy actors which allows for flexible and updated input on street level delivery service needs to be supported.

This scenario also suggests that public support is an essential component for fostering agency commitment to policy objectives. Resources allocated for public relations campaigns will lead to greater public support and facilitate agency commitment. IRCA demonstrated that implementation is more difficult in hostile environments.

IRCA challenged the INS to set itself up as a service agency. However, as a result of recent sting and deportation operations on the enforcement side, the organizational gains such as outreach and public relations on the service side have diminished. Popular opinion regarding immigration clearly favors the enactment of more enforcement type procedures such as stronger border patrol and stricter penalties towards undocumented immigration.

To date, implementation research has focused primarily on environmental, regulatory, social and civil rights policies. These studies have contributed immensely to the development of the discipline. Though progress in the field has been made and continues to evolve, the IRCA case-study demonstrates that much research into the implementation of policies affecting Latinos is still needed.
Interview Respondents and Their Affiliations

Alan Nelson, from 1982 to 1989, was Federal Commissioner of INS; his responsibilities included translating policy and organizational objectives for the INS nation-wide. He oversaw the four regional commissioners; he also played a key role developing IRCA. Currently, he is a consultant for The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) a lobbying agency for American rights.

Hal Ezell, from 1985 to 1988, was Western Regional Commissioner of INS; his responsibilities included translating policy and organizational objectives for the INS in the western region of the United States which included Arizona, Colorado, Alaska, Hawaii, New Mexico, Oregon, and California; he also oversaw the Los Angeles district. Currently, he is the executive director of the Ezell Associates, a firm that deals with foreign investment.

Bill King, from 1981 to 1988, was Western Regional Manager of IRCA; his responsibilities included translating IRCA's objectives into INS mandates, including both Legalization and Employer Sanctions. He is currently employed by the Ezell Associates.

Ernest Gustafason, from 1985 to 1990, was the Los Angeles District Director of INS; his responsibilities included managing the Los Angeles area which was the largest district to implement IRCA within the United States. Currently he is the director of the United Education Institute, an immigrant advocacy agency in Huntington Park, California.

Donald Looney is the INS' Deputy District Director of Los Angeles. During IRCA, he was the assistant regional commissioner in charge of deportation and apprehension.

Dennis Perry is an INS Asylum Officer responsible for asylum and refugee applicants.

Anita Maker is the Chief Legalization Officer of the Los Angeles INS Office. She had extensive experience implementing IRCA, particularly Legalization.

John Brechtal, during the implementation of IRCA, was the Assistant Regional Commissioner under Hal Ezell. He was in charge of investigations and dealt solely with implementing Employer Sanctions during the initial phase of IRCA. He is currently the Assistant Director of Investigations at the Los Angeles District.

John Flynn is an INS Investigator. His duties mainly deal with examining fraudulent documentation.

Antonia Hernandez is currently the President of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF). She has worked with immigration policy for approximately twenty years. She has been on several major select commissions on immigration, and was the Director of MALDEF in Washington, D.C. during IRCA.

Susan Alva is an attorney for the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights in Los Angeles (CHIRLA). Before IRCA, she had extensive experience with immigration law at the Public Counsel, a non-profit legal agency for the Los Angeles community.
Angelo Ancheta, during the implementation of IRCA, was an attorney for the Asian Law Alliance. His duties included working with Phase 1 applicants of Legalization and conducting in-service training for employers on the provisions of Sanctions. He is currently the Executive Director of the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA).

Rosalind Gold is currently the Legal Consultant for the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO). During Phase I of implementation, she was the legal consultant for a telephone hotline for NALEO. Before NALEO she worked at California Tomorrow dealing with educational requirements for Legalization.

Robert Dickey is currently the Director of Catholic Charities, which was the largest qualified designated entity (QDE) in Los Angeles.

Mike Dino is a Senior Researcher for the GAO. He chaired the western regional study of INS and its performance implementing IRCA. He is currently conducting a major study on the INS within the border patrol unit of the agency.

Elizabeth Rolph is a Senior Researcher at RAND. She was the principal researcher of studies which assessed the implementation of IRCA within the Los Angeles. She has been cited extensively throughout this study.

Endnotes

1. For this research, “Legalization implementation” refers to both Amnesty and Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) applicants.

2. Overall there were 1,622,517 applicants from the state of California. The remainder of Legalization applicants were from: Texas (445,850); New York (171,083); Illinois (159,760); Florida (152,348); Arizona (82,649); New Jersey (45,439); Washington (37,539); New Mexico (28,085); Oregon (27,520); and Other including U.S. territories and possessions (259,058). Data taken from the INS’ Commissioner’s Fact Book Summary of Recent Immigration Data, July 1992.

3. Interestingly, studies that examine social service delivery are somewhat split as to whether implementation decisions should be characterized by discretion during street level decisions.

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Immigrant Social Networks: Implications and Lessons for Policy

Cecilia Menjívar, Ph.D.

Cecilia Menjívar received her B.A. in Psychology and Sociology, her M.S. in International Education and Development from the University of Southern California, and her M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Sociology from the University of California at Davis. Upon completing her doctorate, she obtained the two-year Chancellor's post-doctorate fellowship at the University of California at Berkeley, which allowed her to further the study she had initiated while a graduate student in the Salvadoran community in San Francisco. She has several publications on the social processes of migration, historical and macro-structural antecedents of refugee migration, and gender in migratory processes. She is currently at RAND, working on an ethnographic study of social networks and family dynamics in two Guatemalan towns, one ladino and one indigenous. Upon completion of her fieldwork in Guatemala, she expects to replicate this study among Guatemalans in the Los Angeles area.

Introduction

The notion that social networks are an invaluable aid to their members before, during, and after the migration process has been widely acknowledged (Mitchell, 1969; Taylor, 1986; Massey and García-Españo, 1987; Boyd, 1989). Different forms of social relationships have been successful in meeting the material and emotional needs of migrants at the point of arrival (Massey et al., 1987; Grieco, 1987). Presumably, the presence of relatives and friends at the place of destination lowers the costs, monetary as well as socio-psychological, of immigration (Lomnitz, 1977; Taylor, 1986; Massey et al., 1987). Researchers have found that people pool resources to help their kinfolk and that contacts with kin provide information that reduces the risks of migration (Litwak, 1960; Tilly and Brown, 1967; Choldin, 1973; Taylor, 1986). The structure of social networks based on kinship and friendship allows for migrants to draw upon obligations implicit in these relationships to gain access to assistance at the point of destination, thus substantially reducing the costs of migration (Massey, 1989).

Although the positive effects of social networks have been widely recognized, some researchers have suggested different effects of kinship-based networks on immigrant groups. For instance, Tilly and Brown (1967) argue that migrants who rely on kinfolk may assimilate more slowly than those who are left alone. And Kritz and Gurak (1984) argue in their study of Colombian and Dominican immigrants that kinship relations may actually be detrimental to the adjustment of immigrants because they prevent members from establishing so-
cial networks outside their immediate group. The debate has centered around the positive or negative effects of networks for immigrants, without questioning the underlying assumption that networks always provide a haven of support for immigrants. However, networks do not always function smoothly; as researchers have pointed out, social exchanges within networks imply power transactions, which generate power differentials (Blau, 1964; Mitchell, 1974).

In this paper, I will examine the dynamics of kinship-based social networks among recent Salvadoran migrants to the United States. Although in some instances these social relations continue to provide support for Salvadoran newcomers in the United States, there are as many cases where these social relations become conflictual and even break down. In the latter situations, the presence of relatives in the place of destination no longer represents the familiar comfort and mutual assistance that these networks supposedly embody. Therefore, instead of lending support to the assumption that kinship-based networks are invariably sources of assistance to the newcomers, I analyze a more complex situation in which networks sometimes fail to provide the expected assistance to newcomers. Keeping in mind that there are many Salvadoran immigrants who rely extensively on their kin for support, I will focus mainly on the experiences of those for whom this is not the case because their story also needs to be told.

The debate has centered around the positive or negative effects of networks for immigrants, without questioning the underlying assumption that networks always provide a haven of support for immigrants.

I would like to make three points regarding network breakdown before I begin. First, although not all of the networks were harmonious and peaceful havens of support, they were not necessarily all riddled with strife. There were many shades of gray, where disagreements and conflicts did not lead to violence or threatening situations. Second, in cases of supportive as well as troubled kinship relations, extended kin as well as close family members were involved. Support often came from immediate family members, but in several cases more distant relatives were active in providing assistance. Likewise, distant and close family members were as likely to be involved in cases of tense kinship relations. And last, although there were conflicts and friction, disruptions were seldom permanent. After a major crisis, respondents were usually able to reestablish amiable relations with their relatives, albeit under different terms.

The analysis will demonstrate how the dynamics of immigrant networks and their efficiency are affected by larger processes in the political economic arena, as well as by community-level factors. Central to this work is the assumption that the contextual forces that shape network dynamics are patterned differently across groups, and thus the efficacy of networks of support will vary
accordingly. I believe that we can shed light on the dynamics of social networks among recent Salvadoran migrants through an analysis of the interaction of factors in the receiving context, such as state policies of reception, economy and labor market opportunities, and reception in the local community. In discussing these factors, I emphasize their interconnectedness to avoid simply presenting them as a compartmentalized list of plausible explanatory variables. Furthermore, these factors are not meant as a full explanation of network dynamics. The discussion is meant to emphasize that contextual forces, such as macrostructural events, shape the nature of network dynamics in important ways.

Recent advances in research on immigrant households may be useful in examining networks of exchange among immigrants. This latest research has moved away from treating the “household” as a unit to focus on the complex dynamics of intra-household relations and how these are shaped by larger processes. Researchers from this new perspective criticize the view that households “act” as units. The “household-as-a-unit” view presupposes that everyone shares resources and views within the household, which confluates the individual behavior of its members and assumes that members have collective interests focused on the household (Kearney, 1986; Rouse, 1989; Hondagneu, 1990; Smith et al., 1991). Empirical evidence in the new tradition demonstrates that decisions are guided by kinship and gender ideologies as well as by hierarchies of power within households (Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991). In some cases, household members cannot even agree on what constitutes a family (Rouse, 1989). By focusing on the complexity of migrant households, this approach can be extended to analyze kinship-based networks of support among migrants. In this way, rather than treating networks as analytical units, in which everyone shares resources due to obligations implicit in kinship and friendship ties, the researcher can attend to the manifold intricacies and asymmetries in these networks.

There is a need to assess the effect of larger forces on network dynamics and consequently on the varied effectiveness of networks among immigrant groups. Whether new immigrants actually encounter a haven of support in their kinsfolk as they arrive or conversely find that their expectations about such help are unfulfilled may effectively influence their decision to remain, relocate, or return. Furthermore, an analysis of this nature has both theoretical and policy relevance. It questions the assumption that networks invariably represent sources of support for immigrants, with an eye to explaining their success or failure. Given the central role that kinship-based networks play in immigrant settlement and the emphasis immigrant-related policies place on kinship networks—from family reunification to a host of social services—a critical examination of networks has important policy implications a theme which runs through this article.

**Data and Methodology**

The major sources of data for this study come from intensive interviews with fifty Salvadoran immigrants conducted from 1990 to 1993 in San Francisco, complemented with ethnographic observations. Ethnographic studies sel-
dom yield generalizable conclusions or precise statements about large populations. Nonetheless, the methodology utilized in this study generated important insights into key dimensions of the effect that structural forces have on immigrant social networks.

The interviewees were “recently arrived,” that is, resided in the United States for not more than five years and were selected from language schools and community service agencies for interviews that lasted for an hour and a half to two hours: The interviews were conducted in Spanish at a location of the respondent’s choice. At least one fourth of the subjects were interviewed more than twice over the course of my fieldwork. The interviews were complemented by informal conversations with the respondents, their families, and friends, as well as interviews with community leaders and workers.

Slightly more than half of the respondents (52 percent) were females; the average age was 30.7 years; and the average educational level was 9.4 years (See Table 1). In El Salvador, the respondents worked as teachers, soldiers, homemakers, laborers, small business owners, nurses, factory workers, and electricians; others were students; one was a street vendor; another was a housekeeper; and one was a university professor. Two thirds of the sample came from large cities in El Salvador, and more than half indicated that they had knowledge of English before coming to the United States, though none were fluent speakers. Slightly fewer than half of the people in the sample were single; ten were married; twelve were in consensual unions; three were widows; and two were divorced.

Table 1: Main Demographic Characteristics of the Sample of Salvadoran Immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Education</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio*</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of Arrival</td>
<td>1985-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Number of males per one hundred females.

Although it was not the objective in this study to select a representative group of Salvadorans in San Francisco, much less of Salvadorans in the United States in general, it is helpful to put their profile into a broader context, with one important qualification to bear in mind: approximately 45 percent of the Salvadorans in San Francisco and close to 62 percent of those in Los Angeles arrived in the United States in the decade of the 1980s, a point that has had important effects on their socio-demographic profile. The United States 1990 Census indicates, for example, that 46 percent of Salvadorans in San Francisco were female, and in Los Angeles, the city with the highest concentration of Salvadorans in the United States, was 49.5 percent.

In terms of education, the census showed that approximately one half of
the Salvadorans residing in San Francisco have under 12 years of schooling, and among those in Los Angeles, this figure is close to 70 percent. The Salvadoran population in San Francisco is older than that in Los Angeles, with a mean age of 29.8 years, compared to 26.5 in Los Angeles. Close to 35 percent of Salvadorans in San Francisco reported that they spoke little or no English, compared to 54 percent in Los Angeles. Of the Salvadoran population in San Francisco, 43 percent were married and 38 percent were single, compared to 23 and 45 percent in Los Angeles, respectively. And finally, one fifth of the Salvadorans in San Francisco arrived between 1985 and 1990 (the period during which my subjects arrived in that city), compared to 28 percent in Los Angeles during the same period of time.

**Kinship-Based Social Networks**

The respondents were about equally divided between those for whom kinship networks were a haven of support and those for whom these networks provided little, if any, assistance. Approximately one half of the fifty subjects said that they lived at a relative’s house while they learned English, and that they

**Although not living with relatives does not automatically mean that relatives do not contact or assist each other, my respondents mentioned several reasons for and consequences of not living with their relatives, with important implications for networks of assistance.**

were not expected to contribute monetarily until they began to earn a salary. For instance, Ileana and Sofia are sisters who came to live with an older sister and a brother. Only the older sister had a job, and the three younger siblings took care of everything around the house. The sisters told me that they felt they had to care for one another because they are a family, and they have only each other to count on. Ileana stressed the importance of relying on her family for help, telling me that she “would not like to have someone from the outside taking care of what is supposed to be a family affair. If it stays within the family, it’s no problem.”

Another case that illustrates the vital support newcomers receive from their relatives already residing in the United States is that of Graciela. Graciela, who joined her cousins in San Francisco after her New York partner had left her pregnant, told me that without her cousins she would have been lost. Graciela stays home taking care of household chores while her cousins work at a restaurant. They have told her not to worry, that as long as they are able to help her, she should worry only about the baby. In another case, Hector said that his cousin had taken him to the union every day to see if he could get a job and had also allowed him to stay at his house for as long as he needed. He said he could
go to him for anything he needed in this country. In addition to Graciela and Hector, Victor and Alina expressed their gratitude to their relatives here because without their assistance they would have been forced to seek any job they could find, instead of enrolling first in English courses.

All the respondents who mentioned that they had received material assistance from their relatives stressed that the relatives had been financially capable of helping them. They said that even though everyone was having a hard time economically, their relatives had reasonably stable jobs, earning at least minimum wage. Eduardo told me that he lived with his brother in San Francisco, but only contacted his sister in Los Angeles once in a while. I asked him about this difference, and he explained:

Well, it’s very simple. My brother helps me financially, and my sister doesn’t. Easy. Not that I don’t love her, but she just cannot support me, and I want to get ahead in this country. My brother has a more stable and better paying job; she works cleaning houses for rich people. She always has problems, and it’s difficult to live like that. She has never been able to give me much, and I want to live a bit more comfortable, calm. That’s the reason.

Almost one half of the interviewees received help from their kinfolk, as exemplified in the preceding anecdotes; the other half of my 50 respondents had not received such support. They told me stories of family conflict that ranged from disagreements and minor daily disputes to members throwing them out of

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**Sharing living quarters with relatives facilitated opportunities for assistance and often included the exchange of in-kind services, such as baby-sitting or help in repairing something around the house...enables both the newcomer and the receiving relative to participate in other spheres of life, particularly in the labor market and in educational endeavors.**

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the house, taking away their wages, and even threatening them with the most dangerous weapon—reporting them to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Those who described tense, troubled relations that interfered with obtaining help from relatives said that this friction had erupted once the respondents had arrived in the United States. Such conflict arises among other immigrant families also. Both Rouse (1989) and Grasmuck and Pessar (1991) have observed family conflict among Mexicans and Dominicans, respectively. However, the magnitude and expression of conflict and its consequences for networks of assistance among Salvadoran families are significant and need to be examined closely.
Approximately one-half of my 50 subjects were not living with a relative in San Francisco at the time of the interview, even though all but two had relatives in the area. Although not living with relatives does not automatically mean that relatives do not contact or assist each other, my respondents mentioned several reasons for and consequences of not living with their relatives, with important implications for networks of assistance.

The case of Marta exemplifies that of several of my respondents. Marta said that her brother did not want her to associate with any solidarity groups doing political work, and he practically had her locked up in the house. But she contacted a solidarity group that helped her to find a job, and a room in a house, and paid the first month’s rent. Marta eventually moved out of her brother’s house. What is important to note in this case, as in others, is that once she moved out of her brother’s house, she lost the little—but steady—support that she had. This support consisted of an occasional small loan for a bus fare or for an application fee or food and shelter when the newcomer did not have the money to pay for these resources. At least with housing assistance, the relative did not have to incur any extra expenses to provide the newcomer with this modest yet vital support; by simply living in the same physical space, kinfolk facilitated the newcomer’s resettlement.

Antonio’s case further exemplifies this pattern. He said that when he first arrived, he lived with his family, but he never felt comfortable there because of the constant arguments about resources. He said that because he had not been able to get a job quickly, he had to depend on his brother and sister for help, but he felt there was not enough money to go around. After he got a job, he decided to go live with some Salvadoran friends whom he had met in San Francisco in order to stop being a burden on his siblings. Living with friends was easier because they were not expected to help Antonio financially. In a similar vein, Maria said that “at first, my cousin used to help me, but because she doesn’t work, only her husband does, I did not want to push her, so now we only visit each other once in a while.”

Again, what is important to note in the cases above is that since assistance from relatives was expected and forthcoming in the form of sharing food and shelter in the same house, not living in the same household often contributed to a break in this vital channel of support. Sharing living quarters with relatives facilitated opportunities for assistance and often included the exchange of in-kind services, such as baby-sitting or help in repairing something around the house. This exchange of in-kind services enables both the newcomer and the receiving relative to participate in other spheres of life, particularly in the labor market and in educational endeavors. The newcomer or the relative is freed from domestic activities or living expenses to earn an income, to learn English, or obtain occupational training.

For other respondents, familial strife went beyond arguments that ended with one person moving out. Margarita, wiping away tears, told me that at first
she tried to contact her relatives in the United States, but they were reluctant to establish any relation with her; as she put it: “They were probably afraid I might ask them for food, since they have jobs and are fairly well-off.” After Margarita gave birth to her daughter, she contacted her relatives again. This time her cousin offered her a job as a baby-sitter, paying Margarita $50 a week for baby-sitting six ten-hour days a week. She accepted because she did not have other job prospects, but a new problem soon emerged. Her cousin skipped several payments and ended up owing Margarita $700 at one point. Meanwhile, Margarita’s relatives were reluctant to let Margarita know the whereabouts of her brother in San Francisco because, Margarita said, “they don’t care what happens to me or to my brother; they just care about themselves.” Margarita and her brother, who was not even allowed to leave his clothes at their relatives’ house, told me that they have had a series of disappointing experiences with their relatives; they preferred to tell people that they did not have any relatives at all in the area.

Margarita did not receive any help from her cousins when she made her journey from El Salvador; she only contacted them once she arrived in San Francisco. However, in the great majority of cases of conflictual family rela-

Three interconnected factors at the place of arrival that contribute to kinship network dynamics emerge from the cases in this study: the reception of migrants by the state, labor opportunities for migrants in the economy, and the reception by the community.

tions, the newcomers had received substantial support at some earlier point—in the form of information about the journey or a loan to make the trip—from the same relatives who later refused to help them. Once they joined the family members in the United States, there was no further assistance. Instead, a series of hostile relations developed.

Paula came to the United States with her youngest son at the urging of her sisters and brothers in San Francisco. They made all the arrangements for her to come, including payment to the coyote—a person who is paid to smuggle people who lack immigration documents into the United States—and money for her journey. All seemed fine until she arrived. Initially, she lived with her brother, but this ended when he asked her to leave his house; he told her that he was tired of supporting her. She then went to live with her sister, for whom she baby-sat for a couple of months, but Paula’s sister became upset with her for not being able to find a job. After quarrels with this sister about the financial strains she said Paula had created, Paula was forced to move in with her third brother, who also threw her out of his house for similar financial reasons.
This time Paula and her three-year-old son spent two nights sleeping in the stairwell of the apartment building where her brother lived, but her brother seemed oblivious to her situation. A tenant informed Paula about a refugee organization that runs a small shelter, which is where I contacted her. While she lived at the shelter, Paula maintained contact with only one of her brothers. Paula cried when she told me that she did not know why her siblings had helped her so much to come here, but upon her arrival had turned her aside. Two months after I met Paula she told me she had met a man, and they were considering moving to Canada, where as she said, “everything sounds much better, there are more opportunities, and I will forget what it is to have a family like mine.” One day I noticed that I had not seen her in a while; when I asked for her I was told that she had indeed left for Canada with her new partner.

I talked to community workers who confirmed the situation that I had been observing, and none of them seemed surprised by the stories of family conflict. In addition, other researchers have observed similar situations among Salvadorans in other cities in the United States. In a preliminary study of Central American migration to Los Angeles, Hamilton and Chinchilla (1984) indicated that even though Salvadorans came to join an established relative in the United States, their relations were not always smooth. The authors reported instances of relatives refusing to take in any new arrivals or asking them to leave after a short stay. In another exploratory study, Chinchilla et al. (1986) pointed out that for the majority of Salvadorans, as well as *ladino* Guatemalans in Houston, the initial supporting household mainly plays a transitory function. According to the authors, these migrants move from their initial household within a few days or weeks of arrival, due to the instability and financial difficulties of these households.

A worker in charge of one of the major refugee organizations in San Francisco told me that over three quarters of the people who ask for help from her organization have relatives in the San Francisco area, most of them undocumented recent arrivals. The person in charge of helping immigrants find employment at another refugee organization attributed the problems within Salvadoran families to their economic situation and to the lack of resources in the community that serves them. She emphasized that the lack of counseling programs is particularly problematic, since many Salvadorans still bear searing scars from the civil war that tend to exacerbate their tense relations with relatives. As she explained, based on the cases with which she deals, many of her clients, particularly those who endured traumatic experiences in El Salvador, are afflicted by *nervios*, a powerful idiom of distress expressed by Latinos from a variety of countries. In the case of Salvadorans in the United States, Guarneria and Farias (1988) point out, it encapsulates fears for family members left behind, broader concerns for the future of their country, the strains of their migration experience, and importantly, the constant stress of living as undocumented refugees in the United States. This condition, the worker emphasized, coupled with serious financial problems and instability, often leads to volatile relations within Salva-
doran families and hence to deep effects on networks of support. A local priest mentioned that instances of family conflict among Salvadorans are common. He related this frequency to the emotional scars and family separation resulting from the political upheaval in El Salvador.

Salvadoran newcomers arriving with expectations of continuing support from relatives found that support elusive. Impoverished migrants, as individuals or as a group, are simply unable to render much material assistance in the form of financial support and housing to their newcomer relatives. When the new arrival cannot procure a job or repay a loan, he or she becomes a further drain on the already strained family resources.

I encountered most cases with hostile or even violent familial relations among people at community organizations, where those with the greatest economic need find support. Poor immigrants draw on services provided by these organizations to complement their incomes, particularly when there has been a breakdown in kinship support. Concomitantly, kinship relations among those at language schools, where those who are better off are able to obtain language training, seemed comparatively less conflict-ridden. Friction may well exist among those with more resources, but the expression of hostility within families may differ based on economic standing. For instance, members of families with more resources may disagree about issues that are not as immediate as food and shelter, and thus are less visible and pressing. Virginia said that life is not always easy because sometimes she and her sister—who paid for Virginia’s trip to the United States and currently supports her—disagree about household decisions. Virginia attributes this to her sister’s 20 years in the United States; however, she could not imagine not sharing a house with her sister if they both live in the same city. Lety mentioned that even though she may disagree with her cousins about what is best for their children, she prefers to live with them because of the support they all give to one another, made easier by living in the same household. These families with more resources may be able to manage problematic relations in a less violent and dramatic way than those confronted with scarcity.

**Factors Influencing Kinship-Based Networks**

Among families with fewer resources, their financial situation plays a fundamental role in the nature of familial obligations. And because Salvadorans in the United States are in general not faring well economically, the relationship between their economic standing and kinship network dynamics is of particular importance for assessing the fate of these immigrants. For instance, the median per capita income for Salvadorans in San Francisco in 1990 was $9061, compared to $19,695 for the general population in the city, and $26,222 and $11,400 for whites and Hispanics, respectively (United States Bureau of the Census, 1993). In Los Angeles, where half of all Salvadorans in the United States reside and three quarters of those in California, the median per capita income was $6284 (United States Bureau of the Census, 1993). Although larger households among Salvadorans may translate into higher incomes, there are more children
in these households. Moreover, working-age adults encounter great difficulty in obtaining employment during the current recessionary cycle.

However, attributing the outcome of these social relations solely to the migrants’ economic situation would offer an easy explanation of a complex situation. I suggest that in addition to the economic situation of Salvadorans, there are other interacting factors that shape these kinship relations. By examining contextual forces at the place of destination, one can begin to understand the dynamics of kinship-based networks. Three interconnected factors at the place of arrival that contribute to kinship network dynamics emerge from the cases in this study: the reception of migrants by the state, labor opportunities for migrants in the economy, and the reception by the community. The state influences economic opportunities by enabling those immigrants who can obtain work permits or other legal documents to have more opportunities and be more competitive in an increasingly tight labor market. The state also determines resettlement aid—including job retraining programs and English language instruction and, at the community level, makes funds available for mutual assistance associations that channel aid and disseminate information about jobs and government opportunities, usually only for legally defined refugees. When immigrants or officially recognized refugees have sufficient resources to survive—through their own jobs or government support—community groups may operate more as community liaison or for longer-term community objectives, and less as charity organizations to help those in need, as the case of the Salvadorans in this study.

Reception by the State

The linkage between the categorization of migrants as either political or economic migrants and foreign policy interests has been researched extensively (Zolberg et al., 1989; Surhke, 1985; Pedraza-Bailey, 1985). The argument essentially states that when the sending and the receiving states have friendly relations, the immigrants are likely to be labeled as economic migrants, regardless of their plight; conversely, when states maintain hostile relations, the receiving state will define migrants as political refugees. From the outset in the 1980s, the United States government conceptualized the Salvadoran conflict as another case of Soviet/Cuban expansionism that needed to be contained. The Reagan administration implemented policies in El Salvador that concentrated on military operations to fight the “Marxist-Leninist” threat, relegating social and political reforms to a lower priority. The United States’s aid package to El Salvador amounted to over $3.5 billion in the 1980s, an amount that a recent Pentagon analysis found “disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest” (Long, 1992). Against this background, it would have been antithetical to United States foreign policy in El Salvador to accept Salvadorans in the United States as refugees. Salvadorans could not be migrating en masse from a country that was trying to establish a democracy by fighting the Communists, with military support from the United States. Therefore, in line with United States foreign policy and national interests, Salvadorans were consistently categorized by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service as economic migrants, even though potential deportees faced volatile wartime conditions in El Salvador.

Once on United States soil, Salvadorans could apply for political asylum, an almost meaningless process, in which only two to four percent of Salvadorans' petitions were granted (National Asylum Study Project, 1992). Furthermore, the majority of Salvadorans in the United States were not eligible for legalization under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) because most arrived in the United States after 1982. (The Salvadoran population in the United States multiplied almost fivefold from 1980 to 1990 [United States Census Bureau, 1993].) In practice many Salvadorans were undocumented subject to deportation, an extremely precarious status, and unable to obtain legal employment given that IRCA stipulated sanctions against employers who hire undocumented workers. Of the 565,081 respondents who identified themselves as Salvadorans in the 1990 United States Census, the latest estimates by the Immigration and Naturalization Service indicate that over 60 percent of them are undocumented (Warren, 1994). (This estimate includes the approximately 100,000 Salvadorans who applied for Temporary Protected Status, discussed below, because of the uncertainty of their situation.) In addition to being unable to work legally in the United States, Salvadorans were largely ineligible for government assistance, except for limited benefits such as Medi-Cal for pregnant women and related Women with Infant Children (WIC) programs.

During the time I was conducting fieldwork, Salvadorans were granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS). In September 1990, under mounting pressure from immigrant and refugee rights groups, the United States Department of Justice agreed to provide TPS to undocumented Salvadorans who had entered the United States prior to September 19, 1990. This program allows Salvadorans to live and work in the United States for a period of 18 months, during which time the Salvadoran conflict was expected to be resolved. This program has been replaced by the Deferred Enforced Departure Decree, which essentially extended TPS until December 1994, and then once again to September 1995. This is not a blanket amnesty for all Salvadorans, and it is only temporary; technically, it is neither asylum nor refugee status. The only privilege bestowed is the conferral of a work permit; refugee status and the concomitant access to social services are still denied. Of the 50 respondents included in this study, seven were in the country legally (five were "resident aliens" or permanent residents and two were political asylees), and during the time I was conducting fieldwork, ten applied, and to my knowledge, were granted Temporary Protected Status; the rest, or two thirds of the group, were living in the country without documents.

Reception by the Economy

Although migrants have always entered the lower rungs of the work force, recent contractions in the United States economy have severely constrained the possibilities for employment and mobility. The nationwide recession that began
in the late 1980s has given way to a period of slow economic growth, with a new cycle of economic downturn overlaid on the longer-term structural changes that have been in place since the 1970s. This latest recessionary cycle has affected every sector of the economy, particularly the booming service sector in San Francisco, which had been the basis for the growth this city experienced during the past decade. The service sector includes both the highly paid and specialized jobs such as those in engineering, finance, and real estate, as well as the low-wage jobs required by high-income residential and commercial gentrification, such as those in restaurants, gourmet shops, hotels, and house cleaning (Sassen, 1991, 1988). The corporations that once fueled the economic growth of San Francisco are currently cutting costs, in part by reducing their permanent work force. For instance, the number of jobs in engineering, accounting, and management industries declined from 29,300 in 1990 to 25,900 in 1992 (Employment Development Department, 1993).

Thus, highly paid workers in the upper echelon of the service sector are now facing increasing employment uncertainty. In a recent poll taken in the Bay Area, half of the respondents indicated that they feared unemployment (Marshall, 1991). This gloomy outlook has had repercussions for the life styles and consumption patterns of highly paid professionals. The capacity of these professionals to maintain their life styles, to hire housekeepers, and to patronize the restaurants and services that employ immigrant labor has weakened. The result of this trend has been a serious shortage of employment for immigrant workers, since as Sassen (1988) indicates, they are highly concentrated in the low-wage end of the service sector.

All of the Salvadorans who were employed at the time I interviewed them held low-paying jobs in the service sector, the overwhelming majority working without documents. Regardless of differences in educational level or age, the men were concentrated in restaurants—mostly as busboys or dishwashers—and in construction jobs, whereas the women held jobs as housekeepers or babysitters. Only a few of the men and women had jobs as office clerks or salespersons. The majority of my respondents had temporary or part-time jobs, often both. But even these jobs were hard to get. For instance, Mariana, a physics instructor in El Salvador, told me that in the face of the current crisis in the United States, she cannot risk leaving her job as a sales clerk to look for something better.
All my interviewees stressed the difficulties they had experienced in procuring jobs in San Francisco, especially in contrast to their friends and relatives who had arrived in the city earlier in the 1980s. They all pointed out the financial stress this situation created not only for them, given that they had expected to find work rather quickly, but also for the relatives who received them, who had not anticipated supporting the newcomer. Adela, who is unmarried and has three children, works as a chamber maid in a hotel near the airport. She shared with me her experiences in an increasingly tight labor market:

I prefer the hotel because when I work, I earn a bit more. I am on the list of people who are "on-call," so many times two weeks go by and I am not called to work. I am lucky because at least I am on their list. But I feel that I have to sort of grab whatever comes to me, squeezing my way in because there are so many of us anxiously waiting for those hours that the hotel wants us to work. I feel we are like children trying to get candy from a piñata, but it's not funny, it's tough.

In addition to the low-paid jobs, many Salvadoran newcomers' unstable legal status, and their consequent marginal lives, another important factor contributes to reduce their already scarce resources. The majority of people I interviewed felt responsible for a family member, often their own children, back in El Salvador. Even those with meager earnings managed to send remittances on a regular basis to their families in El Salvador via the specialized agencies that have proliferated in recent years in areas with high concentrations of Central American immigrants. Esperanza and her daughter illustrate this important aspect of Salvadoran life in the United States: Esperanza's daughter received two dolls on her fourth birthday, but immediately after receiving the second one she turned to Esperanza and said: "Look, mommy, this one is to send back there [El Salvador]." Esperanza explained that the girl is so used to hearing about sending to El Salvador that "it's natural for her to think that."

The magnitude and significance of these remittances need to be placed in context so as to better understand the financial obligations of Salvadoran immigrants that extend beyond the United States borders, linking them to their homes and families. These remittances amount to over 1.3 billion dollars a year, which, according to Montes (1987), equaled the amount of United States aid during 1987 and the total exports of the country combined. The Salvadoran economy became dependent on these remittances, without which the families of the immigrants could not have survived in war-torn El Salvador. This influx of money continues and may explain in part the otherwise difficult to comprehend, apparent economic bonanza that occurred during the war years, manifested through a boom in construction and housing developments, a noticeable increase in the circulation of new automobiles, and the proliferation of shopping malls and the entertainment industry.
Reception by the Community

In an effort to make up for the shortfall in official services designed to ease the refugees’ transition to an alien environment, community groups have organized to provide a range of services from legal defense to shelters and emergency services. The assistance to newcomers through community organizations helps alleviate the added burden of taking in a new family member. With private donations and fund-raising activities, these organizations provide temporary housing, help people with rent payments, and give free access to a community clinic. Health care is always in high demand, for even among those who work, their jobs seldom provide them with any health coverage. In addition, church groups provide shelters, which become invaluable when a home becomes too overcrowded. Impoverished Salvadorans in conflictual situations do turn to these organizations for help.

One of the major refugee organizations that helps Central Americans in the San Francisco Bay Area serves, with varying amounts of assistance, an average of 11,000 persons annually. The director of one of the shelters for Central Americans in San Francisco mentioned that approximately 100 people stay at his shelter for up to one month, but the majority stay only a few nights. The most commonly used services were a weekly food distribution program, housing assistance, legal services, a job-search cooperative, a free clinic, and medical referral services. In some cases, people sought assistance in line with the concerns of local organizations, such as legal aid and health care. But in other cases, the newcomers solicited assistance that would otherwise be provided by the kinship network, such as food and housing; in the absence of support from relatives, economically marginalized newcomers turned to community organizations for help.

Groups actively involved in helping Central Americans, particularly Salvadorans included newly arrived Salvadorans, and North Americans (the town used by the immigrants and Salvadorans in community organizations for United States citizens, usually white and middle class, who were active volunteers), church groups, and the Sanctuary movement, the most commonly known form of organized assistance to Salvadorans in different cities in the United States. Some 40 churches in the Bay Area, 15 in San Francisco, became sanctuaries for Central American refugees, protecting them from deportation and providing them with legal and social services. Community groups’ assistance consisted essentially of legal defense—organized in the form of immigrant and refugee rights groups—and services for Salvadorans who were arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as well as other emergency services. More recently, these groups have been active in aiding Salvadoran applicants for Temporary Protected Status. The most successful projects were those in which newly arrived Salvadorans worked in conjunction with North Americans, such as the free clinic mentioned above and food distribution and employment placement programs, which were part of a larger project funded partially by Catholic Relief Services.
Salvadoran newcomers found help beyond their immediate family through networks established based on political ideology and on religious affiliation; these networks constitute some of the most important forms of social support among Salvadorans. Among those who were active in political organizations working on Central American issues, a strong web of support developed. For instance, José, Tony, Joaquín, and Raúl shared a house in San Francisco, although José, Tony, and Raúl had close relatives in San Francisco. Raúl and José only had sporadic contact with their families because they felt more comfortable living with those with similar ideologies and life styles. As a guerrilla combatant, Joaquín had lost both legs in the Salvadoran war. He said his housemates looked after him as if they were his own family. Interviewees who were members of a church had similar experiences. Virginia told me that although she loved her relatives dearly, her “brothers and sisters in Christ” were as important to her and that she would not know what to do if she had to choose with which of her “two families” to live. Eliza and Pedro are always quick to mention the assistance they have received from their fellow church members, including clothes, furniture, small loans, and help in finding jobs and community assistance.

The Salvadorans who have been active in providing assistance to needy newcomers were newcomers themselves, with little or no assistance from established Salvadoran residents. There may be several reasons why established Salvadoran residents are not apt to aid the newcomers. In general, Salvadoran newcomers come from lower socio-economic backgrounds than established Salvadoran residents. According to a community worker, the different lifestyles of long-time residents who are trying to assimilate in this country prevent them from identifying with the plight of the newcomers, who are mostly from poor social classes, so the old-timers do not care. In addition, a sharp divergence in political views vis-à-vis the Salvadoran conflict contributes to widen the divisions along socio-economic lines.

Those Salvadorans who organize to help the newcomers have openly expressed their disapproval of United States policies in Central America. Long-time residents, who often hold a more supportive view of United States government policies in that region, refuse to associate with the other group. Finally, as another community worker put it, the experiences of these two subgroups back in El Salvador and their migratory trajectories set them widely apart, which (she thinks), makes it extremely difficult to find common ground to act as a united community. Furthermore, because of their open political views, these organizations may be portrayed as guerrilla sympathizers, which creates fear among some newcomers that if they associate with them in the United States, their families will suffer reprisals back in El Salvador. However, for Salvadorans in great need these political disagreements do not matter, and the assistance they receive usually represents their only means of survival.

More recently, the recession has affected the lives of Salvadoran immigrants in yet another respect by influencing the manner in which these organizations offer support. Across-the-board budget cuts have aggravated the fiscal
difficulties of these already constrained organizations, and in some instances entire programs for immigrants financed by the City of San Francisco have been suspended. Moreover, the immigration backlash that has accompanied the recession has profoundly affected the lives of newcomer immigrants. People are afraid to search for jobs, to ask organizations for help, to report crime, or even to send children to school for fear of hostility by the native population.

Therefore, at the community level, the short history of large-scale Salvadoran migration to the United States, the financial constraints of community service organizations, the divisions along political lines, the absence of participation by long-time residents—the better off segments of Salvadorans in the United States, and the recent anti-immigrant backlash have influenced the way in which the Salvadoran community is developing informal networks of support.

**The Receiving Context And Kinship Networks**

Because Salvadorans were de facto refugees who lacked de jure recognition by the United States government (Smith and Tarallo, 1992), they were not given a refugee reception and therefore access to state support. In the face of a tight budget, a relatively short history of migration, and a lack of political clout have prevented the institutionalization of an infrastructure of support—formal or informal—for Salvadorans.

Deep economic recession, they endured precarious labor market opportunities in San Francisco coupled with steep housing costs in that city. Salvadorans were not eligible for government social services—individually or channeled through their community—that could help them to cope with the effects of the economic crisis, with crowded housing conditions, or with the psychological effects of family separations and war trauma. Training programs and language instruction open to government-recognized refugees were not available to Salvadorans, which further hindered their already dim opportunities for secure and better-paying jobs.

Even Salvadorans granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) must concentrate on fulfilling their immediate needs and less on making long-term plans. A person who does not know if he or she will still be in the same city or in the country in a couple of years may find it difficult to make plans for the future. These immigrants may focus on working and earning enough to survive, rather than on investing in a more secure future by learning the language. Immigrants who wish to learn English may find that their irregular work schedules and long hours prevent them from regularly attending language instruction. This failure to develop their human capital is particularly harmful for skilled immigrants.
(and ultimately for society) because they only need minimal retraining to obtain a job commensurate with their educational level and previous work experience.

In addition, TPS was granted on a temporary basis under the assumption that the conflict in El Salvador would be resolved, after which Salvadorans in the United States could return home. This point, worthy of another study in itself, is important. The situation in El Salvador continues to be uncertain, and many, perhaps most, Salvadorans would like to remain in the United States. The war-ravaged Salvadoran economy, dependent on remittances from immigrants (particularly now that the United States is not assisting the Salvadoran government nearly as much as during the war years), is still recovering and may offer limited job opportunities at best. And in the political arena, the fear that there may still be death squads operating, evident in a series of assassinations of political leaders prior to the March 1994 elections, provides an all too real reminder of the horrors that drove many refugees to flee their homeland in the first place.

This combination of factors placed considerable strains on kinship net-

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works: Salvadorans arrived only to share a condition of poverty with those upon whom they had expected to rely for assistance. As the newcomers tried to rely on their kinfolk for help, their relatives’ resources became inadequate to accommodate additional family members in the face of worsening economic times. Of particular significance, newcomers had based their expectations regarding labor market opportunities on the experiences of their earlier counterparts. Very often, the newcomers’ inability to procure jobs soon after they arrived created problems. On the one hand, the newcomers could not immediately earn money to start supporting themselves after they arrived. On the other, the relatives already in the United States not only had to support the newcomers, but could not even get back the money they had lent the person to make the trip. These circumstances became the basis for hostile and potentially explosive situations within families. By cutting off the flow of material assistance and hindering the sharing of in-kind services, this situation effectively debased the network viability because it undermined the reciprocity upon which kinship support networks are sustained.

Tight budgets, a relatively short history of migration, and a lack of politi-
cal clout have prevented the institutionalization of an infrastructure of support—formal or informal—for Salvadorans. The community organizations that have formed to assist Salvadorans do not have enough resources to meet the need. This lack of resources affects directly the mechanisms by which informal sources of support, such as those based on kinship ties, operate. The assistance provided to newcomers through community organizations alleviates the added burdens of accepting a new member into a household, and these organizations provide alternative forms of support when the receiving household or family can no longer support the added burden. In the absence of this assistance, the newcomers and their families have minimal alternatives for support.

Geographical distance and the war did not allow Salvadorans to travel back and forth between the United States and their home country. Relations within families became strained or even broken with the migration of one or more members. In a more indirect way, the geographical separation of family members has affected intra-family relations among Salvadorans. Life styles and political ideologies have been affected by the war, and often members of the same family have diametrically opposed views with respect to the political conflict in El Salvador. Salvadorans come to join relatives in the United States with whom they find little in common as a “family,” a condition exacerbated by the lack of access to subsidized housing or mechanisms to cope with these reunifications. This internal division creates an emotionally volatile environment in which family members find it difficult to live together. Many Salvadorans have been directly affected by the civil strife in El Salvador and still bear the trauma of damaging experiences in their war-torn homeland. This psychological distress places a heavy burden on relatives in the United States, who themselves are still trying to cope with life in a foreign environment. The conflict that ensues effectively undermines the reciprocity that lies at the core of social networks and thus leads to network breakdown.

**Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations**

The Salvadoran case exemplifies a critical issue regarding the organization of kinship-based sources of assistance among migrants—the structure of the receiving context. The political agenda of the receiving state and its consequent immigration policy, the dynamics of the receiving economy, and the organization of the receiving community are all factors that can hinder the flow of reciprocal obligations, thus shaping in significant ways kinship-based sources of assistance. As with other social relations, social networks are conditioned and modified by the combined effect of macro-structural events and the socio-cultural organization and characteristics of the relevant migrant group. Therefore, we should expect that these relations differ not only among groups, but also within groups according to the geographical area and particular macro-structural configurations at a point in time.

My findings warn against the oft-held notion that a common background, constant contact, and a shared migration experience automatically generate con-
genial relations among immigrants. This study demonstrates that policy-makers and scholars must be attentive to the varied effectiveness of networks across groups and contexts. These findings challenge the assumption that social networks invariably represent reliable sources of aid and familiar comfort to immigrants. Academics and policy-makers alike must avoid romanticizing immigrant social networks by evoking exaggerated images of havens of support. As this study demonstrates, immigrant kinship networks may be inconsistent sources of support to newcomers; such networks are capable of weakness and break down. Adhering to an image of kinship networks as unflagging means of support divests the state of responsibilities to immigrants, particularly refugees.

The results of this study should not be overgeneralized; policies directed at the Latino population should attend to the heterogeneity of this group. Specific policies need not be drawn for each immigrant group; however, for general policies to be effective, adjustments may be necessary to accommodate such heterogeneity. New Latino groups, such as Salvadorans, face barriers to resettlement common to other Latino newcomers, particularly with regard to labor market opportunities and the neighborhoods they come to inhabit. But newly arrived

The critical problems disrupting intra-family relations and hindering the successful incorporation of Salvadoran newcomers that I observed in more than three years of fieldwork in the Salvadoran community stem from the Salvadorans’ temporary and unstable immigration status.

Salvadoran immigrants also experience unique difficulties in their incorporation into the United States Salvadoran migration encapsulates significant differences that require the rethinking of policy to reach this group.

There are two sets of policy recommendations that can be drawn from this study. The first deals with research needs. More investigation needs to be conducted in the area of immigrant social networks, preferably relying on in-depth observations of the group in question, so that immigrant experiences will be included in generating policy. In researching immigrant networks, the method utilized is critical in targeting a different aspect of these social relations. It is not enough to know how many people a person knows, whether relatives or friends live close by, or even who was financially responsible for the individual’s migration. As this study has shown, simply asking these questions would have proven misleading. Additionally, researchers need to focus specifically on what kind of help—emotional or financial—immigrants actually receive (not just ask for) and from whom—families or friends—and how much. This kind of research would further refine theoretical frameworks in migration studies and would help policy-makers decide how much and when the state should intervene in helping
immigrant families.

The second set of recommendations deals with practical suggestions for targeting and structuring services aimed at recent Salvadoran immigrants. Researchers have pointed out that being embraced by solid networks may have detrimental long-term effects for newcomers because it prevents members from establishing contacts beyond the immediate group. But based on evidence from this study, I believe that in general, strong kinship support networks represent a positive element in the experiences of Salvadoran newcomers. The reciprocity inherent in strong network ties benefits both the receiving relatives and the newcomers by enabling them to become productive members of society through relationships of mutual support. For recent arrivals, asking for and obtaining assistance from a familiar source represents an important bridge in an otherwise traumatic transition to a foreign environment. The policy recommendations that follow are based on this general assumption.

As indicated before, the great majority of the cases of conflictive kinship networks occur within families with the fewest economic resources. And in general, Salvadoran newcomers—who constitute over three quarters of this group across the nation—experience poverty and marginalization. Therefore, these suggestions may prove useful as a general approach to helping this group as well as others in similar situations, again with the caveat that additional research is needed to confirm and expand on the findings of this study.

The critical problems disrupting intra-family relations and hindering the successful incorporation of Salvadoran newcomers that I observed in more than three years of fieldwork in the Salvadoran community stem from the Salvadorans’ temporary and unstable immigration status. Although Salvadorans were not classified as refugees during the years of the civil war in their country, they were granted Temporary Protected Status in 1990. During this period, Salvadorans will supposedly seek to change their situation to a more permanent status, but there have not been any special arrangements made that would facilitate such a process. As mentioned earlier, their current situation, and what they may foresee for the immediate future, is neither permanent nor refugee status; thus, it does not promise these immigrants anything more than a temporary work permit and temporary relief from deportation. Therefore, the majority of Salvadorans in the United States are either relegated to the limbo of uncertainty about a new expiration date for their temporary status or they simply remain undocumented.

This situation leads to a host of problems that may leave Salvadoran immigrants at a permanent disadvantage in integrating into the new society. Salvadorans could be greatly assisted by granting them a more permanent status or at least regularizing their temporary status, to allow them access to aid packages that the government offers to other immigrants fleeing from political persecution. This does not simply mean providing social services to an immigrant group, a suggestion which under the current anti-immigrant crusade would at best be ignored. It is a suggestion to enact responsible policy based on the acknowledg-
ment of the conditions under which massive Salvadoran migration took place—not simply of the political upheaval that spurred it, but more importantly, of the deep involvement of the United States government in that conflict, and thus accord this group the necessary assistance for their resettlement. In essence, the Salvadoran case underscores the vital importance of refugee resettlement aid. The experiences of Salvadoran newcomers exemplify the consequences of the absence of state support for a group that fled the ravages of a civil war. Aid to unrecognized Salvadoran refugees, as in the case of recognized refugee groups, should be forthcoming as access to a package of minimum social services. And based on evidence from this study, this assistance could be channeled through existing community organizations operating in Salvadoran neighborhoods because of the familiarity immigrants have with these organizations, which are largely run by co-nationals.

With a regularized status, whether permanent or refugee, Salvadorans could have access to government-funded job-retraining programs and English-language instruction. The acquisition of language skills may be particularly useful to those Salvadoran refugees who arrive with professional or technical degrees, but must take menial and unskilled jobs because they lack English proficiency. Recall Mariana, the physics instructor who worked as a sales clerk. In addition, the cases of Sandra and Alejandro are worth mentioning in this respect. Sandra with a degree in Psychology and Philosophy from the National University in El Salvador, was a teacher, and had some knowledge of English prior to her arrival in the United States. Once here, she has been working as a housekeeper. She cannot afford to quit and look for a better job because she needs to send money to her daughter in El Salvador; in addition she faces severe job competition. Alejandro was in his last semester of medical school when he left El Salvador after a death threat. Since he arrived in San Francisco he has been working as a dishwasher 12 hours a day and sleeps in a shelter for Central American refugees in the Mission District. Like Mariana and Sandra, Alejandro cannot afford to look for another job for fear of losing what little he has. Additionally, the long hours and unpredictable work schedules prevent Salvadoran newcomers from regularly attending language classes, effectively thwarting their chances to improve their skills in an ever more competitive job market.

With a minimal social service package, Salvadorans would qualify for subsidized housing, which would ameliorate harsh living conditions arising in part from exorbitant housing costs. Housing assistance would reduce overcrowded living conditions, which spark family tensions when exacerbated by economic and other material pressures. Health care, including mental health services, would become in reach. As a rule, Salvadorans work long hours for low wages with no benefits such as health care. And, as community workers and spokespersons repeatedly mentioned, there is a widespread and urgent need for psychological counseling in this group. These immigrants have carried memories of their troubled land across the border, and these conditions have a profound effect on their relations with family members, who are themselves trying to cope with life in a
new environment.

Regularizing the status of Salvadorans would alleviate the burden on receiving relatives and give the newcomers an improved chance for a better future in this country. An investment in stability and security could reduce the long-term costs of immigration by preparing newcomers to lead productive lives. To ignore the particular needs of Salvadorans—the second largest Latino group in California and one of the largest in other states—at this early stage of their migration experience may accelerate the buckling of informal networks of support under the strain of financial and emotional insecurity. The breakdown of kinship networks will have the undesirable consequence of further marginalizing Salvadorans and condemning them to chronic poverty and social isolation.

Endnote

1. An earlier version of this paper appeared in the working paper series of the Chicano/Latino Policy Project at the University of California. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The RAND Corporation.

References


Prospects and Barriers to Successful Latino and African-American Coalitions

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Introduction

This paper addresses the prospects and barriers to interethnic and interracial issues-based (as compared to candidate or electoral, organizational, or community) coalitions. It describes and analyzes the history of Latino underrepresentation in the vast local government workforce of Los Angeles County, California in order to reveal interethnic and interracial intolerance and discrimination towards Latinos. These attitudes, reflecting some of the historical, political and racial perceptions towards Latinos in California, play a significant role in restricting the possibility of interethnic or interracial issues-based coalitions.\(^1\) The use of the terms racism include its counterpart, ethnicism which is an equivalent of racism but towards ethnic groups, e.g. Latinos, Jews or Arabs. Ethnicism characterizes "a system of ethnic group dominance based on cultural criteria of categorization, differentiation, and exclusion, such as those of language, religion, customs or world views" (van Dijk, 1993).\(^2\)

Contemporary African-American racism towards Hispanics is reminiscent of the racism African-Americans themselves experienced thirty years ago when first fighting for equal employment opportunities. African-Americans were rejected by the white elite as unsuitable candidates for equal employment based upon the white held myth of the lack of African-American qualifications, education, literacy and merit. African-Americans claim that they do not possess the economic and political power, and thus the group behavioral ability, to be racist. This argument is unconvincing. Racism is first and foremost an attitude, a set of beliefs, a mind-set. Racism may be expressed in either rhetoric or in physical behavior, but either condition reveals the attitudes, values, and agendas of its owners. These attitudes and agendas inform the realities of race (or ethnic) specific stratification and therefore discrimination.

African-American racism has been nourished by a similar history of anti-
Hispanic racism from an historic Anglo (white) power structure. It provides a second front underlying white majority agendas for assuring Latinos remain virtually politically and economically powerless, and for Latinos in local government employment to remain perpetually underrepresented. Anglo (white) colonization of Latinos coupled with efforts to politically and economically disenfranchise Latinos (mainly Mexican-Americans), have provided a source for these political attitudes which have become assimilated by many African-Americans, African-American public employees, and African-American community spokespersons (Heller, 1994; Renteria, 1994; van Dijk, 1993; Yaffe, 1993). "The basic philosophical boundaries of society have been defined by whites for their benefit... the system is renewed with the racial socialization of each new generation in the United States" (William E. Nelson, 1986, as quoted in J. Jennings, 1994). I propose that, as a result, African-Americans have paralleled, and in some cases exceeded whites as some of the more blatant proponents of anti-Latino racism.

The manipulation of equal employment policies by a predominate white government power structure serves their own factional agendas. Van Dijk states that even when whites are not apparently or openly involved in racism, "their

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**Group partners must maintain and communicate a sense of genuine trust and worth of the others, and value the presence and alliance with one another. They must acknowledge the entitlement to coalition rewards for all partners.**

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problem... consists of their passivity, their acquiescence, their ignorance, and their indifference to ethnic inequality" (1993, 6, 10; see also Bayor, 1993; and Simpson and Yinger, 1986). Additionally, by enabling and supporting the concept and practice of African-American dominance and exclusivity for affirmative action, their efforts strengthen and legitimize African-American idiosyncratic and revisionist perspectives on affirmative action.

A counterpart to this observation is that even though the dominant white society acknowledges its limited obligation to address slavery and historical racism towards African-Americans, it does not extend this obligation, nor publicly recognize their role in the historical and contemporary institutional and social discrimination against other ethnic minorities (Starr, 1993). In order to illustrate these conclusions I will present an analysis of a prospective Latino and African-American collaboration confronting public employment discrimination and workforce underrepresentation.

**Coalitions: Generic Components, And Differences**

Coalitions are dependent upon shared definitions of the realities affecting coalition participation. Sonenshein points out that "barriers of racial ideology
can rarely be overcome by common interests strong enough to create a coalition" (1993). Definitions of reality (which include racial ideologies) inform the participants’ personal, social and political perceptions and attitudes surrounding issues. Among other conditions, successful alliances require and depend upon coalitions being an alliance of equal partners and not merely one group using the other for support of only one sided objectives. Group partners must maintain and communicate a sense of genuine trust and worth of the others, and value the presence and alliance with one another. They must acknowledge the entitlement to coalition rewards for all partners. Both sides must share in existing and expected resources, determine common objectives, benefits and rewards, and share in existing and future increase in power, control and influence resulting from the alliance. Each group must support the common interests and be assured that individual group’s needs and agendas will not be co-opted by the dominant or more powerful coalition partners.

Although there are important comparative differences that delineate coalitions (candidate or electoral coalitions, community-based coalitions, organizational coalitions, and issues-based coalitions), I do not intend to characterize or discuss these differences at length, but only to the degree necessary to characterize and focus upon issues-based coalitions relative to equal employment and interethnic minority conflicts. Issues-based coalitions (e.g. demand-protest coalitions) have the potential to serve as a viable means of compelling an equitable implementation of public policy. They can serve as a vital mechanism for removing incongruency between the mandates and provisions of formal policy and realized informal policy decisions.

Electoral or candidate coalitions consist of various power and partisan configurations of minority-majority support for political candidates. Community-based alliances and organizational coalitions develop out of mutual concerns of community residents or members of formal organizations who seek temporary alliances for the purpose of resolving more localized issues impacting a more locally defined membership (Bayor, 1993; Hardy-Fanta, 1993). In community-based and organizational coalitions the critical nature of race and ethnicity is a less significant factor for participants and for the success of outcomes, and falls somewhere between electoral or candidate coalitions and issues-based coalitions.

Only minimal research has focused on the prospects and barriers to interminority (interracial or interethnic) issues-based coalitions. These coalitions are emotionally charged, and center around competitive and conflicting civil rights issues such as equal employment or affirmative action opportunities (Bayor, 1993; Henry, 1980; Lott, 1990; Marable, 1994; McClain and Karnig, 1990). In the case of equal employment entitlements, attempts at coalition formation would more likely reveal and accentuate intense competition for limited public resources—an element not found to the same degree in candidate or community coalitions (Hall and Saltzman, 1975; McClain and Karnig, 1990). In regard to the conflict potential of issue-based coalitions Manning Marable states...
that, "The prism of a group's racial experiences tends to blunt the parallels, continuities, and common interests that might exist between oppressed racial groups, and highlights and emphasizes areas of dissension and antagonism" (1994, 35). Because of their competitive nature interethnic and interracial coalitions (in areas such as equal employment) seem unable to get past the stage of rhetoric of racial and ethnic politics. In terms of equal employment and affirmative action issues, it is the racial and ethnic allocation of equal employment opportunities that constitutes the substance of the goal itself.

**Interethnic and Interracial Coalitions**

Inner-city riots, dramatic changes in urban demographic and socio-political environments, the potential for minority electoral influences, the civil rights movement, and growing concerns about racial and ethnic conflict have drawn considerable research attention to the subject of interethnic and interracial coalitions (Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1984; Graham, 1990; Jennings and Lusane, 1994; Hahn, Klingman and Pachon, 1976; Guinier, 1994; Lott, 1990; Rose, 1993; Sonenshein, 1986, 1993; Villarreal, Hernandez and Neighbor, 1988). "The question of how communities of color will relate to each other politically is one of the most important questions facing both activists and scholars in the next several decades" (Fuentes, 1994). However, the focus on coalitions as viable forms of ethnic minority empowerment cannot overlook the fact that contemporary and historical contextual realities "create [group] responses, sometimes joining diverse ethnic and racial groups in cooperative liaisons and sometimes putting them against each other in conflict" (Bayor, 1993).

The main focus of research on ethnic and racial minority coalitions has been on the barriers and prospects of political alliances between these ethnic and racial political minorities, and between ethnic minorities and the political majority. Commenting on the efficacy of candidate coalitions, Manning Marable points out that "...the current dilemma...is the collapsing myth of 'brown-black solidarity,'" and that "it is necessary to build something more permanent than temporary electoral coalitions between these groups" (1994). In their study of political mobilization in ten large California cities, each with a sizable Hispanic and African-American population, Browning, Marshall and Tabb conclude that for both Hispanics and blacks (African-Americans) minority coalitions and alliances are critical to successful political incorporation, to significant minority employment gains, and as "an especially strong form of access to policy making" (1984). Yet, the potential for failure or success of African-American and Latino coalitions does not escape the fact that "many times these groups are locked in zero-sum political conflict, where one group perceives the victory of another group as a loss for their own group" (J. Jennings, 1994). Thus, while coalitions are seen as significant to achieving employment gains and political access, they also may accentuate and lock participants into an existing impasse.

In ethnically and racially diverse urban settings like Los Angeles, ethnic and racial differences are more likely to affect the success or failure of prospec-
tive issues-based coalitions (Gurwitt, 1993; Jones, 1992; Kotkin, 1990; LA Times 1991, February 7; Miles, 1992; Oliver and Johnson, Jr., 1984; Prud’Homme, 1991; Rodriguez and Chavez, 1992; Sample, 1987). Significant differences in group definitions of, and responses to, various interpretations of organizational, political, ethnic and racial realities hinder coalition participants from reaching a mutually satisfying level of cooperation and representation, from obtaining a fair share of public resources, and finally prevent successful resolution of the problem that originally suggested the formation of the coalition. African-Americans are finding that the traditional acceptance (and all that it entails) as the dominant minority in the U.S. is being challenged and threatened by Latino population growth (Harris).

When viewed in light of these considerations, it would appear that interminority or interethnic issues-based coalitions may not in fact be as pragmatic, credible, or as successful as are some candidate or community coalitions. Sociologist Robert Blauner states, “In a racial order, a dominant group, which thinks of itself as distinct and superior, raises its social position by exploiting, controlling and keeping down others who are categorized in racial and ethnic terms” (as quoted in J. Jennings, 1994). Similar concerns regarding the probability of success have even been alluded to in regard to some candidate coalitions involving Latinos and African-Americans. James A. Regalado, in examining the benefits to Hispanics (after twenty years of support) for former African-American Los Angeles City (LAC) mayor Tom Bradley, expressed agreement with Sonenshein, that “there is little optimism with regard to successful and rewarding Black-Latino coalitions in Los Angeles than elsewhere” (Regalado, 1988).

In response to a study of African-American underrepresentation in the upper ranks of the city’s fire department, one African-American LAC councilman supported the goal of the city’s workforce being reflective of the city it served. However, if the employment trends in LAC government are a reflection of that diversity, then Latinos might reasonably doubt that future efforts for diversity will include correcting the underrepresentation of Hispanics. Similar doubts have been raised in research by Susan MacManus and Carol Cassel (1988) in their study of Hispanics and city politics. They state that “Mexican-Americans and blacks also find themselves in competition for [city government employment and services]. Mexican-Americans, as the politically weaker of the two minorities, may prefer to maximize their influence through election of members of their ethnic community, rather than through coalitions with blacks”.

Therefore, rather than being a viable option for problem resolution grounded in existing political, organizational and ethnic and racial realities, interminority coalitions (at least of Latinos and African-Americans) may merely manifest the trappings and propensity for political, social and civic correctness (CalTech, 1993). They may lack substance but still be promoted as an acceptable means of addressing ethnic and racial discord, of avoiding open confrontation, of bypassing divisive majority politics, and for promoting the benefits of multicultural
cooperation. Reflecting on lessons learned from interethnic coalitions in the 1970s, Juanita Lott concludes that, "black and other minority groups have little interest in forming coalitions if the price they must pay is to share limited program resources for an unspecified goal of intergroup harmony" (Barboro, 1977, cited in Lott, 1990; Lott, 1994). Interminority issues coalitions also have the potential to generate, highlight and fuel inter-group conflicts, and thus early on may defeat any substantive exploration and shaping of coalition issues and agendas (Bayor, 1993; Jackson and Farrell, Jr., 1994; Dinh, 1994).

I will exemplify these concerns for potential interethnic group conflicts by describing some of the historic and contemporary patterns of racism held by both whites and African-Americans towards Latinos (Deicer, 1994; Fuchs, 1993; van Dijk, 1993). These historic patterns underlie much of the anti-Latino sentiment contained in more recent local conflicts and prejudices that inevitably affect possible coalitions between Latino and African-American public employee groups. I have previously described these African-American and white attitudes as indicative of a displacement anxiety (i.e. group anxiety to being challenged as the only legitimate benefactors to equal employment and other civil rights opportunities) (Rose, 1993; Takaki, 1993; Yaffe, 1993-94).

In his discussion of the social replication of racism, van Dijk states that, "...as soon as elite interests are challenged, as in the domain of ethnic affairs, such elites will quickly forget the norms of tolerance and the values of equality that they supposedly espoused" (1993, 9). This description reflects my own views relative to Los Angeles County (LACO) and Los Angeles City (LAC), where expectations and aspirations for issue-based coalitions, for Latino and African-American local government public employees, and under current social, political and organizational conditions, may be without plausibility. Attitudes and relationships between Latino and African-American public employees are devoid of some of the essential ingredients and preconditions of successful and enduring coalitions (NCLR, 1990).

Equal Employment, County Demographics, and Local Government Employment

Equal Employment

In 1972, eight years after the passage of Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, equal employment and affirmative action requirements were extended to local government employers. Local governments were required to correct past discrimination in the public workforce, and establish affirmative action programs in order to assure equal minority representation relative to measurable standards and goals. The success or failure of such programs was judged by results, not motives or efforts (BNA, 1986; Simmons, 1993).

In addition to race, legislative revisions and expansions to equal employment mandates prohibit discrimination based on gender, national origin, religion

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or disabilities. The formation of official equal employment offices within Los Angeles County government in 1969, and in Los Angeles City government in 1971, confirmed, adopted, and incorporated all of these equal employment provisions into their respective county ordinances, for all of these protected groups. In accordance with equal employment legislation Hispanics or Latinos, as an ethnic and national origin minority, were guaranteed full and equitable protection from employment discrimination in any stage of the employment process. Philosophic and political legitimacy, and the inclusion of Hispanics as righteous subjects of civil rights and equal employment considerations became accepted within most modern political thinking and statutory definitions.

In 1970 a federal district court defined Mexican-Americans as ‘an identifiable ethnic minority.’ Three years later, the U.S. Supreme Court describing the problems of Mexican-American students in Denver, stated that blacks and Hispanics [Hispanics-Latinos] suffered identical patterns of discrimination. . . . the courts finally concluded that ethnic minorities as well as racial minorities could and did suffer discrimination (Shorris, 1992).

The legal interpretation, definition, and finally inclusion of Hispanics (Latinos) as an officially recognized minority is evident in virtually all census recordings, labor force data, official government equal employment policies, and all federal, state and regional governments’ legislation on equal employment programs. “Hispanic” is not as old a demographic or statistical classification as “black (African-American).” It was developed for federal statistical and policy reporting in the 1970s, and has been utilized extensively since the 1980 census (Lott, 1990).

Demographics and Local Government Employment

In 1991 total full-time, civilian non-instructional state and local government employees in the U.S. numbered 5,458,570; Hispanics represented only 4.2% of these employees, while African-Americans represented 10.2% (Hispanic Business 1994). In 1991, California employed 635,378 employees in state and local governments (counties, cities, special districts). Hispanics (Latinos) represented 15.9% (101,261) of state and local government employees but represented 25.8% of the state’s population. African-Americans, on the other hand, comprised 7.0% of California’s census, but 13.5% of state and local government employees (CA Statistical Abstracts 1992; EEOC, 1992; EEOC, 1993).

For Los Angeles County (LACO) in 1991, the aggregated local government (non-instructional) workforce numbered 157,466 (encompassing county government, eighty-nine municipalities, and hundreds of special districts). Since the mandating of equal employment responsibilities (and the formation of local government affirmative action programs) in local government between 1969-1971, Hispanics have remained the only major racial or ethnic group that has never achieved a reasonable representation in the public workforce (EEOC, 1993; Yaffe, 1994b).
Los Angeles City (LAC) is the largest city in the county, and the second largest city in the U.S. Its 1993 population numbered over 3.6 million. Its 1991 government (non-instructional) workforce comprised 45,006 employees. Since 1970 the African-American population in LAC has decreased from 17.9% to a 1990 census of 13.0%. Latinos, on the other hand, have increased from a 1970 census of 18.4% to a 1990 census of 39.9% (over 1.439 million). In the City’s government workforce, African-American employees in 1973 were over-represented at 21.9%. They remain overrepresented since that time, and in 1991 they occupied 22.4% of the city’s workforce positions. Latinos in 1973 accounted for only 9.3% of the city’s workforce, and continued to be underrepresented through 1991 at 19.9% of LAC government positions.

The inverse relationships between the workforce and population in the county workforce parallel those of LAC. In both jurisdictions, and for both African-Americans and Latinos, the results of twenty-five years of inequitable employment practices have been continuously emphasized in county and city affirmative action reports. The 1990 U.S. census for LACO was over 9 million. As the largest employer in the county, its 1993 (non-instructional) government full-time workforce numbered 76,748. State census data showed that the county population had risen to over 9.158 million in 1993.

The African-American population in 1970 was 10.9% and their county workforce representation was 25.4%. By 1990, their proportion of the population was 10.5%, and their workforce overrepresentation was 29.8%. Latinos in 1970 represented 18.3% of the county census, and rose to 37.8% in 1990. Their representation in the county workforce in 1970 was 6.0% of the workforce, and by 1990 had only increased to 21.4%. A 1994 LACO report to the Board of Supervisors shows that, whether utilizing population representation or civilian labor force (9.6%) African-Americans were overrepresented in thirty-three of the thirty-four county departments (with the lowest level of overrepresentation recorded at 12.2% and the highest level being 47.1%). Hispanic population workforce trends again show an inverse relationship compared to African-Americans in regard to population and representation. Hispanics were underrepresented in all thirty-four departments using either population parity or civilian labor force parity.
This twenty-five years of employment disparities in representation do not parallel or emerge from changes or down turns in the economy, the ethnicity or partisanship of elected officials, the technical workforce needs, or the internal or external availability of qualified Latinos. For both LAC and LACO they are the culmination of discriminatory patterns that have grown out of government (predominantly, though not exclusively, white) supported interethnic discrimination against Hispanics. These results are also endemic in the total county and city workforce, on virtually all occupational levels, and in every individual department. In all of these settings Hispanic 1993 representation is below 1980, and in many cases below 1970, population or civilian labor force parity.

Prejudice And Discrimination Towards Hispanics

Historic Prejudice and Discrimination

Hispanics or Latinos (but mainly Mexican-Americans) represent 10% of the U.S. population, over 25% of California’s residents, and 41% of the population of Los Angeles County. Americans of Mexican descent (incorporating Anti-Mexican, anti-Mexican-American, and anti-Hispanic feelings throughout the southwest, even in the first half of the twentieth century, were frankly and commonly expressed. Public signs often read, “Only White Labor Employed” and “No Niggars, Mexicans, or Dogs Allowed.”

Mexican Indians, Spaniards, and mestizos) were some of the earliest of indigenous peoples in the American southwest even prior to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, and at the time of California statehood in 1850. In this same year, 75,000 Mexicans choosing to remain residents in the territory that was to become Texas, were granted automatic U.S. citizenship (Vigil, 1987, 19). The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo “explicitly guaranteed that [Mexican-Americans] would enjoy “all the rights of citizens of the [United States] according to the principles of the Constitution” (Garcia, 1988).

Today, throughout the U.S. two-thirds of Mexican-Americans are native born citizens. One-fourth of these citizens can trace their ancestry to these initial “citizens by conquest” (NCLR, 1990, 3). Others, trace their ancestry back 400 years to that portion of Mexico that was later to become the “southwestern United States” (Meier and Ribera, 1993). In a study of citizenship and immigration status of Hispanics in Los Angeles (based on 1990 census data) it was found that “of the over 3.3 million Latinos in Los Angeles county, 45.7% were U.S. born citizens, and that only 7% of the Hispanic population were undocumented immigrants (Hayes-Bautista, Schink and Rodriguez, 1994).
Mexicans founded the pueblos of Los Angeles in 1781, and Santa Fe, New Mexico in 1610 (Meier and Ribera, 1993). "In Los Angeles in 1848 Latinos represented 90% of the population" (Latino Coalition, 1993). Yet, in spite of their early status as U.S. citizens, and their legitimate residency in California and the southwest prior to California statehood, the history of treatment of Mexican-Americans by the dominant Anglo (white) population reveals a legacy of colonization, of dehumanization, of discrimination, and the institutional denial of human and civil rights, much of which still persists today throughout California and the southwest. Garcia describes the situation as one in which, "Lynchings and murder of both Mexicans and Indians were so common that they often went unreported. Rape, castration, and beatings, and economic and employment exploitation were commonplace. Long-term residents of the region were reduced to being aliens in their native lands. The common theme that united all Mexicans was their conflict with Anglo society. The dominant society, profoundly racist, found it entirely reasonable to relegate Mexicans to a colonial status within the United States" (Garcia, 1988).

Anti-Mexican, anti-Mexican-American, and anti-Hispanic feelings throughout the southwest, even in the first half of the twentieth century, were frankly and commonly expressed. Public signs often read, "Only white Labor Employed" and "No Niggers, Mexicans, or Dogs Allowed" (Almaguer, 1994; Meier and Ribera, 1993; Sanchez, 1993; Shorris, 1992). More recent and multi-disciplinary research on all facets of Hispanic employment issues indicate that little has changed. Kamasaki and Yzaguirre (1995) of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) delineate several significant areas in which African-Americans, unchallenged by the Anglo (liberal and progressive) political and civil rights establishment, have opposed or sabotaged the inclusion of Hispanics or an Hispanic agenda are the 1975 and 1982 Voting Rights Act Extensions, the English-Only Movement, strong anti-discrimination employer sanctions (related to immigration reform), employment discrimination and EEOC practices, and the funding of English-as-a-Second Language (ESL).

African-American Intolerance of Latinos

As African-Americans experience socioeconomic and political gains, and as Latino population growth promises to supplant African-Americans as the nation's largest ethnic or racial minority, African-Americans have become increasingly intolerant of Latino demands for civil rights inclusion (Cardenas, 1994). The percentage of Latinos in the populations of both LAC and LACO is greater than that of African-Americans by a ratio of almost four to one. Hispanic demands for equity are threatening the solidly nurtured African-American public employee base in Los Angeles (Davis, 1990, 304; LA Times, 1991, February 27). African-American tirades against Latinos in public employment and civil rights activities reflect African-American adoption of a similar historic rhetoric that was directed by whites against African-Americans in past decades. Latinos are well aware that, "In the halls of government and in the press, we are
engaged in a war of words that, as it filters down... may spark African-American/Latino violence” (Rodriguez and Chavez, 1992).

In 1991 “a black administration in Washington, D.C., used the power of the police and courts to suppress the grievances of Latinos just as white administrations had done against black protesters during the urban uprisings of 1968” (Marable, 1994). African-Americans affirm their righteousness in opposing Hispanics (in terms of equal employment) by ignoring the history of indigenous Hispanics in the U.S. and depicting Hispanics only as recent immigrants who are infringing upon African-American exclusivity for equal employment opportunities (Lott, 1994; Tilove, 1993, December 19 and 20). Nationally, 64.2% of Hispanics were born in the U.S. and 9.4% are foreign-born naturalized citizens (US DOC, 1993). African-Americans also fail to fully appreciate their own (albeit forced) immigrant origins in America.

In May of 1994, the NAACP, on behalf of the Black Probation Officers Association (BPOA), filed a federal civil rights suit claiming that since African-

African-Americans also cite their history of suffering from slavery, as the measure of anguish and concurrently allege an absence of historical suffering and discrimination of Latinos, to bolster their argument for exclusiveness. One local newspaper carried the headlines, “Affirmative Action Not for Hispanics, Says Activist Group... it is reparation to blacks for slavery”.

Americans occupy 50% of the probation department’s non-supervisory and non-management personnel, they should also occupy 50% of supervisor and management positions. African-Americans only represent 10.5% of the county population, and 9.6% of the county’s civilian labor force (Weinstein, 1994). Critical of this rhetoric, Manning Marable (1994) states, “Vulgar Afrocentrism looks inward; the new black liberation of the twenty-first century must look outward, embracing those people of color and oppressed people of divergent ethnic backgrounds who share our democratic vision”.

Still, more recent expressions of racism emanate from, and serve to accentuate, the virtual African-American domination and control of political, socioeconomic and civil rights agendas (Beard-Williams, 1994). African-Americans believe Latinos are not proper beneficiaries of civil rights and equal employment mandates. They maintain that Latinos were not as active in the 1960s civil rights movement, and therefore, the movement having been predominately African-American, should benefit only African-Americans. William Raspberry, an African-American syndicated columnist, reminds us that, “The impression given
today is that the civil-rights movement was a black movement. It was not. It was an integrated movement, and innumerable whites also risked their lives and sanity for the principle of freedom and justice for all” (1990; Chappell, 1994; Egerton, 1994; Jackson, 1994). Using the convoluted and self-serving logic of the “African-Americans only” position, but in light of the fact that civil rights statutes and expectations are extensions of the Constitution, African-Americans, women, Asians and Pacific Islanders, religious minorities, and the disabled should be excluded from constitutional guarantees and protections in that they were not considered members of the legitimate polity or citizens at the time of the framing of the Constitution (Gutman, 1993).

African-Americans also cite their history of suffering from slavery, as the measure of anguish and concurrently allege an absence of historical suffering and discrimination of Latinos, to bolster their argument for exclusiveness. One local newspaper carried the headlines, “Affirmative Action Not for Hispanics, Says Activist Group. . . it is reparation to blacks for slavery” (Wagner 1990). In the eyes of many African-Americans, Latinos have not experienced (similar) discrimination as Americans Americans, and therefore should not be considered for civil rights (NCLR, 1990). Charles V. Hamilton (1993) described this as a clash of experiential realities, in which non-African-American minorities did not experience dehumanization. This attempt to define social suffering only in terms of an African-American historical experience, and civil rights entitlements only in terms of African-American history, is self serving and demagogic at best. It blatantly ignores other historical realities such as the massacre of Native Americans throughout the Western hemisphere, the treatment of Jews during the Spanish Inquisition, the European and Armenian holocausts, the Maoist and Stalinist cultural purges, the Cambodian killing fields, and significantly the enslavement of Cubans and Puerto Ricans during Spanish colonial possession of these islands, to name a few. One African-American academic explains the rigid viewpoint of many African-Americans, stating that, “When power itself grows out of suffering, blacks are encouraged to expand the boundaries of what qualifies as racial oppression, a situation that can lead us to paint our victimization in vivid colors even as we receive the benefits and preferences” (Steele, 1990).

The history of slavery is painful to both African-Americans and Anglo Americans alike. Slavery ended 130 years ago, and no African-American living today has had to overcome the *experiential* degradation and mortification of slavery. Other racial and ethnic groups can also cite historical conditions of institutional suffering and discrimination—conditions which exemplify one of America’s most enduring illnesses. Still, “anyone who defines himself as a victim stays in a perpetual state of self- righteous self pity and anger. That is black America today” (Julius Lester, as quoted by Raspberry, 1990). Another commentary on this rhetoric and demagoguery states, “More often, one finds in their [black] political oratory and demands a sense of entitlement, of righteous indignation and resentment, a sharper edge of anger and contempt” (Hamilton, 1993).

African-Americans have also proposed that since Latinos are not a race,
and that they are mainly white, they are not minorities. They have proposed that self-definitions of ethnicity be abolished in favor of using only racial classifications for equal employment and civil rights programs. Of the 41% of Los Angeles County’s Latinos, 1.73% also were identified racially as black (Cal State, 1990). African-American census parity (and thus public employment opportunities) would thus be increased by this amount. Although color remains a major (though not exclusive or required) consideration in equal employment, race came to mean mainly ethnicity and sometimes, national origin (Gutman, 1993). Today, “race” is accepted as essentially a political, rather than an anthropological, classification. Melville (1988), quite aptly, points out that “The value of race as a category for distinguishing people is debatable in that specific phenotype cannot be assigned scientifically and unequivocally.” Marable (1994) also addresses this issue, stating “[r]acial identity politics must be challenged in all communities of color in order to enhance the possibility of coalitions.” And finally, “...modern racism is no longer primarily racial, but also culturally based and legitimated” (van Dijk, 1993).

In the area of equal employment African-American public employee groups and spokespersons claim that Latinos are unqualified and that there is an insufficient number of educated Latinos to fill government jobs and to qualify for promotions. What is being left out of this tirade is that all new employees are held to identical entry requirements, and all promotional candidates must comply with comparable experience and educational requirements. Recent research on the actual number of high school graduates, community college, and four-year college graduates for all degree levels, in LACO, by race and ethnicity from 1979 through 1992 shows that Hispanic graduates exceeded African-American graduates for every year examined. African-American high school graduates for these years numbered 71,847 compared to 153,941 for Hispanics; for community college graduates, African-Americans were 13,225 compared to 17,989 Hispanic. During this thirteen year period college and university graduates (bachelors, masters, doctorates and professional, but excluding degrees in theology) amounted to 35,009 for Hispanics and 23,469 for African-Americans (Yaffe, 1994c).

When Latinos have achieved even a perfunctory or symbolic enforcement of equal employment, outraged African-Americans claim that civil rights was their movement and now it is being used against them. This rhetoric overlooks the rational basis of due process (of being a nation of laws and not of men) and returns us back to a government by men, reminiscent of slavery. What African-Americans also fail to recognize is that even if Latinos were included as whites (as they were prior to the 1970 census, and later as Spanish-Surnamed Americans) increases in African-American representation in LACO would be nonexistent since they are already overrepresented by as much as 400% over parity in local government employment. Therefore, African-Americans would not be entitled to any additional job opportunities greater than they have already acquired, but actually less. The African-American conception of an unregulated
African-American-only affirmative action program was even addressed during 1964 when Title VII was enacted. In 1964 then Senator Edmund Muskie stated, “every American citizen has the right to equal treatment—not favored treatment, not complete individual equality—just equal treatment” (Reynolds, 1993).

African-American employee groups have gone so far as to describe Latino efforts for public employment equity as part of the past and present white supremacist movement and racist efforts to discriminate against African-Americans (BHCTF, 1994). Their anti-Hispanic platform includes the denunciation of all Hispanic demands for employment equity as part of racist attempts to take jobs from qualified African-Americans. Unfortunately, this tirade received support from the previous LACO affirmative action officer who stated that “... recruitment of blacks would suffer if Latinos were hired at the rate [parity or equity] that the Latino association [LACO Chicano Employees Association] wants” (Merina, 1987).

In other words, as previously pointed out, the jobs that African-Americans imply would be taken from them, under county and city equal employment and affirmative action guidelines, are those employment opportunities in which African-Americans have achieved an overrepresentation, and that should in the future (according to the accepted parity standard) be proportionally distributed among other minorities and white employees, based upon each groups representation in the county and city population.

By redefining and filtering legitimate and legal demands for public employment equity for Hispanics, African-American idiosyncratic and Afrocentric perceptions and interpretations translate these Hispanics demands into personal attacks on African-Americans and inaccurately as group combativeness “against” African-Americans. African-Americans have demonstrated against efforts for Hispanic employment equity regardless of legislation and official employment policies, since such inclusion would place a limit or ceiling of African-American goals of an unlimited and unregulated proportion of employment positions. In other words, as previously pointed out, the jobs that African-Americans imply would be taken from them, under county and city equal employment and affirmative action guidelines, are those employment opportunities in which African-Americans have achieved an overrepresentation, and that should in the future (according to the accepted parity standard) be proportionally distributed among other minorities and white employees, based upon each groups representation in the county and city population.
When African-American overrepresentation on all occupational levels in Los Angeles County, in the U.S. Postal service was revealed, African-American postal workers responded with, "See, we are being penalized for our successes" (Colvin, 1994; see also, Oliver, 1994; Rosenblatt, 1994). African-Americans represented only 10-10.5% of the county population and the county civilian labor force, but comprised 60% of all LACO postal employees, 74% of supervisors and managers, and 60% of upper management positions.

During the recovery from the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, African-Americans scouted job-sites with Latino employees and threatened these employees and their employers, blocked job activities, and dragged Latino workers away from their jobs, and in several instances pelted the Latino workers with rocks (Bakewell and Hermosillo, 1992; Russell, 1992). They demanded that those jobs be given to them; they threatened "No justice, no peace." Their position was that illegal (immigrant) Hispanics and Mexicans were keeping African-American from obtaining jobs. This determination of Hispanic citizenship status was based on visual identification and on a perceived lack of language proficiency of the threatened workers. However, African-American behavior was illegal by any standard.

In the city of Compton, California, African-Americans represent 55% of the 1994 population and 78% of the city government employees. Latinos represent 42% of the population but only 10% of city employees. "Several of the city's departments are almost exclusively African-American... blacks have a lock on city government, a beleaguered school system and most municipal jobs" (McDonnell, 1994). Compton city officials have explained recent Latino demands for equity and representation as "...a well-constructed attempt to utilize the historical implications of the African-American civil rights movement for the benefit of a few people, who in fact probably don't even consider themselves non white" (McDonnell, 1994). When these African-American-Latino conflicts first received public notice in 1990, it was noted that "blacks control every public and quasi-public institution in Compton... and show no sign they intend to share their power" (Fuetsch, 1990).

Hispanics perceive African-Americans as co-opting them in setting either Hispanic or multiethnic agendas—an activity which further strains attempts at coalitions and contributes to the portrayal of equal employment solely as an African-American issue. Hispanics observe that many African-American spokespersons resort to the use of doublespeak when employing such phrases as "people of color" and "minorities." Hispanics believe, and there is some documentation to confirm, that in public (e.g. media events and presentations) African-Americans manipulate these references in order to communicate a public image of inclusion and acceptance of Hispanics in minority matters, but privately (among African-Americans) they mean "African-American only." Using this tactic blacks have been able to garner Hispanic support for apparent common issues, and appear inclusive and cooperative, but in practice are merely garnering support for, and perpetuating, an African-American issues agenda (Arias, 1980). “His-
panics are frequently expected to defer to black interests when setting the agenda for the civil rights community” (NCLR, 1990).

In many respects national and local white power structures fostered the portrayal of civil rights as essentially an African-American-white concern. This became evident in the early 1980s within the very institutions that were entrusted to enforce equal employment legislation for all protected groups (Gallegos, 1993). In a study of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEOC), it was found that since the development of national EEOC field offices the employee composition was predominately African-American, regardless of parity levels in the cities in which the offices were located, and regardless of the size and employment discrimination experienced by the Hispanic populations. In addition, it was found that for all types of cases received, investigated and referred for litigation, and for all reward and disposition categories, African-American were overrepresented and Latinos underrepresented (NCLR, 1990; NCLR, 1993).

Recent California Events Challenging the Prospects for Interethnic Alliances

Three very recent and potentially devastating events in California will be providing possible (and forced) opportunities for cooperation and cohesive alliances between all groups afforded equal employment and affirmative action status, but even more significantly between African-Americans and Latinos. If the African-American critique and response to these events can be separated from the prevailing anti-Hispanic atmosphere in California (which found “legitimacy” in the recent passage of Proposition 187-the anti-immigrant measure, which received substantial black support) African-Americans will find an opportunity to explore and acknowledge their contributions to the exploitation and interethnic subjugation and of Latinos. These events therefore have the potential to: (1) stimulate internal African-American assessments of their necessity or preference for coalitions and alliances with Latinos and other ethnic minorities, (2) intensify African-American reactions into an even more exclusive bastion of Afrocentrism, and (3) enable African-Americans to rise above Afrocentric racial politics and ideologies. Whether or not constructive alliances develop depends to a significant extent on permanently altering the view that African-Americans are affirmative action’s chosen people.

First, in June of 1994 a group of conservative California assembly members submitted assembly bill ACA 47 to the Assembly Judiciary Committee for consideration as an amendment to the California Constitution. ACA 47 was “aimed at doing away with affirmative action programs in state-related public employment, public education and the awarding of public contracts” (Cal. Leg., 1994). The bill was rejected as being damaging to race and ethnic relations in California (LA Times, 1994, August 14). In December 1994, ACA 47 was resubmitted as ACA 2 for consideration for approval in light of California’s recently elected and more conservative House and Assembly (LA Times, 1994,
December 7). AC 2 was again “killed” in both the House and Assembly in March 1995 paving the way for its authors and supporters to place the proposal on the 1996 ballot as a voter initiative (as the Civil Rights Initiative) (Ingram, 1995; Los Angeles Times, 1995, April 6). AC 2 received early support from governor Wilson. Its author (at that time) prophesied that this “is an indication of what will come. There is massive support in the community for this, and it will be an issue of both national and state levels” (Ellis, 1994). Governor Wilson, making affirmative action one of his prime campaign issues for his bid for the next presidential elections, still supports the Civil Rights Initiative and ordered the review and abolition of scores of state affirmative action advisory panels and all affirmative action regulations not mandated by federal or state law (Ellis, 1995).

Second, presented as an effort to ward off threats of a law suit, the California State Personnel Board issued a seventy-nine page briefing and a two year plan to reevaluate and redefine California’s guidelines and regulations for affirmative action parity standards and criteria for setting goals (State Cal., 1994). The “briefing” makes no mention of who is threatening to sue the state, but presents an elaborate statistical structure whereby affirmative action goals, standards and opportunities would be drastically reduced and subsequently predicated upon an arbitrary selection of the 1990s proportion of college graduates in CA (by race, gender and ethnicity) as the criteria for occupational availability. The underlying results would be that all minorities would be pitted against whites based on these graduation rates, which tend to reduce available opportunities for minorities and increase them for whites, well above white population and civilian labor force representation. If successful in creating and codifying this new interpretation of affirmative action for whites on the state level, then county and municipal governments would likely be the next targets.

The final 1994 “new years resolution” from California’s elected officials to create civil rights chaos in the state came from governor Wilson himself. Wilson publicly indicated he would seek “abolishing affirmative action rules for those entering government jobs and colleges and universities” (Chavez, 1994; Ellis, 1994). Wilson’s direct attack of minority civil rights and equal employment comes as the third leg to balance an anti-minority platform geared to replacing minority affirmative action opportunities with the old “whites only need apply” slogans evident of nativist and anti-immigrant, racist and anti-Hispanic movements throughout the state’s history. The signs will not read “blacks and whites only need apply.”

These are not new tactics, but can be located throughout California’s history (Almaguer, 1994). Anti-Hispanic and anti-black history reveals with similar movements during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that,

“Politicians were not afraid of the consequences for they knew that they controlled the historical memory of Chicanos [and blacks]. The elite . . . had learned how to effectively undermine the progress minori-
ties had been making... in developing their identity and culture. The elite did, however, fear the weakening of control, as well as any challenge to their hegemony. The result was an intense Americanization campaign... with the sole purpose of integrating the Latino and black middle classes and dividing them from the masses of the poor" (Navarro and Acuña, 1990).

Summary, Conclusion and Critique

This discussion of historic and contemporary contexts surrounding African-American racism towards Latinos introduces epistemological, social and political dilemmas and barriers that must be confronted and resolved before any promise of equity-based interethnic coalitions can ensue. Justice and equity for African-Americans cannot (by either definition or practice) be seized, legitimized and extolled if they rest on the dehumanization and discrediting—on attempts to rationalize injustice and discrimination—of Hispanics, or any other group. Entitlement to any constitutional or legislative civil rights guarantees does not rest upon Afrocentric endorsements any more than it did on white racist endorsements for African-Americans.

The reemergence of blatant citizen and official efforts to again institutionalize and legitimize discrimination against minorities demands that African-American racial attitudes be assessed through genuine self-examination. This resolve carries with it a special importance in regard to assessing prospects and barriers to the formation of Latino-African-American issue-coalitions even within the demographic, political and socioeconomic contexts discussed previously.

Ethnocentric definitions of racism only enable its advocates to deny, minimize and justify their own intolerance. In this case, African-Americans seem to have entered into a covenant with deception in order to absolve themselves from racism towards Hispanics... a behavior found in the "old south," Nazi Germany, in Cambodia, in Stalinist Russia, in white supremacy groups, in American nativist groups. Racism from African-Americans is in essence the same racism that is directed towards African-Americans.

Endnotes

1. I am not suggesting that mutually successful interethnic and interracial coalitions do not exist within the U.S. However, they are usually either exclusive of Latinos or Hispanics, or are community based and, less frequently, candidate based alliances. They are short lived, dissolving after the immediate election, or, in the case of community based coalitions, after an acceptable solution is achieved or reached in terms of the condition which brought the groups together in the first place.

On issues-based coalitions (e.g. affirmative action), Kamasaki and Yzaguirre (1994-95) of the National Council of La Raza reported that "For many years, we had quietly, patiently, and respectfully framed our concerns to our counterparts in the African-American leadership; the response, to say the least, was
very disappointing. We formed coalitions, but when it came time to meet only the Hispanics would show up. On a few occasions when we had the opportunity to speak frankly and seriously about our concerns, we experienced two types of reactions. At their worst, we were confronted with the same kind of race-baiting and stonewalling tactics that so frustrated our black colleagues in the initial stages of the black civil rights movement. But, even at their best, we experienced the kind of subtle patronizing, and ultimately unsatisfying reactions that characterize some of the civil rights groups’ interactions with too many of our liberal ‘friends’.

2. For many reasons the term ethnicism more accurately reflects discriminatory attitudes towards Latinos as well as intra-ethnic (Latino) attitudes. As with Jews, Latinos represent members of all racial groups, all religious groups and numerous nationalities. African-Americans perceive civil rights and related issues in terms of race, while Latinos (Hispanics) tend to view these relations in terms of ethnicity. Consequently Latinos categorize blacks along side Anglos (whites) as one more oppressive group aimed at diminishing their presence.

I consider rigid African-American and Anglo racial categorization as significantly limited for many reasons. From a scientific (anthropological standpoint) racial classifications are increasingly unreliable, vague, an as an artifact of more racist discourse (see Hotz, 1995). Historically, interracial marriages also belie racial purity. Marriages between whites and blacks in 1993 represented 20% of all racial marriages nationwide (Choose, 1995). Historically black and white, black and Native American, and more recently black and Latino, and black and Asian unions have (positively) weakened rigid racial identities, categories, and stratification.

Still, nationally and locally the media’s portrayal of civil rights issues compels and almost demands—an understanding of, and adherence to, an exclusive and rigid black and white racial categorization as the only definitions and categories of civil rights entitlement. Race therefore remains more a political and social transparency in which skin color remains the most immediate and obvious determinant of race since it is the most visible, however unreliable and fragile a criteria. For both African-Americans as well as for Latino sub-groups, skill color plays a dominant role in comparing group “acceptability” by Anglo American/European standards.

On the other hand, the current term “African-American” itself denotes a leaning (however, non-conscious and gradual) towards an ethnic-national classification, and away from traditional (somewhat outmoded) racial categorization. I maintain that a different and overlooked dimension of being black in American is as much, if not more so, determined by American social and political experiences, than to racial heritage.

This is the perplexing situation for Latinos as well—and, for different reasons, equally perplexing for African-Americans and Anglo-Americans. Earl Shorris (1992) reminds us that racism (racismo) goes back to colonial periods in Mexico, Cuba and Puerto Rico. “A matrix exists in at least six dimension: language, color, economics, education, citizenship, and national origin. I would add a seventh: ethnicity or race of marital partners. Even in New Mexico, “a new category was added when a class of former Indian slaves, the Gen’zaros, was defined”. Shorris goes on to indicate that “the relation of each variable to all the others is so complex as to equal at least 46,656 possible permutations”.

Frank Bonilla, presents a different picture of Latino dilemmas with American race issues. He concludes that the influence of Anglo-European racial
mores, values and social stratification has taught Latinos to “experience blackness as a misfortune,” but suggests that this racial stratification is not indigenous to the Islands (Cuba and Puerto Rico) but arise from Latino encounters with (and migration to) the mainland (U.S.) (see Frank Bonilla’s discussion of the question of race in “Beyond Survival: Por qué Seguiremos Siendo Puertorriqueños,” A New Look at the Puerto Rican. 1972. Institute of Puerto Rican Studies. NY: Brooklyn College).

Beyond the Euro-American and African-American pre-occupation with race one is faced with still other dilemmas to our racial security. Our political rhetoric is challenged by anthropological facts such as the Ainu of Japan and the Australian aborigines, both groups being categorized anthropologically as Caucasian. What this suggests is that not all (anthropological) Caucasians are politically white, nor are all political whites, Caucasian. By the same token, not all African-Americans are racially black in the morbid sense of racial purity, nor are all blacks ethnically African-American.

3. Census and workforce figures for Los Angeles County and Los Angeles City obtained from various reports from respective government census and workforce composition, and affirmative action reports for 1973 through 1994.


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