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Dean’s Welcome

It is my privilege to introduce the seventh volume of the Kennedy School Review. Launched in 2000 as a student-run general interest public policy journal to showcase the talent of emerging leaders in public service, the Kennedy School Review reflects the depth and diversity of thought and academic excellence that the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University strives to achieve.

The journal’s publication is the culmination of a yearlong editorial process, carried out entirely by our master’s degree candidates. Kennedy School students not only comprise the entire staff of the journal, they also provide all of its content. The publication of this volume is a particularly notable achievement as the entire staff, including both co-editors-in-chief, was new to the journal. While dedicated to maintaining the same level of academic excellence as in years past, the editors sought to make this year’s journal more engaging and accessible to a wider audience.

In past years, the editors of the Kennedy School Review had set a theme relevant to a specific policy issue during the year of publication. This year, however, the editors recognized several major issues of global importance on the world stage. Their decision to broaden their coverage has produced content that is diverse in focus, timely, and engaging. This volume explores creative ways of addressing issues such as corruption, climate change, and human trafficking, and also illustrates how strategies like grassroots politics and e-governance can improve societies in both industrialized and developing countries. Engaging interviews with former child soldier and best-selling author, Ishmael Beah, and award-winning media producer and communications strategist Mark McKinnon are also included. Commentaries, book reviews, and photo essays round out the journal’s content, all of which I hope will provide for a thoroughly valuable reading experience.

The journal reflects the insights and perceptions of an exceptional student body drawn from more than eighty different countries. Its present volume reflects their commitment to both rigorous thought and to public service.

David T. Ellwood
Dean
Editorial Introduction

The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University comprises diverse, engaged young people from all over the world who share a commitment to solving public problems. As the school’s only generalist public policy journal, the *Kennedy School Review* aspires to reflect the school’s dynamic culture by publishing the freshest ideas and innovations of the student body.

This year, we have sought to do that in new ways. While the *Review* has always successfully showcased the academic talents of Kennedy School students, we wanted to highlight their diversity, creativity, and the practical nature of their experiences. Thus, we have published photo essays that give a visual perspective on three important global policy issues: child slavery in India, the plight of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and the aftermath of the Srebrenica massacre in Serbia. “There Are No Friendlies” outlines a personal perspective on immigration in America, and “That Old Village Religion” gives a creative account of life as a Peace Corps volunteer—an experience common to many Kennedy School students.

At the same time, we have published a selection of the important academic work taking place at the school. “Four Steps to Understand, Cure, and Prevent Corruption” reports the progress of Kennedy School students who, working closely with the World Bank, have developed a system of corruption prevention based in game theory. “Addressing the Human Trafficking Crisis through Social Entrepreneurship” posits strategies to solve this incredibly important policy problem utilizing principles of social entrepreneurship. “Memo to Tomorrow’s Policy Makers: Let the Art In!” makes the case for a stronger focus on the arts as a solution to policy problems, and “Plan B in Iraq: Beyond the Surge: Keeping the Military Relevant in an Asymmetric World” gives a soldier’s view on military alternatives to the United States’ current approach in Iraq.

Many of our student body are directly engaged with the political process. Hence, “New Frontiers in Fighting Climate Change” outlines a fresh perspective on the political challenges inherent in this policy issue; “Pointing Guns in a New Direction: The NRA at a Crossroads” suggests a new political direction for the NRA; “Building a Decentralized Machine: The New Grassroots Politics” details recent developments in creating grassroots political movements. “Citizen-centric E-government: The Next Frontier” examines e-governance models in operation around the world, and “Innovation in Learning and Beyond: Introducing a $100 Laptop through Public-Private Partnerships” considers a new approach to financing the $100 laptop program.

One of our student book reviewers examined the work of British Chancellor Gordon Brown in “Man Out of Time.” New approaches to policy analysis were reviewed in “Stripping Off the Straightjacket: How Complexity Theory Provides a Whole New Approach to Making Policy.” We reviewed *A Long Way Gone: Memoirs*
of *a Boy Soldier* and interviewed the author, Ishmael Beah, when he recently visited the Kennedy School. Mark McKinnon, a fellow at the Kennedy School’s Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, took the time to share his views on current political events with *Review* staff.

The breadth, quality, and creativity of the pieces published in this year’s journal is something that the authors and the editorial and publishing staff of the *Kennedy School Review* are proud of. Students defined the content, wrote the pieces, and edited the journal. They raised the funds, designed the cover and layout, and provided the pen drawings that sit alongside several of the pieces. The students who volunteered their time to the journal did so with commitment and energy. As a staff, we saw the journal as a very small way in which we could make a contribution to raising awareness about, and finding solutions to, some of the problems we face as current and future policy makers from around the world. When it comes down to it, making such a contribution is what the Kennedy School is all about.

**Naveed Malik**
Co-Editor-in-Chief

**Clare O’Neil**
Co-Editor-in-Chief
Acknowledgments

At the time of our appointment as co-editors-in-chief, the two of us were new not only to the Kennedy School Review, but to the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University itself. We fully knew the monumental task of reviving the Kennedy School Review could not possibly be accomplished through our efforts alone. Consequently, we leaned heavily on Christine Connare, our former publisher, in the first months of our work and found her gracious and helpful at every step. We also owe a debt of gratitude to Jen Smetana, our current publisher, to Professor Richard Parker, our faculty adviser, and to David T. Ellwood, dean of the Kennedy School.

The generosity of the Kennedy School Student Government and the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy made publication of this volume possible.

Most of all we are thankful for our fellow Kennedy School students, thirty of whom comprised our staff—the largest in the Review’s history. The entire staff was in fact new to the journal, but persevered and, in the end, delivered. Kennedy School students have always served as this journal’s talented writer base and inspiration. Not only did they make this year’s volume a reality, but in coming years, their dedicated efforts will take the Kennedy School Review to new heights.
Kennedy School Review

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Interview with Ishmael Beah


Naveed Malik had the pleasure of interviewing Beah at that time. We are grateful to Andrea Rossi, a visiting fellow from UNICEF, who arranged for the personal meeting.

A review of A Long Way Gone follows this interview.

KS

Ishmael, in reading your book, I was struck by the number of instances in which your cassettes of American music got you out of trouble. Do you still listen to hip-hop today?

Beah

Yes, I still do love and listen to hip-hop.

KS

Who are your favorite artists?

Beah

Mostly old school and underground hip-hop, but there are some emcees that I still regard highly; Common, Mos Def, Talib Kweli, and Outkast are a few.

KS

Can you tell us about your first trip back to Sierra Leone?

Beah

I went back to Sierra Leone—home—in June of 2006. I left in 1997 and this was my first trip back. I traveled with people from VH1 and Article 19 films who were making a documentary called Bling: A Planet Rock that aimed at educating American rappers about the war, the blood diamond trade that fueled the war, and generally intro-
Introducing them to the people and culture of Sierra Leone. We took with us there musicians: Raekwon from the Wu-Tang Clan, Tego Calderon, and Paul Wall. My role was to bridge the two cultures since I have lived in both and have a strong interest in hip-hop music. We visited Freetown, the capital, and went to Kono, the diamond area.

KSR
Did you learn the whereabouts of any of your friends mentioned in the book?

Beah
A lot of them didn’t survive the war, but some did and I have been able to reconnect with them. Some live abroad and others still back home in Sierra Leone, where I was able to find them during my visit.

KSR
Do you still have flashbacks from the war?

I have come to use my memories and experiences from that war as instructional tools that guide me to live in peace and appreciate my second life, as I like to think of it.

Beah
I still carry memories from that war that bring me flashbacks and nightmares. But I have learned to live with them, to fully understand and transform them so that they no longer disturb me as they used to. I have come to use my memories and experiences from that war as instructional tools that guide me to live in peace and appreciate my second life, as I like to think of it.

KSR
In your second life, where is home?

Beah
I intend to live in both America and Sierra Leone. Regardless of what happened in Sierra Leone, it is my home; it is where I received the early traditional and cultural upbringing that shaped my identity and taught me a deep understanding of life that gave me the strength to be able to heal from that war. As much as I love Sierra Leone, however, there are certain opportunities that I can’t get there. For example, I can’t currently be a writer in Sierra Leone. So for this reason I stay in the United States. However, I will do whatever I can to contribute to the future of my nation.
KSR
To that end, can you tell us about the Ishmael Beah Foundation?

Beah
The Ishmael Beah Foundation, which is now incorporated and should have a Web site up and running soon, will provide educational and vocational opportunities for children whose lives have been affected by war during and after the rehabilitation process so as to prevent them from reentering a life of violence. The foundation will provide financial support for local organizations that are already doing this work and will create programs to do follow-up work after children leave the rehabilitation centers. The foundation's initial work will start in Sierra Leone, and we will then expand to other nations.

KSR
I take it you want to write more. What ideas do you have for the next book?

Beah
I already have a few chapters of my first novel, but it is still too early to discuss it in much detail. I have also received another interesting request a lot after readings: people want to know how I got here as my current book ends when I am still in Africa. So there is a tremendous interest in a sequel. I am not sure which will come first, the novel or the sequel.

KSR
You've already accomplished a great deal through the book and your advocacy work. What about people who don't have your incredible personal story and might not be able to reach and affect people as you do? What is the best course of action we can take to advance this issue?

Beah
Firstly, I hope that this book will compel individuals to want to find out more about the issue because, through this, they will be able to find organizations that they can support to prevent this issue, places they can volunteer to work, and a whole host of other options. Second, I believe that advocacy is very important as it serves as a constant reminder for people to pay attention to a continuing problem. Advocacy will also push individuals to empower themselves with more information about the issue, so that they will be in a position to pressure their governments to work toward the prevention of the use of children in war—governments that are both affected and not affected.
The number of children currently in armed conflict is estimated between three hundred thousand and half a million. In which parts of the world is the problem of child soldiers the worst today?

Beah
There are so many, but a few countries are Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar, and so on. It is a worldwide problem, not just an African problem, as it is widely perceived.

What relationship should advocates have with politicians and policy makers? And what in your view must the latter do to address child soldiering?

Beah
It is absolutely critical [for advocates] to work with governments to prevent the use of children in war, and much has been done to make this happen. This cooperation requires careful negotiation and compromise, and I just hope that there will be continuous and rigorous support from governments, and more political will to strengthen the work of UN agencies and NGOs. It is absolutely essential to have this cooperation so as to effectively heal those children affected by war in all capacities and to further prevent the occurrences of these wars. Much has been done and much more remains to be done. And I advocate for preventive measures, things that get rid of the practices that give rise to war in the first place.

If, during a war, an aid worker has intermittent access to active child soldiers, what do you feel they must do to maximize the child’s welfare? Can they effectively begin the healing process at this stage, even though those children will return to fighting after their meeting?

The methods vary from situation to situation even though there are some commonalities. But one point that I will make is that the aid workers have to carefully negotiate with warlords in order to be able to get them to release children. There is a document known as the Paris Principles and Commitments that UNICEF and other NGOs have put together to examine the practical measures that can be used to effectively help children affected by war. This Paris Principles came from a careful study of practices that have worked and those that have failed, and how these can be improved to make rehabilitation and the reintegration process effective in the best interests of the child. I would recommend that you take a look at it. It should be available online.
KSR
You were removed from conflict and rehabilitated through the efforts of UNICEF and its partner organizations. From your firsthand experience, most of which is described in the book, what recommendations can you offer groups carrying out this work to improve their effectiveness?

Beah
A thorough understanding of the culture and sensitivity to the traditions of the people they are trying to help. Also, this kind of work requires perseverance and tremendous patience.

I want my involvement with preventing the use of children in war, and in generally promoting the respect for the human rights of all people, to go beyond just advocacy.

KSR
During your visit to the Kennedy School, you expressed an interest in pursuing graduate studies. Do you have a particular focus in mind?

Beah
I am interested in pursuing a dual degree, an M.A. in international affairs and a J.D. in international law.

KSR
Ishmael, you’re a best-selling author, a famous child rights advocate, and currently work at the most prestigious human rights organization in America. What more do you hope to accomplish by going to graduate school?

Beah
I want my involvement with preventing the use of children in war, and in generally promoting the respect for the human rights of all people, to go beyond just advocacy. Through this graduate program, or any other higher degree, I will be able to participate in high-level policy work, thereby bringing firsthand experience to make policies that work.
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Picking Up the Pieces: A Child Soldier’s Reflection

Ishmael Beah’s *A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier*  
(Farrar Straus and Giroux 2007)

REVIEWED BY RISHMA THOMAS

Few thirteen-year-olds lose track of how many people they’ve killed. Or how many lines of cocaine they’ve snorted, or how many friends they’ve watched die in agony. *A Long Way Gone* is Ishmael Beah’s story, a tale so frightening that at times it reads like the figment of a sick and twisted imagination. It has all the plot of a tragedy, down to the irony of our protagonist finally finding his family only to lose them again, forever. Only this is not fiction. It is the reality of life as a child soldier in Sierra Leone.

Today there are roughly three hundred thousand children fighting in more than eighty-five countries, yet they are completely inaccessible to us in the developed world. They make excellent fighters and are almost guaranteed to keep war alive in perpetuity by participating in the most unimaginable gruesome acts, believing these acts are normal, even noble. These children are swallowed up into complete horror, and few are able to escape. Fewer still have the ability, opportunity, and courage to write about their experiences. Precisely because of who he is and what he has done, Beah’s book is enormously important. Even if it were not well written, his perspective is so unique that the world would have the moral responsibility to make his words best-sellers anyway.

But this work is well written. Incredibly so. Beah’s writing style is simple, his story made all the more powerful by its complete lack of hyperbole. His tone is subtle, showing rather than telling his emotional turmoil. One moment his language is cool, calculated, devoid of any emotion. He talks about winning a throat-slitting competition in the same matter-of-fact tone another teenager would use to explain how he’d won a tennis match:

*I grabbed the man’s head and slit his throat in one fluid motion. His Adam’s apple made way for the sharp knife, and I turned the bayonet on its zigzag edge as I brought it out . . . I dropped him on the ground and wiped my bayonet on him.*

Just a few paragraphs later, however, we find him left alone that night, and his conscience takes him to task. He hears a voice humming songs from his childhood, but unable to deal with the memories, he “would listen for a bit and then fire a few rounds into the night, driving the humming away.”

And yet perhaps most amazing of all is that, at times, he is funny. It is difficult to write humor in the best of circumstances; when talking about your experiences...
running away from war I would have imagined it to be entirely impossible. But somehow Beah elicits a smile as he pokes fun of his experience trying to pick coconuts, "each attempt ... more pitiful than the last." He even elicits a laugh when describing his first encounter with snow: "I had seen movies about Christmas, and this white fluffy stuff was in those movies. It must be Christmas here every day, I thought." And with American food: "I was baffled by the food. I would simply order 'the same thing' or put on my plate whatever I'd seen others put on theirs. Sometimes I was lucky to like what landed there. That was usually not the case."

Although the story is not entirely told with humor, it is nonetheless entirely devoid of self-pity. If Beah has privately cursed God for inflicting such cruelty into his young life, there is not even a whisper of it in his writing. Despite this lack of self-pity, it does read like a confession in places — almost as if he will be absolved of his sins through the cathartic experience of writing. In a strange paradox, however, nowhere does it read like an apology. I imagine Beah has internalized what he first hated hearing, that his sins were not his fault.

**If Beah has privately cursed God for inflicting such cruelty into his young life, there is not even a whisper of it in his writing.**

Ironically, *A Long Way Gone* hardly mentions politics. A reader would come away with no better understanding of what the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was fighting for, or what the government forces were supposedly defending against. Again, this is Beah’s way of showing us what the war meant to a child. He himself did not understand Sierra Leonean politics; he only understood that his family had been brutally killed, he had felt constant fear for over a year, and he was being given the opportunity to retaliate against those who had done him so much harm. Even then, amazingly, there is no real villain that emerges. I suspect this is because Beah now knows that children fighting for the RUF were brainwashed in exactly the same way he was, were given exactly the same message that he was: the enemy was the cause of all hurt and suffering in Sierra Leone. His work also gives the impression that descending into the depravity of drugs and murder is a lot easier than coming out of it, no matter what side you were fighting for.

For what this work is, a memoir of a child soldier, we cannot ask it to be anything more. And yet inevitably the reader is left with questions. Does Beah think that the international community did as much as they could have to help him and others from descending into these depths of despair? What was the role of female child soldiers, who are never mentioned? It is impossible for one work to address all of these issues, but Beah’s book begs others to be written. Beah thinks that some read his book with the same morbid fascination of watching a car accident. But I'd like to think that deeper
than that, we want to know what happened to others in Sierra Leone, and we'd like to do whatever we can to help them.

Finishing this book leaves the reader frozen. He wants to run under a rock, cry a thousand tears, and give up on any notion of human beauty. And yet he has only read the book. Ishmael Beah, who lived the life, is capable of forgiving and creating new joy. Today, Beah smiles a lot. He laughs genuinely and speaks articulately. If he was your neighbor in college, you would probably think that he was a little shy. You would never imagine the secrets he has burned into his heart and mind. And if he can pick up the pieces of a broken past and strive to bring peace to the world, what is our excuse not to do the same?
Leadership always matters.

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Photos from CPL-sponsored events (clockwise from upper left): Harlem Children’s Zone founder Geoffrey Canada; a panel discussion at a tribute to Harvard combat veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan; Harvard Business School professors Bill George and Rosabeth Kanter and CPL director David Gergen discussing America’s leadership deficit; and Teach for America founder Wendy Kopp speaking at a student breakfast.
There Are No Friendlies

BY JAMES A. AHLERS

The men in red, white, and blue jerseys line up at midfield and look nervously out at a sea of red, white, and green. The date is 7 February 2007. Tens of thousands of Mexican soccer fans fill the stands, cheering wildly for their national team to defeat the gringos in this “friendly” exhibition match. The U.S. team has home-field advantage in name only. They are playing in Phoenix, Ariz., but the atmosphere feels more like Mexico City’s Estadio Azteca, and the Mexicans seem very much at home.

As I watch the game on television in Somerville, Mass., I remember the last time I saw Mexican soccer fans pack the stands in Phoenix, almost five years ago to the day. On 13 February 2002, Mexico played a “friendly” exhibition match against Yugoslavia in Phoenix, and I was in the crowd as the spokesman for then-Arizona governor Jane Hull. At halftime, I stood at midfield to deliver the governor’s official welcome to the Mexican national team and its forty thousand fans, who included some friends from my weekend pickup games. As I made my way through the most intimidating speech of my life, I could hear my voice shaking. Suddenly, the fans burst into cheers. The notes in my hands stopped shaking and my voice grew more confident, building on the energy of the crowd.

In a world that regularly told them that they were invisible, they were asking for some form of official recognition.

Back in the stands after the speech, I described the sensation to my friends. They laughed and told me that the crowd had actually been chanting, “¡Licencias! ¡Licencias!” The fans, many of whom were undocumented immigrants, were demanding the right to Arizona driver’s licenses. In a world that regularly told them that they were invisible, they were asking for some form of official recognition.

They would not get it. It had been only five months since the attacks of September 11, and although ground zero was two thousand miles away, the impact was still being felt along America’s Southwestern border. The nightmare scenario of a flawed immigration system had become reality, and in its aftermath, all border issues had collapsed into a single-minded focus on security. The flowering spirit of cooperation between President Bush and Mexico’s President Vicente Fox predating the attacks had since stalled, and with it the promise of meaningful immigration reform.

Before my halftime speech, I hadn’t thought of going to a soccer game as a political act. But the overwhelming presence of tens of thousands of Mexicans—many of them in the United States illegally—could not help but make the act political. Were it not for the Mexican fans, a soccer match in the Arizona desert would draw fewer fans
than a game of desert ice hockey. And without those same undocumented immigrants, the hotels, citrus groves, restaurants, and countless other businesses that fueled the state’s rapid growth would cease to function. Yet outside the stadium, participants in the immigration debate failed to acknowledge these immigrants as anything more than a security threat, let alone try to incorporate them into society. So there they were, announcing their presence with passionate chants and the bright colors of the Mexican national flag. The members of Arizona’s shadow economy came out of the shadows that day at the game. After that it was no longer just a game.

Little has changed in the five years that have passed since the Yugoslavia game. As I watch the 2007 U.S.-Mexico match in Phoenix from my couch in Somerville, tension between the two countries is as high as ever—on and off the field. The U.S. national team has finally overcome Mexico’s historic dominance to outplay its southern neighbor in several recent matches. Embracing the rivalry, the U.S. Soccer Federation has started promoting games between the countries with the slogan, “Come see the beautiful game get a little ugly.” The rising animosity between the teams has manifested itself in the form of sharp elbows, rough tackles, and head butts, perhaps best illustrated by the bruising 2002 World Cup semifinal in which the United States dealt Mexico a humiliating upset. A U.S. fan holds up a sign that sums up the mood of both sides succinctly: “There Are No Friendlies.” The players no longer even shake hands after matches.

On game day, the politics of immigration find their way onto the field even if they are not on the players’ minds. Mexican fans know that the patch of Arizona desert on which the game is played belonged to Mexico a century and a half ago. The U.S. fans know that many of the Mexicans in the stands are undocumented. For some Americans, the overwhelming Mexican presence in the stadium brings to mind the reconquista, the theory that little by little Mexico is reclaiming its lost territory through migration. Many of the Mexican fans are probably among the hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants who took to the streets of Phoenix in the spring of 2006 to demand their rights to services and recognition in the United States, rights many Americans feel they don’t deserve. Those American fans experience a special satisfaction in watching the United States defeat Mexico 2-0 on the U.S. team’s nominal home turf. The players walk off the field without shaking hands, but also without having drawn any blood.

Though the game ends without incident, the week along the Arizona-Mexico border does not. The day after the February 2007 match, four gunmen open fire on a pick-up truck of undocumented immigrants in the Ironwood Forest National Monument, near Tucson, killing two men and a fifteen-year-old girl. Authorities do not yet know whether the shooters were American vigilantes or Mexican smugglers—so far the investigation points to smugglers—but the damage to Arizona-Mexico relations is done.
Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano arrives in Mexico City that very same day for a long-planned meeting with the new president, Felipe Calderón. Governor Napolitano finds herself answering impromptu questions about the shootings and calling for the U.S. Congress to take action on immigration reform. But in a land where there are no friendlies, the possibility of reform appears increasingly remote.

Meanwhile, the Mexicans keep coming to fill Arizona's communities, jobs, and stadiums. And for now, we continue to pretend they do not exist.
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Documenting Modern Slavery in India

BY JESSICA REITZ

We traveled at least two hours every morning by van from our base camp in Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh, India, to visit the villages of slaves. Bumping along unpaved, potholed roads, we crossed godforsaken terrain where dusty rock quarries extend as far as the horizon. Only the thatched roofs and mud walls of small huts and an occasional isolated tree break the monotony of the landscape. The smell of burning cow dung permeates the air.

The bonded laborers or slaves in the villages we are visiting today are just a few of the world's twenty-seven million slaves who are hidden far from public view. Held against their will through the threat or commission of physical and/or psychological violence, they are economically exploited and unable to walk away. As antislavery activists, we interview slaves and document their lives, using their testimony to educate the world about modern slavery and help bring it to an end.

Their fathers worked for this contractor and their fathers before them; generations working to pay off a debt, the origin of which is long forgotten.

Recently, we visited Lalai, Hadgad, Sujhai, and Pantnagar, just a handful of the hundreds of villages in Uttar Pradesh, where approximately half a million slaves reside. The families in these villages spend their days breaking rock into sand for the slave owner, euphemistically called a contractor in these parts. Using slave labor, the slave owner is able to maximize his profits—in some cases upwards of 50 percent—on the sand and gravel he sells to local construction companies. If the slave owner paid the national minimum wage rate, his profits would fall to 1 percent or less. Thus, the incentive to utilize slave labor is strong in this industry.

The slaves in these villages know nothing outside the world of the hammer and rock. Their fathers worked for this contractor and their fathers before them; generations working to pay off a debt, the origin of which is long forgotten. Perhaps it was a loan to purchase medicine for a sick child or for a marriage celebration or for death rites. The average loan that holds these families in bondage is $18, or about 740 rupees, and the interest on such loans can run as high as 60 percent per year. Because the slave owners pay the families in bags of rice or with below subsistence wages, any additional expenses, such as medicine, require asking the contractor for an additional loan. Debt continues to accumulate as a matter of fact and is never paid off from one generation to the next.
Several men in the villages have learned to read and write. All of the women and children, however, are illiterate. When photographing and interviewing these families, we carry an inkpad so that the women and children can sign release forms for the use of their pictures and stories with their thumbprint.

Slave owners exercise physical violence or psychological control over their slaves to keep them from running away. One villager summed up his life this way: “If I would move in my house or out of my house, if I want to sit somewhere, get up, if I want to eat, if I want to drink—anything that I wanted to do—it required permission.” Slave owners force their slaves to work extremely long hours, so they have no time to plan an escape. Most threaten violence and some even brutalize their slaves. Rape and sexual assault of women and girls is also common.

Under such circumstances, freedom seems impossible, but it’s not.

With the help of local activists, these slaves can liberate themselves. The slaves in each village form self-help groups (SHGs). All the women form one SHG, and all the men another. The members of both SHGs pool together their meager savings into one pot, and over the course of several years, the SHGs save enough money to obtain a lease on their own land, many miles away. The activists fill out the paperwork and secure the land, and the slaves walk away to freedom.

_text continues on page 18._

[Image: Women’s Self Help Group, Sujhai, Uttar Pradesh]
Breaking Rock, Lulai, Uttar Pradesh

Child Slaves, Nauhatta, Bihar

Despair, Pan Nagar, Uttar Pradesh
In theory, the process is this simple; in practice, it is very dangerous and difficult. In the past, contractors who discovered their slaves were organizing sought revenge by setting the village on fire and raping the women. Additionally, the success of SHGs is contingent on building trust and gaining consensus among members of the groups, which is a challenging and time-consuming process.

When SHGs work, however, the results are remarkable. In one free village we visited called Azad Nagar, or “Land of the Free,” we met men and women members of SHGs who had freed themselves from the bonds of slavery. One man we interviewed, named Ramphal, was lyrical in his freedom, even though he still does the same back-breaking work morning “till night”: “I agree the work is the same, but there’s a fundamental difference: I’m master of my own mind, my own destiny. That’s a big difference. Today I’m free, not only to live as I want to live, but to hope for a better tomorrow.” The first thing the women did was send their children to school. One of them told us, “I can think about the future. I can dream now. I am happy.” They are breaking the cycle and building a new life for their children and their children’s children.
Thousands of women, children, and men are trafficked or born into slavery every day. In most of these situations, the outcomes are tragic, leading to irreparable physical and psychological abuse, rape and sexual exploitation, and even death. However, by supporting grassroots antislavery activists and groups, working with policy makers and government officials to enact and enforce antitrafficking and antislavery policies, promoting slave-free trade in commodities such as cocoa, cotton, and diamonds, and continuing to investigate and document modern forms of slavery, we can bring an end to this horrendous human rights abuse.

*A short documentary on the people I interviewed in the village of Azad Nagar can be viewed at [http://freetheslaves.net/store/the-silent-revolution/](http://freetheslaves.net/store/the-silent-revolution/).*
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Addressing the Human Trafficking Crisis through Social Entrepreneurship

BY PETER DYRUD, NAVEED MALIK, AND TAI SUNNANON

Every 10 minutes, there are anywhere from 15–76 victims trafficked worldwide. —Children in Slavery: The 21st Century

As the global phenomenon of human trafficking pushes past current efforts to curb it, policy makers and professionals alike must consider new ways to approach the problem. We propose a new approach to combating human trafficking—one rooted in the spirit of social entrepreneurship. While hundreds of organizations of all sizes are working on antitrafficking programs around the world, they are, by and large, working alone. Countless professionals, policy makers, and academics acknowledge the need for worldwide cooperation, yet no system for sharing information or coordinating operations exists.

Enormous obstacles stand in the way of establishing a "super-agency" to facilitate worldwide coordination, but there are other, simpler, low-cost ways to achieve these objectives. Creating and building extended social networks can help radically improve the effectiveness and efficiency of antitrafficking efforts. Increased political pressure on national governments to confront this crime head-on with their substantial financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and military resources can be achieved by the media and citizen action.

In addition to a review of leading publications on trafficking, we conducted interviews and surveyed stakeholders representing national governments, UN agencies, nonprofits, and academic institutions across the globe. The results of this research are interpreted through the lens of social entrepreneurship, as are the recommendations formulated. This article shows how to use social entrepreneurship practices to combat the human trafficking epidemic.

It's Not a Problem, It's a Crisis

The most rapidly growing form of organized crime, human trafficking is considered by some to be "our modern-day slavery." By most narrowly defined estimates, between seven hundred thousand and possibly as many as four million people, primarily women and children, are trafficked around the world each year. The crime's elusive nature makes accurate estimates impossible. We do know that human trafficking has existed—and gone largely unchecked—for centuries. Most programs aimed at combating human trafficking, however, are still in their infancy. In the 2006 "Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns" report, Antonio Maria Costa, executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), concedes that
“efforts to counter trafficking have so far been uncoordinated and inefficient.” Paradoxically, as the crime of trafficking continues to grow, funding for antitrafficking programs is declining. The UN, national governments, and NGOs now face the problem of coping with sophisticated international networks of traffickers with increasingly scarce resources.

This crime’s global nature has prompted us to consider a complementary approach to current efforts. Social entrepreneurship can be defined a number of ways, but at its most basic level, it means a creative solution to a social problem; it does not require corporate involvement. The spirit of social entrepreneurship comes from the reinvention of the social sector in its quest for best practices to provide important goods and services and solve social problems. It involves activities such as mobilizing economic and human resources, taking initiative to create new structures or revamp existing ones, crafting alliances (social networks), measuring performance, and increasing accountability. As business, government, and the nonprofit sector share tools and models, entrepreneurial opportunities have emerged. It is with this new lens that this article approaches combating trafficking of human beings.

Defining Trafficking: A Dilemma unto Itself

Trafficking in Persons

Human trafficking involves the commercial trade of a person for an illegal or exploitative purpose. In official circles, most national governments use the following definition from the 2000 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons:

“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

Women and children compose the overwhelming majority of trafficked persons. They are exploited primarily for labor and sex, as well as child soldiering and organ and baby sale. The crime’s elusive nature leads to substantial underreporting and makes human trafficking difficult to quantify. Conservative estimates suggest that at least eight hundred thousand people are trafficked every year (see the June 2005 “Trafficking in Persons” report released by the U.S. State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons). This number is based on the narrowest
definition of human trafficking, which excludes child sex tourism (CST), child laborers, or child soldiers. When these groups are included, estimates of the annual number of human beings trafficked swells to tens of millions.

Owing to its above noted definition, any discussion of human trafficking also must include the geographic landscape that permits the migratory movements of peoples. Countries of origin are those from which women and children are acquired. Most of these countries, including the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Thailand, are poverty stricken. Countries of transit are those where trafficking victims are brought from their homes and often sold or transferred to another party or cell within the same trafficking network for further movement. These countries are marked by a high degree of lawlessness and corruption, ideal circumstances for the operation of human trafficking. Countries of destination generate the demand for women and children. This is a diverse list including Western nations like the United States and the United Kingdom and Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia and China.

**Current Trends and Global Profit**

Traffickers lure many victims from their homes with promises of well-paying jobs, then force or coerce them into prostitution, domestic servitude, farm or factory work, or other types of exploitative labor. Prostitution, CST, and related activities, which are inherently harmful and dehumanizing, contribute to the trafficking problem.

Human trafficking has become an epidemic. It has become the third most profitable organized crime in the world, just behind the sale of arms and drugs. Gilbert King’s 2004 *Woman, Child For Sale: The New Slave Trade in the 21st Century* states that the human trafficking industry generates twelve billion dollars per year while an estimated profit of eight to ten billion dollars per year is gained through prostitution and forced labor of those who are trafficked. The sociopsychological impact on victims, women and children in particular, is equally staggering.

**Today’s Landscape**

**UN Protocol**

In 1998, Argentina proposed a special convention against “trafficking in minors” that ultimately was expanded to include all persons. In 2000, after lengthy negotiations, the UN authored a protocol against human trafficking that supplemented the convention against transnational crime. Officially titled the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, it established the following objectives:

1. Prevent and combat trafficking in persons, paying particular attention to women and children:
2. Protect and assist victims of trafficking, with full respect for their human rights; and

3. Promote cooperation among States in order to meet these objectives.

These objectives have not been met, according to the executive director of the UNODC. Moreover, the UNODC Web site lists just over one hundred signatories to the UN protocol, meaning that a great many of the 192 UN member states have yet to even sign on to the protocol.

Key Contributors and Current Approaches

In the fight against trafficking, there are three major categories of contributors: national governments, the United Nations (and its agencies), and other organizations, which include NGOs like the International Rescue Committee, media, and academic/research institutions. Many of these other organizations are “on the ground,” carrying out day-to-day operations such as investigations, interviews, rescues, and repatriation. The UN serves as the forum where international consensus is built and, ideally, where coordination takes place. National governments, however, are the most important contributors because they have the power to legislate and have access to enforcement mechanisms, intelligence, and resources required to fight trafficking, as well as large incentives to either combat or, in some cases, protect traffickers.

In the current political and economic environments, neither the formation of a new agency to facilitate such coordination is possible, nor is any existing one willing to take on this monumental task alone.

Most of these organizations have had little coordination, largely due to financial constraints and economic, labor, education, and political concerns. Our survey and interviews revealed, however, that at least a few agencies have improved their coordination, such as the U.S. State Department and the International Organization for Migration, largely through the collection and distribution of information. However, due to the global nature of trafficking, for cooperation to make a substantial impact, grand-scale coordination would be required. In the current political and economic environments, neither the formation of a new agency to facilitate such coordination is possible, nor is any existing one willing to take on this monumental task alone.

Research Methodology: Taking the Pulse of Key Contributors

Why are organizations ineffective in combating trafficking and what can be done to improve efforts via social entrepreneurship? To find an answer, we undertook
substantial research, conducted interviews, and surveyed stakeholders representing institutions across the globe.

**Interviews and Analysis**

Our initial approach was to research possible incentives for key contributors to share information, coordinate their antitrafficking efforts, and seek legal punishment of offenders. Funding is among the most pressing concerns, leading to substantial inefficiency in antitrafficking operations. For instance, the scarcity of donor funds for most organizations (for national departments and NGOs, in particular) causes more competition than cooperation. In a November 2006 interview, Andrea Rossi, UNICEF special adviser on trafficking, explained, “There are implications in donor giving because this creates competition in a free market, which is good for private companies who compete for a share of the funds, but competition does not equate to cooperation—in fact it disables all chances for it in the global arena, especially when it comes to combating trafficking in persons.”

The difficulty of incentivizing of cooperation among contributors is exacerbated by the fact that no one government or agency has been mandated to take the lead in these efforts. Indeed, the UN protocol does not mandate or single out a particular nation or body to do so. Hence, “everyone wants to cooperate, but no one wants to lead the effort,” said Rossi later in the interview. “Everyone wants cooperation, but no one wants to give cooperation.” This may be reflected, again, by the funding factor. Rossi pointed out that the issue is not always high on the list of a government’s priorities.

Rossi’s assessment is confirmed by the annual international conventions addressing the need to combat trafficking, which are only just beginning to produce results in the area of worldwide coordination. In addition to the UN convention that led to the 2000 trafficking protocol, there are annual conferences such as the Hemispheric Conference on International Migration and the Civil Society and Government Collaboration to Combat Trafficking in Persons, in the Americas and Asia, respectively. Though well intentioned, the final reports produced by such conferences are dated, broad in scope, and do little to aid current efforts on the ground to combat trafficking.

**Survey**

Our research included an anonymous online survey of key contributors to find patterns and track information. We contacted organizations across the globe, including national government agencies, UN agencies, research organizations, advocacy organizations, and media. Questions were divided into four types: (1) factual information, (2) resource flow, (3) incentives for cooperation, and (4) assessing governments and networks. (Refer to appendix for complete survey results.) Though our results are not conclusive due to our limited time and access, we found:

(1) A startling and complete lack of agreement on the basic question of geographical concentration of trafficking, which should not require much speculation; this
finding supports our hypothesis that a lack of information sharing is causing inefficiency. Presumably, with better communication and more complete information, greater consensus could be reached among contributors on the allocation or resources and division of labor across the globe.

(2) Only 23 percent of respondents said that their organizations had sufficient funding over the past five years to meet their antitrafficking goals, and only 15.3 percent expected to have enough funding over the next five years. Also, major funding sources for their organizations were fairly well divided between government/public funding, philanthropic donations, and private organizations, but philanthropic donation was the weakest response. We concluded that there is always more room for donor education and motivation efforts, as well as pursuing greater funding in general.

(3) Respondents overwhelmingly agreed that, after funding, the most important factor in effectively combating human trafficking is coordinating policies and active operations with other governments and organizations. Additionally, a strong majority of respondents said that they could benefit from both the shared resources and better communication that would come with increased coordination. This response confirmed our belief that there is the need for cooperation and provides clues as to incentives, such as funding and influence on policy.

Competition for funds appears to be the primary reason that key players have failed to cooperate.

(4) Respondents noted the following major countries with which they expressed a need to coordinate: United States (50 percent of the responses), Thailand (30 percent), and China (30 percent). Beyond these three, there was a startling variety of responses, underlining the worldwide extent of the trafficking problem. As far as which governments have so far been the most cooperative, the United States and Thailand were the two nations mentioned most by respondents. Several African, Southeast Asian, and European countries made appearances on the survey results. China was conspicuously absent.

Social Networking Roadmap: Using Diversity as a Strength

Through our field research, we concluded that lack of cooperation among contributors was the single greatest obstacle to successfully combating human trafficking worldwide. Competition for funds appears to be the primary reason that key players have failed to cooperate. Having determined why current efforts at combating trafficking are failing to keep up with the criminal enterprise, we then focused on improving organizational and operational efficiency and efficacy.
Social Networks

We recommend key contributors increase their efforts to build both formal and informal social networks of public and nonprofit sector organizations, matching the alliance aspect of social entrepreneurship. For example, existing antitrafficking conferences should be hosted by national governments, the UN, educational institutions, and other key contributors. This approach is more efficient than starting from scratch, as it capitalizes on already established informal social networks. In his 1974 book *Getting a Job*, sociologist Mark Granovetter used hundreds of interviews to support his idea that “weak ties” are more effective for accomplishing objectives than “strong ties.” Weak ties are relationships between people who would not normally be in the same social circles or share the same perspective or resources. We should thus focus on building a network that is as diverse as possible, in terms of geography, capabilities, influences, and contacts.

One strategy at the organizational level is to build upon the very basic level of cooperation already undertaken by key contributors, such as the technical cooperation undertaken by the UNODC and its partners. Governmental agencies, research organizations, and NGOs can create and share private access databases, which track movements and trends in trafficking. This information can help participating organizations better focus and coordinate their individual efforts to combat trafficking. Interpol, a multilateral law enforcement agency representing nearly eighty agencies, also focuses on policing human trafficking. Interpol can rely on institutional expertise and real-time information agencies on the ground to improve their policing. Imagine that an NGO in India learns of numerous abductions of children from a cluster of villages in the Punjab province and uploads this information into a shared database. Two days later, Pakistani border guards spot illegal border crossings and also upload this information in the same shared database. Sophisticated programming sorts data in a way that “connects the dots,” and Interpol identifies and captures the traffickers, rescuing the children. Real-time, global-scale information sharing and coordination of antitrafficking efforts can be a reality.

One drawback of Web-based coordination may be that an electronic database with proprietary information would not remain secure for long. In order to sustain a viable system, government support is critical for access to encryption technology, for security screening of those who would have access to the database, and possibly to make information sharing outside the network a criminal activity. An alternative would be making online information intentionally vague, so that no damage is done if it is leaked, limiting critical information exchange to offline personal interactions facilitated by the database. Another objection may be that no one would want to participate. However, based on our survey results, the need for cooperation is widely recognized, and there could be additional incentives for participation, such as increased funding corresponding to the level of involvement.
At the individual level, one prospect to build networks is by scheduling face-to-face meetings over meals between people from various organizations involved in antitrafficking programs who may not otherwise talk to each other. Although this may seem contrived, conferences are an ideal time to establish connections between people with similar goals; precedents do exist, such as the hundreds of scheduled meetings across social boundaries that occurred at St. Mark’s Catholic Parish in Dorchester, Mass., as described by Ian Simmons in *On One-to-Ones*. Participation may be encouraged by using stories of effective cooperation from conference attendees and by paying for the meals of all who participate. The value of information exchange should itself be an incentive for individuals to come together. A similar tactic is simply ensuring that any discussion groups include participants from as many sectors and continents, such as organizational representatives, government officials, and concerned citizens, as is feasible. These interactions can help ease suspicions and competition for funding.

The intended effect of social networking is increased consensus and awareness and more efficient and effective allocation of scarce resources through information sharing. Participating contributors in such a network can provide the basis for the formation of an international advisory board comprised of key stakeholders from all sectors (UN, governments, and NGOs) and perhaps lead to a future UN body devoted entirely to trafficking in persons.

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The intended effect of social networking is increased consensus and awareness and more efficient and effective allocation of scarce resources through information sharing.

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**Additional Considerations**

**Nonsignatories**

As there are many countries which have still not signed the protocol, we recommend the UN Human Rights Council specifically and signatories in general sustain pressure on nonsignatories to sign. Signing the protocol publicly obligates a country to criminalize trafficking, and it is the first step toward holding governments accountable in the international legal arena.

Pressure would be primarily diplomatic and include political and economic incentives to join. We believe the UN should give this objective increased priority and use its available resources to achieve it. Afghanistan, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Morocco, Singapore, and Vietnam are some of the countries with the most serious and urgent trafficking problems, and all have yet to ratify the protocol. Other ways to encourage government action include integration into trade agreements, economic and political sanctions for gross abusers, and financial support for domestic NGOs to lobby internally.
Timothy Muldoon’s 1999 article “South Africa: A Case Study in Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Rollback,” published in the National Security Studies Quarterly, documents a positive precedent in South Africa’s 1991 signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and subsequent disarmament, which shows how political changes and a desire to join the international community can pressure a country to make its actions consistent with its agreements. We suggest offering new signatories incentives, as encouraged by the social entrepreneurship concept, such as some form of international leadership in the field.

**Outsiders’ Opportunities**

The media and the public can join in the exchange of resources. The media largely determines which issues are on the political table and can generate public interest through stories about trafficking victims. Concerned citizens, in turn, can push their representatives in Congress to move the issue to the front of their agendas. We also suggest that the media focus on putting a political spin, rather than just a moral one, on the issue of human trafficking. For example, Rossi has suggested framing the issue in terms of migration and refugees, which draws more interest groups into the trafficking discussion. Many countries have large departments of migration with substantial funding that could be used to combat human trafficking.

**Moving Forward**

The practice of human trafficking is as old as civilization itself. Indeed, as Kathryn Farr observes in her book Sex Trafficking: The Global Market in Women and Children, slavery, forced prostitution, and sexual exploitation existed in many ancient cultures, including the Egyptian, Roman, Greek and Persian societies, since 3000 B.C.E. It is, however, a new breed of criminals which has propelled human trafficking to unprecedented levels. The issue of willingness and genuine desire to combat and prosecute trafficking is not in question. Rather, it is a failure of the current system that leaves resource-strapped governments unable to coordinate antitrafficking efforts efficiently. Consequently, the challenge to identify incentives took a central role in our research.

To this end, after analyzing research data, insights from interviews, and survey responses, we have proposed a three-pronged approach: (1) identify key contributors such as governments, NGOs, and interagencies and create a social network to facilitate efficient information sharing and effective coordination of efforts, culminating perhaps in a formal UN structure; (2) impose pressure via economic and diplomatic sanctions on the UN member states who have yet to ratify the UN protocol; and (3) systematically modify the trafficking discussion to take on a more political character, thus merging it into the larger issues of migration and refugees (where significantly more resources exist). In so doing, governments should be compelled to take proactive, rather than reactive, measures to address the root causes of human trafficking. While trafficking in persons is a distressing global phenomenon, it is one which shared incentives, resources, and efforts can help to eradicate.
### Appendix 1. Survey Results

1. **In your opinion, which of the following regions of origin has the greatest number of women and children being trafficked as a percentage of population?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **What is the most important factor or resource for a government or group, other than funding, to combat trafficking in persons?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating action/policy with other governments or groups</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct influence on national policy within country</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to current research</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to law enforcement</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence on groups or individuals committing crimes</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **What could you gain from cooperation between groups to help combat trafficking in persons?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better communication</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared resources</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More timely access to information</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better governance</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **What do you envision your primary role to be in the global effort to cooperatively combat trafficking in persons?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate efforts worldwide</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate efforts within my agency</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide information</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend conferences/present research</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate efforts within national government</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **In the past five years, has your organization had sufficient funds to address the goal of reducing trafficking in persons?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, shortfall of 51–100 percent</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, shortfall of 26–50 percent</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes, we have a sufficient amount</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<tr>
<td>No, shortfall of 1–25 percent</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>No, shortfall of 101 percent or more</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>No, need 51–100 percent more</td>
<td>38%</td>
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<tr>
<td>No, need 26–50 percent more</td>
<td>31%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes, we have a sufficient amount</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>No, need 1–25 percent more</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, need an additional 101 percent or more</td>
<td>8%</td>
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6. **Looking ahead five years, does your organization forecast sufficient funds to fight trafficking in persons?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forecast</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, need 51–100 percent more</td>
<td>38%</td>
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<tr>
<td>No, need 26–50 percent more</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, we have a sufficient amount</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>No, need 1–25 percent more</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>No, need an additional 101 percent or more</td>
<td>8%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### 7. What is your major source of funding?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Source of Funding</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government/public funding</td>
<td>38%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philanthropic donation (individual/group)</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral organization (e.g., World Bank, UN, etc.)</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGO</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax revenue</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 8. Which national governments do you feel are most important in terms of needing to coordinate efforts with your organization on combating trafficking in persons in the years to come? (List up to five.)

- United States: 50%
- PRC (China), Thailand: 30%
- Cambodia, Greece, Japan, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom: 20%
- Albania, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Italy, Israel, Kenya, Laos, Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Togo, Turkey: 10%

### 9. Which national governments have been the most cooperative with you in collecting and sharing information on trafficking in persons? (List up to five.)

- United States: 40%
- Thailand: 20%
- Albania, Benin, Cambodia, Ghana, Italy, Moldova, Nigeria, Philippines, ROC (Taiwan), Sierra Leone, Spain, Togo, United Kingdom: 10%
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New Frontiers in Fighting Climate Change

BY KARIM BARDEESY

Climate Change: Concern and Disappointment

Issues of climate change and efforts to avert it now form a primary political discourse in North America, Western Europe, and Australia/New Zealand. Government agencies, scientists, the media, and the activist and voluntary sectors are increasingly shining new light on the effects of global warming on the planet. They are advocating or instituting ways to reduce individual and collective contributions to global warming; governments and corporations are reacting to these discourses by issuing new policies to explicitly address the challenge of global warming. With each new disclosure of the human and economic risks of global warming—the most recent being the updated Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report—the imperative to act grows.

Acclaim and new political capital for Al Gore after *An Inconvenient Truth*; the flourishing of green roofs and hybrid cars; a Nobel Peace Prize for Kenyan activist Wangari Maathai for contributions to sustainable development; polls placing the environment at the top of issues of national concern in a number of Western nations—all indicate a new awareness of the serious potential effects of climate change in the political, business, and public arenas.

Scientists and activists have succeeded in assembling an international consensus that climate change is real and that human activity is a main contributor. But despite this consensus, and the signing of the Kyoto Protocol by 169 countries to limit greenhouse gas emissions, have politics failed those who seek to address climate change? In Canada, for instance, 2004 emissions were 34 percent above Kyoto targets and up 24 percent from 1990, according a 2006 report by that country’s Environment Commissioner to Parliament.

Gaining Support outside Government Institutions

Enforcing the high aspirations of international regimes and treaties within individual countries has always been difficult. With an issue as important as climate change, however, activists may need to alter their usual approach to ensuring Kyoto compliance, which has largely consisted of directly targeting governments to increase domestic pressure and to gain support for refining existing treaties. New initiatives are needed to pressure governments and complement international treaty mechanisms. Some initiatives are under way; others involve new types of citizen action that have yet to be fully implemented. This involves three fields of play.

First, at the popular level, new methods of communicating information about greenhouse gas emissions to citizens—and new techniques in allowing them to
measure such emissions—are engaging more people directly and meaningfully on environmental issues. Second, among elite actors and full-time activists engaged in political activity, new political alliances are emerging, especially between evangelicals and environmentalists. These are signals of the broadening of the tent that will be required to and drawing attention toward solutions to global warming to more people. Third, at the level of political institutions, new structures specifically created by activists for the sole purpose of shining light on environmental shortcomings, what I call here an estates general, could be created.

This paper discusses new political alliances and coalitions, innovations in citizen involvement in science and consumer activity, and new and potential political processes. A lack of political will can be combated by new efforts by nongovernment actors. And citizens can translate their soft feeling that “something needs to be done” into explicit political preferences and a more energetic focus on results that slow global warming.

These activities may help achieve some greenhouse gas reductions on their own. More importantly, they will cultivate the political conditions to force the hands of national leaders, giving them greater incentives to meet their treaty obligations.

**Consumer, Science, and Citizen-oriented Innovations**

The political system has failed citizens of many Western nations who support strong measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Though majorities of voters in many industrialized countries have expressed preferences in polls for more state action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, few governments have taken any significant policy initiatives. Without more statutory incentives, carbon emitters are unlikely to change their behavior on a macro-scale.

One way of increasing political support for government action is to make the issue more concrete and tangible in people’s lives. This requires more than simply marketing green products or connecting people to like-minded activists. People can undertake passive or low-impact activities to foster understanding of the threat of climate change and help galvanize them toward political action. Environmentalists looking to enhance their political clout can promote some of the practices below, in addition to their conventional lobbying techniques.

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**Though majorities of voters in many industrialized countries have expressed preferences in polls for more state action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, few governments have taken any significant policy initiatives.**

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One way to increase public awareness of the impacts of climate change is through labeling regimes, or providing more information on and about consumer products. The
Energy Star program of certification for energy-efficient products started as a modest consumer electronics labeling regime by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1992 and has now grown to include over forty product areas. EPA-sponsored research shows that products purchased with the Energy Star label are attributed with helping generate 12 billion dollars in energy-related savings for consumers in 2005 alone; public awareness of the label in the United States jumped from 40 percent to over 60 percent in the last five years.

Labels on many consumer products now even identify the environmental impacts of the product's manufacture, use, and disposal. Tesco, the UK supermarket giant, recently pledged to reveal the carbon impact—the amount of carbon attributable to the manufacture, packaging, and distribution—of each of the seventy thousand products it sells on product labels. The United Kingdom also requires that labels on all foodstuffs show if the product was imported by air. Like the metric system and movie rating systems, arriving at a new, widely accepted technique of measurement takes time. By affecting consumer purchasing decisions, labeling products with this information can drive producers to make less carbon-intensive products.

Citizen science experiments and techniques in which nonprofessionals collect ecological information using simple tools that would not ordinarily be collected by experts can also help integrate climate change facts in people's daily lives. The information from these experiments has traditionally been used to illustrate new, locally specific environmental hazards facing communities. In Louisiana, for instance, activists have used air sample collections to illustrate the impact of a nearby oil refinery, as reported in the summer 2003 issue of the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.

In its recent tour to highlight the dangers of greenhouse gas emissions, the Climate Action Network of Canada was most struck by the frequency with which participants noted how climate change was having effects that they themselves could perceive in their daily lives, according to Andrew Dumbrille of the network. Given the complexity of the science and the extent of the impacts of global warming, simply collecting air data does not give a full enough picture. Local soil or water monitoring by citizens can be just as effective and can help researchers obtain good proxies on carbon dioxide circulation.

Because these experiments don't require any special expertise, they create the opportunity to engage citizens in an environmental ethic—a way of life that more fully integrates environmental issues. Sympathetic governments at the local level could explicitly and formally partner with local environmental organizations to help collect information on a wide variety of ecosystems, pollutants, and temperatures. This would give people who rely on their current folk knowledge about global warming effects an audience and an opportunity to add to the stock of available information on climate change. Citizen science in other areas seeks to spark local change due to some
immediate environmental threat, like an industrial site. The objective here would be to create enduring relationships between citizens, activists, and governments and bring citizens to a higher level of engagement.

Some other citizen science techniques do not require government involvement at all but can lead to the kind of applied learning that is necessary for people to turn their dispositions into actions or into a more concrete personal investment in the issue. ClimatePrediction.net is an example of one citizen science mobilization tool that places minimal demands on citizens but can lead to learning and could result in a useful form of engagement for certain subgroups. This Web site links to software that allows anyone with Internet access to engage their computer in a large network that helps make some of the millions of calculations that are required to test different versions of models developed by scientists to better understand climate change. These include models relating to the atmosphere, sea, and ocean levels and currents as well as deforestation. Participation in this experiment, connecting directly to scientists around in the world, can foster pride, which can lead to more active levels of political engagement on environmental issues. According to the BBC, which partnered with ClimatePrediction.net, over a quarter million people have already participated. Moreover, with this computer technique and with the collection of data near homes, ordinary people can add to science’s body of knowledge and make climate change more personal, tangible, and relevant to their daily lives.

New Political and Economic Alliances and Opportunities: The Conservative-Evangelical-Environmentalist Movement

A surprising but powerful new alignment has formed between religious conservatives and environmentalists in the United States. Many religious conservatives are joining informally with environmental liberals to fight climate change. In February 2006, eighty-six evangelical leaders under the auspices of the Evangelical Climate Initiative cosigned a statement acknowledging the existence of “human-induced” climate change and pledged to act to help fight it. The political implications of such an alliance, given the existing political power and numbers of the religious right in America, are large.

Some key figures in the climate change debate are serving bridging functions in this alliance. Sir John Houghton, chair of the scientific assessment team for the IPCC, is an evangelical Christian and has spoken to small groups of evangelical leaders to mobilize them. Rick Warren, pastor of the Saddleback Community Church and author of the multimillion-selling book The Purpose-Driven Life is part of this community. In a sign of both the relevance of climate change to Christian theology, and the continuing need to convince skeptics in the evangelical community, Joel Hunter, the president-elect of America’s Christian Coalition, resigned in November 2006 due to an unwillingness by other church leaders to be more active in the fight against climate change.
What is crucial for activists and for political leaders is that evangelical Christians are helping reshape the global warming debate as a moral question. Simultaneous with the familiar "environment and the economy" trade-off being reframed as an opportunity for innovation, evangelical leaders are portraying a depleted environment as being in conflict with a Christian ethic. The evangelical leaders state in their manifesto that "love of God, love of neighbor, and the demands of stewardship are more than enough reason for evangelical Christians to respond to the climate change problem with moral passion and concrete action." By using such value-laden language and implementing campaigns such as "What Would Jesus Drive?" (an appeal to Christians to buy less-polluting vehicles, complete with bumper stickers), evangelical Christians are able to introduce relevance about global warming into people's lives in new ways. This new relevance will make it more likely to citizens because they will be more active in translating their preferences into political pressure.

This alliance is still more of an association of like-minded groups, rather than a concerted joint effort. It still faces obstacles. These two groups will continue to disagree on many issues. Texas Baptist Deacon Mary Darden was recently quoted by the Associated Press as saying, "I know environmentalists, they want to see a bunch of Christians marching on the Capitol. I don't really want to be seen as out there beating the drums to try to get people to the Capitol. We have a longer-term goal, which is about the stewardship of creation." But there are examples here for other faith groups and environmentalists in other countries to work together even more to pool political resources.

What is crucial for activists and for political leaders is that evangelical Christians are helping reshape the global warming debate as a moral question.

A Dialogue of the Willing

How should those concerned about climate change build upon these engagement initiatives? Part of the lesson of the evangelical/environmentalist connection is that political movements can be most potent when they find new audiences and encourage interactions among people to whom conventional activism may not appeal. One tenet of a deliberative democracy and of public reason is that citizens should try to put themselves in the place of the "other" who may oppose them and to understand where they are coming from. This disposition means citizens coming from a nonactivist background could be encouraged to think more positively about being an activist in the global warming struggle; at the same time, activists could reach across to nonactivists and be more sensitive to some of the consequences for jobs and the economy of fighting global warming. More fundamentally, people are more likely to respond positively to messages from a single other person or peer than from a source that is mediated or not personally known to them. The power of this communication is enhanced
if they don’t consider that messenger or interlocutor to be trying to sell a position, and especially if that interlocutor may even have something to lose by speaking out. (The proceedings of the 2005 Yale University Faculty of Forestry and Environmental Studies-convened conference, Americans and Climate Change: Closing the Gap between Science and Action, which has motivated part of this section of the paper, has more on this concept and on other methods of reaching people successfully with a political message about climate change.)

Activists should look to create more opportunities for unscripted and authentic dialogues between groups with a common interest in greenhouse gas policy who may not normally connect, such as oil workers and northern aboriginal peoples, or ecology students and farmers. The members of each group have an investment in a nonrenewable or carbon-generating resource, through their jobs and belief systems, and each also has detailed knowledge about the resource’s use and impacts.

How can we create these dialogues? One way is for activists and people with a pro-environment disposition to reach out to groups neglected in the climate change debate, like industrial workers or seniors. These dialogues could be mediated and organized by larger civic organizations that specialize in deliberation, such as the National Issues Forums in the United States. Small deliberative assemblies could be organized at the local level to kick-start the process of ongoing discussion and to encourage diplomatic efforts by leaders of the organizations from their national headquarters. To ensure that the terms were not exclusive, activists could issue invitations to the previously neglected groups and organizations, then invite them to set the terms of the discussion. The Yale conference proposed these dialogues, as well as new funded organizations that help scientists translate their studies into more accessible public information.

Ultimately, to maximize the interchange, people from different lines of work that relate to greenhouse gas emission may wish to do short fellowships or take positions with their counterparts’ organizations for a longer period of time. Canada already has a model, the Katimavik program, which is a volunteer service and exchange program for young Canadians, with a particular emphasis on cross-cultural and cross-language contact. According to a 1999 KPMG study, 93 percent of former Katimavik participants said they left the program with a much better understanding of Canada’s cultural diversity compared to 23 percent before starting the program. The U.S. Peace Corps works on a similar model, in which young people perform service work overseas, act as ambassadors for their nation, and gain cultural understanding. Even the entertainment industry can help with these interchanges and make them novel and different—reality TV shows placing CEOs “on the shop floor” for a day have proven popular in a number of countries. Again, by placing or exposing people to environmental situations with which they are not familiar, we can increase the number of people who are sensitive to climate change issues and impacts. This can lead to greater political pressure in support of stronger government action.
Political Innovations Present and Future: An Estates General on Climate Change

All of these innovations and approaches can help expand the number and impact of climate change advocates. However, those concerned about global warming will ultimately have to tap into their national political systems. The political, economic, and public participation processes discussed above help generate some of the political support for policy change at the national level. But government regulation and the reorganization of the economy and society around sustainable principles must remain some of the key objectives for environmental activists. And to achieve this, all sides must rally round to fully seize the attention of public policy makers.

Campaigners could activate two new mechanisms of governance to generate publicity and accountability. One would be a conference organized by many elements of the voluntary and community sector, with special incentives to force the hands of government, giving them less opportunity to elude their international treaty obligations.

Call it an estates general conference. It would be a founding constitutional convention on climate issues convened by advocates. Delegates would be elected locally by grassroots organizations and citizen groups (ensuring regional balance), but the conference itself would not be run by government. Activists would come together initially to create a constitution and rules of governance for the estates general. They would deliberate on issues relating to climate policy and make strong recommendations. It would be a time-limited conference, held once or twice over four or five days each in different parts of the country/continent over several weeks.

Commercial sector players from large emitting power plant owners and vehicle manufacturers to home builders and small business people, activists of every stripe and from every region, all levels of government, any interest social sector, scientists and medical professionals, anyone with a personal or professional interest—all would be invited to observe. As well as proving a networking and politicking opportunity for elites and government/industry-oriented professional activists, breakout tables would be established to enable conversations between different kinds of groups. Participants would be asked to focus on proposals that would achieve short-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Research papers would be presented, and new science and market mechanisms could be proposed.

There are historical antecedents for this kind of conferring, and the concept of a grand political “inquiry” is quite familiar in many nations. North American governments have often used the tools of the task force, royal commission, or commission of inquiry to help advise them on public policy issues from health care to the organization of security and intelligence services. And in a few cases, they have led to tremendous policy change, like free trade in Canada and a new intelligence coordinating body in the United States. In other instances, such as the Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples or the Iraq Study Group, many of the recommendations were never acted upon. In either set of cases, major change resulted, or the lack of change served
as a helpful political tool for advocates—they could point to the best research that the commission requested and point to unfulfilled promises emanating from that. Here, the research agenda and sense of urgency would be as great as with the North American commissions, though driven from the bottom up.

The specific notion advocated here is more directly inspired by Québec, where major états généraux have been convened in the last decade on health, education, and the economy, bringing sectoral leaders together on a similar time frame and with similar levels of openness.

But what could another conference really accomplish? After all, much of the content of an estates general would recreate what is already known about climate change. An estates general would be different in design, giving it a special potency and translating the general desire into action, then into a series of actionable items for governments (and perhaps businesses) coming out of the research agenda of the conference.

Accountability mechanisms would be built right into the terms of the estates general. After its first convening, it could create internal automatic trigger mechanisms that would require a new conference. For instance, if the country/region in question increased its carbon emissions, or if a given number of provinces had yet to adhere to some kind of regional carbon-trading scheme, within a certain number of months, the necessity of a new meeting of the estates general could be written right into its founding terms. These formal rules have the effect of turning today’s actions on emissions into a kind of signal that has its own dynamic—the threat of another conference call to embarrass the offending institutions. This would give the estates general a different flavor from a classic stakeholder conference. Each estates general could conclude with the unveiling of a report card of findings and failings, and the assignment of letter grades to key players.

Although report cards have the appearance of definitive rulings, their true intention is to function as shaming mechanisms; one analyst has described the method internationally as being “tote-board diplomacy.” Pressure groups like Greenpeace and the Sierra Club already do this with various report cards on general environment protection issues, or with the regular issuance of statistics on carbon emissions. The estates general could go further, making tote-board diplomacy a standard for measuring the performance not just of national and provincial governments, but of local governments and large public or private sector corporations in the reducing of emissions. Faith groups, political parties, even environmentalists themselves on their success in mobilizing climate change action outside the ambit of the conference. Civil society—and ideally government, business, and faith organizations—could collaborate on funding a permanent secretariat that would assist the estates general during and after its meetings. The estates general could elect a president or spokespersons from within its ranks to spread the messages. Nonparticipation in the estates general by key actors would give them especially negative grades on the tote-board, an idea put forward by
Marc Levy in *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection.*

This would create a trickle-down activism effect, as delegates vied for regional and sectoral representation. Given the levels of interest and some of the preparatory steps outlined above, such an estates general could indeed capture the vigor and scope of current interest the environment, especially global warming. Although some self-selection of participants would take place, the imperatives to attend and some further accountability mechanisms, described below, would help bring people to the table.

Nonetheless—and this is one of the great merits of this approach—there is no absolute precondition of national government participation, or even cooperation, in such an endeavor. The estates general could be launched by a multistakeholder coalition and might benefit at the first instance from separation from government. This kind of approach may not be as familiar to traditional environmental activism, but given the increase in activists' capacity after the Montreal/Kyoto conference in December 2005, and the increased profile of the issue generally, it may be more helpful to try to bring as many new activists and sympathetic business partners in first. This also helps keep the estates general in control of activists and citizens, and away from short-term political agendas that may be dominating the national legislature or executive branch.

We must acknowledge that even with all the proposals above in place, though they may take us on the path to more genuine engagement and greater accountability, our ultimate aims may not be met. It is possible that a more fundamental realignment of environmental decision-making needs to be considered. This might require, for instance, popular participation in deciding exactly how a society will reach given emissions targets, or in deciding how to direct a given allocation of spending on anti-climate change initiatives. Instead of depending on elected representatives, citizens chosen by lot would deliberate on policy options and make choices. (This approach has recently been tried with electoral reform in Canada.) This, too, is hard. Citizens would have to be fully briefed on the relevant public policy issues. Governments would need to make a political commitment to carry through on the decisions made by the citizen-deliberators. Such a radical solution could undercut governments but holds potential for being the most effective approach to actually implementing hard choices around industrial and transportation policy that impact climate change.

But, this is a long-term and emergency proposal only. For this to happen, governments would have to surrender a large portion of their representative functions on this specific issue, and constitutional litigation would undoubtedly result.
Going Forward

More and more people are waking up to climate change, by what they hear in their pews or in the movies, by what they see in their weather patterns, and by what they worry about for their children. But their government institutions have failed to fulfill the commitments that scientists and the public have encouraged them to make. In the past, both governments and activists have failed to innovate, focusing on electoral politics and wrangling over international treaties. Emissions targets have not been reached, political action has not been commensurate with political interest in the issue, and, perhaps most importantly, no new institutional mechanisms have been put into place or proposed to ratchet up the pressure. More inventive or rigorous methods of involving citizens in co-managing, in directing their political pressure, or in making their own contributions to emissions reduction are possible. With inventive thinking from above and below, activists can help leverage the right kind and level of pressure to force governments and businesses to make some of the tough choices that mitigation of global warming necessitates in the twenty-first century.

Thanks to Professor William Clark at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University for his help with sources for this article.
Memo to Tomorrow’s Policy Makers: Let the Art In!

BY MARC VOGL

Abstract

Schools of government don’t teach arts policy; federal and state budgets don’t prioritize the arts, and campaigning politicians don’t talk about the arts. That a country should have a ministry of culture or that a city should support a museum, orchestra, or theater is rarely disputed, but that cultural institutions and the artistic creativity that brings them into existence should be an essential component of good public policy is hardly considered.

But if policy makers, and those going into the field, don’t change the way they think about the arts, then they’re compromising their ability to become effective change makers. When policy makers embrace the arts—and policy making is treated as an art—the result is better outcomes and more effective policy. Forward-thinking public servants who have incorporated the arts into their work have been better able to tackle concrete challenges like raising educational performance and building successful affordable housing developments as well as approach more abstract dilemmas like enhancing cross-cultural understanding and creating lasting peace. Those currently engaged in public service, and those preparing to join them, must recognize the intrinsic and instrumental potential of arts and of the creative process and unleash this potential in the service of more enlightened, and more effective, public policy.

There are 247 classes listed in the 2006-2007 John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University course bulletin. Two of them have the word “art” in the title: The Arts of Communication and The Art of Political Leadership. Neither is actually about “art.” The Kennedy School is not atypical; America’s top five graduate schools of public policy together offered only three courses on the subject this academic year. In his 2008 budget President Bush proposes to spend $124 million, 0.005 percent of the nation’s budget, on the National Endowment for the Arts. The entire agency merits just one paragraph in the 346-page main budget book, about 0.1 percent of the text. State spending on the arts has not filled the void left by the federal government. While a country like Britain spends $8 per capita on the arts, the U.S. national average is about $1.10, and California, a national leader in arts-related industries, slashed funding for the arts by 94 percent in 2003, reducing arts funding to just 3 cents per Californian. Four years later, the state’s actor-governor has increased spending on arts education, but the state’s primary arts agency, the California Arts Council, is still funded at just one-sixth of its 2002 level.
While presidential candidates regularly promise to be the "education president," we have yet to see one declare that they're running to be the "arts president." Whether it's because support for the arts doesn't poll well or because individual politicians don't have a personal affinity for the arts, the fact remains that, with the exception of Bill Clinton playing the saxophone on the Arsenio Hall show, the arts don't get much play on the campaign trail.

Thus—at least in institutions of higher learning, in government, and in politics—there appears to be consensus that the arts are not useful to, let alone necessary for, good public policy. Candidates don't talk about it, politicians don't fund it, and leading schools don't teach it.

But if policy makers, and those going into the field, don't change the way they think about the arts, they're compromising their ability to become effective change makers. The arts and the art-making process can equip policy makers with new tools and approaches for meeting society's essential needs and can be instrumental to achieving a wide range of policy objectives. Forward-thinking public servants who have incorporated the arts into their policy making have been better able to tackle concrete challenges like raising educational performance and building successful affordable housing developments as well as approach more abstract dilemmas like enhancing cross-cultural understanding and creating lasting peace. Policy makers who approach their jobs as artists, and who incorporate art and the creative process into their work, will be better equipped to do their jobs well.

Arts and Education

In the field of education, where policy makers are challenged with keeping kids in school, raising their academic proficiency, and preparing them for good jobs, a host of arts programs have been found to improve outcomes.

For over thirty years the Guggenheim Museum's Learning Through Art program has sent artists into New York City public schools to supplement arts and music education; the program has reached over 130,000 students. One museum-run program has successfully increased young children's linguistic sophistication by asking them to deconstruct the Arshile Gorky's *The Artist and His Mother* (1926). As compared to a control group, the elementary school students exposed to the postimpressionist painter's work were better able to retain focus during a conversation, develop interpretive hypotheses based on evidence, and describe what they saw more thoroughly.
And the instrumental application of the arts for educators can be vast. Studies in the *Journal of Educational Research* have found that incorporating drama and drawing into regular lesson plans greatly improves narrative writing skills of second and third graders. Developmental psychologists have done field work showing that the high school dropout rate is significantly lower among students who participate in after-school activities generally (including the arts) and a study conducted by Florida State University’s Center for Music Research found that students at risk for dropping out of high school often credited the arts as a reason not to give up on their education. Focusing on a much younger age group, a report in the *Journal of Aesthetic Education* has found compelling evidence that teaching kindergarteners how to read and make music improves their spatial reasoning, a crucial skill for solving multistep problems.

A successful educational policy should ensure that the arts are incorporated not as an expendable counterpoint to the academic curriculum (e.g., the art class squeezed into the schedule once the testing is out of the way), but as an integral part of it. The arts don’t detract from—or even simply complement—schools’ ability to be successful: they enhance educators’ ability to teach and children’s ability to learn.

### Arts and Affordable Housing

Beyond the realm of education, the arts have contributed to success in urban development. Approaching urban planning as a work of art not only adds aesthetic value to the built environment; the arts have a unique capacity to foster strong senses of community, cultural understanding, and pride. An example of this can be found in Houston’s Third Ward. In the early 1990s Rick Lowe, a studio artist, took a look around this inner-city neighborhood and found challenges familiar to any urban planner: a historically rich but economically poor community struggling to keep itself safe, healthy, and worth living in. Approaching the problem as an artist, Lowe imagined rehabilitating twenty-two forlorn shotgun shacks as a found-art canvas. The organization he created—Project Row Houses—went beyond restoring homes with an artistic touch. Lowe’s group resurrected the African-American tradition of the shotgun-house community to create a set of structures that became both a world class art installation and a vibrant inner-city village of thriving art studios, galleries, office space, and housing for single mothers looking for a chance to get on their own feet. The value added by Lowe’s approach to rehabilitating housing is manifest in the community’s pride in its physical landscape, its connection to its history by way of reimagined traditional architectural forms, and unique sense of place that walking by, and living in, works of art provides.

Lowe’s work is also crucial in the context of gentrification. How can a city be transformed? How can the contest between a neighborhood’s past and present be resolved? Should an old house be knocked down? Should people be displaced? Projects like Lowe’s engage these questions and ensure that the cultural and historic
value of the impoverished neighborhood shine through and continue to contribute to the reanimation of a community.

Lowe’s career proves that artists can make policy and policy makers can—and should—make art; creating art and serving the public aren’t conflicting goals but rather work best in concert. “We can approach our lives as artists,” he told Michael Kimmelman in the 17 December 2006 New York Times. “You don’t have to make houses the way people always have. If you choose to, you can make every action a creative act.”

**Arts and Understanding**

From Shakespeare to Spielberg, there are many artistic depictions of common humanity transcending racial, ethnic, and national identities and communities in conflict finding a way to live together. But can the arts play any role in promoting understanding and creating peace in reality?

Getting parties in conflict to talk and work with one another is a good starting point for any peacemaker. As the Israeli conductor Daniel Barenboim and the late Palestinian scholar Edward Said discovered, creating art is a constructive way to get young Jews and Arabs to start the dialogue.

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**The process of making music is a powerful metaphor for making peace and an instructive tool for the negotiators, diplomats, community organizers, and national leaders who seek to bring a fractured part of the world together.**

Barenboim and Said formed the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra in 1999. Each year the orchestra brings one hundred musicians from the many countries of the Middle East to practice and perform an expansive repertoire of classical music at concert halls around the world. In a region littered with broken treaties and hollow speeches, the orchestra members overcome a bloody history by speaking a different language: music.

Music is well suited to dialogue among parties in conflict and to understanding of interdependence because, as Barenboim observes on the orchestra’s Web site, “music does not contain limited associations as words do. Music teaches us that there is nothing that does not include its parallel or opposite, therefore no element is entirely independent because it is by definition in a relationship of inter-dependence.” As they pick up their instruments, learn their scores, and practice personalizing melodies and forging harmonies, the young musicians don’t just lose themselves in the rigors of mastering a difficult craft. They are practicing creativity and understanding. Their conductor, in an interview with NPR, told listeners that one does not play music to forget the world, but to learn about it. Intelligent musicians, he continued, must play creatively.
and express all their feelings about that music, but also must listen to what their fellow musicians are playing—a perfect school for building understanding.

The process of making music is a powerful metaphor for making peace and an instructive tool for the negotiators, diplomats, community organizers, and national leaders who seek to bring a fractured part of the world together.

Of course, incorporating the arts into the peace-building process may not yield the tangible, quantifiable results seen in education and urban planning programs that embrace art. The value in this context is, admittedly, more abstract. But envisioning a peaceful Middle East is abstract too, and getting from today’s violence to tomorrow’s serenity requires creativity, imagination, collaboration, and understanding—“abstract” qualities that the arts are so good at developing and nurturing.

Conclusion

The intrinsic value of art is appreciated by anyone who has ever found a familiar truth or a revolutionary surprise in a painting, a song, or a book. And the value of art as a form of social commentary has long been recognized. What today and tomorrow’s policy makers need to understand is that the arts have tremendous instrumental value as well and that by incorporating the arts into policy and approaching their policy-maker roles as artists, they can create better policy.

Too often the arts are relegated by politicians to the status of inessential decoration—the museum, the public mural, or the concert in the park are seen as luxuries for a society that’s met all its “important” needs. Elected officials and public servants need to realize that art is itself essential.

Increasingly, academics and practitioners in the public policy field preach the gospel of tri-sector competence and interdisciplinary approaches to problem solving. Responses to the world’s most vexing policy challenges require the involvement of public agencies, private firms, and nonprofit organizations. Successful policies blend the assets and competencies of different fields like a great collagist borrowing from this media and to fuse the world they know and the world they see into a coherent and original vision.

None of these cross-sector, interdisciplinary approaches, however, is possible without a willingness on the part of policy makers and policy educators to embrace the collage model of policy innovation. They must avail themselves of the idea that there is much to be learned by looking outside of the narrow silos in which policy expertise has long been sequestered and to let the art in. From rehabilitating a shotgun shack to repairing a war-torn corner of the globe, the arts and the creative process contain a unique set of intrinsic and instrumental qualities ready to be tapped in the name of enlightened, more effective public policy. It’s up to those currently engaged in public service and those preparing to join them to recognize this potential, understand it, and put it into action to transform the world.
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Plan B in Iraq: Beyond the Surge: Keeping the Military Relevant in an Asymmetric World

BY FERNANDO MARTINEZ LUIJÁN

Abstract

Regardless of the outcome of “the surge” this summer, growing domestic political pressure will likely soon force American decision makers to pull the plug on the large U.S. troop presence in Iraq. Faced with this difficult situation, senior military and civilian leaders must act now to develop a viable Plan B as an alternative to precipitous, forced troop withdrawal. By necessity, this Plan B must incorporate both a smaller, sustainable troop presence and a series of sweeping organizational reforms to address the military’s badly outdated intervention strategies. Yet the stumbling in Iraq is only a symptom of a much larger problem: America’s military and civilian institutions, organized for Cold War conflict, have grown increasingly incapable of dealing with today’s world of failing states, insurgencies, humanitarian crises, and nonstate actors. Without a major reform of institutions—leveraging interagency elements, developing more nuanced and culturally attuned forces, and recognizing the importance of the media—the changing dynamics in areas of conflict will make American power increasingly irrelevant.

The Surge: Mission Impossible?

While public opinion is still radically divided regarding the ongoing plan to “surge” 21,500 additional American troops into Iraq, there can be little argument that the next twelve months will be decisive to America’s future. Despite attempts by the administration to portray the new plan as only one option out of many remaining, most media outlets are now describing the troop increase as a last chance for American and Iraqi forces to “secure the country.” As a result, insurgents and death squads can win by not losing. They understand that in a war that is being fought largely in the news, any major attack conducted during the surge discredits the United States and helps mark this “last chance” as a failure. Even if the attacks occur in less-defended areas outside of Baghdad and Anbar—away from where the surge is targeted—the insurgents know that the resulting ten-second news sound bites will make no distinction.

Once the additional troops are in place this summer (and even better, once American leadership has begun to call the new plan a success), the insurgents will be in ideal position to conduct a Tet Offensive-style campaign of escalated attacks to cripple any remaining U.S. domestic support. But unlike the North Vietnamese, they will not need to attack U.S. bases directly to achieve their aims; attacks against mar-
kets, mosques, schools, and other soft targets will be just as effective at reinforcing the perception that the surge has failed and the war is hopeless.

To make matters worse, the timing for the troop increase coincides with the run-up to the 2008 U.S. elections. As early campaign speeches already show, the majority of presidential candidates have chosen some kind of troop withdrawal as a central part of their platform. Regardless of whether the surge results in limited success or limited failure, there is little chance that the newly elected president of the United States—Republican or Democrat—will be willing or able to support sustained troop levels for more than a few months after taking office. Polls conducted in early spring 2007 by ABC, Associated Press, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post reinforce these predictions, showing that a growing majority of voting-age Americans support withdrawal within twelve months and see the situation in Iraq as unwinnable.

Meanwhile, the strain on the army and Marines has grown to the point where continued deployment—even at pre-surge levels—will force ever greater mobilization of diluted and less-trained reserve forces, push retention levels to all-time lows, and, in the words of the National Security Advisory Group, risk “breaking the force.” As the group (chaired by former secretary of defense William Perry) details in its 2006 report, current operational demands “pose a very real threat to future security.” Even if the army succeeds in meeting its recruiting and retention goals, it is already showing a deficit of eighteen thousand personnel in its junior enlisted ranks and is soon expected to fall short by thirty thousand soldiers overall. Over 95 percent of National Guard and reserve combat units have been mobilized, and there is little remaining combat capacity remaining, short of rewriting the statutory rules that govern deployments. The smaller Marine Corps is being affected to an even greater extent: all active-duty marine units are on a continual “tight” rotation schedule, with seven months deployed, less than a year home to refit, then another seven months deployed.

The situation is critical for the senior leaders charged with “winning” the war. They must develop plans to address the changing conditions at home and abroad, informed by the recognition that deployment of over one hundred thousand troops in Iraq will soon become untenable. The continued assumption that existing troop levels can be maintained is a prescription for certain failure. Instead, a more sustainable Plan B should be developed and presented to policy makers as an alternative to forced, precipitous withdrawal.

The alternate plan must begin with a fundamental acceptance that the existing paradigm for military intervention is no longer adequate and a new framework is needed. Plan B would incorporate three critical elements: (1) a generational approach to the Iraq War based on the idea of smaller, embedded forces and long-term institution building, (2) a massive mobilization of talent from both civilian and military society to engage with Iraqi institutions across a broad front, and (3) a drastically increased focus on information warfare and the role of public opinion. Yet these three compo-
ments represent only the first steps toward an essential and all-encompassing reform of America's military and civilian institutions. The alternate organizational strategy embodied by Plan B points the way toward a new type of bifurcated force structure—a structure that prepares groups of soldiers for either conventional security or nation building—that will become indispensable for success in future conflicts.

The most fundamental reason behind the deteriorating security situation in Iraq is outdated organizational structure and culture.

Football and Water Polo: How Did the Situation Get So Bad?

Before examining a solution, we must first understand the problem: the most fundamental reason behind the deteriorating security situation in Iraq is outdated organizational structure and culture. During a January 2007 lecture at the Fletcher School, Cofer Black (President Bush's former State Department coordinator for counterterrorism) described the changing position of our security-related agencies and departments this way: "Before 9/11 we were like a fantastic football team. We could run and pass and tackle. We were invincible, and we ran through the doors of the stadium on game day ready to tear apart our opponents... but instead of a field we found a swimming pool, and everyone was wearing goofy hats. The game was water polo, and we had no idea how to play it."

Due to several factors that included major technological advantages, a lack of serious asymmetric (or unconventional) threats, and a desire to not repeat the Vietnam experience, the United States pursued a doctrine prior to September 11 that emphasized overwhelming firepower and decisive engagement. This approach—named the Powell doctrine after its greatest proponent, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and secretary of state Colin Powell—asserts that when the United States engages in war, every resource and tool should be used to achieve overwhelming force against the enemy, minimizing U.S. casualties and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate (hence the initial "Shock and Awe" campaign in Iraq). This philosophy of overwhelming force has its roots in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and has been used successfully in conflicts over the past two hundred years. But sadly, it has not proved effective in Iraq, and it will grow even less effective in the future. The doctrine that was perfected during the Cold War has begun to break down in today's unipolar world of nonstate actors, humanitarian crises, and failing states.

The United States simply cannot treat these emerging asymmetric conflicts (whereby weaker, nonstate enemies attempt to circumvent superior military power through surprise and ruthlessness) as if they met the classifications or assumptions of the old doctrine: Decisive, quick victory is impossible. Success lies not in the number of enemies killed, but in the difficult campaign for "hearts and minds." The use of firepower is often counterproductive. Technology and expensive equipment offer little
advantage. Initiative, adaptability, and cultural understanding at the lowest level are often the most critical factors.

Yet to this day, the philosophy of overwhelming force and the legacy of conventional organizational architecture largely continues to shape stability operations. American divisions are still generally organized to conduct synchronized, large-scale battles against advancing tank columns. Orders flow from top to bottom and war plans are created at the highest levels. Combat forces are formed into stove-piped, hierarchical, Napoleonic brigades with high-level staffs growing wildly bloated in an effort to analyze all available data, develop strategies, and issue commands to their waiting subordinates. Innovation typically arises in spite of (rather than because of) organizational structures. Midlevel and senior commanders raised in pre-September 11 years stress kinetic (or offensive) operations and conduct large-scale search and destroy-type missions, fruitlessly attempting to flush out elusive enemies that refuse open combat and hide perfectly within the population. Deployed units—discouraged from taking risks or experimenting to develop better tactics—are concentrated on huge “mega-bases” with little meaningful partnership or interaction with Iraqis. Initiative on the ground is replaced by strict rules and the need to gain “approval from higher,” usually through an elaborate process of PowerPoint slide requirements sent over secure e-mail.

The military—still organizationally outdated and struggling to transform itself out of Cold War paradigms—has become increasingly tasked to perform the whole range of reconstruction and security activities with little interagency support.

The centralization and bureaucracy exhibited by military forces only encourages a similar trend in the interagency (i.e., government but nonmilitary), multinational, and private entities that ostensibly support them. Invaluable assets such as linguists, analysts, and technical advisors are often retained at the highest level instead of being sent down to the units engaged in the reconstruction and stability effort. The majority of civilian resources, personnel, and support systems are confined to the most secure areas like the Green Zone of Baghdad, far removed from the realities of local politics, intimidation, and survival (for more, read Imperial Life in the Emerald City by Washington Post writer Rajiv Chandrasekaran). Huge military staffs become so bloated with haphazardly added interagency and contractor personnel that their primary purpose—supporting forces on the ground—is obscured by the production of meaningless slide presentations and hundred-page reports. In such an environment, where weekly Latin Dance nights, Burger King, swimming pools, and ice cream are the norm, it is easy to understand how reconstruction plans have failed to fully address the needs of Iraqis.
The truth is that no plan developed in such an isolated environment can ever hope to save Iraq or curb the violence. In other words, Iraq is far too granular and complex for a plan developed in the Green Zone. Interagency resources must be pushed down to the lowest level, fully integrated with military forces, then empowered to plan and execute in a decentralized manner.

This is not to suggest that there has been no attempt to include other agencies outside of the Green Zone. The military’s interim solution, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), is certainly a step in the right direction. In theory, these interagency teams, consisting of elements from the State Department, the Agency for International Development, various NGOs, and other reconstruction-related groups would work cooperatively at the provincial level to “win hearts and minds.” However, in practice, the PRTs are generally understaffed by interagency personnel, not integrated fully with the efforts of American combat units, and lacking an effective program to develop the capability of Iraqi administrators. Those civilian personnel assigned duty at far-flung firebases are often very junior and uninformed about joint operations. A comprehensive reform in the way America staffs, organizes, trains, and employs its interagency forces overseas is becoming increasingly urgent. None of the involved agencies have committed to developing a robust cadre of professional, deployable, and fully trained personnel capable of operating completely outside of the familiar embassy circuit. Instead, the military—still organizationally outdated and struggling to transform itself out of Cold War paradigms—has become increasingly tasked to perform the whole range of reconstruction and security activities with little interagency support. Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s request earlier this year for military assistance in filling the State Department’s assigned PRT billets should be a clear sign of the times.

Closing Windows of Opportunity in Iraq

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the impact of these collective organizational shortcomings is to imagine the Iraq War as a series of closing windows of opportunity: in the days after toppling Saddam’s regime, coalition forces had a rapidly closing window of opportunity to reestablish basic services and security before losing the confidence of Iraqi citizens. The outdated organizational concepts I’ve described played a critical role by encouraging misplaced operational and strategic focus. Instead of capitalizing on existing Iraqi power structures and working through local institutions, interim U.S. administrators drafted short-sighted policies such as de-Baathification and the demobilization of the Iraqi military, which only helped sow the seeds of a powerful insurgency. Instead of leveraging interagency expertise and planning in advance for the complex political and cultural geography, planning initiatives such as the Free Iraq Project were brushed aside in favor of traditional military war plans (as detailed by former senior State Department advisor David Phillips in his book Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco). By failing to meet the initial window of
opportunity in Iraq and leaving local citizens vulnerable to mass looting, food shortages, unemployment, and politically motivated violence, the coalition set into motion events that would begin the long, slow decline into more lasting chaos.

The loss of Iraqi confidence in the first few months enabled other actors to use grievances to recruit followers, gain power, and eventually oppose coalition efforts. In this sense, one failed window of opportunity led to others, each more difficult and more disastrous if unmet: the neutralization and/or integration of Sadr’s militia, the reconciliation of Sunni moderates, the blocking of Mughaweir militiamen attempting to infiltrate Iraqi police forces, the engagement of regional actors—none of these goals necessary for security was accomplished. At each stage, the military’s outdated structure and procedures only made each task more difficult by wasting valuable time: Time that could have been devoted to containment of insurgent elements and large-scale reconstruction was instead spent learning hard lessons, attempting to adapt the military’s culture to a counterinsurgency, and forming ad hoc organizations to conduct vital training and development missions—which, prior to the war, were seen as ancillary concerns at best.

This summer, the U.S.-led coalition faces a final closing window of opportunity: It must hand off security responsibilities to reasonably competent Iraqi forces and begin drawing down troop levels before logistical, political, or operational concerns force a precipitous withdrawal. If a handoff cannot be done on coalition terms, the consequences will go far beyond military defeat. Foreign policy experts continue to debate a whole range of likely nightmarish scenarios, including the emergence of a Sunni-dominated ministate that facilitates international terrorism, an upsurge in sectarian violence that rips the nation apart and leads to genocidal activity, the rise of a nuclear Iran as a regional hegemon, and the permanent loss of U.S. prestige.

Despite these dire possibilities, there have been some encouraging signs of change: General David Petraeus and his small cadre of counterinsurgency experts have assumed command in Iraq and set to work reversing the long-standing culture of conventional-minded operations. The surge, beyond its obvious call for more troops, also calls for a renewed focus on securing civilian populations and working to win hearts and minds. Coupled with the other economic, political, and structural reforms unveiled earlier this year, the overall Iraq strategy has clearly improved on many fronts. But given the rapidly changing political situation at home and the state of our overstretched military, the simple reality is that time is going to run out for the surge. An alternate plan is needed, built upon the assumption that the current troop presence will be forcibly drawn down in the near future by political pressures. The following represents an outline for such a Plan B based upon three critical policy initiatives that leaders at the highest levels of government must consider.
Critical Step #1: Force a Paradigm Shift: Smaller, Embedded, and Long Term

The first critical step attacks the fundamental cause of failure and makes immediate, sweeping changes to the organization of forces on the ground. Senior governmental leaders must preempt a politically forced, complete withdrawal from Iraq by presenting an alternate plan that incorporates major organizational changes and significant—but not total—troop reductions. Plan B would force a paradigm shift in the way our troops are organized and directed on the ground. The U.S. military in Iraq would be drawn down drastically to reflect a mission focused exclusively on combat advisor duties and long-term engagement. The rhetoric and policy of “decisive victory” would be scrapped in favor of a generational approach. Attempting to surge forces into Iraq in hopes of speeding up the process of bringing a functional central government, competent security forces, and a self-sustaining economy to Iraq is simply unrealistic; Plan B would reduce the U.S. presence as much as possible while simultaneously increasing integration with Iraqi forces. This smaller, more sustainable force structure—numbering thirty-five thousand troops or less—will send the message that these advisory teams are there to stay and capable of working with Iraqi security forces for as long as necessary.

After a careful 12- to 18-month phased redeployment of excess combat units, the remaining troops would be organized into small groups of specially selected and trained American advisors working exclusively within Iraqi security forces. Instead of the traditional framework of brigades and battalions on huge mega-bases, U.S. forces would operate in platoon-sized elements of approximately thirty men, each completely embedded within larger Iraqi security forces and supported by interagency elements, civil society, and private contractors. The advisors’ role would be to provide mentorship, ensure the Iraqi forces work against the insurgency and sectarian violence, and call for reinforcements or air support if needed. Rather than attempting to directly intervene in the growing civil strife, this strategy focuses working with the Iraqi soldiers and policemen that will continue the fight long after the coalition withdraws. Advisors would evaluate and build local forces in the best way known to work, gaining their trust by eating, sleeping, training, and fighting alongside their counterparts at all levels in the chain of command. Iraqi leaders or soldiers found to be corrupt or incompetent would be replaced, their jobs turned over to the most effective and progressive of their subordinates.

Doubters who might ask, “What about the security of these small advisor elements? What if one of these platoons gets in trouble?” should remember that this type of program has already been in existence in Iraq for some time, on a smaller scale. Hundreds of military transition teams (MiTTs) exist in Iraq today, each consisting of ten to fifteen senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers. A large proportion of these teams already live completely embedded within their assigned Iraqi units. To this date, not a single MiTT team has been overrun by insurgents. MiTT teams, though seemingly more exposed and isolated, are generally less vulnerable because of
the ties they’ve forged with their Iraqi counterparts. The Iraqi units feel a brotherly bond with their American advisors and hold themselves responsible for the MiTT team’s safety. The MiTT model has to be grown to be a primary element of the U.S. strategy.

As an additional safeguard, these dispersed, decentralized teams would also be covered by a perpetual security umbrella provided by standard, conventional units. What many American leaders have failed to recognize is that in this new century, with technology and communication constantly evolving, the threat of immediate, lethal force is more potent than the actual presence of force. The tank on the street corner is more obtrusive and less important than the idea that a flight of fighter jets and a company of helicopter-borne shock troops are only a radio call away. While most of the overt American military presence would be withdrawn from the country, a small but well-equipped presence of traditionally organized military forces would be retained in regionally positioned quick reaction force (QRF) bases. From these few bases—far enough away from civilian populations to reduce frictions but close enough to respond—the more heavily armed standard military units could offer assistance by sending mechanized or helicopter-borne reinforcements and/or medical assets (such as MEDEVAC). With the assistance of the air force, these regionally located bases could also run twenty-four-hour combat air patrols to provide the air support needed in the event of a serious enemy attack. Some mechanized ground units would also be pushed out as necessary to the Iranian border, where their thermal sensors could make a difference in securing the vast desert expanses.

Yet the changed military framework called for under Plan B represents only half of the needed organizational reforms. The military advisor teams are designed to form part of a broader interagency network that would be embedded in all major Iraqi institutions—the army, the police, the courts, the government, the education system, and so on. In the same way that the military advisory teams would work with Iraqi security forces, newly created civil advisory teams would partner with their Iraqi counterparts to focus on capacity building, rule of law, development, and governance. The existing concept of provincial reconstruction teams does not go far enough—PRTs must be further decentralized and embedded within standing institutions at the lowest level possible. Without fully embedding civil advisors, American-led forces remain blind to the infiltration or influence of foreign or corrupt powers. Take for instance the example of a PRT-sponsored water purification plant in southern Iraq: after a very modest turn-out for the ribbon-cutting ceremony to open the new facility in March 2006, U.S. civil affairs personnel later discovered that a huge, second ceremony had been conducted only hours later in their absence—and that the entire project had been publicly attributed to the benevolent Iranian government! By embedding as closely as possible with the most critical Iraqi institutions, U.S.-led forces can increase their ability to build productive relationships and expose the most harmful or corrupt actors.

Under Plan B, interagency and military elements would thus form a dispersed net-
work of embedded advisor teams working through Iraqi institutions to help improve Iraqi society and governance. Top-heavy bureaucratic structures would be ruthlessly stripped away. To synchronize efforts, the various teams would still be grouped into provincially sized geographic regions and issued guidance by an overall military leader, but cooperation and initiative would be the guiding principles. Instead of awaiting specific, detailed plans from headquarters in Baghdad, each team would be given general mission-type guidance and the freedom to determine the best way to contribute to the overall intent. Each team’s mission would define its composition, whether it be assisting a local mayor to bring basic services to his people, establishing a court system, or building a cadre of trained civil engineers. Select teams would be empowered with an FDR New Deal-type charter to create a job corps and develop projects on a massive scale. A system of reverse embeds would also be created to allow the next generation of Iraqi administrators to learn by working within American-led teams, thus building the indigenous capacity to continue reconstruction efforts after the coalition withdraws. The overarching effort would not be to rebuild Iraq, but to create a capacity for self-governance within Iraqi institutions through the training, advice, technical support, and targeted financial assistance.

This new dynamic of small footprints, direct embedding, and umbrella security is the key to success in Iraq and the larger War on Terror.

This new dynamic of small footprints, direct embedding, and umbrella security is the key to success in Iraq and the larger War on Terror. The current surge plan simply attempts to achieve too much in too short a period of time. Without fully partnering with Iraqi forces and embracing the idea of a lasting (but small-scale) presence, U.S.-led coalition forces will constantly be faced with a security vacuum the moment they withdraw. The drastic change in strategy and organization prescribed by Plan B would transform the existing task force into an entity much more capable of achieving its true mission—the long-term, disciplined, and gradual development of Iraqi institutions.

Critical Step #2: Surge Military and Civilian Talent, Not Troops Alone

*America isn’t at war. The marines are at war. America is at the mall.*

—From a bulletin board in Ramadi

The next critical step addresses both staggering shortages in civilian interagency support and counterproductive manning strategies in the military. Plan B must be accompanied by a massive recruitment of talent from across American society to fill thousands of civil advisory positions. Up until now, there has been little real mobilization of any segment of society outside of the military. Conspicuously absent from all State of the Union addresses and White House press conferences is a call for sacrifice from
the public at large. Yet the Iraq War, unlike the World Wars before it, does not hinge 
upon the mass production of tanks, guns, bombs, and warships. Instead, success in Iraq 
hinges on the mass mobilization of America’s best and brightest to solve the innumer-
able challenges of reconstruction, stability, training, and capacity building. The war is 
labor intensive, not materiel intensive. No amount of congressionally allocated recon-
struction dollars will ever change the dire situation without the balanced application 
of skilled individuals to engage with Iraqi institutions—talented civil servants, academ-
dics, technical experts, and administrators from all walks of life are needed to help 
build the capacity for development.

Policy makers must turn their full attention to enlisting the kind of talent needed 
to take much of the reconstruction burden off of the military. Up until now, there has 
been no concerted effort to fill this shortfall because the need has scarcely been rec-
ognized or announced. The various agencies and departments involved in Iraq have not 
even committed to the idea of building a robust cadre of reconstruction advisors, let 
alone begun recruiting for it. As a result, a whole generation of experienced and com-
mitted Americans remains unengaged and underutilized. Plan B forces the United 
States to come to terms with the lack of nonmilitary talent by identifying the specific 
numbers of personnel and expertise required in order to constitute the new organiza-
tional paradigm.

In the short term, the mobilization of talent will require not only recruiting for vol-
unteers, but also calling upon expertise outside of government in the form of private 
contractors. These contractors—unlike many of the private security companies cur-
cently in Iraq—must not be treated as separate, free-ranging entities, but instead be 
integrated directly within civil assistance teams. Each contractor would be hired to fill 
specific gaps and held as fully accountable for performance and conduct. The range of 
useful skills is virtually unlimited: security, electrical engineering, farming, road con-
struction, census taking, urban planning, and other skills that can be effectively taught 
to Iraqi administrators over time. The use of the private sector, which will continue to 
increase in asymmetric conflicts, must be fully embraced but carefully structured—the 
goal is flexibility with oversight.

At the same time that America mobilizes its civilian talent to implement Plan B, 
the U.S. military must similarly make a focused effort to send its best and brightest to 
Iraq. The U.S. military ranks are more educated, skilled, and dedicated than any previ-
ous cohort, and soldiers have shown great bravery in the face of adversity. Within the 
ranks, a scattered group of talented individuals continues to exhibit special distinction. 
These individuals must be the foundation upon which a Plan B is built. More than any 
other type of military endeavor, the forces charged with counterinsurgency and nation 
building rely heavily on the individual talent of those working at the lowest levels. The 
effort requires soldiers who are comfortable working with only minimal guidance, 
through many cultural barriers, and surrounded by their Iraqi allies. These individu-
als—using their unique ability to assess the complex cultural landscape, build rela-
tionships, and develop trust—become invaluable over time as they gain a deep understanding of how to improve their surroundings.

Given these realities, the current military manning strategy in Iraq makes little sense. In many ways the military is still conducting personnel management in ways that resemble peacetime. The majority of the military’s best officers and NCOs regularly rotate through stateside academic tours or other noncombat-related assignments. In a similar fashion, the troop rotation schedule in theater reflects the philosophy that the deployment burden should be shared as equally as possible across all units. A wide range of military units of all types, proficiencies, and experiences takes turns serving in theater. While both these practices were designed with good intentions—they attempt to maximize quality of life—there are many unfortunate side effects: there is little continuity, and rarely do any of the constantly cycling units ever return to the same area for a second tour. As a result, the newly arrived units must spend months learning the intricacies of their individual areas. The former commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, commented about the same phenomenon in Vietnam when he quipped, “We didn’t fight a nine-year war... We fought a one-year war nine times.” Additionally, current manning strategies can lead to a mismatch in abilities, with poorly prepared units relieving highly proficient ones—sometimes in extremely sensitive areas where a weak plan can totally unravel stability. An ill-trained, culturally ignorant, or otherwise mediocre unit makes poor decisions, offends the locals, and undermines a year of development efforts.

Senior leadership must recall the military’s best talent to the fight now, while the outcome of the war hangs in the balance. The reduced force presence called for in Plan B would allow the military to surge talent by recruiting gifted individuals and selecting its most counterinsurgency-savvy units to deploy as the foundation for its embedded advisory force. These selected forces would undertake a type of tag-team rotation schedule already being used by many Special Operations Forces. Under the new schedule, two similar embedded teams would take turns working a year on, then a year off with the same Iraqi unit. While local conditions will certainly change in the space of a year, the task of making adjustments and resuming old relationships with Iraqi counterparts will be much easier than starting anew in a strange area. Also, to capitalize on each embedded team’s inherent talents, those selected for service in Iraq under the new organizational paradigm would undergo extensive training in counterinsurgency, intelligence, reconstruction, and language/culture to prepare them specifically for their role as advisors. This training would be conducted by experts: representatives from Special Forces, the CIA, the State Department, the FBI, and even Iraqi refugees would be employed for various phases of the program in order to give every team the best possible chances for success.

While the two or three such contingents are fully committed to the long-term campaign in Iraq, the rest of the military would begin the much-needed process of recovery and retraining. Senior leadership would be given time to reconstitute military
capabilities, continue the process of transformation, and repair the logistical damage done by five years of continuous operations. Despite the obvious benefits to the military as a whole, the emotional and physical toll on the most talented members of the force cannot be discounted. Healthy incentives will be necessary to attract and compensate the individuals selected for service in Iraq: Targeted bonuses equivalent to a 200 percent pay increase (comparable to the rates offered by private security contractors such as Blackwater), increased opportunity for promotion, and special training would be needed to compensate these patriots for repeated tours and more demanding roles. These measures—as well as the others I’ve described to mobilize civilian talent—are certainly drastic and costly. But this country has reached a point where drastic measures can no longer be avoided.

Critical Step #3: Wage an Information War

The final critical step deals with the role of the media. Even if the forces in Iraq can be effectively reorganized and American talent can be brought to the fight, any successes will be instantly nullified if portrayed negatively in the news. A major shortcoming in all Iraq strategy to date is the failure to recognize the supreme importance of information. The two “centers of gravity” for this war should not be identified as the senior al Qaeda leadership and Anbar Province, but instead as Iraqi and American public opinion. Victory is utterly impossible without fully engaging both. It is therefore surprising that we collectively have done so little to influence the media coverage at home and abroad. The military has much to learn from the public relations teams used by corporate America, where brand or reputation has a direct effect on earnings. The Department of Defense needs to adopt a strategy of more proactive, direct engagement with the U.S. media, even direct-hiring the best of the private sector to train and lead these expanded media relations teams.

Plan B would include a far-reaching and well-developed media component. The goal would be an open dialogue: instead of refusing comment or using carefully crafted scripts, General Petraeus should take the opportunity provided by his fresh command and the new strategy to start a running conversation with the American people. In the same way the General Schwarzkopf held press briefings during Desert Storm, General Petraeus should be a common sight on national television, offering frank assessments of our troops’ progress and setbacks. The existing rhetoric for Iraq is dangerously simple: our troops are “hunting down Isalo-fascist terrorists,” who have been driven insane by some “perversion of their religion” that compels them to strap bombs to themselves. The American people need to hear from the commanding general in Iraq that the reality is not so simple. The insurgent fighters are highly rational, committed to defined objectives, and understand the importance of the media better than we do. The American viewer sitting at home is more of a target for roadside bombs than the soldier in the convoy. The insurgent bombings, beheadings, and shootings are not only designed to kill their immediate victims, but also (and more impor-
tantly) to break the will of the American people through their psychological impact. This dynamic cannot be disrupted until Americans begin to understand the complexity of this war and its many different facets, instead of only being subjected to daily reports of anonymous violence.

At the same time, Plan B would engage Iraqi public opinion in a much more aggressive manner. The United States must step up efforts to shape the stories produced by Arab television stations in the region using two distinct approaches. First, the United States should invest significant time and money in creating a separate, overt news source that encompasses Internet, radio, and television coverage. The connection between this news source, run by Iraqis, and the West does not have to be hidden. While an association with Western media may delegitimize the channel to a degree, it will not prevent all Iraqis from watching. This Iraqi alternate lens (an “Arab Fox News,” as my colleague Stephen Hopkins has coined it) would present an alternative viewpoint to the heavily biased Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya networks, which consistently support insurgents by airing exclusive footages of their attacks. Truthful stories with a pro-Western spin would be the goal. Failures would be discussed frankly, but would be balanced with stories regarding the positive actions taken by coalition forces and the atrocities committed by insurgent fighters.

The current effort to improve foreign perceptions of America, led by undersecretary and former senior Bush adviser Karen Hughes, has generally been ineffective. The propaganda efforts must be undertaken on a grand scale, on a similar footing as those during the Cold War to counter Russian propaganda. Moderate Muslim society must be engaged on all fronts to build an alternate dialogue through academic circles, religious leaders, community gatherings, literary publications, popular culture, and other forums. Furthermore, the representatives selected to manage this effort and serve as ambassadors for American culture must be as close to Muslim society as possible—fluent in Arabic, well traveled, born abroad, and as far removed from American stereotypes as possible. Sympathetic American immigrants from the greater Middle East should be aggressively scouted, trained, and employed in this effort.

A second, indirect media channel would also be expanded. Covert action would be broadly authorized to place positive stories through neutral or opposing Iraqi news outlets, all while hiding the American fingerprint. These actions would obviously be conducted more sparingly, but potentially to greater effect. The more neutral or anti-American the news outlet may be, the more legitimate the covertly aired story. In both approaches, the channels between coalition forces and these news outlets would be drastically streamlined so that pro-Western, pro-Iraqi government stories air sooner than those of their pro-insurgent counterparts. Direct communications must be established to allow the embedded military and civilian advisory effort to pass images, facts, vignettes, and other valuable data onto well-trained information managers for rapid dissemination in the media.
Those who question these practices should take the time to examine the ruthless use of propaganda by insurgent groups to recruit volunteers and discredit American-led forces. Ever innovative, enemies of the United States have learned to recover the bodies of their fallen comrades killed in battle, strip away all weapons and ammunition, drag the bodies into a mosque, and send video clips of the mock atrocity to Al Jazeera. Most disturbingly, these staged human rights violations consistently appear with stunning alacrity on television—often only hours later—and long before the hopelessly layered bureaucratic system of official U.S. message approval can release the true story.

**We are on the fringe of a far-reaching and profound revolution that will change the way war is conceived.**

**The Way Ahead: The Need for a Bifurcated Military**

The three critical steps outlined by Plan B are only a small part of much larger reforms that must occur throughout America’s military and civilian institutions. The rough reorganization into embedded teams, the mobilization of talent, the expansion of interagency assistance, the full engagement of the media—these are all short-term steps that reflect the need for a new long-term vision. We are on the fringe of a far-reaching and profound revolution that will change the way war is conceived. The standard notions of military strength—usually measured in the numbers of aircraft, tanks, and personnel or, more recently, in the speed of deployment and level of training—will start to become less important than the ability to influence populations and strengthen governmental institutions abroad. Insurgencies, militias, and other asymmetric enemies thrive where the government is weak and local sympathies are strong. In order to be effective in this type of conflict, the military must be capable of employing some very unconventional tools—health care, security, political advice, development projects, technical training, basic education, farming assistance, and a myriad of other services—to isolate enemies from their supporters. At the same time, the forces engaged in this effort must have the skill, autonomy, and cultural sensitivity to read the complex political landscape and take effective action where needed. The military’s solution to this dilemma thus far—as evidenced in the army’s slogan “every soldier a decathlete”—has been to expect every combat unit to train for conventional war and nation building at the same time. This practice is both unrealistic and harmful. The way forward in Iraq and in the broader War on Terror calls for a bifurcated military, organized into two distinct but supporting elements.

The concept of the bifurcated military is strangely born of compelling but bitterly opposed arguments. The first, advanced by former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others in the lead up to the Iraq War, called for a lighter, faster military that can outsource warfare through surrogates and employ technology to minimize its
presence. Rumsfeld, who once said, “The [military’s] bureaucracy is the number one security threat to this country,” recognized the limitations of the military’s entrenched organizational structure. At the same time, the second argument, put forward by former chairman of the Joint Chiefs Eric Shinseki, was that success in Iraq would require the massive employment of major combat forces. General Shinseki understood the potential chaos that could result in the aftermath of the initial invasion. (These arguments, and the term bifurcated military are developed by Thomas Barnett in his Blueprint for Action).

Both of these arguments are correct. The changing nature of warfare has introduced a growing need for two distinct types of military forces, both robust and well-trained. The first, a conventional-type force, is needed to deter aggression by other nations, provide temporary security to maintain order abroad, and act as a reaction force during emergencies. This force is very similar to the current military and still employs the full array of tanks, heavy weaponry, and large combat units; its task is to seize ground, destroy opposing forces, and provide instant security. There is no chance of eliminating the need for this type of force so long as future conventional wars remain a possibility.

The second type of military force needed in today’s world is altogether different. It would take the form of a diverse network of military, interagency, and civilian elements, and its role would be to work through the institutions of other nations to build the capacity for self governance and self defense. The embedded force structure described in Plan B is only a rough sketch of the full potential this type of organization would possess. This new conception of military power would be lighter and faster, show little sign of the standard bureaucracy, and would barely adhere to the standard definition of “military” at all. The interagency and military force would operate in a decentralized manner and work exclusively within foreign armies, police forces, and governmental offices as embedded advisor teams. The defining characteristics of the new force would be language skills, cultural understanding, and special training to allow the many civilian and military teams to work effectively with their foreign counterparts. While some units within the military have long developed this capability (namely the Army Special Forces and some elements within the marines), there are simply no forces capable of this type of mission on a larger scale or within nonmilitary institutions.

The two forces—conventional and embedded—would thus have distinct roles, but provide mutual support throughout the campaign. Viewing the case of Iraq through the bifurcated paradigm, the intervention would have looked very different indeed: the large conventional-type force would have overthrown the regime, then provided immediate security to prevent looting, preserve order, and avoid a power vacuum. The interagency expeditionary-type force, organized into much smaller and culturally fluent units, would have linked up with those elements of the former Iraqi government that could be persuaded to align with the coalition. Specially selected interagency and mil-
itary elements would have embedded with existing Iraqi police, army, regional government, and civilian infrastructure to preserve as much capacity as possible while recruiting to fill gaps. As quickly as possible (to minimize the perception of foreign occupation), the conventional forces would have repositioned in regional quick reaction force bases. In their place would be Iraqi forces, accompanied exclusively by their embedded military advisors. The dispersed network of government agency, civilian, and military advisors would have served as conduits through which resources could be introduced for reconstruction. Each embedded team would thereby have been in a position to empower, advise, support, or otherwise influence its Iraqi counterparts to provide needed services for the population. We would need a time machine to show that this plan would have worked initially in Iraq; however, the current situation could still see great improvement with the change in organization I suggest.

Looking Beyond Iraq

The type of military and interagency framework I’ve described—both in Plan B and in the long-range vision of a bifurcated military—will become more important as future contingencies arise where a more nuanced, scalable, and legitimately perceived intervention force is needed. In the cases of humanitarian intervention or assistance to failing states, the deployment of large, purely conventional forces may be counterproductive. A smaller, bifurcated force—led by a well-trained and decentralized network of interagency and military teams but supported by a few regionally positioned, conventional response forces—may prove much more effective for many reasons: A smaller force is much more sustainable for the long periods of time needed to enact change in complicated asymmetric conflicts. The concept of multilateral, interagency teams assisting foreign governments to secure their own territories is far less likely to inspire accusations of neo-imperialism (and thus unintentionally unite disparate tribes, clans, and political parties against the United States as a “foreign occupier”). By partnering with local power structures at the lowest level and applying indirect influence via embedded advisory elements, the interagency force would serve as the proverbial glue to bind competing interests under a central government, instead of attempting to overcome cultural animosity, historical differences, and ethnic tensions with sheer numbers and firepower. The embedded expeditionary elements would be in a better position to ensure that their counterparts—local security forces, legal institutions, and governing bodies—adhere to universally held standards for human rights.

Finally, the transformation to a more bifurcated force has its own logical basis due to other developments. Technologically, advances in communications have grown to the point where a decentralized military or multiagency organization—which previously would have been unmanageable—is now preferable and far more responsive than a strict hierarchy. Financially, most of the cost of transformation arises from organizational restructuring or retraining. There is no magic piece of equipment that must be invented or procured to facilitate the change.
But the transition will take time. The forces that will continue to prevent this type of transformation will be political and institutional. Forty-five years of Cold War structures cannot be undone overnight. The most senior military and civilian leaders must be informed and persuaded. The general public must be educated. The challenges of cultural inertia are daunting. Yet there is a growing voice for change coming from within the ranks of the military—from the junior officers and noncommissioned officers who are charged with the real work of the Iraq war and who have felt its frustrations first hand. These young men and women—not a think tank, or a group of Pentagon generals—represent the best hope for transformation.

A real danger of the Iraq war is that the United States will emerge from it learning the wrong lessons: Never intervene, and if we must, do so with more troops and more firepower. Nation building is nearly impossible. The military's only job is to fight wars. But such conclusions are misguided and ignore the reality that nonstate actors and asymmetric threats continue to grow. For all the policy debate and fiery accusations that will continue to rage over the invasion, we must not stop asking how things can be done better. If the wrong lessons are learned from Iraq, the damage to America's position in the world will be inestimable. Rivals will be emboldened with the knowledge that asymmetric warfare is America's Achilles heel—through insurgency, terrorism, subversion, and irregular fighting, even the most powerful nation can be defeated. The United States must create the capability now to deal effectively with these types of threats on a larger scale, or it will be caught in a perpetual cycle of abortive conflicts. Without serious organizational reform, the considerable might of the U.S. military—though armed with the most fearsome weapons and composed of the most dedicated people—will prove increasingly irrelevant and incapable of protecting the nation's interests.
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That Old Village Religion
BY BEN LAMBERT

During my Peace Corps service in Mali, I was prone to weird mental obsessions and fads. I had spent most of my life up to that point in big-city America, where my mind was conditioned to the constant influx of information—from the Internet, radio, television, and magazines. Living in a mud hut without electricity, my brain took to supplying its own media feed.

When I first arrived in Sombo, a village of five hundred people, I kept imagining myself playing video games. Not that I would actually play them in my head, but I would go over games I had played, coming up with new moves and strategies. Later on, as the limited nature of Sombo’s culinary options sunk in, I invented an imaginary restaurant named Señor Shiva’s, which would serve Mexican/Indian fusion cuisine. I spent hours creating a menu in my head, designing the layout, and planning promotional campaigns. These are the things that happen when a mind used to mass culture is suddenly cut off.

I built an image of Zen out of half-remembered articles, Beat literature (I had a copy of On the Road with me), and stereotypes about the East.

Another topic that I fixated on was Zen Buddhism. I didn’t know anything about Zen—only that it seemed calm, detached from struggle. Village life was hot, full of social conflict, sickness, hard work, and poverty. I missed the serenity of quiet air-conditioned rooms. I built an image of Zen out of half-remembered articles, Beat literature (I had a copy of On the Road with me), and stereotypes about the East. I conjured images of silent temples, statues of serene potbellied men, jade, gongs, pools of still water, saffron robes, and meditation. It was soothing.

Meanwhile, all of my friends were trying to convert me to Islam. One of them, Yakuba, was especially persistent. On Fridays he would show up at my hut and try to convince me to come to the mosque with him.

“I’d feel weird,” I would say. “I don’t believe in it. I’d feel like I was faking. Do you really want someone like that in your mosque?”

“Yes. Once you start praying, you’ll start to believe.”

“Can I go next Friday?”

I enjoyed feeling like I was a part of the community, and being asked to prayers gave me the sense that I was accepted. But I also needed to keep part of myself separate, and my strange make-believe world of video games, Zen Buddhism, and fusion...
restaurants helped me preserve that separate space. It was a kind of communion with the detritus of my culture—a reminder of where I had come from.

My reluctance to go to the mosque put me in good stead with the local animists and teenagers, as well as anyone else who resisted the tug of the village’s own version of mass culture embodied by the muezzin’s regular call. The teenage boys especially saw me as sympathetic—the typical bachelor uncle ready to indulge the classic adolescent rebellions. Occasional requests for alcohol and pornography trickled in (it was assumed that I could buy this stuff on my trips into the capital).

I preferred hanging out with the animists—although to say that there was a specific group of them would be inaccurate. Animism was more like a tendency, hidden for the most part, but emerging in private, in the face of danger or sickness, for celebrations, or to protect against enemies. The village chief wielded a special fetish—a wishbone-shaped stick smeared with black gunk—that was so powerful it could only be held with two hands. If you carried it with one hand, it was said, the fetish’s power would flow directly into you, electrocuting you with spirit and killing you immediately. A secret society of hunters met in the bush who could kill at long distance. Eating bananas in the morning caused malaria. A special mixture of honey and herbs, applied before sex, would prevent pregnancy.

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I was in Mali for two years, and as I settled in, I spent less time in my imaginary world, more time with people from the village.

When I came down with a sore throat and lost my voice, my friend Sayon recommended that I visit an old neighbor of his who knew a spell to heal throats. One night we went to his courtyard together. The old man sat me down on a wooden stool and spat on the side of my neck. He rubbed the spit in with the tips of his fingers, chanting from the bottom of his throat. He spat again. His saliva had a sharp smell from the cola nut he’d been chewing. He kept rubbing my neck. I began to get a strange feeling inside my throat and stomach—probably discomfort from being repeatedly spat on. On the other hand it could have been some kind of magic. My voice returned a few days later.

I was in Mali for two years, and as I settled in, I spent less time in my imaginary world, more time with people from the village. I was close with Sayon’s second wife, a young woman named Ame. At night I’d sit next to her and help with her chores. We spent a lot of time sorting corn kernels from chaff and shelling peanuts. Once I bragged to her that America had sent men to the moon. It was a full moon and I pointed at it to make my point.

Ame had a way of moving her eyes very slowly toward you while lowering her brows that indicated she thought you were being stupid.

“The moon,” I said. “Have you ever wanted to go there?”
“No,” she shook her head. “Allah lives on the moon. You go there when you die.”

“Huh” I answered.

She shook her head and shelled a peanut, banging it on the hard dirt to break the shell, then stripping the shell away with her fingers.
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Refugees and the Elephant

by Naseem Khuri

I remember walking through the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria a couple years back thinking to myself, "These people are forgotten." I was stepping over open sewage runoffs and dodging hanging electrical wires, much more slowly and methodically than the seemingly hundreds of children of Shatila Refugee Camp I kept seeing. I was a mid-to-upper-class ArabAmerican kid from Boston, the son of Palestinian parents who had fled their homes in 1948, and I had no idea these people lived like they did.

I met a woman named Suha who had kept the key and deed to the home she and her husband once owned in Palestine forty years ago.

They could have been me. They were regular people with regular needs, considered guests in their countries of residence due to their insistence that one day they will go back to Palestine. I met a boy named Abdel who described for me the hills and olive trees of Palestine from photos, having never left his camp. I met a woman named Suha who had kept the key and deed to the home she and her husband once owned in Palestine forty years ago. I met boys who proudly posed for me near a graffiti depiction of Handala, a famous cartoon of a boy refusing to grow up until he could return to his homeland. On the walls of narrow "streets," there are many paintings of the Al Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem.

And these people do suffer. Shatila is located ten minutes from the beautiful Beirut downtown area and houses more than twelve thousand residents in one square kilometer. Their "guest" status in Lebanon prevents them from attaining high-skill jobs, and they are reduced to minimal pay and horrible living conditions. The Lebanese government both cannot afford to take care of them and relinquishes its need to by proudly insisting that these people will one day return to Palestine. While refugees in Syria are treated much better, the latter stance can easily be used to deflect attention from the people themselves, who, in their hearts, hold the same mentality: they will return.

There were about twelve of us—reporters, lawyers, artists, curious citizens—traveling as a delegation intent on witnessing these conditions. We arrived interested in understanding the stories of Abdel and Suha and perhaps finding clarity on what role such stories played in the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We left perplexed, unable to grasp the disconnect between their importance in any possible peace agreement between the two peoples and the lack of acknowledgment as such in any high-level talks. The elephant in the room was asleep.

Text continues on page 76.
In order to be considered part of any comprehensive peace agreement, the Palestinian refugees scattered across the Middle East and living in squalor must first be considered a problem. Not only are they a people suffering under immense poverty and therefore deserving of at least a little of the West’s attention, they are also a crucial element of the conflict. Physically, the 4.375 million registered refugees represent almost as big a population of Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza as inside. Symbolically, they represent 1948 or 1967, when they either fled or were forced to flee Palestine. It is rare to find a Palestinian who ignores this and will not feel cheated by a potential deal that does.

As students of public policy, we are taught to step back from a situation or problem, analyze it from all angles, and formulate a strategy that encapsulates what we have learned. In the process, we are encouraged to be creative. The refugee problem is often considered taboo because of its roots to 1948 and the image it may evoke of threatening Israel’s existence. In talking with numerous refugees, it often seems that grievance exists not because of a particular house or plot of land, but because of the denial of “home” and infringement of dignity. Often, people want to feel like they are home, even if they are not in a house.

Diplomats, heads of state, etc., must understand these underlying issues and use creative action to address them. They are anxious to work on what are considered to be more relevant issues—borders, security, etc.—and often dismiss the importance of the refugee problem and the fact that not resolving it could come back to haunt them. They must think creatively, focusing less on fears, more on opportunities. The problem need not be considered a threat to Israel’s existence, rather a means of contributing to the widely held notion of two democratic states for two free and just peoples.

If peace is truly an option, the elephant must be woken up and addressed head on. If not, Abdel will continue to learn about the mythical place down south, Suha will continue to hold tight her key and deed, and a lasting peace will still only be a dream.
The Road to Srebrenica

BY NIK STEINBERG

It was still dark outside when we arrived. My friend Amir, a Bosnian whom I’d met in college, had borrowed a friend’s car to drive me to the abandoned lot on the outskirts of Sarajevo. We were early. The buses would not leave until 5:00 a.m. As we waited, groups of men and women huddled in the crisp air and talked quietly, plumes of cigarette smoke rising above their heads. Suddenly, the bus engines rumbled to life.

“Sure you don’t want to come with me?” I asked Amir, hoping he’d changed his mind.

“Not something I need to revisit,” he said, turning to walk back to the car.

It was September 2003, more than eight years since the massacre at Srebrenica, when Bosnian Serbs killed more than eight thousand unarmed Bosnian Muslims in the largest single atrocity since World War II. I was passing through Bosnia on my way to Kosovo, and I’d stopped to visit Amir in Sarajevo. On my walks through the battered city, I kept noticing a poster that lined the walls of abandoned buildings and was plastered across Sarajevo’s few remaining billboards. It was black and white, and featured a photograph of a hand in a plastic glove lifting up the decaying remains of another hand. Beneath it was a date: 09.21.2003.

They stretched into the distance, rows upon rows of perfectly symmetrical black rectangles with clean wooden coffins resting inside.

The poster, I learned later from Amir, was publicizing the mass reburial of hundreds of victims from the massacre at Srebrenica. In the wake of the atrocity, the murderers had buried the victims in mass graves. But as the war came to an end and the perpetrators began to fear being held accountable for their crimes, they dug up the bodies, destroyed all forms of identification, and relocated them to unmarked sites around the countryside. As the mass graves were uncovered in the years after the war, the families of the victims waited while teams of forensic anthropologists carried out the painstaking work of identifying the dead, one by one.

Amir told me that if I wanted to go, he’d take me to the meeting point for buses going to Srebrenica on the twenty-first.

More than a dozen buses left that morning from Sarajevo. On the road to Srebrenica we joined cars, vans, and buses originating from cities around Bosnia—tuzla, Mostar, Zenica—and from beyond, which together formed a long caravan, a pilgrimage of mourners. As we made our way, the passengers sat in near-total silence, staring out the windows at pockmarked buildings and factories with gaping holes.
blasted in their sides. We crossed a border from Bosnian Muslim territory to Bosnian Serb territory. Although the regions were part of the same country, the soldiers on the two sides wore different uniforms.

Hours later, we came to a giant clearing where vehicles of all sizes were lined up in a makeshift muddy parking lot. I followed the other passengers as they got down off the bus, and we joined a movement of people who were walking down the road on foot.

When we reached the site, the graves were left open. They stretched into the distance, rows upon rows of perfectly symmetrical black rectangles with clean wooden coffins resting inside. To their sides sat piles of earth with shovels atop them. Newly built grave markers, each one featuring a simple Islamic star and crescent and the same date of death, lined up one after another.

Families made their way down the line looking for familiar names and, arriving at their destination, began the process of covering the coffins with the piles of earth. Men took turns between shoveling and praying. Women stood in circles beside them, holding the children, some weeping. Across the horizon, arcs of dirt flew through the air. Metal shovels made rhythmic swishes as they cut into the earth. I saw an older man walk from a grave and sit on a heap of dirt, resting his forehead on his palm in a gesture of total resignation. The sun had come out and the heat was sudden and dry. All around, people were singing and praying in groups. As I passed one site, a man handed me a shovel and I started to work on a pile of dirt.

Later that afternoon, after the graves had been filled and people had retired to the shade of nearby trees to share water and loaves of bread, President Clinton spoke to the mourners. He had come to inaugurate a new museum, which would be housed on the site to pay tribute to the victims. I have little memory of what he said. I do remember that as he spoke, and his words were translated over loudspeakers for the audience, people talked among themselves. It was as though he wasn’t even speaking.
Building a Decentralized Machine:  
The New Grassroots Politics  

BY SARAH RASMUSSEN

Introduction

When voter turnout in United States elections at all levels reached historic lows in the late nineties, many explanations were offered, but few people actually knew what to do about it. Projects like Rock the Vote received a lot of attention by using celebrities as spokespeople but seemed to have little real impact. On the other hand, a growing number of leaders began calling for a return to grassroots, volunteer-driven campaigns. This rising interest coincided with growing interest in the social capital, social networking, and decentralized models of engagement suggested by the Internet and culminated, in 2004, in a number of innovative, unique campaigns that attempted to use the power of social networks to get more people to the polls. This paper studies two of these campaigns and shows how each offers future campaigns lessons in using social networks effectively. More broadly, how can civic organizations create voter engagement campaigns that will keep voters engaged after election day?

The subject of social context and voting patterns has recently become more interesting to researchers and political scientists, and there is an emerging body of work on the topic. Concurrently, there is a growing research interest in peer-to-peer voter engagement models. Both bodies of research show the effect of social networks and personal appeals on voter turnout and choice. While social scientists long have viewed voting as a rational, individual choice, theorists and practitioners increasingly are coming to believe that, as Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague put it, “voting preferences are socially structured.” Valdis Krebs calls this the “social voter.”

Several studies have shown that personal connections and conversations have a significant impact on voter behavior. Voters make electoral choices within a social context, and Huckfeldt and Sprague showed that social conversations have their greatest impact when the converser feels that she shares ideological similarities with her conversation partner. Paul Beck showed that people also are more likely to “defect” to a different party if their discussion network supports that other party or if their discussion network does not sufficiently support the candidate from their own party.

Most famously, Donald Green and Alan Gerber showed in three large, randomized experiments (two studying students in several cities and one with a general population sample of mostly low-income minority and immigrant voters from New Haven, Conn.) that face-to-face contact is the most effective way to get a person to vote. In both studies, face-to-face canvassing with a nonpartisan message had a significant positive impact on a person’s likelihood of voting (face-to-face canvassing increased voter turnout by 14.5 percentage points in the general population experiment and by
8.5 and 10.5 percentage points, respectively, in the two student experiments). Contact by phone increased voter turnout as well, but to a substantially less degree than face-to-face canvassing. Interestingly, the face-to-face canvassing also produced what Green and Gerber called “spillover effects”: others in the household of those canvassed also were much more likely to vote.

In one of these studies, however, canvassing did not have long-lasting impacts. When surveyed after the election, treatment group members were no more likely than the control group to be interested in politics, be confident in the process, or feel a sense of civic duty. This indicates a significant weakness in traditional campaign outreach models.

The Changing Nature of Voter Mobilization

It is a widely known and lamented fact that voting has grown rarer and rarer among the U.S. population, a fact that is often cited as a key symptom of our ailing civic life. Since the 1960s, voting rates in the United States have declined sharply, from 62.8 percent in 1960 to under 50 percent in 1996, a decline of 22 percent. The year 1996 was a low point in U.S. voting rates, with one of the lowest rates since 1832. Accompanying this decline in voting has been a decline in many other forms of political and civic involvement, from attendance at rallies and signing petitions, to inviting neighbors over for dinner and being involved in community groups. This decline was documented by Robert Putnam in his book *Bowling Alone*, in which he asserts that the United States has suffered a steady loss of social capital since the 1960s. Putnam defines social capital as the value gained from “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.”

At the same time, the nature of campaigning has changed. Up to and during the 1960s, the primary model for campaigning (especially for Democrats) was a grass-roots style typified by the party machine system. In this system, every precinct had a “captain” responsible for getting his neighbors to the polls to vote for his party’s candidate, through personal appeals and conversations. These precinct captains reported to ward captains, who in turn reported to higher-ups in the party.

This system worked as a way of turning out voters for at least two reasons. First, the party itself was a strong, sustainable institution and network with the power to help people find jobs and meet other material needs. Second, the mobilization tactics were based on personal relationships. As Huckfeldt and Beck’s research shows, political conversations are most effective when the person being persuaded believes he has something in common with the persuader. Precinct captains were likely to know enough about a voter to know the best way to approach that person, and they had a baseline of shared experience that potentially made them trustworthy.

Beginning in the 1960s, however, this “retail” system lost favor to more “wholesale” tactics like television ads, direct mail, and paid phone calls. Now, a typical
campaign's advertising expenditures equal half or even two-thirds of its total budget. These tactics, while expensive, appeal to campaign managers because they are more easily controlled by a campaign, reach large numbers of voters, and do not require the maintenance of a large grassroots infrastructure like a party machine system does.

Even more recently, campaigns have begun targeting voters more carefully, segmenting the electorate by demographics, region, and even consumer habits. This is good for prioritizing campaign resource investments but not necessarily good for revitalizing democracy. As a result, many (like Marshall Ganz in an essay for the December 1994 issue of The American Prospect) argue that political campaigns have come to resemble marketing campaigns more than movements.

Thus, there have been two concurrent trends over the last five decades in American politics: as voter participation declines, campaigns themselves become more specialized and professionalized.

This may be a market failure of modern American democracy: social capital creation was a positive externality of the old political machine model. However, technology and market segmentation have allowed campaigns to run more efficiently—without extensive, labor-intensive, grassroots get-out-the-vote (GOTV) networks—at least according to the common wisdom in campaign circles.

Thus, there have been two concurrent trends over the last five decades in American politics: as voter participation declines, campaigns themselves become more specialized and professionalized, as Putnam illustrates. There is much debate over which causes which (much like the classic chicken/egg question), but it is clear that there is some sort of relationship between the two phenomena. The existence of this relationship is supported by the various Gerber et al. study results, which show that face-to-face appeals are the most effective way to get a voter to the polls.

In recent years, however, many strategists and leaders from both parties have been trying to develop ways to change course: ways to reach out to more voters and get them to the polls without losing campaign focus. These efforts began in the late 1990s, but really came to fruition in the 2004 presidential election cycle. There were countless efforts on both sides to reengage the grassroots and bring new voters to the polls, especially in the five to ten swing states. These projects ranged from the Republican party's Amway-style system of peer-to-peer voter identification and persuasion, to the League of Pissed Off Voters (who used music, arts, parties and other "nonpolitical" tactics to get countercultural young people involved), to America Coming Together's massive paid and volunteer technically savvy canvasses (which had precinct lists of voters on PalmPilots, for example).
In many ways, 2004 was a pilot year for the new grassroots political strategies, and many new experimental models were tried. Nonparty organizations also played a huge role, operating independently from the political parties (by the necessity of election law). Most of all, the rise of the Internet and the growing interest in social capital prompted many campaigns to use technologies in new ways and experiment with decentralized peer-to-peer models. Many of the experiments of 2004 are still being evaluated and refined, which makes studying them challenging but fruitful.

Two Campaigns
First, I will examine the MoveOn.org Leave No Voter Behind initiative, which attempted to get its enormous membership base involved in getting their friends and neighbors to volunteer and vote. Then, I will look at the campus organizing of the 21st Century Democrats’ Young Voter Project. In order to analyze these campaigns, I interviewed volunteers and staff from both projects. The Young Voter Project also gave me access to their campaign plans and post-election evaluations.

When analyzing these two campaigns, I will try to answer important questions about each: What is unique or innovative about this campaign? How did the campaign use social capital to get voters to the polls and was this effort successful? How effective was the campaign at engaging and involving new volunteers? Answering these questions will give us a sense of how effectively these campaigns exploited and created social capital, as well as how effectively they mobilized their targeted voters.

Case I: Leave No Voter Behind

Background
MoveOn.org was founded in 1998 as a simple e-mail campaign urging members of Congress to censure Bill Clinton and then “move on” rather than impeach him. This ballooned into a multi-issue Web-based activist organization, which now has 3.3 million members. In 2004, MoveOn.org decided to get its members out from behind their keyboards and into their neighborhoods to defeat President Bush in that year’s election.

Initially, MoveOn.org tried hiring state organizers to recruit volunteers from its membership base, but that proved to be too daunting a task for an organization with a small staff of telecommuters (MoveOn.org operates with a handful of staff who all work from home). The leadership also realized that there were plenty of organizations with the capacity to run traditional electoral campaigns who were doing just that. So they decided instead to run a campaign more suited to their niche: a decentralized campaign, where local volunteer organizers could access voter lists and mobilize voters in their own precincts.
Campaign Structure and Goals

MoveOn.org contracted with a for-profit company called Grassroots Campaigns, Inc. (GCI) to run the campaign. GCI began setting up its campaign infrastructure in late summer and established organizers in swing states around the country. Each organizer was responsible for thirty precincts and recruited precinct captains (mostly MoveOn.org members) from each of these precincts. The precinct captains, in turn, were responsible for recruiting other volunteers, contacting voters, and collecting voter information, such as issue interest and the candidates for whom they planned to vote.

The campaign focused on contacting people who were infrequent voters (those who voted in one or two of the previous four elections). The goals were ambitious: 450,000 voter contacts in total, divided across 10,000 precincts. Each precinct captain had the goal of contacting 150 voters, identifying 100 likely Kerry voters (and 90 undecided voters), and getting 50 voters to the polls. They also were supposed to recruit ten other volunteers in their precinct to help with this work. The voter files were available on an online system called the Web Action Center (WAC), so that volunteers could download their precinct lists, contact voters, and then input the results.

What Worked

Empowering Volunteers

Everyone I interviewed at MoveOn.org agreed that by giving up a certain level of control, the campaign created a structure that unleashed the creativity and ingenuity of volunteers. In a traditional campaign, where paid organizers handle all training and coordinating, there is little room for volunteers to take initiative and ownership. In MoveOn.org's campaign, because volunteers could access voter lists on their own and had so little supervision, they could run their own minicampaigns.

This empowerment led many volunteers to develop important civic skills for future campaigns and initiatives. One precinct captain I interviewed got involved despite her lack of activism experience because the election was so important to her. She was thrust into the leadership role and soon found herself devising neighborhood strategy, recruiting her friends, and developing messages that would work locally. Essentially, she ran a GOTV drive in her neighborhood. Since then, she has become very active in local politics and played a leadership role in a state legislative campaign in 2006.

Established Membership Base

One reason the MoveOn.org campaign was able to accomplish so much in just six weeks was that they had an enormous base of potential volunteers in their membership rolls. MoveOn.org has over 3 million members who are, by definition, politically aware, liberal, and used to being asked to take some sort of political action by
MoveOn.org. Most of these actions, of course, had been in the form of making donations, writing e-mails to members of Congress, or other low-time-commitment activities, but MoveOn.org actually had already organized some “real-life” events during the lead up to the Iraq War, like lobby days and candlelight vigils.

As one of the paid organizers told me, many MoveOn.org members are politically aware but not active. Affiliation with MoveOn.org is their only political outlet, their source of information on how to get involved. So it made sense to them that MoveOn.org now was asking them to help. It felt comfortable. Also, MoveOn.org has a sort of cool cachet among many of their members, so they may be able to get people involved who otherwise might not be interested.

**A Step Toward Social Capital Creation**

As explained below, the MoveOn.org campaign was not as successful as it could have been in creating social capital. Nonetheless, simply encouraging their members to get out from behind their computers and talk to their neighbors about issues was a big step. The most important indicator of involvement is being asked, and MoveOn.org successfully asked several thousand people to engage with their neighbors.

**Problems with the MoveOn.org Campaign**

**Lack of Support and Training**

Just as almost everyone interviewed agreed that the decentralization was the best thing about the campaign, everyone also agreed that the volunteers and paid organizers were not supported or trained well enough. Volunteers were given initial training if they wanted it, were shown how to use the WAC, given their goals, and then pretty much left alone. This fostered the creativity described above but also caused some problems. In Minnesota, for instance, MoveOn.org volunteers were removed from a polling place because they allegedly approached voters inside, which is illegal. This lack of oversight also led many volunteers to feel frustrated and unsupported and to leave the campaign. Inconsistent canvassing scripts and changing instructions from headquarters added to volunteers’ frustration.

The WAC system also suffered from many problems. Many volunteers lacked enough training to use it (as one organizer said, “We overestimated the tech-savvyness of our volunteers”). Also, only one person at the headquarters maintained it although it was supposed to serve tens of thousands of volunteers, which made it hard to get the system fixed when it crashed. The leap from a centralized, Web-based organization to a decentralized, real-world movement reliant on a Web-based database may have been made too quickly.
Late Start
MoveOn.org probably had to make this rapid leap because GCI got such a late start in planning and launching the campaign. They did not begin setting up the infrastructure until late July and did not begin recruiting organizers until August. The organizers themselves did not start working until late September, which gave them only six weeks to set up and run campaigns, recruit dozens of volunteers, train them, and make sure they met their goals.

This meant that organizers were not able to spend much time with their volunteers. It also meant that the precinct captains were on a very tight timeline, which made the kind of relationship-building important to social capital difficult, if not impossible.

Limited Social Capital Creation
While MoveOn.org’s system lowers the barriers to participation, it does little to build social capital. MoveOn.org’s campaign had great potential to build social capital within and across communities, but it fell short of its potential for at least two reasons. First, the autonomous nature of the technology set-up allowed volunteers to simply print out voter lists and canvass on their own, which meant they could—and often did—avoid ever talking to any other volunteers in their precinct. One precinct captain told me that there were just two volunteers in her precinct. This would be unimaginable in a normal electoral campaign, where volunteers must go to an office to get their lists. Second, the autonomous-precinct model created a campaign of “silos” in which most volunteers had little or no interaction with volunteers in other precincts. This isolated the volunteers and eliminated the potential for interneighborhood bridging social capital.

MoveOn.org’s campaign had great potential to build social capital within and across communities, but it fell short of its potential.

Use of a Contractor
MoveOn.org contracted with GCI to provide what MoveOn.org lacked: the capacity and ability to hire, train, and supervise a large number of grassroots organizers in a short period of time. For the purposes of MoveOn.org’s short campaign, this seems to have worked reasonably well. However, this is problematic in terms of building a long-term movement. All of the organizers were hired only for the period of the campaign, and most were actually “parachuted in” to their regions and then left after the election. When they left, the relationships (and all the important information embedded in those relationships) went with them.

The volunteers I spoke with told me that MoveOn.org made little effort to contact them after the election (beyond the standard member e-mails). One precinct captain even said that she was instructed to shred her voter lists with all the information she
and her volunteers had collected. This, along with the contracting out, suggests that MoveOn.org intended the campaign solely to get Kerry voters to the polls, not as a means to build a long-term progressive movement.

Case 2: The Young Voters Project

Background
The Young Voters Project (YVP) was founded in 2004 as a project of the 21st Century Democrats, a progressive political action committee whose mission is to recruit and train the young “farm team” of local elected officials and political leaders. The purpose of YVP is to engage young voters in swing states on a grassroots level and also to create new models for effectively engaging young voters. They had organizers and ran campaigns in several states. In this paper I will focus on their Minnesota campaign and, specifically, their campus efforts.

Campaign Structure and Goals
YVP identified, registered, and mobilized tens of thousands of student and college-aged voters on over a dozen campuses throughout Minnesota. I focused my research on two large campuses: the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities (UMN), which has one of the largest student bodies in the nation, and St. Cloud State, a midsized university in a small city. At both of these schools, YVP placed one or two full-time, paid organizers (recent college graduates themselves) who then hired several students as part-time, stipended organizers. On each campus, YVP used a mix of door-to-door canvassing, “vote-mobbing,” and other voter outreach tactics:

Door-to-door canvassing: Each dorm on both campuses was supposed to have a “dorm captain” who was stipended and would organize his or her dorm, identifying and registering voters (later encouraging them to vote), as well as recruiting and managing volunteers. This was supplemented by campus-area nondorm canvassing, conducted both by student volunteers and, in Minneapolis, young paid canvassers.

Vote mobbing: This was YVP’s name for non-door-to-door canvassing. Volunteers would approach students in high-traffic areas like the student union, asking them if they wanted to register to vote. The most successful vote-mobbing activity was done on freshman move-in day at St. Cloud State, where volunteers got seven hundred pledges to vote for change, from which they were able to recruit a number of volunteers.

Other outreach: YVP organizers also used activities like going to classes to register and identify dozens of voters at once. The full-time organizer at St. Cloud managed to get into the meetings of all the fraternities and sororities on campus to talk to and register students.

While MoveOn.org primarily worked with lists of registered voters, YVP volunteers created new lists because their population was composed of new voters.
Whenever a new voter was identified or registered by YVP volunteers, her information was recorded. If she indicated that she was undecided or planning to vote for Kerry, a volunteer would follow up with a call providing more information and asking her to volunteer. Each new voter was contacted several times throughout the campaign, leading up to the weekend before election day.

What Worked

Training and Support
Unlike the MoveOn.org campaign, YVP made training and development of volunteers a priority. Each campus had a full-time organizer responsible for ensuring that volunteers knew how to do their jobs and felt comfortable with their roles. Organizers also worked with student volunteers to develop ongoing strategy; in St. Cloud, all campus volunteers and staff would meet every Sunday night to debrief from the previous week and plan for the upcoming one. Through this collaboration, students also learned how to plan a campaign.

Engaging Hard-to-Reach Voters
Students are generally a hard-to-reach category, often overlooked by traditional campaigns because they have no voting record, often live in dorms and apartment buildings, and often have unlisted or cell phone numbers. Through the dorm captain system and through vote mobbing, YVP was able to reach students living in secure dorms, which a traditional campaign could not have done. By registering and mobilizing the students, YVP got them into an early habit of voting.

Part of a Coalition
YVP was part of America Votes (AV), a coalition of progressive organizations doing electoral work, and its Minneapolis campaign shared office space with many of its AV partners. This connection gave YVP access to AV’s considerable institutional resources and allowed its members to learn from AV’s more experienced mentors, which was significant, given that the Minneapolis campaign’s oldest staffer was twenty-six. The coalition also provided YVP a place within the broader Minnesota progressive political world. As a result, many of the full-time organizers and part-time student volunteers have gone on to work with a wide variety of progressive political organizations in Minnesota. Many organizations and campaigns train young activists; few take the extra step of giving them a place within the community.

Social Capital Creation
YVP created social capital among the students involved by giving them an opportunity to develop close bonds. Every YVP representative I interviewed emphasized how much fun they had. In addition to registering and mobilizing voters, they had a good time and made new friends. For the most part, activities like vote mobbing were done
as a group. The weekly campaign meetings in St. Cloud helped to solidify the group and make people feel part of a team. As the full-time St. Cloud organizer said, "The best way to hold volunteers accountable is through relationships and trust. If they know the whole team—their friends—is counting on them, that's what will hold them accountable."

Problems with the YVP Campaign

Poor Data Management
As with MoveOn.org, poor data management hampered YVP's ability to build social capital. YVP changed its tracking system twice during the campaign. As a result, volunteers were spending time figuring out the new data systems instead of engaging voters.

Dorm Captain System Weaknesses
Again like MoveOn.org, the dorm captain system was not a universal success. It was quite successful at St. Cloud, where an enthusiastic organizer was able to inspire volunteers. However, at UMN, many dorms did not have captains and many captains had trouble recruiting other volunteers; some felt nervous about knocking on doors.

Principles for Future Social Network Campaigns
The MoveOn.org and YVP campaigns were successful as voter-turnout operations, exceeding their goals and contributing to the record voter turnout of 2004. Both also shared some problems, notably in their electronic infrastructure and the cultivation of semi-independent captains. These two cases offer several lessons.

Training and guidance are crucial. This is certainly not news, but it seems to be the key difference between the MoveOn.org campaign and the Young Voters Project in the latter's relative success at creating social capital. It is great to empower volunteers to develop their own campaigns, but to do that, they need experienced trainers and/or organizers who can teach them how and then give them guidance and support throughout the process.

A good support system and infrastructure matters. Both campaigns suffered from problems with their data management systems. This is likely to be a problem for any campaign. However, this was a much bigger problem for MoveOn.org because the volunteers felt disconnected from headquarters and state-level staff. They could call headquarters to get help with the WAC, but since they wouldn’t know the person they were talking to, this would be somewhat like calling a customer service line. Likewise, when someone at the national office decided to change the canvassing script, the reasons were usually a mystery to volunteers, and thus these changes were often ignored. YVP, on the other hand, had a much more solid support system in place, and so when something went wrong or there was a strategy shift, the volunteers knew why and were
more likely to trust that things would work out. If they didn’t work, they had a channel for voicing their discontent, which MoveOn.org volunteers did not have.

*Professional, committed organizers matter.* This may seem counterintuitive. One of the main goals of a decentralized, volunteer-driven campaign is to put “amateurs” back into the process. However, the most successful example in either of the cases was at St. Cloud, where an incredibly talented organizer was able to inspire and empower her volunteers to run a very successful campaign. In contrast, the organizers for MoveOn.org may have been talented, but they were all hired for only two months, and most were placed in cities in which they’d never lived. In a situation like this, the best work an organizer can do is purely operational or managerial, especially given that they were not even working for MoveOn.org itself. If an organization is serious about developing a grassroots base, it needs to hire and develop strong organizers.

*Start early.* Most of MoveOn.org’s problems came from the fact that they started so late. YVP, on the other hand, started in late spring, so that, by the time the school year started, they were able to hit the ground running. This is not just important for logistics and operations, though. If an organization or campaign is serious about creating civic engagement networks, the people involved should understand that these networks take time to develop, which leads to the final, and most important, principle.

*Take the Long View.* A new era of civic engagement won’t be created in a day, or in one election cycle. YVP seemed to understand that, and that is one of the reasons they were successful from a social capital standpoint. The MoveOn.org campaign, on the other hand, was about winning one election, and that showed in the campaign’s disorganization. In order to develop a strong grassroots base, institutions and organizations need to be willing to invest in networks over the long term.

**Conclusion**

We are in a new era of electoral politics. The year 2004 was an exciting one for the testing of new voter engagement models, and many of them seemed to have worked given the rise in voter turnout from the nadir of the late 1990s. Campaigns in 2006 took this a step further, largely through the use of the Internet to engage the grassroots. Deval Patrick’s campaign for governor of Massachusetts was a leader in this area: volunteers could establish their own campaign Web pages, to be used for fund raising and organizing; his decentralized grassroots operation was widely cited as a key factor in his unlikely victory. The 2008 presidential campaign may take this even further: all the frontrunners already have Web sites that allow supporters to create their own content (blogs, videos, etc.) and link up with other supporters. Hopefully, these innovations will further increase participation and voter turnout.
Pointing Guns in a New Direction: The NRA at a Crossroads

BY JEFF GINSBURG

Editor's Note: The author wrote this piece prior to the shooting incident at Virginia Tech on April 16, 2007.

From its humble roots as a marksmanship training outfit in the decades following the American Civil War, the National Rifle Association (NRA) has evolved into one of the largest and most powerful lobbying groups in American politics. The transformation, which has occurred largely in the last thirty years, wasn’t entirely a grassroots change. Rather, a small group of leaders launched an effort to takeover the organization and move its mission away from training and outdoor recreation and toward the sporting life of big-time politics. Since making the transition, the NRA has closely aligned itself with the Republican Party. However, today, an increasing number of politicians championing issues important to the majority of gun-owners are progressive. Good leadership would see the organization leave behind its conservative tendencies and endorse those candidates who best represent their members’ interests.

By all accounts, moves over recent decades to aggressively grow the size and influence of the NRA have been a success. Today’s NRA boasts over four million members and has annual fund-raising and membership revenues of more than 150 million dollars. The impact of their coffers has had a profound effect on American politics. Rallied to action by the specter of gun control legislation, the NRA hasn’t just become political—it has become partisan, throwing its sizeable weight behind the Republican Party for almost thirty years. Not only has it been a major player in national elections (the NRA has publicly endorsed every Republican candidate for president since Ronald Reagan), every two years it has filtered money and operational support into hundreds of congressional elections around the country.

If gun control seems less likely to make the legislative agenda, the NRA risks losing the magnetic pull it has enjoyed on its membership.

But despite its recent dominance, the NRA stands at a crossroads in its development as a representative of American gun-owner interests in the twenty-first century. The 2006 midterm elections saw control of Congress pass to the Democrats for the first time in twelve years. Now, in the midst of political battles over terrorism and war, and in the wake of the Democratic Party moderating to win elections, the likelihood of Congress proposing, much less passing, laws that expand gun control in the next legislative cycle is at a new low. That itself could spell trouble for the NRA. If gun control seems less likely to make the legislative agenda, the NRA risks losing the magnetic pull it has enjoyed on its membership. And as other issues that were once
marginalized as concerns of the far left begin to gain mainstream acceptance—particularly concerns about the environment—the NRA may face critical questions about its long-term strategy and, for the first time in decades, may find itself losing power.

The biggest challenge to the NRA comes, ironically, at the hands of its own success. As the leadership of the NRA has increasingly pursued a right-wing political agenda, it has fallen out of step with the long-term interests of its members. The rank and file of the NRA is largely made up of outdoorsmen. They don’t own guns for the sake of making a political point about the Second Amendment; rather, they champion the Second Amendment because their hobbies, interests, and beliefs involve gun ownership, riflery, and hunting. This may be a subtle distinction, but it is one that remains ripe for political exploitation by moderate liberals. If the Democrats can show this sizeable NRA cohort that an issue other than gun control is the biggest threat to gun owners, they may find themselves with the beginnings of an unlikely but powerful electoral coalition.

Rather than promoting conservation as a means of strengthening ties with its members, the NRA continues to support candidates who oppose environmental regulation and conservation.

According to Steve Jarding—political consultant, John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University professor, and senior advisor to the 2006 Jim Webb senatorial campaign—Democrats may be able to use conservation as an inroad into the NRA's base. Instead of fearing the NRA and avoiding discussion on guns entirely, Democrats should talk more about the interests of gun owners and outdoorsmen. As Jarding and Dave “Mudcat” Saunders argue in Foxes in the Henhouse, lack of conservation, not the weakening of the Second Amendment, is the biggest threat to gun owners today. According to a University of Wisconsin study, if habitat destruction and pollution continue on current trends, sport hunting will nearly cease to exist in the United States by 2050. Forty percent of all freshwater fish in America have disappeared, and between 40 and 45 percent of domestic rivers and lakes are too polluted to fish or swim in. And with an estimated half of all households having at least one gun owner, and nearly 40 percent of Americans age sixteen or older regularly fishing, hunting, or watching wildlife, this issue affects millions of Americans.

How has the NRA leadership responded to these trends? Rather than promoting conservation as a means of strengthening ties with its members, the NRA continues to support candidates who oppose environmental regulation and conservation. As Jarding explains, the NRA publishes a report card based on every congressional member's support for gun issues. In 2002, the NRA gave at least an A grade to 227 candidates or members of the House of Representatives. By 2004, the combined voting records of these congressmen on key conservation and preservation issues scored only 17.2
percent, according to a report card issued by the League of Conservation Voters. These endorsements alone show how out of touch the NRA leadership is with the issues that really affect their members.

In a grudging nod to changing political realities, the 2006 election cycle saw the NRA make slight adjustments in disbursing campaign funds. As Conor Clarke pointed out in *The New Republic* in January 2007, the NRA backed fifty-eight pro-gun Democratic candidates in the 2006 elections—all of whom won. But while the NRA's willingness to support Democrats is significant, the devil is in the details. Eighty-five percent of the NRA's money, and arguably an even higher percentage of its manpower and mass marketing were behind Republican candidates—most of whom were the same congressmen and women who had scored so poorly on conservation issues two years before. On one hand, the last election was essentially another NRA victory, electing swarms of new pro-gun candidates. But at the same time, the NRA spent the run up to the midterms warning the membership that a Democratic takeover would spell what the NRA termed on its Web site “the biggest election disaster in fifteen years.”

In 2008, the NRA may find a familiar—and favorite—foe in Hillary Clinton, the current frontrunner for the Democratic nomination for president. The NRA embarrassed the Clinton administration during the development of the 1994 crime bill and demonized the Clintons as their liberal nemeses in order to expand the NRA's fundraising and membership base to unprecedented levels. The NRA then used these gains to help defeat congressional Democrats in the 1994 midterm elections, forever changing the direction of the Clinton presidency, and launching a twelve-year period of Republican dominance. According to John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge in the *Right Nation*, during the 1994 election cycle, “when it came to trooping around precincts and rallying people to the conservative cause, the NRA showed a prowess second only to the Christian Right.”

A Clinton candidacy provides the NRA with a rallying cry for its members and an opportunity to rely upon the method that has served them best over the years: fearmongering. But will it be enough? Will the played up fears of a Hillary Clinton taking away their guns trump the very real evidence of vanished forests and depleted wildlife that the rank-and-file membership can see for themselves? It may be too soon to tell how the 2008 election will turnout, but in the long term the NRA must end its often unilateral party affiliation and begin to make endorsements that prioritize conservation and environmental policy if they hope to remain as politically powerful as they have been.
Consulting Texas-Style:
Mark McKinnon on Politics and Campaigning

BY KARIM BARDEESY

Mark McKinnon’s office in the Taubman Building at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard Square in Cambridge, Mass., is spare and shadowed. He fumbles with DVDs and adjusts his satchels, scarves, and overcoats on his way to a Young Republicans political event. When not serving as an adjunct lecturer on political communications at the Kennedy School, McKinnon is a political professional. The DVDs in his office illustrate the favorite thrusts of McKinnon’s scalpel from the successful 2004 campaign to reelect George W. Bush as president of the United States. They include an ad highlighting John Kerry’s inconsistencies—“I actually voted for the $87 billion before I voted against it”—while featuring images of Kerry windsurfing to the lilting sounds of the Blue Danube waltz. Another ad shows a pack of wolves beginning their pursuit, a clear signal of the threat of terrorism, and McKinnon’s presentation of Bush as the one to stop it.

McKinnon has counted both Bush and Bush’s 1994 gubernatorial opponent, Democrat Ann Richards, as clients. He’s currently engaged with another former Bush rival, 2008 U.S. presidential aspirant John McCain, as a senior advisor to his campaign. He’s a rare breed of political consultant—few have managed to switch parties while retaining friendships on both sides, and fewer have spent time in jail on a First Amendment issue, or time on Kris Kristofferson’s couch, trying to break into songwriting in Nashville, Tenn. The nontraditional career path and campaign success make McKinnon a figure to heed in light of coming election campaigns. Before heading off to talk to some Young Republicans, he sat down with the Kennedy School Review to share some war stories from his past and his insights on George Bush, the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, and the nature of political campaigns in general.

McKinnon’s wanderlust began early. He left his Midwest home in his teens, going to Nashville to write songs, then moving on to Austin, Tex., drawn again by the fertile alternative music scene (“that cosmic cowboy stuff”) of the mid-1970s. After realizing he “didn’t want to be fifty years old, playing at a Holiday Inn,” McKinnon enrolled at the University of Texas at Austin, where he was elected editor-in-chief of the Daily Texan newspaper. He was jailed briefly, after refusing to turn over to the police unpublished photo negatives of pro-Ayatollah Iranian students demonstrating outside a lecture by a Shah-affiliated official. Soon after, he started working on a Democratic campaign for the Senate with political consultants and future Bill Clinton strategists James Carville and Paul Begala, saying it was good money at the time (five dollars an hour doing data entry). He quickly “caught the bug” and jokes now that “politics was a place where you could fail upward.” McKinnon ended up working for Democratic governor of Texas Mark White. But McKinnon says that he found himself “allergic to
bureaucracy” and threw himself into political consulting. He had many successes in the 1980s and early ’90s, including two memorable campaigns that taught him important lessons on linking a good message with a good messenger and on innovating when a campaign seems hopeless.

John Sharp, a Democrat running for state comptroller in Texas in 1991 (an office “most people don’t even know how to spell”), hired McKinnon for his campaign. The comptroller supervises public spending and revenue collection in the state. To communicate his message and cut through the confusion, Sharp came up with a very simple idea. “He said, ‘If I’m elected comptroller, I’m going to audit every school. I’ll show you the data so you can go to your school boards and raise hell.’” McKinnon learned that the way Sharp chose to communicate his candidacy created a link between the job and his motivations, and urged citizens to feel an investment in the campaign. In the end, Sharp got more votes than any other office-seeker, including the senatorial and gubernatorial candidates. “He found a unique and relevant way to talk about that message,” McKinnon recalls.

McKinnon was also asked to work on a 1993 referendum that would have brought limited zoning to the city planning of Houston. “I didn’t particularly care about zoning,” he says, but he offered to help a friend on the campaign opposed to city planning through zoning. The problem was that the pro-zoning supporters had a very large lead in the public opinion research McKinnon saw. “I thought, there’s no way we can run a campaign,” McKinnon says.

However, a hidden asset was available to the anti-zoning campaign. During a focus group, McKinnon sat behind a one-way mirror and sent in a message to the moderator to tell the assembled that a known and well-reputed pro-zoning advocate actually opposes the plan, because it doesn’t go far enough. “We converted everyone in the group. We put that guy on TV, and we turned it around.” A drive through Houston’s endless outer suburbs will tell you who won that race. (McKinnon also worked on the reelection campaign of incumbent mayor and pro-zoning advocate Bob Lanier during another election in the early 1990s.)

Meanwhile, McKinnon had also connected with a Texas icon—Democratic gubernatorial candidate Ann Richards. She was, he recalls, “a real pioneer: big, loud, brash, funny, big white hair.” He helped run her winning 1990 campaign—the first woman elected governor in Texas history.

McKinnon continued to amass more victories but tired of the pace and multiplicity of campaigns; he publicly swore off partisan campaigning in a 1996 Texas Monthly essay. In his parting shot, he said, “I won’t miss desperate candidates, manic campaign managers, and last-minute attack and response ads. This year I will not be spending the frantic last weekend before the election in a dark editing studio. I’ll be deep in the interior of Mexico, following the migration of the monarch butterfly—with my family.”
Little more than a year later, McKinnon was working on an education documentary when he came into contact with then-governor of Texas, George W. Bush, who had defeated Richards in 1994. “I went in really thinking I was really not going to like the guy. I had these preconceived notions . . . the mantra Democrats had been spinning, that he was a rich guy, that he sort of inherited everything. [But] he disarmed me immediately.” McKinnon discovered a “deep integrity and character,” and “a real humanity—a much different person one-on-one than what you see on television.” They developed “a social relationship rather than a professional one.” At the same time, “we bonded over this education issue” that was the subject of Bush’s reforms and McKinnon’s documentary, and McKinnon was won over politically as well as personally.

The political conversion was definitely noted, and not everyone was forgiving. Former business associate Dean Rindy, involved in a legal battle with McKinnon over partnership revenues, lashed out in 1999 that “Mark is plainly doing this for money and ambition.” Some critics point to estimates of multimillion-dollar revenues reaped by a consortium headed by his firm in the subsequent 2004 presidential campaign. Former partner-in-crime Begala was quoted in a 1999 Texas Monthly profile saying, “I love the rascal like a wayward stepchild,” but that the switch to Bush was “maybe a bit of a midlife crisis.”

On his political “conversion,” McKinnon says, “I’d been evolving politically over time and had become much more conservative.” McKinnon positions it as an evolution of party politics in Texas as well. As Democrats lost their hegemony, “a lot of conservative Democrats became Republicans. Bush was a much different model. Unlike the Gingrich era, he was talking about things like immigration reform and education reform. Things that Republicans had never talked about, and issues I cared a lot about.”

It was not an easy decision, and McKinnon has not fully embraced a partisan conversion. In a 1999 interview with the Austin-American Statesman, McKinnon said, “I don’t consider myself a converted Republican. I’m a Bush man.” (The only Republicans McKinnon has worked for personally are Bush and McCain.) And he acknowledges he lost friends but points out that others were understanding. Indeed, Democrat Bob Lanier, the former Houston mayor and McKinnon client, ended up endorsing Bush; he says that Bush got more heat for bringing McKinnon onboard his reelection campaign than McKinnon himself did for joining.

Bush’s role and perception in Texas, and in local Republican and Democratic party politics, continues to arouse controversy, especially since the onset of the Iraq War. The Austin political world was rocked recently when another former Democrat and senior 2004 Bush campaign strategist, McKinnon friend Matthew Dowd, publicly disavowed Bush.
But McKinnon has been steadfast. Bush made McKinnon a political monogamist: “Bush said, ‘You’re working for me, and no one else,’ and I was fine with that,” McKinnon maintains contact with Bush. “I see him once every month or two. I usually go bike riding with him. You could talk about Iraq all day long — I try to talk about other things.”

Reflecting on over twenty-five years in campaigns, McKinnon says some features of political campaigns will remain essential. “The principles of messaging have stood up over time, and I think will forever . . . It’s all about storytelling, a narrative arc.” He learned this in part from his international campaign experience, advising presidential candidates Olu Falae of Nigeria and Yvonne Baki of Ecuador, and President Virgilio Barco of Colombia, on media strategy. “I understood the same principles applied—the motivations and strategies are pretty transferable.” He also helped lead the introduction of these principles into the private sector by helping to found a new consultancy, Public Strategies. “Businesses had never done polling and message testing before. They were used to doing all their business behind closed doors.”

People don’t recognize that politics has always been tough. The stakes are big, so the contests ought to be vigorous.

To those who oppose the idea of “spin,” of a negative campaign, or the very profession of political consulting, McKinnon says, “Most of the people I know in this business are passionate about democracy, about ideas. People don’t recognize that politics has always been tough. The stakes are big, so the contests ought to be vigorous.”

On the other hand, the ways campaigns are organized, and the resources they use, are changing rapidly. McKinnon points to videos and counter-videos run on YouTube, saying the media-sharing Web site has become “a video press release service.” Well-paid professionals are now challenged by “thousands of ‘ad producers’ out there in their pajamas.” Technologically, “what used to take ten people and ten days to do can now be done by one person in an hour.”

McKinnon points to an opportunity from the 2004 presidential election campaign. John Kerry uttered his infamous line about his congressional votes on Iraq War appropriations, “I actually voted for the $87 billion before I voted against it,” in response to a Bush ad that questioned Kerry’s support for American troops. Spotting a whopping political waffle in the making, McKinnon ordered a new, updated ad that included the video of Kerry’s clarification line and sent it to air on TV almost immediately.

McKinnon has also pointed out that today’s video-sharing technologies mean that political advertising is not just limited to thirty or sixty seconds anymore; longer media clips can be sent to partisans and shared to rally support. One of McKinnon’s trademarks is interview settings in which the candidate is looking at McKinnon (the interviewer), not the camera, and it allows McKinnon to draw out more the personal
side of what motivates the candidate and what character traits he is seeking to promote.

Turning to 2008, McKinnon predicts a tight race on both sides. He recalls the ephemeral and fickle aspects of conventional wisdom about frontrunners, remembering that Joe Lieberman led the field for eight months of public opinion polls even before Howard Dean’s rise and fall during the pursuit of the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination. McKinnon has sided with John McCain, Bush’s 2000 archrival, but acknowledges, “I could see [Newt] Gingrich getting in late.” He can even imagine a scenario in which McCain, Mitt Romney, Rudy Giuliani, and Gingrich each have 20 percent of the vote at the Iowa caucus or New Hampshire primary in early 2008. On the Democratic side, McKinnon sees a “really energized Democratic party ready to fight in 2008 . . . If the election’s about change, then who’s the biggest change agent in this race? Obama.” He’d like to see a McCain/Obama contest, but says that Hillary Rodham Clinton and John Edwards also have very strong candidacies.

Why support McCain? McKinnon liked McCain even during the hard-fought 2000 Republican presidential primary. (“I believed Bush should have been the president then, and I think McCain should be the next president.”) McKinnon points to character and motivation, and betrays some of the features that also make him a highly attractive candidate for a political consultant. “His life story and experience are profound. I had no interest in another presidential campaign. [Being in a presidential campaign] is like a human microwave. But I would go mow his lawn, [anything] to serve a guy who’s done so much for his country.” McKinnon is steadfast in the face of fundraising and media setback McCain faced in the summer of 2007. “I’m with McCain until the bus runs out of gas or runs me over. [By December], voters will realize McCain is the right guy for these challenging times.”

McKinnon may continue to breathe electoral politics after walking away briefly in the mid-1990s, but a couple of subtle accessories and some parting words point to some other motivations. On his right wrist he wears the yellow circle of cyclist Lance Armstrong’s Live Strong campaign and foundation and the white of DATA’s Make Poverty History campaign, which counts U2’s Bono as its main spokesman—two bracelets, two celebrities, and two causes; McKinnon is an advisor to both. He smiles and says in awe, “I got to go Africa with Bono. It’s hard not to be compelled that humanity has to address the crisis there. Bono is the most compelling individual I’ve met by a factor of ten.”
Citizen-centric E-Government: The Next Frontier

BY PIAL ISLAM

Abstract
Many governments around the world have made significant strides in embracing e-government. Much of the effort constitutes the migration of service offerings to an Internet platform. In doing so, however, many governments have missed a critical opportunity to rethink and reorganize the delivery models from a truly citizen-centric perspective. While there are many aspects of e-government, such as increasing public sector productivity and encouraging e-democracy, this paper focuses on the adoption of e-government services. Within this scope, the paper will highlight some of the recent advances in e-government, identify some of the missed opportunities, and propose a new paradigm that incorporates citizen-centricity and cross-sector integration that collective enhance user experience and increase e-government adoption.

Introduction
Citizens need to be at the heart of e-government, which is best described as a government’s use of technology to enhance service delivery to their citizens. When Sara, a single mother in Boston who was recently laid off, cannot even find vital information from the numerous government Web sites about things such as skills retraining and subsidized day care for her two children, there is a problem. The solution is a single, easy-to-use Web site that encompasses multiple government services. If the billions of dollars of investments in e-government cannot assist a citizen like Sara with such simple tasks at a time of dire need, the problem must be resolved.

Since the dawn of e-government ten years ago, many governments, both in industrialized and developing nations, have made significant strides in moving various public services online. However, much of the focus of e-government has been on ‘e’ and less on placing the target audience—the citizens—at the center of service delivery enhancements. A critical opportunity to rethink, reorganize, and streamline government services from the perspective of the citizens has been missed, resulting in countless untapped benefits.

In his book Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance, Darrell West argues that e-government has powerful potential, such as increasing public sector productivity, enhancing the adoption of electronic channels such as the Web and e-mail, and encouraging e-democracy. This paper focuses on the adoption of e-government services by simply enhancing user experience. Within this scope, the paper chronicles some of the progress in both industrialized and developing countries, and highlights the many missed opportunities in designing and delivering e-government services. It introduces the concepts of scenario and persona design—principles
borrowed from the user experience modeling discipline—as key tools for bringing the citizens to the heart of solution development. The paper concludes by proposing a new paradigm that incorporates citizen-centricity and cross-sector integration within a “sandbox” model for breakthrough innovation.

What Exactly Is E-Government?

E-government is the government’s use of information and communication technology (ICT) to provide important services to citizens, businesses, and other arms of the government itself using a number of different electronic channels: Web, e-mail, land lines, cell phones, and kiosks. The three primary delivery models are government to citizen, government to business, and government to government. According to a 2006 report drafted by consulting firm Capgemini entitled “Online Availability of Public Services,” the e-government offerings can be categorized in two key service clusters: (1) the government-to-citizen cluster, which includes income taxes, job search, social security benefits, registration (birth, property, business), and education; and (2) the government-to-business cluster, which includes corporate tax, customs, registration, public procurement, and permits. E-government may also be used by legislatures and executive agencies to improve internal efficiency and the delivery of public services and to streamline many processes of democratic governance.

Where Are We Today?

Industrialized Countries Have a Head Start

Over the last decade, many industrialized countries have taken advantage of their impressive ICT infrastructure to make e-government a core part of their service delivery capacity. In its annual global e-government maturity assessment, consulting firm Accenture ranked Canada number one for the fourth consecutive year. At the heart of Canada’s success are two broad strategies: customer-centricity and a “whole-of-government” approach. Unlike many other countries, Canada’s strategy is built on a solid foundation of facts grounded in ongoing citizen surveys leading to continuous improvements.

One example of Canada’s commitment to e-government is the launch of a new government department called Service Canada, which was built on its two-pronged strategy. (The author was part of a multidisciplinary, multiparty initiative that launched this department.) Foremost, Service Canada places the citizens squarely at the center of service redesign and delivery. Canada’s detailed customer-segmentation strategy, backed by in-depth client surveys, resulted in identifying which government services are used by which segments. This was founded on a core concept of life events—services geared toward each stage of a person’s life. For example, the recent-graduate customer segment is likely to explore student loan repayment, job search, and first-home mortgage options. Service offerings are therefore bundled to meet these
specific needs using a channel strategy suitable for this segment such as utilizing the Internet and mobile phone channels rather than in-person and paper or mail channels.

Secondly, the whole-of-government strategy leads to improved service offerings through integration of various layers of government—leveraging information from multiple departments at national, regional, and local levels. From the end-client’s (i.e., citizen’s) view, this resulted in a one-stop-shopping experience for nearly all of the required interactions with government. Sara would have had a far easier time accessing government services online if she lived in Canada.

Several other industrialized countries are quickly advancing in e-government initiatives as well. In the 2006 edition of the *Compendium of Innovative E-government Practices*, the United Nations highlights leading e-government practices throughout the world. For example, in the United States, the New York Police Department instituted a Real Time Crime Center that provides real-time data on crimes throughout the city with features such as Web-based systems to access 911 calls and arrest records as well as a video system to display information, maps, and video feeds. According to Capgemini, taxpayers in Sweden receive a precalculated version of their tax return, which they can file online using a “soft electronic ID” or can simply confirm by using the Tax Board’s telephone service or their own mobile phones. The UN compendium notes that in Singapore, the Ministry of Trade’s online application system brought together services from thirty different agencies to streamline business license applications not only by offering the services online, but by using the opportunity to conduct an extensive policy review that resulted in cutting nearly 10 percent of the licenses, reducing the processing time by 50 percent, and saving nearly $2 million annually.

**Only a Handful of Developing Countries Have Begun the Journey**

Greater familiarity with ICT and substantial investments in technology and higher education have resulted in e-government advancements in industrialized countries. As a result, access to online services has increased in those countries. Unfortunately, the inverse is the reality for many developing countries. Most impoverished economies cannot afford the required investment in technology, suffer from lower literacy rates and education levels, and have widespread unfamiliarity with ICT tools. Access to online services is therefore sporadic in the developing world. Nonetheless, some forward-thinking developing states have begun to embrace aspects of e-government because they view ICT as a means of leapfrogging in their economic development.

For example, India has made the most significant strides in e-government, leveraging its global capabilities in ICT. The UN compendium identifies several leading e-government practices throughout the developing world. The online citizen payment system in the state of Kerala, called FRIENDS, allows its highly educated and tech-savvy citizens to make a number of payments to the government with a few simple clicks, including utility bills, revenue taxes, license fees, and university fees. India's Dhar District Government introduced a community-owned rural intranet kiosk
initiative, called Gyandoot, to provide the poverty-stricken rural population of half a million people with e-services such as agricultural produce rates, land records, and grievance services. Other developing countries have begun their e-government journeys as well. In Africa, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Finance uses an aid management platform to harmonize the aid from various donor agencies and to facilitate streamlined reporting to meet required donor procedures, rules, and regulations. In Latin America, Argentina and Chile are equipped to enable their citizens to submit their taxes online.

While some countries have taken proactive steps in implementing e-government, many have missed potential opportunities by simply offering the existing services through electronic channels.

What Have We Missed?
While some countries have taken proactive steps in implementing e-government, many have missed potential opportunities by simply offering the existing services through electronic channels. According to a 2001 McKinsey Quarterly article entitled “Putting Citizens On-line, Not In-line” the real value of e-government derives less from simply migrating existing services to online channels than from the ability to force a government department to rethink, reorganize, and streamline its delivery. When a single government department launches a portal that allows simple online transactions, such as renewal of a driver’s license, the potential cost savings are 20 to 25 percent. However, if a few related departments collaborate to provide added services online, such as driver’s license renewals, parking ticket payments, and vehicle emission test scheduling simultaneously from a single portal, the potential cost savings rises to 35 to 45 percent.

Even when elaborate government services exist online, if people do not make use of them, too many critical benefits are left on the table. To increase the return on e-government investments, countries must address the adoption challenges. While there are several reasons for lack of adoption, the most important barrier is usability. Fortunately, it is a barrier that has been weakened on account of substantial research and progress.

How Do We Ensure Adoption of E-Government Services?
Adoption can be increased by simply making e-government initiatives more citizen-centric. In a 2000 report called “World Class User Experience,” Capgemini notes that borrowing from the success of the private sector’s user experience modeling discipline will go a long way to help. In their “The Power of Design Personas” report of 2003, Forrester Research argues that a core component of the discipline is scenario design, which is an approach to creating end-to-end, cross-channel experiences based on an understanding of users, their goals, and their behavior. Design is as much science as
Turning a calculated business model into a rewarding user experience is a creative process, but it is a process that needs a framework in order to consistently produce meaningful results. To encourage innovation but avoid creative excesses, the scenario design answers three basic questions. (1) Who are the users? (2) What are their goals? (3) How can users achieve their goals?

Who are your users? The initial, vital step in knowing the user is to conduct interviews with a cross-section of the population. To guide the design decision, an organization should transform the rich data from customer interviews into crisp representations of target users for each customer segment. These representations, defined as “personas” in the 2000 Forrester Research report “Scenario Design,” help development team members by creating a shared understanding of the real people who will ultimately use the e-government application. In “The Power of Design Personas,” Forrester Research argues that personas should be presented as stories about real people and sound just like a description of individuals with whom an organization works, so that they are easy to both understand and relate to. Success is realized when those associated with the project can talk about Sara, the single mom who was recently laid off and desperately needs the government’s help to find a new job to put food on the table for her two children, rather than “the citizen” in need of unemployment insurance and skills retraining.

What are their goals? To develop tools that anticipate and support customer behavior on demand, determining what a customer wants to accomplish is critical. Using ethnographic tactics derived from anthropology—such as videotaping, on-site interviewing, and silent observation—organizations can uncover the true ends that users try to reach, according to Capgemini’s 2000 report. Furthermore, these specific goals need to be documented from the user’s perspective and prioritized according to the impact on the customer, the number of customers in the segment and the ease/cost of implementation.

How can users achieve their goals? Using the same ethnographic research, instead of noting what the users want to do, organizations should explore how they do it. This requires breaking down complex user behavior into smaller components of activities, tasks, and subtasks. Next, organizations should map the user’s paths (for example, through an online portal to find specific information) by laying out flow diagrams and other documentation that represents the steps users take to reach their goals.

Personas are not immortal. Scenarios and personas need to be continuously updated as customer needs evolve over time and as new technology becomes available. For example, as mobile phones become increasingly commonplace, extending the e-government services from Internet portal platforms to mobile platforms will require an entirely new set of personas.
Where Do We Go From Here?

The next generation of e-government services should be founded on a two-pronged paradigm. The first is to enhance citizen-centricity. Scenario and persona design should be used in realizing this objective. Once government services are restructured from citizens’ perspectives, greater integration of these services should become the foundation of the second component of the new paradigm.

In “The Innovation Sandbox,” an article in the Autumn 2006 issue of Strategy + Business, C.K. Prahalad argues that implementation involves adoption of a “sandbox approach” for breakthrough innovation, including radical restructuring of the entire service design and delivery model—technology choices/availability, distribution, scale, adoption, and workflow. In addition to customer research, the architects must immerse themselves in the lives of the target citizens because many of them, especially in developing nations, may not be able to adequately articulate their needs and preferences. Such a method will also help address the tough challenges in access, awareness, affordability, and availability. Governments must also accept certain constraints as they cannot provide all services for all customer segments. Instead, they should prioritize their service offerings and provide these exceptionally well. Finally, governments must not innovate in isolation. Prahalad writes “Breakthroughs occur when there are clusters of innovations, taking place continuously over time, in small experiments from which organizations learn rapidly, and in an ecosystem involving many collaborators and partners.”

The clusters do not necessarily need to emerge from government actors alone. In many countries, there is an entire spectrum of services from all three sectors—public, private, and civil society—that meet single customer segment needs. Integration of cross-sector services will result in the highest return on investment and greatest customer satisfaction. Using the examples cited above, this new paradigm would require an e-service to provide not only renewal of a driver’s license, paying a parking ticket, and scheduling a vehicle emissions test, but also auto-financing options from private banks and car insurance policies from insurance agencies under the same portal.

The key differences between e-government today and the proposed paradigm are the ability to anticipate citizen needs based on various life events and the ability to proactively reach out to provide the services to meet these needs using the most appropriate delivery channel. The many benefits include vastly increased adoption of e-government, improved citizen satisfaction, and increased public savings. Every idea articulated in this paper is technologically feasible. However, it is only through developing an integrated citizen-centric service model that governments can leverage the unprecedented opportunity that exists today to graduate to the next level of e-government and count people like Sara as satisfied citizens.
Four Steps to Understand, Cure, and Prevent Corruption

BY RONALD MACLEAN-ABAROA AND NGOC ANH TRAN

An organization, business or other, is a system of information, rules for decisions, and incentives; its performance is different from the individual performances of the people in it. An organization can be negligent without any individuals being negligent. To expect an organization to reflect the qualities of the individuals who work for it or to impute to the individuals the qualities one sees in the organization is to commit what logicians call the "fallacy of composition." Fallacy isn’t error, of course, but it can be treacherous.
—Thomas Schelling, 1974

Antonio Maria Costa, head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, recently estimated that in Africa alone the cost of corruption has reached 150 billion dollars per year, equivalent to a quarter of the continent’s GDP. The cost of corruption for the world economy hovers around a trillion dollars. According to the World Bank Institute, a country can quadruple its national income if it effectively controls corruption; business can grow as much as 3 percent faster, and child mortality can fall as much as 75 percent. How to fight corruption remains the key question.

This paper can assist policy makers fighting corruption at the local level. We will provide an analytic framework that emerges from Robert McKillop’s book Corrupt Cities: A Practical Guide to Cure and Prevention, and we will combine insights from Thomas Schelling and other experts in game theory, applying also the economics of crime and the economies of local institutions. Using this framework, we analyze the four key steps to reduce corruption: (1) comprehending corruption, (2) assessing it, (3) implementing reform, and (4) sustaining achievements. Throughout the paper, corruption is generally defined as the misuse by government officials of their governmental powers for illegitimate private gain.

Step 1. Comprehending Corruption

Suppose you are the mayor of a city with poor public services because of widespread corruption. In your city, many factors such as low public salaries, poor transparency, incompetent personnel, etc., allow and encourage corruption. You have recognized that you need to fix the dysfunctional and corrupt municipal system. You decide to analyze the system in three ways to identify the key conditions that encourage corruption and the key interventions that will reduce it.

The Principal-Agent-Client Framework

This framework is commonly used in economics and political science and remains a useful tool for this purpose. It has become relevant in any government or policy situation that involves more than one person delivering and benefiting from the
service. In this framework, the mayor is called the principal. He or she provides public services such as building infrastructure and collecting taxes to the city's residents. The mayor cannot provide these services alone however, so he or she has to hire agents, such as public officials, tax collectors, or procurement officers, to perform these services. City residents and local firms are usually the final consumers of these public services, and they are called the clients. The better the services provided to the clients, the more (political) credit the principal receives.

The principal-agent-client relationship can be described as a three-player “game” in which the principal sets the rules to affect the behavior of the agents and clients, who may have divergent interests. The rules of this game are as follows:

**The principal:**

- Hires and manages the agents.

- Determines the agents’ rewards and penalties, which include salary, performance-based bonuses, achievement acknowledgment, job security, job prestige, legal penalties for corrupt acts, etc.

- Obtains information about the agents’ performance through internal monitoring schemes, external evaluation systems, and information from the public and the media.
• Structures the agent-client relationship. Examples include how much discretion and power the agent has in dealing with the client, and how transparent the relationship should be.

• Affects the agents’ moral cost, which is a psychological tension in the mind of corrupt agents. This cost includes both the worries before corruption is discovered and the shame afterward.

_The agents have two choices:_

• Be honest.

• Be corrupt.

_The clients also have two choices:_

• Be honest.

• Be corrupt.

_The Economics of Crime_

If the agents choose to be honest, they receive a payoff that is the sum of all current and future salaries derived from keeping their job. If they choose to be corrupt, they get a bribe but suffer from a moral cost of being corrupt. Corrupt agents also face the cost of being caught, which is affected by the probability of apprehension and the size of the penalty. This penalty may include the loss of the job, future pay and pension, the criminal penalty, the disgrace to their reputation, and so forth. Note that in societies with higher levels of corruption, feelings of disgrace felt by individuals are reduced.

_Figure 2. The Agents’ Decision Tree_
Corrupt agents receive private benefits but also generate costs for the principal. Their corruption wastes resources, distorts policy, twists incentives toward unproductive activities, or creates political alienation and instability. Going back to the case of our mayor, let’s suppose corrupt water inspectors (agents) take some money from businesses to ignore dumping of chemicals into common supplies. In that case, the mayor (principal) would have to invest in training new inspectors and establish better processes to discipline corrupt inspectors. The mayor also will lose political support if there is an outbreak of bacteria that could be traced back to insufficient enforcement.

The agents choose honest or corrupt behavior by comparing the expected costs and benefits of these choices.

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**When Does Corruption Happen?**

For corruption to exist, the following three conditions must be present.

1. An agent acts on behalf of the principal.
2. It is difficult or costly for the principal to obtain correct information about the agents’ behavior.
3. The agents’ perceived benefits outweigh their costs

The agents choose honest or corrupt behavior by comparing the expected costs and benefits of these choices. The principal can affect the level of the agents’ corruption by changing the parameters. Economic parameters include the value of the agents’ regular pay, the potential size of the bribe, the severity of criminal penalty, and the probability of being caught. The psychological parameters include the moral cost of being corrupt (or moral satisfaction of being honest) and the humiliation or the disgrace of being found corrupt. The principal—here, the mayor—can change the parameter through new policies and new leadership approaches.

Agents may find jobs with attractive salaries in the private sector, so, whenever possible, the principal must make sure that the government pays high salaries, so that agents become afraid of losing their government jobs. Agents often use low salaries as the moral justification for their corrupt behavior. The clients (firms or residents) also face similar benefits and costs from engaging in corrupt behavior; therefore, the principal can also affect their level of corruption. (For a more detailed framework, see Appendix 1, available online at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksr.)
Corruption Formula

When it comes to policy, it can be difficult to identify the most vulnerable areas and select appropriate policy interventions because of the complexity of causal factors. The following formula sums up the key sources of corruption.

\[ C = M + D - A \]

**Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability**

*Monopoly* concerns the first of the three conditions for corruption: the existence of the principal-agent-client relationship. For instance, if our mayor cannot be removed from office, he or she will exact kickbacks from agents in a corrupt fashion. If agents are protected through job protection clauses or intimidation, they will be able to demand more bribes from clients. In particular, the mayor should act to create rules that encourage competition among the agents, to bring balance to the agent-client relationship.

*Discretion* affects the third condition for corruption, which is the potential to benefit from corrupt behavior. Rules and regulations, if drawn up improperly, create opportunities for agents and clients to negotiate for private gains. Rules, regulations, and official duties should be simple and clear. Discretion should be minimized to minimize corruption. For example, in public procurements, government officials should follow a transparent bidding procedure, adhere to a clear grading system, and not be able to arbitrarily select the winner.

Accountability and transparency allow the principal to monitor the agents’ behavior. They increase the agents’ cost of being corrupt and the probability of being caught.

*Accountability* and transparency deal with the second condition of corruption, which is the problem of information asymmetry. Accountability and transparency allow the principal to monitor the agents’ behavior. They increase the agents’ cost of being corrupt and the probability of being caught. Accountability and transparency depend not only on the capacity of internal auditors or the police but also on the involvement of elected bodies, citizens, and media. If our mayor is able to keep track of the performance of his or her tax collectors, and if aggregate data on tax receipts and the use of tax dollars is in the public domain, it will be more difficult for those tax collectors to shirk their responsibilities or to divert the share they collect to private avenues.
Illicit behavior flourishes when the agents have monopoly power over clients, when the agents have great discretion, and when accountability of the agents to the principal is weak. Accordingly, anticorruption efforts should center on reducing monopoly, limiting discretion, and improving accountability of the agents.

**Step 2. Assessing Corruption**

An analytic assessment of a corrupt system is the second essential phase of an anticorruption campaign. In our framework, assessments can be carried out by each of the players: principal, agents, and clients.

**Vulnerability Assessments by the Principal**

In vulnerability assessments, the principal, with assistance from experts and with cooperation from employees, will review the key components of the principal-agent-client relationship for the organization. The principal needs to understand this trilateral relationship structure, the selection of agents, their rewards and penalties, their performance information system, and their moral stand. Monopoly, discretion, and accountability need to be assessed in order to identify areas that are most vulnerable to corruption. Some of the questions that need to be asked in this assessment include: Are appropriate reporting relationships in place among the organizational units? To what extent is the program vague or complex in its aims, heavily involved with third-party beneficiaries, dealing with cash, or in the business of applications, licenses, permits, and certifications? (For a full list of questions that would be addressed in a vulnerability study, see Appendix 2 to this article, available online at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksr/.)

**Participatory Diagnoses by the Agents**

Agents know best why and how deeply they can be corrupt. Somewhat surprisingly, experiences in Bolivia show that agents can become the best source of information on corruption in an organization—as long as the diagnosis focuses on the system and not on specific individuals. They are often able to suggest the most appropriate measures to prevent systematic corruption based on their intimate knowledge of it.

Psychologically, agents often have mixed feelings about corruption: they may loathe it and wish to eradicate it while at the same time participating in it or allowing it to occur. These mixed feelings are essential conditions to allow what might be called participatory diagnosis. The reformer needs to “infiltrate” the agents by developing and utilizing a mix of guilty feeling and sense of collective survival.

Participatory diagnosis is designed to enable agents such as government officials to speak about the corrupt system diagnostically without the fear of reprisal. The purpose of the diagnosis is not to judge but to fix. Indeed, our analytic framework helps agents to recognize that corruption is a problem of corrupt systems and not only of evil people. Its solutions emphasize preventive measures before the fact rather than
punitive measures after the fact. A reforming mayor could, for instance, convene a study group of twenty to twenty-five agents, lead by a senior manager, in which best practices in other regimes and shortcoming and opportunities in the current regime in which they are working could be discussed.

Results from participatory diagnoses in our experience have been remarkable. The principals may propose special projects to follow the outcomes of these diagnoses. (For guidelines about organizing a participatory diagnosis, see Appendix 3 of this paper, available online at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kst/ and Box 7 in Corrupt Cities: a Practical Guide to Cure and Prevention.)

**Service Evaluations by the Clients**

It usually takes two to tango: for an agent to receive a bribe, a client needs to offer it. In corrupt systems, clients usually do not report corruption since they may pay a large personal cost and receive only a small fraction of an uncertain social benefit. However, they are a remarkable source of information not only about the level of corruption, but also about its forms and its consequences on service quality. Service evaluation can be proactively sought in different ways, such as systematic client surveys, focus groups, hotlines, call-in shows, village councils, citizen oversight bodies, and other creative forms.

Service delivery surveys (SDSs), for example, have been implemented in about forty countries since mid-1980s with the assistance from the World Bank and other international organizations. SDSs are community-based, action-oriented research projects that gather and communicate data on public services. They often combine quantitative data from recurring clients’ surveys and qualitative data from in-depth agents’ interviews. Questions in SDSs focus on the use of services, levels of satisfaction, payment of bribes, and suggestions for change. SDSs repeat measurements obtained at the same sites and therefore reduce sampling errors and allow a more accurate impact estimation. SDSs are a particularly useful tool for two reasons. First, they allow clients’ participation to generate relatively unambiguous measurement of the problems. Second, they emphasize the interaction among service users, service providers, and researchers to identify solutions.

**Step 3. Implementing a Sequenced Reform**

Bad and good incentives are usually understood after the corrupt system has been assessed properly. In most reforms, good incentives (such as new regulations, stricter control, more severe penalties) are often proposed to be implemented, and anticorruption efforts stop here—and most of them fail. Our reforming mayor may consult with outsiders and plan out an effort to tackle corruption, but may not execute it with an eye to the long term. To analyze the dynamic challenges of implementing good incentives, we invite you to look at the reform from the game theory point of view.
Multi-Equilibria Game

Game theory is a powerful tool in political and economic sciences to analyze strategic interactions between players such as firms or individuals. In game theory, an equilibrium in a game is a situation where all the players want to maintain their behavior. For example, public officials would be more likely to be corrupt if they believe that everyone around them is corrupt, and they can easily get away with their behavior. This belief creates a *vicious equilibrium* where everyone stays corrupt.

However, if everyone believes that everyone else is not corrupt, he or she would be unlikely to be corrupt because he or she would probably fail or get caught. This belief creates a *virtuous equilibrium* where everyone maintains his or her honest behavior. Professor Thomas Schelling pioneered the analysis of this type of equilibrium in his 1973 article “Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: a Study of Binary Choices with Externalities.”

When it comes to implementing an anticorruption reform, we often need to look beyond the principal-agent-client framework to recognize other players in the game: the police, the judges, the media, the public, and so forth. These elements can be called players in context. There are complex relationships among the principal, agents, clients, and these players. Corruption creates a vicious equilibrium because all players have incentives to behave corruptly. If good incentives are simply announced to replace bad incentives, players would be skeptical about whether the good incentives can be carried out through the whole system. For instance, simply adopting higher salaries may not in itself be enough to win over civil servants into giving up corrupt practices, and businesses and other officials may still see the need to offer bribes and kickbacks. The incentives do not get carried through the whole system, and a cycle of corruption continues.

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**Figure 3. The Principal-Agent-Client Framework with Other Players**

![Diagram](chart.png)
Reform as a Coordinated Move from a Vicious to a Virtuous Equilibrium

To design a successful coordination strategy, the first task is to identify the key players and understand their payoffs under different incentive schemes. The reform agenda can be seen as a strategy in a multiplayer sequential game. The reformer’s goal is to drive the outcome of the game to an equilibrium where there is effective governance and no corruption. It is recommended that the reform be sequenced carefully so that partnerships with important players are built progressively and strategically. Below is a sample list of key players in an anticorruption reform at the municipal level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National government</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City council</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Multilateral and bilateral donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departments of the bureaucracy</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary system</td>
<td>Underworld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic society</td>
<td>Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector, including firms that benefit from and firms that suffer from corruption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Uncertainty has a positive and important role in moving the reform. In a vicious equilibrium, everyone is almost certain that everyone else is corrupt, so it is safe to be corrupt. When a credible reform is introduced, this certainty is eliminated as corrupt people face a positive probability of being trapped and caught—in fact and in their belief system. As this probability increases, it becomes less and less safe to be corrupt. If the perception of this probability is reinforced by further reform efforts, it would lead to a stable virtuous equilibrium where everyone believes that everyone else is honest. The following are some major lessons arising from the practice of implementing anticorruption reforms in the city of La Paz, Bolivia.

*Align with favorable forces.* There is no single correct sequence of a successful reform, but it is important to start with the players who are both ready to ally and important for subsequent phases. Suppose the national government is pushing for market reform or fighting against organized crime. It would be useful to give priority to these elements in the anticorruption agenda to get political and financial support. If the private sector and civic society are active against certain corrupt practices, it may be useful to focus resources there. Some international agencies may be interested in helping with certain areas such as decentralization or financial management. Then anticorruption should be embedded into such reforms.

*Work with bureaucracy not against it.* Instead of attacking a player, the reformer can also do better by beginning with something positive to open an exit for that player. This exit can be a new system that emphasizes information and different incentives. Information systems can be improved by involving clients, auditors, legislators, or judges, and the information can be used to provide evaluations with links to financial and career incentives. A good example for an information system is the service delivery surveys discussed above. As the system becomes more transparent and accountable, corruption will naturally drop. Mayor Ronald MacLean-Abaroa, who successfully dealt with huge redundancy and corruption in the city of La Paz, increased the salary for 60 percent of his staff and at the same time laid off the rest. He also took a participatory approach to win the minds and the hearts of his employees.

*Show that you mean business.* Staying for so long in a corrupt system and witnessing many failed reforms can lead to a cynical mentality, which in turn prevents future reforms. To coordinate a move to a better equilibrium, the reformer needs to break this mentality and convince everyone that they mean business. This can be done in several ways. They can pick low hanging fruit, i.e., solving the most visible and bothersome corruption to gain trust with the general public. They then have to rupture the culture of impunity to gain conviction of people in the system. The most persuasive way to do so is to fry big fish, i.e., find and punish some powerful corrupt officials. The prosecution of the chief superintendent Peter F. Godber in Hong Kong for accepting bribes is a vivid example. “Fight Corruption, Arrest Godber” was a famous slogan during the war on corruption in Hong Kong at that time. It sends a message that no one in the system is immune from penalty. Another important action is to make a splash to gain attention.
Change the systems. Corruption only flourishes under certain conditions. The summary corruption formula, Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability, suggests a way to identify these conditions and eliminate them. By changing the structure underlying monopoly, discretion, and accountability, corruption would inevitably die out. Specific examples include contracting for some public services and focusing the municipal resources on monitoring corruption; adopting alternative regulations/tax schemes that may not be optimal theoretically but which reduce discretion and are easy to understand; and establishing a result-based evaluation system built on peer review, citizens’ feedback, and other objective indicators.

Step 4. Sustaining Achievements
Some successful anticorruption endeavors stop or even turn around when the reform leaders leave office. After moving the system away from a vicious equilibrium, it is important to lock in a virtuous equilibrium. An extended principal-agent-client framework may give some insight into this step. You may have already recognized that the mayor of a city is also a super agent. From a democratic point of view, the ultimate principals are in fact the residents of the city who delegate the right to run the city to the mayor. (The residents might be the clients at the same time if they utilize the services provided by the agents on behalf of the super agent.)

**Figure 5. The Extended Principal-Agent-Client Framework**
Like the agents, the super agent also works with certain incentives and has the choice of becoming corrupt or not. Under the same incentives, the actual choice of different super agents may vary because their moral costs and other intrinsic characteristics might be different.

The rules that provide incentives for the super agent are often called *institutions*. For example, democratic institutions motivate the super agent to act in order to increase his or her chance to be reelected. The far-seeing super agent, having successfully implemented anticorruption reform, also needs to change the institutions so that the future super agents cannot turn around the reforms. Such self-sustaining institutions can be established by empowering the people, i.e., the ultimate principal of the system. This is another reason it is more practical to fight corruption at local level and why decentralization is important.

The institutions that discourage corrupt behavior of the super agents should also follow the Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability formula: reduce monopoly power, limit discretion, and increase accountability. Good democratic institutions serve these objectives well. Competitive political elections eliminate the monopoly power of the politicians in office. Checks and balances from other branches of the government restrict discretion and improve accountability across agencies. Empowerment through a developed civic society and citizen oversight bodies increases the super agent's accountability to the ultimate principal—the people.

Final Notes

The implications of this analytic framework stand in contrast to some common anti-corruption practices. It does not call for more resources, more training, more control, or more regulations by themselves. The framework does not recommend moving the reform forward on too many fronts at the same time. Instead, it suggests an analytic understanding, careful assessment, sensibly sequenced reform, and institution building. It encourages the replacement of government-based relationships with market-based ones to remove the possibility of corrupt practices. It also implies that fighting corruption at the local level can be more effective than at the national level because it is easier to engage the people and to coordinate stakeholders.

In a sense, corruption coexists with bad governance just as a high temperature is often found in a sick person. The aim of the doctor is not to reduce the temperature but to treat the roots of the sickness. Similarly, it is essential not to forget that the goal of the reformer is not to combat corruption per se but to fix the causes of the dysfunctional governance. Once the incentives are right and the system is healthy, there is very little room left for corruption.

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*The content of this article is of sole responsibility of the authors, and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the World Bank.*
Innovation in Learning and Beyond: Introducing a $100 Laptop through Public-Private Partnerships

NAOTO KANEHIRA

Abstract

This article describes an innovative approach to broadly introduce an inexpensive laptop to schoolchildren throughout Macedonia. The One Laptop per Child (OLPC) project seeks to utilize public-private partnerships to improve learning, but also to stimulate information and communications technology (ICT) and other sectors.

S100 Laptop Project

The One Laptop per Child (OLPC) project aims to provide an extremely cheap computer for elementary schoolchildren in developing countries. Designed at the MIT Media Laboratory, the $100 Laptop, so named because of its intended price, can be used as a laptop and e-book, replacing paper textbooks, notebooks, and pencils. The XO, as it is now officially called, has a wind-up crank power generator for regions with limited access to electricity, and Wi-Fi mesh networking functionality that allows computers to “talk” to nearby computers in areas with limited Internet access. In 2006, Brazil, Argentina, Libya, Thailand, and Nigeria agreed to test prototypes before the planned large-scale distribution to millions of schoolchildren. The argument driving the intended low price is that half of the cost of existing laptops is profit and another quarter stems from the excessively high quality of microchip and display, all of which can be eliminated. Much of the ICT community supports the project, including Google, AMD, and Linux.

The laptop stimulates children’s creativity and collaboration, altering classroom dynamics from teacher-centric, unidirectional knowledge transfer to a more inquisitive, interactive process.

Findings from the Maine Learning Technology Initiative (MLTI)—OLPC’s U.S. precursor, started in 2002—suggest that one laptop per child, rather than computer labs with desktops at school, can bring innovation to teaching and learning. The laptop stimulates children’s creativity and collaboration, altering classroom dynamics from teacher-centric, unidirectional knowledge transfer to a more inquisitive, interactive process.

Nicholas Negroponte (the cofounder of the Media Lab, founder of OLPC, and younger brother of Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte) promotes the project by saying, “A nation’s most precious natural resource is its children.” Kofi Annan announced the UN’s strong support for the project at the World Summit on the Information Society in 2005.
Several countries have expressed interest in participating in the OLPC project, but one of the most interesting is Macedonia in southeastern Europe.

**Macedonia Country Background**

Macedonia, since its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, has been facing severe economic and political challenges: UN economic sanctions, economic blockage by Greece (which opposed the use of the name Macedonia for the new state), an inflow of refugees from Kosovo, and armed conflict in a complex multiethnic society. In 1995, the country’s real GDP declined to 78.8 percent of its preindependence level, and has grown only around 2 percent annually in the subsequent decade. Foreign Direct Investment inflows have amounted to a total of only about 1.7 billion dollars since independence. The official unemployment rate is as high as 36 percent. Despite, or perhaps because of these obstacles, Macedonia is uniquely positioned to take advantage of the $100 laptop project.

**ICT Landscape in Macedonia**

Macedonia has the world’s first wireless Internet service covering 99 percent of the population, thanks to a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) project that installed a nationwide wireless infrastructure interconnecting schools and worked with an entrepreneurial telecom operator to offer Wi-Fi services all over the country.

USAID argues that the project has introduced competition among telecom providers, driving down the price of broadband Internet access from $150 to $10 per month and increasing Internet penetration rates. However, according to a recent survey by the Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute (SMMRI), household Internet penetration is still only 13 percent, and only 6 percent for families with monthly income of less than 200 euros (the average monthly income is 160 euros). One of the top reasons cited for not using the Internet at home is that it is too expensive. The wireless infrastructure, despite its high coverage, is still highly underutilized. The information technology sector’s effect on other sectors is also limited; for example, manufacturing productivity, measured by output per employee, has shown no improvement from 2000 to 2004, per the State Statistical Office. Many people in Macedonia are hoping that with much cheaper computers and Internet access there will be an increase in productivity in other sectors, as has been seen in other countries.

**Objectives and Policy Measures**

There is an ongoing discussion taking place at the policy level about the best way to stimulate economic growth, improve primary education, and address the poverty problem. The XO has been floated by many as a possible contributor to all three. The project seeks to leverage a commercially sustainable public-private partnership with a three-tiered approach: (1) educational reform, (2) partnership with Internet service providers (ISPs), and (3) broader industrial policies for the ICT sector.
Educational Reform

Over the past three years, USAID has supported the introduction of computer labs to secondary schools. The proposed $100 laptop project would expand the scope of educational reform to primary schools and introduce one laptop per child, potentially bringing further pedagogical improvements. The interface accompanying the XO, called Sugar, is a fundamental departure from the traditional window-and-folder-based model because it is based around a student-centered "neighborhood" of activities and other students. Rather than folders, a "journal" is created automatically as the student works, allowing the student to return to previous work. This model resembles more closely the way students learn and interact. But the flexible framework should allow for a broader-based learning model than one in which a group of students simply listen to a single teacher.

Partnership with Internet Service Providers (ISPs)

The conventional approach to introducing the XO (although no country has implemented it yet) is that the government would purchase the laptops and distribute them for free. This could be a heavy burden for governments, considering the large number of children to cover, and the consequent need to replace the laptops every three to five years. An alternative approach is to work with the private sector.

One proposed investment scheme is through an ISP that could underwrite the cost of the laptops, distribute them for free, and charge cheap connection fees. Assuming a high penetration rate, a $3–5 monthly charge could recoup the price of a laptop in two to three years. This price is still significantly lower than the current lowest market price for monthly internet service in Macedonia ($10), but, granted the current under-utilization of the existing infrastructure, the marginal costs for the ISPs of adding additional users would be minimal. Preliminary financial analysis by an UN-sponsored study group suggests a strong, positive return for an ISP participating in such a plan.

Broader Industrial Policies

Large-scale distribution of laptops could reshape the ICT industry in Macedonia. In 2004, the number of computers sold domestically was just around thirty thousand. Once laptops are distributed to each of Macedonia’s 219,000 school children (thus reaching around 30 percent of households) and family members start to have access to the Internet through the child’s laptop, the user base for Internet services would immediately double or triple. This could stimulate local entrepreneurial activities and foreign investment, accelerating growth in the ICT sector (ISP, software, maintenance, contents, e-commerce, business-to-business services) if a more favorable business environment is successfully established through necessary policy measures in areas such as tax structures, company registration processes, and competition policy.
Global Implementation

Nearly a dozen countries, including Brazil, Thailand, Nigeria, and Uruguay, have committed to buying the XO laptops. However, several countries, including Brazil, are also exploring more traditional PCs for their students, such as Intel's Classmate PC.

In Macedonia, things are moving forward. In 2006, a plan for implementation was discussed with government officials including the deputy prime minister and the minister of education and science. A taskforce was formed between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the government and is now involving various stakeholders to help the government assess the way forward. UNDP offices in neighboring countries, including Bosnia, Moldova, and Georgia, have shown interests in taking a similar approach. The UNDP regional office in Bratislava is starting coordination for a regional initiative.

Conclusion

The XO has the potential to revolutionize approaches to learning, and stimulate growth in ICT and other sectors. Utilizing a public-private partnership approach can help address the poverty issue while helping to stimulate a stagnant economy in the long run.

However, for the OLPC project to achieve its long-term goal of dramatically increasing access to computers globally, it will require organizational and institutional innovation. Governments, municipalities, schools, and teachers will need to adapt to a significant change in assumptions and behaviors. For the private sector, serving the poorest and staying profitable requires a creative business model. Furthermore, it is eventually up to children and teachers to determine whether the new technology can be well utilized and can catalyze a new form of learning. Educators and policy makers around the world are eagerly awaiting the results.

A “dream team” assisted the project: Clea Kaske (John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (KSG)), Ken Kita (MIT Sloan School of Management), Yosuke Kotsuji (Harvard Business School), Tanya Nahman and Kamille Woodbury (Harvard Graduate School of Education), Kazuhiro Numasawa (Fletcher School, Tufts University), advised by Penelope Gjurovicha (KSG), Professor Calestous Juma (KSG), and Professor Alex “Sandy” Pentland (MIT Sloan School of Management).
Stripping Off the Straightjacket: How Complexity Theory Provides a Whole New Approach to Making Policy

Fritjof Capra’s *The Hidden Connections* (Harper Collins 2002)  
Mark Buchanan’s *Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen*  
(Three Rivers Press 2002)

REVIEWS BY ROSHAN PAUL

How is it that scientists have spent millions of hours and billions of dollars trying to figure out when earthquakes occur without making much progress? How could an accidental wrong turn made by a chauffeur in a busy Sarajevo street one morning in June 1914 have led to the greatest war the world had ever seen? Why is it that managers of the world’s largest organizations feel that no matter how hard they work, things are out of their control? Can we design a world in which the two great forces of global capitalism and ecological sustainability veer off their collision course and find a space to coexist productively?

In the last three decades, the quest to answer these big, baffling questions has sent researchers scurrying to all known corners of the intellectual universe. And, perhaps surprisingly, the discipline that has been coming up with the most compelling answers is physics. Yet physics only came to grips with these new areas of inquiry when it began incorporating insights from other fields. In the process, a new field of study—complexity, complex systems, or, more technically, nonlinear dynamics—came into being.

In a nutshell, what complexity does is to use metaphors and mathematical models to examine the way in which the many constituent parts of a living system network with each other to create new types of relationships and processes that often turn out to be just as important as the (more easily tangible) material parts of the system that get most of our attention.

Fortunately, for those of us less inclined towards scientific modeling, several physicists have taken on the unenviable task of simplifying complexity, so to speak. And they all seem to have followed the modern nonfiction writer’s *modus operandi* whereby you take an idea, explain it in a few chapters, and then write a handful of case studies to flesh out the concept further. The most eloquent of these physicists-turned-writers is Austrian Fritjof Capra, the author of the popular 1975 work *The Tao of Physics*, which explored parallels between modern physics and ancient religious teachings of Asia. Almost thirty years later, Capra capped more than a decade of research into living systems and network theory by publishing *The Hidden*
Connections, in which he explains how every single system on the planet—from the smallest amoeba to the largest international organization—is essentially comprised of a series of networks through which information flows from one side of the network to the other, and every now and then jumps from network to network. Life, in one of Capra’s many evocative turns of phrase, “constantly reaches out into novelty.”

Extending this idea though the book, Capra first describes how insights from the “systems view of life” have been revolutionizing the fields of biology, genetics, cognitive psychology, and sociology. For instance, the insight that the workings of the brain can be better studied in the context of the brain’s relationship with other brains and bodies than as a single unit of analysis has changed the way in which cognitive psychologists understand and study human consciousness. Confident of our grasp of the scientific material, Capra then shows how these insights can be applied to some of the greatest problems of the twenty-first century: from organizational management to biotechnology, and from global capitalism to the issue that appears to most concern him—the design of ecologically sustainable communities. In these applications of complexity, we see the startling similarities between metabolic networks in biological systems and communication networks in social systems, or how flows of energy and matter closely resemble flows of information and ideas. For instance, compare the astonishing speed at which drug resistance spreads across bacterial communities with the efficiency with which peace activists in late 2002 mobilized hundreds of thousands of people in cities in every continent to protest the impending invasion of Iraq. Microbiology, according to Capra, “teaches us the sobering lesson that technologies [such as] a global communications network . . . , often considered to be advanced achievements of our modern civilization, have been used by the planetary web of bacteria for billions of years.”

With this understanding that all life is organized as networks comes the discovery that networks of all kinds—molecules, people, even ideas—tend to organize themselves along remarkably similar lines. But one of the downsides of this way of organizing is that these systems are susceptible to the occasional small shock that unexpectedly triggers a cataclysmic reaction—the carelessly tossed match that ignites a massive forest fire or the ever-so-slight slip of the earth’s crust that triggers a devastating earthquake, and so on. Complexity scientists believe that this pattern occurs because of the tendency of living systems to self-organize into a “critical state,” which is a state where systems are at their most efficient but nevertheless contain “riddling lines of instability” that make them vulnerable to short periods of total collapse. (Incidentally, if this seems similar to the concept of chaos theory, that’s because it is—chaos theory was one of the intellectual forefathers of complexity theory, which is now taking the insights from chaos theory into new previously uncharted areas of exploration.)

To better understand the critical state, Mark Buchanan traces the evolution and intellectual history of the “power law,” another concept central to the understanding of complexity. Buchanan’s Ubiquity takes earthquake science as its central case study and
charts the painful failure of earthquake scientists to predict when an earthquake will occur and, more importantly, since earthquakes occur all the time, how bad an earthquake is going to be. Eventually, earthquake science consoled itself by incorporating the power law into its worldview.

Social scientists and statistics students come across the normal distribution, illustrated graphically by a bell curve, in their daily work. The normal distribution reflects a natural tendency for any the quantity of any individual event to cluster around the average for that event—results that are farther from the average are less likely to occur. The heights of people, among other natural phenomena, are normally distributed. But what the power law tells us is that for a surprisingly large number of phenomena, this distribution does not hold. However, these phenomena do conform to another type of statistical distribution, which can be simply described as follows: as the scale of the event rises, the probability of its occurrence decreases exponentially. After examining thousands of such distributions, scientists concluded that each phenomenon conforming to a power law obeys its own individual ratio of size to occurrence. Hence, the power law of earthquakes is different from the power law of stock market crashes—in the case of earthquakes, every doubling of magnitude in earthquakes is accompanied by a frequency decrease of a factor of four.

Although complexity and the systems approach initially come from physics, what they emphasize most is the importance of not thinking within disciplines but instead ... across disciplines.

Some of these power law distributions can be as mundane as the size of fragments from a shattered frozen potato. But others—and this is why understanding the power law is so important for policy makers— include the distributions of events as dramatic as the magnitude of earthquakes, the area burnt in a forest fire, the level of stock market crashes, the mass extinctions of species, and the number of deaths in wars. Unfortunately, what the power law also indicates is that predicting the scale of one of these catastrophes is nearly impossible because, as Buchanan writes, "an earthquake when it begins doesn’t itself know how big it is going to be. And if the earthquake doesn’t know, we aren’t likely to know either.” The same phrase can just as easily be applied to any of these other catastrophes.

Although complexity and the systems approach initially come from physics, what they emphasize most is the importance of not thinking within disciplines but instead paying attention to relationships, context, patterns, and processes across disciplines. What makes this difficult, particularly in Western societies, is our imprisonment by the Cartesian division between mind and matter. Buchanan quotes Isaiah Berlin’s comment that the history of thought has been “a changing pattern of great liberating ideas that eventually turn into suffocating straitjackets.” In the seventeenth century, when
René Descartes muttered, "Cogito ergo sum" ("I think therefore I am"), he divided nature into two separate realms—mind and matter—which were meant to be studied separately and as different units of analysis, rather than as two realms that can best be understood in the context of each other. Thus, while Descartes's famous statement jumpstarted modern philosophy, it also created a straitjacketed framework for analysis that Capra believes has haunted and suffocated Western science and culture for more than three hundred years. For a simple example of this straitjacketed framework, just look at the way universities are structured by academic discipline and how each discipline vigorously resists any movement toward interdisciplinary scholarship.

By instructing us to look across disciplines, complexity theory is in effect urging us to abandon the Cartesian way that has served us so decisively for so long. No wonder then that its journey to the mainstream has been excruciatingly slow and that despite three decades of increasing focus in this area, it still remains off the radar screen of most policy makers. Capra finishes The Hidden Connections by insisting that the crucial issue is not further research into complexity but politics. And thus, the great challenge of the twenty-first century will be to change not just the intellectual frameworks that govern policy making but also some of policy making's underlying value systems, in order to reflect the lessons that we are learning from complexity and the systems view of life.

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Man out of Time: Gordon Brown

Robert Peston’s *Brown’s Britain* (Short Books 2005)

REVIEWED BY JOHN McDERMOTT

Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 27 June 2007. A fascinating character study, Brown is one of the true intellectual forces in contemporary politics, yet little is known of Brown outside of Britain. Committed to international development, to the Anglo-American “special relationship,” and to ensuring “British values” in an increasingly interconnected world, Brown will invariably be a key player in the international arena over the next few years.

“It is never difficult to distinguish between a Scotsman with a grievance and a ray of sunshine,” observed P.G. Wodehouse. Gordon Brown, the former chancellor of the exchequer (the second most important position in British politics, with responsibility for economic and fiscal policy) and new Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, is not known for his chipper demeanor. An intensely private man, Brown nevertheless attracts an array of epithets from critics (dour, brooding, uncompromising) and allies (intellectual, loyal, farsighted) alike. Ever since he was allegedly described by Blair’s former director of communications Alistair Campbell as having “psychological flaws,” the study of his character has meant more than a mere portrayal of tortured introspection. Rather, it has become central to his desire to retain the premiership.

No less important is Brown’s record as chancellor. At first glance his prudent stewardship of the economy has few echoes of that other famous Scotsman from Brown’s small hometown of Kirkcaldy, Adam Smith. Yet Brown has attempted to balance “the invisible hand” famously described in *The Wealth of Nations* with the lesser known, but in Smith’s opinion, equally important “helping hand” discussed in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. His tenure can be seen as a decade-long effort to encourage enterprise while ensuring social justice. Granting the Bank of England the power to set interest rates and cutting capital gains tax was coupled with radical welfare-to-work schemes and the introduction of a minimum wage. Self-imposed constraints,
Brown argues, provided stability to an economy hitherto associated with oscillating periods of boom and bust.

But Brown has been more than just a competent economic manager. He used the power of the purse to garner unprecedented control of domestic policy. As the legend goes, this was Brown’s reward from the deal made with Blair in 1994 where he agreed not to stand against his erstwhile junior colleague for the Labour leadership in exchange for broad powers in economic and social policy. This ostensible pact has provided fertile fodder for the speculative British press. Regardless of its veracity, Brown ensured his influence stretched far beyond the confines of the treasury. Inevitably, this extended writ, combined with an infamous lack of tact, raised the ire of cabinet colleagues. Given this animosity, it remains in doubt whether Brown, as prime minister, can inspire the same loyalty as the gregarious Blair.

According to Tom Bower, a chancellor “oblivious to everything other than his own truths” is unlikely to cut an emollient presence. His polemical biography ruthlessly examines the psychology and political machinations of the would-be prime minister. Brown’s childhood under the aegis of his father, a Presbyterian minister, is interpreted as the incipience of a life led with religious angst. To understand an upbringing as the “son of the manse” is to understand Brown. Equipped with “an osmotic understanding of the Bible” and surrounded by the poverty widespread in postwar Scotland, Brown developed compassion for those around him. Scottish Presbyterianism with its avowal of egalitarianism and hard work laid the foundations for his political philosophy.

Presbyterianism dovetailed with socialism defined Brown’s years as a precocious student at Edinburgh University. His doctoral thesis on the Scottish leader of the Independent Labour Party (a radical scion of the more popular movement), James Maxton, offered a historical compliment to his nascent activism. Maxton was a quixotic socialist, who possessed all the necessary qualities except one: the ability to achieve real power. Bower argues Brown would thereafter seek to learn from his subject’s mistakes. Unfortunately for Brown, Bower contests, his early reluctance to fight for a seat in Parliament indicated a “lack of courage” that would continue throughout his career. This theme would recur when deciding not to challenge Blair for the leadership in 1994 and throughout his period as the “slighted” chancellor. Unsurprisingly, Bower supports Blair’s chief of staff, Jonathan Powell, in his description of Brown as a character in “a Shakespearean tragedy”: a Hamlet perennially resisting the temptation to be Macbeth.

All of this is great fun, of course, and Bower’s engaging romp echoes a significant minority of the public’s perception of Brown. However, the author’s bitterness and propensity for conjecture undermine his arguments. To claim that Brown lacks courage is unjustified. In his first year at university he lost sight in one eye and had to spend six months in a darkened hospital room to stave off blindness in the other. Nevertheless he returned to excel academically and be elected rector (a position of
great symbolic importance at Scottish universities). When his first child, Jennifer, died within a week of being born, he spent the next weeks comforting a mourning family while continuing his duties as chancellor. What may deprive him of greatness, though, is not courage but audacity. When he has displayed the latter, for instance with the Bank of England, it has been an acclaimed success. To stave off the resurgent Conservative Party he will need to juggle his famed prudence with acts of boldness.

Boldness is not something Bower lacks. Bizarre choices of historical analogy (did Labour’s accession to power really “resemble the storming of the Winter Palace in 1917 by the Leninists”?) and unsourced quotations give the impression of a biography written with an argument decided a priori. Compounding the problem is the number of factual errors (there were two general elections in 1974, and the Scottish Nationalists won eleven seats in the second, rather than the eight Bower claims). Brown is no angel, but neither is he the monster portrayed in this book.

A more nuanced profile is provided by Robert Peston in Brown’s Britain. Peston eschews psychoanalysis for an in-depth look at Brown’s political philosophy and policy record. Brown disappointed many Labour Party members by promising to keep within Conservative spending plans for the first two years after winning power in 1997. Antecedent Labour chancellors had cost the party dearly by economic mismanagement of which, however unfairly, the Conservatives never failed to remind the electorate. He realized Labour’s success depended on being perceived to be trustworthy stewards of the economy. Therefore prudence was to be “atonement for Labour’s sins.” Competence would breed confidence.

The primacy of stability also reflected Brown’s personal and political ideology. Checks and balances were created by Brown for Brown. The establishment of the Monetary Policy Committee within the independent Bank of England to set interest rates, a quintet of tests to assess entry into the Eurozone (the group of countries using the euro currency), and an economic “golden rule” to balance borrowing and spending allowed the chancellor to plan strategically for the long term. Constraints today meant freedom tomorrow. Specifically, it created the conditions for Brown to make record levels of investment in public services and to create a “progressive universalist” merger of the tax and benefit systems in the second term. Clintonian welfare reforms based on tax credits and employment incentives were designed to encourage an “enterprise society” with a “helping hand” from government. Peston adroitly surveys the results of Brown’s “quiet revolution”: no negative growth in any quarter since 1997; unemployment down to less than one million; nearly a million children lifted out of poverty; and inflation below the Eurozone average.

Regrettfully, scant recognition is given to the contribution of the former prime minister. In Great Britain PLC, Blair was chairman to Brown the CEO. Brown was the pragmatic socialist working with the markets while Blair was the media operator, “the classless breakfast television presenter.” There is a grain of truth in this but Blair, as
Andrew Ranwmsley and others have shown, is hard done by when portrayed as simply the style to Brown’s substance. Peston also glosses over some of the shortcomings of Brown’s reforms. Gross management failings concerning the introduction of the tax credit system has mitigated its effects. Despite contemporaneous warnings from his independent adviser Sir Derek Wanless, Brown’s insistence on a plethora of targets in the National Health Service has undermined investment. Peston is right in praising the former chancellor for managing the money, but he fails to investigate fully what happens when it is spent. He leaves unexamined the possibility that Brown’s dominance of domestic policy and emasculation of cabinet colleagues has left the government bereft of a plurality of capability.

Despite these shortcomings Peston provides sufficient evidence to demonstrate Brown’s genuine intellectual prowess and real ideological distance from Blair. Whereas Blair’s adoption of the Third Way is based on a crude triangulation, Brown’s cooption of elements of market philosophy to promote egalitarianism is rooted in intellectual reflection. Brown’s political philosophy comes closer to that of John Rawls than any other current politician. His “progressive universalism,” as Peston describes it, mirrors Rawls’ conception of justice. Rawls argued for the primacy of equal basic liberties and added that social and economic inequalities, when they do exist, should be arranged such that the greatest advantages accrue to the least well-off. Brown repeatedly places emphasis on the “equality of liberty” (i.e., fair quality of opportunity) and the acceptance of markets so long as they help to lift the most disadvantaged out of poverty. Unlike more doctrinaire socialists, Brown is cognizant of the trade-offs inherent in coupling equity with economic growth. It remains to be seen though whether as prime minister, Brown will be able to promote this Rawlsian framework without losing essential votes among the English middle classes.

Ironically, when speculating as to what Brown’s Britain will look like, insufficient attention is paid to his own thoughts as detailed in his speeches, collected in Moving Britain Forward. Upon publication in the United Kingdom, commentators scoffed at his avowals of British values as no more than the political tactics of a Scotsman needing to win over the English middle class. In part, this is true. But political expediency is coupled with a genuine scholarliness and unique desire to reflect on what it means to be British in the twenty-first century. It reveals the best of Brown: a politician willing to think both historically and long term in order to create a rigorous intellectual and policy framework.

What, for Brown, is Britishness? In a nutshell, it is to be part of “a society in which there is liberty for all, responsibility by all and fairness to all.” Throughout British history, liberty—as established at Runnymede in 1215, in the Bill of Rights in 1689 and in the Reform Bills of the nineteenth century—has been entwined with a sense of duty and fair play. According to Brown this conception of positive liberty is, in contrast with America, “a far more generous, expansive view of liberty . . . focused not just on the abuse of power but on the empowerment of the individual.” It gave rise
to what Orwell termed the "decency" of the British people, and what Burke before him noted were "the little platoons" of civic organizations that were widespread in Britain long before de Tocqueville boarded a boat to America. Yet the decline of British power brought a lack of confidence in these values. Instead Britons were forced to choose between the twin evils of socialist central planning and unsympathetic free market Thatcherism. Brown calls for a reassertion of liberty, responsibility, and fairness in order for Britain to thrive in an increasingly globalized twenty-first century.

Another British trait is, of course, cynicism, and Brown's remarks in this sense at least have received a patriotic hearing. This would be understandable if they came from a politician with less erudition. Brown, a trained historian (who actually reads the numerous books he cites in speeches), deserves a fairer hearing. His ability to couple the nebulous with the practical grants him this. Brown implies that, as prime minister, he will reform central and local government to instill a renewed sense of citizenship, give community organizations the resources to flourish, and encourage the enterprise of the market in the National Health Service but never at the risk of two-tiered provision.

Brown depicts a country struggling to match its history and values to a rapidly changing world. Much the same can be said about the man himself. The unifying theme of these books is the sense that Brown is a politician from a bygone era, in which personality politics, if not irrelevant, came second to ideas. Egotistical, tempestuous, and—yes—dour politicians are nothing new. But Machiavelli's maxim that it is "much safer to be feared than loved" no longer holds. If the upshot of this is a barrier to politicians willing to tackle the big issues with intellectual power and a long-term strategy, then that will be a tragedy of Shakespearean proportions. Fortunately, the man out of time is now the man in charge.
About the Contributors

James Ahlers is a joint J.D./M.P.P. degree candidate at Harvard Law School and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Ahlers, who holds a bachelor of arts in journalism, most recently spent a summer with Brown and Bain Law Firm as a summer associate, prior to which he served as the communications director for the state of Arizona’s Tourism Department. Ahlers has also served as press secretary for the governor of Arizona.

Karim Bardeesy is a first-year master in public policy candidate from Bathurst, New Brunswick, Canada. Prior to coming to the Kennedy School, Bardeesy was a political staffer in the province of Ontario, serving as a political assistant and campaign staffer for members of Provincial Parliament and the minister of finance. Bardeesy holds a B.A. (Honors) in political science from McGill University in Montreal. In the summer of 2007 he will be doing a journalism fellowship through the News21 organization, reporting in New York City on the religions of India and their adherents’ adaptation to life in North America.

Benjamin Chan is a first-year master in public policy candidate from Quezon City, Philippines, and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Prior to joining the Kennedy School, he worked at the Investment Climate Capacity Enhancement Programme at the World Bank Institute in Washington, D.C. His academic interests are in economic development, particularly skilled-worker migration and private sector development. Chan graduated from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in 2005 with a concentration in international politics and justice and peace studies. In his free time, he enjoys illustration and painting, working primarily in pencils and watercolors. He is also a freelance graphic designer and tattoo artist.

Peter Dyrud is a first-year master in public policy candidate from Brooklyn Park, MN. He is specializing in international security and political economy, with additional concentrations in leadership and negotiation. A 2006 U.S. Air Force Academy graduate, he oversaw the honor education program there and is deeply committed to character development. He double majored in physics and mathematics and will serve as an Air Force pilot or combat rescue officer. Dyrud and his wife, Felisa, host a house church in their Cambridge home. He also likes to play and write music for piano and drums, run marathons, and write inspirational material.

Jeff Ginsburg is a master in public policy candidate. Immediately prior, Ginsburg served as director of development and operations at East Harlem Tutorial Program, a free K–12 after-school education program. In 2003, Ginsburg founded Management Support Technologies, Inc., (MSTi) to create a network of hands-on, adult, interactive science education, after-school opportunities for youth across Massachusetts. He currently serves on the board of directors of the Passim Center in Cambridge, as well as the advisory board to United Way’s Math, Science and Technology Initiative. Ginsburg holds a B.A. in political science from Trinity College and grew up in Natick, MA.
Pial Islam is a Mason fellow at the Kennedy School. He has ten years professional work experience in public, private, and nonprofit sectors in Asia, North America, and Europe. His work has focused on management consultant, providing strategic advice to senior government and corporate officials in the areas of policy analysis, growth strategies, performance management, accountability frameworks, social entrepreneurship, international development, and technology-enabled change management. Most recently, his advisory role encompassed helping launch a new social services department for the government of Canada and developing its customer-centric service delivery model. Islam holds an M.B.A. and a professional certification in management consulting.

Sam Jeffers, who designed this year’s cover, hails from London and is a first-year master in public policy candidate. He was a drummer and Web developer before leaving it all behind for the Kennedy School. He holds a degree in international relations from the London School of Economics and lives with his partner, Natalie, in Cambridge.

Naoto Kancheira is a joint-degree student at the Kennedy School and MIT Sloan School of Management, and a sponsor’s adviser/researcher at MIT Media Lab, with five years of experience at McKinsey Consulting. His interest is in innovation and organizational learning in the private and public sectors.

Naseem Khuri is a first-year master in public policy candidate from outside Boston. Before the Kennedy School, he was an associate at CMPPartners. At the same time, he founded the American Diaspora Alliance for Israeli Palestinian Peace, a forum for Arab and Jewish Americans to advocate among their broader constituencies for a just and lasting settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. Eventually, he would like to apply skills of negotiation, mediation, and facilitation to public sector organizations. He came to the Kennedy School because he couldn’t cut it as a musician in New York City, but he is still trying in Boston.

Ben Lambert is currently pursuing an M.P.P/M.B.A. from the Kennedy School and Harvard Business School. His past jobs include being a Peace Corps volunteer in Mali. Lambert has a bachelor’s in philosophy from New York University and is interested in private sector development in Africa. He is a resident of Takoma Park, MD.

Fernando Martínez Luján is a master in public policy candidate at the Kennedy School and 1998 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. He is an active-duty Special Forces officer with the rank of major and commanded an A-team in Iraq last year. He has also served in Afghanistan and South America in a variety of counterinsurgency or counterterrorism roles. Following his time at Harvard, he will teach in the social science department at West Point.

Ronald MacLean-Abaroa is a Bolivian politician and leading international expert in anti-corruption programs. MacLean-Abaroa was the first democratically elected mayor of La Paz, Bolivia, and was reelected four times between 1985 and 1991 to this office. He has
held five national cabinet positions, including planning, foreign affairs, information and communications, finance, and development, under three different Bolivian presidents. He is the author of several articles and books, notably *Corrupt Cities: A Practical Guide to Cure and Prevention*, coauthored with Robert Klitgaard and Linsey Parris, that has been published in five languages.

**Naveed Malik** is a first-year master in public policy candidate from Chicago. Prior to coming to the Kennedy School, Malik conducted corporate policy analysis and auditing for a private bank-holding firm and volunteered with Humanity First on education and disaster relief projects. His academic and professional interests include human rights, journalism, and child-centered development work. In his free time, Malik plays football and performs volunteer work through the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community. He loves all things Chicago, including his grandmother, mom Naseera, sister Mishal, and the Bears. This summer, Malik will be developing child protection policies in Haiti with the UN Children's Fund.

**John McDermott** is a first-year master in public policy candidate. A graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science, McDermott is presently a United Kingdom Fulbright Scholar. His academic interests include poverty, education, electoral politics, and political philosophy. A keen supporter of Heart of Midlothian Football Club, McDermott is fascinated by twentieth century American literature, British cinema, and the Chicago Bears. McDermott is a resident of Edinburgh, United Kingdom.

**Roshan Paul** is a first-year master in public policy candidate from Bangalore, India. Prior to coming to the Kennedy School, he helped Ashoka Innovators for the Public launch a youth social entrepreneurship program in India, trying to catalyze a movement whereby young people in India proactively start making social change. Going forward he wants to help social entrepreneurs figure out how to prevent violent conflict in areas of tension. When not reading, writing, watching cricket, or cooking, he is busy dreaming about his next trip to a totally different part of the world.

**Sarah Rasmussen** is a second-year master in public policy candidate. Prior to her time at the Kennedy School, she was a grassroots organizer with Greenpeace, America Coming Together, and Clean Water Action. She graduated from Macalester College, where she founded a campus pro-choice organization. Her academic interests include voting behavior and civic engagement. Rasmussen enjoys travel, live music, and aimless bookstore browsing.

**Jessica Reitz** is a master in public policy candidate. Prior to coming to the Kennedy School, Reitz was the development manager at USAAction, a national progressive organization, and before that she was the director of development and outreach at Free the Slaves in Washington, D.C. Her academic interests include international security policy, human rights, and conflict resolution and negotiations. She is interested in a career in human rights policy and international conflict resolution. In her free time, Reitz is a rower, backpacker, and marathon runner. She will be spending her summer in Khartoum, Sudan, working on the Darfur peace process.
Nik Steinberg is a first-year master in public policy candidate. After graduating from Dartmouth in 2002, Steinberg headed to Chiapas, Mexico, where he helped displaced communities set up their own schools. He then assisted asylum seekers in the Balkan states and fought caste discrimination in South India. Steinberg hopes his studies will allow him to bring together his passion for social justice with his love of writing. Steinberg will spend the summer as a News21 fellow with the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, where he will be reporting on the theme of “God, sex, and family.”

Tai Sunnanon is a first-year master in public policy candidate. Passionate about education, Sunnanon created the California W.I.S.H. (Working in Supporting the Homeless) Foundation in 1996. He received a bachelor in political science (highest honors) and then became a community development specialist in the Republic of Palau with the U.S. Peace Corps from 2002 to 2004. Today, he has focused his studies on social enterprise in the education sector. He is the first recipient of the Julius E. Babbitt Fellowship at the Kennedy School. Sunnanon enjoys playing his guitar, scuba diving, or learning a new language (now at six).

Rishma Thomas is a first-year master in public policy candidate. Originally from Vancouver, Canada, she graduated from Princeton University in 2005 with a degree in Near Eastern Studies. She has traveled much of the world but has a particular affinity for Central Asia. She has worked extensively in Afghanistan, in both the nonprofit world and in President Karzai’s office. Before coming to Harvard, she worked as the regional coordinator for a disaster management organization in the remote mountainous regions of Tajikistan. Besides all adventures Central Asian, she also loves skiing, swimming, and talking about early Sufi theology to whoever will listen.

Ngoc Anh Tran is a Ph.D. candidate in public policy and a fellow at the Center for International Development. He studies both the theoretical and policy dimensions of governance and its impact on developing countries. Tran has previously been awarded the UNDP Human Development Fellowship for a Ph.D. prospectus that aims to contribute to the human development approach. Before coming to Harvard, he studied at the Russian Economic Academy and at the University of New South Wales, and worked for the prime minister’s Advisory Council in Vietnam.

Marc Vogl is a mid-career master in public administration candidate. After earning a B.A. from Brown, Vogl worked as a reporter in East Africa and flower deliveryman in Washington, D.C. He then spent ten years in San Francisco performing with, and serving as executive director for, the comedy group/theater company Killing My Lobster and the annual Hi/Lo Film Festival. In 2005 Vogl served was elected by the Board of Supervisors to serve on the San Francisco Arts Task Force, which reviewed the city’s arts policies and successfully lobbied for greater public support for the arts. Vogl believes that art is what makes life worth living.