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Letter from the Editor

We are pleased to present the fifth edition of the Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy (JMEPP). JMEPP’s mission is to provide cutting-edge analysis on issues of policy relevance in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Our Spring 2016 volume encapsulates the dangerous developments in MENA over the course of the past year. While the international community hoped for a resolution to the five-year Syrian Civil War, the conflict has further divided the region into a sectarian split, pitting Shia Iran and the Sunni gulf states on opposing sides. Additionally, Russia’s brief military intervention, finally winding down as of March 2016, has further destabilized the country and significantly increased the flow of refugees into the heartland of Europe. With the November 2015 Paris attacks, the threat of the so-called Islamic State (Daesh) to the west was finally realized, calling into question ongoing efforts to counter violent extremism, as well as to resolve the Syrian Civil War. Meanwhile, Turkey’s increasing two-front war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Daesh has resulted in a series of deadly terrorist attacks throughout the country, putting further pressure on Turkish leadership to both find a solution to the Kurdish question and stem the refugee flow transiting northward from Syria. It is through this lens that the Spring 2016 edition has been crafted.

With conflict and instability abound, we present first an exclusive interview with Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament Salim al-Jabouri. On a more positive note, JMEPP also interviewed Tunisia’s Minister of Economic Infrastructure and Sustainable Development Hedi Larbi. Interview conducted by Kristin A. Wagner

Finally, we conclude with a literature review by Adi Saleem Bharat on the Boycott, Divest, Sanction (BDS) movement as it pertains to academia.

With the increasingly growing list of challenges faced by the Middle East today, we at JMEPP understand and embrace the opportunity to view both geopolitical and policy hurdles from dynamic perspectives. We invite you to read, comment, and contribute in the coming weeks, months, and years. Only through discussion, criticism, and focused engagement will the international community be able to counteract the forces pulling the region apart, and we invite you to join the conversation. If you like the content contained herein, please subscribe to future editions through our website at www.hksjmepp.com.

Kristin A. Wagner
Editor-in-Chief
Cambridge, MA, April 2016
Iraq, Daesh, and Security Implications: Interview with Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament Salim al-Jabouri

Interviewed by Satgin Hamrah

JMEPP: What factors in Iraq’s modern history do you think led to the creation of Daesh?

AL-JABOURI: Policies of oppression, discrimination, partisanship, the sectarian interests of the ruling elite, and the gross negligence of the demands of important parts of the Iraqi people are among the main factors that helped facilitate the creation and growth of Daesh, and provided the permissive environment to promote it. Some international players have also facilitated and helped in exporting such ideas to Iraq. Religious extremism is not part of the Iraqi culture, but the continuous support for such ideas through media and social media have led to the polarization of some of the young and fervent people who have found themselves in this aforementioned environment.

JMEPP: Who or what are the contributing factors that are leading to Daesh losing territory?

AL-JABOURI: Daesh is suffering from internal problems. These problems stem from the fact that some of the Daesh members are ex-Ba’athists—remnants of the previous regime’s intelligence apparatus—as well as opportunistic fighters. The differences in approach definitely lead to such differences in approach definitely lead to such

JMEPP: Do you think Daesh’s loss of territory in the Middle East will translate to an increase in attacks in the west?

AL-JABOURI: We cannot rule out that a desperate Daesh will find new land on which to continue its attacks. There is a difference, however, between finding an alternative battleground and waging attacks on additional areas. In all cases, Daesh will not give up on threatening the west whether it loses in Iraq or not. We have consequently discussed at great length the importance of eliminating Daesh instead of just defeating it. This is crucial to prevent it from resurfacing again in other areas promoting its bloody atrocities. We have called for the world to support us, so that Iraq can provide a model and serve as a success story on how to face and eliminate extremism. We have explained that this battle relies on various tools, including the security solution, our final option. A package of real steps toward reform, in tandem with an awareness campaign against extremism, are sufficient in limiting Daesh’s influence and capabilities.

JMEPP: What are the challenges with fighting Daesh?

AL-JABOURI: One of the most important challenges we are facing in the fight against Daesh is the challenge of including local fighters in the battle. This is in addition to the obstacles associated with security (and) the required logistical needs, i.e., weapons, training, information, and aid. Furthermore, it is important to use the concept “hold on” to the newly liberated territories as one of the main tools in this fight. Daesh is still capable of regaining territories it loses if we don’t utilize the potential of the local people themselves in maintaining control of their respective territories. Another important factor in providing the manpower for this fight could be the recruitment of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) within Iraq. Daesh knows that those who have been expelled and suffered a great deal from being IDPs will fight and fiercely defend their land against future incursions into their territories.

JMEPP: How is Daesh being used as a tool to advance foreign interests?

AL-JABOURI: Daesh is a militarized organization that is based on an idea and interest. When Policies of oppression, discrimination, partisanship, the sectarian interests of the ruling elite, and the gross negligence of the demands of important parts of the Iraqi people are among the main factors that helped facilitate the creation and growth of Daesh, its interests match with the interests of some other countries, then Daesh and these countries will not hesitate to strike a deal to fulfill these interests with mutual help. In addition, some of these countries have been determined to be sending some of their intelligence members as fighters with Daesh and they might already have reached senior positions in this terrorist organization.

JMEPP: What were some of the lessons learned in recapturing Ramadi and the other areas that have been liberated from Daesh?

I fear that even a decade from now, we will be financially incapable of rebuilding the areas destroyed in the conflict, not to mention affording areas not touched by the conflict the opportunity to develop.

AL-JABOURI: One of the most important lessons we have learned from the liberation of Ramadi is the importance of depending on the tribes to liberate their own areas, and the importance of effective cooperation between them and the Iraqi army. This model has proven to be successful and has achieved major results. Thus, we call for repeating the same model in Nineveh (Mosul) and in liberating the rest of Salahaddin areas, which have not yet been liberated. In the same regard, it is important to include the local people, who may otherwise feel ashamed when they are prevented from participating in the liberation battles. The local people request the honor of participating in the liberation effort and look forward to avenging.

JMEPP: How do you think violence can be stemmed?

AL-JABOURI: Violence happens for various reasons. Two of the main reasons are the feelings of despair and oppression. I think one of the tools necessary to eliminate violence and extremism is to unite our efforts to achieve social justice and political reform. This is not to forget the important and critical role the media plays in society, raising the awareness about the danger and wrongdoing of ISIS.

JMEPP: How will Iraq be governed after Daesh is completely eliminated?

AL-JABOURI: It will be imperative for the Iraqi government to achieve the principle of decentralization as one of the most important tools that helps in getting rid of authoritarianism by affording societies and communities the opportunity to govern themselves. A post-Daesh Iraq will yield a key lesson for our people about the necessity of standing against extremist ideas. I expect that the areas that will be liberated will have a huge opportunity to develop and progress, and will consequently be immune to the return of terrorism. For the question of partitioning Iraq, I rule that option out and stand firmly against it. However, there will need to be a definite decentralization in the next phase of Iraq’s history. As previously mentioned, I don’t rule out that some of the governors will request regional status, and I don’t see a problem with such requests, as long as they are within the constitutional limits and within the governorate framework as opposed to rooted in sectarianism.

JMEPP: What are some of the challenges associated with the rebuilding of Iraq and its administration?

AL-JABOURI: One of the principal challenges is the economic hardship that Iraq is facing. I fear that even a decade from now, we will be financially incapable of rebuilding the areas destroyed in the conflict, not to mention affording areas not touched by the conflict the opportunity to develop. However, we rely on international support, as well as seizing the opportunity of a reconstruction process that is based on international investment. This process will primarily depend on the government’s flexibility in its investment regulations and procedures, in addition to the extent of its efforts to convince international companies of the bene-
fits of investing. We are also awaiting the World Bank’s direct support to the local governments in their respective efforts to rebuild their areas by providing grants and loans. We consider this to be one of the most effective tools to expedite the reconstruction effort. We also cannot neglect the crucial impact of the security situation on the process of reconstruction. Without a permissive and stable security situation it will be difficult for any international player to enter the area, to initiate a reconstruction process, or to invest.

JMEPP: What challenges do you see in recruiting, expanding, and strengthening the Iraqi military?

AL-JABOURI: The biggest challenge is certainly political, as some parties would like to see the army represented by only one faction of Iraqi society. This is detrimental for the army and for the Iraqi people. The second challenge is the lack of a relationship between the people and the army in some areas. It is crucial that people feel that the security apparatus is there to serve them, not to suppress them. Only then they will be cooperative and the mission will certainly succeed. In addition to these factors, the economic challenges hinder the expansion and development of the army. For example, the current budget for the Ministry of Defense and Interior does not represent a war budget. It is limited and small.

JMEPP: Do you think tribal loyalties have an adverse impact on the Iraqi military?

AL-JABOURI: In general, tribal loyalties do not conflict with, or stand against, military doctrine and performance. Actually, it is sectarian loyalties that have affected the military institution, and I think the experience of including the tribes in the fights and battles proved how developed the tribes’ vision and the relation with the state are. The tribes no longer stand against government authority or the rule of law. There remains limited tribal unrest in Basha, which has affected the security apparatus.

Satgin Hamrah has a master of international relations from Boston University and a master of public administration from the University of Southern California. Satgin is a PhD student in history at Tufts University. She is also a PhD Fellow at the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, a fellow at the South Asia Democratic Forum, an associate editor for Harvard University’s Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy.

Dr. Salim Al-Jabouri was elected as the speaker of the Iraqi Parliament on 15 July 2014. He holds a doctorate in law and previously worked as a law professor at Nahraun University in Baghdad. In this interview he answers questions about ISIS and the challenges associated with the rebuilding of Iraq and its military.

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JMEPP: Thank you for meeting with us, Your Excellency Larbi. Many outsiders have commended Tunisia for what is described as a successful transition to democracy, post-revolution. Is this an accurate claim, to say that Tunisia has been the most successful of the countries that have faced unrest in the region? In what capacity can Tunisia be a role model for its neighbors?

LARBI: It’s difficult to say that Tunisia is a model, because, scientifically, a model is something that is replicable and for which you have definite analysis to measure definitive elements of it. That said, using the indicators of peacefully going through a process of political transformation and eventually obtaining institutions that are progressive in entrenching democratic regimes, as well as hosting free and democratic elections, it can be said that any type of transition, as measured by these metrics, is successful. Tunisia is a good example that can inspire the rest of the [MENA] region. Tunisia is an example of a transformation where varied political actors unite and agree on a transitional process. By striving for agreement through dialogue and consensus building, we can avoid what is happening in most of the countries in the region.

JMEPP: How would you characterize the state of the Tunisian economy and its development since the revolution, and what actual impact have political and security issues had on the economy?

LARBI: The political transition process has been tumultuous, and regrettably, the economic and social dimensions have been overlooked; hence, the economic situation is difficult, particularly when examining public finance balances, external accounts, economic growth, and unemployment rates. I don’t think that we can find an example of a transition where there were not major costs of this nature; the problem for Tunisia and the rest of the Arab world is that the transition took longer than it should have. We must work on ameliorating economic and social issues inherited from the past and exacerbated and aggravated during this transition.

JMEPP: What have been the consequences of the security issues Tunisia has faced in the past year, such as the attacks in Sousse and at the Bardo?

LARBI: The security issues are not only issues for Tunisia, but also issues for the region. Just after the Arab uprising, this relatively unknown “wild card” appeared very quickly: political Islam and radical groups wanted to have a role to play in politics. Unfortunately, this went far in terms of disturbing the security arrangements in these countries, and today, insecurity is a serious problem for the whole region, and even moving across borders to Europe and beyond. The consequences are in the form of negative impacts on the tourism sector, which is especially important for Tunisia, constituting seven to eight percent of the GDP. Similarly, they are also in the form of raising the risk profile for potential investors.

JMEPP: Have you seen an actual drop in FDI and investor confidence?

LARBI: There is currently some movement in addressing investment and economic issues in the country. In addition to the security issues, we also have to implement structural and fiscal reforms to create the business environment that is expected by investors and which inspire hope in the public. The political regime is equally as important as the economic regime, which includes a development model and the new approach to governance in Tunisia via transparency and accountability, as well as eliminating rigidity and bureaucracy in the system.

JMEPP: Are the interior regions of Tunisia indeed marginalized, as some Tunisians claim, and if so, to what extent is this a direct result of an imbalance in the government budget allocation?
LARBI: This is one of the issues that people think contributed to the uprising. Again, taking economic and social indicators into account, it’s true that these regions, which are approximately 200 miles from the coast, are lagging behind in terms of having much higher unemployment, poverty, and less access. Perhaps they didn’t get the budget allocation they needed, but when I look at the issue, I find that they got almost equal the amount as any of Tunisia’s other regions, and sometimes even higher in terms of public allocation in investments. The problem lies in that public investment didn’t take place in these regions to the extent it should have. We need the right diagnosis to have the right policies for this. We should revisit the business environment in this region and why this didn’t improve as it did in the coastal areas. This is attributed to two factors—the first is institutional. If you consider the local and regional institutions, they are extremely poor in terms of decision-making capacity. Tunisia is a highly centralized country and hence the decision-making process has not been developed at local and regional levels. Therefore, when investors go there, they go to identify their project and talk to the various authorities, but then they have to come back to the capital, Tunis, to make and execute these decisions and receive the proper authorization and deal with the bureaucracy that comes with it. Therefore, we don’t need to wait until we have a decentralization policy; we can now begin devolving some of the authority for decision-making to the regional level. The second key is to simplify the different procedures and bureaucracy at the regional level so the investor can be more motivated and afforded incentives. The incentives that are there should suffice if they are delivered in a timely and proper manner.

JMEPP: What do you see as the role of international monetary institutions—some of which for whom you worked, such as the IMF and the World Bank—in promoting or hindering a democratic transition? How do you feel their policies toward, and expectations of, Tunisia have changed since Ben Ali, or have they? LARBI: The international institutions do play a role and have tried to help Tunisia as much as possible in the process. Particularly responsible of them was to not be pushy in terms of implementing reforms during the political transition, as doing so would have added to the political tension at the time. Such institutions have been helping provide policy advice and reform programs; however, because of the difficulties of the political transition, Tunisia wasn’t able to deliver all of the reforms that it should have. This brings to light the real issue, which is the low functional capacity of our institutions, including the justice system. For those who embezzled public money and who are corrupt, the justice system should be permitted to deal with them accordingly.

In terms of changing their policies, they definitely learned their lesson and have since attached much greater importance to good governance, transparency, fighting corruption, and attempting to implement institutional reforms. They’ve also focused on inclusive growth, equity, redistribution, and creating the jobs that Tunisians need, while being cognizant of the necessity of helping Tunisian institutions embed and tailor policy suggestions to the Tunisian context, as opposed to taking them as external recommendations that are imposed.

Kristin A. Wagner is a master of international business candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and editor-in-chief of the Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy.

Hedi Larbi served as both the Minister of Economic Infrastructure and Sustainable Development and the Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister, Tunisia, between 2014 and 2015. Larbi has over thirty-five years of professional experience in economic and social development as both a policy advisor and policy maker, with more than two decades of high level work in the World Bank group, the private sector, and the Tunisian transitional government.
Two Strategies for Diffusing Tension in the Middle East

By Benjamen Franklin Gussen

Abstract

This paper argues that the Middle East as an analytical or geopolitical concept has become too problematic. The prophylactic measures proposed here center on two strategies. The first is the dissolution of the Middle East based on differentiated continental association. This would see Turkey and Iran become part of Europe and Asia, respectively, while the rest of the Middle East—including Israel—would become part of a "Greater Africa." The redissolution on the Middle East would ensure the accentuation of the differences between different parts of the Middle East, to the end of reducing tension between them. The second strategy is based on polycentricism. The paper argues for greater emphasis on polycentric constitutional orders in the spirit of philosopher Baruch Spinoza's understanding of sovereignty. This vision necessitates international treaties to underwrite charter cities as the dominant governance structure in the Middle East. Sovereignty, as envisaged by Spinoza, is the key piece for constituting and protecting this sovereign's subsidiarity between different organizational scales (local, national, and global). The Middle East is made up of a rich mosaic of religions and ethnicities that is especially amenable to such orders. A lasting peace in the Middle East requires relinquishing the nation-state model in favor of small, non-contiguous jurisdictions. This neuausrichtung, or realignment, would see a drifting away from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Yemen, and the Levant (including Israel) would benefit from a reorientation away from Asia. As a long-term strategy, this would see a drifting away from the influences exerted by Turkey and Iran on these countries.

This approach is no stranger in the long history of these countries. Both Hebrews and Arabs have strong ties to North and East Africa. The story of the Exodus is in one sense an affirmation of the influences flowing between the Levant and Egypt. Even the early days of Islam provide insight into the first point of security for the Arabian Peninsula.

The Middle East needs to move to an Olympic future, as opposed to its current World Cup model. After all, it was Ethiopia that was the first haven of security for Prophet Mohammed and his followers.

This neuausrichtung, or realignment, would see these parts of the Middle East join African organizations ranging from the African Union to the Confederation of African Football. The forging of formal ties with Africa would provide an employment and symbiosis where supply and demand for labor could be matched through immigration and direct foreign investment—diverting most immigrants away from Europe in the process. Perhaps most importantly, from a geopolitical perspective, African military forces would bolster those of Middle Eastern nations, both in manpower (i.e. Nigeria) and know-how (i.e. Ethiopia), beyond the role played by the historically military-centric Egypt. The combined armed forces of the African Union with those in the Arabian Peninsula and Levant would prove as a counterweight to Iran and Turkey militarily.

The positive outcomes from the proposed "Greater Africa" could be understood through evolutionary game theory, notably the Hawk-Dove game. This is an anti-coordination game were players choose to follow either a hawk strategy of aggressive behavior or a dove strategy of backing down in the face of aggression. The idea of a "Greater Africa" increases the cost of conflict from a hawk strategy. It does so by recalibrating the military power of Israel, the Levant, and the GCC vis-à-vis Turkey and Iran, through the human reserves that could be produced by countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, or even Ethiopia. Now all parties follow a hawk strategy—an evolutionary stable strategy. This solution to the game would involve "ritual fighting," rather than actual fighting.

Prophylactic Intervention 1: Continental Differentiation

The first proposed strategy to ensure a détente in the Middle East is to systematically reorient the cultural, social, and political compass of some parts of the Middle East towards Africa. In particular, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Yemen, and the Levant (including Israel) would benefit from a reorientation away from Asia. As a long-term strategy, this would see a drifting away from the influences exerted by Turkey and Iran on these countries.

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Prophylactic Intervention 2: Sovereignty à la Spinoza

The Middle East needs to move to an Olympic future, as opposed to its current World Cup model. In an Olympics competition, one city hosts a multitude of sports. However, under the auspices of the local city, the tournament in no less than eleven cities. The World Cup model showcases a nation rather than a particular city. In a region like the Middle East, with its rich mosaic of cultures, religions, and ethnicities, the nation model will always be problematic if at a scale similar to that of Bahrain (less than 1,000 square kilometers). I hence argue for governance structures based on autonomous cities, or the Olympics model.

Today, the nation state is obsolete and no longer the optimal unit for organizing economic activity. A new conception of the nation state has emerged: the state as a network, which "signals the end of . . . sovereignty based on a territorial unit." Today, the Olympic model provides a model in which powers are shared between sovereign bodies . . . which reaffirm their separate- ness . . . In federal systems such as the United States or in Australia, legislative, judicial and executive powers are distributed between federal and different state governments . . . under [Spinozistic sovereignty], however, "confederal powers . . . were extremely closely restricted . . . Rather than attempting to harmonize differences . . . [it upheld] the constructiveness of difference . . . City power is again on the ascendancy, as we can currently discern a move toward empowering cities on two fronts. The first front is domestic where there is constitutional recognition and co-operative models of federalism, of the local governments of city-regions as co-equal to federal and state governments, and the development of what is known as the "doctrine of usurpation of jurisdiction." This approach does not emphasize political autonomy , but rather the idea of subsidiarity where general competence powers are extended to city-regions.

The second front is international, where there is an emerging field of law that acknowledges city-regions as independent international actors. While international law has long had an indirect impact on cities, it is now enlarging the nation state club that has historically dominated its institutions in order to admit subnational governance structures.
most notably city-regions, mainly through regu-
lating the relationship between cities and their
nation states. International instruments such as
the United Nations International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Inter-
national Convention on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), among others, are alter-
ing the relationship between cities and nation states.
City-regions are becoming “nodal points for rad-
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common goal to transform cities from mere sub-
visions of sovereign states into legally empowered
entities, able to advance goals and values that are
different from their states.”

Given its rich cultural mosaic, the Middle East is
a prime candidate for charter cities as polities. To
be precise, countries like Syria and Iraq, inter alia,
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“A lasting peace in the Middle East requires relinquishing the nation-state
culture in favor of small, non-contiguous jurisdictions connected in loose
confederal structures within the cultural milieu of different continents.

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arity in New Zealand. Other areas of research
Gussen is active in include charter cities and com-
plexity economics.

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Caution Gives Way to Increasingly Assertive Policies in Saudi Arabia, But to What End?

By Robert Mason

Abstract

Since King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud assumed the Saudi Arabian throne on 23 January 2015, there have been clear continuities in both Saudi domestic and foreign policies to maintain regime security and stability for the ruling elite; however, significant change is also evident on a number of levels. These shifts primarily reflect differences in leadership styles of the late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and King Salman, dynamics within the royal family, and state relations with the ulema (recognized Islamic scholars and authorities) and the broader population. The onset and consequences of the Arab Spring have raised questions about the legitimacy of the Al Saud family rule, which are being met by the Saudi government with a steadfast neutralization and counter policy. This article will focus on the issue of succession in Saudi leadership, the Saudi military’s involvement in the current war in Yemen, the Saudi role in the now Sunni-dominated military alliance, and the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Finally, the article will explore whether a more assertive policy stance will support the Al Saud regime or ultimately undermine its stability.

Succession in Saudi Leadership

As Rob Sobhani discusses in King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia: A Leader of Consequence, the late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who ruled Saudi Arabia from 2005 until his death in 2015, was considered by his supporters to be a reformist and by the United States as a close ally and someone who brought stability to the kingdom. He focused on increasing access to Saudi education through 200,000 scholarships that enable Saudis (of both sexes) to study at foreign universities or to study at the growing number of universities across the kingdom. He additionally spent considerable effort improving the status of women in Saudi society, granting women the right to vote for the first time in 2015. He addressed extremism and issues surrounding religion and the economy and oil, seeking to make advances within a conservative rubric.

A Shift in Policy

Similarly, since the succession of Abdullah’s half-brother, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, to the throne following King Abdullah’s death in January 2015, King Salman has been labeled “focused,” “creative” and “austere” by Khaled Almaeena, editor-in-chief of Arab News, a mainstream Arab news agency. Furthermore, CNN agrees that King Salman is viewed as “a pragmatic and cautious reformer.” These features are particularly relevant in an oil-rich state where various royal families have been involved in money-making schemes, and where, as early as 1986, the US government was concerned about a backlash against them. Resentment over economic disparities still exists and has become part of a range of economic challenges linked to the Arab Spring (such as jobs, economic diversification, and development), social marginalization, sectarianism, and terrorism.

However, traditional caution of King Salman and the Al Saud rulers before him appears to have given way in the advent of the Syrian conflict in 2011 to more assertive foreign policies in an effort to address an increasingly insecure and unstable region and wider Middle East. In the first weeks of his tenure as king, Salman issued decrees that promoted Prince Mohammad bin Nayef to Deputy Crown Prince and Prince Mohammad bin Salman to Minister of Defense. In similar fashion, he promoted individuals from his own Sudairi branch of the royal family to higher rankings within the government. The risk of the unprecedented move to promote Prince Mohammad bin Salman to Ministry of Defense is that he lacks relative experience and could therefore compromise the external security of the kingdom.

King Salman’s son, Prince Mohammad bin Salman, thirty-four, has not held a government posting prior to assuming the high-profile position of Minister of Defense. In addition, he is widely viewed as a driving force behind the Saudi intervention in Yemen, garnering accusations from the Bundensnachrichtendienst (Germany’s intelligence agency, BND) of destabilizing the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region through a policy that prioritizes regional leadership and utilizes a strong military component. Therefore, King Salman’s personnel decisions have resulted in controversy surrounding Saudi policies.

Problems Within Saudi Leadership Circles

Saudi Arabia’s controversial military campaign in Yemen has forced Saudi leadership into a tight position in which it cannot afford to make policy missteps. Yemen’s civil war has become regionalized, involving other member countries of the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC), such as Qatar and the UAE, as well as the use of foreign mercenaries from states as far away as Colombia. If the ground offensive objectives in Yemen are not realized, Prince Mohammad bin Salman may become marginalized from the defense portfolio. This could happen through a number of possible scenarios, including a prolonged Saudi military campaign without resolution or further condemnation from the US or the UN for alleged breaches of human rights and international law. The precedent for such ostracism already exists; Prince Bandar bin Sultan was relieved from his two positions as secretary-general of the now defunct National Security Council and as special envoy of the king with responsibility for Syria policy due to the contribution of his decisions to the Syrian conflict, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP), which is using its growing base in Yemen to once again challenge the Saudi state.

The Influence of Yemen’s Civil War on Saudi Foreign Policy

Given the high stakes in Yemen, it is surprising that Saudi Arabia has consented to UN-backed peace talks. Nevertheless, Riyadh knows that the US is supportive of its conflict against the Houthi, which Saudi Arabia perceives to be an Iranian-backed insurgency. It will consequently take time for any potential UN resolution to be approved and implemented. However, there are signs that growing civilian casualties in the conflict are drawing in greater US participation in vetting military targets and searching vessels bound for Yemen. Time is an important factor in this calculation because in the interim period, Saudi forces can try to implement changes on the ground and better shape the outcome to benefit Saudi policy goals. Thus, peace talks are unlikely to succeed until Saudi Arabia has secured a military advantage on the battlefield; continued fighting on both sides has compromised the negotiating climate. The humanitarian cost of the now Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen has forced Saudi leadership into a tight position in which it cannot afford to make policy missteps. Yemen’s civil war has become regionalized, involving other member countries of the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC), such as Qatar and the UAE, as well as the use of foreign mercenaries from states as far away as Colombia. If the ground offensive objectives in Yemen are not realized, Prince Mohammad bin Salman may become marginalized from the defense portfolio. This could happen through a number of possible scenarios, including a prolonged Saudi military campaign without resolution or further condemnation from the US or the UN for alleged breaches of human rights and international law. The precedent for such ostracism already exists; Prince Bandar bin Sultan was relieved from his two positions as secretary-general of the now defunct National Security Council and as special envoy of the king with responsibility for Syria policy due to the contribution of his decisions to the Syrian conflict, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP), which is using its growing base in Yemen to once again challenge the Saudi state.

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arms embargo on Saudi Arabia linked directly to the heavy civilian casualties due to its conduct in Yemen.

Additional Foreign Policy Issues
Saudi Arabia has, for decades, maintained a policy of limiting Shiite influence and expanding its own Sunni influence through the heavy funding of mosques and madrasas (Islamic religious schools), Islamic associations, and training centers across the Islamic and developing world, as well as in states of strategic interest, including China. Such foreign policy forays are increasingly drawing criticism from Europe, which is claiming that such programs may fund jihadi causes. Additionally, these efforts have exacted a heavy financial burden on Saudi Arabia. Conventional military expansion alone amounted to $900 billion over the last five years, and will amount to another $50 billion over the ...

Traditional caution of King Salman and the Al Saud rulers before him appears to have given way in the advent of the Syrian conflict in 2011 to more assertive foreign policies in an effort to address an increasingly insecure and unstable gulf region and wider Middle East.

A New Sunni Military Alliance
Apart from efforts to unite the country on the Yemen campaign by improving relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia has focused on addressing the growing violent threats in the Islamic world. It is tackling this issue foremost through a new Sunni military alliance consisting primarily of existing allies across the Islamic world, with a joint operations center in Riyadh. Additionally, the Saudis have begun publicly voicing their willingness to send in ground troops (likely special forces) to Syria as part of a US-led coalition to help combat the Islamic State. These steps serve multiple purposes, including:
- Addressing international concerns that Saudi Arabia is not making sufficient efforts to tackle the so-called Islamic State; the post-Paris attacks era to degrade and destroy it;
- Confronting those who accuse Saudi Arabia of promoting violent Islam through its promotion of Wahhabism, a radical, exclusivist, and parochial branch of Sunni Islam;
- Tackling national concerns that the Islamic State (and other violent Islamic factions) pose a growing threat to the kingdom;
- Drawing states from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East into a closer orbit with Saudi Arabia and therefore influencing them in accordance with Saudi policies vis-à-vis Iran; and
- Demonstrating a continued commitment to US objectives (particularly important in the context of remarks made by President Obama in March 2016 in which he labeled Saudi Arabia, along with some others in the Gulf and in Europe, as “free riders”) and encouraging Washington to lead a more effective coalition in areas that are deemed vital to Saudi national security interests.

Despite these efforts, there are a number of troubling features inherent to the new Sunni military alliance. First, certain members such as Pakistan have expressed surprise at their inclusion in the alliance without prior consultation. A Pakistani army spokesman confirmed that “we are not looking for any involvement outside our region.” Second, activities of the alliance will include everything from efforts in counter-terrorism ideology and terrorism to military intervention where it is deemed necessary (mandated by the UN or the Arab League). The new Saudi-led coalition could thus be considered too broad in scope, challenging in practice and dependent on the political will of others to be truly effective. The likelihood of the alliance reverting back to a unified military command in the style of the GCC could therefore be quite high. Third, by focusing exclusively on the Houthi threat in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated that a broader intervention targeting terror groups such as AQAP is not currently on the agenda, to the point where the Saudi-led coalition continuously avoids attacking AQAP positions. This has resulted in substantial territorial gains for AQAP in Yemen, whereas just over a decade ago the Saudi interior ministry was fighting a counter-terrorism campaign against AQAP on the streets of Riyadh.

The Execution of Nimr Al-Nimr
Domestically, Riyadh perceives the Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian jihadists, and human rights activists as active threats to national security. A case that exemplifies this challenge is that of Raif Badawi, a blogger who was sentenced in June 2010 to 1,000 lashes for criticizing Saudi Arabia’s religious police, which the authorities equated with blasphemy. His sentencing received harsh criticism from Europe and he subsequently received the 2015 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.

The execution of senior Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr is further evidence of the Saudi struggle for control of its internal affairs, and in particular the restive Eastern province—especially in Qatif where al-Nimr was a driving force behind violent protests that broke out in 2011, and where he called for secession and the formation of a Shiite state. Al-Nimr was also renowned for his hostile, anti-government speeches, which began in 2002, and indirectly caused police casualties.

Al-Nimr’s Execution: A Ripple Effect
Instead, the Saudi political calculations behind al-Nimr’s execution seek to avoid domestic attention on what Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer, calls a “perfect storm” of “low oil income, opened war in Yemen, terrorist threats from multiple directions, and an intensifying regional rivalry with its nemesis, Iran.” In private, several US officials have been more forthcoming about expressing their anger over the poor timing of the Nimr al-Nimr execution, as it risks undermining US policy in the wider region. Specifically, the actions have complicated efforts, through rising sectarian confrontation and proxy conflict for a peaceful resolution in both Yemen and Syria, which requires both Iranian and Saudi diplomatic support.

Exacerbation of Sunni–Shia Tensions
Rather than enhancing cooperation, al-Nimr’s execution has escalated Saudi Arabian tensions with Iran. These tensions were further exacerbated by the Iranian authorities’ unwillingness to stop the Saudi embassy in Tehran from being stormed by Iranian protestors in the immediate aftermath of the execution in January 2016. Adding to the hostility, Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran’s parliament, said on 2 January 2016 that “Saudi will not pass through this machiavellism.” The event plays to the hands of political opponents of the Al Saud family, such as President Assad of Syria, and reinforces comments made in early 2015 by Syria’s ambassador to the UN, Bashar Jaafari, stating that the Saudis are “cultivating a culture of sectarian bloodshed in the region.” The execution has put additional pressure on social and sectarian divisions in states such as Bahrain and Iraq—both Bahrain and Sudan have
severed ties with Iran over its response to the execution of Nimr al-Nimr was deemed to be in accordance with the Wahhabi interpretation of Sharia’s law, Shari’a is a huge body of literature with four bodies of jurisprudence. The sentencing could therefore have been interpreted differently in Wahhabi tradition, with a greater emphasis on the broader interests of the ummah (the whole community of Muslims bound together by religious ties), such as reducing sectarian conflict, not only in the kingdom, but also across the region and the Islamic world.

Conclusion

The undercurrent of discontent in Saudi society amplified its domestic and international reformists—especially those who call for a written constitution, and particularly the Shi’i population—as well as factions within the royal family, pose a different but persistent threat to regime stability. These threats will be magnified if the current political policies such as escalating sectarian tensions with Iran, military policies such as escalating the Shi’a population—as well as factions within the House of Saud), was established by Hassa bint Ahmed al-Sudairi with King Abdulaziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia. The clan is from Najd, the same part of the Arabian Peninsula as the Al Saud. See Hussein Ibish, “Bayan Reshufle, Saudi Shakes-up Consolidates King’s Power,” The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 30 April 2015.

Robert Mason is lecturer in political science at the British University in the Emirates. His works include International Politics of the Arab Spring; Popular Unrest and Foreign Policy (Palgrave, 2014) and Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East (I. B. Tauris, 2013). He is a contributing author to a newly edited volume of Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation (I. B. Tauris, 2016).
Looking to Syria: No-Fly-Zones and Political Stability in Iraq and Libya

By Dylan MaGuire

Abstract
The ongoing civil war in Syria has reignited interest in no-fly zones as policy options for halting violence against civilians and maintaining stability in conflict-ridden regions. In order to evaluate the success of this policy option, this article will survey a portion of relevant literature to establish the components of no-fly zone operations, followed by an examination of US-led Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq and Unified Protector in Libya to answer the following questions: 1) What goals did policymakers hope to achieve with these operations?, and 2) Did these operations produce the desired political outcomes? While the number of implemented no-fly zones is limited, these particular cases were chosen due to their similarity with the situation in Syria. Operational and political goals will be measured using relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and presidential statements, as these best capture the strategic thinking at the time of implementation. Outcomes will be measured through an analysis of the security and political situations on the ground shortly after the cessation of operations. Though subject to interpretation, this metric provides estimates for the performance of the no-fly zones in question and insights as to their overall success. Finally, this piece will discuss the findings from the case study analysis and make brief policy recommendations for a no-fly zone in Syria.

Due to its infrequent use, the literature on no-fly zones remains limited but suggests a three-category typology, developed by Alexander Benard, for classifying operations (see Table 1). Type 1 features air assets providing air cover for ground troops deployed in combat or otherwise hostile environments; Type 2 presents air assets as the sole means of influencing the situation on the ground; and Type 3 employs air assets as a deterrent for creating a buffer space between combatants on the ground. All three types prioritize establishing air supremacy in the designated zone and also seek to collect intelligence to monitor developments on the ground. The discriminating factor between types is the amount of risk assumed by the military forces responsible for maintaining the zone. Yet, this typology remains weak when differentiating between desired political outcomes. While Types 1 and 2 could describe classic military operations between belligerent parties, only Type 3 specifically seeks to de-conflict and potentially create humanitarian safe zones, thus resembling the common understanding of the no-fly zone.

Conceptual Definitions
Many military analysts broadly define no-fly zones as the restriction of airspace to unauthorized aircraft. These analysts narrowly define success and focus almost exclusively on military objectives to inform future operations. This approach could misrepresent to policymakers the often unanticipated political outcomes that result from establishing no-fly zones. While the no-fly zone is one of many variables (including domestic political calculations and the uncertainty of military operations, for example) that can explain these outcomes, this article focuses on it as the primary means through which policymakers are engaged on the ground.

Political destabilization is an alternative theoretical approach that frames coercive airpower as a means of undermining a regime. This perspective better captures the political implications of constraining sovereignty and exhibiting a regime’s weakness vis-à-vis domestic opposition. This case study reveals that far from merely restricting airspace, the two no-fly zones examined severely eroded regime control, leading to soft partition in northern Iraq and regime change in Libya.

Introduction
American policymakers from across the ideological spectrum have repeatedly called for the establishment of a no-fly zone over besieged areas of Syria in order to protect civilians. Advocates of humanitarian intervention rightly concentrate on the near-term goal of establishing safe zones in which to provide much needed relief. Yet, the implications for political stability have not, thus far, received sufficient consideration when discussing no-fly zone options. Historically, two no-fly zones established under similar circumstances provide data for analyzing the potential outcomes of such a policy. US-led Operation Provide Comfort and Unified Protector, occurring in 1991 and 2011, respectively, enforced no-fly zones over northern Iraq and Libya and were implemented to halt regime violence against civilian populations. The current debate surrounding the efficacy of no-fly zones typically cite at least one of these cases as evidence of success; however, success has been measured in terms of military, as opposed to political, outcomes. If no-fly zone advocates seek to use these cases as evidence for implementing a no-fly zone in Syria, the implications of implementing them for political stability must also be considered.

Table 1. Benard’s No-Fly Zone Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Air Cover</td>
<td>Provide close air support and overwatch for ground troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Air Occupation</td>
<td>Exert force without deploying ground troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Air Deterrent</td>
<td>Create buffer zone between hostile groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Summary of Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Operational/Political Goal</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Provide Comfort</td>
<td>Humanitarian relief, territorial integrity</td>
<td>Soft partition, civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Unified Protector</td>
<td>Civilian protection, national unity</td>
<td>Regime change, civil war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the crisis and adopted Resolution 688 in response.

Operational and Political Goals

Under the authority provided by UNSC 688, President H.W. Bush ordered the start of Operation Provide Comfort, a military humanitarian relief effort and no-fly zone. The operation included ground elements and humanitarian relief on the Iraqi-Turkish border with a no-fly zone enforced against "Iraqi fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel." The first phase of the operation saw a Type 1 no-fly zone, but with the withdrawal of ground troops in mid-July of that year, it shifted to a Type 2. When asked about US commitment to protect the protected enclaves, President H.W. Bush responded that "I don’t think it has to be long-term . . . and now this is a logical step to get it [humanitarian relief] done much more sanitarily . . . " While recognizing the plight of Iraqi-Kurdish refugees, President H.W. Bush made it clear that the United States did not wish "to see a fractured, destabilized Iraq," that the U.S. was not going to "interfere in its civil war," and that the "Iraqi people must decide their own political future." According to these stipulations, Operation Provide Comfort was a temporary solution to a humanitarian crisis and was not intended to lead to Iraq's fracture.

Outcome

Under coalition air cover, the Kurdish Dem­ocratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) formed the autonomous Kur­distan Regional Government (KRG) and held their first elections in May 1992, after which they formed a unity government. During this process the US never officially recognized the KRG, a redline for its ally Turkey, but rather provided assistance for the elections. However, significant economic pressure from internally displaced Kurds, a lack of reliable funding, and former guerrilla fighters not accustomed to governing led to a breakdown in the unity government, negatively impacting any political progress that had been achieved up to that point.

In May 1994, less than two years after the election, internal divisions in the Kurdish coalition government erupted into open fighting; in June, casualties numbered in the hundreds. What had initially become known as the Kurdish Civil War saw both sides seek assistance from external sources with the PUK favoring Iran and the KDP looking to Baghdad for support. In early August 1996, the "political autonomous region that then experienced a civil war where the former dictator was forced to create conditions that allowed for the overthrow of the Libyan government.

Findings

The use of no-fly zones as a policy for providing immediate humanitarian relief and civilian protec­tion is strongly supported in the aforementioned data, Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Unified Protector identified imminent humani­tarian catastrophes and were able to successfully avert them. Short-term goals articulated by the authors of the document and statements made by Presidents H.W. Bush and Barack Obama were clear, concise, and met without difficulty. However, the data does not support the successful achieve­ment of the four no-fly zones as of the writing of this article. The data reveals the exact opposite of the stated policy preference for the maintenance of territorial integrity and national unity. At the start of Operation Provide Comfort, President H.W. Bush stated that the US military would not get involved in Iraq's domestic politics. Yet, the US no-fly zone provided protection for the formation of a politically autonomous region that then experienced a civil war where the former dictator was
invited back in to aid one of the belligerent parties. Operation Unified Protector was in direct response to the fear that the Qadhafi regime was about to massacre its own civilians. President Obama specifically stated his intention was not to initiate regime change. Despite these statements, the coalition air campaign drastically changed the domestic balance of power allowing a loose alliance of opposition groups to depose the government.

The data correlates no-fly zones and political instability, but does not show a causal relationship. No-fly zones were established to address humanitarian crises that were themselves the byproducts of civil war. In both cases civil wars were already underway at the start of the respective no-fly zones, and in both cases there were brief moments of stability after the completion of operations, followed by relapses into conflict. This study has not discussed the changing policy goals as policymakers reacted to facts on the ground, but instead focuses on strategic goals at the time of implementation as a baseline for measuring outcomes. Furthermore, this study reveals that Benard’s typology for categorizing no-fly zones does not adequately capture the true nature of the conflicts. Operation Provide Comfort deterred regime airpower and positioned in all three types, but was unable to prevent the breakout of Kurdish fighting, as demonstrated in Type 3. Operation Unified Protector not only deterred regime airpower, again captured by all three Types, but also destroyed regime ground assets. It simultaneously provided close air support, as demonstrated in Type 1, but for rebel forces as opposed to coalition troops. The two cases examined in this piece do not fit neatly into any of the types, but rather draw from elements of each.

Conclusion and Recommendation

A no-fly zone in Syria will only weaken Bashar al-Assad’s regime and may not be possible given Russia’s current deployment. As the US hopes to empower democratic opposition elements, a no-fly zone is likely to aid the Islamic extremist groups it opposes. A successful no-fly zone in Syria requires the deployment of ground troops to guarantee that protected enclaves are not continuously targeted by militant groups. Furthermore, a no-fly zone requires that both the regime and rebel factions are roughly equally degraded, so as to prevent the balance of power from shifting drastically to one side’s advantage with a negotiated settlement being the only real conflict termination strategy short of all-out victory by one side. Pursuing this strategy has become significantly more challenging given Russian intervention in direct support of the regime. While the US and international community have made real progress in negotiating a temporary “cessation of hostilities,” they will need to take a long-term approach to managing relations within the diverse opposition to prevent future conflict.

The no-fly zones examined in Iraq and Libya weakened regime power and allowed opposition groups to gain political control. While the no-fly zones were successfully established to protect innocent lives, they may have caused or extended conflict, leading to further suffering and destabilization. Policymakers must take these long-term outcomes into consideration when advocating for any future use of no-fly zones as intervention strategies.

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By Serhat S. Çübükçuoğlu

Abstract

The discovery of offshore natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean Sea added a new dimension to long-standing confrontations over the Cyprus problem. Competing claims over rights to exploit rich offshore energy resources and to exert political influence for furtherance of national interests heightened Cyprus’s importance and underscored its crucial strategic position. On the geopolitical dimension, Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war and the attempt to monopolize energy supply routes to Europe has led consumers of the industrialized world finally to become serious about hydrocarbon alternatives. These developments reveal not only that the dispute surrounding Cyprus is inextricably linked to its geographical context, but also that energy-related conflict and diplomacy shapes the shifting power play of partnerships in the new global geopolitical environment surrounding the Middle East.

Introduction

In May 2015, leaders of the divided island of Cyprus resumed peace talks for reunification under a federal government, visibly raising new hopes to catalyze a resolution to its decades-old dispute. In 2014, unilateral pursuit by Greek, and subsequently Turkish, Cypriots for offshore natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean Sea heightened competition over the delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and legal rights to exploit rich energy resources beneath the seabed. Notably, the proven combined reserves of recoverable hydrocarbons in the Levantine basin could meet the region’s demand for the next 100 years. Furthermore, the Arab Spring that began in 2011 emphasizes the importance of natural gas and the power struggle over energy resources around the Fertile Crescent (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan). The politically motivated unrest in the region coincided with an economic slowdown in Europe, creating diverging push and pull dimensions to interregional relationships and further complicating negotiations in the Cyprus dispute.

Natural Gas and Regional Dynamics

In addition to this tectonic shift in energy geopolitics, Turkey, with a projected use of 70 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year by 2020, has sought to diversify its energy resources geographically, also furthering economic and foreign policy gains. In this context, special attention was given to the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to Athens in December 2014, Opmeng’s remained high that an interim agreement between Greece and Turkey to jointly search for and produce hydrocarbons could serve as a confidence-building measure, providing the perception that time was ripe to revive UN-led peace talks in Cyprus. Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s reciprocal visit to Ankara in November 2015 furthered the notion that a regional benchmark in energy politics had been bestowed upon the Eastern Mediterranean.

The resumption and progression of talks was easier said than done, however. Ensuing political and financial crises in southeastern Europe, on top of deep divisions between Greek and Turkish views of the problem and long-term interests, have rendered a quick and immediate solution unlikely. First, despite the momentum of the ongoing peace talks, national pride is an important psychological factor that influences decisions of the Cypriot polity. Greek Cypriots perceive a creative solution to be a reduction in power that could negatively impact their negotiating position in the recognition and sovereignty of northern Cyprus. Secondly, Cyprus does not have sufficient power to exert influence on Turkey by acting alone, and relies on closer interaction, cooperation, and coalition with Greece, Egypt, and Israel to mitigate this power asymmetry. In December 2015 and January 2016, the group issued declarations in two separate tri-
partite summits backing the Greek Cypriot position to continue engaging in natural gas extraction, production, and exporting activities without a negotiated settlement of the maritime delimitation dispute. The uniting factor between these parties is their desire to develop a common position and enhance their partnership on energy security counts Turkish interests. Nevertheless, “groupthink” around cooperation in making use of hydrocarbons involves overcoming the quadrupartite coalition’s power, reinforces cognitive biases of the Greek Cypriot policy, and contributes entrenchment in its own position.

Since the Greek Cypriot government framed proposals for negotiation with Turkey as gains and became risk-averse, it is inadvertently more comfortable and much less willing to take risks vis-à-vis Turkish Cypriots. Turkey was therefore left with its next best course of action in 2014, to conduct seismic research and hydrocarbon exploration activities on behalf of northern Cyprus in seven EEZ areas that overlap with those demarcated by the Greek Cypriot government. However, since then, Turkey has ended the hydrocarbon research activity on its territorial waters, and one of its seismic vessels, Barbaros Hayreddin Pasa, as a political gesture to end the standoff prior to the re-launch of peace talks between the two communities in May 2015.

The Israeli-Egyptian Connection
Concurrently, 2015 witnessed another geopolitical event that would further alter regional dynamics: Italian gas company Eni’s discovery of 850 bcm of a natural gas reserve in Egypt’s Zohr field 192 miles ashore amounted to the largest to date in the Mediterranean Sea and added a new dimension to regional energy geopolitics. Historically, Egypt had suffered from supply shortage due to expansion of gas-fired power generation capacity and strong growth in electricity demand. If production in Zohr field starts in 2017 as estimated, it will not only fill up underutilized capacity and fulfill Ever-growing Turkish market.

Turkey’s Geopolitical Position
Turkey remains an important player in energy geopolitics, acting first and foremost as a transit country, through its pipeline which connects two natural gas routes between central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. In December 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement to drop the decade-old South Stream pipeline project in favor of Turkey as its preferred partner, for an alternative route, was perceived with joy in some circles. This positive climate hovers on tactical cooperation in large-scale energy projects quickly shifted to a political crisis following Turkey’s downing of a Russian warplane in November 2015. The incident brought Turkey closer to the Euro-Atlantic alliance and reinvigorated its relations with the European Union (EU), enabling intensified dialogue to ensure commitment to common policy objectives and border protection against the flow of Syrian refugees. Furthermore, Greece and Turkey would like to see Cypriot and Israeli natural gas exported via LNG terminals or pipelines across the seabed to mainland Greece, then linked with Greek natural gas pipelines. Turkey, the Ionian Sea, ultimately becoming the energy transit hub for Europe. This is, by and large, contingent upon Greek and Greek Cypriot EEZs having a common maritime boundary. According to Greece, Turkey is the only potential rival actor that can impede such a project because consent of the coastal state is the only potential rival actor that can impede such a project because consent of the coastal state with jurisdiction over the EEZ is required for the delineation of the course for laying pipelines on the continental shelf.

Turkey’s Position
Turkey, contrarily, is a non-signatory to UNCLOS and does not recognize Greek Cypriot EEZ delimitation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel. Ankara claims that as a de facto divided island, the “Republic of Cyprus” (the Greek Cypriot government) cannot represent the interests of northern Cyprus unless the island is reunified with a single EEZ. Ankara is backed by a Russian warplane in November 2015. The incident brought Turkey closer to the Euro-Atlantic alliance and reinvigorated its relations with the European Union (EU), enabling intensified dialogue to ensure commitment to common policy objectives and border protection against the flow of Syrian refugees. Furthermore, Greece and Turkey would like to see Cypriot and Israeli natural gas exported via LNG terminals or pipelines across the seabed to mainland Greece, then linked with Greek natural gas pipelines. Turkey, the Ionian Sea, ultimately becoming the energy transit hub for Europe. This is, by and large, contingent upon Greek and Greek Cypriot EEZs having a common maritime boundary. According to Greece, Turkey is the only potential rival actor that can impede such a project because consent of the coastal state with jurisdiction over the EEZ is required for the delineation of the course for laying pipelines on the continental shelf.

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Cypriot Maritime Dispute
Natural gas now stands as the most important pillar in Turkey’s demand for energy; as the world’s energy supply and demand cartography changes, Turkey emerges both as a major conduit and a heavy importer. Since Turkey is Gazprom’s second largest export destination after Germany, access to alternative sources of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean would decrease its excessive dependence on a friend-turned-foe at a time of heightened tensions. Safe access to high seas and the underlying resources of the seabed are of key significance to sustain its formidable economic growth, and therefore Turkey tries to reap the lion’s share of natural gas trade in order to become a regional powerhouse, energy supplier, and transit hub.

Greek Cypriot Position
For Cyprus, the viability and security of international energy supply projects depends on a just and equitable resolution of the EEZ delimitation dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Greek Cypriot position is essentially based on the claim that the maritime delimitation between mainland Turkey and Cyprus must be done exclusively by the adoption of the equidistance principle irrespective of any “special circumstances” that may exist. According to this view, Cyprus has sovereign right to exercise jurisdiction over its 200-mile wide EEZ around the entire island as per Article 121:2 of the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Greek Cypriot EEZ overlaps the area Turkey claims in five of the thirteen offshore research blocks in the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, Greece would like to see Cypriot and Israeli natural gas exported via LNG terminals or pipelines across the seabed to mainland Greece, then linked with Greek natural gas pipelines. Turkey, the Ionian Sea, ultimately becoming the energy transit hub for Europe. This is, by and large, contingent upon Greek and Greek Cypriot EEZs having a common maritime boundary. According to Greece, Turkey is the only potential rival actor that can impede such a project because consent of the coastal state with jurisdiction over the EEZ is required for the delineation of the course for laying pipelines on the continental shelf.

Recommendation
As a key actor, Turkey should realign its strategy and pursue value-creating maritime negotiations with all littoral states in the region. Polemics, discours, demagoguery, and stereotyping toward key stakeholders will only lessen the chances of reaching a resolution. Since sovereign rights for researching and developing the underwater resources belong to the entire island of Cyprus, excluding Turkish or Turkish Cypriots, Turkey should continue to foster a constructive dialogue whereby parties are more easily invent options for mutual gains and dismiss the illusion of a fixed pie. If Turkey can be part of a brokered peace deal in Cyprus this would strengthen the EU-NA TO partnership, decrease political risk, and increase the affordability of a Cypriot Turkish pipeline project that could be linked with the southern corridor from Azerbaijan to Europe, bypassing Russia. This would present an alternative route over conflict-prone energy corridors such as Kivrikku-Ceyhan, North Africa, and Persian Gulf LNG supplies that face risks from regional instability.

Turkey’s core interest is not in controlling a particular sea area, but to diversify its energy supplies, fuel its expanding economy, have safe access to marine fisheries, and ensure security of Turkish
Cypriots. Likewise, Greek Cypriots’ core interest is not in controlling a particular sea area, but rather to economize on energy resources of the region more efficiently, to sustain the political reconciliation process on the island for a just solution, and to alleviate the perceived threat of Turkey’s military intervention.

Conclusion

International pipeline projects over the Eastern Mediterranean compete to gain feasibility and security appraisals in finding the most cost-effective energy supply route to consumer markets of Europe. This situation has underscored Cyprus’ crucial strategic position and heightened its importance in a power struggle between Qatar, the US, the EU, Turkey, Russia, and Iran to control energy supply routes from east to west. While Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Egypt have committed to increase efforts to mark out their maritime zones, the tendency in Ankara has been to downplay such maneuvers on the assumption that what states do matters a lot more than what they say, and that multilateral negotiations may proceed slowly before conclusive agreement may take place. In light of the new political context, it is crucial for Turkey to change this bilateral negotiation geometry and address the complex and multipartite nature of the maritime dispute, utilizing overall patterns of deference and influence. In an escalating contest for power and strategic influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, undeniably an impasse developing contest for power and strategic influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, undeniably an impasse.

Endnotes

4. Serhat S. Çubukçuoğlu, “The EEZ Delimitation Dispute Between Cyprus and Turkey – Part II,” Tufts University, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1 December 2014.
5. Ibid.
8. “Greece, Cyprus and Israel Eye Tripartite Talks,” Ekathimerini, 10 November 2014.
10. Ibid.

Military intervention after an earthquake. Image taken from Al Djihch Magazine.
A Sexualized and Contradictory Representation of Military Women

A corpus of forty issues from 2011 to 2014 of El DJeich was analyzed in an interpretative textual approach. This includes an examination of what was said about women and the manner in which it was said. Additionally, careful attention was given to the pictures of women. From this research I found the military institution draws a sharp line between males and females, reinforcing gender divisions. It also links masculinity and war.

An exception was found in a special April 2013 issue for women's day titled “PNA: History and Memory of the Fiftieth Anniversary.” There is a woman in military fatigues (land army) from behind. She is standing up, wearing a helmet, with her hair visible and tied back. She is holding a Vickers–Berthier (VB MK1) machine gun. In another picture, titled “Algerian Women: More Than 50 Years of Sacrifices and Abnegation,” there is a woman in military fatigues (land army) from behind. She is lying on her stomach, holding what looks to be a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG7). In another picture, there is a woman in military fatigues (land army) from behind. She is standing up, wearing a helmet, with her hair visible and tied back. She is holding a Vickers–Berthier (VB MK1) machine gun. The main narrative of these rare pictures is to show the ability of women as fighters within the PNA: they can fight, use weapons, and have special skills like men. These representations help negate the army’s male-forward, but similarly, emphasize the “hyper-virile” character of the military institution that is and remains primarily male and martial. A contradiction also exists here, as women are attributed certain qualities in the magazine traditionally associated with men, such as bravery, courage, determination, strength, and stamina.

One has to acknowledge the PNA’s efforts to offer women the same chance to work in the army and be equal with their male counterparts. However, by displaying women less often than men, feminizing them, continuously representing them in passive positions, and eluding imagery of women and warfare, the PNA only reinforces gender division and strengthens the associations between virility, masculinity, and war.

The Traditional Sexual Division of Labor

In the Algerian military, women are recruited based on an equality policy. However, they suffer from a traditional sexual division of labor and a resistance to their full participation in the PNA. According to interview with former military officials, the majority of women occupy subordinate positions. Today, as during the Algerian War of Independence (1954 to 1962), women are still the “aides” of their male counterparts. Indeed, during the War of independence, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and its armed wing, the Armée de Libération Nationale (NAL), advertised heroic images of les pouses de bombes (roughly translated to the “installers of bombs”)—a term used to describe leading female combatants such as Djamilah Bouhired, Hassiba Ben Bouali, and Zohra Drif—in order to present itself as an avant-garde for a progressive audience. Images of combatant women, however, were not the rule, but rather, the exception. Algerian women posing with military outfits and a gun constituted the face of the FLN/ NLA to the outside world, a way of saying “our women are heroes of the revolution against colonialism, and they are not victims of any kind of dominant patriarchy.”

Today, as before, women are only recruited to the army for what are considered “suitable” positions. As explained by a former male lieutenant-colonel explains, “Women do work in different sectors and there is no segregation against them, not at all . . . They have access to all sectors, they can work wherever they want . . . even if they remain localized in female jobs that are more suitable for their nature, you know, like administration, the secretariat or social services or interpretation, also the judicial service . . . but this is their choice.” Based on interviews with former military personnel it can be discerned that the majority of women in the Algerian army are concentrated in the communications department. Some work as switchboard operators, while others serve as map-makers, translators, or data entry personnel. Figures from El DJeich confirm this trend: the army’s information and communications department employs 17 percent of women enlisted in the military and 51 of the civilian women assimilated in the military. The health department employs 17 percent of enlisted women. A substantial portion of enlisted women also work in educational roles as instructors, researchers, or scientists.

As M. Wechsler Segal explains, “The degree of gender segregation in the civilian occupational structure also affects women’s military participation, although the relationship is not linear.” The pattern of minimal women’s participation in the PNA mirrors the trend in the gender division of the national labor force. Indeed, out of 10.7 million employed people in Algeria, 1.9 million are women, or only 18.6 percent. To put that into context, in 2014, women made up 49.7 percent of the country’s total population. Despite women’s open access to the workplace—as a result of mass education with a female youth literacy rate of 80 percent in 2014—their access to decision-making positions is inconsequential. The
military echoes this trend; however, data showing the number of women occupying senior ranks is not available. Nevertheless, it is highly revealing that, on the day when Fatma-Zohra Arijoun became the first woman promoted to general on 5 July 2009, fifty-one men also achieved the same rank.

Women are still over-represented in lower paying positions and concentrated in a few sectors traditionally seen as “feminine.” As such, there is a high proportion of women in health. More than 50 percent of medical maîtres-assistants (assistant professors) are women, and more than forty-eight of paramedics are female. Women constitute even higher proportions in the education sector. In 2011 they accounted for 74.3 percent of those working in pre-primary education, 54.9 percent in primary education, and 39.2 percent in higher education. In the same year, women accounted for 67.9 percent of the employees of the National Radio Staff. They also constitute lower proportions in positions of higher status: there are only 11.4 percent of senior positions (in ministries, as secretaries—generals, director generals, chiefs of ministries, ambassadors, and executives in central government institutions, public bodies, and local authorities) that are occupied by women. In the judiciary sector, women constitute only 24 percent of the Supreme Court, and there is only one female general prosecutor who was appointed in 2014.

"Even in the Military, a Woman is Still a Woman . . . and a Mother Above All"

Based on interviews conducted for this research, another illustration of women’s limited integration in the army is the inequality in training, though the institution leaves it to the women’s discretion to decide which physical exercises to partake in. As one former male PNA colonel states, “If a military woman wants to do the same drills as men, she can do so, but only if she wants to . . . but it is useless . . . because she does not need it. It is up to her. It is also up to the instructor’s personality—if he considers women equal to men, he will ask her to perform the training exactly like the men . . . but he cannot oblige her. Women have the right to decline participation in a drill because they are women. A man cannot have any excuse.”

According to one colonel, in addition to segregation in field exercise, women cannot serve in the infantry, armor, or field artillery branches slated for direct ground combat. One former lieutenant-colonel states, “Women don’t go into combat. It is well-known but not written down because it is bad publicity . . . [Women] don’t participate in combat missions; it is useless to make them do these exercises that they are never going to execute.”

This exclusion is also true in the air force, as women are trained to become pilots, but generally work in transportation units or in flight training. Physiological differences (body composition, strength, and endurance) remain the most cited justification for the segregation. As a male lieutenant colonel states, “Let’s be exact, women are not made the same, it is Mother Nature who decided . . . but this does not mean that there is no equality. There is total equality in the institution, but women have to be protected, so the institution protects them.”

The combat ban reflects traditional, paternalistic attitudes toward women who are excluded from full participation in the military. This paternalism deprives women of the treatment their male counterparts receive, therefore undermining their training and capacities as female soldiers. It also leads to female exclusion from prestigious military positions for which combat experience is the key. There are no explicit regulations governing the field exercise segregation because it would damage the PNA’s projected image of equality. However, according to all interviewees, there are “special arrangements” made for female soldiers.

All interviewees supported the view that women cannot go through the same military training as men because of physical inadequacies, explaining that because of their “delicate nature” women need to be protected. As a retired commandant concludes, “Even in the military, a woman is still a woman . . . and a mother above all.”

Conclusion

Despite the unfinished integration, women’s recruitment to the PNA remains a positive accomplishment, specifically in comparison with the army’s previous stance on the issue and when viewing alongside other regional militaries. The PNA has made important and valuable efforts in recruiting women and acknowledging their rights, but their integration into the military remains incomplete. In order to overcome the gap between the discourse of equality and the reality for women in the military, the PNA needs to start regarding and treating women as full-fledged soldiers and equal members of its institution.

Note: A longer version of this study was published by the Carnegie Middle East Center, as part of the 2014–2015 “Renegotiating Civil-Military Relations in Arab States: Political and Economic Governance in Transition” Project.

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Endnotes

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
16. It should be noted that “labour force” mentioned here describes those working for an industry or company where employment is structured and paid in a formal way. 17. Femme Algérienne en Chiffres (Sidi M’Hamed, Algeria: Centre d’Information et de Documentation sur les Droits de l’Enfant de la Femme, 2014.)
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Women doing computer work. Image taken from Al Djiech Magazine.
The Kurdish Divide: Reshaping of Interests and Actors in Syria’s War

By Joseph Sadek

Abstract

The war in Syria has devastated the country and the violence has bled into neighboring states. As a result, hundreds of thousands have died and millions have fled the country. The forces fueling this conflict come from many sources, each having their own complexities while intertwining with one another. Kurdish armed groups are no exception. Today, while violence between Turkey and its Kurdish population escalates, so too does Kurdish involvement in the war in Syria. The diverse political and military objectives of the Kurds in the region are not conducive for cooperation. The Turkish-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Syrian-based Democratic Union Party (PYD) are one example of the growing divide. As the war in Syria goes on, inter-group objectives and international alliances will produce greater competition and division between Kurdish armed groups.

Introduction

When Kurdish armed groups captured Tel Abyad in June 2015 many feared Kurdish militias were unleashing an ethnic cleansing of Arabs in the Syrian border town. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its paramilitary wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), with assistance from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), were coordinates and conducted a joint operation to retake an important Daesh supply route in a region the Kurds call Rojava in northeastern Syria. By mid-June, the Kurdish militias had captured a strip of land on Syria’s northern border from Kobani (also known as Ain al-Alar) to the Iraqi border (see Figure 1).

While recapturing Tel Abyad was a strategic victory against Daesh, the new reality reveals something much grimmer for Ankara: Turkey now faces a formidable Syrian-Kurdish presence along its southern border. Soon after the Kurdish gains, it became clear that Ankara was doing more than fighting the so-called Islamic State: Turkey’s air campaign was targeting Kurdish armed groups—primarily the PKK, and to an extent, the YPG/YPG. The air campaign ended the possibility of a future peace.

In 2013, Ankara began to take a much more active role in the Syrian War. While the Erdogan government called for Syrian President Bashar al Assad to step down in 2011, it has only recently begun ramping up support to opposition groups—primarily the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Ahwar al-Sham. Ankara’s support for the Syrian opposition was consistent with its 2011 statements, its policy having second-order effects for Syria’s Kurds.

On a number of occasions, the emboldened and predominately Arab Ahwar al Sham and FSA clashed with the PKK and the PYD—especially throughout 2012 and 2013. Although this may not have been the intended consequence of Ankara’s policies, it surely saw Arab-Kurdish clashes in the Turkish state’s interest. Turkey’s intervention on its southern border, amid clashes in northern Syria, only increased over the next two years.

After a series of terrorist attacks in the summer of 2015, Turkish policymakers signaled that it would cooperate evermore closely with the US-led mission to degrade and destroy Daesh. Turkey’s granting of access to Incirlik Air Base was an important contribution to the air campaign. However, it soon became clear that Ankara’s military involvement focused largely on targeting Kurdish-held positions in Tal Abyad and Kobani. By targeting its enemies on the ground, Turkey’s joint air campaign threatened the undoing of US efforts a month earlier that allowed the same Kurdish groups to recapture the two key cities.

The 2015 Turkish Elections

Further contributing to the devolution of Turk- Ish-Kurdish relations, as a result of the aforementioned military campaign, is the political fallout after the electoral losses of the Justice Develop- ment Party (AKP) in Turkey’s 2015 parliamentary election. The elections gave the liberal, Kurdish-led People’s Democratic Party (HDP) thirteen percent of the vote and admittance into the Turkish Parlia- ment (admittance requires a ten percent minimum). After the election, the AKP, the country’s largest bloc, led by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Pres- ident Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was forced to form a coalition government in parliament. The AKP lead- ership was united in its opposition to the Republican People’s Party within the constitution- ally mandated forty-five-day time period. Opti- mists believed that an AKP-HDP coalition might coalesce, but hardliners and political jockeying on both sides made any agreement unlikely. In fact, many believed Erdogan’s party actively campaigned to undermine the HDP, reflecting the deep-seated mistrust that HDP has for the ruling AKP. Most recently, this is reflected in AKP’s campaign to lift immunity from HDP parliamentarians.

The summer 2015 terrorist attacks during the election cycle initially heightened electoral antago- nism as AKP and HDP both seized the opportunity to blame the other for inciting the violence. While HDP leadership had used the occasion of the legisla- tion, top figures in AKP blamed Daesh, the PKK, and radical leftists. Many wonder if the left- ists the AKP was referring to was teh HDP. HDP argued that AKP had let the reigns loose on terror- ists and commingled with the PKK and other leftist organizations. Many wonder if the left- ists the AKP was referring to was teh HDP. HDP and many media outlets believed this to be especially true for the Kurdish Communist center bombing in July 2015. In October, when the investigation of the Ankara peace rally bombing was underway, the PKK publicly announced a ceasefire. The PKK seemed to realize that HDP’s political support was tenuous, which could explain its willingness to ini- tiate a ceasefire.

Erdogan’s party knew the renewed violence would work in AKP’s favor, as his government took steps to harden its position against terrorism, which included more air strikes on Kurdish-held positions in Syria and Iraq. In the November 2015 snap elections, AKP was counting on the Turkish electorate voting for safety and stability to be ushered in by AKP instead of HDP which had been labeled as a destabilizing force. AKP won back a majority in Parliament. HDP lost almost three percent points, but remained above the parliamen- tary threshold of ten percent.

The Turkish political mainstream response to the 2015 elections initiated a second front of engagement between Turkey and its Kurdish citi- zens. For forty years Ankara has dealt with a PKK engagement between Turkey and its Kurdish citi- zens. In the November 2015 snap elections, AKP was counting on the Turkish electorate voting for safety and stability to be ushered in by AKP instead of HDP which had been labeled as a destabilizing force. AKP won back a majority in Parliament. HDP lost almost three percent points, but remained above the parliamen- tary threshold of ten percent.

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An Untenable Approach
The International Crisis Group (ICG) has rightly argued that addressing the Kurdish insurgency requires separating the conflict with the PKK from addressing the legitimate concerns of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens. The ICG also argues that conferring more social and political rights to Kurds is a human rights issue and addressing Kurdish grievances would yield Ankara a better relationship with all of its citizens. Doing so would signal to the Kurds that Ankara is willing to offer real concessions for peace, undermining PKK violence. However, Turkey’s participation in the Syrian war and the strong-armed policies by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the face of the Syrian war. However, the PKK will be able to outlast contemporary groups by moving to Syria and establishing coalitions with Syrian and Iraqi Kurds. The growth of the PKK insurgency led to the formation of the Democratic Union Party (PYD)—the Syrian manifestation of the PKK, which has, today, consolidated itself as a legitimate force combatting Daesh and playing a key role in the American-led coalition.

Today’s Turkey must contend with a profound duality in its relationship with the Kurds, a relationship with both a political and military dimension.

YPG risks damaging its crucial alliance with US coalition forces by extending into Turkey, America’s NATO ally. External geopolitical alliances play an important role in the PYD’s continued arms and logistical support. Washington does (even if superficially) make a distinction between the PYD/YPG and the PKK; one that strengthens the PYD’s position in the war in Syria. vis-à-vis the PKK’s is this distinction. The PYD carefully words its statements regarding regional actors, often claiming that it is not necessarily at war with Turkey, but rather warding off hostile actors. Third, conditions on the ground make the PYD’s focus on Syria more urgent as the expanding threat of Daesh continues. The PKK has been embedded historically in the insurgency against the Turkish State and can easily operate in eastern Turkey from its bases in Iraq and Turkey. Additionally, the PYD/YPG risks having their focus on Syria and northern Iraq. Kurdish fighters would likely superficially ascribe to the PYD label and shift resources to solely fighting the Islamic State. This argument neglects Turkey’s role in the Syrian war, as well as who is providing the Kurds’ fighting material from a resource perspective. Therefore, it makes analytical sense to distinguish the PKK and PYD. The argument, however, forgets that the Turkish military’s shift to addressing the Kurdish insurgency in the country has taken a center stage. Policymakers in Washington and Brussels clearly prioritize the Daesh threat over any other immediate threats Turkey faces. As a result, NATO will distribute resources and aid to groups fighting the Islamic state, demonstrating that Western objectives favor the PYD’s goals over those of the PKK. As the West and Russia prioritize supporting the PYD over other armed groups, these actions will ostracize the PKK, whose political base demands and comparative advantage favors the insurgency in Turkey. This asymmetry in resources will only deepen between the groups and may cause a faster schism between the two. This shift in symmetry would affect the PKK insurgency in several ways. With less resources, the PKK may utilize more crude methods of violence against the Turkish state, including terrorist attacks in the form of suicide bombings, mass shootings, and/or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as proven by 2016 attacks in Ankara. Participation in the Syrian civil war remains another option for PKK operations. However, such a scenario remains doubtful. As stated earlier, the prioritization of positioning PYD forces in Syria means that giving up operational control to the PKK will be unlikely and also unwise. What results as a consequence is a distinct and growing divide between the PKK and the PYD/YPG.

Conclusion
The nature of Turkey’s relationship with Kurdish armed groups has significantly evolved over the last forty years. The birth of the Turkish Republic brought with it the ideals of a dominant Turkish identity, as defined by Kemal Mustafa and the Republic elite. These ideals excluded the opportunity of Kurdish cultural and linguistic expression and canonicalized hope for Kurdish autonomy. The subsequent rise of the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) was a result of Turkey’s policies towards its Kurdish citizens while the PKK insurgency provoked military coups throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Escalation of operations into Turkey? Most likely, the answer will be no. This is where PKKYPD divergence becomes clear. The PYDYPG will remain focused in Syria, while the PKK continues its insurgency in eastern Turkey due to separate priorities and goals.

In late 2015, it became clear that Turkey would constitute the PKK’s sphere of operations for four reasons. First, the PKK has been embedded historically in the insurgency against the Turkish State and can easily operate in eastern Turkey from its bases in Iraq and Turkey. Additionally, the PYD/YPG risks having their focus on Syria and northern Iraq. Kurdish fighters would likely superficially ascribe to the PYD label and shift resources to solely fighting the Islamic State. This argument neglects Turkey’s role in the Syrian war, as well as who is providing the Kurds’ fighting material from a resource perspective. Therefore, it makes analytical sense to distinguish the PKK and PYD. The argument, however, forgets that the Turkish military’s shift to addressing the Kurdish insurgency in the country has taken a center stage. Policymakers in Washington and Brussels clearly prioritize the Daesh threat over any other immediate threats Turkey faces. As a result, NATO will distribute resources and aid to groups fighting the Islamic state, demonstrating that Western objectives favor the PYD’s goals over those of the PKK. As the West and Russia prioritize supporting the PYD over other armed groups, these actions will ostracize the PKK, whose political base demands and comparative advantage favors the insurgency in Turkey. This asymmetry in resources will only deepen between the groups and may cause a faster schism between the two. This shift in symmetry would affect the PKK insurgency in several ways. With less resources, the PKK may utilize more crude methods of violence against the Turkish state, including terrorist attacks in the form of suicide bombings, mass shootings, and/or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as proven by 2016 attacks in Ankara. Participation in the Syrian civil war remains another option for PKK operations. However, such a scenario remains doubtful. As stated earlier, the prioritization of positioning PYD forces in Syria means that giving up operational control to the PKK will be unlikely and also unwise. What results as a consequence is a distinct and growing divide between the PKK and the PYD/YPG.

Conclusion
The nature of Turkey’s relationship with Kurdish armed groups has significantly evolved over the last forty years. The birth of the Turkish Republic
Radicalization in Context: Understanding and Addressing the Path Toward Violent Extremism

By Lauren Fisher

Abstract
Research on violent extremism often conflates two common phrases: X factor is the cause of radicalization in Y country, and Y factor is the primary cause of radicalization in Y country. The latter recognizes radicalization as a fusion of multiple factors, while the former incorrectly suggests that individuals follow a fixed path toward extremism. As radicalization increasingly threatens communities across the globe, security officials have created formulas to help identify the individuals most likely to carry out acts of violent extremism. However, such models are destined fail if they do not contextualize the process of radicalization from the vantage point of the radical individual. The following think piece reviews existing individual-centered models put forth by leading political scientists Marc Sageman, Tore Bjørgo, Tinka Velthuis, and John Horgan, and Jorgen Staun. It also explores a variety of factors at the micro- and macro-levels that can influence an individual’s process of radicalization.

Introduction
In order to understand how individuals become extremists, scholars must consider the process of radicalization from the vantage point of the radical, examining the interplay between multiple layers of influence at the micro- and macro-levels. This requires exploring the degree to which psychological, social, economic, and political factors affect an individual’s perception of the world. Failure to use an individual-centered approach to understand radicalization has led policymakers to work backward, projecting false generalizations about extremism onto an entire identity group. Failure to use an individual-centered approach to understand radicalization has led policymakers to work backward, projecting false generalizations about extremism onto an entire identity group. Such generalizations may explain why some individuals radicalize, but they fail to explain why the majority of individuals—under the same circumstances—do not.

This work functions as both a think piece and a literature review. It explores how leading theories of radicalization can function in concert with one other to illuminate the complexity of radicalization amid a public discourse that often attempts to simplify the subject. To do this, I will examine some elements on the micro- and macro-levels that could affect an individual’s process of radicalization, referred to in this piece as “drivers of radicalization.” Because the path toward extremism is unique to each individual, the drivers of radicalization explored in this work are neither exclusive nor exhaustive.

Micro-Level Drivers of Radicalization
Social Networks
One of the oft-cited theories of radicalization is that social networks drive individuals to join extremist groups. Such is the case in the theory put forth by Marc Sageman in his book Leaderless Jihad. Sageman notes that interpersonal drivers of radicalization typically fall into one of two subcategories: collective radicalization with friends into an extremist group, or individual radicalization because of a friend already in an extremist group. Sageman terms the first type of social radicalization the “Bunches of Guys” theory, which argues that entire groups of friends can undergo a gradual process of radicalization if they isolate themselves from the mainstream and reinforce each other’s radical opinions. Al-Qaeda’s Hamburg cell, which ultimately helped carry out the September 11 terrorist attacks, is an example of this process. Al-Qaeda’s Hamburg cell consisted of four Middle Eastern students studying in Hamburg, Germany who sought comfort in their shared cultural background. As the group spent less time in the mainstream student community, they began intensifying and reinforcing each other’s radical beliefs. Eventually, when the group traveled to Afghanistan to join Al-Qaeda, it was not “the path of a lone individual, as often portrayed in the press; it was [..]
The second type of social network radicalization refers to individuals who radicalize because of personal connections with existing members of extremist groups. Within diaspora communities, immigrants tend to drift toward acquaintances, friends, or family members from their own coun-
tries of origin. If these acquaintances are already involved in a radical network, they can sway new-
comers into said groups. Such is the case with those who carried out the Madrid bombings: five of the seven bombers had been childhood friends in Morocco before moving to Europe. This particular case challenges the common misconception that individuals become involved in radical networks because of a lack of interpersonal relationships. If social networks are primary drivers to radical groups then radicals are not strangers united by ideological worldviews; instead, they are teammates, neighbors, and family friends.

In order to understand how individuals become extremists, scholars must consider the process of radicalization from the vantage point of the radical, examining the interplay between multiple layers of influence at the micro- and macro-levels.

**Psychological Perceptions**

Authors John Horgan and Tore Bjørgo believe radicalization is more influenced by psychological factors than by social ones. In his book Leaving Terrorism Behind, Bjørgo advocates for the rational choice model, which argues that individuals undergo a subconscious cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether or not to join extremist groups. Because radical groups are characterized by ideological conformity, individuals who experience political grievance often feel the other's suffering as if it were his or her own and are thus susceptible to vigilantism. For Sanae, political grievance led her to seek out radical leaders who shared her political extreme outrage.

Conversely, Sanae's sister, Imane, felt no psychological affinity for al-Dura. However, because she was so closely connected to her sister, Imane joined in meeting with Hassan Chaouni, a radical leader, at a community mosque. Through her relationship with her sister, Imane also radicalized, joining a plotted suicide attack against the Moroccan Parliament, even though she lacked the same political ideology that inspired her sister to turn toward violent extremism. Sanae's primary driver—political grievance—was primarily psychological, while her sister's was primarily social.

It is important to remember that primary drivers alone do not turn everyday people into radicals. This is the difference between claiming that X causes radicalization and claiming that X is the primary cause of radicalization. The former incorrectly assumes that radicalization is the result of a single factor. The latter acknowledges that a primary driver represents the most salient of multiple micro- and macro-level factors that lead an individual to radicalize. Social networks and political grievances functioned as Sanae's and Imane's primary drivers of radicalization. However, the two teenagers chose to engage in violent extremism because those primary drivers were compounded by a variety of secondary drivers at both the macro- and micro-levels, mostly centered on their family structure.

At the micro-level, the Laghriss twins suffered from a broken family structure and cyclical poverty. They had no father figure and regularly moved homes because their mother was unable to care for them. This likely created a psychological search for stable, family-like relationships that they found in Chaouni. Sanae also grew up reading Arabic newspapers from the Middle East with her aunt and uncle, whom she loved; this may have created a positive psychological connotation that resonated with her radical teachings at the Al Walda mosque. Understanding the broader context of the Laghriss twins helps reveal why these two girls were susceptible to violent extremism, while other teens living under similar conditions remained impenetrable.

**Macro-Level Factors in the Individual-Centered Model**

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An individual-centered model should not be one that focuses exclusively on micro-level factors. By proportionately focusing on drivers at the macro-level, it is the most difficult variable to quantify. This is dangerous, as extremists might think they have joined a group for a certain reason and then, because they were sold something different, begin to doubt their psychological state of the individual. Undoubtedly plays a significant role in the process of radicalization, it is the most difficult variable to quantify.

Concurrent Factors at the Micro-Level

Although authors tend to emphasize either social or psychological paradigms for understanding radicalization, the Laghriss twins' 2003 suicide attack plot in Rabat, Morocco, is the concurrent presence of both models. Sanae Laghriss, one of the twins, began radicalizing after witnessing a TV report citing the death of Palestinian Mohamed al-Dura, who was violently killed by Israeli soldiers. Sanae's reaction to the event is an example of political grievance: a severe psychological association with someone else's suffering. Individuals who experience political grievance often feel the other's suffering as if it were his or her own and are thus susceptible to vigilantism. For Sanae, political grievance led her to seek out radical leaders who shared her political extreme outrage.

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**Macro-Level Drivers: The Afghanistan Case**

While proponents of individualist models tend to focus primarily on drivers at the micro-level, conditions at the macro-level can also serve as primary drivers in an individual's path to radicalization. Such is the case in Afghanistan's tribal regions. The case of Afghanistan demonstrates the phenomenon that counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen calls the "accidental guerrilla," a situation in which military intervention intended to curb extremist activity disproportionately extends the fight. The phenomenon occurs in a multi-stage cycle in which radical extremists embed themselves in local communities, incite US intervention, and then exploit the backlash to generate supporters. Following US intervention in Afghanistan, moderate community members began "fighting alongside extremist forces not because they support[ed] takfiri [religious Muslims who accuse other Muslims of apostasy] ideology, but because they oppos[ed] the US military presence alone did not cause a rise of violent extremism in Afghanistan. If that were the case, the global community should expect to see proliferation of terrorism in all regions where the United States stations troops. However, this is not the case. The rise of radicalization in Afghanistan, therefore, must be contextualized with the secondary drivers at play in order to fully understand how the process is unique to each person.

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pushed individuals to join radical groups. First and foremost, extremist groups like the Taliban already had strong footholds in tribal areas of Afghanistan prior to American intervention, rendering the area particularly vulnerable to radicalization.

In order to most effectively combat the growing threat of terror, policymakers and academics must maintain a flexible approach to violent extremism. Instead of trying to create a one-size-fits-all formula for understanding radicalization, they should grow their understandings of what factors at the micro- and macro-levels can be formative in moving individuals away from mainstream society.

Furthermore, poor governance, rapidly expanding narcotics trade, and a weak economy—all macro-level factors—functioned as secondary drivers. In ungoverned areas with limited public goods, groups like the Taliban provide education where the state does not. Afghan living in rural areas may have therefore been more receptive to the Taliban because it filled an economic need in the absence of basic government services.

On the micro-level, radicals embedded themselves in host communities by setting up small business, forming friendships with community members, and marrying locals. This interpersonal infiltration likely facilitated group membership through the social network theories discussed earlier. On the psychological level, personal experiences with death and violence, especially those at the hands of American troops, helped facilitate radicalization among the affected population. With shared political interests and personal connections to radical groups were not decisive in the rise of Afghanistan’s Taliban, they contextualize the driving variable in a way that may help to explain why US military presence fueled extremism in Afghanistan but not necessarily in other nations.

The Age of the Internet

Since the rise of the Internet, online platforms have created virtual spaces where individuals can radicalize from the comfort of their own homes. Though the Internet itself is not a driver of radicalization, it plays a key role in facilitating contemporary radicalization through two primary channels: it creates virtual social networks through chat rooms and makes information available on how to carry out acts of violence without ever having to join an extremist group.

Online radical communities, often in the form of semi-private chat rooms, represent a fusion of the social networks and rational choice theories discussed earlier in this piece. Individuals who feel isolated from their “RL” (real life) communities may join chat rooms seeking a sense of belonging. Such is the case with a twenty-three-year-old American woman who spent hours each day chatting online with ISIS members because she was frequently by herself, and “they [ISIS members] were online all the time.” Once inside chat forums, individuals may succumb to Sageman’s “Bunches of Guys” theory: chat room members can network and validate each other’s thoughts, creating an echo chamber where existing radicals (who can serve as forum moderators) remotely inject radical ideas.

In addition to creating virtual social spheres, the Internet allows individuals interested in carrying out acts of violence to do so in the name of radical ideology without necessarily believing in the ideology or having actual membership in a radical group. Such is the case of the Tsaarna brothers, because it filled an economic need in the absence of basic government services.

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Lauren Fisher began studying political science at Colby College, where she received her BA in government. During her time at Colby, she published an article about Jewish violent extremism in the Fall Sigma Alpha Journal of Political Science. After receiving her BA, Fisher went on to complete her MA in security and diplomacy at Tel Aviv University in Israel. Throughout her graduate coursework, Fisher focused much of her research on Al-Qaeda and Islamic radicalization. Fisher served as a research assistant at the International Institute of Counterterrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel. Her research with the ICT culminated in a published report analyzing the threat of Islamic radicalization in the state of Maine. After living in Israel for two years, Fisher has returned to her hometown of Boston, Massachusetts, working as an educator in teen leadership.

Endnotes

1. For the purpose of this work, the term “primary driver” will refer to the most decisive condition in an individual’s path towards extremism. The term “secondary driver” will refer to any complimentary factor that contributes to the radicalization process, though it may not be the most pivotal.
5. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
Against Apartheid: The Case for Boycotting Israeli Universities Book Review
By Adi Saleem Bharat


Ashley Dawson and Bill Mullen’s edited essay collection is a timely contribution to the ongoing debate surrounding academic boycott of Israeli universities. Against Apartheid opens with a foreword by Ali Abuminah, followed by an introduction by the editors. The book is then divided into five sections. In his foreword, Abuminah states, “the struggle for a just solution of the conflict in Palestine has heightened a bigger existential crisis at universities.” This existential crisis, according to Abuminah, is over whether universities can remain “safe zones for academic dissent, critical scholarship, and innovation.” In their introduction, Ashley Dawson and Bill Mullen describe the book as “a tool, a guidebook, and a living chronicle [of the BDS movement].” For Dawson and Mullen, like Abuminah, that is a larger project beyond challenging Israeli apartheid, namely, “building a wider left resistance in our neoliberal times.” They also explain the use of the term “apartheid” as applied to Israel. While they “analyze the conditions in the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel to those in South Africa during the apartheid era,” they do not mean to imply that the situations are similar. The editors admit significant differences between apartheid South Africa and Israel, but insist that “these differences should not obscure their fundamental similarities.” Dawson and Mullen then briefly describe the complicity of Israeli academic institutions with the actions of their government, before charting the trajectory of academic boycotts since 2003.

In the first section of Against Apartheid, “From the Front Lines: Palestinian Scholars Make the Case for Academic Boycott,” four Palestinian scholars describe firsthand the limitations and restrictions imposed upon Palestinian academics, as well as the complicity of Israeli universities in this and in the occupation. The second section, “Tackling on the Settler-Colonial University: Academic Boycott and Academic Freedom,” comprises chapters that attempt to demonstrate the efficacy of boycott and to further explain the reasons for “singing out” Israel. David Lloyd and Malini Johar Schueller, for example, write in “The Israeli State of Exception and the Case of Academic Boycott” that “it is because Israel is constantly distinguished or singled out from other nations, particularly in the United States, that a BDS campaign is justified.” Additionally, the chapters in this section challenge the absolutist approach to academic freedom. The third section, “The Academic Boycott of Israeli Universities in Historical Context,” aims to historicize the subject at hand. Like the other chapters in this section, Ian Pappo’s “The Boycott Will Work: An Israeli Perspective” draws upon historical progressions since 1948 to argue that pressure from the outside is necessary in order to successfully coerce a paradigm shift that would lead to “finding a formula for joint living.”

Section four, “Students and Scholars in the Struggle, Under Attack,” describes the ways in which universities repress BDS activity on campuses. The last section, “New Horizons for the Academic Boycott Movement,” is a look to the future. Inter alia, the chapters in this section aim to underscore the notion that academic boycotts, and BDS in general, are not to be ends unto themselves, but rather means to an end. Unfortunately, it is not always clear what that end is envisioned. In this section, Joseph Massad’s “Recognizing Palestine, BDS, and the Survival of Israel” implicitly rejects the two-state solution and troublingly seems to favor, not merely the end of the occupation, but the end of Israel itself.

For different reasons, a few chapters in particular deserve to be brought to attention. Lisa Taraki’s “The Complicity of the Israeli Academy in the Structures of Domination and State Violence” makes the case for academic boycott by describing the complicity of Israeli academics and academic institutions in Israeli state policies that negatively impact Palestinians. Her main point is that, while there are “disident” Israeli academics, the Israeli academy is structurally complicit in state violence against Palestinians. Taraki discusses the careers of three Israeli academics, namely Yehoshafat Haraki, Menahem Milson, and Shlomo Gazit, in order to demonstrate that the “Israeli university leadership […] does not find anything morally amiss in appointing to top posts individuals known to have supervised and designed repressive measures and persistently committed violations of international humanitarian law against Palestinians in their other careers as military and intelligence functionaries.” She goes on to explain that this is not a thing of the past and that “a quick review of the names of the founders, directors, or staff of these institutes shows that they have had careers with the Israeli military and intelligence establishment.” Taraki then challenges the claim that academic boycott “punishes one of the most antiestablishment communities in Israel, namely Israeli academics.” This, she writes, is a seriously flawed depiction. According to Taraki, the only times Israeli academics have taken a stand, they’ve released statements and resolutions that were “so general as to lose any academic message.” At the end of her chapter, Taraki acknowledges that “this does not mean that there are no dissident academics in Israel [but] the fact remains that the Israeli academy as an institution is complicit in violations of international law, grave violations of international humanitarian law, and outright war crimes.”

Rima Najjar Kapitan’s “Climbing Down From the Ivory Tower: Double Standards and the Use of Academic Boycotts to Achieve Social and Economic Justice” highlights the possible double standards of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). She notes that in another international case (i.e. Singapore) the AAUP suggested the use of academic boycott was “not only a right but an obligation.” In the case of the establishment of a Yale campus in Singapore—a country with a problematic human rights record—the AAUP had voiced concerns over Yale’s collaboration with Singapore. This is in contrast to the anti-boycott stance the AAUP has taken with regards to Israel. As Kapitan writes, “[AAUP] concerns stemmed partly from a worry that the establishment of the campus might aggravate existing cultural implica- tions” because it would entail directly assisting the Singapore government in achieving greater financial strength and cultural legitimacy.” For the AAUP, Yale has the obligation to avoid legitimizing countries with “odious” laws. By bringing up this international case, Kapitan makes a persuasive argument about the exception that seems to be made for Israel by some of those who position themselves as defenders of academic freedom. She unfortunately undercuts her argument by employing a strange analogy:

The University of Illinois might choose to establish a joint degree program with the University of Edinburgh but not the University of Glasgow, but that would not violate the academic freedom of the professors at a third, unrelated university is much different from American institutions choosing to boycott all Israeli universities. Kapitan is making this comparison in order to differentiate between academic entitlement and academic freedom. Her point is that those who disagree with a blanket boycott of Israeli universities are confusing entitlement with freedom. Indeed, in her hypothetical case, the professors of Glasgow would be allowed to take action over Edinburgh’s collaboration with Edinburgh. But this is not the same as a general boycott of Israeli institutions.

Yet between Mohsen’s “Standing for Justice: Challenges and Victories of Students for Justice in Palestine” must also be mentioned since it is a contribution that only tangentially deals with the subject of the book: making the case for academic boycott. Instead, Mohsen writes about her childhood in America before going on to make debatable claims and unproven assertions. One such assertion is that Israel is currently carrying out “ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians.” One could indeed make the case that the nature of the occupation, with its ever-expanding settlements, calls into mind aspects of ethnic cleansing, but Mohsen does not make this argument. Rather, she states it as a fact without attempting to substantiate her claim. Assertions without substantiation are, unfortunately, symptomatic of Mohsen’s contribution. Another example is her claim that “the recent hypermilitarization of police in the United States” is tied into its “true nature” because it would entail directly “assist[ing] the Singapore government in achieving greater financial strength and cultural legitimacy.” For the AAUP, Yale has the obligation to avoid legitimizing countries with “odious” laws. By bringing up this international case, Kapitan makes a persuasive argument about the exception that seems to be made for Israel by some of those who position themselves as defenders of academic freedom. She unfortunately undercuts her argument by employing a strange analogy:

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Yet between Mohsen’s “Standing for Justice: Challenges and Victories of Students for Justice in Palestine” must also be mentioned since it is a contribution that only tangentially deals with the subject of the book: making the case for academic boycott. Instead, Mohsen writes about her childhood in America before going on to make debatable claims and unproven assertions. One such assertion is that Israel is currently carrying out “ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians.” One could indeed make the case that the nature of the occupation, with its ever-expanding settlements, calls into mind aspects of ethnic cleansing, but Mohsen does not make this argument. Rather, she states it as a fact without attempting to substantiate her claim. Assertions without substantiation are, unfortunately, symptomatic of Mohsen’s contribution. Another example is her claim that “the recent hypermilitarization of police in the United States” is tied into its “true nature” because it would entail directly “assist[ing] the Singapore government in achieving greater financial strength and cultural legitimacy.” For the AAUP, Yale has the obligation to avoid legitimizing countries with “odious” laws. By bringing up this international case, Kapitan makes a persuasive argument about the exception that seems to be made for Israel by some of those who position themselves as defenders of academic freedom.
though the latter group was very keen to collabo-
rate. She explains how the CSI Hillel was “eager to
work with us, regardless of our differing political
stares.” Mohsen and the CSI SJP however, were
not as eager and declined, citing their “political dif-
fences” and their “stance of antinormalization.”
Unfortunately, Mohsen does not clearly explain the
exact circumstances of the collaboration the CSI
Hillel had in mind. If it were merely a discussion or
debate, for example, it would be unfortunate that “political differences” were an impediment.
Similarly, if “antinormalization” impedes all inter-
actions between two groups of people, how can any
meaningful dialogue ever take place? In any case,
even though Mohsen claims to have explained her
stance of antinormalization to the vice president
of student affairs (who was also keen to see a SJP-
Hillel collaboration),

Mohsen does not explain “antinormalization”
in her chapter. Instead, she tells us what she told
the CSI vice president of student affairs: that SJP
working with Hillel would be akin to “a climate
change club” working with climate change deniers,
or an LGBTQ group working with a homophobic
organization. Of course, she does not clarify what
working means in these contexts and, especially,
in the non-hypothetical context of Hillel reaching
out to SJP. If, by working together, she means the
holding of some kind of dialogue, then it is regret-
table that no such dialogue did take place due to
ambiguous notions of “political differences” and
“antinormalization.”

While Mohsen’s essay deserves some merit for
highlighting some of the difficulties that SJP chap-
ters at CUNY and other likeminded students face
from the CUNY administration, her case is diluted
by inconsequential paragraphs on her childhood,
unsubstantiated assertions, and a general confusion
over causality and correlation. As an example, she
writes, “the fact that university administrations are
trying so hard to silence us means that we are doing
something right.” This, of course, is not necessarily
so.

While there have been numerous books written
both in favor and against BDS, there had not been,
until recently, books written precisely about the
question of academic boycott of Israeli universities.
In November 2014, Cary Nelson and Gabriel Noah
Brahm edited the essay collection The Case Against
Academic Boycotts of Israel. The following year, in
October 2015, Against Apartheid was published.
Considering the similarity in title, it is likely that
Against Apartheid was conceived as a response to
the former. Unfortunately, remarkably few chap-
ters in Against Apartheid directly address points
made in Nelson and Brahms’s collection.

In general, Against Apartheid reads as a mono-
logue that only briefly attempts to discuss or chal-
denge opposing views. This is in stark contrast to
Nelson and Brahm’s collection, which devotes at
least 253 pages to discussing and challenging dis-
senting viewpoints. This is only one of the dis-
appointing aspects of Against Apartheid, whose
contributors, as we have seen, occasionally employ
shaky metaphors and unclear terminology, while
demonstrating a hesitancy to avoid the proposed
subject of the collection.

A case in point regarding the confusion over ter-
mologv is how Andrew Ross’s “The Wall is Crum-
b1ing: Will Labor Follow the Universities?” states
that boycotts are tactics and not strategies. Mas-
sad’s piece, on the other hand, claims boycotts are,
in fact, strategies. Neither author however, explains
the difference between strategy and tactic. Never-
theless—and despite failing to convincingly make
the case for a general boycott of Israeli universi-
ties—Against Apartheid has the merit of making a
number of strong points in favor of their argument
that will impact both the debate on academic boy-
cott and the larger debate on BDS.

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Endnotes
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All submissions must be formatted in Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx) following the Chicago Manual of Style guidelines with citations provided as endnotes. All figures, tables, and charts must be submitted as separate, high-resolution files. Please submit a cover letter with your name, title, and affiliation; mailing address; e-mail address; and daytime phone number. All work must be submitted to jmepp@hks.harvard.edu.

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